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4 
3 

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8 

5 
9 

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» 


NEW    ESSAYS 


CONCERNING 


HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING 


S  5  1  C      12 


■:^^y^ 


NEW  ESSAYS 


CONCERNING 


HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING 

BY 

GOTTFRIED   WILHELM   LEIBNITZ 

TOGETHER    WITH 

AN    APPENDIX 

CONSISTING  OF  SOME  OF  HIS  SHORTER  PIECES 

/  ^Sd  I 

TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  ORIGINAL  LATIN,  FRENCH 
AND  GERMAN,   WITH  NOTES 


ALFRED   GIDEON   LANGLEY 
A.M.  (Brown) 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Ltd. 
1896 

All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1S96, 
By   the   MACMILLAN   COMPANY. 


NortoooO  ^rfss 

J.  S.  Cushing  &  Co.  -  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


3 


STo  mg  IKotfjcr  anb  Sister 

SOMETIME    GONE   WHERE    WE    SHALL    KNOW   AS   WE   ARE   KNOWN 

^ntJ  to  mg  Jatf)£r 

STILL   WHERE   WE    SEE   AS   IN   A    MIRROR    OBSCURELY 

IN  DEEPEST  LOVE  AND  GRATITUDE 

I  DEDICATE  THIS  BOOK 


CONTENTS 


Translator's  Preface xi 

Gerhardt's    Introduction   to   his   edition    of    Leibnitz's    Nouveaux 

Essais 3 

LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

On  Locke's  Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  1G96     ....       13 
Specimen  of  Thoughts  upon  the  First  Boole  of  the  Essay  on  Human 

Understanding,  1698 20 

Specimen  of  Thoughts  upon  the  Second  Book,  1698   ....      23 
On  Coste's  Translation  of  Locke's  Essay  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing ;   from  the  "  Monatliche  Auszug,"  September,   1700, 

pp.  611-636 26 

Addition  thereto.     "  Monatliche  Auszug,"  1701,  pp.  73-75       .        .       37 

New  Essays  on  The  Understanding,  by  the  Author  of  the 
System  of  Pre-established  Harmony 

Preface 41 

Bnnl-  I.  — ■  Innate  Ideas 

CIIAPTRR 

I.    Are  there  innate  principles  in  the  mind  of  man  ?   .        .         .64 
II.    No  innate  practical  principles  .......      85 

III.     Otlier  considerations  toucliing  innate  principles,  both  spec- 
ulative and  practical 100 

lindk  I  J.  —  Ii/cas. 

the  way 


I.     Which  treats  of  ideas  in  general,  and  examines  by 
whether  the  mind  of  man  <ilways  thinks    , 
II.     Simple  ideas 

III.  Of  ideas  which  come  to  us  by  one  sense  only  . 

IV.  Of  solidity 

V.    Of  simple  ideas  whicli  come  by  different  senses 

VI.    Of  simple  ideas  wliich  come  by  reflection 

vii 


109 
120 
121 
122 
129 
130 


CONTKNTS 


riiAi-ui:  PACE 

Vll.  Of  ideas  which  come  by  sensation  and  reflection  130 

VIII.  Other  considerations  upon  simple  ideas     ....  130 

IX.  Of  perception 135 

X.  Of  retention 142 

XI.  Of  discernment,  or  the  faculty  of  distinguishing  ideas      .  143 

XII.  Of  complex  ideas 147 

XIII.  Of  simple  modes,  and  first  of  those  of  space       .         .        .  149 

XIV.  Of  duration  and  its  simi)le  modes 155 

XV.  Of  duration  and  expansion  considered  together         .  158 

XVI.  Of  number IGO 

XVII.  Of  infinity 161 

XVIII.  Of  other  simple  modes 1G4 

XIX.  Of  the  modes  of  thmking 164 

XX.  Of  modes  of  pleasure  and  pain 167 

XXI.  Of  power  and  freedom 174 

XXII.  Of  mixed  modes 221 

XXIII.  Of  our  complex  ideas  of  substances 225 

XXIV.  Of  collective  ideas  of  substances 235 

XXV.  Of  relation 235 

XXVI.  Of  cause  and  effect  and  some  other  relations     .        .        .  237 

XXVII.  What  identity  or  diversity  is 238 

XXVIII.  Of  some  other  relations,  and  especially  of  moral  relations  258 

XXIX.  Of  clear  and  obscure,  distinct  and  confused  ideas    .        .  265 

XXX.  Of  real  and  fantastical  ideas 275 

XXXI.  Of  adequate  and  inadequate  ideas 278 

XXXII.  Of  true  and  false  ideas 281 

XXXIII.  Of  the  association  of  ideas          .        .        .        .        .        .  281 

Book  III.  —  Words. 


I.  Of  words  or  language  in  general 285 

II.  Of  the  signification  of  words 291 

III.  Of  general  terms 307 

IV.  Of  the  names  of  simple  ideas 318 

V.  Of  the  names  of  mixed  modes  and  relations      .        .        .  325 

VI.  Of  the  names  of  substances 330 

\ai.  Of  particles 364 

VIII.  Of  abstract  and  concrete  terms 368 

IX.  Of  the  imperfections  of  words 369 

X.  Of  the  abuse  of  words 376 

XI.  Of  the  remedies  which  may  be  applied  to  the  imperfec- 
tions and  abuses  just  spoken  of 390 


CONTENTS 


Book  I V.  —  Of  Knowledge 

CHAPTER 

I.  Of  knowledge  in  general 

II.  Of  the  degrees  of  our  knowledge 

III.  Of  the  extent  of  human  knowledge 

IV.  Of  the  reality  of  our  knowledge  . 
V.  Of  truth  in  general 

VI.  Of  universal  propositions,  their  truth  and  certitude 

VII.  Of  propositions  called  maxims  or  axioms    . 

VIII.  Of  trifling  propositions 

IX.  Of  our  knowledge  of  our  existence 

X.  Of  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  God  . 

XL  Of  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  other  things 

XII.  Of  the  improvement  of  our  knowledge 

XIII.  Other  considerations  concerning  our  knowledge 

XIV.  Of  judgment 

XV.  Of  probability 

XVI.  Of  the  degrees  of  assent 

XVII.  Of  reason     .         .         .         .         .         .         .    ^    . 

XVIII.  Of  faith  and  reason  and  their  distinct  limits 

XIX.  Of  enthusiasm 

XX.  Of  error 

XXI.  Of  the  division  of  the  sciences    .... 


PAGE 

397 
404 
423 
444 
449 
452 
462 
490 
497 

44e*»^°i 

511   '■ — 

517 

528 

528 

529 

532 

555    »— 

583     . 

596 

607 

621 


APPENDIX 


I. 

II. 
III. 

IV. 


V. 


VI. 
VII. 


Leibnitz  to  Jacob  Thomasius.     April  20-30,  1669 .         .        .631 

Fragment,     (c.  1671) 651 

Demonstration  against  atoms  taken  from  the  contact  of 
atoms.     (October,  1690) 

Essay  on  Dynamics  on  the  laws  of  motion,  in  which  it  is 
shown  that  not  the  same  quantity  of  motion  is  preserved, 
but  the  same  absolute  force,  or  rather  the  same  quantity 
of  moving  action  (Z'aciJow  moince).     (c.  1691) 

Essay  on  Dynamics  in  defence  of  the  wonderful  laws  of 
natui'e  in  respect  to  the  forces  of  bodies,  disclosing  their 
mutual  actions  and  referring  them  to  their  causes, 
Part  I.     1695 

lb.     Part  II.     1695 

On  the  radical  origin  of  things.     1097   .... 

Appendix  to  a  letter  to  Honoratus  Fabri.     1702    . 


652 


657 


670 
684 
692 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

\'lll.     Li'lliT  of    lA'iliiiit/.  to   P.jisiiiii^c  dc  Bcauvixl,  editor  of   the 
"  Ilistoiro  des  Ouvrages  des  Savants,"   printed  in  that 

journal,  July,  1098,  pp.  ;W0s(7 706 

IX.     Fragment  of  a  letter  to  an  unkilown  person.     1707  712 

X.     That  the  most  perfect  Being  exists 714 

XI.     What  is  idea 716 

XII.     On  the  method  of  distinguishing  real  from  imaginary  phe- 
nomena       717 

AnnniONs  and  CoiMiECTiONS    .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .  721 

Index  A.     To  the  Critique  of  Locke 777 

Index  B.     To  the  Appendix 823 

Index  C.     To  the  Notes,  Additions,  and  Corrections        .         .         .  831 


TRANSLATOR'S    PREFACE 

The  work  herewith  given  to  the  public  consists  of  a  transla- 
tion of  the  entire  fifth  volume  of  Gerhardt's  Die  pliilosophischen 
Schriften  von  G.  W.  Leibniz,  sub-entitled  "Leibniz  und  Locke," 
consisting  of  an  Introduction  by  Gerhardt,  several  short  pieces 
on  Locke's  Essay  and  the  Neio  Essays  on  Human  Under- 
standing;  and  of  an  Appendix  contaiuing  a  translation  of 
other  short  pieces  of  Leibnitz  bearing  on  the  subjects  dis- 
cussed in  the  Neio  Essays  or  referred  to  therein.  The  Intro- 
duction on  The  Philosophy  of  Leibnitz  by  the  translator 
suggested  and  urged  by  Professors  Palmer  and  Royce  of  Har- 
vard University,  and  for  some  time  contemplated,  is  deferred, 
and  reserved,  if  at  all,  for  another  time  and  occasion,  owing 
to  the  size  of  the  present  volume,  as  well  as  for  other  good 
and  sufficient  reasons  which  it  is  not  necessary  here  to 
mention. 

Tlie  translation  of  Leibnitz's  JSlouveaux  Essais  sicr  VEntende- 
\^  ment  Hmnain  was  first  suggested  by  the  following  sentence 
:s^  of  the  late  Professor  George  S.  Morris,  of  the  University  of 
I    Michigan,  in  a  note  to  his  Philosophy  and  Christianity,  page 
J^  292:  "It  suggests  no  favorable  comment  on  the  philosophic 
J   interest  of  the  countrymen  of  Locke  that  the  above-mentioned 
reply  of  Leibnitz  to  Locke  has  never  (so  far  as  I  can  ascertain) 
been  translated  into  English."     Four  instalments,  consisting 
of  Book  I.  and  Book  II.,  chapters  1-11  inclasive,  were  pub- 
lished in  as  many  numbers  of  the  "Journal  of  Speculative 
Philosophy."^     Professor  Morris  very  kindly  sent  me  a  care- 
ful criticism  of  about  one-third  of  the  first  instalment,  with 
valuable  suggestions  regarding  the  further  wbrk  of  transla- 
tion.    His  corrections  and  suggestions  received  careful  con- 

1  Vol.  19,  No.  3,  July,  1885;  Vol.  21,  No.  3,  July,  1887;  Vol.  21,  No.  4,  Octo- 
ber, 1887 ;  Vol.  22,  No.  2,  April,  1888. 

xi 


TRANSLATOR'S   PREFACE 


sicK-ratioii  ami  wore  embodied  in  subsequent  revisions  of  the 
translation  in  pre})aring  it  for  the  present  issue. 

The  portion  of  the  New  Essays  thus  published  being 
favorably  received  by  professors  and  students  of  philosophy 
in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  and  being  encouraged  to  go  on 
and  translate  the  entire  piece,  the  work  begun  in  1885  was 
continued  in  leisure  hours  until  in  June,  1891,  the  translation 
was  completed.  Revision,  annotation,  and  the  labor  of  get- 
ting it  through  the  press  have  occupied  the  greater  part  of  my 
free  time  since  then.  The  annotation,  which  was  not  a  part 
of  the  original  plan,  but  which  was  found  to  be  desirable,  if 
not  even  necessary,  as  the  sheets  began  to  appear  in  type,  has 
been  the  chief  cause  of  the  delay  in  the  appearance  of  the 
book,  the  labor  involved  therein  proving  far  greater  and  una- 
voidably more  protracted  than  was  expected,  the  annotation 
also,  as  is  frequent  in  such  cases,  growing  with  the  progress 
of  the  book. 

The  text-basis  of  the  translation  is  that  of  C.  I.  Gerhardt, 
in  his  Die  philosophiscJien  Schriften  vo7i  G.  W.  Leibniz,  7  vols., 
Berlin,  1875-1890,  except  for  the  Dynamical  Pieces  in  the 
Appendix,  Xos.  IV.,  V.,  the  text-basis  of  which  is  C.  I.  Ger- 
hardt's  Leihnizens  mathematisclie  Schriften,  Berlin  and  Halle, 
1849-1863,  and  Appendix  ISTo.  VII.,  for  which  both  these 
editions  are  used;  for  Appendix  No.  IX.,  the  text  is  that 
given  by  Guhrauer,  G.  W.  Freiherr  v.  Leibnitz.  Eine  BiograpMe, 
Breslau,  1846.  The  other  editions  used  in  the  comparison  of 
the  text  and  the  preparation  of  the  notes  are:  J.  E.  Erd- 
mann,  Leibnitii  Opera  Philosopliica,  Berlin,  1839-1840;  M.  A. 
Jacques,  (Euvres  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1842;  P.  Janet,  (Euvres 
Philosophiqiies  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1866;  Dutens,  Leibnitii  Opera 
Omnia,  Geneva,  1768;  Eoucher  de  Careil,  Lettres  et  Opiiscides 
inedits  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1854,  Nouvelles  Lettres  et  Opuscules 
de  Leibniz  inklits,  Paris,  1857,  and  (Euvres  de  Leibniz,  Paris, 
1859  sq.,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1867  sq.  E.  E.  Raspe,  (Euvres  Philoso- 
phiqiies de  feu  Mr.  Leibnitz,  Amsterdam  and  Leipzig,  1765,  was 
received  too  late  to  be  of  service,  but  as  his  text  is  the  original 
printed  text  of  the  Neio  Essays,  and  has  been  used  by  all  sub- 
sequent editors,  it  is  not  probable  that  any  important  variation 
of  reading  has  been  overlooked;  and  Raspe's  text  has  no  notes. 
Besides  these  editions  of  Leibnitz's  AVorks,  the  German  trans- 


TRANSLATOTl'S   PREFACE 


lations  of  the  Theodicee  and  of  the  smaller  philosophically 
important  works  entitled  Die  kleineren  philosophisch  loichtigeren 
Schriften  by  J.  H.  von  Kirchmann,  in  his  Pliilosophische 
Bibliothek,  Berlin,  1879,  and  the  English  translation  of  his 
important  philosophical  opuscules  by  Professor  George  M. 
Duncan  of  Yale  University,  entitled  The  Philosophical  Works 
of  Leibnitz,  New  Haven,  1890,  have  been  consulted.  From 
the  last-named  work,  so  as  to  include  in  one  book  all  of  Leib- 
nitz's discussions  of  Locke,  it  was  at  first  intended  to  re})rint 
in  the  Appendix  all  the  pieces  bearing  upon  the  subject  dis- 
cussed in  the  Neiv  Essays,  or  espesially  referred  to  therein. 
It  finally  seemed  best  to  both  Professor  Duncan  and  myself 
to  change  the  plan  and  translate  new  material,  rather  than 
duplicate  that  already  translated,  so  that  with  the  exception 
of  Appendix  No.  VI.,  Professor  Duncan's  translation  of  which 
was  either  forgotten  or  unnoticed  till  after  mine  was  in  type, 
nothing  appears  in  both  books  save  such  portions  of  the  Neio 
Essays  as  he  has  included,  and  the  piece  entitled  On  Locke's 
Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  169G.  This  statement  Avill 
explain  the  references  in  certain  notes,  for  example,  page  101, 
note  1,  page  154,  note  1  (cf.  infra,  pages  737  and  749  respec- 
tively), to  certain  pieces  of  Leibnitz  in  the  Appendix,  which 
references  are  corrected  in  the  Additions  and  Corrections  by 
being  changed  to  the  proper  pages  of  Professor  Duncan's 
book. 

Of  great  value  in  the  revision  of  the  translation,  and  of  the 
greatest  service  in  the  preparation  of  the  notes,  has  been  the 
German  translation  of  the  Nouveaux  Essais,  with  notes,  by 
Professor  Carl  Schaarschmidt  of  the  University  of  Bonn. 
His  material  has  been  fi'eely  used,  either  by  direct  translation 
and  quotation,  or  in  substance,  in  the  notes  of  the  present  edi- 
tion, though  always,  so  far  as  possible,  only  after  verification 
and  further  independent  study.  His  notes,  I  regret  to  say, 
contain  many  numerical  errors,  occasioned  presumably  by  in- 
sufficient care  and  accuracy  in  proof-reading;  otherwise  they 
are,  for  the  most  part,  accurate.  The  fact  that  Professor 
Schaarschmidt's  book  was  not  received  till  after  a  portion  of 
mine  Avas  in  type  accounts  in  part  for  the  appearance  of  so 
much  of  his  note-material  in  the  Additions  and  Corrections, 
rather  than  in  its  proper  place  in  the  foot-notes  to  the  text. 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE 


Trofessor  A.  C.  Frazer's  splciulid  edition  of  Locke\'i  Essay, 
Oxford,  1804,  did  not  ap})ear  until  after  most  of  the  New 
Essays  were  in  type;  and  P.  Coste,  Essai  i)1iiloso2)1iique.  con- 
cernant  V Entendement  liumain — j?a?'  M.  Locke,  Amsterdam, 
1742,  1  vol.,  4to,  1774,  4  vols.,  12mo,  could  not  be  obtained 
until  all  tlie  New  Essays  and  most  of  the  Appendix  were  in 
type.  Both  of  these  works,  therefore,  could  be  used  only  in 
the  supplementary  notes  in  the  Additions  and  Corrections. 

AVitli  regard  to  the  text  itself,  particularly  of  the  Neic  Essays, 
a  few  words  may  not  be  out  of  place.  The  variations  ar(^  slight 
and  chiefly  verbal,  and  scarcely  ever  essentially  modify  the 
thought.  They  are  ultimately  due  either  to  the  manuscript  of 
Leibnitz  —  which  Erdmann  (Preface,  p.  xxii)  says  is  "written 
in  such  small  characters  often,  and  so  full  of  corrections,  that 
it  is  very  diilicult  to  read  it"  ("tam  parvis  gsepe  literis  con- 
scriptum  et  correctionibus  adeo  abundans  ut  perdifficile  lectu  ") 
—  or  to  certain  changes  made  for  the  |)urpose  of  im])roving  the 
literary  style  of  the  author,  and  of  thus  making  his  work  more 
accei)table  to  his  French  readers.  The  chief  difference  between 
tlie  text  as  given  by  Gerhardt,  who  has  compared  his  impres- 
sion "with  the  original,  so  far  as  it  is  still  extant,"  and  that 
of  the  otiier  editors  consists  in  a  transposition  of  the  text  in 
Book  I.,  chap.  I.,  a  transposition  Avhicli  is  fully  indicated  in 
the  note  at  the  point  in  the  text  of  tlie  translation  where  it 
occurs,  and  which  is,  I  suppose,  due  to  Gerliardt's  fidelity  to 
Leibnitz's  original  text.  All  the  important  textual  variations 
are  listed  in  the  notes. 

Gerhardt's  text,  having  been  com])ared  with  the  original, 
seems  the  nu)st  trustworthy,  and  accordingly  has  been  followed 
in  this  translation,  excepting  in  a  few  instances  mentioned  in 
the  notes,  where  it  is  manifestly  erroneous  from  inaccurate 
proof-reading  or  other  cause,  and  where  the  text  of  some  other 
editor  seemed  more  consistent  or  correct.  Gerhardt  has  intro- 
duced into  liis  text  the  brackets,  [  ],  in  which,  "  in  the  original, 
Leibnitz  has  enclosed  the  words  of  riulalcthes,  who  states  the 
views  of  Locke,"  "perhaps  as  an  indication  that  they  are  not 
his  own;"  and  I  have  introduced  them  into  the  translation 
precisely  as  they  stand  in  the  text  of  Gerhardt,  in  order  that 
the  translation  may  conform  to  and  re]n-esent  as  perfectly  as 
possible  Leibnitz's  original  text  in  its  integrity.    There  seems 


TRANSLATOR'S   PREFACE 


to  be,  however,  little  regularity  or  consistency  in  the  employ- 
ment of  these  brackets,  so  far,  at  least,  as  I  can  discover  upon 
comparison  with  Locke's  treatise. 

Besides  the  editions  and  translations  already  named,  the 
various  separate  editions  of  single  works  of  Leibnitz,  as  also 
the  various  discussions  of  his  philosophj^,  theology,  etc.,  and 
the  monographs  on  different  parts  of  the  same,  were  occasion- 
ally consulted  or  referred  to,  so  far  as  these  were  accessible 
or  could  be  procured.  Among  the  monographs,  especial  men- 
tion should  be  made  of  Professor  John  Dewey's  most  excellent 
Leibniz's  New  Essays  concerning  the  Human  Understanding . 
A  Critical  Exposition,  1888,  in  the  series  of  German  Philo- 
sophical Classics  edited  by  Professor  George  S.  Morris,  and 
l)ublished  by  8.  C.  Griggs  &  Co.,  Chicago;  and  of  the  earlier 
monograph  of  G.  Hartenstein,  Lodce's  LeJire  von  der  mensch- 
lichen  Erkenntniss  in  Vergleiclmtuj  mit  Leibniz's  liritik  derselben, 
Leipzig,  18()1. 

The  translation  has  purposely  been  made  close  rather  than 
free,  a  philosophical  treatise  seeming  properly  to  require  a 
(doser  adherence  on  the  part  of  the  translator  to  the  author's 
form  of  thought  and  expression  than  a  history,  novel,  or  poem. 
"Whatever  view  may  be  taken  on  this  point,  —  and  I  frankly 
admit  that  at  least  two  views  are  possible  and  that  each  method 
of  translation  has  its  advantages  and  its  disadvantages,  its 
jierils  and  its  successes, —  the  form  and  style  of  the  Neio  Essays 
nuike  an  elegant  and  forceful  translation  well-nigh  impossible. 
Such  a  translation  would  necessitate  the  entire  re-writing  of 
Leibnitz's  work,  would,  in  fact,  be  a  reproduction  rather  than 
a  translation,  a  task  1  have  not  attempted  nor  felt  it  incumbent 
on  me  to  attem])t.  My  aim  has  been  simply  to  represent  as 
I'aitli fully  and  as  accurately  as  jjossible,  and  in  as  good  English 
as  its  form  and  expression  admitted,  Leibnitz's  exact  thovight. 
Tlie  style  of  Leibnitz  in  the  Neiv  Essays,  especially  in  the 
al)breviations  or  abstracts  of  Locke's  Essay  put  into  the  mouth 
of  Pliilalctlies,  is  often  abrupt  and  obscure  and  sometimes 
(n'(Mi  uiigrammatical  (cf.,  for  example,  JVe?o  Essays,  Book  III., 
chap.  II.,  §  18,  ])age  .'392,  lines  6  and  7,  and  the  note  thereto, 
infra,  ])age  7G8  ad  Jin.).  This  condition  of  things  is  due  partly 
to  tlui  form  of  the  work,  but  chiefly  to  the  method  of  its  com- 
])osition  (cf.  Gerhardt's  introduction,  infra,  page  8,  and  notes. 


TRANSLATOirs    IMJF.rACE 


aiul  the  li'ttt'i's  of  Ivoibnitz  cited  by  K;i.s])e  in  liis  Preface,  page 
V2,  note  (■),  anil  which  he  says,  "1  found  with  the  manuscript 
of  the  Xi'w  Essays,"  and  " give  as  I  found  them  '').  A  work  so 
written,  in  spite  of  more  or  less  revision,  could  not  possibly 
be  a  finished  treatise  or  a  work  of  literary  art  like  the  Dia- 
logues of  Plato,  and  the  character  of  the  work  must  of  neces- 
sit}'  be  reflected  in  the  translation. 

The  notes  aim  to  give  the  desirable  or  necessary  biographical 
and  bibliographical  information  regarding  the  persons  and 
books  referred  to  in  the  course  of  the  work,  so  far  as  such 
information  could  be  obtained;  references  to  other  pieces  of 
Leibnitz,  and  occasionally  to  other  authors,  where  the  same 
topic  is  discussed;  and  explanations  of  a  few  terms  thought 
to  be  obscure  and  the  explanations  of  which  are  not  generally 
known  or  easily  accessible.  The  notes  do  not  pretend  to  be  a 
commentary  on  the  text.  Except  in  a  few  cases,  the  reader 
or  student  has  purposely  been  left  to  gain  his  know^ledge  of 
Leibnitz's  views  from  Leibnitz  himself.  Extended  com- 
mentary was  impossible  within  the  necessary  limits  of  the 
volume,  and  accordingly  was  not  included  in  the  plan.  The 
philosophical  notes,  therefore,  confine  themselves  to  a  brief 
statement  of  Leibnitz's  views  and  to  brief  criticism  or  indica- 
tion of  criticism.  The  aim  was  to  bring  Leibnitz's  great  work 
witliin  the  reach  of  English  students  and  to  render  it  more 
easily  accessible,  with  such  annotation,  literary  and  other,  as 
would  make  it  more  acceptable  to  the  student. 

All  material  taken  from  other  authors  has,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, been  verified  and  made  the  subject  of  such  independent 
study  as  the  ease  seemed  to  demand.  All  references  to 
authorities  have  been  verified  when  possible,  and  very  great 
pains  liave  been  taken  to  secure  perfect  accuracy  in  all  refer- 
ences. The  citations  have  uuiformly  been  taken  and  the 
references  made  to  the  best  editions,  and  usually  to  the  latest, 
when  these  editions  were  accessible.  Occasionally  other  works 
or  editions  are  referred  to  because  of  their  accessibility  or  for 
other  evident  reasons.  For  the  convenience  of  those  possess- 
ing different  editions  of  Leibnitz's  works,  as  well  as  for  those 
wlio  may  have  access  to  only  one  of  them,  reference  is  usually 
made,  especially  in  the  earlier  notes,  to  all  of  the  editions. 
Later  this  procedure  seemed  to  encumber  the  notes  with  an 


TRANSLATOR'S   PREFACE 


vinuecessary  amoiiut  of  numerical  reference,  and  it  was  for  the 
most  part  discontinued. 

Attention  is  called  to  the  Additions  and  Corrections  as 
containing  matter  of  importance,  most  of  which  was  not 
obtained  till  after  the  portion  of  the  book  to  which  it  refers 
was  already  in  type,  and  which,  therefore,  could  not  be 
inserted  in  its  proper  place  in  the  book,  but  had  to  be  reserved 
to  the  end. 

The  Indexes  are  intentionally  full  and  complete  and  have 
been  made  with  great  care  by  Rev.  Robert  Kerr  Eccles,  M.D. 
There  is  no  adequate  index  to  Leibnitz's  works,  and  none 
whatever  exclusively  devoted  to  the  New  Essays.  The  refer- 
ences thereto  in  the  meagre  index  in  Raspe's  edition  of  the 
Philosophical  Works,  not  generally  accessible,  and  in  the 
general  index,  full  as  it  is,  in  Erdmann's  edition,  are  by  no 
means  sufficient.  It  is  hoped  that  the  Indexes  here  furnished 
may  prove  adequate  for  the  works  of  Leibnitz  included  in  this 
volume,  and  that  thus  a  beginning  at  least  of  an  adequate  index 
to  Leibnitz's  complete  works  shall  have  been  made. 

In  Appendix  No.  IV.,  infra,  page  663,  and  No.  V.,  infra, 
pages  674,  682,  and  686,  the  numbering  of  the  cuts  is  changed 
from  that  of  the  original  text  to  conform  to  their  proper 
numerical  order  in  this  book.  The  fact  is  here  noted  to  pre- 
vent confusion  in  referring  to  the  original. 

I  gratefully  acknowledge  my  obligations  and  express  my 
thanks  to  all  who  have  aided  me  in  my  long  and  arduous  work. 
Especially  to  President  E.  B.  Andrews  of  Brown  University, 
for  aid  in  the  note  on  the  term  "quarto  modo,"  page  455, 
and  for  the  verification  of  references;  to  Professor  Albert  G. 
Harkness  of  Brown  University,  for  aid  in  locating  some  of 
tlie  Latin  quotations  in  the  New  Essays;  to  Professor  J.  F. 
Jameson  of  Brown  University,  for  the  note,  page  757,  ex- 
plaining the  term  "Promoter,"  page  227;  to  Professor  John 
M.  Manly  of  BroAvn  University,  for  infarmation  and  aid  in 
the  notes  to  the  New  Essays,  Book  III.,  chap.  2,  page  294, 
notes  2,  3,  page  295,  notes  2,  3;  to  Professor  E.  B.  Delabarre 
of  Brown  University,  for  aid  in  the  note  to  page  122,  lines 
1,  2,  infra,  pages  739-740;  to  Professor  H.  P.  Manning  of 
Brown  University,  for  aid  in  the  note  on  the  "perles"  of 
De  Sluse,  page  768;  to  Rev.  R.  H.  Ferguson,  for  aid  in  the 


TRANSLATOR'S   PREFACE 


same  note,  and  in  the  revision  of  a  portion  of  the  Appendix; 
to  Mr.  Frank  E.  Thompson,  A.M.,  Head-master  of  the  Rogers 
High  School,  Newport,  R.  I.,  for  aid  in  connection  with  a 
part  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  Dynamical  Pieces  in  tlie  Ap- 
pendix; to  Professor  licnjamin  O.  True  of  Rochester  Theo- 
logical Seminary,  for  information  and  verification  of  references 
in  connection  with  the  notes  to  the  New  Essays,  Book  IV., 
chap.  19,  page  599,  note  2,  601,  note  1,  602,  note  1;  to  Pro- 
fessor F.  A.  March  of  Lafayette  University,  for  the  location 
of  the  Latin  poetical  rpiotation  on  page  603;  to  Professor  Carl 
Schaarschmidt  of  Bonn  University,  for  consulting  books  inac- 
cessible in  this  country,  and  for  information  kindly  furnished 
by  letter,  and  for  his  cordial  interest  in  my  work,  as  well  as 
for  the  very  valuable  notes  to  his  translation  of  the  New 
Essays,  without  which  mine  never  would  have  been  written 
in  their  present  form;  to  the  various  libraries  whose  resources 
have  in  one  way  or  another  been  placed  at  my  disposal,  among 
which  should  be  mentioned  the  Boston  Public  Library,  the 
Boston  Athenaeum,  the  libraries  of  Andover  Theological  Semi- 
nary, Xewton  Theological  Listitution,  Rochester  Theological 
Seminary,  Brown  University,  Harvard  University,  Yale 
University  through  Professor  Duucan,  the  Library  of  the 
Surgeon  General's  Office,  Washington,  D.C.,  and  the  Red- 
wood Librar}?^,  Newport,  R.I.;  to  the  libraries  particularly 
of  Newton  Theological  Institution,  Brown  University,  and 
Harvard  University,  for  the  long-continued  loan  of  needed 
books ;  to  Professor  Charles  R.  Brown  of  Newton  Theological 
Institution  for  information  and  the  verification  of  references; 
to  my  friend  and  former  pupil  Mr.  Alfred  R.  Wightman,  of 
the  Morgan  Park  Academy  of  the  University  of  Chicago,  for 
the  verification  of  references  and  aid  in  the  revision  of  a 
portion  of  the  Appendix;  to  Mr.  Thomas  J.  Kiernan  of  the 
Harvard  University  Library,  for  special  favors  in  the  consul- 
tation of  the  library,  for  the  loan  of  books  from  the  same, 
and  for  information  cordially  furnished  by  mail;  to  Benjamin 
Rand,  Ph.D.,  of  the  Department  of  Philosophy  at  Harvard 
University,  for  frequent  consultation  of  authorities,  verifica- 
tion of  references  and  information  furnished;  to  my  friend 
Mr.  Richard  Bliss,  Librarian  of  the  Redwood  Library,  with- 
out whose  competent  criticism  and  constant  advice  and  aid. 


TRANSLATOR'S   PREFACE 


added  to  his  comprehensive  and  accurate  knowledge  in  many 
fields,  and  especially  in  bibliography,  my  notes  would  have 
been  far  less  full  and  accurate  than,  I  trust,  they  now  are; 
and  last  but  not  least,  to  my  wife  for  literary  criticism  in  the 
revision  of  the  translation  and  notes,  and  aid  in  the  laborious 
task  of  proof-reading.  Had  I  always  accepted  and  adopted 
her  criticism  and  that  of  Mr.  Bliss,  my  work  would  doubtless 
rank  higher  as  a  piece  of  literature  than  is  now  possible. 

My  thanks  are  also  due  and  most  heartily  tendered  to 
my  publishers,  Messrs.  Macmillan  &  Co.,  for  their  uniform 
courtesy  and  long-suffering  patience  in  the  repeated  but  un- 
avoidable delays  which  have  characterized  the  appearance 
of  this  book;  and  to  J.  S.  Gushing  &  Co.,  of  the  Norwood 
Press,  for  the  excellence  of  their  work,  and  the  pains  they 
have  taken  to  secure  the  greatest  possible  accuracy  in  the 
same,  and  for  their  uniform  courtesy  and  long-suffering 
patience  amid  the  vexatious  delays  unavoidably  incident  to 
the  preparation  of  the  notes  and  the  correction  of  the  proof. 

In  editing  the  work  of  a  thinker  and  writer  so  comprehen- 
sive as  Leibnitz,  it  is  impossible  to  escape  all  errors  of  fact  or 
judgment.  I  have  done  the  best  I  could  in  the  circumstances 
in  which  I  have  had  to  work,  away  from  large  libraries  and 
from  the  advice  and  criticism  of  fellow-students  in  the  same 
lines.  Competent  and  truth-loving  criticism,  and  the  correc- 
tion of  any  and  all  real  errors  will  be  thankfully  received. 

With  one  sentence  from  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Coste,  June  16, 
1707,  as  significant  of  his  character  and  illustrative  of  his 
spirit,  more  truth-loving  than  polemical,  and  as  beautifully 
expressing  the  essence  of  true  criticism,  I  close  this  Preface  : 
"  Mon  but  a  este  plustost  d'eclaircir  les  choses,  que  de  refuter 
les  sentimens  d'autruy,"  which,  being  interpreted,  is:  "My 
purpose  has  been  to  throw  light  upon  things  rather  than  to 
refute  the  opinions  of  another." 


Newport,  R.I.,  April  11,  1896. 


Alfkkd  G.  Langlicv. 


LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE    OF    LOCKE    ON" 
HUMAN   UNDEESTANDING 


GERHARDT'S   INTRODUCTION  TO  HIS  EDITION  OF 
LEIBNITZ'S   NOUVEAUX  ESSAIS 

\_Froin  the  German] 

Iisr  the  first  philosophical  treatise,  Meditationes  de  Cognitione, 
Veritate,  et  Ideis,^  which  Leibnitz  published  in  the  year  1684,  he 
had  firmly  laid  the  foundations  of  human  knowledge ;  he  de- 
clared adequate  and  at  the  same  time  intuitive  knowledge  as 
the  most  complete.  At  the  end  he  adds :  Quod  ad  controver- 
siam  attinet,  utrum  omnia  videamus  in  Deo  ...  an  vero 
proprias  ideas  habeamus,  sciendum  est,  etsi  omnia  in  Deo 
videremus,  necesse  tamen  esse  ut  habeamus  et  ideas  proprias, 
id  est  non  quasi  icunculas  quasdam,  sed  affectiones  sive  modifi- 
cationes  mentis  nostrae,  respondentes  ad  id  ipsum  quod  in, Deo 
perciperemus  :  utique  enim  aliis  atque  aliis  cogitationibus  sub- 
euntibus  aliqua  in  mente  nostra  mutatio  fit ;  rerum  vero  actu 
a  nobis  non  cogitatarum  Ideee  sunt  in  mente  nostra,  ut  figura 
Herculis  in  rudi  marmore.  The  assumption  of  these  ideas 
slumbering  in  the  mind,  these  innate  ideas  {aiujehornen  Ideen; 
idees  inn^es),  Leibnitz  regards  as  necessary  in  order  to 
understand  the  nature  of  the  mind.  (Habet  anima  in  se 
perceptiones  et  appetitus,  iisque  natura  ejus  continetur,  he 
writes  to  Bierling,  Hanoverte  12.  Augusti  1711.^  Et  ut 
in  corpore  intelligimus  avTiTvirCav,  et  figuram  generatim,  etsi 
nesciamus,  quge  sint  figurse  corporum  insensibilium :  ita  in 
anima  intelligimus  perceptionem  et  appetitum,  etsi  non 
cognoscamus  distincte  insensibilia  mgredientia  perceptionum 
confusarum,  quibus  insensibilia  corporum  exprimuntur.) 
He    could    therefore    only    prove    the    necessary    truths,    i.e. 

1  C.  I.  (;crli;inlt :  Die  jili/losajt/iiftrhcn  Schri/fcn  von  (1.  W.  Leibniz.  Vol. 
4,  pp.  4'-!'2-42(>.  .1.  ]<;.  l<]nlin:inn:  (J.  G.  Lfihniiii  Ojx'rii  ]'/nl().v)phica,  pp.  78- 
Hl.  Translated  by  G(w)r^r  iM.  ])iiiic;ui,  The  I'liilonKfiliical  Worls  of  Leibnitz, 
pp.  21-:V2,  New  Ilavcii :  Tiittlc,  Morehouse,  &  Taylor,  18^)0.  —  Th. 

2  The  letter  is  IoiiikI  in  Gerhanll's  e<l..  Vol.  7,  i)p.  5li0-5(i2.  —  Tu. 

3 


LKIBNITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


those  which  are  kiu)\vii  by  demonstration,  inasmuch  as  the 
senses  indeed  teach  what  happens,  but  not  what  necessarily 
happens.  Such  ideas  innate  to  the  mind  are,  according  to 
Leibnitz,  the  conceptions  of  substance,  identity,  the  true  and 
the  good. 

The  writing  of  the  man  who  questioned  and  rejected  these 
fundamental  principles  of  the  system  of  Leibnitz  could  not 
faij^-te-lay  claim  to  Leibnitz's  entire  attention.  It  was  John 
^ckej^oru,  1632,  at  Wrington,  near  Bristol ;  died,  1704,  at 
(jSii^Tir  the  county  of  Essex,  in  the  house  of  Sir  Francis 
Masham,  whose  wife  was  a  daughter  of  Cudworth),  who  in  his 
celebrated  work  ("^An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understand- 
ing " ;  in  four  books,  London,  1690  ^)  sought  toMiscover  also  the 
originy-tha.  certainty,  and  the  extent  of  human  knowledge,  but 
who  denied  the  existfuci'  ol  innate  idt^is  and  }iriiicipk's,  and 
affirmed  tliat  ilie  mind  is  originally  like  an  unwritten  tablet 
(tabula  fii-^a).     In  the  hrst  book  of  the   work  iianiril,  Locke 

seeks    to  set  forth  the  view  thnt.  thprp  n.vp.  nn  inn  iti'  ideas,  and 

therefore  no  innate  principles  and  trutha;  that  the  under- 
standing is  by  nature  like  an  unwritten  sln/et  of  paper.  The 
second  book  contains  the  proof  whence  the  understanding  gets 
its  ideas.  Since  there  are  no  innate  concepts  and  principles, 
the  origin  of  all  ideas  can  be  only  in  experience.  Experience, 
however,  has  a  double  sphere,  that  of  external  and  of  internal 
periLeptioa-:.-th.e  fir&tXockej3alls  Sensatioii;  the  second,  Eeflec- 
tion.  Sensation  is  the  perception  of  external  objects  mediated 
through  the  senses ;  reflection,  the  perception  of  the  activities 
of  the  soul  in  relation  to  the  ideas  presented  through  the  senses. 
Ideas  are  partly  simple,  partly  complex.  Simple  ideas  arise 
through  the  single  senses,  remoter  ideas  through  more  senses, 
as  extension,  form,  motion,  rest ;  through  reflection  alone,  for 

1  This  work  was  already  completed  in  the  year  11)87 ;  au  abstract  made  by 
Locke  hims(!lf  appeared  in  the  following;  year,  IHSS,  translated  into  French  in 
Leclerc's  "  Bildiotheqiie  universelle,"  T.  VIIL,  pp.  49-142.  The  contents  of 
the  work,  after  it  was  completely  pnlilished  in  the  year  1600,  was  communi- 
cated in  much  detail  by  Led  ere  in  the  "Biblioth.  Univers.,"  T.  XVII.,  p.  399 
sq.  TJie  new  editions,  which  already  in  tlie  shortest  time  followed  each  other 
in  quick  succession  in  tlie  years  1(>94.  KiHT.  1(>99,  170.">,  prove  wliat  a  miichty 
impression  T^ocke's  work  made  upon  cultivated  circles.  1700  api^eared  Coste's 
French  translation  of  I^ocke's  work:  it  was  enriclied  by  Locke  himself  with 
improvements  and  additions.  Leibnitz  followed  this  French  translation  in 
I  lie  composition  of  his  Novvcavx  E.fsai.t. 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING 


example,  the  idea  of  thought  and  will ;  through  union  of  sensa- 
tion and  reflection,  the  ideas  of  power,  existence,  unity.  The 
complex  ideas  are  of  three  kinds  :  modes,  substances,  relations. 
The  modes,  i.e.  the  complex  concepts,  which  contain  nothing 
existing  for  itself,  are  either  pure  (simple  modes),  as  space,  time, 
or  mixed  (mixed  modes),  as  thought,  motion,  power.  By  sub-"'" 
stances  I>fj£l^p  nn'1t^vstn.nf[a  those  combinations  of  simplgH^eas 

or    greupS    of    ideas,  which  iWff  nrtnf>piuMr1'  nprm    <i1iin    1iji|ii^<-,]^ogig- 

that  theyi correspond  to  definite,  actually, existing  things,  so 
that  the  substance  {.■^iibstrdfuni.)  presupposed  fm-  and  in  f.hp-m 
is  considered  ;is  the  point  of  union  for  the  yest  of  thq  nnn'^^-H" 
ent  parts  eontained  in  the  grn.up  of  ideas.  Of  substance,  man 
has  no  eleav  conception;  it  is.  according  to  Locke,  worthless. 
According  to  him  this  conception  is  n(jt  limited  to  single  tilings,  • 
but  he  extends  it  also  to  the  collective  ideas  of  many  things ; 
thus  an  army,  a  herd  of  sheep,  is  just  as- much  a  substance  as 
a  single  man  or  one  sheep.  Relations  arise  from  the  comparison 
of  many  things  with  one  another,  as  the  conceptions  of  cause 
and  effect,  time  —  and  place  —  relations,  identity  and  diversity. 

Ideas  and  their  combinations  are  apprehended  in  langua^^e  ; 
therefore  Locke  begins  in  the  third  book  with  an  investigation 
upon  language,  in  so  far  as  our  knowledge,  although  relating 
to  things,  is  bound  to  words,  and  words  are  an  indispensable 
middle-term  between  thoughts  and  things.  The  extent  and  the 
certainty  of  knowledge  are  on  this  account  conditioned  upon 
the  constitution  and  significance  of  words.  In  the  fourth  book 
Locke  pronounces  the  concluding  judgment  upon  'the  extent 
and  the  different  grades  of  certainty  in  human  knowledge.^ 

Leibnitz's  attention  was  already  turned  from  his  own  work  to 
that  of  the  English  philosopher  by  the  above-mentioned  edition 
published  by  Locke  himself  in  the  "Bibliotheque  universelle." 
When  later  Locke's  work  reached  his  hands,  he  threw  off,  as 
was  his  custom  while  he  skimmed  through  the  book,  soin(> 
remarks;^  they  folh)w  h(u-e  under  the  superscription:    "  Sur 

'For  the  foreuoiiijj;  are  of  valiK^:  Hartcnstciii,  TyOf/y'.s  Lrltrc  von  dcr 
meiixi-hHi-hf))  Er/:r)nitniss  hi  Vcr(/lci<'!uni</  mit  Lcihniz'.t  Krilik  ilrrsilhcn. 
Lei])zii;;,.  18(11.  —  Uuliorwej^,  Grundriss  der  Gi't<rhic/itr  der  PhUo.tdjdiie,  ■>  Tlicil. 
Berlin,  1880. 

2  They  came  into  lieing  iiftfu- the,  year  l()(l.">,  since  nieiilion  is  niaih'  in  thcni 
of  T^iclve's  Tr.ac^t  npon  Eiluciition :  Thoiif/hls  o»,  Education,  London,  KIIK!. 
Tliey  were  first  pi'inted  in  SDivr.  Farniliiir  Lctlcrs  betiveen  Mr.  Locke  and 
Seii'v.r(d(>f  hiH  Fricndx,  T,ondon,  170S,  pp.  l!M;-2n.'). 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


I'Essay  de  I'enteudemeut  humaiii  de  Monsieur  Lock."^  Leibuitz 
sent  it  ill  accord  witli  his  pleasant  custom  to  Thomas  Burnett, 
with  whom  he  corresponded.^  Through  him  they  came  to  the 
knowledge  of  Locke,  who,  however,  ujjon  vain  pretexts,  de- 
clined every  reply  thereto.^  When  Leibnitz  received  among 
others  the  communication  from  Burnett  (July  20,  1698),  that 
Locke  had  so  far  expressed  his  opinion  that  he  for  his  part  did 
not  sufficiently  understand  Leibnitz's  remarks  upon  his  book, 
he  resolved  upon  a  remodelling  of  the  same.  Two  fragments 
of  the  year  1698  are  thereupon  at  hand  ;  they  are  printed  here 
for  the  first  time,  under  the  superscription  :  '•'  Echantillon  *  de 
Ketlexions  sur  le  I.  Livre  de  I'Essay  de  I'Eutendeinent  de 
I'homme.  — Echantillon  de  Reflexions  sur  le  II.  Livre."  Leil> 
nitz  again  sent  them  to  Burnett ;  through  whom  Locke  re- 
ceived them  ;  but  this  attempt  also  on  Leibnitz's  side  remained 
without  result,  as  appears  from  Burnett's  letter  to  Leibnitz 
October  23,  1700. 

1  On  Locke's  Essay  on  Human  Understanding.     See  infra,  pp.  i;5-19. — Tr. 

2  Leibnitz  to  Thomas  Burnett,  7th-17tli  March,  1090:  "  I  found,  also,  finally, 
a  rough  draught  which  I  had  had  copied  formerly,  of  some  remarks  I  made 
wlien  rimning  through  the  excellent  essay  of  Locke  upon  Human  Understand- 
ing; I  take  the  liberty  of  sending  you  a  copy."  — Leibnitz  to  Th.  Burnett, 
17th-2Tth  July,  l(j!)7:  "  What  I  sent  you  of  my  reflections  upon  the  important 
book  of  Locke  is  entirely  at  your  disposal,  and  you  can  communicate  it  to 
whomever  it  seems  good  to  you ;  and  if  it  falls  into  his  hands,  or  those  of  his 
friends,  so  much  the  better;  for  that  will  give  him  an  opportunity  to  instruct 
us  and  to  clear  up  the  matter." 

3  Higlily  characteristic  is  that  which  Burnett  commimicated  to  Leibnitz 
upon  the  2;?d  of  July,  1697:  "  I  must  tell  you  a  joke  of  Locke's  the  other  day, 
on  this  matter.  We  began  to  speak  of  the  controversies  of  savants  with  those 
of  this  country.  He  said:  'It  seems  to  me  we  live  very  peaceably  as  good 
neighbors  of  the  gentlemen  in  Germany,  for  they  do  not  know  our  books,  and 
we  do  not  read  theirs,  so  that  the  tale  (la  [?  Ze  — Tk.]  conte)  {?  le  compte,  the 
account)  was  well  adjusted  on  each  side.'"  —  On  the  other  hand,  we  find 
a  very  dissenting  judgment  of  Locke's  upon  Leibnitz  and  his  remarks  in 
his  letter  to  Dr.  Molyneux,  of  April  10,  1(597:   "I  must  confess  to  you  that 

Mr.  L 's  great  name  had  I'aised  in  me  an  expectation  whicli  the  sight  of 

liis  paper  di<l  not  answer,  nor  that  discourse  of  his  in  tlie  'Acta  Eruditorum,' 
which  he  quotes,  and  I  have  since  read,  and  had  just  the  same  thoughts  of 
it,  when  I  read  it,  as  I  find  you  have.  From  whence  I  only  draw  this  infer- 
ence. That  even  great  parts  will  not  master  any  subject  without  great  thinking, 
and  even  the  largest  minds  have  but  narrow  swallows."  —  Not  less  disparaging 
is  Locke's  judgment  upon  Leibnitz  in  the  next  letter  to  Molyneux,  of  May  ,3, 
1()'.I7.  —  The  correspondence  lietween  Locke  and  Molyneux  is  contained  in  the 
already  quoted  book:  Simir  Familiar  Letters  between  Mr.  Locke,  etc. 

*  Specimen  of  Retlectioiis  on  Book  I.  of  the  Essay  on  Human  Understand- 
ing.    Specimen  of  Reflections  on  Book  H.     See  infra,  pp.  20-25.  —  Tr. 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDINa 


In  the  year  1700  appeared  the  French  translation  of  Locke's 
work  published  by  Pierre  Coste;^  it  was  prepared  according  to 
the  fourth  edition  and  contained  accordingly  the  additions 
which  Locke  had  made  to  the  previous  editions  of  his  book. 
Leibnitz  at  once  took  occasion  thereof  to  write  a  sketch  for  the 
"  Monatliche  Auszug^  aus  allerhand  neu-herausgegebenen,  niitz- 
lichen  und  artigen  Biichern,"  for  the  year  1700  (September,  pp. 
611-63G).  This  follows  here  under  ISTo.  III.^  together  with  the 
supplement  of  the  following  year,  1701.*  In  this  sketch  Leib- 
nitz discusses  two  of  the  weightiest  of  Locke's  additions,  iilling 
two  ^separate  chapters,  viz. :  chapter  33  of  the  second  book, 
wherein  Locke  treats  of  the  Association  of  Ideas,  and  then 
chapter  19  of  the  fourth  book,  in  which  he  discourses  of 
Enthusiasm. 

Through  the  French  translation  Leibnitz  first  gained  real 
access  to  Locke's  work.^  He  recognized  the  importance  of  its 
contents  in  its  fullest  extent ;  at  the  same  time  the  extremely 
large  circulation  and  the  universal  recognition,  which  ex- 
pressed itself  through  the  editions  following  each  other  in 
rapid  succession,  must  have  made  upon  him  a  deep  impression. 
Evidently  for  these  reasons  Leibnitz  conceived  the  plan  of 

1  Essai  Philosophiqixe  concernaut  I'entendemeiit  liumain,  oh  Ton  montre, 
quelle  est  reiiteiidiie  de  uos  Conuoissances  certaiiies  et  la  maniere  dont  uous  y 
parvenons,  traduit  de  I'Auglais  de  Mr.  Locke  par  Mr.  Pierre  Coste,  sur  la 
quatrieme  edition,  revue,  corrigee  et  augmeiitee  par  I'Auteur.  A  Amsterd., 
1700.  4.  This  first  edition  of  Coste's  translation  was  not  accessil)le  to  me  :  I 
have  been  able  to  make  use  of  the  second :  Essai  Philosophique  concernant, 
etc.  Traduit  de  I'Anglois  par  M.  Coste.  Seconde  edition,  revue,  corrigee,  et 
augmentee  de  quelques  Additions  importjiutes  de  TAuteur  qui  n'ont  paru 
qu'apres  sa  mort,  et  de  quelques  Remarques  du  Traducteur.  A  Amsterd., 
1729.    4. 

^  I.e.  "  'Monatliche  Auszug'  (Monthly  Abstract)  of  the  various  newly  imb- 
lished,  ijrofitable,  and  pleasing  books."  —  Tr. 

3  See  infra,  pp.  2(J-38.  —  Tb. 

*  Tliis  "  Monatliche  Auszug  "  appeared  in  three  annual  sets  from  1700-170'j. 
Guliraner  (Leibnitz's  deutsche  Schri/ten,  2ter  Band)  has  tried  to  prove  in  n- 
very  complete  excursus  that  Leibnitz  was  the  real  editor  of  this  Journal. 
Certainly  tlie  sketc-h  of  Locke's  work  originated  witli  Iiini. 

5  Leibnitz  to  Tliomas  Burnett,  17th-27th  July,  1(;!H>:  "I  could  wish  I  had 
tlie  same  knowledge  of  tlie  English  language  "  (as  of  tlie  I'^rcncli) ;  "  liut,  nut 
having  had  the  occasion  for  it,  all  I  can  (h)  is  to  undcrsliind  ]iassa))ly  tlie  books 
writt('n  in  this  langiiago.  And  at  tht;  age  at  whicli  I  have  arrived,  I  doul>t  if 
I  could  ever  make  myself  better  ac(piaintcd  witli  it."  —  Leibnitz  to  Coste,  of 
June  10,  1701:  "I  have  followed  your  French  version,  because  I  tliought  it 
l)roper  to  write  my  remarks  in  Frcsncli,  since  nowaihiys  this  kind  of  invtistiga- 
tiou  is  but  little  iu  fashion  iu  the  Latin  Quarter." 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


ans-\vering  Locke's  work  with  a  more  extensive  writing.  It 
grew  out  of  the  ofteu  hastily-throwu-off  remarks  whicli  lie 
occasionally  put  on  paper  in  the  years  following  that  of  1700, 
in  which  he  was  not  permitted  to  undertake  any  continuous 
work.'  In  order  to  obliterate  the  traces  of  this  method  of 
work,  Leibnitz  considered  it  advisable,  before  he  published  it, 
to  submit  his  book,  as  to  composition  and  style,  to  the  judg- 
ment of  a  native  Frenchman.  This  revision  was  protracted 
until  the  year  1705,  as  appears  from  a  writing  which  has  no 
signature.^  Another  delay  occvirred  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
Leibnitz  in  the  following  year,  1706,  entered  into  correspond- 
ence with  Pierre  Coste,  the  translator  of  Locke's  work ;  Coste 
told  him  (April  20,  1707)  that  the  translation  of  Locke  itself 
would  be  examined  and  furnished  with  important  improve- 
ments; he  would  urgently  advise  him  (Leibnitz)  to  put  off 
the  publication  of  his  work  until  he  obtained  a  knowledge  of 
these  changes  of  Locke.  This  further  consideration,  that  he 
learned  of  the  dissenting  opinions  of  Locke  in  his  corre- 
spondence with  Molyneux,  as  also  Locke's  death,  which  had 

1  "  I  have  made  these  remarks  iu  the  leisure  hours  when  I  was  travelling  or 
at  Herreuhausen,  where  I  could  not  apply  myself  to  researches  which  required 
more  care"  (besoin^  in  sense  of  soin.^  —  Tr.).i 

2  "The  frequent  diversions  to  which  I  have  heen  exposed  have  prevented 
me  from  pushing  forward  my  remarks.  Besides,  I  have  been  obliged  to  divide 
my  time  between  the  reading  of  your  work  and  the  commissions  with  which  I 
have  been  entrusted  by  the  Count  de  Schwerin,  of  which  I  must  give  account 
to  him.  Yon  will  find  few  remarks  upon  this  paper;  but  I  have  taken  the 
liberty  of  changing  iu  the  work  itself  a  very  large  number  of  places  in  reference 
to  which  I  did  not  at  all  hesitate  when  I  saw  that  I  could  do  this  without  dis- 
arranging the  rest  of  the  writing.  I  have  not  touched  what  is  properly  called 
tlie  style ;  but  the  confidence  with  which  you  have  honored  me  obliges  me  to 
say  to  you  here  that  it  greatly  needs  amendment,  and  that  you  seem  too  much 
to  have  neglected  it.  You  know,  sir,  to  what  excess  our  French  peoi)le  have 
carried  their  well- or  ill-founded  delicacy.  Too  long  periods  are  distastef lil ; 
an  And  (Et)  or  some  other  word  too  often  repeated  in  the  same  period  offends 
them ;  unusual  constructions  embarrass  them ;  a  trifle,  so  to  speak,  shocks 
them.  It  is  proper,  liowevcr,  to  accommodate  yourself  to  their  taste  if  you 
wish  to  write  in  their  language;  and,  iu  case  you  should  decide  to  print  your 
work,  I  believe  you  will  do  well  to  retouch  it  with  a  little  more  severity.  I 
am  certain  that  you  will  not  be  displeased  at  the  freedom  with  which  I  speak 
to  you,  since  it  comes  from  a  per.son  devoted  to  your  service."  —  Feb.  2, 
1705. 

'  W.  T.  narris,  editor  of  the  "  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,"  suggests  that  per- 
haps the  reading  was  hexn/jne  (work) — instead  of  besoiil.  So  that  the  passage  read, 
"  researches  which  required  more  work  (or  labor)."  —  Tit. 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING 


already  followed  in  the  year  1704,  altered  Leibnitz's  original 
plau.^ 

In  order  to  obtain  an  easier  entrance  for  his  own  ideas,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  make  his  reader  familiar  with  those  of 
Locke,  Leibnitz  had  composed  his  work  in  the  form  of  a  dia- 
logue.  Two  friends,  Phiitaletlie'iji  and  'I'heophilm;,  converse 
tog6tEer;  the"  hrst  states  tiie  views  of  LookCj  the  seconds joiciS 
thereto  his^own  (Leibnitz's)  remarks.  This  form  of  composi- 
tion Leibnitz  thonght  of  abandoning.  He  writes  to  Thomas 
Burnett,  May  26,  1706 :  "  The  death  of  Locke  has  taken  away 
my  desire  to  j^ublish  my  remarks  upon  his  works.  I  prefer 
now  to  publish  my  thoughts  independently  of  those  of 
another."  On  the  other  hand,  he  remarks,  wellnigh  it  seems 
in  tlie  opposite  sense,  to  the  same,  three  years  later.  May  12, 
1709 :  "  My  remarks  upon  the  excellent  work  of  Locke  are 
almost  finished ;  although  we  are  not  of  the  same  opinion,  I 
do  not  cease  to  value  it  and  to  find  it  valuable." 

Leibnitz's  work  remained,  in  form  at  least,  unfinished ;  a 
magnificent  torso,  and  unpublished.^     He  turned  to  the  compo- 

1  Leibnitz  to  Coste,  June  IG,  1707 :  "  The  Rreat  mei-it  of  Mr.  Locke,  and  the 
general  esteem  which  his  work  has  with  so  much  justice  gained,  united  to 
some  intercourse  by  letters  which  I  have  had  tlie  pleasure  of  having  with  my 
Lady  Masham,  caused  me  to  emi^loy  some  weeks  in  remarks  vipon  this  impor- 
tant work,  in  the  hoj)e  of  conferring  upon  them  with  Mr.  Locke  himself.  But 
his  deatli  sliocked  me,  and  caused  my  reflections  to  be  beliiudliand,  although 
they  are  finished.  My  purpose  has  been  to  throw  light  upon  things  rather 
than  to  refute  the  opinions  of  another.  I  shall  be  delighted,  however,  sir,  to 
receive  the  additions  and  con-ections  of  this  excellent  maji,  in  order  to  profit 
from  them."  —  Leibnitz  to  Remond,  March  14,  1714:  "He  (Hugony)  has  also 
seen  my  somewhat  extended  reflections  upon  Locke's  work,  which  treats  of 
Human  Understanding.  But  I  dislike  to  publish  refutations  of  dead  authors, 
although  they  might  appear  during  their  lifetime  and  be  communicated  to  the 
authors  themselves.  Some  minor  remarks  escaped  me,  I  know  not  how,  and 
were  carried  to  England  by  a  relative  of  the  late  Mr.  Burnett,  bishop  of  Salis- 
bury. Locke  having  seen  them,  spoke  of  them  slightingly  in  a  letter  to 
Molyneux,  wliich  may  be  found  among  some  posthun;ous  letters  of  Locke.  I 
learned  his  opinion  of  them  only  from  tliis  impression.  I  am  not  astonished 
at  it :  we  differed  a  little  too  mucli  in  princij)lcs,  and  the  views  I  advanced 
seemed  to  him  paradoxical.  However,  a  friend  more  biassed  in  my  favor  and 
less  so  in  favor  of  Locke  informs  me  that  those  of  my  reflections  there  inserted 
appear  to  him  the  best  of  the  collection.  I  do  not  adopt  this  view,  not  Iiaving 
examined  the  collection." 

2  Over  the  Preface,  which  certainly  was  composed  after  the  completion  of 
the  entire  work,  Ijcibnitz  has  written  as  tlif^  tit le  of  the  work  :  Naitvemtx  E.ssais 
sur  I'entendement  par  I'Auteur  du  systcrne  de  rJIarmonie  preestablie.  In  the 
Preface  itself  he  leaves  out  tlic  word  "humain."    The  superscription  of  the 


10  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

sition  of  the  "Theodicy."  Foi-  the  first  time,  fifty  years  after 
his  death,  it  was  sent  to  the  press  in  "  (lOuvres  i'liik)sophiqiies 
hitines  et  franqoises  de  feu  Mr.  de  Leibnitz.  Tirees  de  ses 
nianuscrits  qui  se  conservent  dans  la  bibliothetj^ue  lloyale  a 
Ilanovre,  et  publiees  par  Mr.  Kud.  Eric.  Raspe.  Avec  une 
Preface  de  Mr.  Kaestner,  Professeur  en  Mathematiques  a 
Gcittingen.  A  Amsterdam  et  a  Leipzig,  1765."  The  present 
impression  has  been  newly  compared  with  the  original,  so  far 
as  it  is  still  extant.^  The  corrections  in  reference  to  the  style 
proposed  by  the  native  Frenchman  are  not  taken  into  consider- 
ation, in  order  not  to  obliterate  Leibnitz's  style  of  expression ; 
they  relate,  indeed,  only  to  the  first  books. 

In  the  preface  to  his  work,  in  w^iich  Leibnitz  has  put 
together  the  points  of  difference  between  his  system  and  that 
of  Locke,  he  remarks  in  the  first  place  that  Locke's  Essay  upon 
Human  Understanding  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  vabia- 
ble  works  of  its  time ;  that  he  has  determined  to  make  some 
remarks  upon  it,  because  he  himself  has  considered  the  same 
subject  for  a  long  time,  and  deemed  it  a  good  opportimity  to 
create  a  favorable  entrance  for  his  own  ideas  in  this  way. 
His  own  system  differs,  in  truth,  from  Locke's  considerably,  in 
so  far  as  Locke's  is  more  closely  related  to  Aristotle,  his  own, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  Plato ;  Locke's  is  more  universally  com- 
prehensible, his  own  more  abstract.  Meanwhile,  by  clothing 
his  own  remarks  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue  between  two  per- 
sons, one  of  whom  presents  Locke's  views,  the  other  joins 
thereto  his  own,  he  hopes  to  avoid  the  dryness  belonging  to 
abstract  remarks ;  at  the  same  time  the  reader  is  spared  the 
labor  of  comparing  the  passages  from  Locke's  essay  under  dis- 
cussion. —  The^  iirst-4«ipGrtiLnt  point— £'£-4iff£rence,_  wherein 
Leibnitz  distinguishes  hi^elffrom_J'"^kfi^  iisjji  the^ques- 
tion_v£lleth£x^-the--S£o^I_is_in_jtself  empty  like_a_to6MZa  rasa,  as 
Aristotle  had  already  maintainecl7  and  thatit  receives  every- 
thing through  sense-perceptions   and  experience,  or  whether 

fourth  hook  runs  thus:  Nouveaux  Essays  siir  V entendement ;  in  the  case  of 
the  three  first  hooks  we  find  the  superscription :  Nouveaux  Essais  sur  V en- 
tendement humaine. 

1  In  the  original,  Leihnitz  has  enclosed  the  words  of  Philalethes,  who  states 
the  \iews  of  Locke,  in  [],  perhaps  as  an  indication  that  they  are  not  his  own. 
Raspe  has  omitted  them.  —  Gerhardt's  Note.  In  this  translation  Gerhardt's 
use  of  [  ]  has  heen  strictly  followed.  —  Tr. 


ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  11 

the  soul  originally  has  the  principles  of  many  conceptions  and 
doctrines,  as  Leibnitz  with  Plato  thinks.  Hence  arises  another 
question,  whether  all  truths  depend  upon  experience,  or  whether 
there  is  still  another  principle.  The  senses  are  necessary  for 
our  actual  knowledge,  but  they  sfive  us  only  examplet^,  -i  p  ij>- 
divMiial-tQlths,  which  are  not  adequate  for  grounding  the  uni- 
versal nep.pssity  of  a.  f.ruth.  The  necessary  truths,  which  are 
fouad  in  pure  mathematics,  appear  to  rest  upon  other  princi- 
ples, whose  proof  depends  not  upon  (.■xix-ricncr'TiiKl  the  testi- 
mony of  the  senses^  — a.  poinJiJiQ  be  wi'll  roiisidrrcd.  Logic,. ^ 
metaphysics^  ethics,  are  full  of  Euch  truths,  wliich  can  arise 
only  Irom~such  principles  as  are  callqd  innate,;  It  is  neverthe- 
less possible,  continues  Leibnitz,  tEaJE^-mj^  opponent  is  not  - 
wholly  remote  from  my  view.  For  after  he  has  rejected 
innate  ideas  in  the  first  book  of  his  essay,  he  begins  the  second 
book  with  the  statement  that  the  ideas  which  have  not  their 
origin  in  sensation  arise  through  reflection.  What,  however, 
is  reflection  but  a  regard  for  what  is  in  us  and  born  in  us  ? 
Such  are  the  ideas  of  being,  unity,  substance,  etc.  If,  thinks  . 
Leibnitz,  an  understanding  with  his  opponent  might  easily, 
perhaps,  be  re-established  in  reference  to  the  above,  yet  it 
might  create  more  difficulty  in  reference  to  the  affirmation 
that  the  soul  does  not  always  think,  just  as  bodies  do  not_ 
always  have  motion.  To  this  Leibnitz  opposes  the  statement 
that  bodies  are  always  in  motion  and  that  a  substance  cannot 
exist  without  activity ;  there  are  in  the  soul  a  multitude  of- ' 
impressions  too  small  to  be  separately  distinguished,  but  which,' 
however,  united  produce  an  activity,  altliough  simply  inarticu- 
late, like  the  noise  of  the  waves.  These  little  perceptions  are 
of  greater  significance  than  we  think.  By" means  of'these  in- 
sensible perceptions  the  j^rc-ostablishcfl  harmony  between  the 
soul  and  the  body  is  explaincil.  I  n  i  he  saiiLO  manner  Fhey  are 
of  great  importance  for  Physics,  for  thereupon  rests  the  law  ' 
of  continuity.  These  mhiute  insensible  perceptions  are  also 
the  reason  Avhy  there  are  not  two  perfectly  similar  souls  or 
things  of  the  same  kind.       ^  ..^ 

Another  point  of  difference  between  Leibnitz  and  Locke  is- 
in  reference  to  the  conception  of  the  nature  of  Matter.     Locke" 
considered  the  smallest  particles  of  matter  to  be  rigid  bodies, 
and  therefore  assumed  that  space  is  empty,  else  were  any  mo- 


LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


tioii  impossible.  Leibnitz,  on  the  other  hand,  supposes  space 
to  be  lilled  with  a  tiuid  matter  which  is  divisible  to  infinity  ; 
he  calls  especial  attention  to  the  fact  that  Locke,  who  at  first 
professed  the  gravitation  theory  of  Newton  constantly  contested 
by  Leibnitz,  viz. :  that  bodies  work  upon  each  other  from  any 
distance  whatever  without  touching,  at  a  later  period  freed 
himself  from  this  assumption  of  Newton. 

In  discussing  the  concepts  of  space,  time,  and  number,  Locke 
had  remarked  that  only  with  these  concepts  may  that  of  infinity 
be  united.  Leibnitz  agrees  with  him  in  this,  that  there  is 
neither  an  infinite  space,  nor  an  infinite  time,  nor  an  infinite 
number,  that  in  general  the  infinite  is  not  given  in  that  which 
is  put  together  out  of  parts.  But  the  true  infinite,  Leibnitz 
adds,  is  in  the  Absolute,  which  is  without  parts.  From  this 
proceeds  the  concept  of  the  finite  through  limitation. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  third  book  Locke  had  undertaken 
a  discussion  of  language  as  the  expression  of  the  forms  of 
knowledge.  He  had  made  thereby  a  distinction  between  nom- 
inal and  real  being.  Leibnitz  rejects  this  distinction  as  a 
perplexing  innovation.  Things,  Leibnitz  affirms,  have  only 
one  essence,  but  different  definitions  of  them,  nominal  and  real 
definitions,  are  possible. 

The  contents  of  the  fourth  book,  in  which  is  treated  the 
knowledge  of  the  truth,  gives  Leibnitz  no  occasion  to  raise  an 
important  point  of  controversy.  In  reference  to  the  axioms, 
whose  indispensableness  to  scientific  investigations  Leibnitz 
affirms,  Locke  contests,  the  former  enters  into  a  more  protracted 
explanation.  In  like  manner  he  turns  against  Locke's  notion 
that  the  use  of  Logic  is  rather  unfruitful. 


ON  LOCKE'S  ESSAY  ON  HUMAN  UNDEESTANDING,^ 

1G96 

{_From  the  FrencW] 

I  FIND  so  many  marks  of  unusual  penetration  in  what 
Mr.  Locke  has  given  us  on  the  Human  Understanding  and 
on  Education,  and  I  consider  the  matter  so  important,  that 
I  have  thought  I  shoukl  not  employ  the  time  to  no  purpose 
which  I  should  give  to  such  profitable  reading ;  so  much  the 
more  as  I  have  myself  meditated  deeply  upon  the  subject 
of  the  foundations  of  our  knowledge.  This  is  my  reason  for 
putting  upon  this  sheet  some  of  the  reflections  which  have 
occurred  to  me  while  reading  his  Essay  on  the  Understanding. 

Of  all  researches,  there  is  none  of  greater  importance,  since 
it  is  the  key  to  all  others.  The  first  book  considers  chiefly 
the  principles  said  to  be  born  with  us.  Mr.  Locke  does  not 
admit  them,  any  more  than  he  admits  innate  ideas.  He  has 
doubtless  had  good  reasons  for  opposing  himself  on  this  point 
to  ordinary  prejudices,  for  the  name  of  ideas  and  principles 
is  greatly  •  abused.  Common  philosophers  manufacture  for 
themselves  principles  according  to  their  fancy ;  and  the 
Cartesians,  who  profess  greater  accuracy,  do  not  cease  to 
intrench  themselves  behind  so-called  ideas  of  extension,  of 
matter,  and  of  the  soul,  desiring  to  avoid  thereby  the  necessity 
of  proving  what  they  advance,  on  the  pretext  tliat  those  who 
will  meditate  on  these  ideas  Avill  discover  in  them  the  same 
thing  as  they ;  that  is  to  say,  that  those  who  will  accustom  them- 
selves to  their  jargon  and  mode  of  thought  will  have  the 
same  prepossessions,  which  is  very  true. 

My  view,  then,  is  that  nothing  should  be  taken  as  first 
principles  but  experiences  and  the  axiom  of  identity  or  (what 

1  Knliuumi,  Lrihniiii  Opcni  Philosujilu'nt,  pp.  i:!()-i:')!).  —  'I^t. 


14  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [i 

is  the  same  thing)  contradiction,  wliich  is  primitive,  since 
otherwise  tliere  wouhl  be  no  dili'ereuce  between  trnth  and 
falsehood ;  and  all  investigation  would  cease  at  once,  if  to 
say  yes  or  no  were  a  matter  of  indifference.  We  cannot,  then, 
prevent  ourselves  from  assuming  this  principle  as  soon  as  we 
wish  to  reason.  All  other  truths  are  demonstrable,  and  I  value 
very  highly  the  method  of  Euclid,  who,  Avithout  stopping  at 
what  would  be  supposed  to  be  sufficiently  proved  by  the  so- 
called  ideas,  lias  demonstrated  (for  instance)  that  in  a  triangle 
one  side  is  always  less  than  the  sum  of  the  other  two.  Yet 
Euclid  was  right  in  taking  some  axioms  for  granted,  not  as 
if  they  were  truly  primitive  and  indemonstrable,  but  because 
he  would  have  come  to  a  standstill  if  he  had  wished  to  reacli 
his  conclusions  only  after  an  exact  discussion  of  principles. 
Thus  he  judged  it  projjcr  to  content  himself  with  having 
pushed  the  proofs  wp  to  this  small  number  of  propositions, 
so  that  it  may  be  said  that  if  they  are  true,  all  that  he  says 
is  also  true.  He  has  left  to  otliers  the  task  of  demonstrating 
further  these  principles  themselves,  which  besides  are  already 
justified  by  experience ;  but  with  this  we  are  not  satisfied  in 
these  matters.  This  is  why  Apollonius,  Proclus,  and  others 
have  taken  the  pains  to  demonstrate  some  of  Euclid's  axioms. 
Philosophers  should  imitate  this  method  of  procedure  in  order 
finally  to  attain  some  fixed  principles,  even  though  they  be 
only  provisional,  after  the  way  I  have  just  mentioned. 

As  for  ideas,  I  have  given  some  explanation  of  them  in  a 
brief  essay  printed  in  the  "  Actes  des  Sgavans  "  ^  of  Leipzig  for 
November,  1(384  (p.  537),  which  is  entitled  Meditationes  de 
Cognitione,  Veritate,  et  Ideis;^  and  I  could  have  wished  that 
Mr.  Locke  had  seen  and  examined  it;  for  I  am  one  of  the  most 
docile  of  men,  and  nothing  is  better  suited  to  advance  our 
thought  than  the  considerations  and  remarks  of  clever  per- 
sons, when  they  are  made  w^ith  attention  and  sincerity.  I 
shall  only  say  here,  that  true  or  real  ideas  are  those  whose 

1  The  "  Afta  Eruditorum,"  Lipsiae,  1682-1731.  — Tr. 

2  Gcrhardt,  Vol.  4,  pp.  422-42fi;  Erdmann,  pp.  78-Sl.  Translated  in  part  by 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  Lectures  on  Louie,  Lect.  X.,  II  XXX.,  pp.  127-12'J, 
Amer.  ed. ;  and  complete  by  George  M.  Duncan,  The  PhUosopliical  Works 
of  Leibnitz,  pp.  27-.32,  New  Haven:  Tuttle,  Morehouse,  &  Taylor,  ISitO; 
also  by  Professor  Thomas  Spencer  Baynes,  in  the  A^jpeudix  to  his  edition 
of  the  Port  Royal  Logic.  —  Tk. 


I]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  15 

execution  we  are  assured  is  possible  ;  the  others  are  doubtful, 
or  (in  case  of  proved  impossibility)  chimerical.  Now  the 
possibility  of  ideas  is  proved  as  much  a  iniori  by  demon- 
strations, by  making  use  of  the  possibility  of  other  more 
simple  ideas,  as  a  posteriori  by  experience ;  for  what  exists 
cannot  fail  to  be  possible.  But  primitive  ideas  are  those 
whose  possibility  '■"-  T^^.1'>"^"'--cf,.oi^iQ^  miri  wVii^v.  ^^^^  in  i-.i-nth 
np^Tng  else  than  the  attribute!^  of  GnrL 

.*^  I  do  not  find  it  absolutely  essential  for  the  beginning  or  for 
the  practice  of  the  art  of  thinking  to  decide  the  question 
whether  there  are  ideas  and  truths  born  with  us  ;  whether  they 
all  come  to  us  from  without  or  from  ourselves  ;  we  will  reason 
correctly  provided  we  observe  what  I  have  said  above,  and 
proceed  in  an  orderly  way  and  without  prejudice.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  and  of  our  maxims  is  not  pre- 
liminary in  Philosophy,  and  we  must  have  made  great  progress 
in  order  to  solve  it  successfully,  I  think,  however,  that  I  can 
say  that  our  ideas,  even  those  of  sensible  things,  come  from 
within  our  own  soul,^  of  which  view  you  can  the  better  judge  by 
what  I  have  published '  upon  the  nature  and  connection  of  sub- 
stances aiid  what  is  called  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the  body. 
For  I  have  found  that  these  things  had  not  been  well  under- 
stood. I  am  nowise  in  favor  of  Aristotle's  tabula  rasa;  and 
there  is  something  substantial  in  what  Plato  called  reminis- 
cence. There  is  even  something  more;  for  we  not  only  have  a. 
reminiscence  of  all  our  past  thoughts,  but  also  a  presentiment 
of  all  our  future  thoughts.  It  is  true  that  this  is  confused, 
and  fails  to  distinguish  them,  in  much  the  same  way  as  when 
I  hear  the  noise  of  the  sea  I  hear  that  of  all  the  particular 
waves  which  make  up  the  noise  as  a  whole,  though  without 
discerning  one  wave  from  another.  Thus  it  is  true  in  a  cer- 
tain sense,  as  I  have  explained,  that  not  only  our  ideas,  but 
also  our  sensations,  spring  from  within  our  own  soul,  and  that 
the  soul  is  more  independent  than  is  thought,  although  it  is 
always  true  that  nothing  takes  place  in  it  which  is  not  deter- 


1  The  French  is :  "  de  nostrc  propre  fotids."  —  Tr. 

2  In  the  "Journal  des  Savants,"  June,  KiiJS.  For  the  piece,  cf.  Gcrhardt, 
Vol.  4,  pp.  477  .sry.  (first  sketch  470  nq.) ;  and  the  portion  of  his  introduction 
and  notes  referring  to  tlio  same,  Vol.  4,  ])p.  414-417;  I'h-dniann,  pp.  124-128; 
cf.  also  pp.  129-i;J6.    For  tlie  translation,  Appendix,  pp.  . — Tu. 


10  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [i 


mined,  and  nothing  is  found  in  creatures  that  (iod  does  not 
continually  create. 

In  Book  II.,  which  comes  to  the  details  of  ideas,  1.  admit  that 
the  reasons  brought  forward  by  Mr.  Locke  to  prove  that  the 
soul  sometimes  exists  without  thinking  of  anything,  do  not  ap- 
pear to  me  convincing,  unless  he  gives  the  name  of  thoughts  to 
those  perceptions  only  which  are  sufficiently  noticeable  to  be 
distinguished  and  retained.  I  hold  that  the  soul  (and  even  the 
body)  is  never  without  action,  and  that  the  soul  is  never  with- 
out some  perception  :  even  in  dreamless  sleep  we  have  a  con- 
fused and  dull  sensation  of  the  place  where  we  are ;  and  of 
other  things.  But  even  if  experience  should  not  confirm  the 
view,  I  believe  that  it  may  be  demonstrated.  It  is  much  the 
same  as  we  cannot  prove  absolutely  by  experience  whether 
there  is  a  vacuum  in  space,  and  Avhether  there  is  rest  in  matter. 
Nevertheless,  questions  of  this  kind  appear  to  me,  as  well  as 
to  Mr.  Locke,  to  be  decided  demonstratively. 

I  admit  the  difference  which  he  puts  with  much  reason  be- 
tween matter  and  space ;  but  as  for  the  vacuum,  many  clever 
people  have  believed  in  it.  Mr.  Locke  is  of  this  number.  I 
was  nearly  persuaded  of  it  m3'self ;  but  I  gave  it  up  long  ago. 
And  the  incomparable  Mr.  Huygens,  who  was  also  for  the 
vacuum  and  the  atoms,  began  at  last  to  reflect  upon  my 
reasons,  as  his  letters  can  testify.  The  proof  of  the  vacuum 
derived  from  motion,  of  which  Mr,  Locke  makes  use,  assumes 
that  body  is  originally  hard,  and  that  it  is  composed  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  inflexible  parts.  For  in  this  case  it  would  be 
true,  whatever  finite  number  of  atoms  might  be  taken,  that 
motion  could  not  take  place  Avithout  a  vacuum.  But  all  the 
parts  of  matter  are  divisible  and  even  pliable. 

There  are  also  some  other  things  in  this  second  book  which 
arrest  my  attention:  for  example,  when  it  is  said  (chap.  17) 
that  infinity  should  be  attributed  only  to  space,  time,  and  num- 
bers. I  believe,  indeed,  with  Mr.  Locke  that,  properly  speak- 
ing, we  may  say  that  there  is  no  space,  time,  nor  number  Avhich 
is  infinite,  but  that  it  is  only  true  that  however  great  ^  may  be 

1  Gerlmrdt's  text  seems  here,  for  some  reason,  to  he  defective.  It  reads 
thus  :  "  Mais  qu'il  est  seiilement  vray  que  pour  ^rand  que  luy  sans  fiu,"  etc. 
Erdmann's  seems  tlie  more  correct,  and  is  therefore  followed  in  the  translation. 
It  reads  thus:  "Mais  qu'il  est  seulemcnt  vrai  que  pour  grand  que  soit  uu 
espace,  iin  tems,  ou  un  nombre,  il  y  en  a  toujours  un  autre  plus  grand  que  lui 


I]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  17 

a  space,  a  time,  or  a  number,  there  is  always  another  greater 
than  it  without  end ;   and  that  thus  the  true  infinite  is  not  * 
found  in  a  whole  composed  of  parts.     It  is  none  the  less,  how- 
ever, found  elsewhere ;  namely,  in  the  absolute,  which  is  with- 
out  parts,  and  which  has   infiuence  over   compound   things, 
because  they  result  from  the  limitation  of  the  absolute.     The 
positive  infinite,  then,  being  nothing  else  than  the  absolute,  it 
may  be  said  that  there  is  in  this  sense  a  positive  idea  of  the  / 
infinite,  and  that  it  is  anterior  to  that  of  the  finite.     For  the/ 
rest,  in  rejecting   a  composite  infinite,  we  do   not  deny  the 
demonstrations  of  the  geometers  de  Seriebus  infinitis,  and  par- 
ticularly what  the  excellent  Mr.  Newton  has  given  us,  not  to 
mention  my  own  contributions  to  the  subject. 

As  for  what  is  said  (chap.  30)  de  ideis  adcequatis,  it  is 
allowable  to  give  to  the  terms  the  signification  which  one  finds 
pertinent.  Yet  without  finding  fanlt  with  Mr.  Locke's  mean- 
ing, I  put  degrees  in  ideas,  according  to  which  I  call  those 
adequate  in  which  there  is  nothing  more  to  explain,  much  the 
same  as  in  numbers.  Now  all  ideas  of  sense-qualities,  as  of 
light,  color,  heat,  not  being  of  this  nature,  I  do  not  reckon 
them  among  the  adequate.  So  it  is  not  through  themselves, 
nor  a  prioTi,  but  through  experience,  that  we  know  their  reality 
or  possibility. 

There  are  further  many  good  things  in  Book  III.  in  which 
he  treats  of  words  or  terms.  It  is  very  true  that  everything 
cannot  be  defined,  and  that  sense-qualities  have  no  nominal 
definition:  thus  they  may  be  called  primitive  in  this  sense  ;  but 
they  can  none  the  less  receive  a  real  definition.  I  have  shown 
the  difference  between  these  two  kinds  of  definition  in  the 
meditation  ^  cited  above.  The  nominal  definition  explains  the 
name  by  the  marks  of  the  thing;  but  the  real  definition  makes 
known  a  priori  the  possibility  of  the  thing  defined.  For  the 
rest,  I  strongly  commcmd  Mr.  Locke's  doctrine  of  the  demon- 
strability  of  moral  truths. 

The  foiirth  or  last  book,  which  treats  of  the  knowledge  of 
truth,  shows  the  use  of  what  has  just  been  said.  I  find  in  it, 
as  well  as  in  the  preceding  books,  an  infinite  number  of  beauti- 

sans  fin."  p.  138  a.  Cf.  also  Leibniz's  New  Essays  cmir.erninr/  the  Human 
Understanding.  —  A  Critical  Exposition,  by  John  Dewo^y,  Ph.D.  i^p.  190. 
Chi(^aso:  S.  C.  Gri.iLfss  &  Co.,  1888.  — Til. 

^  I.e.  Meditationes  de  Cof/nitione,  Voritate,  et  Idcis.  —  Tii. 
C 


18"  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [i 

fill  vetlectious.  To  make  suitable  remarks  upon  them  would 
be  to  make  a  book  as  large  as  the  work  itself.  It  seems  to  me 
that  the  axioms  receive  therein  a  little  less  consideration  than 
they  deserve.  The  apparent  reason  for  this  is  that,  excepting 
those  of  the  matliematicians,  we  ordinarily  find  none  which 
are  important  and  solid:  I  have  tried  to  remedy  this  defect.  I 
do  not  despise  identical  propositions,  and  I  have  found  that 
they  are  of  great  use  even  in  analysis.  It  is  very  true  that 
we  know  our  own  existence  by  an  immediate  intuition,  and 
that  of  God  by  demonstration;  and  that  a  mass  of  matter, 
whose  parts  are  witliout  perception,  cannot  make  a  thinking 
whole.  I  do  not  despise  the  argument  invented  some  centuries 
ago  by  Auselm,  archbishop  of  Canterbury,  which  proves  that 
the  perfect  being  must  exist;  although  I  find  that  the  argu- 
ment lacks  something,  because  it  assumes  that  the  perfect 
being  is  possible.  For  if  this  single  point  were  proved  in  addi- 
tion, the  whole  demonstration  would  be  complete. 

As  for  the  knowledge  of  other  things,  it  is  very  well  said, 
that  experience  alone  does  not  suffice  for  a  sufficient  advance 
in  Physics.  A  penetrating  mind  Avill  draw  more  conclusions 
from  some  quite  ordinary  experiences,  than  another  could  draw 
from  the  most  choice ;  besides,  there  is  an  art  of  experimenting 
upon  and,  so  to  speak,  (j^uestioning  nature.  Yet  it  is  always 
true  that  we  can  make  progress  in  the  details  of  Physics  only 
in  ])roportion  as  we  have  experience. 

Our  author  shares  with  many  able  men  the  opinion  that  the 
forms  of  logic  are  of  little  use.  I  should  be  quite  of  another 
opinion,  and  I  have  often  found  that  the  paralogisms,  even  of 
mathematics,  are  the  faults  of  form.  Mr.  Huygens  has  made 
the  same  observation.  Much  might  be  said  upon  this  point, 
and  many  excellent  things  are  despised  because  the  use  of 
which  they  are  capable  is  not  made  of  them.  We  are  inclined 
to  despise  what  we  have  learned  in  the  schools.  It  is  true  we 
learn  there  many  useless  things ;  but  it  is  good  to  exercise 
the  function  della  Crusca,^  i.e.  to  separate  the  good  from  the 
bad. 

1  "La  C'ntsca,  a  celebrated  academy  of  Florence,  founded  in  15S2,  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  purity  of  tlie  Italian  language,  tliat  is  to  say,  of 
separjitiug  the  bran  (rrusca)  from  the  tloiu" :  hence  the  name."  Duncan's  note. 
Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  j).  378. 


i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  19 

Mr.  Locke  Ccan  do  this  as  well  as  any  one  whatsoever ;  and  in 
addition  he  gives  us  important  thoughts  of  his  own  invention ; 
his  penetration  and  fairness  appear  everywhere.^  He  is  not 
only  an  assayer,  but  he  is  also  a  transmuter  by  the  increase  of 
good  metal  he  gives.  Should  he  continue  to  present  it  to  the 
public,  we  should  be  greatly  indebted  to  him. 

1  Erdmauu  omits  this  clause.  — Tr. 


II 


SPECIMEN  OF  THOUGHTS  UPON  THE  FIRST  BOOK 
OF  THE  ESSAY  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING 

[Fram  the  French^ 

In  order  to  prove  that  there  are  no  ideas  born  with  us,  the 
excellent  author  of  the  Essay  on  Human  Understanding  ad- 
duces experience,  which  shows  us  that  Av^e  need  external  occa- 
sions in  order  to  think  of  these  ideas.  I  agree  with  him,  but 
it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  it  follows  that  the  occasions  which 
cause  us  to  see  them,  cause  them  to  spring  into  being.  And 
this  experience  cannot  determine  whether  it  is  through  immis- 
sion  of  a  species  or  by  impression  of  outlines  upon  an  empty 
tablet,  or  whether  it  is  by  the  development  of  Avhat  is  already 
in  us  that  we  perceive  ourselves.  It  is  not  extraordinary  that 
there  be  somewhat  in  our  mind  of  which  we  are  not  always 
conscious.  Reminiscence  shows  us  that  we  often  have  diffi- 
culty in  remembering  what  we  know,  and  in  seizing  what  is 
already  in  the  enclosure  and  possession  of  our  understanding. 
This  proving  to  be  the  truth  in  acquired  knowledge,  nothing 
prevents  its  being  also  true  in  the  case  of  that  which  is  innate. 
And,  indeed,  there  is  still  more  difficulty  in  perceiving  this 
last,  since  it  has  not  yet  been  modified  and  detailed  by  ex- 
perience, as  is  the  acquired,  of  which  often  the  circumstances 
remind  us. 

The  author  undertakes  to  show  in  particular  that  impossibil- 
ity and  identity,  whole  and  part,  etc.,  are  not  innate  ideas.  But 
I  do  not  understand  the  force  of  the  proofs  he  brings.  I  ad- 
mit that  it  is  difficult  to  make  men  perceive  distinctly  these 
metaphysical  notions,  for  abstraction  and  thought  cost  them 
^effort.  But  one  may  have  in  himself  that  which  he  has  diffi- 
•  culty  in  distinguishing  there.  Something  else,  howeverj  than 
20 


I]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  21 

the  idea  of  identity  is  necessary  to  answer  the  (j^uestion,  which 
is  here  proposed,  viz. :  Whether  Euphorbus  and  Pythagoras 
and  the  cock/  in  which  the  soul  of  Pythagoras  dwelt  for  some 
time,  were  always  the  same  individual,  and  it  does  not  at  all 
follow  that  those  who  cannot  solve  this  question  have  no  idea 
of  identity.  What  is  clearer  than  the  ideas  of  geometry  ?  ■ 
Yet  there  are  some  questions  which  Ave  have  not  yet  been  able 
to  decide.  But  that  one  which  considers  the  identity  of  Pytha- 
goras following  the  story  of  his  metempsychosis  is  not  one  of 
the  most  impenetrable. 

Eegarding  the  idea  of  God,  he  brings  forward  examples  of 
some  nations  who  have  had  no  such  knowledge.  M.  Fabritius, 
a  very  distinguished  theologian  of  the  late  Elector  Palatine 
Charles  Louis,  has  published  the  "  L'Apologie  du  genre  humain 
contre  I'accusation  de  I'Atheisnie,"  in  which  he  replies  to  such 
passages  as  are  here  cited.  But  I  do  not  enter  into  this  dis- 
cussion. Suppose  there  are  men,  and  even  peoples,  who  have" 
never  thought  of  God;  we  may  say  that  this  fact  proves  only 
that  there  has  not  been  an  occasion  sufficient  to  awaken  in 
them  the  idea  of  the  supreme  substance. 

Before  passing  to  the  complex  principles  or  })rimitive  truths, 
I  will  say  that  I  agree  that  the  knowledge,  or  better,  the  actual 
consideration  (envisagement) ,  oi  ideas  and  trutlis  is  not  innate, 
and  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  we  have  distinctly  known 
them  in  a  former  state  of  being,  according  to  Plato's  doctrine 
of  reminiscence.  ])ut  the  idea  being  taken  for  the  immediate 
internal  object  of  a  notion,  or  of  what  the  logicians  call  an 
incomplex  term,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  its  always  being 
in  us,  for  these  objects  can  subsist  when  they  are  not  per- 
ceived. Ideas  aiid  truths  may,  furthermore,  be  divided  into 
primitive  and  derivative :  the  knowledge  of  the  primitives , 
does  not  need  to  be  formed ;  they  must  be  distinguished  only ; 
that  of  the  derivative  is  formed  by  the  understanding  and  by ' 
the  reason  upon  occasion.  However,  we  may  say  in  one  sense, 
tliat  the  internal  objects  of  this  knowledge,  th;it  is  to  say,  the 
ideas  and  truths  themselves,  primitive  as  well  as  derivative, 
are  all  in  us,  since  all  the  derivative  ideas  and  all  the  truths 
deduced  from  them  riisult  from  the  relations  of  primitive  ideas  ' 
which  are  in  us.     But  usage  makes  it  customary  to  call  innate 

1  Cf.  I.oekc,  /V//7'..s'.  ICoz-Z-.s  (liolm's  cd.),  Vol.  1,  p.  LSI  .s^.,  and  note.  —  Tu. 


22  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [ii 

tho  tvutlis  to  which  credence  is  given  us  soon  as  they  are 
heard,  and  the  itleas  whose  reality  (that  is  to  say,  the  possibility 
of  the  thing  which  it  represents)  is  of  the  number  of  these 
truths,  and  needs  not  to  be  proved  by  experience  or  by  reason; 
there  is  then  considerable  ambiguity  in  this  question,  and  it 
sutlices  at  the  last  to  recognize  that  there  is  an  internal  light 
born  with  us,  which  comprises  all  the  intelligible  ideas  and  all 
tlie  necessary  truths  which  are  only  a  result  of  these  ideas  and 
need  not  experience  in  order  to  be  proved. 

To  reduce,  then,  this  discussion  to  something  practical,  I 
believe  that  the  true  end  one  should  have  is  the  determination 
of  the  grounds  of  truths  and  their  origin.  I  admit  that  con- 
tingent truths,  or  truths  of  fact,  come  to  us  by  observation 
and  experience ;  but  I  hold  that  necessary  derivative  truths  de- 
pend upon  demotistration,  i.e.  upon  definitions  or  ideas,  united 
with  the  primitive  truths.  And  the  primitive  truths  (such  as 
the  principle  of  contradiction)  do  not  come  at  all  from  the 
.senses  or  from  experience,  and  cannot  be  perfectly  proved,  but 
from  the  natural  internal  light,  and  this  is  what  I  mean  in 
saying  that  they  are  innate.  The  geometers  also  have  very 
well  understood  this.  They  could  prove  passably  their  proposi- 
tions (at  least,  the  most  important  of  them)  by  experience,  and 
I  do  not  doubt  that  the  ancient  Egyptian  and  the  Chinese 
had  such  an  experimental  geometry.  But  the  true  geometers, 
above  all,  the  Greeks,  have  desired  to  show  the  force  of  rea- 
son, and  the  excellence  of  science,  by  showing  that  they  can 
in  these  matters  foresee  everything,  by  the  internal  light  in 
advance  of  experience.  It  must  also  be  admitted  that  experi- 
tence  never  assures  us  of  a  perfect  universality,  and  still  less 
of  necessity.  Some  of  the  ancients  laughed  at  Euclid  because 
he  proved  what  a  fool  even  is  not  ignorant  of  (as  they  say),  viz. : 
that  in  a  triangle  two  sides  together  are  greater  than  the  third. 
But  those  who  know  what  genuine  analysis  is,  are  much 
obliged  to  Euclid  for  his  proof.  And  it  is  much  that  the 
Greeks,  if  less  exact  in  other  things,  have  been  so  much  so  in 
geometry.  I  attribute  it  to  providence;  and  I  believe  without 
that  we  should  hardly  know  what  demonstration  is.  I  also 
believe  that  it  is  principally  in  that  respect  that  we  are  thus 
•far  superior  to  the  Chinese. 

But  it  is  needful  further  to  look  a  little  at  wjiat  our  clever 


ii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  23 

and  celebrated  author  says  in  chapters  2  and  3,  to  sustain  his 
point  that  there  are  no  innate  principles.  He  is  opposed  to 
the  universal  consent  alleged  in  their  favor,  maintaining  that 
many  races  doubt  even  this  famous  principle  that  two  contra- 
dictories cannot  be  true  or  false  at  once,  and  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  human  race  ignores  it  altogether.  I  admit  that 
there  are  an  infinite  number  of  persons  who  have  never  made 
a  statement  of  them.  I  have  indeed  seen  authors  who  desired 
to  refute  them,  apprehending  them,  without  doubt,  wrongly. 
But  where  shall  we  find  one  who  does  not  avail  himself  of 
them  in  practical  life,  and  who  is  not  offended  with  a  liar  who 
contradicts  him  ?  JSTevertheless,  I  do  not  ground  myself  wholly 
upon  universal  consent ;  and  as  for  propositions  which  are  ap- 
proved as  soon  as  they  are  proposed,  I  admit  that  it  is  not  at 
all  necessary  for  them  to  be  primitive  or  proximate  to  them, 
for  they  may  be  very  common  facts.  As  for  this  statement 
which  teaches  us  that  one  and  one  make  two  (which  the  author  ■ 
brings  forward  as  an  example),  it  is  not  an  axiom,  but  a  defini-' 
tion.  And  when  he  says  that  sweetness  is  a  different  thing  ■ 
from  bitterness,  he  states  only  a  fact  of  primitive  experience, 
or  of  immediate  perception.  Or  better,  we  have  only  to  say 
that  the  perception  of  what  is  understood  by  the  term  sweet- 
ness is  different  from  the  perception  of  that  which  is  under- 
stood by  the  term  bitterness.  I  do  not  here  distinguish  at  all 
the  practical  truths  from  the  speculative ;  they  are  always  the 
same.  And  as  we  can  say  that  it  is  one  of  the  most  manifest 
trutlis,  that  a  substance  whose  knowledge  and  power  are 
infinite  should  be  honored,  we  can  say  that  it  emanates  at 
once  from  the  light  which  is  born  with  us,  provided  one  can 
give  his  attention  to  it. 


SPECIMEN   OF   THOUGHTS    UPON   THE    SECOND 
1500K 

[From  the  French'] 

It  is  very  true  that  our  perceptions  of  ideas  conu:;  either 
from  the  external  senses  or  from  the  internal  sense,  which  may 
be  called  rcfiectinn :  Init  tliis  reflection  is  not  limit('(l  to  the 


24  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [ii 

oitorations  alone  of  the  iniml,  as  is  stated  (chap.  1,  §  4)  ;  it 
reaches  even  to  the  mind  itself,  and  it  is  in  the  consciousness 
of  self  that  we  perceive  substance. 

I  admit  that  I  am  of  the  opinion  of  those  who  believe  that 
the  soul  always  thinks,  although  often  its  thoughts  are  too 
confused  and  too  feeble  for  it  to  be  able  distinctly  to  remember 
them.  I  believe  I  have  certain  proofs  of  the  continual  activity 
of  the  soul,  and  I  believe  also  that  the  body  can  never  be 
without  motion.  The  objections  raised  by  the  author  (Book 
II.,  chap.  1,  §§  10  to  19)  can  be  easily  met  by  what  I  have  just 
said  or  am  about  to  say.  They  are  based  upon  the  experience 
of  sleep,  which  is  sometimes  dreamless  ;  and  in  fact  there  are 
some  persons  who  do  not  know  what  it  is  to  dream.  How- 
ever, it-is  not  always  safe  to  deny  everything  that  is  notj^er- 
ceived.  It  is  much  the  same  as  when  there~afe  people  who 
deny  the  corpuscles  and  insensible  motions,  and  laugh  at  the 
particles  bemuse  they  cannot  be  proved.  But  some  one  will 
tell  me  that  there  are  proofs  which  force  us  to  admit  them. 
I  reply  that  there  are  in  like  manner  proofs  which  compel  us 
to  admit  perceptions  which  are  not  marked  enough  for  us  to 
remember  them.  Experience,  furthermore,  favors  this  view ; 
fo'flnstance,  those  who  have  slept  in  a  cold  place  notice  that 
they  have  had  while  sleeping  a  confused  and  feeble  sensation. 
I  know  a  person  who  wakes  up  when  the  lamp  which  he 
always  keeps  lighted  at  night  in  his  room  goes  out.  But  here 
is  something  more  precise,  and  which  shows  that  if  we  did 
not  always  have  perceptions,  we  could  never  be  waked  up 
"from  sleep.  Let  a  man  who  is  sleeping  be  called  by  several 
persons  at  once,  and  let  it  be  assumed  that  the  voice  of  each 
by  itself  is  not  loud  enough  to  awake  him,  but  that  the  noise 
of  all  these  voices  together  awakes  him  :  let  us  take  one  of 
them  ;  it  is  very  necessary  that  he  be  touched  by  this  voice  in 
particular,  for  the  parts  are  in  the  whole,  and  if  each  one  by 
itself  does  nothing  at  all,  the  whole  will  do  nothing,  either. 
Yet  he  would  have  continued  to  sleep,  if  the  voice  had  been  a 
single  one,  and  that,  too,  without  remembering  that  he  had  been 
called.  Thus  there  are  some  perceptions  too  feeble  to  be 
noticed,  although  they  are  alwaj's  retained,  but  among  an  infi- 
nite number  of  other  small  perceptions  which  we  have  con- 
tinually.    For  neither  motions  nor  perceptions  are  ever  lost; 


ii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  25 

both  continue  always,  only  becoming  indistinguishable  through 
composition  with  many  others.  One  might  reply  to  this 
reasoning,  that  each  voice  by  itself  effectively  touches  the 
body,  but  that  a  certain  quantity  of  it  is  needed  in  order  that 
the  motion  of  the  body  may  reach  the  soul.  I  reply,  that  the 
least  impression  reaches  the  entire  body,  and  consequently  to 
that  part  whose  motions  correspond  to  the  actions  of  the  soul. 
And  accordingly  no  principle  of  limitation  can  be  found,  how- 
ever necessary  a  certain  quantity  may  be.  I  do  not  wish  to , 
insist  upon  the  interest  that  the  immortality  of  the  soul  has 
in  this  doctrine.  For  if  the  soul  is  passive,  it  is  also  without 
life,  and  it  seems  that  it  can  be  immortal  only  by  grace  and  by 
miracle —  a  view  which  there  is  reason  to  disapprove.  I  admit, 
however,  that  our  interest  is  not  the  measure  of  truth,  and  I 
do  not  wish  to  mix  here  theological  reasons  with  those  of 
philosophy. 


TIT 

[From  the  German'] 

Essai  Pliilosophique  concernaiit  rEntendement  Immain,  ou  Ton  montre, 
quelle  est  roiitendtie  de  iios  conuoissances  certaines  et  la  maiiiere  doiit  nous  y 
pavveuons,  traduit  de  I'Anglois  de  Mr.  Locke  par  Mr.  Pierre  Coste,  sur  la 
quatrieiue  edition,  revue,  corrigee  et  augmentee  par  I'Auteur.  A  Amsterd. 
1700  iu  4to. 

rbilosophiscber  Versuch,  betreffend  deu  Menscbliclien  Verstand,  ahvo 
gewiesen  wird,  wie  weit  sicb  unsre  gewisse  Erkiiudtniissen  erstreckeu,  und 
auf  wass  Weise  wir  darzu  gelangen;  au.sz  den  Englischen  iibersetzet  von  Hrn. 
Peter  Coste  naeb  der  vierten  vom  Autor  selbst  Ubersebeuen,  verbe.sserten  und 
-Aermebrten  Edition.    5.  Alpb.  12.  Bog. 

It  '  is  uitnecessavy  for  tis  to  give  a  complete  abstract  of  this 
notable  book,  after  the  author  himself  has  relieved  us  of  this 
task,  since  in  the  year  1688  he  prepared  such  an  abstract  for 
Mr.  Clerc  for  insertion  in  his  "  Bibliotheque  universelle,"  ^ 
T.  YIII.,  p.  49  sqq.,  before  be  gave  it  to  the  press.  In  the  year 
1690  it  appeared  first  in  London  in  folio,  and  Mr.  Clerc  again 
published  lengthy  excerpts  in  the  said  "  Bibliotheque  univer- 
selle,"  T.  XVII.,  p.  399.  Soon  afterwards  a  new  English  edition 
appeared,  enlarged  with  many  pieces,  and  in  particular  Avith 
an  entire  chapter  ^  on  Identity  and  Diversity,  which  he  treats 
in  an  exceedingly  clear  and  excellent  manner. 

Ill  the  second  edition  mentioned,  Locke  acknowledges  that 
he  erred  in  the  first  edition  when  he  assumed,  in  accordance 
with  the  common  view,  that  what  brings  the  Avill  to  any  change 
of  action  in  the  course  of  arbitrary  actions  is  the  assurance  of 
a  much  greater  good.  For  when  he  considered  the  matter 
more  carefully,  he  found  that  a  present  unrest  which  consists 
in  desire  or  is  constantly  accompanied  by  the  same,  places  its 
limits  upon  the  will.     For  the  reasons  for  this  view,  see  Book 

1  From  tbe  "  Monatliche  Auszug,"  Sept.  1700,  pp.  (311-{i3G.  — Tr. 
~  "  Bililiotbeque  universelle  et  bistorique,"  Amsterdam,  1G8G-1()S)3.  —  Tr. 
3  In  tbe  present  edition  tbis  ebapter  is  27  in  tbe  second  book.  — Gerbardt's 
note. 

26 


Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  27 

II.,  chap.  21.  He  will  gladly,  however,  be  informed  of  a  bet- 
ter view.  Some  time  after,  a  third,  and  in  the  year  1699,  a 
fourth,  edition  appeared,  in  which  last  edition  Locke  either 
further  explained  his  previous  thoughts  by  many  additions  or 
supported  them  by  wholly  new  grounds.  Peter  Coste  made 
his  translation  on  the  basis  of  this  edition,  and  when  Locke 
sent  him  his  manuscript,  had  worked  upon  the  same  for  more 
than  two  years.  Locke  himself  considered  this  translation  a 
good  one  and  presented  his  thanks  accordingly,  so  that  con- 
sequently it  must  be  the  more  welcome  by  a  great  deal  to  us. 

To  enumerate  all  the  new  additions  would  take  too  long; 
hence  we  Avill  content  ourselves  with  the  mention  of  the  two 
most  important,  which  make  two  separate  chapters,  of  which 
the  first  is  Book  XL,  chap.  33,  and  treats  of  the  Association  of 
Ideas. 

Locke  says  there  is  almost  no  one  who  does  not  find 
something  in  the  opinions,  conclusions,  and  actions  of  other 
people  which  seems  to  him  fantastic  and  extravagant,  and  is  so 
in  fact.  Every  one  may  have  eyes  keen-sighted  enough  to 
mark  the  least  fault  of  this  kind  in  the  case  of  another,  if 
only  it  may  be  distinguished  from  his  own,  and  he  himself  may 
have  sufficient  understanding  to  condemn  the  same,  although 
he  also  may  have  in  his  own  opinions  and  his  own  conduct  the 
greatest  errors  of  which  he  might  be  aware,  and  of  which, 
where  not  impossible,  he  may  yet  with  difficulty  be  convinced. 

This  arises,  he  continues,  not  merely  from  self-love,  although 
this  passion  has  often  a  great  part  therein.  For  one  daily  sees 
such  people  lying  sick  with  the  same  disease,  who  are  otherwise 
skilful  and  whole  enough  to  make  nothing  of  their  own  merits. 

This  defect  of  reason  is  customarily  ascribed  to  education 
and  to  the  force  of  prejudice,  and  this,  according  to  the  common 
opinion,  not  without  cause,  but  according  to  Locke's  statement, 
this  explanation  reaches  not  to  the  root  of  the  disease,  and  does 
not  show  completely  its  origin  and  peculiarity. 

He  himself  explains  it  as  follows:  Some  of  our  ideas  [his 
own  words]  have  among  themselves  an  exact  correspondence 
and  connection.  The  o1)ligation  and  highest  perfection  of  our 
reason  consists  in  tlie  fact  that  it  reveals  such  ideas  and  holds 
them  together  in  the  selfsame  unity  and  correspondence  as 
that  which  is  grounded  in  their  particular  nature.     There  is 


28  LKIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [in 

besides  this  another  bond  of  ideas  which  depends  u})on  chance 
or  custom,  so  that  the  ideas  which  naturally  are  wholly  unre- 
hxted  become  so  exactly  united  in  the  minds  (esprit  ^ )  of  some 
men,  that  they  can  with  difficulty  be  separated  from  one 
another.  They  accompany  one  another  constantly,  and  one  can 
no  sooner  present  itself  to  the  understanding  (intellectui) 
than  the  others  or,  indeed,  more  of  them,  so  united  are  they, 
appear  also,  nor  can  they  at  all  be  separated  from  one  another. 

This  association  of  ideas,  which  the  mind  makes  in  itself 
either  voluntarily  or  by  chance,  is  the  sole  source  of  the  defect 
of  which  we  now  speak.  And  as  this  strong  union  of  ideas  is 
not  originally  caused  by  nature,  it  is  for  this  reason  wholly  dif- 
ferent in  different  persons,  viz. :  according  to  their  different 
inclinations,  education,  and  self-interests. 

That  there  are  such  associations  of  ideas,  which  custom 
begets  in  the  minds  of  most  men,  no  one,  according  to  Locke's 
statement,  can  doubt,  who  with  much  earnestness  considers 
himself  and  other  people.  And  to  this  cause  can  perhaps  with 
convenience  and  reason  be  ascribed  the  greater  part  of  those 
symiDathies  and  antipathies  which  one  finds  among  men,  and 
which  w'ork  as  strongl}^  and  produce  as  regular  effects,  as  if 
they  were  natural,  which  fact  then  makes  them  to  be  called  so, 
although  at  first  view  they  had  no  other  origin  than  the  chance 
connection  of  two  ideas,  which  the  strength  of  a  first  impres- 
sion, or  of  an  excessively  great  compliance,  so  firmly  united, 
that  they  always  thereafter  remain  together  in  the  mind  of 
the  man,  as  though  only  a  single  idea.  Locke,  however,  in  no 
respect  denies  that  there  are  wholly  natural  antipathies  which 
depend  upon  our  original  constitution  and  are  born  with  us. 
He  believes,  however,  that  with  proper  consideration  man 
would  recognize  the  most  of  those  which  have  been  regarded 
as  natural,  as  in  the  beginning  caused  by  impressions  which 
w^ere  not  heeded,  whether  they  were  suggested  sufficiently 
early  or  through  a  ridiculous  fancy.  Locke  notices  incidentally 
the  difference  which  may  be  made  between  natural  and  ac- 
quired antipathies,   so  that  those  who  have  children  or  who 

1  This  word  I  have  voluntarily  retained  here  and  for  the  most  part  in  what 
follows,  because  it  cannot  he  expressed  quite  clearly  in  German.  —  Leibnitz's 
note,  Gerhardt,  p.  27. 

Perhaps  we  should  retain  the  word  "  esjn-it  "  in  English.  —  Tr. 


in]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  29 

must  educate  tliein,  may  see  how  much  heed  they  shouLl  take 
of  this  principle,  and  with  what  care  this  disorderly  union  of 
ideas  in  the  mind  of  the  youth  should  be  prevented. 

He  thereupon  points  out  by  some  examples  how  such  a  union 
of  ideas,  which  are  not  of  themselves  united,  yet  depend  one 
upon  another,  is  sufficient  to  impede  our  moral  and  natural 
action,  yea  more,  our  notions  themselves. 

The  ideas  of  goblins  or  of  spirits  agree  as  little  with  dark- 
ness as  with  light ;  if,  however,  a  foolish  maid  instils  and 
aAvakens  these  different  ideas  in  the  mind  of  a  child,  as  though 
they  were  connected  with  each  other,  the  child  during  his  entire 
life  will  perhaps  not  be  able  to  separate  them  from  each  other; 
so  that  the  darkness  ever  more  will- seem  to  him  to  be  accom- 
panied with  these  horrible  ideas. 

If  any  one  has  suffered  a  grievous  wrong  on  account  of 
another,  he  thinks  very  often  of  the  persons  and  the  deed,  and 
while  he  thus  strongly  or  for  a  long  time  thinks  thereupon,  he 
at  the  same  time  glues  these  two  ideas  together  so  firmly,  that 
he  makes  them  almost  one,  as  it  were,  and  never  remembers  the 
person  but  that  the  wrong  received  also  enters  his  head.  And 
while  he  can  scarcely  distinguish  these  two  things,  he  has  just 
as  much  aversion  for  the  one  as  for  the  other.  Thence  it 
comes,  Locke  adds,  that  hatred  arises  from  slight  and  worth- 
less reasons,  and  quarrels  are  taken  up  and  continued  in  the 
world. 

One  of  Locke's  friends  was  wholly  cured  of  madness  by  a 
certain  man  through  a  very  painful  operation,  for  which  service 
he  acknowledged  himself  under  great  obligation  to  him  through- 
out his  life,  as  he  was  so  circumstanced  that  he  required  from 
no  one  a  greater  service  during  his  life.  Reason  or  gratitude 
might  suggest  to  him  what  they  would,  yet  he  could  never 
bear  the  sight  of  this  surgeon.  For  as  the  sight  of  him  always 
l)rought  again  to  mind  the  idea  of  the  very  great  pain  which 
lie  had  been  obliged  to  endure  at  his  hands,  he  could  not  endure 
this  idea,  so  violent  were  the  impressions  it  produced  in  his 
mind. 

Many  children  hold  their  books,  which  were  the  occasion 
hereto,  accountable  for  most  of  the  ill  treatment  they  endured 
at  school,  and  they  unite  these  ideas  so  avcII  tliat  they  regard 
a  book  with  groat  disgiist,  and  all  their  life  study  and  books 


30  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [iii 

cannot  win  tlirir  love,  because  to  tliem  readinj^,  which  might 
otherwise  have  greatly  delighted  them,  became  a  genuine  tor- 
ture, 

,  An  example  notable  for  its  singularity  is  the  folloAving  which 
an  eminent  man,  who  assured  him  he  had  himself  seen  it,  re- 
lates to  Locke  :  A  young  man  had  learned  to  dance  very  prettily 
and  perfectly.  There  chanced  to  stand,  howevei-,  in  the  hall 
where  he  first  learned,  an  old  trunk,  the  idea  of  which  com- 
bined so  imperceptibly  with  his  turns  and  steps  in  the  dance, 
that  although  he  could  dance  incomparably  well  in  this  hall, 
he  could  do  this  only  when  the  old  trunk  Avas  there ;  in  other 
places,  however,  he  could  not  dance  at  all,  unless  tlie  old  trunk 
itself  or  one  like  it  stood  in  its  accustomed  place. 

The  habitus  intellectuales  which  are  contracted  through  such 
association  of  ideas,  are,  as  Locke  further  informs  us,  just  as 
strong  and  numerous,  even  though  very  little  heeded.  Silp- 
posing  the  ideas  of  being  and  matter  were  very  strongly  united, 
either  by  education  or  by  an  excessively  great  application  to 
these  two  ideas,  according  as  they  are  combined  in  the  mind, 
what  notions  and  reasonings  would  they  not  produce  concern- 
ing different  spirits  ?  If  a  custom  accepted  from  childhood 
up  had  united  a  form  or  figure  Avith  the  idea  of  God,  into  what 
absurdities  would  such  a  thought  in  the  contemplation  of  deity 
not  plunge  us  ?  We  shall  no  doubt  find,  Locke  adds,  that  it 
is  nothing  else  than  similar  ill-grounded  and  unnatural  combi- 
nations of  ideas,  which  break  the  path  for  the  many  conflicting 
sects  in  philosophy  and  religion ;  for  it  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  each  meinber  of  those  different  sects  is  Avillingly  deceived, 
and  against  his  better  knoAvledge  and  conscience  rejects  the 
truth  demonstrated  to  him  by  clear  evidence.  It  is  indeed 
certain  that  sometimes  interest  assists  greatly  in  this  sort  of 
thing,  yet  no  one  could  affirm  that  it  could  captivate  and  lead 
astray  whole  societies,  so  that  they  all,  none  excepted,  should 
affirm  plain  and  deliberate  falsehoods.  For  it  must  be  that 
some  at  least  do  what  others  pretend  to  do,  viz. :  seek  truth 
sincerely. 

Therefore  there  must  be  something  which  blinds  their  un- 
derstanding and  hinders  them  from  recognizing  the  falsehood 
of  what  they  consider  as  pure  and  refined  truth.  If  noAv  Ave 
investigate  accurately  Avhat  takes  reason  prisoner  and  darkens 


Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  31 


the  understanding  of  otherwise  sincere  people,  we  find  that  it 
is  simply  and  solely  some  free  ideas,  which,  properly  speaking, 
really  have  no  bond  among  themselves,  but  which,  by  educa- 
tion, custom,  and  uninterrupted  action  on  their  part,  are  so 
united  in  the  mind  that  they  can  no  more  be  separated  and 
distinguished  from  one  another  than  a  single  idea.  Thence  it 
comes,  Locke  continues,  that  often  the  crudest  things  are 
taken  for  worthy  opinions,  absurdities  for  demonstrations,  and 
intolerable  and  absurd  results  for  strong  and  fluent  reason- 
ings. 

The  other  chapter  we  promised  to  present,  treats  of  Enthu- 
siasm, and  is  the  19th  in  the  4th  book.  Locke's  thoughts 
thereupon  are  as  follows  :  — 

Whoever  will  earnestly  seek  for  truth  must  first  before  all 
things  acquire  a  love  for  it.  Whoever  does  not  love  the  truth, 
to  him  we  must  necessarily  attribute  the  opposite.  Hence  we 
can  rightly  say,  that  among  those  who  pretend  to  seek  it, 
there  are  very  few  who  really  love  it.  We  may  recognize  a 
genuine  seeker  of  the  truth,  since  he  does  not  assume  for  a 
statement  any  greater  certainty  than  the  proofs  upon  which 
he  grounds  it  warrant.  Whoever  steps  beyond  this  limit  lays 
hold  of  the  truth  not  out  of  love  for  it,  but  from  another  indi- 
rect purpose.  Por  while  the  unquestionable  clearness  of  a 
statement  truly  consists  in  the  evidence  for  it  (excepting 
those  which  are  sufficiently  clear  of  themselves),  yet  it  is 
plain  that  so  far  as  space  is  given  to  assent  beyond  the  unques- 
tionable clearness  of  a  proposition,  the  remaining  portion  of 
the  assurance  is  not  drawn  from  love  for  the  truth,  but  from 
another  passion.  For  as  it  is  impossible  that  love  for  the 
truth  can  bring  any  one  to  give  to  any  proposition  an  assent 
greater  than  that  certified  by  the  truth  itself,  just  so  is  it  also 
impossible  that  any  one  oiit  of  love  for  the  truth  can  assent  to 
a  statement  in  view  of  evidence  of  such  a  character  that  from 
it  he  cannot  see  whether  the  statement  is  true;  which  Avould 
be  actually  equivalent  to  the  assumption  that  tlie  proposition 
is  a  truth  because  possibly,  or,  indcHid,  })robably,  it  seems  not 
to  accord  witli  the  trutli. 

Locke  adds,  it  follows  indisputably  from  this  evil  disposi- 
tion of  the  mind,  that  men  assume  the  authority  to  dict.ntci 
their  own   opinions  to  others.     For  hcnv  slnndd  one  avIio  has 


32  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [in 

imposed  on  his  own  belief,  not  be  willing  also  to  impose  on 
the  belief  of  others  ?  How  is  it  to  be  expected  that  one  will 
use  valid  arguments  and  proofs  in  dealing  with  others,  who  is 
not  accustomed  to  use  them  in  dealing  with  himself,  who  does 
violence  to  his  own  powers,  who  tyrannizes  over  his  own  mind, 
and  misuses  the  advantage  which  truth  alone  has,  viz. :  that  it 
assents  to  nothing  but  what  is  indisputably  true  ? 

After  Locke  has  laid  this  foundation,  he  proceeds  to  the  in- 
vestigation of  Enthusiasm,  to  which  some  people  ascribe  as 
much  power  as  to  faith  and  reason,  and  would  establish  revela- 
tion without  the  aid  of  reason,  whereby,  however,  they  would 
at  once  destroy  both  reason  and  revelation,  and  without  any 
reason  erect  in  their  place  the  fancies  forged  in  their  own 
brain,  which  they  choose  as  the  plumb-line  of  their  opinions 
and  conduct.  Reason  is  nothing  else  than  a  natural  revela- 
tion, whereby  God  bestows  upon  men  that  portion  of  truth 
which  he  has  poured  into  the  capacity  of  their  natural  powers. 
Revelation  is  natural  reason,  enlarged  by  a  new  set  of  discov- 
eries flowing  immediately  from  God,  the  ground  (raison)  of 
which  is  the  truth  by  testimony  and  proof  they  offer  that 
these  discoveries  actually  come  from  God.^  AVhoever,  there- 
fore, destroys  reason  to  make  room  for  revelation,  extin- 
guishes both  these  lights  at  the  same  time.  As,  however,  men 
find  that  an  immediate  revelation  is  a  much  easier  means  of 
strengthening  their  opinions  and  of  directing  their  conduct 
than  the  labor  of  arranging  all  according  to  strict  reasoning, 
which  is  usually  irksome,  prejudiced,  and  for  the  most  part 
without  successful  progress ;  so  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
that  they  often  pretend  revelations  and  persuade  themselves 
that  God  directs  them  in  particular  as  regards  their  actions 
and  opinions,  and  especially  in  those  things  which  they  cannot 
justify  by  the  principles  of  reason.  If  their  minds  are  once 
possessed  with  this  thought,  the  most  absurd  opinions  which 
are  firmly  impressed  upon  their  fancy,  must  seem  to  be  ilhi- 
minations  coming  from  the  Spirit  of  God  and  having  divine 
authority.  Every  extraordinary  thing  to  which  they  are  led 
by  a  strong  impulse,  they  consider  as   certainly  a  divine  call 

1  On  tliis  whole  discussion,  rf.  an  article  by  the  translator  entitled  "Reve- 
lation, Inspiration  and  Autliority,"  in  "The  Andover  Review,"  April  1891. 
—  Tr. 


Ill]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  33 

which  they  must  follow,  and  as  a  command  from  on  high  in 
whose  execution  it  is  impossible  to  err. 

This  is,  properly  speaking,  what  is  meant  by  Enthusiasm, 
which  is  not  adjusted  to  reason  nor  to  divine  revelation,  but 
springs  forth  only  from  the  imagination  of  a  heated  and  con- 
ceited spirit,  aiid  which,  as  soon  as  it  has  taken  a  little  root, 
plays  much  more  strongly  upon  the  opinion  and  actions  of 
men  than  reason  or  revelation  separately  or  together. 

Although  now  the  extravagant  actions  and  opinions,  wherein 
enthusiasm  has  involved  men,  should  spur  them  on  to  be  more 
on  their  guard  and  to  avoid  the  false  2^'>'i^^cfpici)  which  lead 
astray  both  their  belief  and  their  conduct;  yet  through  its 
love  for  the  extraordinary,  through  its  ease  and  illumined  by 
its  glory,  and  through  its  extraordinary  paths  to  knowledge  it 
has  come  to  pass  that  the  laziness,  ignorance,  and  vanity  of 
many  are  so  tickled,  and  they  are  brought  to  such  a  point,  that 
after  they  are  captivated  by  such  ways  of  an  immediate  reve- 
lation, of  an  illumination  without  search,  of  a  certainty  with- 
out proof  and  investigation,  it  is  very  difficult  to  bring  them 
out  of  it  again. 

They  are  transported  beyond  reason,  and  reason  in  their 
case  perishes.  They  see  a  light  infused  into  their  understand- 
ing and  can  no  longer  be  deceived.  This  light  visibly  appears 
as  the  clearest  sunbeam  and  requires  no  other  proof  than  its 
own  clearness.  They  feel,  according  to  their  statements,  the 
hand  of  God  moving  them  within ;  they  feel  the  impulses  of 
the  Spirit,  and  cannot  be  mistaken  in  their  feeling.  Thus 
they  persuade  themselves  that  reason  has  nothing  to  do  with 
what  they  see  and  feel  in  themselves.  The  things  which  they 
clearly  experience  are  beyond  all  doubt,  and  need  no  proof; 
and  so  of  all  the  rest  of  their  strange  talk.  They  are  sure  of 
these  things  because  they  are  sure  of  them,  and  their  opinions 
are  correct  because  they  are  firmly  fixed  in  their  mind.  For 
this  is  the  upshot  of  their  words  when  stripped  of  the  meta- 
phors of  hear  17)//  and  feeling  in  which  they  are  clothed. 

Locke  investigates  the  ground  of  this  inner  light  and  feel- 
ing, upon  which  these  people  so  firmly  base  themselves,  and 
speaks  thus :  Is  this  seeing  of  the  light  a  perctqjtion  of  the 
truth  of  a  certain  particular  statement,  or  perhaps  of  this,  that 
it  is  a  revelation  from  God?  Is  this  feeling  a  perception  of 
I) 


34  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [in 

an  inclination,  wbicli  comes  from  a  fancy  to  do  something,  or 
from  the  spirit  of  God,  which  begets  in  it  this  inclination? 
These  are  two  wholly  different  feelings,  which  must  be  care- 
fully distinguished  from  one  another  if  we  would  not  deceive 
ourselves.  I  can  perceive  the  truth  of  a  proposition;  but  I 
cannot  thereby  know  as  yet  whether  it  is  an  immediate  revela- 
tion from  God.  I  can  i:)erceive  the  truth  of  a  projjosition  in 
Euclid  without  its  being  or  my  knowing  that  it  is  a  revelation. 
I  may  also  know  that  I  did  not  attain  this  knowledge  through 
natural  means,  thence  may  indeed  conclude  that  it  is  revealed 
to  me,  but  I  cannot  thereby  yet  know  it  is  a  revelation  from 
God;  because  there  may  be  minds  which  without  a  divine 
commission  for  this  work  arouse  these  ideas  in  me  and  set 
them  in  such  order  in  my  mind  that  I  may  perceive  their  con- 
nection. So  that  the  knowledge  of  a  proposition,  which  enters 
my  head,  I  know  not  how,  is  thus  not  an  evidence  that  it 
comes  from  God.  Still  less  is  a  firm  persuasion  that  this 
fancy  is  true,  a  certain  evidence  that  it  comes  from  God,  or 
that  it  is  true. 

We  may  call  such  a  fancy  sight  or  liglit,  yet  it  is  nothing 
more  than  belief  and  confidence.^  For  if  the  proposition  under 
discussiou  be  one  which  they  have  imagiued,  but  do  not  know 
to  be  true,  it  cannot  be  seeing,  but  Relieving.  One  may  also 
give  to  such  fancy  any  name  he  pleases.  What  I  believe,  I 
must  put  forth  as  true  upon  another's  testimony,  and  must 
know  certainly  in  the  case  that  this  testimony  is  given ;  for 
without  this  my  belief  would  be  groundless.  I  must  see 
whether  God  reveals  this  to  me,  or  Avhether  I  see  nothing. 
Thus  the  issue  is,  that  I  know  how  I  am  to  know  that  God 
reveals  something  to  me,  that  this  impression  in  my  soul 
occurs  through  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  that  consequently  I  am 
bound  to  follow  it.  If  I  do  not  know  this,  my  confidence, 
great  as  it  may  be,  is  without  the  least  foundation,  and  all  the 
light  with  which  I  perceive  myself  illumined,  is  but  enthusi- 
asm. For  whether  the  proposition  supposed  to  be  revealed, 
be  evidently  true  in  itself,  or  visibly  probable,  or  whether  it 
be  difficult  to  vindicate  it  by  the  ordinary  paths  of  knowledge, 
this  must  nevertheless  before  all  things  be  clearh^  established 
and  proved,  that  God  has  revealed  this  proposition,  and  that 

1  The  German  is  "  Credulitiit  imd  Confideutz."  — Tr. 


Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  35 

what  I  take  as  a  revelation  certainly  comes  of  itself  into  my 
mind,  and  is  no  illusion,  which,  some  one  else  has  thrust  in  or 
my  own  fancy  has  awakened.  Until  one  has  come  this  far, 
all  confidence  that  this  revelation  comes  from  God  is  a  mere 
conjecture,  and  all  this  light  which  dazzles  one  is  nothing  but 
an  ignis  fatuus,  which  will  unceasingly  lead  us  into  this  circle : 
This  is  a  revelation  because  I  finnh/  believe  it;  and  I  believe  it 
because  it  is  a  revelation. 

It  follows  from  this  that  those  who  imagine  that  they  have 
such  revelations  of  this  or  that  truth  must  be  assured  that  it, 
is  God  who  has  revealed  it  to  them.  For  to  say,  as  they  gen- 
erally do,  that  they  know  it  by  the  light  which  it  brings  with 
it,  which  shines  and  flashes  in  their  souls,  and  which  they 
cannot  resist,  means  only  that  it  is  a  revelation  because 
they  believe  it  certainly  is  one ;  since  all  the  light  of  which 
they  speak  is  nothing  but  a  strong  imagination  which  is  firmly 
fixed  in  their  mind,  and  yet  has  not  the  least  ground  that  it  is 
a  truth.  For  they  must  consider  that  to  assume  accepted 
grounds  as  reasonable  and  as  a  proof  that  it  is  a  truth,  is  a  nec- 
essary acknowledgment  that  they  have  no  such  (grounds).^ 
Because,  if  they  have  such,  they  receive  this  truth  uo  longer 
as  a  revelation,  but  as  a  truth  established  upon  common 
grounds.  And  if  they  believe  it  to  be  true,  because  it  is  no 
revelation,  and  if  they  have  no  other  reason  to  prove  it  a 
revelation  than  simply  because  they  are  completely  persuaded 
of  its  truth,  without  any  other  ground  and  only  on  account  of 
this  fancy,  then  they  believe  it  to  be  a  revelation  only  be- 
cause they  strongly  believe  it  to  be  a  revelation.  Who  does 
not  see  that  if  we  build  upon  such  grounds,  we  make  our  own 
fancy  the  only  rule  of  our  opinions  and  conduct,  and  conse- 
quently subject  ourselves  to  the  strangest  errors  and  vexa- 
tions. For  once  for  all  the  strength  of  our  opinions  is  no 
proof  of  their  correctness.  Meanwhile  men  can  approve  an 
error  as  a  truth,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  case  of  those  zealous 
people  who  maintain  in  the  sharpest  manner  two  propositions 
contrary  to  one  another. 

In  reference   to  wliicli  Locke  well  says,  that  if  the   light, 

1  The  text  is:  " Deim  dieses  miissen  sie  vor  raisonublo  uiul  von  eiiiisem 
lieweise  iialten,  der  da  zeige,  dass  es  eiiie  Warlieit  scy,  tjeiioiinncne  Oriiiido 
aiiuehineii,  dass  sie  erkouiieu  iiiiissoii,  wie  sie  clei'i;lciclirn  iiiclil  liabcu." — Tii. 


30  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [in 

which  oveiy  one  thinks  lie  has  in  himself,  and  which  in  this 
case  is  nothing  but  the  strength  of  his  own  opinion,  be  a  proof 
that  his  thought  comes  from  God,  then  we  must  'conclude  that 
all  contrary  opinions  have  the  right  to  pass  as  divine  inspira- 
tions ;  and  God  would  be  not  only  the  father  of  light,  but  also 
of  wholly  opposite  lights,  which  lead  men  in  ways  wholly 
contrary. 

Therefore  Locke  concludes  that  he  who  does  not  wish  to 
fall  into  a  mass  of  disorderly  delusions  and  errors  must  first 
^test  thoroughly  this  inner  light  which  offers  itself  as  a  guide. 
God,  he  says,  does  not  destroy  the  man  when  he  makes  a 
prophet.  He  leaves  all  his  faculties  in  their  natural  condi- 
tion, so  that  he  may  thereby  judge  whether  the  inspirations 
which  he  feels  within  have  sprung  from  God  or  not.  If  God 
will  have  us  acknowledge  the  truth  of  a  proposition,  he  permits 
us  to  see  this  truth  either  through  the  ordinary  paths  of  nat- 
ural reason,  or  he  makes  us  know  that  it  is  a  truth  which  we 
must  receive  upon  his  authority,  while  he  convinces  us  by 
certain  marks  which  reason  cannot  reject  that  it  comes  from 
him.  I  will  not,  however,  Locke  adds,  say  by  this,  that  we  are 
to  examine  by  reason  whether  a  proposition  thus  revealed  to 
us  by  God  may  be  proved  by  natural  principles,  and  if  not  we 
may  reject  it;  but  I  will  say,  that  we  must  consult  reason  and 
by  its  aid  see  whether  it  be  a  revelation  from  God  or  no. 
For  if  reason  finds  it  to  be  a  divine  revelation,  it  declares  for 
it  as  such  from  that  hour  on  as  well  as  for  any  other  truth, 
and  makes  it  one  of  its  rules,  so  that  it  cannot  be  rejected. 

If  this  inner  light,  or  a  proposition  which  presents  itself  in 
our  mind  as  revealed,  accords  with  the  principles  of  reason  or 
with  the  word  of  God  which  is  an  attested  revelation,  we  have 
the  warrant  of  reason  for  it,  and  may  accept  this  light  as  true, 
and  direct  our  faith  and  walk  accordingly.  If,  however,  this 
light  has  the  witness  or  proof  of  neither  of  these  rules,  we 
cannot  consider  it  as  a  revelation ;  nay  more,  as  a  truth.  For 
if  we  at  the  same  time  believe  it  to  be  a  revelation,  that  does 
not,  however,  make  it  so ;  it  may,  however,  be  shown  by  some 
other  mark  to  be  really  a  revelation.  The  old  prophets,  when 
they  were  to  receive  revelations  from  God,  had  other  proof 
than  the  inner  light  which  assured  them  that  these  revelations 
reallj^  came  from  God.     They  imagined  not  only  that  their 


Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  37 

imaginations  came  from  God,  but  they  had  also  external  signs 
Avhich  convinced  them  that  God  was  the  author  of  their  reve- 
lation. And  if  they  were  to  convince  others  of  the  same,  they 
received  beforehand  a  special  power  to  set  forth  the  truth  of 
the  commission  given  them  of  Heaven  with  visible  signs.  Thus 
Moses  saw  a  burning  bush  which  was  yet  not  consumed  and 
heard  a  voice  out  of  the  bush.  This  was  something  more  than 
an  inuer  feeling  of  an  impulse  to  free  the  children  of  Israel 
from  the  hands  of  Pharaoh.  Yet,  Moses  did  not  believe  that 
this  was  enough  to  warrant  him  in  going  into  Egypt  with  God's 
commission  ;  until  God  assured  him  by  still  another  miracle,  of 
the  rod  changed  into  a  serpent,  that  such  was  his  real  will,  and 
granted  him  the  power  to  work  precisely  similar  wonders  in 
the  sight  of  Pharaoh.  Precisely  similar  was  it  in  Gideon's 
case.  These  and  other  examples  of  the  old  prophets^  show 
sufficiently  that  they  did  not  believe  that  an  inner  vision  or 
their  own  imagination  attested  by  no  other  affirmation  a  suffi- 
cient evidence  that  their  imagination  came  from  God;  although 
the  Scripture  does  not  everywhere  mention  that  they  always 
asked  for  or  received  such  proofs. 

These  few  passages  from  the  clever  work  of  Locke,  under 
the  guidance  of  the  accurate  translator  Coste,  we  have  brought 
forward  as  specimens.  Perhaps  we  shall  have  further  oppor- 
tunity to  speak  of  it,  when  the  Latin  translation,  with  which 
some  one  ^  is  now  occupied  in  England,  is  published. 


In  the  "  Monatliche  Auszug  "  of  the  year  1701  is  found  (pp. 
73-75)  the  following  addition  to  the  foregoing  sketch :  — 

What  Locke  says  of  the  connection  and  accompaniment  of 
ideas  is  not  to  be  despised,  and  serves  often  to  arouse  the  emo- 
tions; as  for  errors  and  false  judgments,  however,  they  spring 
from  other  contiguous  and  peculiar  causes,  viz.:  that  one 
assumes  false  principles,  and  imagines  that  he  once  had  proof  of 
them  in  his  mind,  Avithin  which  now  a  lapse  of  memory  occurs; 
and  then  from  incorrect  conclusions  which  he  produces  from 
these  principles  assumed  as  known,  because  he  gives  not  the 
time  and  labor  to  investigate  all  in  a  formal  and  orderly  way. 

1  Bun'idj;e  of  Dublin.     Tlio  version  appeared  in  1701.  —  Tii. 


;]8  leie:sitz's  critique  of  LOCKE  [hi 

Meaiiwliile  it  is  true  that  the  emotions  greatly  assist  this  credu- 
lity coueeruiug  principles  and  carelessness  in  false  deduction  ; 
for  one  believes  and  easily  draws  the  conclusion  he  would  gladly 
have.  It  is  besides  noticeable  in  this  book  of  Locke's,  that  in 
his  last  writings  against  the  Rev.  Lord  Bishop  Stillingfleet  he 
has  changed  a  large  part  of  his  opinions  concerning  the  nature 
of  the  body  contained  in  this  Teatanien  or  Essay  on  Human 
Understanding ;  while  in  this  Tentamen  he  held  opinions,  in 
common  with  modern  philosophers,  especially  the  followers 
of  Descartes  and  Gassendi,  that  in  the  body  nothing  is  to  be 
met  with  but  size,  solidity  or  impenetrability,  and  motion  or 
change ;  now,  however,  he  begins  to  hold  the  opinion  that  there 
is  something  to  be  found  therein  not  revealed  through  these 
qualities.  He  repudiates,  besides,  in  this  essay  innate  ideas 
and  the  natural  light,  but  appears  not  to  distinguish  suffi- 
ciently the  necessary  truths  arising  from  possibility,  from  those 
others  whose  ground  must  be  assumed  from  the  experience  of 
realities,  and  thus  must  be  drawn  from  without. 

Thus  he  accepts  the  tabula  rasa  of  Aristotle,  rather  than 
the  implanted  (ideas)  of  Plato.  It  is  true  that  we  do  not 
come  upon  thoughts  in  these  most  abstract  matters,  without 
external  sensations,  but  in  the  case  of  these  necessary  truths, 
such  sensations  serve  more  as  a  reminder  than  as  a  proof; 
which  (proof)  must  come  simply  and  solely  from  internal 
grounds,  as  those  do  not  sufficiently  understand  who  deal  little 
in  demonstration  proper. 


NEW   ESSAYS   ON   THE   UNDERSTANDING 

By  the  Autiiok  of  the  System  of  Pke-Established 
Hakmony 


PREFACE 

The  Essay  on  the  Understanding,  by  a  distinguished  English- 
man, being  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  esteemed  works  of 
this  period,  I  have  resolved  to  make  some  remarks  upon  it, 
because  having  sufficiently  meditated  for  a  long  time  upon 
the  same  subject  and  upon  the  greater  part  of  the  matters 
therein  touched  upon,  I  have  thought  that  it  would  be  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  publish  something  under  the  title  of 
"  New  Essays  on  the  Understanding,"  and  to  procure  a  favor- 
able reception  to  my  thoughts,  by  putting  them  in  so  good 
company.  I  ^  have  thought  also  that  I  could  profit  from  the 
labor  of  another  not  only  to  lessen  my  own  (since  in  fact  it 
is  less  difficult  to  follow  the  thread  of  a  good  author  than  to 
work  wholly  independently),  but  further  to  add  something  to 
what  he  has  given  us,  which  is  always  easier  than  to  start  from 
the  beginning ;  for  I  think  I  have  cleared  up  some  difficulties 
which  he  had  left  in  their  entirety.  Thus  his  reputation  is  an 
advantage  to  me ;  having  for  the  rest  a  disposition  to  render 
justice,  and  very  far  from  wishing  to  diminish  the  esteem  in 
which  this  work  is  held,  T  would  increase  it,  if  my  approval 
carried  any  weight.     It  is  true  I  often  differ  in  my  views  (from 

1  Gorhardt's  text  reads  as  follows:  "J'ai  cru  eiicor  poHvoir  profiter  du 
travail  d'autruy  non  seulement  pour  dimiiuKU'  le  mien  (puisqu'eii  elToct  11  y  a 
mollis  de  peine  a  suivre  le  til  d'lin  boii  auteur  qu'a  travailler  a  iionveaux  frais 
en  tout),  mais  eneor  pour  adjouter  quelque  chose  a  ce  qu'il  nous  a  doiinc,  ce 
qui  est  tousjours  plus  facile  que  de  commencer ;  car  je  (;rois  d'avoir  leve 
quelques  diflficultes  qu'il  avoit  laissees  on  leur  entier.  Ainsi  sa  i-epiitation 
ra'cst  avantaguese ;  estant  d'ailleurs  d'humeur  a  rendro  justice  et  bicTi  loin  do 
vouloir  diminuer  I'estiTuo  qu'on  fi  pour  cet  ouvrago,  jo  raccroistrois,  si  mon 
api)robatioii  estoit  de  quelque  jioids.  Tl  est  vray  que  je  suis  souvent  d'un  autre 
avis,  mais  bien  loin  de  discoiivcuir  du  merito  des  Ecrivains  celebres,  on  leur 
rend  temoii;na.s;e,  on  faisant  connoistro  en  qiioy  ct  pour  quoy  on  s'('loii,aio  de 
leur  sentiment,  quand  on  juge  neeessaire  d'empecbor  que  leur  autorite  no 
prevaille  h,  la  raison  en  quelques  points  de  consequence,  outro  qu'cn  satisfaisant 
:i  de  si  exccllens  liommis,  on  rend  la  vi'rite  plus  recevable,  ot  il  faut  supposer 
que,  e'est  principalenient  poui'  elle  qu'ils  (ravaillcnl ."  —  'I'u. 

11 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


liini'),  Init  very  far  from  donying  the  merit  of  celebrated 
writers,  we  bear  witness  to  it,  by  making  known  in  what  and 
why  we  differ  from  their  views,  when  we  judge  it  necessary 
to  ])revent  their  authority  from  prevailing  over  reason  on  some 
important  points ;  besides,  by  satisfying  such  excellent  men, 
we  render  the  truth  more  acceptable,  and  it  must  be  supposed 
that  it  is  principally  for  truth  that  they  labor. 

In  fact,  although  the  author  of  the  Essay  says  a  thousand 
beautiful  things  which  I  commend,  our  systems  are  very  dif- 
ferent. His  has  more  relation  to  Aristotle,  mine  to  Plato, 
although  we  both  differ  in  many  things  from  the  doctrine  of 
these  two  ancient  philosophers.  He  is  more  popular,  and  I 
am  compelled  sometimes  to  be  a  little  more  acroamatic  and 
more  abstract,  which  is  not  an  advantage  to  me,  especially 
when  Avriting  in  a  living  language.  I  think,  nevertheless,  that 
by  making  two  persons  speak,  one  of  whom  sets  forth  the 
views  drawn  from  the  Essay  of  this  author,  and  the  other 
joins  thereto  my  observations,  the  parallel  will  be  more  to  the 
liking  of  the  reader  than  wholly  dry  remarks,  the  reading  of 
which  would  be  interrupted  at  every  moment  by  the  necessity 
of  recurring  to  his  book  in  order  to  understand  mine.  It  will 
nevertheless  be  well  still  to  compare  sometimes  our  writings, 
and  not  to  judge  of  his  views  except  by  his  own  work,  although 
I  have  ordinarily  preserved  its  expressions.  It  is  true  that  the 
constraint,  which  another's  discourse,  whose  thread  must  be 
followed,  gives  in  making  remarks,  has  prevented  me  from 
thinking  to  secure  the  charms  of  which  the  dialogue  is  sus- 
ceptible ;  but,  I  hope  the  matter  will  make  amends  for  the 
defects  of  the  style. 

Our  differences  are  upon  subjects  ^  of  some  importance.  The 
question  is  to  knoAv  whether  the  soul  in  itself  is  entirely  empty 
as  the  tablets  upon  which  as  yet  nothing  has  been  written 
,  (tahnla  rasa)  according  to  Aristotle,  and  the  author  of  the 
Essaj^,  and  whether  all  that  is  traced  thereon  comes  solely 
from  the  senses  and  from  experience  ;  or  whether  the  soul  con- 
tains originally  the  principles  of  many  ideas  and  doctrines 
which  external  objects  merely  call  up  on  occasion,  as  I  believe 

1  Erdraann  ami  Jacques  read  :  "  que  lui,"  which  does  not  occur  in  Gerhardt's 
text.— Tr. 

'-  Erdmann  and  Jacques  read :  "objects."  — Tr. 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  43 

with  Plato,  and  even  with  the  schoolmen,  and  witli  all  those 
who  interpret  in  this  way  the  passage  of  St.  Paul  (Rom.  2 :  15) 
where  he  states  that  the  law  of  God  is  written  in  the  heart. 
The  Stoics  call  these  principles  ^  j;)rolepses,  i.e.  fundamental 
assumptions,  or  what  is  taken  for  granted  in  advance.  The 
Mathematicians  call  them  general  notions  (/coivat  eVvotat).  Mod- 
ern philosophers  give  them  other  beautiful  names,  and  Julius 
Scaliger  in  particular  named  them  semina  mternitatis,  also 
zopyra,  i.e.  living  tires,  luminous  flashes,  concealed  Avithin  us, 
but  which  the  encounter  of  the  senses  makes  appear  like  the 
sparks  which  the  blow  makes  spring  from  the  steel.  And 
the  belief  is  not  without  reason,  that  these  glitterings  indicate 
something  divine  and  eternal  which  appears  especially  in  the 
necessary  truths.  Whence  another  cpiestion  arises,  whether 
all  truths  depend  upon  experience,  i.e.  upon  induction  aiid  ,  I  ^ 
examples,  or  whethfir.jthere  are  som^_jvjiichL-haye-  still  aruetl^e^  |  ^ 
^foundation.  Por  if  some  eveirEs~canbe  foreseen  prior  to  any  \  ^ 
proof  which  may  have  been  made  of  them,  it  is  manifest  \ 
that  we  ourselves  contribute  something  thereto.  The  senses,.? 
although  necessary  for  all  our  actual  knowledge,  are  not  suffi- . 
•cient  to  give  it  all  to  us,  since  the  senses  never  give  us  anything  • 
but  examples,  i.e.  particular  or  individual  truths.  Now  all  the  ■ 
examples  which  confirm  a  general  truth,  whatever  their  num- 
ber, do  not  suffice  to  establish  the  universal  necessity  of  that 
same  truth,  for  it  does  not  follow  that  what  has  happened  will 
happen  in  the  same  way.  Por  example,  the  Greeks  and  the 
Eomans,  and  all  the  other  peoples  of  the  earth  known  to  the 
ancients,  have  always  observed  that  before  the  lapse  of  twenty- 
four  hours  day  changes  into  night,  and  night  into  day.  I>ut 
we  would  be  deceived,  if  Ave  believed  that  the  same  laAV  holds 
good  everywhere  else;  for  since  then,  the  contrary  has  been 
experienced  in  the  region  of  Nova  Zembla.  And  he  would 
still  l)e  in  error  Avho  believed  that,  in  our  climates  at  least,  this 
is  a  necessary  and  eternal  trutli,  which  will  always  endure, 
since  we  must  think  that  the  earth,  and  the  sun  even,  do  not 
necessarily  exist,  and  that  there  will  perhaps  be  a  time  when 
this  beautiful  star,  together  with  its  whole  system,  will  not 
longer  exist,  at  least  in  its  present  form.     Whence  it  appears-^ 

1  For  a  very  full  iioiiiciiclatnre  of  these  prinei)iles,  see  ITaniilloirs  Reid, 
Nofe  A.,§  v.,  Vol.  II.,  I )]).  755-770.     8tli  ed.,  Kdinlnir-li  and  I-midoii,  ISSO.  — 'I'h. 


44  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

that  necessary  truths  such  as  are  found  in  pure  mathematics, 
and  particularly  in  arithmetic  and  in  geometry,  must  have 
principles  whose  proof  does  not  depend  upon  examples,  nor 
consequently  upon  the  testimony  of  the  senses,  although  with- 
out the  senses  it  would  never  have  occurred  ta  us  to-think  of 
them.  This  distinction  must  be  carefully  made,  and  was  so 
well  understood  by  Euclid,  that  he  often  proved  by  the  reason, 
what  is  sufficiently  seen  through  experience  and  by  sensible 
images.  Logic  also,  together  with  metaphysics  and  ethics,  one 
of  which  shapes  theology  and  the  other  jurisprudence,  both 
natural  (sciences),  are  full  of  such  truths,  and  consequently 
A  their  proof  can  come  only  from  internal  principles  which  are 
A7  called  innate.  It  is  true  that  we  must  not  imagine  that  these 
^^  eternal  laws  of  the  reason  can  be  read  in  the  soul  as  in  an  open 
book,  as  the  praetor's  edict  is  read  upon  his  album  without  diffi- 
culty and  research;  but  it  is  sufficient  that  they  can  be  discov- 
ered in  us  by  dint  of  attention,  for  which  the  senses  furnish 
occasions,  and  successful  experience  serves  to  confirm  reason, 
in  much  the  same  way  as  proofs  in  arithmetic  serve  for  the 
better  avoidance  of  error  in  calculating  when  the  reasoning 

''is  long.  Herein,  also,  human  knowledge  differs  from  that 
of  the  brutes :  the  brutes  are  purely  empirics  and  only  guide 
themselves  by  examples ;  for,  so  far  as  we  can  judge  of  them, 
they  never  attain  to  the  formation  of  necessary  propositions ; 
while  men  are  capable  of  demonstrative  sciences.    'It  is  also 

/'for  this  reason  that  the  faculty  the  brutes  have  for  making 

\  consecutions  is  something  inferior  to  the  reason  of  man.     The 

consecutions  of  the  brutes  are  merely  like  those  of  simple 

/  empirics,  who  claim  that  what  has  sometimes  happened  will 

V  happen  again  in  a  case  where  something  strikes  them  as  similar, 

Vwithout  being  able  to  judge  whether  the  same  reasons  hold 
good.  This  is  why  it  is  so  easy  for  men  to  entrap  the  brutes, 
and  so  easy  for  simple  empirics  to  make  mistakes.  This  is 
why  persons  who  have  become  skilful  through  age  and  experi- 
ence are  not  exempt  (from  error)  when  they  depend  too  much 
upon  their  past  experience,  as  has  happened  to  many  in  civil 
and  military  affairs ;  because  they  do  not  consider  sufficiently 
that  the  world  changes,  and  that  men  become  more  skilful  by 
finding  a  thousand  new  dexterities,  while  the  deer  and  hares 
of  the  present  do  not  become  more  cunning  than  those  of  the 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  45 

past.     The  consecutions  of  the  brutes  are  only  a  shadow  of 
reasoning,  i.e.  are  only  connections  of   the  imagination  and 
passages  from  one  image  to  another,  because  in  a  new  juncture 
which  appears  similar  to  the  preceding  they  expect  anew  that 
connection  which  they  formerly  met  with,  as  if  things  were 
united  in  fact  because  their  images  are  united  in  the  memory. 
I      It  is  true  that  reason  also  counsels  us  to  expect  ordinarily  to  see 
/that  happen  in  the  future  which  is  conformed  to  a  long  past 
■experience,  but  it  is  not  on  this  account  a  necessary  and  infalli- 
;  ble  truth,  and  success  may  cease  when  least  expected,  when 
j  ,'  the  reasons  change  which  have  sustained  it.     Therefore  the 
/    wisest  men  do  not  so  commit  themselves  to  it  as  not  to  try  to 
discover,  if  possible,  something  of  the  reason  of  this  fact  in 
order  to  judge  when  it  is  necessary  to  make  exceptions.     For_ 
reason  is  alone  capable  of  establishing  sure  rules,  and  supply- 
"  ing  what  is  wanting  to  those  which  were  not  such  by  inserting 
their  exceptions ;  and  of  finding  at  length  certain  connections 
in  the  force  of  necessary  consequences,  which  often  furnish 
the  means  of  foreseeing  the  result  without  the  necessity  of 
experiencing  the  sense-connections  of    images,  to  which   the 
brutes  are  reduced,  so  that  that  which  justifies  the  internal   '      v 
principles  of  necessary  truths  also  distinguishes  man  from  the 
-\brutes.  | 

Perhaps  our  clever  author  will  not  wholly  differ  from  my 
view.     For  after  having  employed  the  whole  of  his  first  book 
in  rejecting  innate  intelligence,  taken  in  a  certain  sense,  he  ,    ■ 
nevertheless,  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  and  in  the  sequel,  |    (  ' 
admits  tliat  ideas,  which  do  not  originate  in  sensation,  come   , 
i  /from  /eflecti^i. '   Now  reflection  is  nothing  else  than  attention 
[  to  whafTTmus,  and  the  senses  do  not  give  us  what  we  already 
\  carry  with  us.     That  being  so,  can  it  be  denied  that  there  is    j^ 
nmch  that  is  innate  in  our  mind,  since  we  are  innate,  so  to-i 

(speak,  in  ourselves?  and  that  there  is  in  us:  being,  unity,  J -^-r- 
substance,  duration,  change,  action,  perception,  pleasure,  ancT 
a  thousand  other  objects  of  our  intellectual  ideas  ?  And  these 
objects  being  immediate  to  our  understanding  and  always  pres- 
ent (although  they  cannot  always  be  perceived  by  reason  of- 
our  distractions  and  needs),  what  wonder  that  we  say  that  these 
ideas  with  all  depending  upon  them  are  innate  in  us  ?  I  have 
made  use  also  of  the  comparison  of  a  l)l()ck  of  marble  which 


46  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

.  has  veins,  rather  than  of  a  block  of  marble  Avholly  even,  or  of 
blank  tablets,  i.e.  of  what  is  called  among  philosophers  a  tabula 
rasa,  For  if  the  soul  resembled  these  blank  tablets,  truths 
would  be  in  us  as  the  figure  of  Hercules  is  in  the  marble,  when 
the  marble  is  wholly  indifferent  to  the  reception  of  this  figure 
or  some  other.  But  if  there  were  veins  in  the  block  which 
should  indicate  the  figure  of  Hercules  rather  than  other  fig- 
ures, this  block  would  be  more  determined  thereto,  and  Her- 
cules would  be  in  it  as  in  some  sense  innate,  although  it  would 
be  needful  to  labor  to  discover  these  veins,  to  clear  them  by 
polishing,  and  by  cutting  away  what  prevents  them  from  ap- 
pearing. Thus  it  is  that  ideas  and  truths  are  for  us  innate,  as 
inclinations,  dispositions,  habits,  or  natural  potentialities,  and 
not  as  actions  ;  although  these  potentialities  are  always  accom- 
panied by  some  actions,  often  insensible,  which  correspond  to 
them. 

It  seems  that  our  clever  author  claims  that  there  is  nothing 
virtual  in  us,  and  indeed  nothing  of  which  we  are  not  always 
actually  conscious  ;  but  he  cannot  take  this  rigorously,  other- 
,,  wise  his  opinion  would  be  too  paradoxical ;  since,  moreover, 
^^  acquired  habits  and  the  stores  of  our  memory  are  not  always 
perceived  and  do  not  even  always  come  to  our  aid  at  need, 
although  we  often  easily  recall  them  to  the  mind  upon  some 
slight  occasion  which  makes  us  remember  them,  just  as  we 
need  only  the  beginning  of  a  song  to  remember  it.^  He  limits 
his  thesis  also  in  other  places,  by  saying  that  there  is  nothing 
^  in  us  of  which  we  have  not  at  least  formerly  been  conscious. 
But  besides  the  fact  that  no  one  can  be  assured  by  reason 
alone  how  far  our  j)ast  apperceptions,  which  we  may  have  for- 
gotten, may  have  gone,  especially  according  to  the  Platonic 
doctrine  of  reminiscence  which,  wholly  fabulous  as  it  is,  is  in 
no  respect  incompatible  at  least  in  part  with  reason  wholly 
pure:  besides  this,  I  say,  why  must  we  acquire  all  through 
the  perception  of  external  things,  and  nothing  be  unearthed  in 
ourselves  ?  Is  our  soul  then  by  itself  such  a  blank  that  besides 
the  images  borrowed  from  without,  it  is  nothing  ?  This  is  not 
an  opinion  (I  am  sure)  that  our  judicious  author  could  approve. 

1  Erdmaim  and  Jacques  read:  "le  commencement  d'une  chanson  pour  nous 
faire  ressouvenir  dii  reste,"  i.e.  the  beginning  of  a  song  to  remind  us  of  the 
rest.  — Tr. 


I 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  47 

And  where  do  we  find  tablets  that  have  no  variety  in  them- 
selves ?  For  we  never  see  a  plane  perfectly  even  and  uniform. 
Why,  then,  could  we  not  furnish  also  ourselves  with  something 
of  thought  from  our  own  depths  if  we  should  dig  therein?  • 
Thus  I  am  led  to  believe  that  at  bottom  his  opinion  upon  this 
point  is  not  different  from  mine,  or  rather  from  the  common 
view,  inasmuch  as  he  recognizes  two  sources  of  our  knowledge, 
the  Senses  and  Reflection. 

I  do  not  know  whether  it  will  be  so  easy  to  harmonize 
him  with  us  and  with  the  Cartesians,  when  he  maintains 
that  the  mind  does  not  always  think,  and  particularly  that 
it  is  without  perception  when  we  sleep  without  dreaming; 
and  he  objects  ^  that  since  bodies  can  exist  without  motion, 
souls  can  also  exist  without  thought.  But  here  I  make 
a  somewhat  different  reply  than  is  customary,  for  I  hold 
that  naturally  a  substance  cannot  exist  without  action,  and  that 
there  is  indeed  never  a  body  without  movement.  Experience 
already  favors  me,  and  you  have  only  to  consult  the  book  of 
the  distinguished  Mr.  Boyle  against  absolute  rest,  to  be  con-  r 

vinced  of  it ;  but  I  believe  reason  favors  it  also,  and  this  is  one        ^ 
of  the  proofs  I  have  for  doing  away  with  atoms.  ~^     ^ 

Moreover,  there  are  a  thousand  indications  which  make  us     j 
think  that  there  are  at  every  moment  an  infinite  number  of     ' 
perce2)tlons  in  us,  but  without  apperception  and  reflection,  i.e. 
changes  in  the  soul  itself  of  which  we  are  not  conscious,  be- 
cause the  impressions  are  either  too  slight  and  too  great  in.^^^ — 
number,  or  too  even,  so  that  they  have  nothing  sufficiently 
distinguishing  them  from  each  other;  but  joined  to  others, 
they  do  not  fail  to  produce  their  effect  and  to  make  themselves 
felt  at  least  confusedly  in  the  mass.     Thus  it  is  that  habit  .-j--- 
makes  us  take  no  notice  of  the  motion  of  a  mill  or  a  waterfall    ' 
when  we  have  lived  quite  near  it  for  some  time.     It  is  not 
that  the  motion  does  not  always  strike  our  organs,  and  that 
something    no    longer    enters   into    the    soul    corresponding 
thereto,  in  virtue  of  the  harmony  of  the  soul  and  the  body, 
but  these  impressions  which  are  in  the  soul  and  the  body,  be- 
ing destitute   of   the  attractions  of  novelty,   are    not   strong 
enougli  to  attract  our  attention  and  our  nu^mory,  attached  to-^'^ir- 
oljjects  more  engrossing.     For  all  att(!ntiou  I'equires  memory,. 
1  Enlmaiiu  and  Jacques  vvmX  :  "  II  (lit  que,"  i.e.  He  says  that.  —  Tu. 


48  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

and.  ofteu  when  we  are  not  admonishecl,  so  to  speak,  and 
warned  to  take  note  of  some  of"  our  own  present  perceptions, 
we  allow  them  to  pass  without  reflection,  and  even  without 
being  noticed ;  but  if  any  one  directs  our  attention  to  them 
immediately  after,  and  makes  us  notice,  for  example,  some 
noise  which  was  just  heard,  we  remember  it,  and  are  conscious 
of  having  had  at  the  time  some  feeling  of  it.  Thus  there 
"were  perceptions  of  which  we  were  not  conscious  at  once,  con- 
sciousness arising  in  this  case  only  from  the  warning  after 
some  interval,  however  small  it  may  be.  And  to  judge  still 
better  of  the  minute  perceptions  which  we  cannot  distinguish 
in  the  crowd,  I  am  Avont  to  make  use  of  the  example  of  the 
roar  or  noise  of  the  sea  which  strikes  one  when  on  its  shore. 
To  understand  this  noise  as  it  is  made,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  hear  the  parts  which  compose  this  whole,  i.e.  the  noise  of 
each  w^ave,  although  each  of  these  little  noises  makes  itself 
known  only  in  the  confused  collection  of  all  the  others,  i.e.  in 
the  roar  itself,  and  would  not  be  noticed  if  the  wave  Avhieh 
makes  it  were  alone.  For  it  must  be  that  we  are  affected  a 
little  by  the  motion  of  this  wave,  and  that  we  have  some  per- 
ception of  each  one  of  these  noises,  small  as  they  are ;  other- 
wise we  would  not  have  that  of  a  hundred  thousand  waves, 
since  a  hundred  thousand  nothings  cannot  make  something. 
One  never  sleeps  so  soundly  as  not  to  have  some  feeble  and 
confused  sensation,  and  one  would  never  be  awakened  by  the 
greatest  noise  in  the  world  if  he  did  not  have  some  perception 
of  its  small  beginning ;  just  as  one  would  never  break  a  rope 
by  the  greatest  effort  in  the  world  if  it  were  not  stretched 
and  lengthened  a  little  by  smaller  efforts,  although  the  slight 
extension  they  produce  is  not  apparent. 

These  minute  perceptions  are,  then,  of  greater  efficacy  in 
■  their  results  than  one  supposes.  They  form  I  know  not  what, 
these  tastes,  these  images  of  the  sense-qualities,  clear  in  the 
mass,  but  confused  in  the  parts,  these  impressions  which  sur- 
roiinding  bodies  make  upon  us,  which  involve  the  infinite,  this 
connection  which  each  beiug  has  with  all  the  rest  of  the  uni- 
verse. We  may  even  say  that  in  consequence  of  these  minute 
perceptions,  the  present  is  big  with  the  future  and  laden  with 
the  past,  that  all  things  conspire  (o-uyaTrvota  Travra,  as  Hip- 
pocrates said),  and  that  in  the  least  of  substances  eyes  as 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  49 

penetrating  as  those  of  God  could  read  the  Avhole  course  of 
the  things  in  the  universe. 

QuEe  sint,  quae  fu-erint,  quse  mox  futura  trahantur.i 

These  insensible  perceptions  indicate  also  and  constitute  the 
same  individual  who  is  characterized  by  the  traces  or  expres- 
sions which  they  conserve  of  preceding  states  of  this  individual, 
in  making  the  connection  with  his  present  state ;  and  they  can  be 
known  by  a  superior  mind,  even  if  this  individual  himself  should 
not  be  aware  of  them,  i.e.  when  there  would  no  longer  be  in  him 
the  express  recollection  of  them.  But  they  (these  perception.s, 
1  say)  furnish,  indeed,  the  means  of  finding  again  this  recollec- 
tion at  need  by  the  periodic  developments  which  may  some  day 
happen.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  death  can  be  only  a  sleep,  and 
cannot,  indeed,  continue,  the  perceptions  ceasing  merely  to  be 
sufficiently  distinguished,  and  being  reduced  in  the  animals  to  a 
state  of  confusion  which  suspends  consciousness,  but  which  can- 
not last  always ;  not  to  speak  ^  here  of  man,  who  must  have  in 
this  regard  great  privileges  in  order  to  preserve  his  personality. 
It  is  also  by  means  of  the  insensible  perceptions  that  this 
admirable  pre-established  harmony  of  the  soul  and  the  body, 
and  indeed  of  all  the  monads  or  simple  substances,  is  ex- 
plained ;  ^  which  supplies  the  place  of  the  unmaintainable 
influence  of  one  upon  the  others,  and  which  in  the  judgment 
of  the  author  of  the  most  excellent  of  dictionaries  exalts  the 
grandeur  of  the  divine  perceptions  beyond  what  has  ever  been 
conceived.  After  this  I  would  add  little  if  I  should  say  that 
it  is  these  minute  perceptions  which  (M£imine  us  in  many 
junctures  without  being  thought  of,  and  which  deceive  the 
vulgar  by  the  appearance  of  an  indifference  of  equilibrium,  as 
if  we  were  entirely  indifferent  whether  we  turned  (for  ex- 
ample) to  the  right  or  to  the  left.  It  is  not  needful  also  that 
I  notice  here,  as  I  have  done  in  the  book  itself,  that  they 
cause  that  uneasiness  which  I  show  to  consist  in  something 
which  differs  from  pain  only  as  the  small  from  the  great,  and 
which,  however,  often  constitutes  our  desire  and  even  our 

1  Erdmami  reads:  quae  mox,  etc. ;  Jacques:  qvx  mox  ventura  trahanfiir. 
Gerliardt's  reading:  "  que  "  is  evidently  an  error.  —  Tr. 

'■' Erdmaiiu  and  Jacques  omit:    "pour  ne  parler  icy  de  I'liomme  qui  doit 
avoir  cu  cela  des  grands  privileges  pour  <i;arder  sa  personalite-."  —  Tu. 

8  Erdmann  and  Jac(jU(;s  rimd  "  j'cxpliciue,"  I  cxi)lain.  —  Tr. 
E 


50  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

pleasure  by  giving  to  it  an  exciting  flavor.  It  is  also '  the 
insensible  parts  of  our  sensible  percepjtions,  which  produce 
a  relation  between  the  perceptions  of  colors,  heat,  and  other 
sensible  (qualities,  and  between  the  motions  in  bodies  which 
correspond  to  them ;  while  the  Cartesians  together  with 
our  author,  penetrating  as  he  is,  conceive  the  perceptions 
which  we  have  of  these  qualities  as  arbitrary,  i.e.  as  if  God 
had  given  them  to  the  soul  according  to  his  good  pleasure, 
without  any  regard  to  any  essential  relation  between  these 
perceptions  and  their  objects:  a  view  which  surprises  me 
and  which  appears  to  me  little  vv^orthy  of  the  wisdom  of 
the  Author  of  things,  who  does  nothing  without  harmony  and 
without  reason. 

.  -  In  a  word,  the  insensible  perceptions  are  as  eminently  use- 
ful in  Pneumatology  ^  as  are  the  insensible  corpuscles  in 
Physics,  and  it  is  equally  unreasonable  to  reject  the  one  or 
the  other  under  the  pretext  that  they  are  out  of  reach  of  our 
senses.  Nothing  is  accomplished  all  at  once,  and  it  is  one  of 
my  great  maxims,  and  one  of  the  most  verified,  that  nature 
makes  no  leaps :  a  maxim  which  I  called  the  Law  of  Continuity, 
when  I  spoke  of  it  in  the  first  " Xouvelles  de  la  Republique 
des  Lettres,"  ^  and  the  use  of  this  law  is  very  considerable  in 
Physics.  This  law  declares  that  we  pass  always  from  the  small 
to  the  great,  and  the  reverse,  through  the  medium,  in  degree  as 
in  parts,  and  that  motion  never  springs  immediately  from  rest, 
nor  is  reduced  thereto  save  by  a  smaller  motion,  as  one  never 
completes  the  survey  of  any  line  or  length  until  he  has  com- 
pleted a  smaller  line,  although  hitherto  those  who  have  set 
forth  the  laws  of  motion  have  not  observed  this  law,  believing 
that  a  body  can  receive  in  a  moment  a  motion  contrary  to  the 
preceding.      And   all  this   makes  one   indeed  think  that  the 

1  ErdmaTin  and  Jacques  read :  "  Ce  sont  les  memes  parties  insensibles,"  etc., 
It  is  tlie  same  insensible  parts,  etc.  —  Tr. 

2  I.e.  Psyeliolouy.  Cf.  Hamilton's  Reid,  8th  ed.,  Vol.  I.,  p.  217  a,  and  note. 
—  Tr. 

3  A  literary  journal  published  by  Pierre  Bayle  at  Amsterdam,  1084-1687 ; 
afterwards  continued,  at  Bayle's  i-equest,  by  Basna^e,  under  the  title  "  Histoire 
de  ouvraffes  des  Savants,"  1087-1709.  Leibnitz  published  in  this  journal  in 
July,  1098,  his  Edairci.'fsejnent  de.'i  difficnites  que  M.  Rai/le  a  tronvees  dans  le 
nysteme  nouveau  de  I'union  de  I'ame  et  du  corps.  Gerhardt,  Vol.  4,  pp.  517- 
524;  Erdmann,  pp.  150-154;  Jacques,  Vol.  1,  pp.  481-187.  Translation,  Appen- 
dix, pp.  706-712.— Tr. 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  51 

noticeable  jnrceptions  also  arise  by  degrees  from  those  which 
are  too  minute  to  be  observed.  To  thiuk  otherwise,  is  to  have 
little  knowTedge  of  the  immense  subtilty  of  things  which 
always  and  everywhere  surrounds  an  actual  infinite.  "^ 

I  have  also  noticed  that  in  virtue  of  these  insensible  varia-  ' 
tions,  two  individual  things  cannot  be  perfectly  alike,  and  ; 
that  they  must  always  differ  more  than  numero :  a  fact  which  '. 
destroys  the  blank  tablets  of  the  soul,  a  soul  without  thought,  ij 
a  substance  without  action,  a  vacuum  in  space,  atoms  and  even 
particles  not  actually  divided  in  matter,  absolute  rest,  entire 
uniformity  in  one  portion  of  time,  place,  or  matter,  perfect 
globes  of  the  second  element,  born  of  cubes  perfect  and  orig- 
inal, and  a  thousand  other  fictions  of  philosophers  which  arise 
from  their  incomplete  notions,  and  which  the  nature  of  things 
does  not  allow,  and  which  our  ignorance  and  the  little  atten-  ^" 
tion  we  give  to  the  insensible  let  pass,  but  which  cannot  be 
made  tolerable  unless  they  are  limited  to  the  abstractions  of 
the  mind  which  protests  that  it  does  not  deny  what  it  puts 
aside,  and  thinks  should  not  enter  into  any  present  considera- 
tion. Otherwise  if  it  were  very  well  understood,  viz. :  that 
things  of  which  we  are  not  conscious  are  neither  in  the  soul 
nor  the  body,  we  should  be  lacking  in  philosophy  as  in  politics, 
in  neglecting  to  (tiKpov,  the  insensible  progressions,  while  an 
abstraction  is  not  an  error,  provided  we  know  what  it  is  that 
we  feign  therein.  Just  as  the  mathematicians  employ  it  when 
they  speak  of  the  perfect  lines  which  they  propose  to  us,  of 
uniform  motions  and  of  other  regulated  effects,  although  matter 
{i.e.  the  medley  of  the  effects  of  the  surrounding  infinite)  always 
makes  some  exception.  It  is  for  the  sake  of  distinguishing  the 
considerations  and  of  reducing  so  far  as  we  may  do  so  the  effects 
to  reasons,  and  of  foreseeing  some  of  their  consequences,  that 
we  proceed  tlius.  For  the  more  we  are  careful  to  neglect  no 
consideration  that  we  can  regulate,  the  more  practice  corre- 
sponds to  theory.  But  it  belongs  only  to  the  supreme  Reason, 
whom  nothing  escapes,  distinctly  to  comprehend  all  the  infinite 
and  to  see  all  the  reasons  and  all  the  consequences.  All  that 
we  can  do  iii  regard  to_infinit(;s  is  to  know  them  confusedly,- 
andTo  know  at  least  distinctly  that  they  are  such  ;  otherwise 
we  judge  very  wrongly  of  the  beauty  and  the  grandeur  of  the 
universe  ;  so  also  we  could  not  have  a  sound  ]*hysics  explaining 


52  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

the  nature  of  bodies  in  general,  and  still  less  a  proper  Pncuma- 
tology  comprising  the  knowledge  of  God,  of  souls,  and  of  simple 
substances  in  general. 

This  knowledge  of  insensible  perceptions  serves  also  to 
explain  why  and  how  two  souls,  human  or  otherwise,^  of  one 
and  the  same  species  never  come  forth  perfectly  alike  from 
the  hands  of  the  Creator  and  have  always  each  its  original 
relation  to  the  points  of  view  which  it  will  have  in  the  uni- 
verse. But  this  it  is  which  already  follows  from  the  remarks 
I  have  made  about  two  individuals,  viz. :  that  their  difference 
is  always  more  than  numerical.  There  is,  moreover,  another 
point  of  importance,  in  respect  to  which  I  am  obliged  to  devi- 
ate not  only  from  the  opinions  of  our  author,  but  also  from 
those  of  the  majority  of  modern  philosophers  :  I  believe  with 
the  majority  of  the  ancients  that  all  genii,^  all  souls,  all  simple 
created  substances,  are  always  joined  to  a  body,  and  that  there 
are  never  souls  entirely  separated.  I  have  a  x)'>'iori  reasons  for 
my  view ;  but  the  doctrine  will  be  found  to  have  this  advan- 
tage, that  it  resolves  all  the  philosoj)hical  difficulties  as  to  the 
condition  of  souls,  their  perpetual  conservation,  their  immor- 
tality, and  their  operation.  The  difference  between  one  of 
their  states  and  another,  never  being  and  never  having  been 
other  than  that  of  more  sensible  to  less  sensible,  of  more 
perfect  to  less  perfect,  or  the  reverse,  this  doctrine  renders 
their  past  or  future  state  as  explicable  as  that  of  the  present. 
One  feels  sufficiently,  however  little  reflection  he  makes,  that 
this  is  rational,  and  that  a  leap  from  one  state  to  another 
infinitely  different  could  not  be  natural.  I  am  astonished 
that  by  leaving  the  natural  without  reason,  the  schoolmen 
have  been  willing  purposely  to  plunge  themselves  into  very 
great  difficulties,  and  to  suj^ply  matter  for  apparent  triumphs 
of  the  strong-minded,  all  of  whose  reasons  fall  at  once  by  this 
explanation  of  things,  in  which  there  is  no  more  difiiculty  in 
conceiving  the  conservation  of  souls  (or  rather,  according  to 
my  view,  of  the  animal)  than  there  is  in  conceiving  the  change 
of  the  caterpillar  into  the  butterfly,  and  the  conservation  of 
thought  in  sleep,  to  which  Jesus  Christ  has  divinely  well  com- 
pared death.     I  have  already  said  also  that  sleep  could  not 

1  Erdmann  reads :  "  on  rienx  choses,"  or  two  things.  —  Tr. 

2  I.e.  Angels  and  arfhangels.  —  Tb. 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  53 

last  always,  and  it  will  last  least  or  almost  not  at  all  iii  the 
case  of  rational  souls  who  are  always  destined  to  preserve  the 
personality  which  has  been  given  them  in  the  City  of  God, 
and  consequently  remembrance :  and  this  in  order  to  be  more 
susceptible  of  chastisements  and  recompenses.  And  I  add 
further  that  in  general  no  derangement  of  the  visible  organs 
is  capable  of  throwing  things  into  entire  confusion  in  the 
animal  or  of  destroying  all  the  organs  and  depriving  the  soul 
of  all  its  organic  body  and  of  the  ineffaceable  remains  of  all 
preceding  traces.  But  the  ease  with  which  the  ancient  doc- 
trine of  subtile  bodies  connected  with  the  angels  (which  was 
confounded  with  the  corporeality  of  the  angels  themselves) 
has  been  abandoned,  and  the  introduction  of  pretended  sepa- 
rate intelligences  in  creatures  (to  which  those  who  make  the 
heavens  of  Aristotle  revolve  have  contributed  much),  and 
finally  the  poorly  understood  view  into  which  we  have  fallen, 
that  the  souls  of  brutes  could  not  be  preserved  without  falling 
into  metempsychosis,  and^  without  conducting  them  from  body 
to  body,  and  the  perplexity  into  which  men  have  fallen  by 
their  ignorance  of  what  to  do  with  them,  have  caused  us,  in 
my  opinion,  to  neglect  the  natural  explanation  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  soul.  This  has  done  much  harm  to  natural  relig- 
ion, and  has  caused  many  to  believe  that  our  immortality 
was  only  a  miraculous  grace  of  God,  of  which  also  our  cele- 
brated author  speaks  with  some  hesitation,  as  I  shall  presently 
remark.  But  it  would  be  well  had  all  those  who  are  of  this 
opinion  spoken  as  wisely  and  in  as  good  faith  as  he,  for  it  is  to 
be  feared  that  many  who  speak  of  immortality  as  a  grace  do 
so  only  to  keep  up  appearances,  and  resemble  at  bottom  these 
Averroists  and  some  bad  Quietists  who  picture  to  themselves 
an  absorption  and  the  reunion  of  the  soul  with  the  ocean 
of  divinity :  a  notion  whose  impossibility  my  system  alone 
perhaps  evinces. 

It  seems  also  that  we  differ  further  in  regard  to  matter,  in 
that  the  author  thinks  that  a  vacuum  is  necessary  to  motion, 
because  he  thinks  that  the  minute  parts  of  matter  are  rigid. 
And  I  admit  that  if  matter  were  composed  of  such  ])arts, 

^  Gerhardt's  text  is:  "et  sans  les  promener  de  corps  en  forps,  et  I'embar- 
ras  oil  Van  a  este  on  nc  saeliant  ce  qii'on  en  dovoit  faire."  Erduiaiin  and 
Jacques  omit  the  elause. — 'I"i:. 


64  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

motiou  iu  a  plenum  would  be  impossible,  as  if  a  room  were 
lull  of  a  quantity  of  little  pebbles  without  there  being  the 
least  empty  space.  But  this  supposition,  for  which  there 
appears  also  to  be  no  reason,  is  not  admissible,  although  this 
learned  author  goes  as  far  as  to  believe  that  rigidity  or  cohe- 
sion of  the  minute  parts  makes  the  essence  of  the  body.  It  is 
necessary  rather  to  conceive  space  as  full  of  a  matter  origi- 
nally fluid,  susceptible  of  all  the  divisions,  and  even  actually 
subject  to  divisions  and  subdivisions  to  infinity,  but  with 
this  difference,  however,  that  it  is  divisible  and  divided  un- 
equally in  different  parts  on  account  of  the  motions  which 
more  or  less  concur  there.  This  it  is  which  causes  matter  to 
have  everywhere  a  degree  of  rigidity  as  well  as  of  fluidity,  and 
no  body  to  be  hard  or  fluid  in  the  highest  degree,  i.e.  no  atom 
to  be  found  of  an  insurmountable  hardness  nor  any  mass 
entirely  indifferent  to  division.  The  order,  also,  of  nature,  and 
particularly  the  law  of  continuity,  destroy  equally  the  one  and 
the  other. 

I  have  also  shown  that  cohesion,  which  b}'  itself  -yvould  not 
be  the  effect  of  impulse  or  of  motion,  would  cause  a  traction, 
taken  strictly.  For  if  there  were  a  body  originally  rigid,  —  for 
example,  an  Epicurean  atom,  —  which  should  have  a  part  pro- 
jecting like  a  hook  (since  we  can  imagine  atoms  of  all  sorts  of 
shapes),  this  hook  pushed  would  draw  with  it  the  rest  of  this 
atom ;  i.e.  the  part  which  is  not  pushed,  and  which  does  not 
fall  in  the  line  of  the  impulsion.  Our  learned  author,  how- 
ever, is  for  himself  opposed  to  these  philosophic  tractions, 
such  as  were  formerly  attributed  to  the  abhorrence  of  a 
vacuum,  and  he  reduces  them  to  impulsions,  maintaining  with 
the  moderns  that  one  part  of  matter  works  immediately  upon 
another  only  by  pushing  it  by  contact,  in  which  I  think  they 
are  right,  because  otherwise  there  is  nothing  intelligible  in  the 
oj^eration. 

I  must  not,  however,  conceal  the  fact  that  I  have  noticed  a 
sort  of  retraction  by  our  excellent  author  on  this  subject, 
whose  modest  sincerity  I  cannot  forbear  praising  in  this 
respect  as  much  as  I  have  admired  on  other  occasions  his 
penetrating  genius.  It  is  in  his  reply  to  the  second  letter  of 
the  late  Bishop  of  Worcester,^  printed  in  1699,  p.  408,  where, 

1  Edward  Stilliugfleet,  1635-1(;*)!»:   Bishop  ol  Worcester,  1G8'.)-I(;'.)ii.  —  Tr. 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  55 

in  order  to  justify  the  view  which  he  had  maintained  against 
this  wise  prelate,  viz. :  that  matter  might  tliink,  he  says  among 
other  things :  "  /  admit  that  I  said  (Essay  on  Understanding, 
Book  II.  chap.  8,  §  11)  that  body  acts  by  imimlse  and  not 
otherwise.  This  also  was  my  vieio  ichen  I  wrote  it,  and  even  now 
I  cannot  conceive  its  action  in  any  other  way.  But  since  then  I 
have  been  convinced  by  the  judicious  Mr.  Newton's  incomjjarable 
book  that  there  is  too  much  loresumption  in  tvishing  to  limit  the 
poiver  of  God  by  our  limited  coyxceptions.  The  gravitation  of 
matter  towards  matter  in  ways  inconceivable  to  me.,  is  not  only  a 
demonstration  that  God,  ivhen  it  seems  to  him  good,  can  j^ut  into 
bodies  poicers  and  modes  of  acting  lohich  are  beyond  what  can  be 
derived  from  our  idea  of  body  or  explained  by  tohat  loe  know  of 
matter;  bid  it  is  furthermore  an  incontestable  instance  that  he  has 
really  done  so.  I  shall  therefore  take  care  to  correct  this  passage 
in  the  next  edition  of  my  book.'''  ^  I  find  that  in  the  French 
version  of  this  book,  made  undoubtedly  from  the  latest  edi- 
tions, the  matter  has  been  put  thus  in  this  %  11  :  It  is  evident, 
at  least  so  far  as  we  can  conceive  it,  that  it  is  by  imptdse  and 
not  otherwise  that  bodies  act  on  each  other;  for  it  is  impossible 
for  us  to  understand  hoiv  the  body  can  act  upon  what  it  does  not 
touch,  which  is  the  same  as  to  imagine  that  it  can  act  ivhere  it 
is  not. 

I  can  only  praise  this  modest  piety  of  our  celebrated  author, 
who  recognizes  that  God  can  do  more  than  we  can  understand, 
and  that  thus  there  may  be  inconceivable  mysteries  in  the 
articles  of  faith ;  but  I  should  not  wish  to  be  obliged  to  recur 
to  the  miracle  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature  and  to  admit 
powers  and  operations  absolutely  inexplicable.  Otherwise  too 
much  license  will  be  given  poor  philosophers,  under  coven-  of 
what  God  can  do,  and  by  admitting  these  centripetal  virtues  or 
these  immediate  attractions  from  afar  without  being  able  to 
make  them  intelligible,  I  see  nothing  to  hinder  our  Seliolastics 
from  saying  that  everything  is  done  simply  by  their  facnilties 
and  from  maintaining  their  intentional  species  wliich  proceed 

I I  have  retranslated  the  passage  from  the  Froneh  version,  as  jjiven  by  Ger- 
hardt.  For  the  original,  cf.  Locke,  Philofi.  Works  (Holm's  (^d.),  Vol.  II.,  p.  '.M^. 
The  entire  letter  is  fonnd  in  Loeke's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  578-774;  tliis  particu- 
lar passage,  p.  754.  Edition  of  4  vols.,  4to.  7th  ed.,  17(>8.  Printed  for  II.  Wood- 
fall,  A.  Millai-,  and  otliers.  —  Tr. 


56  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

from  objects  even  to  us  aud  fiud  means  of  entering  even  into 
our  souls.     If  that  is  so, 

Umuia  jam  tient,  fieri  quae  posse  negabam. 

So  that  it  seems  to  me  that  our  author,  quite  judicious  as  he 
is,  goes  here  a  little  too  much  from  one  extreme  to  the  other. 
He  makes  a  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  operations  of  souls  when 
the  question  is  only  of  admitting  what  is  not  soisible,  and 
behold  he  gives  to  bodies  what  is  not  even  intelligible ;  granting 
them  powers  and  actions  which  surpass  in  my  view  all  that  a 
created  spirit  can  do  and  understand,  since  he  grants  them 
attraction,  and  that  even  at  great  distances  without  limiting 
them  to  any  sphere  of  activity,  and  this  in  order  to  maintain  a 
view  which  does  not  appear  less  inexplicable,  viz. :  the  possi- 
bilit}'  of  the  thought  of  matter  in  the  natural  order. 

The  question  which  he  discusses  with  the  celebrated  Prelate 
who  attacked  him,  is,  wliether  matter  can  think,  and  as  it  is  an 
important  point  even  for  the  present  work,  I  cannot  refrain 
from  entering  upon  it  a  little  and  from  taking  note  of  their 
controversy.  I  will  give  the  substance  of  their  discussion 
upon  this  subject,  and  take  the  liberty  of  saying  what  I  think 
of  it.  The  late  Bishop  of  Worcester,  fearing  (but  in  my 
opinion  without  good  reason)  lest  our  author's  doctrine  of  ideas 
might  be  liable  to  certain  abuses  prejudicial  to  the  Christian 
faith,  undertook  to  examine  some  points  in  it  in  his  "Vindication 
of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  "  ;  ^  and  having  rendered  justice 
to  this  excellent  writer,  by  recognizing  that  he  thinks  the  exist- 
ence of  spirit  as  certain  as  that  of  body,  although  one  of  these 
substances  is  as  little  known  as  the  other,  he  asks  (p.  241  sq.) 
how  reflection  can  assure  us  of  the  existence  of  spirit,  if  God 
can  give  to  matter  the  power  of  thought  according  to  the  view 
of  our  author,  Book  IV.,  chap.  3,  since  thus  the  way  of  ideas 
which  must  serve  to  discern  -  what  may  suit  the  soul  or  the 
body,  would  become  useless ;  while  he  had  said  in  Book  II.  of 
the  Essay  on  Understanding,  chap.  23,  §§  15,  27,  28,  that  the 
operations  of  the  soul  furnish  us  the  idea  of  mind  and  the 

1  Published  in  tlie  autumn  of  1696.  Cf.  Alexander  Campbell  Fraser,  Locke, 
pp.  245-2-KJ  (Philosophical  Classics),  Edinburgh:  Wm.  Blackwood  and  Sous, 
1890.  — Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads:  "  disceruer  " ;  Erdmann  and  Jacques:  "discuter,"  to 
discuss,  debate,  argue.  —  Tr. 


I 


ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTxVNDING  57 

understanding,  and  the  Avill  renders  this  idea  as  intelligible  to 
us  as  the  nature  of  body  is  rendered  intelligible  to  us  by  solid- 
ity and  impulse.  This  is  how  our  author  replies  in  his  first 
letter  (p.  65  sq.)  :  "  I  believe  I  have  proved  that  there  is  a  spirit- 
ual substance  in  us,  for  toe  experience  in  ourselves  thought.  Now 
this  action  or  this  mode  cannot  be  the  object  of  the  idea  of  a  thing 
subsisting  by  itself,  and  consequently  this  mode  needs  a  suptport,  a 
subject,  in  -which  it  may  inhere,  and  the  idea  of  this  support  forms 
what  ice  call  substance.  .  .  .  For  since  the  general  idea  of  sub- 
stance is  everywhere  the  same,  it  follows  that  the  modijication, 
which  is  called  thought  or  power  of  thinking,  being  joined  to  it, 
there  results  a  mind  without  the  necessity  of  considering  what 
other  modijication  it  has  besides;  i.e.  ivhether  it  has  solidity  or 
not.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  substance  which  has  the  modifi- 
cation called  solidity  ivill  be  matter,  whether  thought  is  joined  to  it 
or  not.  But  if  by  a  spiiritual  substance  you  mean  an  immaterial 
substance,  I  admit  that  I  have  not  proved  that  there  is  one  in  us, 
and  that  it  cannot  be  demonstrably  proved  on  my  prrincipjles.  Al- 
though tvhat  I  have  said  on  the  systeins  of  matter  (Book  IV., 
chap.  10,  §  16)  in  j)roving  that  God  is  immaterial,  renders  it  in 
the  highest  degree  probcd>le,  that  the  substance  ichich  thinks  in  us 
is  immaterial.  .  .  .  However,  I  have  shoivn  [the  author  adds, 
p.  68]  that  the  great  ends  of  religion  and  of  morals  are  assured 
by  the  immortality  of  the  soid,  icithout  the  need  of  supposing  its 
immateriality.^'  ^ 

The  learned  Bishop  in  his  reply  to  this  letter,  in  order  to 
make  it  evident  that  our  author  held  another  view,  when  he 
wrote  the  second  book  of  the  Essay,  quotes,  p.  51,  this  passage 
(taken  from  the  same  book,  chap.  23,  §  15),  where  it  is  said,  that 
by  the  simj)l€  ideas  which  we  have  deduced  from  the  operations  of 
our  mind,  we  can  form  the  complex  idea  of  a  mind.  And  that 
putting  together  the  ideas  of  thought,  of  perception,  of  liberty,  and 
of  power  to  move  our  body,  we  have  as  clear  a  notion  of  immate- 
ricd  substances  as  of  mcderial.  He  quotes  still  other  passages 
to  shoAv  that  the  author  opposes  mind  to  body.  And  he  says 
(p.  54)  that  the  ends  of  religion  and  of  morals  are  the  better 

1 1  have  retranslated  the  passage  from  tlie  French  version  as  given  by  Ger- 
hardt.  For  the  orisinal,  of.  Lot^ke,  Philos.  Works  (Bohn's  ed.),  Vol.  11., 
p.  387.  The  entire  letter  is  found  in  Locke's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  45«-r)17  ;  tliis 
particular  passage,  p.  477.  Edition  of  4  vols.,  4to.  7th  ed.,  17()8.  Printed  for 
H.  Woodfall,  A.  Millar,  and  others.  — Tr. 


58  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

assured  by  proving  that  the  soul  is  immortal  by  its  nature,  i.e. 
immaterial.  He  quotes  also  (p.  7U)  this  passage,  that  the  ideas 
ive  have  of  2'>o,rticxdar  and  distinct  kinds  of  substances  are  nothing 
else  than  different  combinations  of  simple  ideas ;^  and  that  thus 
the  author  believed  that  the  idea  of  thinking  and  of  willing 
gave  another  substance  different  from  that  which  the  idea  of 
solidity  and  of  impulse  gives,  and  that  (§  17)  he  remarks  that 
these  ideas  constitute  the  body  as  opposed  to  mind. 

The  Bishop  of  Worcester  might  add  that  from  the  fact  that 
the  general  idea  of  substance  is  in  the  body  and  in  the  mind, 
it  does  not  follow  that  their  differences  are  modifications  of  one 
and  the  same  thing,  as  our  author  has  just  said  in  the  jjart  of 
his  first  letter  which  I  have  quoted.  It  is  necessary  carefully 
to  distinguish  between  modifications  and  attributes.  The 
faculties  of  having  perception  and  of  acting,  extension,  solid- 
ity, are  attributes  or  perpetual  and  principal  predicates ;  but 
thought,  impetuosity,  figures,  movements,  are  modifications  of 
these  attributes.  Furthermore,  we  must  distinguish  between 
physical  (or,  rather,  real)  genus  and  logical  or  ideal  genus. 
Things  which  are  of  the  same  physical  genus,  or  which  are 
homogeneous,  are  of  the  same  matter,  so  to  speak,  and  may 
often  be  changed  the  one  into  the  other  by  the  change  of  mod- 
ification, as  circles  and  squares.  But  two  heterogeneous  things 
may  have  a  common  logical  genus,  and  then  their  differences 
are  not  simple  accidental  modifications  of  one  and  the  same 
subject,  or  of  one  and  the  same  metaphysical  or  physical  mat- 
ter. Thus  time  and  space  are  very  heterogeneous  things,  and 
we  should  do  wrong  to  imagine  I  know  not  what  real  common 
subject  which  had  only  the  continuous  quantity  in  general, 
and  whose  modifications  should  cause  the  rise  of  time  and 
space.-  Some  one  will  perhaps  laugh  at  these  distinctions  of 
the  philosophers  of  two  genera,  the  one  merely  logical,  the 
other  real ;  and  of  two  matters,  the  one  physical,  viz. :  that  of 
bodies,  the  other  metaphysical  only  or  general ;  as  if  some  one 
said  that  two  parts  of  space  are  of  one  and  the  same  matter, 
or  that  two  hours   are  likewise  among  themselves  of  one  and 

1  Locke,  Phihis.  Works  (Bohirs  ecL),  Vol.  1,  p.  426,  chap.  23.  §  (>.  — Tr. 

-  Erdmaiiii  and  Jacques  add  :  "  Cepeudant  leur  genre  logique  comniun  est  la 
quantite  continue,"  i.e.  Nevertheless  their  common  logical  genus  is  the  con- 
tinuous quantity. —  Tr. 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  59 

the  same  matter.  Nevertheless,  these  distinctions  are  not  dis- 
tinctions of  terms  merely,  but  of  things  themselves,  and  seem 
to  come  in  here  very  opportunely,  where  their  confusion  has 
given  rise  to  a  false  conclusion.  These  two  genera  have  a 
common  notion,  and  that  of  the  real  genus  is  common  to  the 
two  matters,  so  that  their  genealogy  will  be  as  follows  :  — 

r  LogicMl  merely,  varied  by  simple  differences. 
\  r  Metaphysical     only,     where 

renus  1  ^^^^^  -vvhose  differences  are  modi-  I  there  is  homogeneity. 

[         Jications,  i.e.  Matter.  j  Physical,  where   there   is    a 

[  solid  homogeneous  mass. 

I  have  not  seen  the  second  letter  of  the  author  to  the 
Bishop,  and  the  reply  which  this  prelate  makes  to  it  scarcely 
touches  the  point  relating  to  the  thinking  of  matter.  But  the 
reply  of  our  author  to  this  second  ansAver  returns  to  it.  God 
(says  he,  nearly  in  these  words,  p.  397)  adds  to  the  essence  of 
matter  the  qualities  and  2^€'>'f€ctions  which  p/ease  /im,  simple 
movement  in  some  parts,  but  in  plants,  vegetation,  and  in  ani- 
mals, sentiency.  Those  who  agree  up  to  this  x)oint,  cry  out  as 
soon  as  we  go  a  step  farther,  and  say  that  God  can  give  to  matter 
thought,  reason,  icill,  as  if  this  destroyed  the  essence  of  matter. 
But  to  prove  it,  they  allege  that  thought  or  reason  is  not  included 
in  the  essence  of  matter,  a  point  of  no  consequence,  since  move- 
ment and  life  are  not  included  therein  either.  They  assert,  also, 
that  we  cannot  conceive  of  matter  as  thinking  ;  hut  our  conception 
is  not  the  measure  of  God's  power. ^  After  this  he  cites  the  ex- 
ample of  the  attraction  of  matter  (p.  99,  but  especially  p.  408), 
where  he  speaks  of  the  gravitation  of  matter  towards  matter, 
attributed  to  Mr.  Newton  (in  the  terms  which  I  have  quoted 
above),  admitting  that  we  can  never  conceive  the  manner  of  it. 
This  is  in  reality  to  return  to  the  occult,  or,  what  is  more,  in- 
explicable qualities.  He  adds  (p.  401)  that  nothing  is  more 
calculated  to  favor  the  sceptics  than  to  deny  what  we  do  not 
understand  ;  and  (p.  402)  that  wc  do  not  conceive  even  how  the 
soul  thinks.     He  will  have  it  (p.  403)  that,  since  the  two  sub- 

1  For  tlie  ori-inal,  cf.  Locke,  Phih>!<.  Worls  (Bolm's  ed.),  Vol.  2,  i)|).  .".iiO,  ;'.!»1. 
The  entire  letter  is  found  in  Locke's  Works,  Vol.1,  pp.  .578-774;  tlii.s  particu- 
lar passage,  pp.  74<t,  7.50.  Edition  of  4  vols.,  4to.  7th  ed.,  1708.  Printed  for 
H.  Woodfall,  A.  Miller,  and  others.  — Tk. 


60  LEIBNITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


stances,  material  and  immaterial,  are  capable  of  being  conceived 
in  their  naked  essence  -witliout  any  activity,  it  depends  upon 
God  to  give  to  each  the  power  of  thought.  And  he  wishes  to 
take  advantage  of  the  admission  of  his  opponent,  who  had 
granted  sentiency  to  the  brutes,  but  wlio  would  not  grant  them 
any  immaterial  substance.  He  claims  that  liberty,  conscious- 
ness (p.  408),  and  the  power  of  abstract  thought  (p.  409)  can 
be  bestowed  upon  matter,  not  as  matter,  but  as  enriched  by  a 
divine  power.  Finally,  he  quotes  (p.  434)  the  remark  of  a 
traveller  as  eminent  and  judicious  as  M.  de  la  Loubere,^  that 
the  pagans  of  the  East  acknowledge  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  without  being  able  to  comprehend  its  immateriality. 

On  all  this  I  would  remark,  before  coming  to  the  explana- 
tion of  my  view,  that  it  is  certain  that  matter  is  as  little  capa- 
ble of  mechanically  producing  feeling,  as  of  producing  reason, 
as  our  author  admits ;  that  in  truth  I  acknowledge  that  it  is 
not  permissible  to  deny  what  we  do  not  understand,  but  I  add 
that  we  are  right  in  denying  (at  least  in  the  natural  order) 
what  is  absolutely  neither  intelligible  nor  explicable.  I  main- 
tain, also,  that  substances  (material  or  immaterial)  cannot  be 
conceived  in  their  naked  essence  without  any  activity ;  that 
activity  belongs  to  the  essence  of  substance  in  general ;  that, 
finally,  the  conception  of  creatures  is  not  the  measure  of  God's 
power,  but  that  their  conceptivity,  or  power  of  conception,  is 
the  measure  of  nature's  power;  all  this  is  in  harmony  with 
the  natural  order,  being  capable  of  being  conceived  or  under- 
stood by  some  creature. 

Those  who  understand  my  system  will  think  that  I  cannot 
wholly  agree  with  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  excellent 
authors,  whose  discussion,  however,  is  very  instructive.  But 
to  explain  myself  distinctly,  it  is  necessary  before  all  things 
to  consider  that  the  modifications  which  may  belong  naturally 
or  without  miracle  to  a  subject  must  come  to  it  from  the  limi- 
tations or  variations  of  a  real  genus,  or  of  a  constant  and  abso- 
lute original  nature.     For  it  is  thus  that  Philosophers  dis- 

1  La  Loubere,  Simon  de,  1642-1729.  Sent  by  Louis  XIV.  in  1(587  to  Siam, 
to  estaljlish  diplomatic  and  commercial  relations  between  that  kingdom  and 
France.  While  there  he  collected  a  large  amount  of  exact  and  interesting 
information  concerning  the  country,  its  history,  customs,  religion,  etc.,  which, 
on  his  return,  he  published  in  his  Du  royaume  de  Siaiyi,  Paris,  1691;  English 
translation,  London,  1693.  — Tr. 


1 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  61 

tinguisli  the  modes  of  an  absolute  being  from  that  being  itself ; 
as  it  is  known  that  size,  figure,  and  movement  are  manifestly 
limitations  and  variations  of  corporeal  nature.  For  it  is  clear 
how  a  limited  extension  gives  figures,  and  that  the  change 
which  is  made  in  it  is  nothing  but  motion.  And  whenever 
we  find  any  quality  in  a  subject,  we  must  believe  that  if  we 
understood  the  nature  of  this  subject  and  of  this  quality,  we 
should  conceive  how  this  quality  can  result  therefrom.  Thus 
in  the  order  of  nature  (miracles  aside)  it  is  not  optional  with 
God  to  give  to  substances  indifferently  such  or  such  qualities, 
and  he  will  never  give  to  them  any,  save  those  which  will  be 
natural  to  them,  i.e.  which  can  be  derived  from  their  nature  as 
explicable  modifications.  Thus  it  may  be  asserted  that  matter 
will  not  naturally  possess  the  attraction  mentioned  above,  and 
will  not  proceed  of  itself  in  a  curved  line,  because  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  conceive  how  this  takes  place  there,  i.e.  to  explain  it 
mechanically,  while  that  which  is  natural  must  be  capable  of 
becoming  distinctly  conceivable  if  we  were  admitted  into  the 
secrets  of  things.  This  distinction  between  what  is  natural 
and  explicable  and  what  is  inexplicable  and  miraculous 
removes  all  the  difficulties,  and  by  rejecting  it,  we  should 
maintain  something  worse  than  the  occult  qualities ;  and  in  so 
doing  would  renounce  philosophy  and  reason,  by  opening 
retreats  for  ignorance  and  idleness,  though  a  dead  system, 
which  admits  not  only  that  there  are  qualities  which  we  do  not 
understand,  of  which  there  are  only  too  many,  but  also  that 
there  are  some  which  the  greatest  mind,  if  God  gave  him  every 
possible  opening,  could  not  comprehend,  i.e.  which  would  be 
either  miraculous  or  without  rhyme  and  reason ;  and  also  that 
God  should  work  miracles  ordinarily  would  be  without  rhyme 
and  reason,  so  that  this  hypothesis  would  destroy  equally  our 
philosophy  which  seeks  reasons,  and  the  divine  wisdom  which 
furnishes  them. 

Now  as  to  thought,  it  is  certain,  and  the  author  admits  it 
more  than  once,  that  it  could  not  be  an  intelligible  modifica- 
tion of  nature  or  one  which  could  be  comprised  therein  and 
explained,  i.e.  that  a  being  who  feels  and  thinks  is  not  a  mech- 
anism like  a  watch  or  a  mill,  so  that  we  might  conceive  sizes, 
figures,  and  movements,  whose  mechanical  conjunction  might 
produce  something  thinking,  and  even  feeling  in  a  mass  in 


62  LEIBNITZ'S   CKI'IUirK   OF   LOCKE 

■which  there  was  nothing  of  the  kind,  which  Avould  cease  also 
in  the  same  manner  npon  the  derangement  of  this  mechanism. 
It  is  not  then  a  natural  thing  for  matter  to  feel  and  think,  and 
this  can  happen  within  it  only  in  two  ways,  of  which  one  will 
be  that  God  should  unite  with  it  a  substance  to  which  thought 
is  natural,  and  the  other  that  God  by  a  miracle  should  put 
thought  therein.  In  this,  then,  I  am  wholly  of  the  opinion  of 
the  Cartesians,  except  that  I  extend  it  even  to  the  brutes, 
and  that  I  believe  they  have  sentiency  and  (properly  speak- 
ing) immaterial  souls,  and  are  as  imperishable  as  the  atoms  of 
Democritus  or  Gassendi,  while  the  Cartesians,  perplexed  with- 
out reason  by  the  souls  of  brutes,  and  not  knowing  what  they 
are  to  do  with  them  if  they  are  preserved  (for  want  of  having 
thought  of  the  conservation  of  the  same  animal  reduced  to 
miniature),  have  been  compelled  to  refuse  even  sentiency  to  the 
animals  against  all  appearances  and  contrary  to  the  judgment 
of  the  human  race.  Biit  if  any  one  should  say  that  God  at 
least  may  add  the  faculty  of  thinking  to  the  prepared  mechan- 
ism, I  should  reply  that  if  this  were  done,  and  if  God  added 
this  faculty  to  matter  without  j)utting  therein  at  the  same 
time  a  substance  which  was  the  subject  of  inhesion  of  this 
same  faculty  (as  I  conceive  it),  i.e.  without  adding  thereto  an 
immaterial  soul,  it  would  be  necessary  that  matter  should  be 
miraculously  exalted  in  order  to  receive  a  power  of  which  it  is 
naturally  incapable  ;  as  some  scholastics  ^  claim  that  God  ex- 
alts fire  even  to  the  point  of  giving  it  the  force  to  burn  imme- 
diately spirits  separated  from  matter,  a  thing  which  would  be 
a  miracle,  pure  and  simple.  And  it  is  enough  that  it  cannot 
be  maintained  that  matter  thinks  without  putting  into  it  an 
imperishable  soul,  or  a  miracle,  and  that  thus  the  immortality 
of  our  souls  follows  from  what  is  natui-al,  since  their  extinc- 
tion can  be  maintained  only  by  a  miracle,  whether  by  exalting 
matter  or  by  annihilating  the  soul.  For  we  know  well  that 
God's  power  can  make  our  souls  mortal,  wholly  immaterial 
(or  immortal  by  nature  alone)  as  they  may  be,  since  he  can 
annihilate  them. 

Xow  this  truth  of  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  is  undoubt- 

1  Erdmann  and  .Jacques  read :  "  Quelques  sclinlnstiques  ont  pretendu  quelqne 
chose  d'approchant  savoir,"  i.e.  Some  scholastics  have  claimed  something 
like  this :  viz.  —  Tr. 


I 


ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  63 

edly  of  importance.  For  it  is  infinitely  more  advantageous  to 
religion  and  morality,  especially  in  our  times  (when  many 
people  hardly  respect  revelation  alone  and  miracles  '),  to  show 
that  souls  are  immortal  by  nature,  —  and  that  it  would  be  a  mir- 
acle if  they  were  not,  —  than  to  maintain  that  our  souls  ought 
naturally  to  die,  but  that  it  is  in  virtue  of  a  miraculous  grace 
grounded  in  the  promise  of  God  alone  that  they  do  not  die. 
Also  for  a  long  time  it  has  been  known  that  those  who  have 
desired  to  destroy  natural  religion  and  to  reduce  all  to  revealed 
religion,  as  if  reason  tauglit  us  nothing  regarding  it,  have  been 
looked  upon  with  suspicion  ;  and  not  always  without  reason. 
But  our  author  does  not  belong  to  that  number.  He  maintains 
the  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  he  attributes 
to  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  a  probability  in  the  highest  de- 
gree, which  could  consequently  pass  for  a  moral  certainty,  so 
that  I  think  that,  having  as  much  sincerity  as  j^enetration,  he 
could  easily  accommodate  himself  to  the  doctrine  which  I  have 
just  set  forth,  and  which  is  fundamental  in  every  rational  phi- 
losophy. For  otherwise  I  do  not  see  how  one  can  prevent  him- 
self from  falling  back  into  the  fanatical  philosoj^hy,^  such  as  the 
"Philosophia  Mosaica"  of  Fludd,''  which  saves  all  phenomena  by 
attributing  them  to  God  immediately  and  by  miracle ;  or  into 
the  barbaric  philosophy  like  that  of  certain  philosophers  and 
physicians  of  the  past,  which  still  manifested  the  barbarity  of 
their  age,  and  which  to-day  is  with  reason  despised,  who  saved 
appearances  by  forging  purposely  occult  qualities  or  faculties 
which  they  imagined  to  be  like  little  demons  or  goblins  capa- 
ble of  producing  without  ceremony  what  is  demanded,  just  as 
if  watches  marked  the  hours  by  a  certain  horodeictic  faculty 
without  needing  wheels,  or  as  if  mills  ground  the  grain  by  a 
fractive  faculty  without  needing  anything  resembling  mill- 
stones. As  to  the  difficulty  that  many  people  have  had  in 
conceiving  an  immaterial  substance,  it  will  easily  cease  (at 
least  in  good  part)  if  they  will  not  demand  substances  sepa- 
rated from  matter,  as  in  fact  I  do  not  believe  there  ever  are  any 
naturally  among  creatures. 

1  Erdmann  and  .Jacques  omit  this  clause.  —  Tit. 

2  Erflmann  and  .Tacqucs  road  :  "  la  philosophie  ou  fanatiquc,"  i.e.  pliilosopliy 
\  or  fanaticism. — Tr. 

3  R()l)(!rt  P'liidd  (ir)74-lfi.'')7),  an  Ensrlisli  physician  and  mystical  philosopher. 
The  Philosrqihia  Mosaica  was  publislicd  at  Gouda  in  KilJH.  — Tr. 


NEW  ESSAYS  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING 


Book  I.  —  Innate  Ideas 
CHAPTER   V 

ARE    THERE    IJ7XATE    PRINCIPLES    IN    THE    MIND    OF    MAN  ? 

Philalethes.  Having  recrossed  the  sea  after  finishing  my 
business  in  England,  I  thought  at  once  of  pajdng  you  a  visit, 
sir,  in  order  to  cultivate  our  former  friendship,  and  to  con- 
verse upon  matters  which  lie  close  to  our  hearts,  and  upon 
which  I  believe  I  have  acquired  some  new  light  during  my 
long  stay  in  London.  When  we  were  living  formerly  quite 
near  each  other  at  Amsterdam,  we  both  took  much  pleasure 
in  making  researches  into  the  principles  and  means  of  pene- 
trating into  the  heart  of  things.  Although  our  opinions  often 
differed,  this  diversity  increased  our  satisfaction,  when,  in  our 
conference  together,  notwithstanding  the  contrariety  which 
sometimes  existed,  there  mingled  nothing  disagreeable.  You 
were  for  Descartes  ^  and  for  the  opinions  of  the  celebrated 
author-  of  "The  Search  after  Truth,"  and  I  found  the  opinions 
of  Gassendi,-  cleared  up  by  Bernier,  easier  and  more  natural. 
Xow  I  feel  myself  greatly  strengthened  by  the  excellent  work 
which  an  illustrious  Englishman,  with  whom  I  have  the  honor 
of  a  particular  acquaintance,  has  since  published,  and  which 
has  several  times  been  reprinted  in  England,  under  the  modest 

1  Book  I.  of  Locke's  Essay  has  four  chapters,  of  which  chap.  1  is  introduc- 
tory.    Chap.  1  of  Leibnitz  corresponds  to  cliap.  2  of  Locke.  — Tr. 

2  Rene  Descartes,  1596-1650;  Nicolas  Malebrauclie,  16.38-1715,  his  chief 
work,  Be  la  Recherche  de  la  Verite,  1674;  Pierre  Gassendi,  1592-1655,  Ahre[/e 
de  la  Philosophie  de  Gassendi,  8  vols.,  1678,  2d  ed.,  7  vols.,  1()84,  by  Fran9ois 
Bernier. —  Tr. 

64 


CH.   I]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  65 

title  of  "An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding."  And 
I  am  delighted  that  it  has  appeared  lately  in  Latin  and  in 
French,  in  order  that  it  may  be  more  generally  useful.  I  have 
greatly  profited  by  the  reading  of  this  work,  and  indeed  from 
the  conversation  of  the  author,  with  whom  I  have  talked 
often  in  London,  and  sometimes  at  Gates,  at  the  house  of  my 
Lady  Masham,^  worthy  daughter  of  the  celebrated  Cudworth,^ 
a  great  English  philosopher  and  theologian,  author  of  the 
Intellectual  System,  from  whom  she  has  inherited  the  spirit 
of  meditation  and  the  love  for  good  learning,  which  appeared 
particularly  in  the  friendship  which  she  kept  up  with  the 
author  of  the  Essay.  And,  as  he  had  been  attacked  by  some 
clever  Doctors,  I  took  pleasure  in  reading  also  the  defence 
which  a  very  wise  and  very  intelligent  young  lady  made  for 
him,  besides  those  which  he  made  for  himself.  This  author 
writes  in  the  spirit  of  the  system  of  Gassendi,  which  is  at 
bottom  that  of  Democritus ;  ^  he  is  for  the  vacuum  and  for 
atoms ;  he  believes  that  matter  might  think ;  that  there  are 
no  innate  ideas,  that  our  mind  is  a  tabula  rasa,  and  that  we  do 
not  always  think;  and  he  appears  disposed  to  approve  the 
most  of  the  objections  which  Gassendi  has  made ^  to  Descartes. 
He  has  enriched  and  strengthened  this  system  by  a  thousand 
beautiful  reflections  ;  and  I  do  not  at  all  doubt  that  now  our 
party  will  triumph  boldly  over  its  adversaries,  the  Peripa- 
tetics and  the  Cartesians.  This  is  why,  if  you  have  not  yet 
read  this  book,  I  invite  you  to  do  so,  and  if  you  have  read  it, 
I  I  ask  you  to  give  me  your  opinion  of  it. 
2\\  ^\Theophilus.  I  rejoice  to  see  you,  on  your  return  after  a  long 
absence,  happy  in  the  conclusion  of  your  important  business, 
full  of  health,  steadfast  in  your  friendship  for  me,  and  always 
transported  with  an  ardor  equal  to  the  search  for  the  most 

1  Tlie  correspondence  between  Leil)nitz  and  Lady  Mashani  is  yiveu  in  full 
by  Gerhardt,  Vol.  .'5,  pj).  .381  ,sg.  —  Tr. 

2  Ralph  Cudworth,  1G17-1688,  liis  i)rincipal  work,  The  True  Intellectual 
System  of  the  Universe,  London,  l(i7H;  Uemocritns,  l)orn  i)robahly  about  the 
middle  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  as  h<!  says  (Dioij.  L.,  IX.,  41)  lu;  was  "still 
young  when  Anaxagoras,"  500-428  n.c,  "was  already  old  (leo?  Kara  TTp^rftx'nrjv 
'Ava^ayopav)."  .  .  .  "The  year  of  Ills  deatli  is  unknown,"  Zcllcr,  Outlines 
of  the  n into ry  of  Greek  Philosojihy,  pp.  7G,  77,  New  York:  II.  Holt  &  Co., 
1880.— Tr. 

'^  In  Vol.  3  of  his  Opera,  of  which  two  editions  were  jynblisliiMl :  by  Mont- 
mort,  1G55,  G  vols,  folio,  Lyons;  by  Averanins,  1727,  also  G  vols,  folio.  —  Tr. 
F 


J 


06  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

important  truths.  I  uo  less  have  continued  my  meditations 
in  the  same  spirit,  and  I  believe  I  have  profited  as  much  as, 
and,  not  to  flatter  myself,  perhaps  more  than  yourself.  In- 
deed, my  need  tlierein  was  greater  than  yours,  for  you  were 
more  advanced  than  I.  You  were  more  conversant  with  spec- 
ulative philosophers,  and  I  was  more  inclined  towards  ethics. 
But  I  have  learned  more  and  more  how  ethics  receives  strength 
from  the  solid  principles  of  true  philosophy ;  therefore  I  have 
lately  studied  these  principles  more  diligently,  and  have  begun, 
meditations  quite  new.  So  that  we  shall  have  the  means  of 
giving  ourselves  a  reciprocal  pleasure  of  long  duration  in  com- 
municating the  one  to  the  other  our  solutions.  But  it  is  nec- 
essary for  me  to  tell  you,  as  a  piece  of  news,  that  I  am  no 
longer  a  Cartesian,  and  that,  nevertheless,  I  am  farther  re- 
moved than  ever  from  your  Gassendi,  whose  knowledge  and 
merit  I,  for  the  rest,  recognize.  I  have  been  impressed  with 
a  new  system,  of  which  I  have  read  something  in  the  "  Jour- 
naux  des  Savans  "  of  Paris,  Leipzig,  and  Holland,  and  in  the 
marvellous  Dictionary  of  Bayle,  article  "Eorarius"^;  and  since 
then  I  believe  I  see  a  new  aspect  of  the  interior  of  things. 
This  system  appears  to  unite  Plato ^  and  Democritus,  Aristotle^ 
and  Descartes,  the  scholastics  with  the  moderns,  theology  and 
ethics  with  the  reason.  It  seems  to  take  the  best  from  all 
sides,  and  then  it  goes  much  farther  than  any  has  yet 
gone.  I  find  in  it  an  intelligible  explanation  of  the  union  of 
soul  and  body,  of  which  I  had  before  this  despaired.  I  find 
the  true  principles  of  things  in  the  Unities  of  Substance,  which 
this  system  introduces,  and  in  their  harmony  pre-established 
by  the  primitive  Substance.  I  find  therein  a  wonderful  sim- 
plicity and  uniformity,  so  that  it  may  be  said  that  this  sub- 
stance is  everywhere  and  always  the  same  thing,  differing 
only  in  degrees  of  perfection.  I  see  now  what  Plato  meant 
when  he  assumed  matter  to  be  an  existence  imperfect  and 
transitory  ;  what  Aristotle  meant  b}^  his  Entelechy  ;  what  that 
promise  of  another  life  is  which  Democritus  himself  made 
according  to  Pliny ;  how  far  the  Sceptics  were  right  in  de- 
claiming against  the  senses ;  how  animals  are  in  fact  automata 

1  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Vol.  4,  pp.  524-55-1,  the  article  "  Rorarius  "  with  Leibnitz's 
remarks.  —  Tr. 

2  Plato,  427-.>47  B.C. ;  Aristotle,  384-^22  B.C.  —  Te. 


CH.  i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  67 

according  to  Descartes,  and  liow  they  have,  nevertheless,  souls 
and  feeling  according  to  the  opinion  of  mankind ;  how  it  is 
necessary  to  explain  rationally  those  who  have  lodged  life  and 
perception  in  all  things,  as  Cardan,^  Campanella,^  and,  better 
than  they,  the  late  Countess  of  Connaway,  a  Platonist,  and  our 
friend,  the  late  M.  FranQois  Mercure  van  Helmont  '^  (although 
elsewhere  bristling  with  unintelligible  paradoxes),  Avith  his 
friend,  the  late  Mr.  Henry  More.-  How  the  laws  of  nature  (a 
good  part  of  which  were  unknown  before  this  system)  have 
their  origin  in  principles  superior  to  matter,  and  how,  never- 
theless, everything  takes  place  mechanically  in  matter,  in 
which  respect  the  spiritualizing  authors  I  just  named  have 
failed  with  their  Arcluei,^  and  even  the  Cartesians,  in  believ- 

1  Girolamo  Card;uio,  1501-157G ;  Tommaso  Campauella,  1568-1639 ;  c/.  Erd- 
maiiii,  Grundriss  d.  Geseh.  d.  Philos.,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  1,  §§  242,  246,  Berlin:  Wil- 
heliii  Hertz,  1878,  aud  the  English  translation  of  the  same,  London:  Swau 
Sonnenscheiu  &  Co.,  1889;  also  the  articles  "Cardan"  and  "Campanella"  in 
the  Encyclopxdia  Britanntra,  9th  ed.  — Tr. 

2  Van  Helmont,  1618-1(>98:  Henry  More,  1614-lf)87.  —  Tr. 

3  Archsmis,  i.  Modern  Latin,  from  the  Greek  apxaios,  apx^,  that  which  is  at 
the  beginning,  source,  origin,  a  first  principle.  Littre'  defines  the  term  thus : 
"  An-he'e.  Terme  de  physiologic  ancieune.  Principe  immaterial  diffe'rent  de 
I'ame  intelligent  et  qu'on  supposait  presider  a  tons  les  phenomenes  de  la 
vie  materielle."  I.e.  "A  term  of  ancient  physiology.  An  immaterial  princi- 
ple different  from  tlie  intelligent  soul,  and  which  is  supposed  to  preside  over 
all  tlie  phenomena  of  the  material  life."  The  Century  Dictionary  gives  the 
following  exposition  and  illustration:  "In  the  i^hilosophy  of  Paracelsus  and 
other  spagyrics,  mysticSj  and  theosophists,  a  spirit  or  invisible  man  or  animal 
of  ethereal  substance,  the  counterpart  of  the  visible  body,  within  whii^h  it 
resides,  and  to  which  it  imparts  life,  strength,  and  the  power  of  assimilating 
food.  The  word  is  said  to  have  been  used  by  Basil  Valentine,  a  German 
clicniist  of  the  fifteenth  century,  to  denote  the  solar  heat  as  the  source  of  the 
life  of  plants.  Paracelsus  uses  it  with  the  above;  meaning.  It  is  frequent  in 
tli(;  writings  of  Van  Helmont,  who  explains  it  as  a  material  pre-existence  of  the 
human  or  animal  form  in  posse.  He  regards  the  archseus  as  a  fluid,  i.e.  as  a 
semi-material  substance  like  air,  and  seems  to  consider  it  a  chemical  constituent 
of  the  blood.  Paracelsus  has  particularly  made  use  of  the  hypothesis  of  the 
archjEus  to  explain  the  assimilation  of  food.  This  function  of  tlie  arcliams 
became  prominent  in  medicine.  Van  Helmont  calls  it  the  doorkeeper  of  the 
slomacli  (Jiiiiiliir  stomachi).  Tliere  are  further  divarications  of  meaning. 
Al.so  spelled  Archeus." 

"  As  for  the  many  pretended  intricacies  in  the  instance  of  the  cfformation 
of  Wasps  out  of  the  Carcase  of  a  Horse,  I  say,  the  Archel  tliat  formed  them 
are  no  parts  of  the;  Horse's  Soul  that  is  deail,  hut  several  distinct  Arr.hei  that 
do  as  naturally  joyn  with  the  matter  of  his  body,  .so  putrifled  and  prepared, 
as  tlie  Crowes  come  to  eat  his  flesh."  — Dr.  H.  Mohk,  Antidote  a(/uinst 
Athe'iHin,  app.  xi.  ^ 

Cf.  Leibnitz:  Considerations  sur  le  Principe  de  Vie  et  sur  les  Natures  Plas- 


68  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [uic.  i 

ing  that  immaterial  substances  altered  if  not  the  force,  at 
least  the  direction  or  determination,  of  the  motions  of  bodies, 
whereas  the  soul  and  the  body  retain  perfectly  each  its  own 
laws,  according  to  the  new  system,  and  yet  one  obeys  the 
other  as  much  as  is  necessary.     In  fine,  it  is  since  I  have  med- 

^  itated  upon  this  system  that  I  have  found  out  how  the  souls 
/    of  beasts  and  their  sensations  are  in  no  sense  prejudicial  to 

1/  the  immortality  of  human  souls,  or,  rather,  how  nothing  is 
more  suited  to  establish  our  natural  immortality  than  to  con- 
ceive that  all  sou.ls  are  imperishable  {morte  carent  animce), 
without,  however,  the  fear  of  metempsychoses,  since  not  only 
the  souls,  but  further,  the  animals  endure  and  will  endure  liv- 
ing, feeling,  acting;  it  is  everywhere  as  here,  and  always  and 
•everywhere  as  with  us,  according  to  what  I  have  already  said 
to  you,  except  that  the  conditions  of  animals  are  more  or  less 
perfect  and  developed,  without  there  ever  being  a  need  of 
souls  wholly  separate,  while  we  nevertheless  have  always 
sjDirits  as  pure  as  possible,  notwithstanding  our  (physical) 
organs,  which  cannot  disturb  by  any  influence  the  laws  of  our 
(spiritual)  spontaneity.  I  find  the  vacuum  and  atoms  excluded 
in  quite  another  way  than  by  the  sophism  of  the  Cartesians, 
grounded  in  the  pretended  coincidence  of  the  idea  of  body  and 
extension.  _I  see  all  things  determined  and  adorned  beyond 
anything  hitherto  conceived;  matter  everywhere  organic,  no 
sterile,  neglected  vacuum,  nothing  too  uniform,  everything 
varied,  but  with  order;  and,  what  passes  imagination,  the 
entire  universe  in  epitome,  but  with  a  different  aspect  in  each 
of  its  parts,  and  likewise  in  each  of  its  unities  of  substance. 
Besides  this  new  analysis  of  things,  I  have  a  better  compre- 
hension of  that  of  notions  or  ideas,  and  of  truths.  I  under- 
stand what  a  true,  clear,  distinct,  adequate  idea  is,  if  I  dare 
adopt  this  word.  I  understand  what  are  primitive  truths,  and 
true  axioms,   the   distinction   between  necessary  truths  and 

tiquespar  I'Auteur  de  V Harmonic  Pr^etahlie,  published  in  the  "  Histoire  des 
Ouvrages  des  Savaus,"  May,  1705,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  (J,  pp.  539-546;  Erdmaiin, 
pp.  420-432;  translation,  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  pp.  163-169.  See 
also  Erdmann,  GrundriKs  d.  Gesrh.  d.  Philos.  3d  ed.,  Vol.  1,  §  241,  7,  Vol.2, 
§  2iX),  12,  or  theEnijlish  tran.slation  of  the  same.  Slight  additional  information 
may  be  found  in  the  Encydopsedia  Britannica,  9th  ed.,  under  the  article, 
"Medicine,"  in  the  part  giving  an  account  of  Paracelsus  and  Van  Hel- 
mont.  —  Tr. 


CH.  i]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  69 

truths  of  fact,  between  the  reasoning  of  men  and  the  consecu- 
tions of  animals,  which  are  a  shadow  of  the  reasoning  of  men. 
In  short,  you 'will  be  surprised  to  hear  all  that  I  have  to  say 
to  you,  and,  above  all,  to  understand  how  much  the  knowledge 
of  the  grandeur  and  of  the  perfection  of  God  is  therein  exalted. 
For  I  cannot  conceal  from  you,  from  whom  I  have  had  nothing 
concealed,  how  I  have  been  thrilled  now  with  admiration  and 
(if  we  may  dare  to  make  use  of  the  term)  with  love  for  this 
sovereign  source  of  things  and  of  beauty,  having  found  that 
what  this  system  discovers  surpasses  everything  one  has  hith- 
erto conceived.  You  knOw  that  I  had  gone  a  little  too  far 
formerly,  and  that  I  began  to  lean  toward  the  side  of  the 
Spinozists,^  who  allow  God  only  infinite  power,  without  recog- 
nizing either  perfection  or  wisdom  in  his  case,  and  regarding 
with  contempt  the  search  for  final  causes,  derive  everything 
from  brute  necessity.  But  these  new  lights  have  cured  me  of 
this  ;  and  since  then  I  sometimes  take  the  name  of  Theophilus. 
I  have  read  the  book  of  this  celebrated  Englishman  of  whom 
you  have  just  spoken.  I  value  it  highly,  and  I  have  found  in 
it  some  good  things.  But  it  seems  to  me  necessary  to  go 
much  farther,  and  necessary  even  to  turn  aside  from  his  views, 
since  he  has  adopted  some  which  limit  us  more  than  is  neces- 
sary, and  lower  a  little  not  only  the  condition  of  man,  but, 
besides,  that  of  the  universe. 

Ph.  You  astonish  me  in  fact  with  all  the  marvels  which 
you  have  recited  to  me  in  a  manner  a  little  too  favorable  for 
an  easy  credence  of  them  on  my  part.  However,  I  will  hope 
that  there  will  be  something  solid  among  so  many  novelties 
with  which  you  desire  to  regale  me.  In  this  case  you  will  find 
me  very  docile.  You  know  that  it  was  always  my  disposition 
to  surrender  myself  to  reason,  and  that  I  sometimes  took  the 
name  of  Philalethes.  This  is  why,  if  you  please,  we  will  now 
make  use  of  these  two  names  which  are  so  congruous  with  our 
mental  constitution  and  methods.  There  are  means  of  pro- 
ceeding to  the  trial,  for  —  since  you  have  read  the  book  of  the 

1  Oil  tlu;  1-elation  of  Le)1)nitz  to  Sp)noz<a,  see  Leibniz  u.  Spinoza.  Ein 
Beitrajj;  zur  EritwickluugSKescliiehte  der  Leil)nizi.sclu!n  Pliilosophie.  Von  Prof. 
Dr.  Ludwi}^  Stein.  Mit  neunzehn  Ineditis  aus  dcun  Naclilass  von  Leibniz. 
Berlin:  G.  Reiincr,  WM.  pp.  xvii.,  '.m2.  Also  "  Mind,"  No.  (W,  p.  2!IS ;  No.  (W,  pp. 
44.3  sq.,  the  latter  an  extended  note  on  Stein's  book  by  Prof.  George  Groom 
Robertson,  the  late  editor  of  "  Mind."  —  Tii. 


.•f 


70  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

celebrated  Englishman,  whieli  gives  me  so  much  satisfaction 
and  which  treats  a  good  part  of  the  subjects  of  which  you 
were  just  speaking,  and  above  all,  the  analysis  of  our  ideas  and 
knowledge  —  it  will  be  the  shortest  way  to  follow  the  thread 
of  this  work,  and  to  see  what  you  will  have  to  say. 
Th.  I  approve  your  proposition.  Here  is  the  book. 
§  1.  Ph.  [I  have  read  this  book  so  thoroughly  that  I  have 
retained  even  its  expressions,  which  I  shall  be  careful  to  fol- 
low. Thus  I  shall  not  need  to  recur  to  the  book,  except  at 
certain  junctures  where  we  shall  judge  it  necessary.  We  shall 
speak  first  of  the  origin  of  ideas  or  notions  (Book  I.),  then 
of  the  different  kinds  of  ideas  (Book  II.),  and  of  the  words 
that  serve  to  express  them  (Book  III.),  lastly  of  the  knowl- 
edge and  truths  which  therefrom  result  (Book  IV.)  ;  and  it  is 
this  last  part  which  will  occupy  us  the  most.  (As  for  the  ori- 
gin of  ideas,  I  believe,  with  this  author  and  a  multitude  of 
clever  persons,  that  there  are  no  innate  ideas  nor  innate  prin- 
ciples.]"\  And,  in  order  to  I'efute  the  error  of  those  who  admit 
them,  it  is  sufficient  to  show,  as  it  appears  eventually,  that 
there  is  no  need  of  them,  and  that  men  can  acquire  all  their 
knowledge  without  the  aid  of  any  innate  impression.) 

Th.  [You  know,  Philalethes,  that  I  have  been  for  a  long 
time  of  another  opinion ;  jthat  I  have  always  held,  as  I  still 
hold,  to  the  innate  idea  of  God,  which  Descartes  maintained, 
and  as  a  consequence  to  the  other  innate  ideas,  which  cannot 
come  to  us  from  the  senses)  Now,  I  go  still  farther  in  con- 
formity to  the  new  system,  and  I  believe  even  that  all  the 
thoughts  and  acts  of  our  soul  come  from  its  own  depths,  with 
no  possibility  of  their  being  given  to  it  by  the  senses,  as  you 
shall  see  in  the  sequel.  But  at  present  I  will  put  this  investi- 
gation aside,  and,  accommodating  myself  to  the  received  ex- 
pressions, since  in  fact  they  are  good  and  tenable,  and  one  can 
say  in  a  certain  sense  that  the  external  senses  are  in  part  . 
causes  of  our  thoughts,  I  shall  consider  how  in  my 'opinion 
one  must  say  even  in  the  common  system  (speaking  of  the 
action  of  bodies  upon  the  soul,  as  the  Copernicans  speak  with 
other  men  of  the  movement  of  the  sun,  and  with  cause), fthat 
there  are  some  ideas  and  some  principles  which  do  not  come  to 
'  us  from  the  senses,  and  which  we  find  in  ourselves  without  form- 
ing them,  although  the  senses  give  us  occasion  to  perceive  them.V 


cii.   i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  71 

I  imagine  that  your  clever  author  has  remarked  tliat  under  the -. 

name  of  innate  principles  one  often  maintains  his  prejudices,  / 
and  wishes  to  free  himself  from  the  trouble  of  discussion,  and 
that  this  abuse  doubtless  has  stirred  up  his  zeal  against  this 
suppositions  He  desired,  no  doubt,  to  combat  the  indolence 
and  the  superficial  manner  of  thinking  of  those  who,  under  the 
specious  pretext  of  innate  ideas  and  of  truths  naturally  en- 
graved upon  the  mind,  to  which  we  readily  give  our  consent, 
care  nothing  about  investigating  or  considering  the  sources, 
the  relations,  and  the  certainty  of  this  knowledge.  In  that  I 
am  entirely  agreed  with  him,  and  I  go  even  farther.  I  would  j . 
that  our  analysis  should  not  be  limited,  that  definitions  should 
be  given  of  all  the  terms  which  are  capable  of  definition,  and 
that  one  should  demonstrate,  or  give  the  means  of  demonstrat- 
ing, all  the  axioms  which  are  not  primitive,  without  distin- 
guishing the  opinions  which  men  have  of  them,  and  without 
caring  whether  they  give  their  consent  or  not.  There  would 
be  more  profit  in  this  than  one  thinks.  But  it  seems  that  the 
author  has  been  carried  too  far  on  the  other  side  by  his  zeal, 
otherwise  very  praiseworthy^!  (  He  has  not  sufficiently  distiri-^  • 
guished,  in  my  opinion,  the  origin  of  the  necessary  truthSjj^ 
whose  source  is  in  the  understanding,  from  that  of  the  truths 
of  fact  drawn  from  the  experience  of  the  senses,  and  even 
from  those  confused  perceptions  which  are  in  us^  You  see, 
then,  that  I  do  not  agree  with  what  you  lay  down  as  factj 
—  that  we  can  acquire  all  our  knowledge  without  the  need  of 
innate  impressions.  And  the  sequel  will  show  which  of  us  is 
right.] 

§  2.  Ph.  We  shall  see  it  indeed.  I  grant  you,  my  dear  The- 
ophilus,  that  there  is  no  opinion  more  commonly  received  than 
that  which  establishes  the  existence  of  certain  principles  of  ;  ; 
truth  in  which  men  generally  agree  ;  this  is  why  they  are 
called  general  notions,  kolvoI  evvotat ;  whence  it  is  inferred 
that  these  principles  must  be  so  many  impressions  which  our 
minds  receive  with  their  existence.  §  3.  But  though  it  were 
certain  that  there  are  some  principles  in  which  the  entire 
human  race  is  agreed,  ^his  universal  consent  would  not  prove 
that  they  are  innate  if  one  can  show,  as  I  believe  he  can,  an- 
other way  through  which  men  have  been  able  to  reach  this 
aniformity  of  opinion. \     §  4.  But,  what  is  much  worse,  this 


72  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

universal  consent  is  nowhere  found,  not  even  with  regard  to 
these  two  celebrated  speculative  principles  (for  we  shall  speak 
about  the  practical  ones  later),  that  whatever  is,  is;  and  that 
it  is  imp)Ossible  for  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same 
time.  For  there  is  a  large  part  of  the  human  race  to  which 
these  two  propositions,  which  will  pass  doubtless  for  neces- 
sary truths  and  for  axioms  with  you,  are  not  even  known, 

Th.  [I  do  not  ground  the  certainty  of  innate  principles  upon 
universal  consent,  for  I  have  already  told  you,  Philalethes, 
that  my  opinion  is  that  we  ought  to  labor  to  be  able  to  demon- 
strate all  the  axioms  which  are  not  primitive.  I  grant  you 
also  that  a  consent  very  general,  but  which  is  not  universal, 
may  come  from  a  tradition  diffused  throughout  the  human 
race,  as  the  practice  of  smoking  tobacco  has  been  received  by 
nearly  all  nations  in  less  than  a  century,  although  some  island- 
ers have  been  found  who,  not  being  acquainted  with  fire  even, 
were  unable  to  smoke.  Thus  some  clever  people,  even  among 
theologians,  but  of  the  party  of  Arminius,^  have  believed  that 
the  knowledge  of  the  Deity  came  from  a  very  ancient  and  very 
general  tradition  ;  ^find  I  believe  indeed  that  instruction  has 
confirmed  and  rectified  this  knowledge.'|  It  appears,  however, 
that  nature  has  contributed  to  its  attainment  without  learning; 
the  marvels  of  the  universe  have  made  us  think  of  a  superior 
powder.  A  child  born  deaf  and  dumb  has  been  seen  to  show 
veneration  for  the  full  moon,  and  nations  have  been  found, 
who  seemed  not  to ''have  learned  anything  of  other  peoples, 
fearing  invisible  powers.  (l  grant  you,  my  dear  Philalethes,  that 
this  is  not  yet  the  idea  of  God  that  we  have  and  ask  for ;  but 
this  idea  itself  does  not  cease  to  be  in  the  depths  of  our  souls, 
without  being  put  there,  as  w^e  shall  see,  and  the  eternal  laws 
of  God  are  in  part  engraved  thereon  in  a  manner  still  more 
legible  and  by  a  species  of  instinct,  j  But  they  are  practical 
principles  of  which  we  shall  also  have  occasion  to  speak.  It 
must  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  inclination  we  have  to 
recognize  the  idea  of  God  is  in  human  nature.  And,  even  if 
the  first  instruction  therein  should  be  attributed  to  revelation, 
the  readiness  which  men  have  always  shown  to  receive  this 
doctrine  comes  from  the  nature  of  their  souls.^  {But  we  will 

1  James  Arminius,  1.560-1609,  a  distinj^ished  Dutch  theologian.  —Tk. 

2  From  this  point  on  Gerhardt,  whose  edition,  it  will  be  remembered,  is  the 


cii.  i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANmNG  73 

suppose  that  these  ideas  which  are  innate  comprehend  incom- 
patible notions.] 

§  19.  Ph.  Although  you  maintain  that  these  particular  and 
self-evident  propositions,  whose  truth  is  recognized  as  soon  as 
one  hears  them  stated  (as  that  green  is  not  red),  are  received 
as  consequences  of  these  other  more  general  propositions, 
which  are  regarded  as  so  many  innate  principles,  it  seems  that 
you  do  not  at  all  consider  that  these  particular  propositions 
are  received  as  indubitable  truths  by  those  who  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  these  more  general  maxims. 

Til.  I  have  already  replied  to  that  above.  We  build  on  these 
general  maxims  as  we  build  upon  the  majors,  which  are  sup- 
pressed when  we  reason  by  enthymemes  ;  ^or,  although  very 
often  we  do  not  think  distinctly  of  what  we  do  in  reasoning 
any  more  than  of  what  we  do  in  walking  and  leaping,  it  is 
always  true  that  the  force  of  the  conclusion  consists  in  part  in 
that  which  is  suppressed  and  could  not  elsewhere  arise,  as  you 
will  find  should  you  wish  to  prove  it.  i 

§  20.  Ph.  But  it  seems  that  general  and  abstract  ideas  are 
more  foreign  to  our  mind  [than  notions  and  particular  truths  ; 
consequently  particular  truths  will  be  more  natural  to  the 
mind  than  the  principle  of  contradiction,  of  which  you  admit 
they  are  only  the  application]. 

Th.  It  is  true  that  we  commence  sooner  to  perceive  particu- 

basis  of  the  present  translation,  transposes  the  text  as  given  by  Erdmann  and 
Jacques  as  follows :  "  Mais  nous  jugerons  que  ces  idees  qui  sont  innees,  ren- 
fernient  des  notions  incompatililes,"  the  first  three  words  of  which  will  be 
found  in  Erdmann,  p.  207,  b.,  about  two-thirds  down  the  page,  Jacques,  Vol.  1, 
p.  29,  about  two-tliirds  down,  the  remainder  in  Erdmann,  p.  211,  a.,  at  the 
middle  of  the  page,  Jacques,  p.  3G,  first  third,  just  preceding  §  19  in  each  case, 
whence  the  three  texts  go  on  in  agreement  until  §  20,  G.,  p.  72,  E.,  p.  212,  b., 
J.,  p.  39.  Here  the  Gerhardt  text  lias  the  following:  "  S'il  y  adesverites  inne'es, 
ne  faut  il  pas  qu'il  y  ait  dans  la  suite,  que  la  doctrine  externe  ne  fait  qu'exciter 
icy  ce  que  est  en  nous  " :  taking  up  with  the  words  "  dans  la  suite,"  the  text 
as  given  by  E.,  p.  207,  b.,  J.,  p.  29,  where  it  previously  left  it,  the  three  texts 
continuing  again  in  agreement  until  the  words  "  des  qu'on  s'appercoit,"  G.,  p. 
79,  last  third,  E.,  211,  a.,  at  the  middle,  J.,  ."(!,  first  third,  whence  G.  complet(^s 
his  senten(!e  witli  the  last  three  words  of  the  first  sentence  of  §  2(i,  as  giv<!n  by 
E.,  212,  b.,  J.,  .'59,  from  which  i)oint  again  the  tliree  texts  substantially  agree 
to  the  end  of  Chap.  1.  It  may  be  added  that  tlie  texts  of  Erdniann,  Jacques, 
and  Janet  follow  the  order  of  Locke's  Essay.  Why  Gerhardt  has  transposed 
the  text  in  his  edition,  I  do  not  know,  as  ho  has  not  alluded  to  the  matter. 
From  his  statement  that  "  the  prescmt  impression  has  Ixu^n  lu'wly  compai'ed 
witli  the  original,  so  far  as  it  is  still  extant  "  (Introduction,  j).  10),  I  presume 
that  the  transposition  is  due  to  his  fidelity  to  this  original.  —  Tk. 


74  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

lar  truths  when  we  commence  with  ideas  more  complex  and 
gross  ;  but  that  does  not  prevent  the  order  of  nature  from  com- 
mencing with  the  most  simple,  and  the  proof  of  the  more  par- 
ticular truths  from  depending  upon  the  more  general,  of  which 
they  are  only  examples.  And  when  we  Avish  to  consider  what 
is  in  us  virtually  and  before  all  ax)perception,  Ave  are  right  in 
commencing  with  the  most  simple.  For  the  general  principles 
enter  into  our  thoughts,  of  which  they  form  the  soul  and  the 
connection.  They  are  as  necessary  thereto  as  the  muscles  and 
sinews  are  for  walking,  although  we  do  not  at  all  think  of 
them.  'The  mind  leans  upon  these  principles  every  moment, 
but  it  does  not  come  so  easily  to  distinguish  them  and  to  rep- 
resent them  distinctly  and  separately,  because  that  demands 
great  attention  to  its  acts,  and  the  majority  of  people,  little 
accustomed  to  think,  has  little  of  it./  Have  not  the  Chinese 
like  ourselves  articulate  sounds  ?  and  yet  being  attached  to 
another  manner  of  writing,  they  have  not  yet  thought  of 
making  an  alphabet  of  these  sounds.  Thus  it  is  that  one 
possesses  many  things  without  knowing  it.) 

§  21.  Ph.  If  the  mind  acquiesces  so  promptly  in  certain 
truths,  cannot  that  acquiescence  come  from  the  consideration 
itself  of  the  nature  of  things,  which  does  not  allow  it  to  judge 
of  them  otherwise,  rather  than  from  the  consideration  that 
these  propositions  are  engraved  by  nature  in  the  mind  ? 

Til.  Both  are  true.  The  nature  of  things  and  the  nature  of 
mind  agree.  And  since  you  oppose  the  consideration  of  the 
thing  to  the  apperception  of'  that  which  is  engraven  in  the 
mind,  this  objection  itself  shows,  sir,  that  those  whose  side  you 
take  understand  /by  innate  truths  only  those  which  would  be 
approved  naturally  as  by  instinct,  and  even  without  knoAving 
it,  unless  confusedly)  There  are  some  of  this  nature,  and  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  speak  of,ibeTftr^  But  what  is  called  7iat- 
ural  light  supposes  a  distinct^nowled^e,  and  very  often  the 
consideration  of  the  nature  of  tEln^ST's  nothing  else  than  the 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  our  mind,(and  of  these  innate  ideas 
Avhich  we  have  no  need  to  seek  outside^  \Hius  I  call  innate 
the  trutl^s  which  need  only  this  consideration  for  their  verifi- 
cation. )^  have  already  replied  (§  5)  to  the  objection  (§  22) 
which  claimed  that  when  it  is  said  that  innate  ifotiolTS  are 
implicitly  in  the  mind,  the  statement  must  mean  simph^  that 


CH.  i]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  75 

it  has  the  faculty  of  knowing  them ;  for  I  have  pointed  out 
that  besides  this  it  has  the  faculty  of  finding  them  in  itself, 
and  the  disposition  to  approve  them  when  it  thinks  of  them  as 
it  should. ) 

§J2^.  Ph.  It  seems,  then,  that  you  claim  that  those  to  whom 
these  general  maxims  are  proposed  for  the  first  time  learn 
nothing  which  is  entirely  new  to  them.     But  it  is  clear  that       \^'"^ 
they  learn  first  the  names,  then  the  truths,  and  even  the  ideas 
upon  which  these  truths  rest. 

Th.  The  question  here  is  not  of  names,  which  are  in  some 
sense  arbitrary,  while  ideas  and  truths  are  natural.  But,  with 
respect  to  these  ideas  and  truths,  you  attribute  to  us,  sir,  a 
doctrine  which  we  have  strongly  repudiated  ;^  for  I  agree  that 
we  learn  ideas  and  innate  truths  either  in  considering  their 
source,  or  in  verifying  them  through  experienc^  Thus  I  do 
not  make  the  supposition  which  you  aver,  as  if,  in  the  case  of 
which  you  speak,  we  learned  nothing  new.  And  I  cannot 
admit  tliis  proposition  : 'cti/  that  one  learns  is  not  innate^  The-- 
JiDitlis  of  numbers  are^in.-u«,  and  we  are  ijot  left  to  learn  them,  ' 
either  by  drawing  them  from  their  source  when  we  learn  them  /Y"^ 
through  demonstrative  proof  (which  shows  that  they  are  in- 
nate), or  by  testing  them  in  examples,  as  do  ordinary  arithme- 
ticians, who,  in  default  of  a  knowledge  of  the  proofs,  learn 
^their  rules  only  by  tradition,  and,  at  most,  before  teaching 
them,  justify  them  by  experience,  which  they  continue  as  far 
as  they  think  expedient.  ,  And  sometimes  even  a  very  skilful 
mathematician,  not  knowing  the  s5u.rce  of  another's  discovery, 
is  obliged  to  content  himself  with  this  method  of  induction  in 
examining  it ;  as  did  a  celebrated  writer  at  Paris,  when  I  was 
there,  who  continued  a  tolerably  long  time  the  examinatio*n  of 
my  aritlimetical  tetragonism,  comparing  it  with  the  numbers 
of  Ludolphe,'  believing  he  had  found  therein  some  error ;  and 
he  had  reason  to  doubt  until  some  one  communicated  to  him 
the  demonstration,  which  for  us  dispenses  with  these  tests, 
which  could  always  continue  without  ever  being  perfectly 
certain.  And  it  is  this  very  thing,  namely,  the  imperfection 
of  inductions,  which  may  yet  be  verified  by  instances  of  expe- 
rience.    For  there  are  progressions  in  which  one  can  go  very 

1  Jolm  .Tol)  Ludolplic,    1049-1711:  his  Tcirui/onomclria  Tabularia,  Frank- 
fort, lOilO. —Tr. 


7G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.  i 

far  before  noticing  the  changes  and  the  hxws  that  are  found 
there. 

Ph.  But  is  it  not  possible  that  not  only  the  terms  or  words 
which  we  use,  but  even  the  ideas,  come  to  us  from  without  ? 

Th.ylt  would  then  be  necessary  that  we  should  be  ourselves 
outside  of  ourselves,  for  the  intellectual  or  reflective  ideas  are 
derived  from  our  mind)  audi  should  much  like  to  know  how 
we  could  have  the  idea  of  being  if  we  were  not  beings  our- 
selves, and  did  not  thus  find  being  in  ourselves. 
"  Ph.  But  what  do  you  say,  sir,  to  this  challenge  of  one  of  my 
friends  ?  If  any  one,  says  he,  can  find  a  proposition  whose 
ideas  are  innate,  that  he  can  name  to  me,  he  would  do  me  a 
very  great  favor. 

Th.  I  would  name  the  propositions  of  arithmetic  and  geome- 
try, which  are  all  of  this  nature ;  and,  as  regards  necessary 
truths,  no  others  could  be  found. 

§  25.  Ph.  That  will  appear  strange  to  most  people.  Can  it 
be  said  that  the  most  difficult  and  the  most  profound  sciences 
are  innate  ? 

Th.  Their  actual  knowledge  is  not,  but  much  that  may  be 
ifcalled  virtual   knowledge  is    innate,  as  the  figure  traced  by 
the  veins  of  the  marble  is  in  the  marble,  before  one  discovers 
them  in  working.)  ^  ^ 

Ph.  But  is  it  possible  that  children,  while  receiving  notions 
that  come  to  them  from  without,  and  giving  them  their  con- 
sent, may  have  no  knowledge  of  those  which  you  suppose  to 
be  inborn  with  them,  and  to  make,  as  it  were,  a  part  of  their 
mind,  in  Avhich  they  are,  you  say,  imprinted  in  ineffaceable 
characters  in  order  to  serve  as  a  foundation  ?  If  that  were  so, 
nature  would  have  taken  trouble  for  nothing,  or,  at  least,  she 
would  have  badly  engraved  their  characters,  since  they  cannot 
be  perceived  by  the  eyes  which  see  very  well  other  things. 

Th.  p'he  apperception  of  that  which  is  in  us  depends  upon 
attention  and  order^  Now,  not  only  is  it  possible,  but  it  is  also 
proper,  that  children  give  more  atteiition  to  the  ideas  of  the 
senses,  because  the  attention  is  regulated  by  the  need.  The 
outcome,  however,  shows  in  the  sequel  that  nature  has  not 
uselessly  given  herself  the  trouble  of  impressing  upon  us  in- 
nate knowledge,  since  without  it  there  would  be  no  means  of 
attaining  actual  knowledge   of   the    truths   necessary  in   the 


CH.  i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  77 

demonstrative    sciences,   and   the   reasons    of   facts ;    and   we 
should  possess  nothing  above  the  beasts. 

§  26.  P/i.(  If  there  are  innate  truths,  does  it  not  necessarily       % 
follow  that  the  external  doctrine  only  stirs  up  here  what  is  in      ~r— 
us  ?\  I  conclude  that  a  consent  sufficiently  general  among  men  ^'/  ^ 
(is  an  indication,  and  not  a  demonstration,  of  an  innate  princi- 
ple ;1  but  that  the  exact  and  decisive  proof  of  these  principles 
consist^,J-n  showing  that  their  certitude  comes  only  from  what 
is  in  us.  I  To  reply  further  to  what  you  say  against  the  general 
approba:t!on  which  is  given  to  the  two  great  speculative  prin- 
ciples, which  are,  nevertheless,  the  best  established,  I  may  say 
to  you  that  even  if  they  were  not  known  they  would  not  cease 
(to  be  innate,  because  they  are  recognized  as  soon  as  heard  y 
but  I  will  add  further  that  at  bottom  everybody  knows  them,  ^  a^,  <>, 
and  makes  use  at  every  moment  of  the  principle  of  contradic-   q^„,^ 
tion    (for   example)    without   considering   it   distinctly ;    and 
there  is  no  barbarian  who,  in  an  affair  of  any  moment,  is  not 
olfended  by  the  conduct  of  a  liar  who  contradicts  himself.     .i^^„ 
Thus,  these  maxims  are  employed  without  an  express  consid- 
eration of  them.  (And  in  nearly  the  same  way  Ave  have  virtu- 
ally in  the  mind  the  propositions  suppressed  in  enthymemes, 
which  are  set  aside  not  only  externally,  but  further  in  our 
thought/ 

§  5.  Ph.  [What  you  say  of  this  virtual  knowledge  and  of 
these  internal   suppressions  svirprises   me]  jffor  to   say  that"' 
there  are  truths  imprinted  upon  the  soul  which  it  does  not 
])erceive  is,  it  seems  to  me,  a  veritable  contradiction./ 

Th.,  [If  you  are  thus  prejudiced,  I  am  not  astonished  that 
you  reject  innate  knowledge.  But  I  am  astonished  that  the 
tliouglit  has  not  occurred  to  you  tha?  we  have  an  infinite  amount 
of  knowledge  of  which  we  are  not  always  conscious,  not  even  ' 
when  we  need  it.J  It  is  for  the  memory  to  preserve  this,  and 
for  the  reminiscence  to  represent  it  to  us,  as  it  often,  but  not 
always,  does  at  need.  That  is  very  well  called  remembrance 
(mbvenire),  for  reminiscence  needs  some  aid.  And  it  must 
certainly  be  that  in  this  multiplicity  of  our  knowledge  we  are 
determined  by  something  to  renew  one  part  rather  than  another, 
since  it  is  impossil)le  to  think  distinctly  and  at  once  of  every- 
thing we  know.] 

Ph.  In  that  I  believe  you  are  riglit;and  this  too  general 


78  LEIBNITZS   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.  i 

affirmation,  that  we  always  perceive  all  the  truths  which  are 
in  our  soul,  escaped  me  without  my  having  given  it  sufficient 
attention.  But  you  will  have  a  little  more  trouble  in  reply- 
ing to  what  I  am  going  to  show  you.  That  is,  that  if  you  can 
say  of  some  particular  proposition  that  it  is  innate,  you  could 
maintain  by  the  same  reasoning  that  all  propositions  which 
are  reasonable,  and  which  the  mind  could  always  regard  as 
such,  are  already  impressed  upon  the  soul. 

Th.  I  agree  with  you  in  regard  to  pure  ideas,  which  I  oppose 
to  the  phantoms  of  the  senses,  and  in  regard  to  necessary 
truths,  or  those  of  the  reason,  which  I  oppose  to  truths  of 
fact.  In  this  sense  it  must  be  said  that  all  arithmetic  and  all 
geometry  are  innate,  and  are  in  us  virtually,  so  that  we  can 
find  them  there  if  we  consider  attentively  and  set  in  order 
what  we  already  have  in  the  mind,  without  making  use  of  any 
truth  learned  through  experience  or  through  the  tradition  of 
another,  as  Plato  has  shown  in  a  dialogue  ^  in  which  he  intro- 
duces Socrates  leading  a  child  to  abstract  truths  b}"  questions 
alone  without  giving  him  any  information.  ( We  can  then 
make  for  ourselves  these  sciences  in  our  studj^,  and  even  with 
closed  eyes,  without  learning  through  sight  or  even  through 
touch  the  truths  which  we  need ;  although  it  is  true  that  we 
would  not  consider  the  ideas  in  question  if  we  had  never  seen 
or  touched  anything.  For  through  an  admirable  economy  of 
nature/ we  cannot  have  abstract  thoughts  which  have  no  need 
whatever  of  anything  sensible,]  when  that  would  only  be  of 
such  a  character  as  are  the  forms  of  the  letters  and  the  sounds, 
although  there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  such  arbi- 
trary characters  and  such  thoughts.  And  if  the  sensible  out- 
lines were  not  requisite,  the  pre-established  harmony  between 
soul  and  body,  of  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  sj)eak  more 
full}",  would  have  no  place.  But  that  does  not  prevent  the 
mind  from  taking  necessary  ideas  from  itself.  You  see  also 
sometimes  how  it  can  go  far  without  any  aid,  by  a  logic  and 
arithmetic  purely  natural,  as  that  Swedish  youth  who,  in  culti- 
vating his  own  (mind),  went  so  far  as  to  make  great  calcula- 
tions immediately  in  his  head  without  having  learned  the 
common  method  of  computation,  or  even  to  read  and  write,  it 
I  remember  correctly  what  has  been  told  me  of  him.  It  is 
^  Mem,  82s5.— Tr. 


CH.  I]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  79 

true  that  he  cannot  work  out  intricate  problems,  such  as  those 
which  demand  the  extraction  of  roots.  But  that  does  not  at 
all  prevent  him  from  being  able  still  to  draw  them  from  its 
depths  by  some  new  turn  of  mind.  Thus  that  proves  only 
that  there  are  degrees  in  the  difficulty  of  perceiving  what  is  in 
us.  There  are  innate  principles  which  are  common  and  very 
,easy  to  all ;  there  are  theorems  which  are  discovered  likewise 
at  once,  and  which  compose  the  natural  sciences,  which  are 
more  understood  in  one  case  than  in  another.  '  Finally,  in  a 
larger  sense,  which  it  is  well  to  employ  in  order  to  have  notions 
more  comprehensive  and  more  determinate,  all  truths  which 
can  be  drawn  from  primitive  innate  knowledge  can  still  be 
called  innate,  because  the  mind  can  draw  them  from  its  own 
depths,  although  often  it  would  not  be  an  easy  thing  so  to  do. 
But,  if  any  one  gives  another  meaning  to  the  terms,  I  do  not 
wish  to  dispute  about  words. 

Ph.  [I  have  agreed  with  you  that  we  can  have  in  the  soul 
what  we  do  not  perceive  there,  for  we  do  not  always  remem- 
ber at  once  all  that  we  know,  but  it  must  be  always  what  we 
liave  learned  or  have  known  in  former  times  expressly.  Thus]- 
if  we  can  say  that  a  thing  is  in  the  soul,  although  the  soul 
lias  not  yet  known  it,  (this  can  only  be  because  it  has  the 
cajjacity  or  faculty  of  knowing  it. ) 

Th.    [Why  could  not  this  have  still  another  cause,  such  as 
tlie  soul's  being  able  to  have  this  thing  within  it  without  its  •• 
being  perceived  ?jfor  since  an  acquired  knowledge  can  be  con- 
I  caled  therein  byHhe  memory,  as  you  admit,  why  could  not    .  \ 
nature  have  also  concealed  therein  some  original  knowledge?).    ^ 
Must  everything  that  is  natural  to  a  substance  which  knows 
itself  be  known  by  it  actually  at  once  ?,    Cannot  and  must  not 
this  substance   (such  as  our  soul)  have  many  jiroperties  and 
affections  which  it  is  impossible  to  consider  all  at  once  and  all       V 
together  ?     It  was  the  opinion  of  the  Platonists  that  all  our      j^ 
knowledge  was  reminiscence,  and  that  thus  the  truths  which      V- 
^he  soul  has  brought  with  the  birth  of  the  man,  and  which       \ 
are  called  innate,  must  be  the  remains  of  an  express  anterior 
knowledge.^  But  this  opinion  has  no  foundation;   and  it  is 
easy  to  believe  that  the  soul  must  already  have  innate  knowl- 
edge in  the  precedent  state  (if  there  were  any  pre-existence), 
however  remote  it  might  be,  entirely  as  here :  it  would  then 


80  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

have  to  come  also  from  another  precedent  state,  or  ^  it  would 
be  finally  innate,  or  at  least  concreate ;  or  else  it  would  be 
needful  to  go  to  infinity  and  to  make  souls  eternal,  in  which 
case  this  knowledge  would  be  innate  in  fact,  because  it  would 
never  have  commenced  in  the  soul ;  and  if  any  one  claimed 
that  each  anterior  state  has  had  something  from  another  more 
anterior,  which  it  has  not  left  to  the  succeeding,  the  reply  will 
be  made  that  it  is  manifest  that  certain  evident  truths  must 
have  been  in  all  these  states ;  and  in  whatever  manner  it  may 
be  taken,  it  is  always  clear  in  all  states  of  the  soul  that  neces- 
sary truths  are  iunateji,  and  are  proved  by  what  is  within,  it 
not  being  possible  to  establish  them  through  experience,  as  we 
establish  truths  of  fact.  Why  should  it  be  necessary  also 
that  we  could  have  no  possession  in  the  soul  of  w^hich  we  had 
never  made  use  ?  And  is  it  the  same  thing  to  have  a  thing 
without  using  it  as  to  have  only  the  faculty  of  acquiring  it  ? 
If  that  were  so,  we  should  never  possess  anything  but  the 
things  which  we  enjoy;  instead  of  which,  we  know  that,  be- 
sides the  faculty  and  the  object,  some  disposition  in  the  fac- 
ulty or  in  the  object,  or  in  both,  is  often  necessary,  that  the 
faculty  may  exercise  itself  upon  the  object.] 

Ph.  Taking  it  in  that  wa-y,  we  could  say  that  there  are 
(truths  written  in  the  soul  which  the  soul  has,  however,  never 
known,  and  which,  indeed,  it  will  never  know.  This  appears 
to  me  strange. 

Th.  [I  see  there  no  absurdity,  although  in  that  case  you 
could  not  be  assured  that  there  are  such  truths.  /For  things 
more  exalted  than  those  Avhich  we  can  know  in  this  present 
course  of  life  may  be  developed  some  time  in  our  souls,  when 
they  are  in  another  state.]  )  * 

Fh.  But  suppose  there  are  truths  which  could  be  imprinted 
upon  the  understanding  without  its  perceiving  them ;  f  I  do 
not  see  how,  in  relation  to  their  origin,  they  could  differ  from 
the  truths  which  it  is  on]}^  capable  of  knowing,  j 

Th.  [The  mind  is  not  only  capable  of  knowing  them,  but 
further  of  finding  them  in  itself ; j  and,  if  it  had  only  the  sim- 
ple capacity  of  receiving  knowledge,  or  the  passive  power  there- 
for, as  indeterminate  as  that  which  the  wax  has  for  receiving 
figures  and  the  blank  tablet  for  receiving  letters,  it  would  not 

1  The  reading  of  Gerhardt  and  Erdmann ;  Jacques  has  *'  oii,"  where.  —  Tr. 


vn.  I]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  81 

Ije  tlie  source  of  necessary  truths,  as  I  have  just  shown  that  it'  ' 
is;  for  it  is  incontestable  that  the  senses  do  not  suffice  to  1,0*. 
show  their  necessity,  and  that  thus  the  mind  has  a  disposition  ;  • 
(active  as  well  as  passive)  to  draw  them  itself  from  its  own 
depths ;  Although  the  senses  are  necessary  to  give  it  the  occa- 
sion and  attention  for  this,  and  to  carry  it  to  some  rather  than 
to  others.  I  You  see,  then,  sir,  that  these  elsewhere  very  clever 
persons  wno  are  of  another  opinion  appear  not  to  have  thought 
enough  upon  the  consequences  of  the  difference  which  there  is 
between  necessary  or  eternal  truths  and  the  truths  of  experi- 
ence, as  I  have  already  observed,  and  as  all  our  discussion 
sliows.  The  original  proof  of  the  necessary  truths  comes 
from  the  understanding  alone,  and  the  other  truths  come  from 
experience  or  from  the  observation  of  the  senses.  Our  mind 
is  capable  of  knowing  both;  but  it  is  the  source  of  the  former, 
;aid,  whatever  number  of  particular  experiences  we  may  have 
(if  a  universal  truth,  we  could  not  be  assured  of  it  forever  by 
induction  without  knowing  its  necessity  through  the  reason. 

Ph.  But  is  it  not  true  that  if  the  words,  to  be  in  the  under- 
sfaitdiiig,  involve  something  positive,  they  signify  to  be  per- 
ceived and  comprehended  by  the  understanding  ? 

Th.  They  signify  to  us  wholly  another  thing.  It  is  enough 
that  what  is  in  the  understanding  can  be  found  there,  and  that 
tlie  sources  or  original  proofs  of  the  truths  which  are  in  ques- 
lion  are  only  in  the  understanding i , the  senses  can.  hint  at,  * 
justify,  and  confirm  these  truths,  buu  cannot  demonstrate  their 
infallible  and  perpetual  certainty. 

§  11.  Ph.  ISTevertheless,  all  those  who  will  take  the  trouble 
to  reflect  with  a  little  attention  upon  the  operations  of  the 
understanding  will  find  that  this  consent,  which  the  mind  gives 
irithont  difficulti/  to  certain  truths,  depends  upon  the  faculty 
ci  the  human  mind.^ 

Th.  Very  well.  jBut  it  is  this  particular  relation  of  the 
liuman  mind  to  these  truths  which  renders  the  exercise  of  the 
faculty  easy  and  natural  in  respect  to  them,  and  which  causes 
them  to  be  called  innate.]  It  is  not,  then,  a  naked  faculty 
which  consists  in  the  mere  possibility  of  understanding  them  ; 
it  is  a  disposition;  an  aptitude,  a  preformation,  which  determines 
our  soul  and  wliich  makes  it  possibh;  for  them  to  be  derived 
from  it.     Just  as   there  is  the  difference  between  the  figui'cs 

G 


82  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

which  are  given  to  the  stone  or  the  marble  indifferently,  and 
between  those  which  its  veins  already  indicate,  or  are  disposed 
to  indicate,  if  the  workman  profits  by  them. 

Fh.  But  is  it  not  true  that  the  truths  are  subsequent  to  the 
ideas  of  which  they  are  born  ?  Xow,  the  ideas  come  from 
the  senses. 

.  Th.  The  intellectual  ideas,  which  are  the  sourQe_Qf_neces- 
sary  truths,  do  not  come  from  the  senses  ;  and  you  admit  that 
there  are  some  ideas  which  are  due  to  the  reflection  of  the 
mind  upon  itself.  For  the  rest,  it  is  true  that  the  express 
knowledge  of  truths  is  subsequent  (tempore  vel  natura)  to  the 
express  knowledge  of  ideas ;  as  the  nature  of  truths  depends 
upon  the  nature  of  ideas,  before  we  expressly  form  one  or  the 
other,  and  the  truths,  into  which  enter  ideas  which  come  from 
the  senses,  depend  upon  the  senses,  at  least  in  part.  But  the 
ideas  which  come  from  the  senses  are  confused,  and  the  truths 
which  depend  upon  them  are  likewise  confused,  at  least  in 
part;  while  the  intellectual  ideas,  and  the  truths  dependent 
upon  them,  are  distinct,  and  neither  the  one  nor  the  other 
have  their  origin  in  the  senses,  although  it  may  be  true  that 
we  would  never  think  of  them  without  the  senses. 

Ph.  But,  in  3'Our  view,  numbers  are  intellectual  ideas,  and 
yet  it  is  found  that  the  difficulty  therein  depends  upon  the 
express  formation  of  the  ideas ;  for  example,  a  man  knows 
that  18  and  19  equal  37  with  the  same  evidence  that  he  knows 
that  1  and  2  equal  3 ;  but  a  child  does  not  know  the  first  propo- 
sition so  soon  as  the  second,  a  condition  arising  from  the  fact 
that  he  has  not  formed  the  ideas  as  soon  as  the  words. 

Th.  I  can  agree  with  you  that  often  the  difficulty  in  the 
express  formation  of  truths  depends  upon  that  in  the  express 
formation  of  ideas.  Yet  I  believe  that  in  jowx  example  the 
question  concerns  the  use  of  ideas  already  formed.  For  those 
who  have  learned  to  count  as  far  as  10,  and  the  method  of 
passing  farther  on  by  a  certain  repetition  of  tens,  understand 
without  difficulty  what  are  18,  19,  37 ;  viz.,  1,  2,  or  3  times  10 
with  8,  or  9,  or  7  ;  but,  in  order  to  draw  from  it  that  18  plus 
19  make  37,  more  attention  is  necessary  than  to  know  that  2 
plus  1  are  3,  which  at  bottom  is  only  the  definition  of  3. 

§  18.  P/i.C Furnishing  propositions  in  which  you  infallibly 
acquiesce  as  soon  as  you  hear  them  is  not  a  privilege  attached 


CH.  i]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  83 

to  the  numbers  or  to  the  ideas,  which  you  call  intellectual.  J 
You  meet  these  in  physics  and  in  all  the  other  sciences,  and 
the  senses  even  furnish  them.  For  example,  this  proposition  : 
tioo  bodies  cannot  be  in  the  same  place  at  the  same  time,  is  a 
truth  of  which  you  are  not  otherwise  convinced  than  of  the 
following  maxims  :  It  is  i7n2:>ossible  for  a  thing  to  be  and  not 
to  be  in  the  same  time;  white  is  not  red;  the  square  is  not  a 
circle;  yellowness  is  not  sweetness. 

Th.  There  is  a  difference  between  these  propositions.  The 
first,  which  declares  the  impenetrability  of  bodies,  needs  proof. 
All  those  who  believe  in  true  and  strictly  formed  condensa- 
tion and  rarefaction,  as  the  Peripatetics  and  the  late  Chevalier 
Digby,^  reject  it,  in  fact ;  without  speaking  of  the  Christians 
who  believe,  for  the  most  part,  that  the  contrary  view  — 
namely,  the  penetration  of  space  —  is  possible  to  God.  But  the 
other  propositions  are  identical,  or  very  nearly  so,  and  identi- 
cal or  immediate  propositions  do  not  admit  of  proof.  Those 
who  look  upon  the  senses  as  furnishing  them,  as  that  one  who 
says  that  yellowness  is  not  sweetness,  have  not  applied  the 
general  identical  maxim  to  particular  cases. 

Ph.  Every  proposition  composed  of  two  different  ideas,  of 
which  one  is  the  denial  of  the  other  —  for  example,  that  the 
sipiare  is  not  a  circle,  that  to  be  yellow  is  not  to  be  sweet  — 
will  be  as  certainly  received  as  indu.bitable,  as  soon  as  its 
terms  are  understood,  as  this  general  maxim :  It  is  impossible 
for  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  in  the  same  time. 

Th.  That  is,  the  one  (namely,  the  general  maxim)  is  the 
principle,  and  the  other  (that  is  to  say,  the  negation  of  one 
idea  by  another  opposed  to  it)  is  its  application. 

Ph.  It  seems  .to  me  rather  that  the  maxim  depends  upon 
this  negation,  which  is  its  ground;  and  that  it  is,  besides, 
much  easier  to  understand  that  what  is  the  same  thing  is  not 
different,  than  the  maxim  which  rejects  the  contradictions. 
Now,  according  to  this  statement,  it  will  be  necessary  for  you 
to  admit  as  innate  truths  an  infinite  number  of  propositions  of 
this  kind  which  deny  one  idea  by  another  without  speaking 

'  Sir  Koiiclin  Dij^by,  1G0;5-10()5,  an  cmiiuiiit  English  pliysic'il  ijliilosophor, 
wlio  livi^d  for  a  time  in  Franco,  where  he  enjoyed  the  friendsliip  of  Descartes 
and  otli(!r  learned  men,  and  wrote  liis  Treatise  on  the  Nature  of  Bodies  and 
other  woi'ks.  — Tr. 


84  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

of  other  tvutlis.  (Add  to  this,  that  a  proposition  cannot  be 
innate  unless  the  ideas  of  which  it  is  composed  are  innate  j 
it  will  be  necessary  to  suppose  that  all  the  ideas  which  we 
have  of  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  figures,  etc.,  are  innate. 

Th.  I  do  not  well  see  how  this :  what  is  the  same  thing  is 
not  different,  is  the  origin  of  the  principle  of  contradiction, 
and  easier ;  for  it  appears  to  me  that  you  give  yourself  more 
freedom  in  advancing  that  A  is  not  B  than  in  saying  that  A  is 
not  non-A.  And  the  reason  that  prevents  A  from  being  B  is 
that  B  includes  non-A.  For  the  rest  this  proposition  :  the 
siveet  is  not  the  hitter,  is  not  innate,  according  to  the  sense 
which  we  have  given  to  the  term  innate  truth.  For  the  sen- 
sations of  sweet  and  bitter  come  from  the  external  senses. 
Thus  it  is  a  mixed  conclusion  {liyhrida  conclusio),  where  the 
axiom  is  applied  to  a  sensible  truth.  But  as  regards  this 
proposition :  the  square  is  not  a  circle,  you  can  affirm  that  it 
is  innate,  for,  in  considering  it,  you  make  a  subsumption  or 
application  of  the  principle  of  contradiction  to  Avhat  the  un- 
derstanding itself  furnishes  as  soon  as  you  are  conscious  of 
innate  thoughts. 

TJi.  Not  at  all,  for  the  thoughts  are  acts,  and  the  knowledge 
or  the  truths,  in  so  far  as  they  are  within  us,  even  when  we 
do  not  think  of  them,  are  habitudes  or  dispositions  ;  and  we 
are  well  acquainted  with  things  of  which  we  think  but  little. 

Ph.  (it  is  very  difiicult  to  conceive  that  a  truth  may  be  in 
the  mind  if  the  mind  has  never  thought  of  that  truth^ 

Th.  It  is  as  if  some  one  said  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  that 
there  are  veins  in  the  marble  before  we  have  discovered  them. 
This  objection  seems  also  to  approach  a  little  too  much  the 
begging  of  the  question.^  All  those  who  admit  innate  truths, 
without  grounding  them  in  the  Platonic  reminiscence,  admit 
some  of  which  they  have  not  yet  thought.  Besides,  this 
reasoning  proves  too  much ;  for,  if  truths  are  thoughts,  we 
shall  be  deprived  not  only  of  the  truths  of  which  we  have 
never  thought,  but  also  of  those  of  Avhich  we  have  thought, 
and  of  which  we  no  longer  actually  think ;  and  if  truths  are 
not  thoughts,  but  habits  and  aptitudes,  natural  or  acquired, 
nothiug  prevents  there  being  in  us  some  of  which  we  have 
never  thought,  nor  will  ever  think. 

1  Petitio  prineipii.  —  Tr. 


CH.  ii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  85 

§  27.  Ph.  If  general  maxims  were  innate,  they  would  appear 
morej^ividly  in  the  mind  of  certain  persons  where,  however, 
we  see  no  trace  of  them  ;  I  may  mention  children,  idiots,  and 
savages,^  for  of  all  men  these  are  they  who  have  the  mind 
less  altered  and  corrupted  by  custom  and  by  the  impress  of 
extraneous  opinions. 

Th.  I  believe  we  must  reason  here  very  differently.  (Innate 
maxims  appear  only  through  the  attention  which  is  given  to 
them  ;T  but  these  persons  have  little  of  it,  or  have  it  for 
entirely  different  things.  Their  thoughts  are  mostly  confined 
to  the  needs  of  the  body ;  and  it  is  reasonable  tliat  pure  and 
detached  thoughts  be  the  reward  of  cares  more  noble.  It  is 
true  that  children  and  savages  have  the  mind  less  altered  by 
customs,  but  they  also  have  it  exalted  by  the  teaching  which 
gives  attention.  It  would  not  be  very  just  that  the  brightest 
lights  should  shine  better  in  minds  which  less  deserve  them, 
and  which  are  enveloped  in  thicker  clouds.  I  would  not  then 
have  one  give  too  much  honor  to  ignorance  and  barbarism 
when  one  is  as  learned  and  as  clever  as  you  are,  Philalethes, 
as  well  as  your  excellent  author ;  that  would  be  lowering  the 
gifts  of  God.  Some  one  will  say  that  the  more  ignorant  we 
are,  the  more  we  approach  the  advantage  of  a  block  of  marble 
or  of  a  piece  of  wood,  which  are  infallible  and  sinless.  But, 
unfortunately,  it  is  not  by  ignorance  that  we  approach  this 
advantage  ;  ('and,  as  far  as  we  are  capable  of  knowledge,  Ave 
sin  in  neglfecting  to  acquire  it,  and  we  shall  fail  so  much  the 
more  easily  as  we  are  less  instructed.  3 


CHAPTER   II 

NO    INNATE    PliACTICAL    PRINCIPLES 

§  1.  Ph.   Ethics  is  a  demonstrative  science,  and  yet  it  has 

no  innate  principles.     And,  indeed,  it  would  be  very  difiicult 

to  produce  a  rule  of  ethics  of  a  nature  to  be  settled  by  an 

assent  as  general  and  as   prompt  as   this  maxim :    ^V^HUever 

is,  is. 

^  For  an  excellent  exposition  of  the  ronteut  of  tlic  Icnn  ravage,  of.  Andrew 
I.ans,  Mijth,  liitual,  and  Relifiion,  Vol.  1,  p.  Ml,  :\m\  note;  also  chap.  .'{,  i>p. 
4()  aq.,  T.oniloii  :  I>oiii;nKUis,  Green,  &  Cf).,  l.S,S7.  —  Tii. 


86  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

Th.  It   is   absolutely  impossible  tliat   there   be   truths    of 

reason  as  evident  as  those  which  are  identical  or  immediate. 

And,  although  you  can  truly  say  that  ethics  has  principles 

*  which  are  not  demonstrable,^nd  that  one  of  the  first  and  most 

practical  is,  that  we  ought  to  pursue  joy  and  avoid  sorrow,  it 

,  is  needful  to  add  that  this  is   not  a  truth  which  is  known 

.  purely  by  reason,  since  it  is  based  upon  internal  experience,  or 

■  upon  confused  knowledge,  for  we   do  not  feel  what  jo}^  or 

sadness  is.) 

Ph.  It  is  only  through  processes  of  reasoning,  through  lan- 
guage, and  through  some  mental  application,  that  you  can  be 
assured  of  practical  truths. 

Th.  Though  that  were  so,  they  would  not  be  less  innate. 
However,  the  maxim  I  just  adduced  appears  of  another  na- 
. ,  ture ;  it  is  not  known  by  the  reason,  but,  so  to  speak,  by  an 
instinct.  (It  is  an  innate  principle,  but  it  does  not  form  a 
part  of  the  natural  light,  for  it  is  not  known  luminously.  But 
this  principle  admitted,  you  can  draw  from  it  scientific  con- 
sequences, and  I  commend  most  heartily  what  you  just  said  of 
ethics  as  a  demonstrative  science.  Let  us  note  also  that  it 
teaches  truths  so  evident  that  thieves,  pirates,  and  bandits  are 
forced  to  observe  them  among  themselves. 

§  2.  Ph.  But  bandits  keep  the  rules  of  justice  among  them- 
selves without  considering  them  as  innate  principles. 

Th.  What  matters  it  ?  Does  the  world  concern  itself  about 
questions  of  theory  ? 

P7i.  They  observe  the  maxims  of  justice  only  as  convenient 
rules,  the  practice  of  which  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the  con- 
servation of  their  society. 

TJi.  [Very  well.  You  could  say  nothing  better  in  general  in 
respect  to  all  men.  ^nd  thus  it  is  that  these  laws  are  written 
in  the  soul,  namely,  as  the  consequences  of  our  preservation 
and  of  our  true  welfare.)  Do  you  imagine  that  we  suppose 
that  truths  are  in  the  understanding  as  independent  the  one  of 
the  other  as  the  edicts  of  the  praetor  were  on  his  placard  or 
album?  I  put  aside  here  the  instinct  which  prompts  man  to 
love  man,  of  which  I  shall  presently  speak,  for  now  I  wish  to 
speak  only  of  truths  in  so  far  as  they  are  known  by  tJie  reason. 
I  admit,  also,  that  certain  rules  of  justice  cannot  be  demon- 
strated, in  all  their  extent  and  perfection,  without  supposing 


CH.  iij  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  87 

the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and 
these,  where  the  instinct  of  humanity  does  not  impel  us,  are 
written  in  the  soul  only  as  other  derivative  truths.]  Those, 
however,  who  base  justice  only  upon  the  necessities  of  this  life 
and  upon  the  need  they  have  of  it,  rather  than  upon  the  pleas- 
ure they  ought  to  take  in  it,  which  is  the  greatest  when  God 
is  its  ground,  are  liable  to  resemble  a  little  the  society  of 
bandits. 

Sit  spes  fallendi,  miscebunt  sacra  profanis.i 

§  3.  Ph.  I  agree  with  you  that  nature  has  put  in  all  men 
the  desire  for  happiness  and  a  strong  aversion  to  misery. 
These  are(</ie  truly  innate  practical  principles,  and  principles 
which,  according  to  the  purpose  of  every  practical  principle, 
have  a  continual  influence  upon  all  our  actions.)  But  they  are 
inclinations  of  the  soul  toward  the  good,  and  not  impressions  ^ 
of  some  truth  which  is  written  in  our  understanding. 

Th.  [I  am  delighted,  sir,  to  see  that  you  admit  in  effect 
innate  truths,  as  I  shall  presently  say.  This  principle  agrees 
sufficiently  with  that  which  I  just  indicated,  which  prompts 
us  to  seek  joy  and  shun  sorrow.  For  felicity  is  only  a  last- 
ing joy.  Our  inclination,  however,  does  not  tend  to  felicity 
proper,  but  to  joy  —  that  is  to  say,  to  the  present ;  it  is  the 
reason  which  prompts  to  future  and  enduring  welfare.  Now, 
the  inclination,  expressed  by  the  understanding,  passes  into  a 
precept  or  practical  truth ;  ^nd  if  the  inclination  is  innate,  the. 
truth  is  innate  also,!  there  being/ nothing  in  the  soul  which 
may  not  be  expressed  in  the  understanding,  but  not  always  by 
a  consideration  actually  distinct^  as  I  have  sufficiently  shown. 
The  instincts  also  are  not  always  practical ;  there  are  some 
which  contain  theoretical  truths,  and  such  are  the  internal 
principles  of  the  sciences  and  of  reasoning,  when,  without  rec- 
ognizing the  reason  in  them,  we  employ  them  by  a  natural 
instinct.  And  in  this  sense  you  cannot  dispense  with  the 
recognition  of  innate  principles,  even  though  you  might  be 
willing  to  deny  that  derivative  truths  are  innate.  Ikit  this 
would  be  a  question  of  name  merely  after  the  explanation  I 

1  Cf.  Kor.  Epist.,  1,  10,  54.     Horace  has  "miscobis."  — Tb. 

2  Erdinaiin  and  Jacqiies  road,  "  d(!S  imperfections  do  quelqne  verite."  Ger- 
hardt  reads,  "des  iin])ressioiis  do  quelqne  veriti'."     I.ock<!  lias,  "  inipressions 

-of  trnth."     Book  I.,  (;liap.  3,  §  3.      Vol.  1,  p.  158,  line  5.  Bulm's  edition.— Tr. 


88  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

have  given  of  what  I  call  innate.  And  if  any  one  desires  to 
give  this  appellation  only  to  the  truths  which  are  received  at 
first  by  instinct,  T  shall  not  contest  the  point  with  him.] 

Ph.  That  is  well.  But  if  there  were  in  our  soul  certain 
characters  imprinted  there  by  nature,  like  so  many  principles 
of  knowledge,  we  could  only  perceive  them  acting  in  us,  as  we 
feel  the  influence  of  the  two  principles  which  are  constantly 
active  in  us  —  namely,  the  desire  of  happiness  and  the  fear  of 
misery. 

Th.  [There  are  principles  of  knowledge  which  influence  us 
as  constantly  in  our  reasoning  processes  as  these  practical  prin- 
ciples influence  us  in  our  volitions  ;  for  example,  everybod}^ 
employs  the  rules  of  deduction  by  a  natural  logic  without 
being  aware  of  it. 

§  4.  Ph.  The  rules  of  Morality  need  to  be  proved  ;  they  are 
then  not  innate,  like  that  rule  which  is  the  soui*ce  of  the  vir- 
tues which  concern  societ}^ :  Do  to  another  only  lohat  you  would 
have  him  do  to  yoxirself. 

Th.  You  always  make  me  the  objection  which  I  have  al- 
ready refuted.  I  agree  with  you  that  there  are  moral  rules 
which  are  not  innate  princiijles  ;  but  that  does  not  prevent  them 
from  being  innate  truths,  for  a  derivative  truth  will  be  innate, 
supposing  that  we  can  draw  it  from  our  mind.  \But  there  are 
innate  truths,  which  we  find  in  us  in  two  ways  —  by  insight 
and  by  instinct.  Those  which  I  have  just  indicated,  show  by 
our  ideas  what  natural  insight  accomplishes.  But  there  are 
conclusions  of  natural  light  which  are  principles  in  relation 
to  instinct/  It  is  thus  that  we  are  prompted  to  acts  of  human- 
ity, by  instinct  because  it  pleases  us,  and  by  reason  because  it 
is  just.  There  are  then  in  us  truths  of  instinct,  which  are 
innate  principles,  which  we  feel  and  approve,  although  we  have 
not  the  proof  of  them  which  we  obtain,  however,  when  we  give 
a  reason  for  this  instinct.  It  is  thus  that  we  make  use  of 
the  laws  of  deduction  conformably  to  a  confused  knowledge, 
and  as  by  instinct,  but  logicians  show  the  reason  of  them,  as 
mathematicians  also  give  a  reason  for  what  they  do  without 
thinking  in  walking  and  leaping.  As  for  the  rule  which  states 
that  we  ought  to  do  to  others  only  what  we  would  have  them 
do  to  us,  it  needs  not  only  proof,  but  also  to  be  proclaimed.  "We 
should  Avish  too  much  for  ourselves  if  we  could  have  our  own 


CH.  II]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  89 

way ;  shall  we  say  then  that  we  also  owe  too  much  to  others  ?  ^ 
You  will  tell  me  that  the  rule  meaus  only  a  just  will.  But 
thus  this  rule,  very  far  from  being  adequate  to  serve  as  a 
measure,  would  itself  need  one.  The  true  sense  of  the  rule 
is,  that  the  place  of  another  is  the  true  point  of  view  for  equi- 
table judgment  when  Ave  attempt  it.] 

§  9.  Ph.  Bad  acts  are  often  committed  without  any  remorse 
of  conscience ;  for  example,  when  cities  are  carried  by  storm, 
the  soldiers  commit,  without  scruple,  the  worst  acts ;  some 
civilized  nations  have  exposed  their  children,  some  Caribbees 
castrate  theirs  in  order  to  fatten  and  eat  them.  Garcilasso  de 
la  Vega"  reports  that  certain  peoples  of  Peru  took  prisoners  in 
order  to  make  concubines  of  them,  and  supported  the  children 
up  to  the  age  of  thirteen,  after  which  they  ate  them,,  and 
treated  in  the  same  manner  the  mothers  so  soon  as  they  no 
longer  bore  children.  In  the  travels  of  Baumgarten  ^  it  is  re- 
lated that  there  was  a  Santon^  in  Egypt  who  passed  for  a  holy 
man,  eo  quod  non  foeminarum  unquavi  esset  ac  2^uero7'icm,  sed 
tantum  anellarum  conctibitor  atque  mularum. 

Th.  Moral  science  (over  and  above  the  instincts  like  that 
which  makes  us  seek  joy  and  shun  sadness)  is  not  otherwise 
innate  than  is  arithmetic,  for  it  depends  likewise  upon  demon- 
strations which  internal  light  furnishes.  And  as  the  dem- 
onstrations do  not  at  once  leap  into  sight,  it  is  no  great  wonder, 
if  men  do  not  perceive  always  and  at  once  all  that  they  pos- 
si!ss  in  themselves,  and  do  not  read  quite  readily  the  characters 
of  the  natural  law,  which  God,  according  to  St.  Paul,^  has  writ- 
ten in  their  minds.  As  morality,  however,  is  more  important 
than  arithmetic,  God  has  given  to  man  instincts  which  prompt 

1  This  sentence  is  found  in  the  texts  of  Erdnianii  and  Gerhixrdt ;  it  is  w.ant- 
iii,'4  ill  tliat  of  Jacques.  — Tr. 

2  Garcilasso  de  la  Vega,  1540-1016,  the  son  of  an  Inca  princess,  and  a  Span- 
ish conqiiei'or,  a  companion  of  Pizarro.  His  CommentarioH  realrs  was  pub- 
lislusd  in  two  parts,  the  first  at  Lisbon,  IfiOf),  sivina;  an  account  of  the  native 
traditions,  customs,  and  history  previous  to  tlu'  Spanish  conquest;  the  second 
under  Ihe  separate  title  of  Historic!  Grnoral  dH  Porv,  Cordova,  1(!17,  treating 
of  the  Spanish  conquest.  The  earlier  and  more  important  part  of  the  work 
has  been  translated,  with  "learned  and  ingenious  notes,"  by  Clements  R. 
Markham,  and  published  in  the  collection  of  the  Ilakluyt  Society,  2  vols., 
London:  1809,  1871.— Tr. 

3  Martin  Baumgarten,  147.V15.3.5,  Trnrrls  tliraiif/h  Er/i/pf,  Arahin,  etc  In 
Churchill,  O.  and  J.  Col.,  Vol.  1,  1744.  — Tr. 

*  Mahometan  monk.  —  Tr.  '"  Rom.  2  :  15 ;  rf.  1 :  11).  —  Tii. 


90  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

at  once  and  -without  reasoning  to  some  portion  of  that  which 
reason  ordains  ;  just  as  we  walk  in  obedience  to  the  laws 
of  mechanics  without  thinking  of  these  laws,  and  as  we  eat, 
not  only  because  eating  is  necessary  for  us,  but  further  and 
much  more  because  it  gives  us  pleasure.  t5ut  these  instincts 
do  not  prompt  to  action  in  an  invincible  way);  the  passions 
may  resist  them,  prejudices  may  obscure  them,  and  contrary 
customs  alter  them.  Nevertheless,  we  agree  most  frequently 
with  these  instincts  of  conscience,  and  we  follow  them  also 
when  stronger  impressions  do  not  overcome  them.  The  great- 
est and  most  healthy  part  of  the  human  race  bears  them  wit- 
ness. The  Orientals,  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  the  Bible 
and  the  Koran  agree  in  respect  to  them ;  the  Mahometan 
police  are  wont  to  punish  the  thing  Baumgarten  tells  of,  and 
it  would  be  needful  to  be  as  brutalized  as  the  American  savage 
in  order  to  approve  their  customs,  full  of  a  cruelty  which  sur- 
passes even  that  of  the  beasts.  Yet  these  same  savages  per- 
ceive clearly  what  justice  is  on  other  occasions  ;  ^  and  although 
there  is  no  bad  practice,  perhaps,  which  may  not  be  authorized 
in  some  respects  and  upon  some  occasions,  there  are  few  of 
them,  however,  which  are  not  condemned  very  frequently  and 
by  the  larger  part  of  mankind.  That  Avhich  has  not  been  at- 
tained without  reason,  and  was  not  attained  by  reasoning  alone, 
should  be  referred  in  part  to  the  natural  instincts.  Custom, 
tradition,  discipline,  are  mingled  therein,  but  it  is  due  to  in- 
stinct (le  naturel )  that  custcmi  is  turned  more  generally  to  the 
good  side  of  these  duties.  (In  the  same  way,^  the  tradition  of 
God's  existence  is  due  to  instincij  (le  naturel).     Xow  nature 

1  Cf.  J.  G-  Solmrman,  The  Ethical  Import  of  Darwiuism,  pp.  256-260,  New 
York":  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1887.  He  states  that  "  some  gropings  amid  the 
general  darkness  incline  me,  at  least  tentatively,  to  the  belief  that,  apart  from 
the  domestic  virtnes,  there  is  no  snch  great  difference  between  the  morals  of 
Christians  and  the  morals  of  savages"  (p.  256).  This  statement  is  modified 
further  on, pp.  258,  259,  and  finally  takes  the  following  form:  "  The  fighting 
men,  actual  and  potential,  in  every  uncivilized  community  recognize  the  same 
rights,  obligations,  and  duties  toward  one  anotlier  as  constitute  the  essence  of 
civilized  morality.  You  never  find  a  man  without  a  moral  nature,  a  nature 
essentially  like  our  own ;  but  the  objects  he  includes  within  the  scope  of  its 
outgoings  vary"  (p.  259).  For  the  real  significance  of  such  facts,  cf.  Ex- 
Pres.  E.'^G.  Robinson,  of  Brown  Vmversitj,  Principles  and  Practice  of  Moral- 
ity, p.  43,  Boston:  Silver,  Burdett  &  Co.,  1888.  — Tr. 

"2Gerhardt  reads,  "  C'est  comma  le  naturel,"  etc.;  Erdmann  and  Jacques, 
"  Le  naturel,"  etc.  — Tr. 


VH.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  91 

gives  to  man  and  also  to  most  of  the  animals  affectionate  and 
tender  feeling  for  those  of  their  species.  The  tiger  even  par- 
cit  cognatis  mascuUs;^  whence  comes  this  bon  mot  of  a  Roman 
jurisconsult,  Quia  inter  omnes  homines  natura  cognationem 
constituit,  uncle  hominum  homini  insidiari  nefas  esse.  Spiders 
form  almost  the  only  exception,  and  these  eat  one  another 
to  this  extent  that  the  female  devours  the  male  after  having 
enjoyed  him.  Besides  this  general  instinct  of  society,  which 
may  be  called  philanthropy  in  man,  there  are  some  more  par- 
ticular forms  of  it,  as  the  affection  between  the  male  and  the 
female,  the  love  which  father  and  mother  bear  toward  the  chil- 
dren, which  the  Greeks  call  o-Topyr/,^  and  other  similar  inclina- 
tions which  make  this  natural  law,  or  this  image  of  law  rather, 
which,  according  to  E-oman  jurisconsults,  nature  has  taught 
the  animals.  But  in  man  in  particular  there  is  found  a  certain 
regard  for  dignity,  for  propriety,  which  leads  him  to  conceal 
the  things  which  lower  us,  to  be  sparing  of  shame,  to  have 
repugnance  for  incests,  to  bury  dead  bodies,  not  to  eat  men  at 
all,  nor  living  animals.  One  is  led  further  to  be  careful  of  his 
reputation,  even  beyond  need,  and  of  life ;  to  be  subject  to 
remorse  of  conscience,  and  to  feel  these  laniatus  et  ictus, 
these  tortures  and  torments  of  which  Tacitus,  following  Plato, 
speaks  ;^  besides  the  fear  of  a  future  and  of  a  supreme  power 
which  arises,  moreover,  naturally  enough.  There  is  reality  in 
all  that ;  but  at  bottom  these  natural  impressions,  whatever 
they  may  be,  are  only  aids  to  the  reason  and  indices  of  the 
plan  of  nature.  Custom,  education,  tradition,  reason,  contrib- 
ute much,  but  human  nature  ceases  not  to  participate  therein. 
It  is  true  that  without  the  reason  these  aids  would  not  suffice 
to  give  a  complete  certitude  to  morals.  Finally,  will  you  deny 
that  man  is  naturally  led,  for  example,  to  witlidraw  from  vile 
things,  under  a  pretext  that  races  are  found  who  like  to  speak 
only  of  filth,  that  there  are  some,  indeed,  whose  mode  of  life 
obliges  them  to  handle  excrements,  and  that  there  are  people 
of  Boutan,  Avhere  those  of  the  king  pass  as  an  aromatic  ?  I 
think  tliat  you  are  of  my  opinion  at  bottom  in  regard  to  these 
natural  instincts  which  tend  toward  what  is  right  and  decent; 

1  Juv.  Snt.,  15,  159-100.  —  Tr. 

2  The  readiii}<  {nom.  aropyn)  of  Erdmann  and  Jacques.     Gerhardt's  reading, 
'opy'nv,  is  evidently  an  error.  —  Tu.  3  (Jonjias,  524  E  ;  Ann.  G,  G.  —  Tk. 


92  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

although  you  will  say,  perhaps,  as  you  have  said  with  regard 
to  the  instinct  which  prompts  to  joy  and  felicity,  that  these 
impressions  are  not  innate  truths.  But  I  have  already  replied 
( tjiat  every  feeling  is  the  perception  of  a  truth,^nd  that  the 
statural  feeling  is  the  (perception)  of  an  innate  trut]i,)but  very 
often  confused,  as  are  the  experiences  of  the  external  senses  -, 
thus  you  can  distinguish  the  innate  tniths  from  the  natural 
light  (which  contains  only  the  distinctly  knowable),  as  the 
genus  must  be  distinguished  from  its  species,  pince  the  imiate 
truths  comprehend  both  the  instincts  and  the  natural  light.]  J 

§  11.  Ph.  A  person  who  knew  the  natural  limits  of  justice 
and  injustice,  and  (who)  Avould  not  cease  confusing  them  with 
each  other,  could  only  be  regarded  as  the  declared  enemy  of 
the  repose  and  the  welfare  of  the  society  of  which  he  is  a  mem- 
ber. But  men  confuse  them  every  moment,  consequently  they 
do  not  knoAv  them. 

Th.  [That  is  taking  things  a  little  too  theoretically.  It 
happens  every  day  that  men  act  contrary  to  their  knowledge  in 
concealing  these  (limits)  from  themselves  when  they  turn  the 
mind  elsewhere,  in  order  to  follow  their  passions ;  otherwise, 
we  should  not  see  people  eating  and  drinking  what  they  know 
must  cause  them  sickness  and  even  death.  They  would  not 
neglect  their  business  ;  they  Avould  not  do  what  entire  nations 
have  done  in  certain  respects.  The  future  and  reason  rarely 
make  so  strong  an  impression  as  the  present  and  the  senses. 
That  Italian  knew  this  well,  who,  before  being  put  to  torture, 
proposed  to  have  the  gallows  continually  in  sight  during  the 
torments  in  order  to  resist  them,  and  they  heard  him  say  some- 
times, "  lo  ti  vedo,"  which  he  explained  afterward  when  he  had 
escaped.  Unless  you  firmly  resolve  to  look  upon  the  true  good 
and  the  true  evil  with  the  purpose  of  following  or  shunning 
them,  you  find  yourself  carried  away,  and  it  happens,  with  re- 
gard to  the  most  important  needs  of  this  life,  as  it  happens  with 
regard  to  paradise  and  hell  in  the  case  of  those,  indeed,  who 
believe  in  them  the  most :  — 

Cantantur  Iiebc,  laudantur  haec, 

Dicuntur,  audiuntur. 
Scribuntur  h;ec,  legiintur  hsec, 

Et  lecta  negliguiitui-.] 


,11.  n]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  93 

Ph.  Every  principle  wluch  you  suppose  innate  can  only  be 
known  by  each  one  as  just  and  advantageous. 

Th.  [You  always  return  to  tliis  supposition,  wliicli  I  have 
refuted  so  many  times,(t.hat  every  innate  truth  is  known 
always  and  by  all.jy 

§  12.  Ph.  But  a  public  permission  to  violate  the  law  proves 
that  this  law  is  not  innate ;  for  example,  the  law  requiring  the 
love  and  preservation  of  children  was  violated  among  the 
ancients  when  they  permitted  their  exposure. 

Th.  [This  violation  supposed,  it  follows  only  that  you  have 
not  well  read  these  characters  of  nature  written  in  our  soul, 
but  sometimes  obscure  enough  by  reason  of  our  excesses,  not 
to  mention  that,  in  order  to  have  a  perfectly  clear  perception 
of  the  necessity  of  duties,  men  must  see  the  demonstration  of 
them  —  a  condition  that  is  rarely  fulfilled.  If  geometry  were  as 
much  opposed  to  our  passions  and  present  interests  as  is  ethics, 
we  should  contest  it  and  violate  it  but  little  less,  notwith- 
standing all  the  demonstrations  of  Euclid  ^  and  of  Archimedes,' 
which  you  would  call  dreams  and  believe  full  of  paralogisms; 
and  Joseph  Scaliger,  Hobbes,^  and  others,  who  have  written 
against  Euclid  and  Archimedes,  would  not  find  themselves  in 
such  a  small  company  as  at  present.  It  was  only  the  passion 
for  glory,  which  these  authors  believed  they  found  in  the  quad- 
rature of  the  circle  and  other  difficult  problems,  which  could 

1  Euclid,  not  to  be  cnnfonnded  with  Euclid  of  Mesara,  a  pupil  of  Socrates, 
fouiid(!r  of  the  Me.uarian  school,  the  fundamental  principle  of  whose  philosophy- 
was  the  union  of  the  Eleatic  idea  of  beinrj  with  the  .Socratic  idea  of  the  nood. 
Tiie  date  of  neither  his  hirth  nor  death  is  known.  Proclus,  the  Neo-Platonist, 
410-4S5  A.D.,  says  that  Euclid  lived  in  the  time  of  Ptolemy  I.,  king  of  Egypt, 
wlio  ivigned  from  323-285  B.C.,  and  that  he  was  younger  than  Plato's  associates, 
hut  ol.lcr  tlian  Eratosthenes,  "  27()-2— 106,-2  B.C.,"  "the  celebrated  scholar 
wliose  chronological  dates  were  adopted  for  the  liistoryof  pliilosophy"  (Zeller, 
Oiiiliiii'ft,  §§  ."?,  G()),  and  Archimedes,  287-212  B.C.  Proclus  preserves  P>uclid's 
reply  to  King  Ptolemy,  who  asked  him  if  thei-e  were  no  easi(!r  way  to  learn 
geometry  than  by  studying  his  elements.  "  There  is  no  royal  road  to  geom- 
etry."—Tr. 

2  Thomas  Hol)l)es,  1588-1079.  The  statement  of  his  geometrical  principles 
in  opposition  to  those  of  Euclid  is  found  in  the  Appendix  to  tin;  English  trans- 
lation of  the  De  Corpora,  which  app(!ared  about  the  middle  of  1650,  entitled 
Six  Lessons  to  the  Professors  of  Matheniutirs,  one  of  Geomrtni,  the  other  of 
Astronomy,  in.  the  Unirersity  of  Oxford,  English  Works,  Vol.  7,  i)p.  iai-,T)0. 
For  an  account  of  the  coiiti'oversy  in  wliich  these  appcariMl,  <f.  George  (Iroom 
Rol)ertsoji,  II(,hhes,  pp.  167-178  (Philosoi)hical  Classics).  Edinburgh:  William 
Blackwood  &  Stins,  1880.  — Tr. 


9i  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

blind  to  such  a  point  persons  of  so  great  merit.  And  if  others 
had  the  same  interest,  they  woukl  make  use  of  it  in  much  the 
same  manner.] 

Ph.  Every  duty  carries  the  idea  of  Law,  and  a  law  cannot 
be  known  or  supposed  without  a  legislator  who  has  prescribed 
it,  or  without  reward  and  without  punishment. 

Th.  [There  can  be  natural  reivards  and  penalties  without 
a  legislator  ;  intemperance,  for  example,  is  punished  by  disease. 
As  this,  however,  does  not  injure  all  at  first,  I  admit  that  there 
are  few  precepts  to  which  you  would  necessarily  be  bound  if 
there  were  not  a  God  who  leaves  no  crime  without  chastise- 
ment, no  good  act  without  reward.] 

Ph.  (The  ideas  of  a  God  and  of  a  life  to  come  must  then  also 
be  innate.  J 

TJi.  [I  am  agreed  in  the  sense  in  which  I  have  explained 
myself.] 

Ph.  But  these  ideas  are  so  far  from  being  written  by  nature 
in  the  minds  of  all  men,  that  they  even  do  not  appear  very  clear 
and  very  distinct  in  the  minds  of  many  students,  who  also  pro- 
fess to  examine  things  with  some  accuracy ;  so  far  are  they 
from  being  known  by  every  human  being. 

Til.  You  return  again  to  the  same  proposition,  which  main- 
tains that  what  is  not  known  is  Jiot  innate,  which  I  have,  how- 
ever, refuted  so  many  times.  ^Vhat  is  innate  is  not  at  first 
.known  clearly  and  distinctly  as  such;  often  much  attention 
and  method  is  necessary  in  order  to  its  perception,  the  student- 
class  do  not  always  adduce  it,  still  less  every  human  being.^ 

§  13.  Ph.  But  if  men  can  be  ignorant  of  or  call  in  question 
that  which  is  innate,  it  is  in  vain  for  you  to  speak  to  us  of  in- 
nate principles,  and  to  claim  to  show  us  their  necessity ;  very 
far  from  their  being  able  to  serve  as  our  instructors  in  the  truth 
and  certitude  of  things,  as  is  maintained,  (we  shall  find  our- 
selves, with  these  principles,  in  the  same  state  of  uncertainty 
as  if  they  were  not  in  us.  ) 

Th.  You  cannot  call  in  question  all  the  innate  principles. 
You  were  agreed  in  regard  to  identical  propositions  or  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  admitting  that  there  are  incontest- 
able principles,  although  you  would  not  then  recognize  them 
as  innate ;  but  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  everything  which 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  95 

f  is  innate  and  necessarily  connected  with  these  innate  princi- 
ples, is  also  at  first  indubitably  evident.  V' 

Fh.  No  one  that  I  know  of  has  yet  undertaken  to  give  us  an 
exact  catalogue  of  these  principles. 

Th.  But  has  any  one  hitherto  given  us  a  full  and  exact 
catalogue  of  the  axioms  of  geometry  ? 

§  15.  Ph.  My  Lord  Herbert  ^  has  been  pleased  to  point  out 
some  of  these  principles,  which  are :  1.  There  is  a  supreme 
God.  2.  He  ought  to  be  served.  3.  Virtue  united  with  piety 
is  the  best  worship.  4.  Repentance  for  sin  is  necessary. 
5.  There  are  penalties  and  rewards  after  this  life.  I  agree 
that  these  are  evident  truths  and  of  such  a  nature  that  when 
w(dl  explained  a  reasonable  person  can  scarcely  avoid  giving 
tlieni  his  consent.  But  our  friends  say  that  they  are  very  far 
from  being  so  many  innate  impressions,  and  if  these  five 
])ropositions  are  common  notions  written  in  our  souls  by  the 
finger  of  God,  there  are  many  others  which  we  ought  also  to 
])ut  into  this  class. 

Th.    I  agree  with  you,  sir,  for  I  takem.ll  the  necessary  truths  ■ 
ars  innate,  and  I  connect  with  them  also  the  instinctsj    But,  I 
agree  with  you,  that  these  five  propositions  are  not  innate  prin- 
(•i})les ;  for  I  hold  that  they  can  and  ought  to  be  proved. 

§  18.  Ph.  In  the  third  proposition,  that  virtue  is  the  wor- 
ship most  agreeable  to  God,  it  is  not  clear  what  is  meant  by 
virtue.  If  you  understand  it  in  the  sense  most  commonly 
niven  to  the  term,  I  mean  that  which  passes  as  praiseworthy 
;u!Cording  to  the  different  opinions  which  prevail  in  different 
countries,  this  proposition  is  so  far  from  being  evident  that  it 
is  not  even  true.  If  you  call  Virtue  -  the  acts  which  are  con- 
formed to  the  will  of  God,  this  will  be  almost  idem  per  idem, 
and  the  proposition  will  teach  us  nothing  of  importance ;  for 
it  would  mean  only  that  God  is  pleased  with  that  which  is  con- 
formed to  his  will.  It  is  the  same  with  the  notion  of  sin  in 
the  fourth  proposition. 

1  Lord  Eilward  Herbert  of  Clicrbury,  ]581-1(;48.  His  Dc  Vrritatr,  Paris, 
1()24,  lias  liad  coii.si(leral)I(!  inHiieiice  on  EiikHsIi  pliilcsopliical  ami  ridij^ious 
thouj^ht,  and  is  of  some  iinjjortanee  in  the  interpretation  of  tlie  polemic  ol 
Lock(!'s  Essay.  —  Tr. 

'^  For  an  excellent  hut  hrief  statement  and  discussion  of  the  main  theories  of 
virtue,  cf.  E.  G.  Robinson:  Friiicijdes  and  Practice  vf  Moralili/,  pp.  140- 
180.  — Tr. 


90  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

Th.  I  do  not  remember  to  have  remarked  that  virtue  is 
commonly  taken  as  something  which  depends  upon  opinion ; 
at  least,  the  philosophers  do  not  make  it  that.  It  is  true  that 
the  name  of  virtue  depends  upon  the  opinion  of  those  who 
give  it  to  different  habits  or  actions,  according  as  they  deem 
them  good  or  bad  and  use  their  reason ;  but  all  are  sufficient!}^ 
agreed  as  to  the  notion  of  virtue  in  general,  although  they  dif- 
fer in  its  application.  According  to  Aristotle^  and  several 
others,  virtue  is  a  habit  of  restraining  the  passions  by  the  rea- 
son, and  still  more,  simply  a  habit  of  acting  according  to  rea- 
son. And  that  cannot  fail  to  be  agreeable  to  him  who  is  the 
supreme  and  final  reason  of  things,  to  whom  nothing  is  indif- 
ferent, and  the  acts  of  rational  creatures  less  than  all  others. 

§  20.  Ph.  You  are  wont  to  say  that  the  custom,  the  educa- 
tion, and  the  general  opinions  of  those  with  whom  you  con- 
verse may  obscure  these  principles  of  morality  which  you 
suppose  innate.  But  if  this  reply  is  a  good  one,  it  annihilates 
the  proof  which  you  pretend  to  draw  from  universal  consent. 
The  reasoning  of  many  men  reduces  to  this :  The  principles 
which  men  of  right  reason  admit  are  innate ;  we  and  those 
of  our  mind  are  men  of  right  reason  ;  consequently  our  princi- 
ples are  innate.  A  pleasant  method  of  reasoning,  which  goes 
straight  on  to  infallibility  ! 

Th.  For  myself,  I  make  use  of  universal  consent,  not  as  a 
principal  proof,  but  as  a  confirmatory  one ;  jfor  innate  truths 
taken  as  the  natural  light  of  reason  bear  their  marks  with 
them  as  does  geometry,  for  they  are  wrapped  up  in  the  im- 
mediate principles  which  you  j^ourselves  admit  as  incontesta- 
ble. I  But  I  grant  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  distinguish  the 
instincts  and  some  other  natural  habits  from  custom,  although 
it  may  very  often  be  possible  so  to  do.  For  the  rest,  it  appears 
to  me  that  people  who  have  cultivated  their  minds  have  some 
ground  for  attributing  the  use  of  right  reason  to  themselves 
rather  than  to  the  barbarians,  since  in  subduing  them  almost 
as  easily  as  they  do  animals  they  show  sufficiently  their  supe- 

1  Eth.  Mr.  II.  G,  ad  init.  Cf.  Zeller:  Outlines  of  the  Hist,  of  Greek  Philos., 
§  61 :  and  E.  Wallace :  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  M  ed.,  §  oil,  pp.  97- 
90.  Cambridge :  University  Press,  ISSo.  In  connection  with  each  section  of 
his  brief  English  statement  and  exposition,  Wallace  aives  the  Greek  text  of 
"  the  more  important  passages  in  Aristotle's  writings,"  with  references  to  the 
Berlin  Academy  edition  of  Aristotle.  — Tr. 


CH.  II]   '  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  97 

riority.  But  if  they  cannot  always  succeed  in  this,  it  is  be- 
cause just  like  the  animals  they  conceal  themselves  in  the 
thick  forests,  where  it  is  difficult  to  hunt  them  down  and  the 
game  is  not  worth  the  candle.  It  is  doubtless  an  advantage  to 
have  cultivated  the  mind,  and  if  we  may  speak  for  barbarism 
as  against  culture,  we  shall  also  have  the  right  to  attack  rea- 
son in  favor  of  the  animals,  and  to  take  seriously  the  witty 
sallies  of  M.  Despreaux,^  in  one  of  his  satires,  where,  in  order 
to  contest  with  man  his  prerogative  over  the  animals,  he  asks, 
whether. 

The  bear  is  afraid  of  the  passer-by,  or  the  passer-by  of  the  bear  ; 
And  if,  by  decree  of  the  shepherds  of  Libya, 
The  lions  would  vacate  the  parks  of  Numidia,  etc. 

We  must,  however,  admit  that  there  are  some  points  in  which 
the  barbarians  surpass  us,  especially  as  regards  vigor  of  body ; 
and  as  regards  the  soul  even  we  may  say  that  in  certain  respects 
their  practical  morality  is  better  than  ours,  because  they  have  not 
the  avarice  of  hoarding  nor  the  ambition  of  ruling.  And  we 
may  even  add  that  association  with  Christians  has  made  them 
worse  in  many  respects.^  They  have  taught  them  drunkenness 
(when  carrying  them  the  water  of  life),  swearing,  blasphemy, 
and  other  vices,  which  were  little  known  to  them.  There  is 
with  us  more  of  good  and  of  evil  than  with  them :  a  bad  Euro- 
pean is  worse  than  a  savage  —  he  refines  upon  evil.^  Still, 
nothing  should  prevent  men  from  uniting  the  advantages  which 
nature  gives  to  these  peoples  with  those  which  reason  gives  us. 

1  Nicolas  Boileau-Despreaux,  10.36-1711.  The  passage  quoted  is  from  Sat.  8, 
62-64.  The  text  as  given  by  all  the  editions  I  have  been  able  to  consult, 
twelve,  ranging  from  1716-1873,  reads  thus : 

"L'ours  a  peur  du  passant,  on  le  passant  de  I'ours; 
Et  si,  sur  un  edit  des  patres  de  Nubie, 
Les  lions  de  Barca  videraient  la  Lybie;"  etc. 
Lines  63  and  64  of  the  text,  as  given  by  Leibnitz,  editions  of  Gerhardt  and 
Erdmann,  Jacques  modernizing  the  spelling  and  correcting  the  misplacement 
of  "  de  "  and  "  des  "  in  line  63,  read  thus : 

"  Et  si  par  un  edit  de  pastres  des  Lybie 
Les  Lions  vuideroient  les  pares  de  Numidie,"  etc. 

It  seems  evident  tliat  Leibnitz  misquoted  tlie  lines.  — Tk. 

2  Compare  J.  G.  Schurman:  The  Ethical  Import  of  Danvinisn) ,  pp.  '2rtCi-'2G0 
as  above.  —  Tr. 

2  The  Frcncli  is:   "  il  rafine  sur  h;  mal."  —  Tr. 


98  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

Ph.  /But  what  reply  do  you  make,  sir,  to  this  dilemma  of 
one  01  my  friends?  I  would  be  pleased,  he  says,  to  have  the 
advocates  of  innate  ideas  tell  me  whether  these  principles  can 
or  cannot  be  effaced  by  education  and  custom.  If  they  cannot 
be  effaced  Ave  ought  to  find  them  in  all  men,  and  they  should 
clearly  appear  in  the  mind  of  each  particular  man.  If  they 
can  be  altered  by  extraneous  ideas,  they  ought  to  appear  more 
distinctly  and  with  more  lustre  the  nearer  they  are  to  their 
source.  I  mean  in  children  or  illiterate  people,  upon  whom 
extraneous  opinions  have  made  less  impression.  Let  them 
take  which  side  they  please,  they  will  clearly  see,  he  says,  that 
it  is  contradicted  by  indubitable  facts  and  by  continual  expe- 
rience.^ 

Th.  I  am  astonished  that  your  clever  friend  has  confounded 
ohscurity  with  effacement,  as  some  in  your  party  confound  non- 
being  with  non-appearance.  Innate  ideas  and  truths  cannot 
be  effaced,  but  they  are  obscured  in  all  men  (as  they  are  now) 
by  their  inclination  toward  the  needs  of  the  body,  and  oftener 
still  by  the  occurrence  of  bad  customs.'!  These  characteristics 
of  the  internal  light  would  always  be  shining  in  the  under- 
standing and  would  give  fervor  to  the  will,  if  the  confused 
perceptions  of  sense  did  not  engross  our  attention.  It  is  the 
struggle  of  which  Holy  Scripture  no  less  than  ancient  and 
modern  philosophy  speaks. 

Ph.  Thus,  then,  we  find  ourselves  in  darkness  as  thick  and 
in  uncertainty  as  great  as  if  there  were  no  such  light. 

Th.  God  forbid;  we  should  have  neither  science  nor  law, 
nay,  not  even  reason. 

§  21,  22,  etc.  Ph.  I  hope  that  you  will  at  least  admit  the 
force  of  prejudice,  which  often  causes  that  to  pass  as  natural 
which  has  come  from  the  bad'  instruction  to  which  children 
have  been  exposed,  and  the  bad  customs  which  education  and 
association  have  given  them. 

Th.  I  admit  that  the  excellent  author  whom  you  follow  says 
some  very  fine  things  upon  that  subject,  and  which  have  their 
value  if  they  are  taken  as  they  should  be ;  but  I  do  not  believe 
that  they  are  opposed  to  the  doctrine  properly  understood  of 
nature  or  of  innate  truths.  And  I  am  confident  that  he  will  not 
extend  his  remarks  too  far ;  for  I  am  equally  persuaded  that 
a  great  many  opinions  pass  for  truths  which  are  only  the  effects 


CH.  ii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDlNa  99 


of  custom  and  of  credulity,  and  that  there  are  many  such  opin- 
ions, too,  which  certain  philosophers  would  fain  account  for  as 
matters  of  prejudice,  whicli  are,  however,  grounded  in  right 
reason  and  in  nature.  There  is  as  much  or  more  ground  for  de- 
fending ourselves  from  those  who  through  ambition  oftenest 
make  pretensions  to  innovation,  than  for  challenging  ancient  im- 
pressions. And  after  having  meditated  sufficiently  upon  ancient 
and  modern  thought,  I  have  found  that  the  majority  of  the  re- 
ceived doctrines  may  bear  a  good  sense.  So  that  I  wish  that 
sensible  men  would  seek  to  satisfy  their  ambition  by  occupy- 
ing themselves  rather  in  building  and  advancing  than  in  retro- 
grading and  destroying.  And  I  desire  them  to  resemble  the 
Romans  who  constructed  beautiful  public  works,  rather  than 
that  Vandal  king '  whom  his  mother  charged  to  seek  the  de- 
struction of  these  grand  structures,  since  he  could  not  hope  for 
the  glory  of  equalling  them. 

Fh.  The  aim  of  the  clever  class  who  have  contended  against 
innate  truths  has  been  to  prevent  men  from  handing  round 
their  prejudices  and  seeking  to  cover  their  idleness  beneath 
this  fair  name. 

Th.  We  are  agreed  upon  this  point,  for,  very  far  from  ap- 
proving that  doubtful  principles  be  received,  I  would,  for  my- 
self, seek  even  the  demonstration  of  the  axioms  of  Euclid,  as 
some  ancients  also  have  done.  And  when  you  ask  the  means 
of  knowing  and  examining  innate  principles,  I  reply,  following 
what  I  said  above,  that  with  the  exception  of  the  instincts 
whose  reason  is  unknown,  you  must  try  to  reduce  them  to  first 
principles,  that  is  to  say,  to  axioms  identical  or  immediate  by 
means  of  definitions,  which  are  nothing  else  than  a  distinct 
exposition  of  ideas.  I  do  not  doubt  even  but  that  your  friends, 
who  have  hitherto  been  opposed  to  innate  truths,  would  ap- 
prove this  method,  which  appears  consonant  with  their  princi- 
pal aim. 

1  Chrocus,  who  with  the  Sueves  and  Alans  is  sairl  to  have  passed  over  the 
Rhine  near  MayeiK-e,  and  following  the  evil  counsel  of  his  mother,  to  have 
ravaged  in  the  most  friijhtfnl  manner  in  Germany  as  in  Gaul.  The  story  is 
given  in  tlie  Olironiele  of  Idatiiis,  eliap.  62.  Cf.  Bouquet,  Benin  Gall,  et 
Franc.  Scriptore.'i,  Tom.  2,  p.  404.  —  Tk. 


100  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 


CHAPTER  III 

OTHER    COXSIDERATIOXS    TOUCHIXG    IXXATE    PRIXCIPLES,     BOTH 
SPECULATIVE    AND    PRACTICAL 

§  3.  Ph.  You  wish  to  reduce  truths  to  first  principles,  and 
I  grant  you  tliat  if  there  is  any  such  principle,  it  is  without 
gainsa3'ing  this;  it  is  impossible  for  a  tiling  to  he  and  not  to 
be  at  the  same  time.  It  appears,  however,  difficult  to  maintain 
its  innate  character,  since  you  must  be  convinced  at  the  same 
time  that  the  ideas  of  impossibility  and  identity  are  innate. 

Th.  It  is  quite  necessary  that  those  who  favor  innate  truths 
maintain  and  be  convinced  that  these  ideas  are  also  innate,  and 
I  admit  that  I  am  of  their  opinion.  (The  ideas  of  being,  of ' 
possibility  of  identity,  are  so  completely  innate  that  they 
enter  into  all  our  thoughts  and  reasonings,  and  I  regard  them  . 
as  essential  to  our  mind  ;^  but  I  have  already  said  that  we  do 
not  always  pay  them  particular  attention  and  that  we  discern 
them  only  with  time.  I  have  said  hitherto  that_^e  are,  so  to 
speak,  innate  unto  ourselves,  and  since  we  are  beings,  the  being 
we  is  innate )  (and  the  knowledge  of  being  is  wrapped  up  in 
that  knowledge  which  we  have  of  ourselves.]  There  is  some- 
thing similar  in  the  case  of  other  general  notions. 

§  4.  Ph.  If  the  idea  of  identity  is  natural,  and  conserpiently^ 
so  evident  and  so  present  to  the  mind  that  we  ought  to  recog- 
nize it  from  the  cradle,  I  would  be  pleased  to  have  a  child  of 
seven  years,  and  even  a  man  of  seventy,  tell  me  whether  a  man 
who  is  a  creature  consisting  of  body  and  soul,  is  the  same  (man) 
when  his  body  is  changed,  and  whether,  metempsychosis  sup- 
posed, Euphorbus  would  be  the  same  as  Pythagoras. 

Th.  (1  have  stated  sufficiently  that  what  is  natural  to  us  is  not 
known  to  us  as  such  from  the  cradle  \  and  even  an  idea  may  be 
known  to  us  without  our  being  able  to  decide  at  once  all  ques- 
tions which  can  be  formed  thereupon.  It  is  as  if  some  one  main- 
tained that  a  child  cannot  have  a  knowledge  of  the  square  and 
its  diagonal,  because  he  will  have  difficulty  in  recognizing  that 
the  diagonal  is  incommensurable  with  the  side  of  the  square. 
As  for  the  question  itself,  it  appears  to  me  demonstratively 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  101 

solved  by  the  doctrine  of  Monads,  which  I  have  elsewhere^ 
shown  in  its  true  light,  and  we  shall  speak  more  fully  of  this 
matter  in  the  sequel. 

1  Cf.  the  Essay,  without  title,  Gerhardt,  4,  427  sq.,  written  at  the  beginning 
of  KiSiJ,  and  referred  to  as  "  im  petit  discours  de  Metaphysique,"  in  Leibnitz's 
letter,  Feb.  1-11,  1086,  to  the  Landgraf  Ernst  von  Hesseu-liheiufels,  (i.  2,  11. 
This  '  Discours,'  regarded  by  Leibnitz  as  the  beginning  of  his  philosophy,  con- 
tains a  summary,  centring  about  the  idea  of  the  individual  substance,  of  all 
his  previous  philosophical  speculation.  He  gained  this  idea,  and  with  it  a 
seemingly  satisfactory  solution  of  the  iirincipal  philosophical  problem,  at  the 
end  of  1G85  or  the  beginning  of  IGSG.  For  this  idea,  still  in  process  of  devel- 
opment, possessing  the  elements  of  force  and  individuality,  but  lacking  those 
of  contiiuiity  and  perceptive  activity  evolved  between  1086  and  1(397,  Leibnitz, 
in  1()97,  when  the  idea  possessed  all  the  elements  essential  to  its  completeness 
in  his  system,  apjjropriated  the  term  "monad."  This  term  he  borrowed,  not 
from  Giordano  Bruno,  1548-1000,  who  used  it  in  a  similar  though  not  precisely 
the  same  sense,  but  from  Francois  Mercure  V'an  Helmont,  1018-1099.  So  far 
as  known,  the  term  "monad"  is  first  mentioned  in  the  letter  to  Fardella, 
Sept.  3-13,  109(),  first  published  by  Foucher  de  Careil,  Nouv.  lettr.  et  opusc.  de 
Leibniz,  p.  328,  Paris,  1857.  The  doctrine  in  substance  till  1097,  and  thereafter 
in  name,  Leibnitz  frequently  set  forth  with  increasing  clearness  and  complete- 
ness in  letters  to  his  numerous  corresi)ondents,  and  in  the  "  Acta  Eruditorum  " 
and  the  "  Journal  des  Savaus."  Reference  may  be  made,  amoug  others,  to  the 
following:  Correspondence  with  Antoine  Arnaukl,  1012-1094,  especially  the 
letter  dated  Venice,  Mar.  23,  1()90,  G.  2,  134;  Erdnianu,.107;  Jacques,  1,443; 
trans..  Appendix,  ;   the  two  systematic  elaborations  of  his  system  of 

the  y(;ar  1095,  the  mathematical  iu  the  Specimen  dy namicum  pro  adniirandis 
natursB  le>/ibus,  etc.,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrifi.,  (i,  234  sq.;  the  meta- 
physical in  the  Systeme  nouceau  de  la  nature,  etc.,  G.  4,  477;  E.  124;  trans., 
Appendix,  ;  De  ipsa  naturu,  etc.,  1098,  espec.  §§  11, 12,  G.  4,  504  ;  E.  154  ; 

J.  1,455  (in  French)  ;  trans.,  Appendix,  ;  Response  { Replique,  Erdinann) 

aux  rejtexions  continues  dans  la  seconde  edition  dn  Dictionnaire  Critique  de 
M.  Boyle,  etc.,  1702,  G.  4,554;  E.  183;  trans.,  Appendix,  ;   Letters  to 

Rud.  Christ.  Wagner  De  vi  aetiva  corporis,  June  4,  1710,  G.  7,  528;  E.  405; 
trans.,  Duncan,  Fhilo.s.  Wks.  of  Leibnitz,  190;  to  Bierling,  Aug.  12,  1711, 
G.  7,  500;  E.  077;  Principes  de  la  nature,  etc.,  c.  1714,  G.  0,  .598;  E.  714; 
trans.,  Duncan,  209;  La  Monadolor/ie,  1714,  G.  6,  007;  E.  705;  trans.,  Duncan, 
218,  F.  H.  H('dge,  "Jour.  Spec.  Philos.,"  Vol.  1,  p.  129;  Letters  to  Des  Bosses, 
G.  2,  285  sq.,  passim,  which  pre.sent  most  penetrating  discussions  of  Leiluiitz's 
metaphysic  and  form  tlie  most  amph;  (■(mimentary  on  the  Moundohxjie ;  to  De 
Voider,  1()4.'5-1709,  G.  2,  139  sq.,  passim,  proving  the  intimate  connection  of 
Leil)nitz's  dynamic  and  metaphysic;  to  Bourguct,  Dec.  1714,  G.  3,  ,575;  E.  720; 
to  Remond  (d(!  Montmort,  E.  724),  Fel).  11,  1715,  §§  3,  4,  G.  3,  0.35;  to  Dangi- 
court,  Sept.  171(i,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  opera  omnia,  3,  499;  E.  745.  Of  the  pieces 
cited  the  most  important  are :  The  Letter  to  Arnauld,  Mar.  2.3,  lOitO,  the  Systeme 
nonveau,  the  De  ipsa  iiatiira,  the  Principes  de  la  nature,  and  the  Mmutdo- 
lof/ie.  As  Leibnitz  was  occujjied,  more  or  less  as  circumstances  permitted, 
with  the  composition  and  revision  of  his  '  N(nv  Essays,'  from  1700,  when  Coste's 
translation  of  Lock(!'s  'Essay'  appeared,  lo  1709  ;md  perhaps  later  (rid.  ante, 
p.  9  and  note),  jxissibly  oven  as  late  as  1714  or  1710,  tiie  relntivc  date  of  com- 
position of  the  several  pieces  liei'e  cited  to  tliat  of  tiie  'New  l'],s.s;iy.s '  can  easily 


■^102  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [i!k.  i 

§  G.  Ph.  [I  see  very  ■n^ell  that  to  you  I  should  object  in  vain 
that  the  axiom  which  declares  that  the  tchole  is  greater  than  its 
part  is  not  innate,  under  pretext  that  the  ideas  of  whole  and 
part  are  relative,  dependent  upon  those  of  number  and  exten- 
sion; since  you  would  apparently  maintain  that  there  are  ideas 
conditionally  innate,  and  that  those  of  number  and  extension 
are  to  such  a  degree  innate.^] 

Th.  You  are  right,  and  indeed  I  rather  believe  that  the  idea 
of  extension  is  posterior  to  that  of  whole  and  part. 

§  7.  Ph.  [What  say  you  of  the  truth  that  God  should  be 
worshipped ;  is  it  innate  ?] 

Th.  I  believe  that  the  duty  of  worshipping  God  declares  that 
on  occasion  you  ought  to  show  that  you  honor  him  beyond 
every  other  object,  and  that  this  is  a  necessary  consequence  of 
the  idea  of  him  and  of  his  existence ;  which  signifies  with  me 
that  this  truth  is  innate. 

§  8.  Ph.  But  the  atheists  seem  to  prove  by  their  example 
that  the  idea  of  God  is  not  innate.  And  without  speaking 
of  those  whom  the  ancients  have  mentioned,  have  not  entire 
nations  been  discovered,  who  have  no  idea  of  God  nor  of  the 
terms  which  denote  God  and  the  soul,  as  at  the  bay  of  Soldania, 
in  Brazil,  in  the  Caribbee  Islands,  in  Paraguay  ? 

Th.  [The  late  Mr.  Fabricius,^  a  celebrated  theologian  of 
Heidelberg,  has  made  an  apology  for  the  human  race  in  order 

be  approximated.  On  the  whole  subject,  cf.  L.  Stein,  Leibniz  u.  Spinoza,  chap.  6, 
pp.  111-219,  Berlin  :  G.  Reimer,  1890,  who  traces  the  history  of  the  rise  of  the 
monad-doctrine  from  1680  till  all  the  elements  of  the  complete  conception  were 
present  in  1697;  E.  Dillmann,  E.  neue  Bar stg.  d.  Leibniz.  Monadenlehre  auf 
Griind  d.  Quellen,  Leipzig:  O.  R.  Reislaud,  1891,  whose  monograph  is  an  elab- 
orate discussion  of  the  entire  subject  with  references  to  or  quotations  from  all 
the  sources.  —  Tr. 

1  The  French  text  is :  "  puisque  vous  soutiendres  apparemraent,  qu'il  y  a  des 
idees  innees  respectives,  et  que  celles  des  nombres  et  de  I'etendue  sont  innees 
aussi."  —  Tr. 

-  John  Lewis  Fabricius,  lfi.32-1697.  Professor,  first  of  Greek,  then  of  Philos- 
ophy and  Theolooy,  at  Heidelberg.  In  16(>4  he  received  the  title  of  "  Conseiller 
ecclesiastique  de  I'electeur  palatin."  Some  years  after,  when  Heidelberg  was 
burning,  he  saved  the  archives  of  the  church  and  the  university,  carrying 
them  first  to  Eberbach,  then  to  Frankfort,  where  he  died.  The  title  of  the 
work  referred  to  in  the  text  (vid.  ante,  p.  21  also,  where  the  name  is  given 
Fabritius,  in  accord  with  his  own  signature  in  the  letter  of  Feb.  Ifi,  1673,  to 
Spinoza,  offering  him  the  professorship  of  Philosophy  at  Heidelberg)  is:  Apol- 
Of/in  f/eneris  humnni  ronfra  cfihimnicm  afJiei.tmi.  It  ajipeared  in  l(i(>2.  His 
collected  works,  with  a  life,  were  published  by  J.  H.  Heidegger,  Zurich,  1698, 
in  4to.  —  Tk, 


ni.  Ill]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  103' 

to  clear  it  of  the  imputation  of  atheism.  He  was  an  author  of 
great  accuracy,  and  decidedly  above  much  prejudice;  I  do  not, 
liowever,  pretend  to  enter  into  this  discussion  of  facts.  I  grant 
that  entire  peoples  have  never  thought  of  the  supreme  sub- 
stance, nor  of  the  nature  of  the  soul.  And  I  remember,  that 
when  you  wished  at  my  reqiiest,  countenanced  by  the  illus- 
trious Mr.  Witsen,  to  obtain  forme  in  Holland  a  translation  of 
the  Lord's  Prayer  into  the  language  of  Barantola,  you  were 
stopped  at  this  point :  halloived  he  thy  name,  because  you 
could  not  make  the  Barantoli  understand  what  halloived 
meant.  I  remember  also  that  in  the.  creed  made  for  the  Hot- 
tentots you  were  obliged  to  express  Holy  Spirit  by  words  of 
the  country  Avhicli  signify  a  pleasant  and  agreeable  wind.^ 
This  was  not  unreasonable,  for  our  Greek  and  Latin  words 
Ti-rev/xa,  anima,  spiritus,  mean  ordinarily  only  the  air  or  wind 
we  breathe,  as  one  of  the  most  subtile  things  which  we  know 
through  the  senses ;  and  we  begin  through  the  senses  to  lead 
meu  little  by  little  to  what  is  beyond  the  senses.  All  this  diffi-" 
eulty,  however,  which  you  find  in  attaining  abstract  knowledge 
effects  nothing  against  innate  knowledge.  There  are  peoples 
who  have  no  word  corresponding  to  the  word  being ;  does  any 
one  doubt  their  knowledge  of  what  being  is,  although  they 
sf'ldom  think  of  it  in  the  abstract  ?  Besides  I  find  what  I 
have  read  in  our  excellent  author  on  the  idea  of  God  (Essay  on 
Luiderstanding,  Book  I.,  chap.  3,^  §  9)  so  beautiful  and  so  to 
my  liking  that  I  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  it.^  Here  it  is  : 
"  Men  can  scarcely  avoid  having  some  kind  of  idea  of  things 
of  which  those  with  whom  they  converse  often  have  occasion 
to  speak  under  certain  names,  and'  if  the  thing  is  one  which 
earries  Avith  it  the  idea  of  excellence,  of  grandeur,  or  of  some 
extraordinary  quality  which  interests  in  some  point  and  which 
impresses  itself  upon  -the  mind  under  the  idea  of  an  absolute 
and  irresistible  power  which  none  can  help  fearing  "  (I  add : 
and  under  the  idea  of  a  superlatively  great  goodness  which 
none  can  help  loving),  "such  an  idea  ought,  according  to  all 

1  ([f.  Bciok  III.,  cliap.  1,  ^  V,,  Til.  (2).  — Tr. 

2  Cliiip.  4,  ill  Locke's  treatise,  Kolin's  ed.  —  Tii. 

3  The  Frencli  ti'aiislatinii  of  T^ncke's  orij^inal,  is,  in  my  jiuljiineiit,  elearev  in 
r<ir!ii  of  statement  and  style  tliaii  Locke  liimself.  ?Ieiice  I  have  ri'translated  the 
I'rench  into  Ennlish.  If  any  n^ader  prefers  Locke's  orii^inal,  lie  can  easily  find 
it  iu  the  Philoa.  Work)^,  Bolin's  ed.,  Vol.  1,  p.  188.  — Tii. 


104  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  i 

appearances,  to  make  the  strongest  impression  and  to  spread 
I'arther  than  any  othei",  especially  if  it  is  an  idea  which  accords 
Avith  the  simplest  insight  of  reason,  and  which  flows  naturally 
from  every  part  of  knowledge.  Now  such  is  the  idea  of  God, 
for  the  brilliant  marks  of  extraordinary  wisdom  and  power 
appear  so  plainly  in  all  the  works  of  the  creation,  that  every 
rational  creature  who  will  reflect  thereupon  cannot  fail  to  dis- 
cover the  author  of  all  these  marvels ;  and  the  impression  that 
the  discovery  of  such  a  Being  must  naturally  make  upon  the 
souls  of  all  those  who  have  once  heard  him  spoken  of  is  so  great, 
and  carries  with  it  thoughts  of  so  great  weight  and  so  adapted 
to  spread  themselves  in  the  world,  that  it  appears  to  me  Avholly 
strange  that  an  entire  nation  of  men  can  be  found  upon  the 
earth  so  stupid  as  to  have  no  idea  of  God.  This,  I  say,  seems 
to  me  as  surprising  as  to  think  of  men  who  should  have  no 
idea  of  numbers  or  of  fire." 

I  would  I  might  always  be  allowed  to  copy  word  for  word  a 
number  of  other  excellent  passages  of  our  author,  which  we  are 
obliged  to  pass  by.  I  will  only  say  here,  that  this  author,  in 
speaking  of  the  simplest  lights  of  reason,  which  agree  with  the 
idea  of  God,  and  of  that  which  naturally  proceeds  from  it,  ap- 
pears to  differ  but  little  from  my  view  of  innate  truths ;  and, 
concerning  this,  that  it  appears  to  him  as  strange  that  there 
may  be  men  without  any  idea  of  God,  as  it  would  be  surprising 
to  find  men  who  had  no  idea  of  numbers  or  of  fire,  I  will  remark 
that  the  inhabitants  of  the  Marian  Islands,  to  which  has  been 
given  the  name  of  the  Queen  of  Spain,  who  has  protected  mis- 
sions there,  had  no  knowledge  of  fire  when  they  were  dis- 
covered, as  appears  from  the  narrative  which  Rev.  Father 
Gobien,^  a  French  Jesuit,  charged  with  the  care  of  distant 
missions,  has  given  to  the  public  and  sent  to  me.] 

§  16.  Ph.  If  you  are  right  in  concluding  that  the  idea  of 
God  is  innate,  from  the  fact  that  all  enlightened  races  have 
had  this  idea,  virtue  ought  also  to  be  innate  because  enlightened 
races  have  always  had  a  true  idea  of  it. 

Th.  [Not  virtue,  but  the  idea  of  virtue,  is  innate,  and  per- 
haps you  intend  only  that.] 

1  Charles  le  Gobien,  105.3-1708.  Professor  of  Philosophy  at  Tours;  secre- 
tai-y  and  procnrator  of  Chinese  missionaries;  wrote  and  published  a  number 
of  works  on  these  missions  in  China;  his  Histoire  des  Isles  Mariannes,  Paris, 
1700,  12mo.  —  Tr. 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  105 

Ph.  It  is  as  certain  that  there  is  a  God,  as  it  is  certain  that 
the  opposite  angles  made  by  the  intersection  of  two  straight 
lines  are  equal.  And  there  has  never  been  a  rational  Qreature 
who  applied  himself  sincerely  to  the  examination  of  the  truth 
of  these  two  propositions  who  has  failed  to  give  them  his  con- 
sent. Nevertheless,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  there  are  many 
men  who,  having  never  turned  their  thoughts  in  this  direction, 
are  ignorant  equally  of  these  two  truths. 

Th.  [I  admit  it ;  but  that  does  not  prevent  them  from  being 
innate  —  that  is  to  say,  does  not  prevent  you  from  being  able 
to  find  them  in  yourself.] 

§  18.  Ph.  It  would  be  more  advantageous  to  have  an  innate 
idea  of  substance ;  but  it  turns  out  that  we  do  not  have  it, 
either  innate  or  acquired,  since  we  have  it  neither  through 
sensation  nor  reflection. 

Th.  [I  am  of  opinion  that  reflection  suffices  to  discover 
the  idea  of  substance  within  ourselves,  who  are  substances. 
And  this  notion  is  one  of  the  most  important.  But  we  shall 
speak  of  it,  perhaps  more  fully,  in  the  sequel  of  our  con- 
ference.] 

§  20.^  Ph.  If  there  are  innate  ideas  in  the  mind  without  the 
mind's  being  actually  aware  of  their  presence,  they  must  at 
least  be  in  the  memory,  whence  they  must  be  drawn  by  means 
of  reminiscence  —  that  is  to  say,  be  known,  when  memory  re- 
calls them,  as  so  many  perceptions  which  have  been  in  the 
mind  before,  unless  reminiscence  can  subsist  without  reminis- 
cence. For  this  conviction,  where  it  is  an  inwardly  certain 
one,  that  a  given  idea  has  previously  been  in  our  mind,  is 
properly  what  distinguishes  reminiscence  from  every  other 
kind  of  flunking. 

Th.  [In  order  that  knowledge,  ideas,  or  truths  be  in  our 
mind,  it  is  not  necessary  that  we  have  ever  actually  thought  of 
them  ;  they  are  only  natural  habitudes ;  i.e.  dispositions  and 
aptitudes,  active  and  passive,  and  more  than  a  tabula  rasa. 
It  is  true,  however,  that  the  Platonists  believed  that  we  have 
already  actually  thought  of  that  which  we  recognize  in  our- 
selves ;  and  to  refute  them  it  is  insufficient  to  say  that  we  do 
not  at  all  remember  it,  for  it  is  certain  that  an  infinite  number 

^  Gcrliardt's  reading.  So  also  Locke,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  197,  Bohn's 
ed.  — Tr. 


lOG  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [i;k.  i 

of  thoughts  recur  to  us  which  we  have  forgotten  that  we 
had.  It  has  happened  that  a  man  believed  he  had  composed  a 
new  verse,  whicli  it  turned  out  he  read  word  for  word  a  long 
time  previous  in  some  ancient  poet.  And  often  we  have  an 
extraordinary  facility  of  conceiving  certain  things,  because  we 
formerly  conceived  them,  without  remembering  them.  It  is 
possible  that  a  child,  having  become  blind,  forgets  ever  having 
seen  light  and  colors,  as  happened  at  the  age  of  two  and  a  half 
years  from  small-pox  in  the  case  of  tlie  celebrated  Ulric  Schoen- 
berg,  a  native  of  Weide,  in  the  Upper  Palatinate,  who  died  at 
Konigsberg,  in  Prussia,  in  1649,  where  he  taught  philosophy 
and  mathematics  to  the  admiration  of  every  one.  It  may  be 
that  such  a  man  has  remaining  effects  of  former  impressions 
without  remembering  them.  I  believe  that  dreams  often  thus 
revive  in  us  former  thoughts.  Julius  Scaliger,'  having  cele- 
brated in  verse  the  illustrious  men  of  Verona,  a  certain  self- 
styled  Brugnolus,  a  Bavarian  by  birth,  but  afterward  estab- 
lished at  Verona,  appeared  to  him  in  a  dream  and  complained 
that  he  had  been  forgotten.  Julius  Scaliger,  not  remembering 
to  have  heard  him  spoken  of  before,  did  not  allow  himself  to 
make  elegiac  verses  in  his  honor  in  consequence  of  this  dream. 
At  length,  the  son,  Joseph  Scaliger,^  travelling  in  Italy,  learned 
more  particularly  that  there  had  been  formerly  at  Verona  a 
celebrated  grammarian  or  learned  critic  of  this  name,  who  had 
contributed  to  the  re-establishment  of  polite  literature  in  Italy. 
This  story  is  found  in  the  poems  of  Scaliger  the  father,  to- 
gether with  the  elegy,  and  in  the  letters  of  the  son.  It  is 
related  also  in  the  "  Scaligerana,"  ^  which  are  culled  from  the 

1  .Julius  CiEsai-  Scaliger,  14S4-155S.  His  Latin  verse  appeared  in  successive 
volumes  in  1533,  1534,  1539,  1546,  1574.  His  tastes  were,  however,  philosophi- 
cal and  scientific  rather  than  literary.  His  scientific  works,  in  the  form  of 
commentaries,  have  only  a  historical  interest.  The  Exotericarum  exerciiatio- 
num  lihi'r,  Paris,  1557,  4to,  a  philosophical  treatise  on  the  De  Siihtilitate,  1552, 
of  Cardan  {vid.  ante,  p.  67,  note  1),  is  the  work  which  best  makes  known 
Scaliger  as  a  philosopher.  It  was  a  popular  text-book  until  the  final  fall  of 
Aristotle's  physics.  — Tr. 

2  Joseph  Justus  Scalioer,  1540-1609,  reputed  the  greatest  scholar  of  modern 
times.  He  was  the  first  to  set  forth  and  apply  sound  principles  of  textual 
criticism  and  emendation  in  his  editions  of  some  of  the  classical  authors,  and 
with  him  arose  a  new  school  of  historical  criticism.  He  reconstructed  the  lost 
Chronicle  of  Eusebius,  a  work  of  considerable  importance  in  the  study  of 
ancient  history. — Tr. 

3  Two  collections  of  anecdotes  concerning  Joseph  Scaliger,  numbered  accord- 


,  ir.  in]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  107 

conversations  of  Joseph  Scaliger.  It  is  very  likely  that  Julins 
Sealiger  had  known  something  of  Brugnol  which  he  no  longer 
remembered,  and  that  the  dream  was  partly  the  revival  of  a 
former  idea,  although  he  may  not  have  had  that  reminiscence, 
properly  so  called,  which  makes  us  know  that  we  have  already 
had  this  same  idea ;  at  least,  I  see  no  necessity  which  obliges 
us  to  assert  that  there  remains  no  trace  of  a  perception  when 
there  is  not  enough  of  it  to  remind  us  that  we  have  had  it.] 

§  24.  Ph.  [I  must  admit  that  your  reply  is  natural  enough 
to  the  difficulties  Avhich  we  have  framed  against  innate  truths. 
I'erhaps,  also,  our  authors  do  not  contest  them  in  the  sense  in 
which  you  maintain  them.  Thus  I  return  only  to  say  to  you,  sir] 
that  we  have  had  some  reason  to  fear  that  the  view  of  innate 
truths  serves  as  a  pretext  for  laziness,  for  exempting  ourselves 
from  the  trouble  of  research,  and  gives  opportunity  to  masters 
and  teachers  to  lay  down  as  a  principle  of  p?v'?;c/^)?c.s  that 
]»rinciples  must  not  be  questioned. 

Th.  [I  have  already  said  that  if  it  is  the  aim  of  your  friends 
to  advise  the  search  for  the  proofs  of  the  truths  which 
tliey  can  receive,  without  distinguishing  whether  or  not  they 
are  innate,  we  are  entirely  agreed ;  and  the  view  of  innate 
truths,  of  the  manner  in  which  I  take  them,  should  deter  no  one 
from  such  search,  for,  besides  being  well  to  seek  the  reason  of 
the  i)istincts,  it  is  one  of  my  great  maxims  that  it  is  good  to 
seek  demonstrations  of  the  axioms  also,  and  I  remember  that 
at  Paris,  when  the  late  Mr.  Koberval,'  already  an  old  man,  was 

ini,'  to  their  date  of  composition.  The  first  was  written  in  Latin  l)y  Franrois 
\'i  rtunien,  a  friend  of  Sealiger,  who  took  notes  of  iiis  conversations  with 
Scaliiicr,  especially  of  all  criticisms  or  anecdotes  worthy  of  preservation,  and 
iiltrrwards  wrote  them  out.  An  advocate,  Fran(,>ois  de  Sigogne,  l)ought  tiie 
MS.  long  after  the  author's  death,  and  i)ulilished  it  at  Haunier  in  l<!(i9.  The 
second  was  written  in  French  and  Latin  by  two  youths  named  Vassan,  who, 
when  students  at  Leyden,  habitually  conversed  after  supper  with  Sealiger,  then 
I'rofessor  of  Belles  Lettres  there,  and  on  their  return  to  their  rooms  wrote  out 
:ill  tliey  could  remember  of  his  conversation.  Their  MS.  was  finally  published 
:ii  La  Haye,  lOGG,  by  Isaac  Vossius.  The  edition  of  the  Sralif/ci-aua,  accounted 
the  best,  is  that  of  1740,  12mo.  The  story  is  told  at  length,  and  the  Elegy  of 
the  elder  Sealiger  cited,  in  the  Cologne  ed.  of  the  Sadiqerana,  1095,  pp.  69- 
7L  — Tr. 

'  Gilles  Persoinie  dc^  Roberval,  a  French  geometer,  born  1()02,  at  Robcrval,  a 
small  village  of  Beauvais.died  1075  at  Paris.  He  was  Proff^ssor  of  Mathematics 
in  the  Royal  College  of  France  for  many  years.  One;  of  tiie  conditions  of  the 
liMHirc  of  this  chair  was  that  its  holder  should  propose  niathcjuntical  (picstions 
for  solulion,  and  resign  in  favor  of  any  one  solving  thcni  better  than  liiinsclf. 


108  LEIIJNITZ'8   CUITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i 

laughed  at  because  he  wished  to  demonstrate  those  of  Euclid 
after  the  example  of  A[)ollonius  '  and  Proclus,- 1  illustrated  the 
utility  of  this  investigation.  As  for  the  principle  of  those 
who  say  that  it  is  wholly  unnecessary  to  argue  against  the  one 
who  denies  principles,  it  has  no  authority  whatever  in  regard  to 
these  principles  which  can  admit  neither  doubt  uor  proof.  It 
is  true  that,  in  order  to  avoid  scandal  and  disturbance,  regula- 
tions may  be  made  regarding  public  disputations  and  some 
other  lectures,  in  virtue  of  which  the  discussion  of  certain 
established  truths  may  be  prolaibited.  But  this  is  rather  a 
question  of  police  than  of  philosophy.] 

Roberval  kept  the  chair  till  his  death.  He  is  best  known  for  his  original 
method  for  the  construction  of  tangents.  —  Tr. 

1  Apollonius  of  Perga,  born  probably  about  250  B.C.,  died  in  the  reign  of 
Ptolemy  Philopater,  222-205  B.C.  Next  to  Archimedes,  he  was  the  most  noted 
of  the  Greek  geometers.  His  fame  has  been  transmitted  to  modern  times 
chiefly  by  his  treatise  on  the  Conic  Sections,  the  best  edition  of  which,  and  the 
only  one  containing  tlie  Greek  text  that  has  yet  appeared,  is  :  Apollonii 
perr/aei  (■onicorum  lihri  oclo,  etc.,  ed.  Halley :  O.xford,  1710,  folio.  He  was  the 
first  to  show  that  all  three  of  the  conic  sections  can  be  cut  from  tlie  same  cone 
by  changing  the  position  of  the  intersecting  plane.  —  Te. 

2  Proclus  Diadochus,  410^85,  "  the  great  schoolman  of  Neo-Platonism,"  the 
doctrines  of  which  received  at  his  hands  the  final  form  in  which  they  have 
come  down  to  us.  He  came  to  Athens  in  his  twentieth  year,  and  remained 
there  teaching  and  writing  till  his  death.  Among  his  writings  now  extant  are 
a  Treatise  on  the  Sphere,  Commentaries  on  Euclid,  and  on  several  of  Plato's 
dialogues,  and  the  wholly  independent  works  ^Toixe'wt^i?  eeoAoyiKj,  or  Institutes 
of  Theolof/y,  and  the  six  books  ^'5  Tr)v  OAaxwio?  ©eoAoyiar,  or  Platonic  Theolor/ff. 
His  philosophical  work  is  found  for  the  most  part  in  the  Commentaries  on  Plato. 
For  his  mathematical  work,  cf.  In  primum  EurUdis  Elementorum  lihrum 
Commentarii,  e.K  recognitione  G.  Friedlein  :  Lipsiae,  1873 ;  also  George  Johnston 
Allman,  Groek  Geometry  from  Thales  to  Euclid,  Dublin:  University  Press, 
18S9;  and  in  "  Hermathena,"  a  series  of  papers  on  literature,  science,  and  phi- 
losophy, liy  members  of  Trinity  College,  Dublin,  Nos.  5,  7,  lO-lo,  Dublin:  187S, 
1881,  1884-1887.  For  his  philosophy,  c/'-  Zeller,  Die  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  3d  ed., 
1881,  Vol.3,  pp.774  sq.,  and  Outlines,^  101;  Hegel,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  2d  ed., 
Vol.  3,  pp.  61-79;  Alfred  William  Benn,  The  Greek  Philosophers,  Vol.2,  pp. 
358-360,  London:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  &  Co.,  1882.  The  Philosophical  and 
Mathematical  Cotnmentaries  on.  the  First  Bonk  of  Euclid's  Elements,  etc., 
were  translated  by  Thomas  Taylor,  London,  1792,  2  vols,  iu  1,  4to.  —  Tr. 


NEW  ESSAYS  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING 


Book  II.  —  Ideas 
CHAPTEE  I 

WHICH    TREATS    OF    IDEAS    IN"  GENERAL,  AND  EXAMINES  BY  THE 
WAY    WHETHER    THE    MIND    OF    MAN    ALWAYS    THINKS 

§  1.  Ph.  Having  examined  the  question  of  innate  ideas,  let 
us  consider  their  nature  and  their  differences.  Is  it  not  true 
that  the  idea  is  the  object  of  thought  ? 

Th.  [I  admit  it,  provided  you  add  that  it  is  an  immediate 
internal  object,  and  that  this  object  is  an  expression  of  the  na- 
ture or  the  qualities  of  things.  If  the  idea  were  the  form  of 
thought,  it  would  spring  up  and  cease  with  the  actual  thought 
to  which  it  corresponds  ;  but  being  the  object  it  may  exist  pre- 
vious to  and  after  the  thoughts.  External  sensible  objects  are 
only  mediate  because  they  cannot  act  immediately  upon  the 
soul.^  God  alone  is  the  external  immediate  object.  We  might 
say  that  the  soul  itself  is  its  own  immediate  internal  object ; 
but  it  is  this  in  so  far  as  it  contains  ideas,  or  what  corresponds 
to  tilings.  For  the  soul  is  a  little  world,^  in  which  distinct 
ideas  are  a  representation  of  God,  and  in  which  confused  ideas 
are  a  representation  of  the  universe.] 

§  2.  Ph.  We  who  suppose  that  at  the  beginning  the  soul  is  a 
tabula  rasa,  void  of  all  characters  and  without  an  idea,  ask  how 
it  comes  to  receive  ideas,  and  by  what  means  it  ac(piires  this 

1  Cf.  Book  IV.,  chaps.  9  and  11.  The  opposition  liere  set  up  botwoen  mediate 
and  ininiiMliate  knowledge  corresponds  to  Kant's  a  2)osteriun  and  a  priori 
knowledge.  — Tk. 

2  Microcosm.  — Tr. 

109 


110  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

prodigious  quantity  of  them  ?    To  that  question  the  reply  in  a 
Avord  is  :  From  experience. 

Th.  [This  fabuln  rasa,  of  which  so  much  is  said,  is  in  my 
opinion  only  a  fiction  which  nature  does  not  admit,  and  which 
is  based  only  upon  the  imperfect  notions  of  philosophers,  like 
the  vacuum,  atoms,  and  rest,  absolute  or  relative,  of  two 
parts  of  a  whole,  or  like  the  primary  matter^'  which  is  con- 
ceived as  without  form.  Uniform  things  and  those  which  con- 
tain no  variet}^  are  never  anything  but  abstractions,  like  time, 
i  space,  and  the  other  entities  of  pure  mathematics.  There  is  no 
body  whatever  whose  parts  are  at  rest,  and  there  is  no  sub- 
stance whatever  that  has  nothing  by  which "tondtstinguish  it 
from  every  other.  Human  souls  differ,  not  only  from  other 
souls,  but  also  among  themselves,  although  the  difference  is 
not  at  all  of  the  kind  called  specific.  And,  according  to  the 
proofs  which  I  believe  we  have,  every  substantial  thing,  be  it 
soul  or  body,  has  its  own  characteristic  relation  to  every  other ; 
and  the  one  must  always  differ   from   the  other  by  intrinsic 

-■  connotations.     Xot  to  mention  the  fact  that  those  who  speak 

- .  so  frequently  of  this  tabula  rasa  after  having  taken  away  the 
•  ideas  cannot  say  what  remains,  like  the  scholastic   philoso- 
phers, who   leave   nothing  in  their   primary   matter.^      You 
may  perhaps  reply  that  this  tabula  rasa  of  the  philosophers 
means  that  the  soul  has  by  nature  and  originally  only  bare  fac- 

-  ulties.  But  faculties  without  some  act,  in  a  word  the  pure 
powers  of  the  school,  are  also  only  fictions,  which  nature 
knows  not,  and  which  are  obtained  only  by  the  process  of  ab- 
straction. For  where  in  the  world  will  you  ever  find  a  faculty 
which  shuts  itself  up  in  the  power  alone  without  performing 

r  any^act?  There  is  always  a  particular  disposition  to  action, 
and  to  one  action  rather  than  to  another.  And  besides  the 
disposition  there  is  a  tendency  to  action,  of  which  tendencies 
there  is  always  an  infinity  in  each  subject  at  once ;  and  these 
y  tendencies  are  never  without  some  effect.  Experience  is  nec- 
j  essary,  I  admit,  in  order  that  the  soul  be  determined  to  such 
or  such  thoughts,  and  in  order  that  it  take  notice  of  the  ideas 

*■' which  are  in  us;  but  by  what  means  can  experience  and  the 
senses  give  ideas  ?     Has  the  soul  windows,  does  it  resemble 
tablets,  is  it  like  wax  ?     It  is  plain  that  all  who  so  regard  the 
1  Materia  Prima.  —  Te. 


CH.  i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  111 

soul,  represent  it  as  at  bottom  corporeal.  You  oppose  to  me  this 
axiom  received  by  the  philosophers,  that  there  is  nothuig  in  the 
soul  which  does  not  come  from  the  senses.  But  you  must  except 
the  soul  itself  aud  its  affections.  Nihil  est  in  intellectu,  quod 
non  fiierit  in  seiisu,  excipe  :  nisi  ipse  intellectus.  Now  the  soul 
comprises  being,  substance,  unity,  identity,  cause,  perception,  • 
reason,  and  many  other  notions  which  the  senses  cannot  give. 
This  view  sufficiently  agrees  with  your  author  of  the  Essay,  who 
seeks  the  source  of  a  good  part  of  ideas  in  the  spirit's  reflec- 
tion upon  its  own  nature. 

Ph.  [I  hope,  then,  that  you  will  agree  with  this  skilful 
author  that  all  ideas  come  through  sensation  or  through  re- 
flection, that  is  to  say,  from  observations  which  we  make  either 
upon  objects  exterior  and  sensible  or  upon  the  inner  workings 
of  our  soul. 

Th.  [In  order  to  avoid  a  discussion  upon  what  has  delayed 
us  too  long,  I  declare  to  you  in  advance,  sir,  that  when  you 
say  that  ideas  come  to  us  from  one  or  the  other  of  these  causes, 
I  understand  the  statement  to  mean  their  actual  perception, 
for  I  think  I  have  shown  that  they  are  in  us  before  they  are 
perceived  so  far  as  they  have  any  distinct  character. 

§  9.  Ph.  [In  the  next  place  let  us  inquire  when  we  must 
say  that  the  soul- begins  to  perceive  and  actually  to  think  of 
ideas.  I  well  know  that  there  is  an  opinion  which  states  that 
the  soul  always  thinks,  and  that  actual  thought  is  as  inseparable 
from  the  soul  as  actual  extension  is  from  the  body.  §  10.  But 
I  cannot  conceive  that  it  is  any  more  necessary  for  the  soul 
always  to  think  than  for  the  body  always  to  be  in  motion,  per- 
ception of  ideas  being  to  the  soul  what  movement  is  to  the 
body.  That  appears  to  me  very  reasonable  at  least,  and  I 
would  gladly  know  your  vieAv,  sir,  thereupon. 

Th.  You  have  stated  it,  sir.  Action  is  no  more  connected 
with  the  soul  than  with  the  body,  a  state  without  thought  in 
the  soul  and  an  absolute  repose  in  the  body  appearing  to  me 
equally  contrary  to  nature,  and  without  example  in  the  world. 
A  substance  once  in  action,  will  be  so  always,  for  all  the  im- 
pressions remain  and  are  merely  mingled  with  other  new  ones. 
Striking  a  body,  we  arouse  therein  or  determine  rather  an 
infinite  number  of  vortices  as  in  a  liquid,  for  at  bottom  every 
solid  has  a  degree  of  liquidity  and  every  liquid  a  degree  of 


112  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.  ii 

solidity,  and  there  are  no  means  of  ever  stopping  entirely  these 
internal  vortices.  Now  we  may  believe  that  if  the  body  is 
never  at  rest,  the  soiil,  which  corresponds  to  it,  will  never  be 
without  perception  either.] 

Ph.  But  it  is,  perhaps,  a  privilege  of  the  author  and  conserver 
of  all  things,  that  being  infinite  in  his  perfections,  he  never  slum- 
bers nor  sleeps.  This  is  not  granted  to  any  finite  being,  or  at 
least  not  to  such  a  being  as  is  the  soul  of  man. 

Th.  [It  is  certain  that  we  slumber  and  sleep,  and  that  God 
is  exempt  from  both.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  we  have  no 
perception  while  asleep.  Rather  just  the  contrary  is  found  to 
be  the  case,  if  we  consider  it  carefully.] 

Ph.  There  is  something  in  us  which  ha^  the  power  to  think ; 
[but  it  does  not  thereby  follow  that  it  is  always  in  action.] 

Th.  [Real  powers  are  never  simple  possibilities.  They  have 
always  tendency  and  action. 

Ph.  But  this  proposition  —  the  soul  always  thinks  —  is  not 
self-evident. 

Th.  I  do  not  say  it  is.  A  little  attention  and  reasoning  is 
necessary  to  discover  it ;  the  common  people  perceive  it  as  little 
as  they  do  the  pressure  of  the  air  or  the  roundness  of  the  earth.] 

Ph.  I  doubt  if  I  thought  last  night ;  this  is  a  question  of  fact, 
it  must  be  decided  by  sensible  experiences. 

Th.  [It  is  decided  as  it  is  proved,  that  there  are  imperceptible 
bodies  and  invisible  movements,  although  certain  persons  treat 
them  as  absurd.  There  are  also  numberless  perceptions  little 
noticed  which  are  not  sufficiently  distinguished  to  be  perceived 
or  remembered,  but  they  become  known  through  certain  conse- 
quences.] 

Ph.  There  was  a  certain  author  who  raised  the  objection  that 
we  maintain  that  the  soul  ceases  to  exist,  because  we  are  not 
sensible  of  its  existence  during  our  sleep.  But  this  objection 
can  arise  only  from  a  strange  prepossession,  for  we  do  not  say 
that  there  is  no  soul  in  man  because  we  are  not  sensible  of  its 
existence  during  our  sleep,  but  only  that  man  cannot  think 
without  being  aware  of  it. 

Th.  [I  have  not  read  the  book  which  contains  this  objection, 
but  it  would  not  have  been  wrong  merely  to  object  to  you  that 
it  does  not  follow  because  the  thought  is  not  perceived,  that  it 
ceases  for  that  reason ;  for  otherwise  it  could  be  said  for  the 


CH.  I]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  113 

same  reason  that  there  is  no  soul  during  the  time  in  which  it 
is  not  perceived.  And  to  refute  this  objection  it  is  necessary 
to  point  out  in  particular  the  thought  that  it  is  essential  to  it 
that  it  be  perceived.] 

§  11.  Ph.  It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  that  a  thing  can  think 
and  not  be  conscious  that  it  thinks. 

Th.  There  is,  doubtless,  the  knot  of  the  affair  and  the  diffi- 
culty which  has  embarrassed  able  men.  But  here  are  the  means 
of  extricating  ourselves  therefrom.  We  must  consider  that  we 
think  of  many  things  at  a  time,  but  we  attend  only  to  the 
thoughts  whicji_are  most  distinct,  and  the  process  cannot  go 
'oiFoTherwise,  for  il^  we  should  attend  to  all,  we  would  have  to 
thinE"attentively  of  an  infinite  numl)cr  of  things  at  tlic  same 
time,  all  of  which  we  feel  and  whicli  make  an  impression  upon 
""our  senses:  i'My^eveiTmoi^T'tTiere  remains  sometlnng  of  all 
our  past  thoughts,  and  none  can  ever  be  wholly  effaced.  Now 
when  we  sleep  without  dreaming  and  when  we  are  stunned  by 
some  blow,  fall,  symptom,  or  other  accident,  an  infinite  number 
of  minute  confused  sensations  take  form  within  us,  and  death 
itself  canprodriceTro  other  effect  upon  the  souls  of  animals, 
who  ought,  doubtless,  sooner  or  later,  to  acquire  distinct  per- 
ceptions, for  all  goes  on  in  an  orderly  way  in  nature.  I  admit, 
however,  that  in  this  state  of  confusion,  the  soul  would  be  with- 
out pleasure  and  Avithout  pain,  for  these  are  noticeable  percep- 
tions. 

§  12.  Ph.  Is  it  not  true  that  those  with  whom  Ave  have  at 
present  to  do,  \_i.e.  the  Cartesians,  who  believe  that  the  soul 
always  thinks,]  grant  life  to  all  animals,  differing  from  man, 
without  giving  them  a  soul  which  knows  and  thinks  ;  and  that 
these  same  (Cartesians)  find  no  difficulty  in  saying  that  the  soul 
can  think  independently  of  a  body  ? 

Th.  [For  myself,  I,  am  of  another  opinion,  for  although  T 
agree  with  the  Cartesians  in  their  affirmation  that  tin;  soul 
thinks  always,  I  am  not  agreed  with  them  in  the  two  other 
points.  I  believe  that  the  beasts  have  imperishable  souls  and 
that  human  and  all  other  souls  are  never  without  some  body. 
I  hold  also  that  God  alone,  as  being  an  actxcs  purus,  is  wholly 
exempt  therefrom.] 

Ph.  If  you  had  been  of  the  0]union  of  the  C!artosiaiis,  1  sliouhl 
have  inferred  therefrom,  that  tlu;  bodies  of  Castor  or  Tollux 
I 


114  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

could  be  sometimes  with,  sometimes  without  a  soul,  though 
being  always  alive,  and  the  soul  having  the  ability  also  to  be 
sometimes  in  one  body  and  sometimes  elsewhere,  we  might 
suppose  that  Castor  and  Pollux  had  only  a  single  soul,  which 
was  active  alternately  in  the  body  of  these  two  men  sleeping 
and  awake  by  turns ;  thus  it  would  be  two  persons  as  distinct 
as  Castor  and  Pollux  could  be. 

Th.  I,  in  my  turn,  will  make  you  another  supposition, 
which  appears  more  real.  Is  it  not  true  that  we  must  always 
admit  that  after  some  interval  or  some  great  change,  one  may 
fall  into  a  state  of  general  forgetfulness  ?  Sleidan  ^  (they  say), 
before  his  death,  forgot  all  he  knew ;  and  there  are  many 
other  examples  of  this  sad  event.  Suppose  that  such  a  man 
became  young  again  and  learned  all  anew,  will  he  be  another 
man  on  that  account  ?  It  is  not  then  memory  which,  properly 
speaking,  makes  the  same  man.  Kevertheless,  the  fiction  of  a 
soul  which  animates  different  bodies  in  turn,  without  concern- 
ing itself  in  one  of  these  bodies  with  that  which  happens  to  it 
in  the  other,  is  one  of  those  fictions  contrary  to  the  nature  of 
things  which  arise  from  the  imperfect  notions  of  philosophers, 
as  space  without  body  and  body  without  motion,  and  which  dis- 
appear when  one  penetrates  a  little  deeper ;  for  you  must  know 

1  John  Sleidan,  original  name  Philipsohn,  e.  150G-1556,  the  annalist  of  the 
Reformation.  He  was  secretary  for  five  years  from  153()  to  Cardinal  du  Bellay, 
minister  of  Francis  I.  of  France.  He  was  wont  to  copy  all  documents  bearing 
upon  the  Reformation  to  which  he  had  access,  and  upon  the  suggestion  of 
Bucer  to  Philip  of  Hesse,  after  some  delay  was  appointed,  with  the  consent 
of  the  heads  of  the  Sehmalkaldic  League,  historian  of  the  Reformation,  with  a 
salary  and  access  to  all  necessary  documents.  He  finislied  the  first  volume  of 
his  great  work  in  1545.  His  work  was  then  interrupted  by  a  diplomatic  mis- 
sion in  a  French  embassy  to  Henry  VIII.  of  England.  While  there  he  improved 
every  opportunity  to  collect  materials  for  his  history.  In  1551  he  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Council  of  Trent  for  Strassburg.  On  his  return  he  was  made  Pro- 
fessor of  Law  at  Strassburg,  a  position  which  enabled  him  to  devote  his  whole 
attention  to  his  great  work.  It  was  finished  for  the  press  in  1554,  and  published 
at  Strassburg  in  1555.  It  is  entitled :  Commentariorum  de  statu  relif/ioiiis  et 
rcipublicx  C'arolo  Quinto,  Csesare,  libri  XXVI.  The  ed.  of  1555  contained 
only  25  books ;  that  of  1559  the  2Gth  and  an  apology  of  Sleidan,  written  by 
himself.  The  best  edition  is  that  of  Francfort,  1785-8G,  3  vols.,  8vo.  The  work 
is  "the  most  valuable  contemporary  history  of  the  times  of  the  reformation, 
and  contains  the  largest  collection  of  important  documents."  It  is  especially 
notewortliy  for  its  accuracy,  impartiality,  and  purity  of  style.  There  are  two 
English  translations,  by  John  Daws,  1560,  and  G.  Bohum,  1680.  There  are 
also  translations  in  other  languages.  Cf.  H.  Baumgarten,  Ufher  Sleidanus 
Leben  und  Briefwechsel,  1878 ;  Sleidans  Briefwechsel,  1881.  —  Tr. 


CH.  I]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  115 

that  each  soul  preserves  all  its  preceding  impressions,  and 
cannot  divide  itself  equally  in  the  manner  just  mentioned;  the 
future  in  each  substance  is  perfectly  united  to  the  past ;  this 
is  what  constitutes  the  identity  of  the  individual.  Memory, 
furthermore,  is  not  necessary,  nor  even  always  possible,  because 
of  the  multitude  of  present  and  past  impressions  which  co-op- 
erate in  our  present  thoughts,  for  I  do  not  believe  that  there 
are  in  man  thoughts  of  which  there  is  not  some  effect  at  least 
confused  or  some  remnant  mixed  with  subsequent  thoughts.  We 
can  forget  many  things,  but  we  could  also  remember  them  long 
after  if  we  would  recall  them  as  we  ought. 
/  §  13.  Ph.  Those  who  chance  to  sleep  without  dreaming  can 
never  be  convinced  that  their  thoughts  are  active. 

Th.  [One  is  feebly  conscious  in  sleep,  even  when  it  is  dream- 
less. The  process  of  waKTngup  itself  shows  this,  and  the  easier 
you  are  awakened  the  more~you  "are  conscTous  of  what  goes  on 
without,  although  this  consciousness  is  not  always  strong  enough 
to  cause  you  to  awake.] 

§  14.  Ph.  It  appears  very  difficult  to  conceive  that  the  soul 
is  thinking  at  this  moment  in  a  sleeping  man  and  the  next  in 
one  awake,  without  remembering  its  thoughts. 

Th.  [ISTot  only  is  that  easy  to  conceive,  but  also  something 
like  it  is  observed  every  day  that  we  are  awake  ;  for  we  always 
have  objects  which  strike  our  eyes  and  ears,  and,  as  a  result, 
the  soul  is  touched  also,  without  our  taking  notice  of  it,  because 
our  attention  is  bent  upon  other  objects,  until  this  object  becomes 
strong  enough  to  draw  it  to  itself,  by  redoubling  its  action  or  by 
some  other  means ;  it  is  like  a  particular  sleep  with  reference 
to  that  object,  and  this  sleep  becomes  general  when  our  atten- 
tion ceases  to  regard  all  objects  together.  Division  of  attention, 
in  order  to  weaken  it, is  also  a  means  of  putting  yourself  to  sleep.] 

Ph.  I  learned  from  a  man,  who  in  his  youth  had  applied  him- 
self to  study  and  had  a  tolerably  felicitous  memory,  that  he 
never  had  a  dream  until  he  had  had  the  fever,  from  which  he 
had  just  recovered  at  the  time  he  spoke  Avith  me,  at  the  age  of 
twenty-five  or  twenty-six  years. 

Th.  [I  have  also  been  told  of  a  student,  more  advanced  in 
years,  who  never  had  a  dream.  But  it  is  not  upon  dreams  alone 
that  you  must  base  the  perpetuity  of  the  soul's  perception,  since 
r  have  shown  how,  even  while  asleep,  it  has  some  perception  of 
what  goes  on  without.] 


IKi  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

§  15.  Ph.  To  think  frequently  and  not  to  preserve  a  single 
moment  the  memory  of  your  thought,  is  to  think  in  a  useless 
manner. 

Til.  [All  impressions  have  their  effect,  but  all  the  effects  are 
not  always  perceptible  ;  when  I  turn  to  one  side  rather  than  to 
the  other,  it  is  very  often  through  a  series  of  minuteimpi-essions 
of  which  I  am  not  conscious,  and  which  render  one  movement 
a  littlSTSore  uncomfortable  than  the  other.  All  our  unpre- 
meditated actions  are  the  results  of  a  concurrence  of  minute 
perceptions,  and  even  our  customs  and  passions,  which  influ- 
ence so  much  our  deliberations,  come  therefrom;  for  these 
habits  grow  little  by  little,  and,  consequently,  without  the 
minute  perceptions,  we  should  not  arrive  at  these  noticeable  dis- 
positions. I  have  already  remarked  that  he  who  would  deny 
these  effects  in  the  sphere  of  morals,  would  imitate  the  poorly 
taught  class  who  deny  insensible  corpuscles  in  physics ;  and 
3'et  I  see  that  among  those  who  speak  of  liberty  are  some  who, 
taking  no  notice  of  these  unperceived  impressions,  capable  of 
inclining  the  balance,  imagine  an  entire  indifference  in  moral 
actions,  like  that  of  the  ass  of  Buridan  ^  equally  divided  between 
two  meadows.  Concerning  this  we  shall  speak  more  fully 
later.  I  admit,  however,  that  these  impressions  incline  with- 
out necessitating. 

Ph.  Perhaps  we  might  say  that  in  the  case  of  a  man  awake 
who  thinks,  his  body  counts  for  something  and  that  memory 
is  preserved  by  means  of  marks  in  the  brain,  but  w4ien  he  is 
asleep  the  soul  thinks  apart  by  itself. 

1  John  Buridan,  a  celebrated  Nominalist  of  the  14th  century,  the  date  of 
whose  birth  and  death  is  unknown.  He  studied  at  Paris  under  William  of 
Occam  (died  1.347)  and  was  for  many  years  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  Paris,  and  in  1327  its  rector.  In  philosophy  his  only  authority 
was  reason.  In  the  third  book,  first  question,  of  Iiis  Quiestiones  hi  decern  libros 
ethicorum  Aristotelis,  1489,  he  discussed  in  an  "independent  and  interesting 
manner  "  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  reaching  conclusions  similar 
to  those  of  Locke.  In  his  view  the  liberty  possessed  by  the  soul  consists  in 
"  a  certain  power  of  suspending  the  deliberative  process,  and  determining  the 
direction  of  the  intellect;  otherwise  the  will  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  view 
of  the  mind,  the  last  result  of  examination."  The  story  of  the  ass  as  an  illus- 
tration of  the  indeterminisra  of  the  will  "is  not,"  as  Sir  William  Hamilton 
says  (Reid,  8th  ed.,  Vol.  1,  p.  238,  note)  he  has  ascertained,  "  to  be  found  in 
his  writings."  On  Buridan,  cf.  Ueberweg,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  English  transla- 
tion, "Vol.  i,  pp.  4G5-4(JtJ;  Prautl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik,  Yol.i,  14-38;  Stockl,  Gesch. 
d.  Philos,  d.  Mittelalters,  Vol.  2,  1023-1028.  —  Tb. 


CH.'i]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  117 

Th.  I  am  very  far  from  saying  tliat,  since  I  believe  there 
is  always  an  exact  correspondence  between  the  body  and 
the  soul,  and  since  I  employ  the  impressions  of  the  body 
of  which  we  are  not  conscious,  whether  awake  or  ^asleep,  in 
oMerTojDiXLve  Jhat, the,  soul  has.  in  itself  similar  ones.  I 
maintain  even  that  something  goes  on  in  the  soul  which  cor- 
responds to  the  circulation  of  the  blood  and  to  all  the  internal 
movements  of  the  viscera,  of  which  we  are  never  conscious 
however,  just  as  those  who  live  near  a  water-mill  do  not  per- 
ceive the  noise  it  makes.  In  fact,  if  there  were  impressions 
in  the  body  during  sleep  o-r  waking  hours,  by  which  the  soul 
was  not  touched  or  in  any  wise  affected,  limits  would  be  given 
to  the  union  of  the  soul  and  of  the  body,  as  if  corporeal 
impressions  required  a  certain  form  and  size  in  order  for  the 
:  soul  to  perceive  them  ;  which  is  not  at  all  tenable  if  the  soul 
is  incorporeal,  for  there  is  no  relation  between  an  incorporeal 
substance  and  this  or  that  modification  of  matter.  In  a 
word,  it  is  a  great  source  of  error  to  believe  that  there  is  no 
perception  in  the  soul  besides  those  of  which  it  is  con- 
scious. 

§  IG.  Ph.  The  greater  part  of  the  dreams  which  we  remem- 
ber are  extravagant  and  incoherent.  We  should  then  say  that 
the  soul  owes  the  power  of  rational  thought  to  the  body,  or 
that  it  retains  none  of  its  rational  soliloquies. 

Th.  [The  body  responds  to  all  the  soul's  thoughts,  rational 
or  not,  and  dreams  have  also  their  marks  in  the  brain  as  well 
as  the  thoughts  of  those  who  are  awake. 

§  17.  Ph.  Since  you  are  so  sure  that  the  sovil  is  always 
actually  thinking,  I  wish  you  would-  tell  me  what  the  ideas 
are  which  are  in  the  child's  soul  before  it  is  united  to  the  body, 
ox  just  at  the  time  of  its  union,  before  it  has  received  any  idea 
by  means  of  sensation. 

Th.  It  is  easy  to  satisfy  you  by  our  principles.  The  soul's 
perceptions  correspond  always  naturally  to  the  constitution  of 
the  body,  and  whert  there  are  a  multitude  of  movements  con- 
fused and  little  distinguished  in  the  brain,  as  happens  in  the 
case  of  those  who  have  little  experience,  the  soul's  thoughts 
(following  the  order  of  the  things)  cannot  be  move  distinct.  Yet 
the  soul  is  never  dei)riv(!d  of  the  help  of  soirsiition,  because  it 
always  expresses  its  body,  and  tliis  body  is  always  impressed 


118  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

by  its  surroundings  ^  in  an  infinite  number  of  ways,  but  which 
often  give  only  a  confused  impression. 

§  18.  Ph.  Bur^here'is  still  another  question  Avhich  the 
author  of  this  Essay  asks.  I  very  much  wish  (says  he)  that 
those  who  maintain  so  confidently  that  the  soul  of  man  or 
(what  is  the  same  thing)  man  thinks  always,  would  tell  me 
how  they  know  it  ? 

Th.  [I  do  not  knoAv  but  that  more  confidence  is  necessary  to 
deny  that  anything  goes  on  in  the  soul  of  which  we  are  not 
conscious  ;  for  that  which  is  perceivable  must  be  composed  of 
parts  which  are  not  so,  nothing  can  spring  into  being  at  once, 
thought  no  more  than  motion.  In  short,  it  is  as  if  some  one 
asked  to-day  how  we  know  the  insensible  corpuscles. 

§  19.  Pli.  I  do  not  remember  that  those  who  tell  us  that 
the  soul  always  thinks  ever  say  that  man  always  thinks. 

Th.  [I  think  that  is  because  they  understand  their  state- 
ment of  the  separated  soul,  and  yet  they  voluntarily  admit  that 
man  always  thinks  during  the  union.  For  myself,  who  have 
reasons  for  holding  that  the  soul  is  never  separated  from  the 
entire  body,  I  believe  that  we  can  state  absolutely  that  man 
always  does  and  will  think.] 

Ph.  To  say  that  the  body  is  extended  without  having  parts, 
and  that  a  thing  thinks  without  being  conscious  that  it  thinks, 
are  two  assertions  which  appear  equally  unintelligible. 

Th.  [Pardon  me,  sir;  I  am  obliged  to  tell  you  that  when 
you  advance  the  statement  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  soul  of 
which  it  is  not  conscious,  you  beg  the  question  which  has  al- 
ready prevailed  in  all  our  former  discussion,  or  you  have  been 
desirous  to  use  it  to  destroy  innate  ideas  and  truths.  If  we 
agree  to  this  principle,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  we  believe 
it  contrary  to  experience  and  reason,  we  should  surrender  with- 
out reason  to  our  feeling,  which,  I  believe,  I  have  rendered 
sufficiently  intelligible.  But  besides  the  fact  that  our  oppo- 
nents, skilful  as  they  are,  have  brought  no  proof  of  that  which 
they  urge  so  often  and  so  positively,  it  is  easy  to  show  them 
the  contrary ;  i.e.  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  always  to  think 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "  frappe  paries  ambians  d'une  infinite  de  manieres,  niais 
qui  soiiveut  ne  donnent  qu'une  impression  confuse."  Erdmann  and  Jacques 
read:  "frappe  par  les  autres,  qui  renvironnent,  d'une  infinite  de  manieres, 
mais  qui  souvent  ne  font  qu'une  impression  confuse."  —  Tr. 


CH.  I]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  119 

expressly  upon  all  our  thoughts ;  otherwise,  the  spirit  would 
reflect  upon^each  reflection  to  infinity  without  ever  being  able 
to  pass  to  a  new  thoughtr^  For  example,  in  my  consciousness 
of  some  present  feeling,  I  should  always  think  that  I  think, 
and  still  think  that  I  think  of  my  thought,  and  thus  to  infinity. 
But  it  is  very  necessary  that  I  cease  reflecting  upon  all  these 
reflections,  and  that  there  be  at  length  some  thought  which  is 
1 1  allowed  to  pass  without  thinking  of  it;  otherwise,  we  should 
dwell  always  upon  the  same  thing.] 

Ph.   But  would  there  not  be  as  good  ground  for  maintaining 
that  a  man  is  always  hungry,  by  saying  that  he  can  be  hungry 
I  j  without  feeling  it  ? 

Th.  There  is  just  the  difference ;  hunger  has  particular  rea- 
sons which  do  not  always  exist.  Nevertheless,  it  is  true  also 
that  even  when  you  are  hungry  you  do  not  think  of  it  every 
moment ;  but  when  you  do  think  of  it  you  feel  it,  for  it  is  a 
very  marked  disposition ;  there  is  always  irritation  in  the 
stomach,  but  it  is  necessary  for  it  to  become  very  strong  to 
cause  hunger.  The  same  distinction  ought  always  to  be  made 
between  thoughts  in  general  and  remarkable  thoughts.  Thus, 
what  appears  to  put  a  ridiculous  construction  upon  our  opinion, 

*  serves  to  confirm  it.] 

'  §  23.  Ph.  One  can  now  ask,  when  man  begins  to  have  ideas 
in  his  thought  ?     And  it  seems  to  me  that  the  reply  must  be, 

I  when  he  has  some  sensation. 

I      Th.    [I  am  of  the  same  opinion;    but  it  is  by  a  principle  a 

I  little  peculiar,  for  I  believe  that  we  are  never  without  thoughts, 
and  also  never  without  sensation.  I  distinguish  only  between 
ideas  ^  and  thoughts ;  for  we  always  have  all  pure  or  distinct 
ideas  independently  of  the  senses  ;  but  thoughts  always  corre- 
spond to  some  sensation.] 

§  25.  But  the  mind  is  passive  only  in  the  perception  of 
simple  ideas,  which  are  the  rudiments  or  materials  of  knowl- 
edge, while  it  is  active  when  it  forms  complex  ideas. 

Th.  [How  can  it  be  that  the  mind  is  passive  merely  with 
regard  to  the  perception  of  all  simple  ideas,  since,  accord- 
ing to  your  own  admission,  there  are  simple  ideas  whose  per- 

1  Gcrhardt  roads:  "Je  distingue  seulement  entro,  Ics  idw'S  et los  ponsecs"; 
l^rdinaiin  and  Jacques  read:  "Je  distingue  seulement  entrc  sensations  et 
pense'es."  — Tk. 


120  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

ception  comes  from  reflection,  and  since  the  mind  ^  gives  itself 
thoughts  from  reflection,  for  it  is  itself  which  reflects  ? 
Whether  it  can  refuse  them  is  another  question,  and  doubtless 
it  cannot  (refuse  them)  without  some  reason,  which  turns  it 
aside  from  them,  when  there  is  some  occasion  for  it.] 

Ph.  [It  seems  that  hitherto  we  have  discussed  ex  professo. 
Now  that  we  are  going  to  come  to  the  detail  of  ideas,  I  hope 
that  we  shall  be  more  agreed,  and  that  we  shall  differ  only  in 
some  particulars.] 

Th.  [I  shall  be  delighted  to  see  able  men  adopting  the 
views  which  I  hold  to  be  true,  for  they  are  adapted  to  improve 
them  and  to  show  them  in  a  good  light.] 


CHAPTER  II 

SIMPLE    IDEAS 

§  1.  Ph.  I  hope  then  that  you  will  admit  that  there  are 
simple  and  complex  ideas  ;  thus  heat  and  softness  in  wax,  and 
cold  in  ice,  furnish  simple  ideas,  for  the  soul  has  a  uniform 
conception  of  them,  which  is  not  distinguishable  into  different 
ideas. 

Th.  [I  believe  that  we  can  affirm  that  these  sense-ideas  are 
simple  in  appearance,  because,  being  confused,  they  do  not  give 
the  mind  the  means  of  distinguishing  their  contents.  In  like 
manner  distant  things  appear  round,  because  their  angles  can- 
not be  discerned,  although  some  confused  impression  of  them 
is  received.  It  is  manifest,  for  example,  that  green  arises 
from  a  mixture  of  blue  and  yellow ;  thus  it  is  possible  to 
believe  that  the  idea  of  green  is  also  composed  of  these  two 
ideas.  And  yet  the  idea  of  green  appears  to  us  as  simple  as 
that  of  blue  or  that  of  warmth.  So  we  are  to  believe  that  the 
ideas  of  blue  and  warmth  are  not  as  simple  as  they  appear.  I 
readily  consent,  however,  to  treat  these  ideas  as  simple  ideas, 
because  at  least  our  apperception  does  not  divide  them,  but  it 

1  Gerbardt  reads  :  "  et  que  I'esprit  se  donne  "  ;  Erdmann  and  Jacques  read; 
"et  qu'au  moins  I'esprit  se  donne,"  and  since  the  mind  at  least  gives  itself. 
—  Tr. 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  121 

is  necessaiy  to  proceed  to  their  analysis  by  means  of  other 
experiences  and  by  reason,  in  proportion  as  they  can  be  ren- 
dered more  intelligible.^  And  it  is  also  seen  thereby  that 
there  are  perceptions  of  which  we  are  not  conscious,  ^ov  the 
perceptions  of  ideas  simple  in  appearance  are  composed  of  per- 
ceptTons  of  the" parts~or which  these  ideas  are  composed,  with- 
out the  mind's  being  conscious  of  them,  for  these  confused  ideas 
appear  simple  to  it.]    ~"^ 

CHAPTER  III 

!  OF    IDEAS    WHICH    COME    TO    US    BY    ONE    SENSE    ONLY 

i      Fh.    Now  we  can   arrange    simple   ideas   according  to  the 

'  means   by  which   we   perceive   them,  for  that  is  done,  1,  by 

means  of  one  sense  only;  2,  by  means  of  more  than  one  sense; 

,'!,  by  reflection,  or  4,  by  all  the  ways  ^  of  sensation  as  well  as 

by  reflection.     Thus  of  those  which  enter  by  a  single  sense 

I  which  is  particularly  adapted  to  receive  them,  light  and  colors 

I  enter  only  by  the  eyes ;  all  kinds  of  noises,  sounds,  and  tones 

\  enter  by  the  ears  ;  the  different  tastes  by  the  palate  ;  and  odors 

'  by  the  nose.     These  organs  or  nerves  carry  them  to  the  brain, 

and  if  any  one  of  these  organs  chance  to  be  disordered,  these 

si'iisations   cannot   be  admitted   by  any  artificial   gate.     The 

I  most  considerable  qualities  belonging  to  the  touch  are  cold, 

1  heat,  and  solidity.     The  others  consist  either  in  the  configura- 

( tion  of  the  sensible  parts,  as  smooth  and  rough,  or  in  their 

i  union,  as  compact,  hard,  soft,  brittle.^ 

Th.    [I  quite  agree,  sir,  with  what  you  say,  although  I  may 

ii-mark   that,   according   to   the   experiment   of  the   late   M. 

!  Aiariotte  *  upon  the  defect  of  vision  with  regard  to  the  optic 

I  1  Errlmann's  and  Jacques's  texts  of  chap.  2  end  here;  Gerhardt's  text  adds 
the  following:  "  Et  Ton  voit  encor  par  la  qu'il  y  a  dcs  perceptions  dont  on  ne 
s'apperooit  point.  Car  les  perceptions  des  idces  simples  en  ai:)parence  sont 
composocs  des  perceptions  des  parties  dont  ces  idecs  sont  coniposees,  sans  que 
I'esprit  s'en  appercoive,  car  cesidees  confuscis  Iny  ])aroiss('nt  simples."  —  Tr. 

2  Locke's  expression.     Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  227,  Bolin's  cd. — Tr. 

8  Locke  uses  these  forms,  instead  of  the  more  common  abstract  forms  end- 
ing in  -ness.     Hence  I  have  used  them  in  the  translation.  —  Tr. 

*  Edme  Mariotte,  a  celebrated  French  physicist,  born  about  1(120,  died  1(184. 
He  was  in  some  sense  the  initiator  of  experimental  physic^s  in  France.  The 
experiment  here  referred  to,  and  the  resulting  discovery  of  the  ))lind  spot  at 


10.J  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


nerve,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  membranes  receive  the  sensa- 
tion rather  than  the  nerves,  and  there  is  an  irregular  en- 
trance for  the  hearing  and  the  taste,  since  the  teeth  and  the 
vertex  assist  in  causing  any  sound  to  be  heard,  and  that  tastes 
make  themselves  known  to  some  extent  through  the  nose,  by 
reason  of  the  connection  of  these  organs.  But  all  that  makes 
no  change  in  the  foundation  of  things  as  regards  the  explica- 
tion of  ideas.  As  for  the  qualities  belonging  to  touch,  you 
can  say  that  smoothness  or  roughness,  hardness  or  softness, 
are  only  modifications  of  resistance  or  solidity.] 


CHAPTER   IV 

OF    SOLIDITY 

§  1.  Ph.  You  will  doubtless  agree  that  the  idea  of  solidity 
is  caused  by  the  resistance  w^e  find  in  a  body  to  the  en- 
trance of  another  body  into  the  place  it  occupies  until  it  has 
left  it.  That  which  thus  hinders  the  approach  of  two  bodies 
when  they  are  moved  one  toward  another  I  call  solidity.  If 
any  one  finds  it  more  to  the  purpose  to  call  it  imjjenetrability,  I 
give  my  consent.  But  I  believe  that  the  term  solidity  bears 
a  more  positive  character.  This  idea  seems  most  intimately 
connected  with  and  essential  to  body,  and  can  be  found  only 
in  matter. 

TJi.  It  is  true  that  we  find  resistance  in  touch,  when  another 
body  reluctantl}-  gives  place  to  our  own,  and  it  is  also  true 
that  bodies  dislike  to  occupy  the  same  place.  IManj^,  how- 
ever, doubt  whether  this  repugnance  is  invincible,  and  it  is  well 
also  to  consider  that  the  resistance  which  is  found  in  matter  is 
derived  in  more  than  one  way  and  by  means  of  reasons  quite 
different.  A  body  resists  another  either  when  it  must  leave 
the  place  which  it  has  already  occupied,  or  w^hen  it  fails  to 
enter  the  place  into  which  it  was  ready  to  enter,  because  the 
other  tries  to  enter  also,  in  which  case  it  may  happen  that,  the 
one  not  yielding  to  the  other,  they  stop  or  mutually  repel  each 

the  entrance  of  the  optic  nerve,  was  made  in  1G68.  An  account  of  it  is  given 
in  a  short  paper  in  the  second  volume  of  his  collected  works.  CEuvres  de 
Mariotte,  2  vols.,  Leyden:  1717,  4to.  — Tr. 


HI.   IV]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  123 

other.  The  resistance  is  seen  in  the' change  of  that  (body)  to 
which  resistance  is  offered,  whether  it  loses  its  force,  changes 
its  direction,  or  both  happen  at  once.  Now  you  can  say  in 
general  that  this  resistance  arises  from  the  repugnance  which 
two  bodies  have  to  occupy  the  same  phice,  which  may  l)e 
called  impenetrability.  Thus  when  one  body  makes  an  effort 
to  enter,  it  at  the  same  time  forces  the  other  to  attempt  to 
leave  or  to  prevent  its  entrance.  But  tliat  kind  of  incompati- 
bility which  makes  one  or  the  other,  or  both  together,  yield, 
being  once  assumed,  there  are  several  reasons  besides  the  one 
named  which  make  one  body  resist  another  which  endeavors 
to  compel  its  departure.  They  are  either  in  it  or  in  the  neigh- 
boring bodies.  There  are  two  which  are  in  itself ;  one  is  pas- 
sive and  constant,  the  other  active  and  variable.  The  first  is 
what  I  call  inertia,^  after  Kepler^  and  Descartes,  which  impels 
matter  to  resist  motion,  and  which  it  is  necessary  to  destroy 
by  force  in  order  to  move  a  body,  suf)posing  that  there  were 
neither  gravity  nor  adhesion.  Thus  a  body  which  undertakes 
to  drive  forward  another,  experiences  for  that  reason  this  re- 
sistance. The  other  cause,  which  is  active  and  variable,  con- 
sists in  the  impetuosity  of  the  body  itself,  which  does  not 
yield  without  resistance  at  the  moment  its  own  impetuosity 
carries  it  into  a  place.  The  same  reasons  reappear  in  the 
neighboring  bodies  when  the  body  which  resists  is  unable  to 
yield  without  causing  the  others  to  yield  also.  But  then  a 
new  consideration  comes  in  —  viz.:  compactness  (fermete)  or 
the  adhesion  of  one  body  to  another.  This  adhesion^  makes 
it  impossible  to  move  one  body  without  at  the  same  time  mov- 
ing the  other  to  which  it  adheres,  and  this  causes  a  kind  of 
traction  in  reference  to  this  other.  This  adhesion  so  acts  that, 
even  should  we  put  aside  inertia  and  manifest  impetuosity, 
there  would  be  resistance  ;  for  if  space  is  conceived  as  filled 
with  matter  perfectly  fluid,  and  if  a  single  hard  body  were 
placed  within  it,  this  hard  body  (supposing  there  were  in  the 
fluid  neither  inertia  nor  impetuosity)  will  be  moved  therein 
without  finding  any  resistance;  but  if  space  were  full  of  little 

1  Gerhardt  reads  "  incertie  " ;  evideiitly  au  error.  —  Tr. 

2  John  Kepler,  loTl-KI.SO,  one  of  the  creators  of  modern  astronomy.  His 
complete  works  were  edited  hy  Dr.  Cii.  Friscli,  Joannis  Kepleri  opera  omnia, 
8  vols.,  Franldort:  1858-1871.  -Tr. 

8  Erdmann  and  Jacques  add  "  souvent,"  often.  —  Tr. 


1_.|  LKIBM'PZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [ijk.  ii 


cubos,  the  resistance  vvliicli  the  hard  body  would  find,  should 
it  be  moved  among  the  cubes,  would  come  from  the  fact  that 
the  little  hard  cubes,  on  account  of  their  hardness  or  because 
of  the  adhesion  of  their  parts  one  to  another,  would  with  diffi- 
culty be  separated  as  much  as  would  be  necessary  to  make  a 
circle  of  movement,  and  to  fill  up  the  place  of  the  body  moved 
at  the  moment  it  departs.  But  if  two  bodies  should  enter  at 
the  same  time  by  the  two  ends  into  a  tube  open  on  both  sides, 
and  should  fill  it  to  its  capacity,  the  matter  in  this  tube,  how- 
ever fluid  it  be,  would  resist  by  its  impenetrability  alone. 
Thus,  in  the  resistance  of  which  we  are  here  treating,  we  have 
to  consider  the  impenetrability  of  bodies,  inertia,  impetuosity, 
and  adhesion.  It  is  true  that,  in  my  opinion,  this  adhesion  of 
bodies  arises  from  a  more  subtile  motion  of  one  body  toward 
another;  but,  as  this  is  a  point  which  may  be  disputed,  it  must 
not  be  assumed  at  first.  And  for  the  same  reason  we  must 
only  assume  at  first  an  original,  essential  solidity,  which  makes 
the  place  always  equal  to  the  body,  that  is  to  say  that  the  iu- 
coiupatibility,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  the  non-consistence  ^ 
of  bodies  in  the  same  place  is  a  perfect  impenetrability  which 
receives  neither  more  nor  less,  since  many  maintain  that  sensi- 
ble solidity  can  arise  from  a  repugnance  on  the  part  of  bodies 
to  be  found  in  the  same  place,  but  which  will  not  prove  to  be 
an  invincible  repugnance.  For  all  the  ordinary  Peripatetics 
and  many  others  believe  that  the  same  matter  can  fill  more  or 
less  space,  which  phenomenon  they  call  rarefaction  or  conden- 
sation, not  in  appearance  only  (as  when  water  is  squeezed  from 
a  sponge),  but  rigorously,  like  the  scholastic  conception  of  the 
air.  I  am  not  of  this  opinion  ;  but  I  do  not  think  that  I  ought 
at  first  to  assume  the  opposite  opinion,  the  senses,  apart  from 
the  reasoning  faculty,  not  sufficing  to  establish  this  perfect  im- 
penetrability, which  I  hold  to  be  true  in  the  order  of  nature, 
but  which  is  not  learned  by  sensation  alone.  And  some  one 
may  claim  that  the  resistance  of  bodies  to  compression  arises 
from  an  effort  of  the  parts  to  spread  themselves  when  they 
have  not  their  entire  liberty.  For  the  rest  the  eyes  aid 
greatly  in  proving  these  qualities,  coming  to  the  assistance  of 

1  Leibnitz's  word  is  "  rinconsistence,"  and,  as  it  is  apparently  technieal,  I 
have  decided  to  transfer  it,  merely  changing  the  form  of  the  negative  in-  to 
non-  to  avoid  ambiguity.  —  Tr. 


cii.  IV]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  125 

touch.  And  at  bottom  solidity,  so  long  as  it  presents  a  dis- 
tinct idea,  is  conceived  by  pure  reason,  although  the  senses 
furnish  the  reasoning  faculty  with  the  proof  that  it  is  in 
nature. 

§  4.  Ph.  We  are  at  least  agreed  that  the  solidity  of  a  body 
carries  with  it  the  filling  of  the  space  it  occupies  in  such  a 
way  as  absolutely  to  exclude  every  other  body  [if  a  space  can 
be  found  in  which  there  was  none  before],  while  hardness  [or 
the  consistence  rather  which  some  call  compactness  (fer- 
mefe)^,  is  a  strong  union  of  certain  parts  of  matter,  which 
make  up  masses  of  a  sensible  size,  so  that  the  whole  mass  does 
not  easily  change  its  form. 

Th.  [This  consistence,  as  I  have  already  remarked,  is  pre- 
cisely what  makes  it  diificult  to  move  one  part  of  a  body  with- 
out the  other,  so  that  when  one  part  is  pushed,  the  other, 
which  is  not  pushed,  and  which  does  not  fall  within  the  line 
of  tendency,  is  nevertheless  induced  to  go  from  that  side  by  a 
kind  of  traction;  and,  further,  if  this  last  part  finds  any  obsta- 
cle which  holds  or  pushes  it  back,  it  draws  it  along,  or  holds 
back,  also,  the  first  part ;  and  this  action  is  always  reciprocal. 
The  same  thing  sometimes  happens  in  the  case  of  two  bodies 
which  do  not  touch  and  which  do  not  form  a  continuous  body 
whose  parts  are  contiguous ;  and  yet,  the  one  pushed  compels 
the  other  to  go  without  pushing  it,  so  far  as  the  senses  can 
give  us  knowledge.     Of  this  the  animant,^  electrical  attraction, 

1  See  Krauth-Fleming,  Vocab.  Philos.  Sciences,  pp.  28,  29,  aud  571,  edition 
of  1877,  New  York:  Sheldon  &  Co.,  1883.  The  animant  is  that  which  pos- 
sesses and  imparts  life.  Together  with  its  cognates  aniniallty,  animalish, 
anlmulht,  used  frequently  by  Cudworth.  See  Intell.  Syst.,  514,  "  Ut  sit 
Animans,  that  it  be  Animant,  or  endued  with  Life,  Sense,  and  Understand- 
ing." Ibid.,  198.  "But  no  Atheist  ever  acknowledged  conscious  imimality 
to  be  a  first  principle  in  the  universe ;  nor  that  the  whole  was  governed  by 
any  animalist,  sentient,  and  understanding  nature,  presiding  over  it  as  the 
head  of  it."  The  term  being  technical,  and,  with  its  cognates,  more  or  less 
current  in  the  seventeenth  century,  it  seemed  best  to  retain  it,  defining  and 
illustrating  as  above.  Its  meaning  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  evident.  It  is  to 
be  noticed,  however,  that  Erdmann,  in  his  Errores  Tirpofjntphici,  prefixed 
to  his  edition,  reads  aimcmt  instead  of  animant.  Jacques's  text  also  has 
aimctnt.  Tlie  translation  would  then  he:  The  loadstone  or  marinet ;  aud 
Schaarschmidt,  following  this  reading,  renders  it  "  der  Magnet,"  in  his  German 
translation  of  the  iVoureaux  Essais,  in  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann's  Philos.  Bibliothek, 
Berlin,  1873.  As  I  translate  on  the  basis  of  Gerhardt's  text  I  retain  his  read- 
ing and  its  translation,  with  the  note  explaining  tlie  term,  although  at  the 
present  writing  the  reading  of  Erdmann  and  Jacques  seems  more  congruous 
with  the  context,  and  so  more  likely  to  be  the  true  one.  — Tb. 


120  LKIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


and  that  which  was  formerly  ascribed  to  the  fear  of  a  vacuum, 
furnish  examples.] 

Ph.  It  seems  that,  in  general,  hard  and  soft  are  names  which 
we  give  to  things  solely  as  related  to  the  particular  constitu- 
tion of  our  bodies. 

Th.  [But  then  many  philosophers  would  not  ascribe  hard- 
ness to  their  atoms.  The  notion  of  hardness  does  not  depend 
upon  the  senses,  and  its  possibility  can  be  conceived  by  the 
reason,  although  we  are  further  convinced  by  the  senses  that 
it  is  actually  found  in  nature.  I  Should,  however,  prefer  the 
word  compactness  — fermete  (if  I  were  allowed  to  use  the  word 
in  this  sense)  —  to  that  of  hardness,  for  there  is  some  compact- 
ness even  in  soft  bodies.  I  seek  even  a  more  suitable  and 
general  term,  like  consistence  or  cohesion.  Thus  I  would 
oppose  hard  to  soft,  solid  to  fluid,  for  wax  is  soft,  but,  unless 
melted  by  heat,  it  is  not  fluid  and  preserves  its  bounds ;  and 
in  fluids  even  there  is  ordinarily  cohesion,  as  is  shown  in  drops 
of  water  and  of  mercury.  I  am  also  of  opinion  that  all  bodies 
have  some  degree  of  cohesion,  as  I  also  believe  that  there  are 
none  which  do  not  have  some  fluidity,  and  whose  cohesion  is 
not  capable  of  being  overcome ;  so  that,  in  my  opinion,  the 
atoms  of  Epicurus,-^  whose  hardness  is  supposed  to  be  invinci- 
ble, cannot  occur  any  more  than  the  subtile,  perfectly  fluid 
matter  of  the  Cartesians.  But  this  is  not  the  place  to  justify 
this  opinion  or  to  explain  the  rationale  of  cohesion. 

Ph.  The  perfect  solidity  of  bodies  seems  to  be  justified  by 
experiment.  For  example,  water  incapable  of  yielding,  passed 
through  the  pores  of  a  hollow  globe  of  gold,  in  which  it  was 
confined,  when  this  globe  was  put  under  pressure  in  Florence. 

Til.  [There  is  something  to  be  said  as  to  the  inference  which 
you  draw  from  this  experiment,  and  from  what  happened  in 
the  case  of  the  water.  The  air  as  well  as  the  water  is  a  body, 
which  is  compressible  at  least  ad  sensiun.  and  those  who  would 
maintain  a  complete  rarefaction  and  condensation  will  say  that 
water  is  already  too  compressed  to  yield  to  our  machines,  as 
air  very  much  compressed  would  resist  also  a  further  compres- 
sion. I  admit,  however,  on  the  other  hand,  that  if  any  slight 
change  should  be  noticed  in  the  volume  of  the  water,  it  might 
be  ascribed  to  the  air  which  is  enclosed  in  it.  Without  enter- 
1  Epicurus,  December,  3i2,  or  January,  341-270  b.c.  —  Tr. 


CH.  IV]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  127 

iug  now  into  the  discussion  whether  pure  water  is  not  itself 
compressible,  as  it  is  found  that  it  is  dilatable  when  it  evapo- 
rates, I  am,  nevertheless,  decidedly  of  the  opinion  of  those  who 
believe  that  bodies  are  perfectly  impenetrable,  and  that  there 
is,  save  in  appearance,  neither  condensation  nor  rarefaction. 
But  this  kind  of  experiment  is  as  little  capable  of  proving  this 
as  the  tube  of  Torricelli  ^  or  the  machine  of  Guerike  ^  are  suffi- 
cient to  prove  a  perfect  vacuum. '^ 

§  5.  Ph.  If  the  body  were  strictly  capable  of  rarefaction 
and  compression,  it  might  change  in  volume  or  extension,  but 
that  not  being  so,  it  will  be  always  equal  to  the  same  space ; 
and,  moreover,  its  extension  will  be  always  distinct  from  that 
of  space. 

Th.  [The  body  might  have  its  own  extension,  but  it  does  not 
thereby  follow  that  it  would  be  always  determinate  or  equal 
to  the  same  space.  Nevertheless,  although  it  may  be  true  that 
in  the  conception  of  body  something  besides  space  is  conceived 
of,  it  does  not  thereby  follow  that  there  are  two  extensions  — 
that  of  space  and  that  of  body ;  for  it  is  as  when  in  conceiving 
several  things  at  once,  one  conceives  something  besides  the 
number,  viz.  :  res  numeratce ;  and,  moreover,  there  are  not  two 
multitudes,  the  one  abstract  —  i.e.,  that  of  number;  the  other 
concrete  —  i.e.,  that  of  the  things  enumerated.  Likewise  one 
can  say  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  think  of  two  extensions  — 
the  one  abstract,  of  space,  the  other  concrete,  of  body,  the  con- 

1  Evangelista  Ton-icelli,  1608-164:7,  a  celebrated  Italian  physicist  and  mathe- 
matician, the  inventor  of  the  mercurial  barometer,  long  called  the  "  Torricel- 
lian tube."  He  had  a  controversy  with  Roberval  (vid.  ante,  p.  107  and  note)  as 
to  the  discovery  of  the  quadrature  of  the  cycloid.  Torricelli  found  the  area  of 
tlie  curve,  and  furnished  the  demonstration  of  it,  which  he  published  in  a  tract, 
l)e  motu  gravium  naturaliter  accelerato  in  his  Opera  geometrica,  Florence, 
1644.  — Tr. 

2  Otto  von  Guerike,  1602-1686,  a  German  physicist,  who  devoted  himself 
especially  to  experimenting  upon  the  vacuum,  and  who,  after  many  attempts, 
finally,  in  1654,  hit  upon  an  air  machine,  which  enabled  him  to  undertake 
a  series  of  experiments  upon  the  different  effects  of  vacuum.  His  labors  and 
principal  observations  have  been  published  under  the  title,  Eyperimenta  nova, 
ut  vocant,  Magdeburgica,  de  vacuo  spatio,  etc.,  Amsterdam,  1672.  —  Tr. 

3  Descartes  maintained  the  impossibility  of  a  vacuum.  Cf.  Prin.  Philos.,  XL, 
§  16;  English  translation  by  John  Veitch,  LL.D.,  The  Method,  Mcdildtioiia, 
and  Selections  from  the  Principle.'^  of  Descartes,  etc.,  8th  ed.,  p.  211,  Kdin- 
bnrgh:  William  Blackwood  &  Sons,  1881;  also  vid.  ante,  p.  16,  and  tli(i  fifth 
letter  to  Samuel  Clarke,  §  :54,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  7,  p.  ;«I6;  Erdmann,  p.  766,  b; 
translation,  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  j).  262.  —  Tk. 


128  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  n 

Crete  existing  as  such  only  through  the  abstract.  And  as 
bodies  pass  from  one  part  of  space  to  another  —  i.e.,  change 
order  aniong  themselves  —  things  also  pass  from  one  part  of 
the  order  or  of  a  number  to  the  other,  when,  for  example,  the 
first  becomes  the  second  and  the  second  the  third,  etc.  In 
fact,  time  and  space  are  only  kinds  of  order,^  and  in  these 
orders  the  vacant  place  (which  in  relation  to  space  is  called 
vacuum),  if  there  were  any,  would  show  the  possibility  only  of 
that  which  is  lacking  together  with  its  relation  to  the  actual. 

Ph.  I  am  nevertheless  very  glad  that  you  agree  with  me 
that  matter  does  not  change  in  volume.  But  you  seem  to  go 
too  fai",  sir,  in  not  recognizing  two  extensions,  and  you  re- 
semble the  Cartesians,  who  do  not  distinguish  space  from  mat- 
ter.- Now  it  seems  to  me  that  if  a  class  is  found  who,  not 
having  these  distinct  ideas  (of  space  and  of  solidity  which  fills 
it),  blends  them  and  makes  of  the  two  one  only,  we  cannot  see 
how  these  persons  can  converse  with  others.  They  are  like  a 
blind  man  who,  when  another  man  speaks  to  him  of  scarlet, 
thinks  it  resembles  the  sound  of  a  trumpet. 

Th.  [But  I  hold  at  the  same  time  that  the  ideas  of  exten- 
sion and  solidity,  like  that  of  scarlet-color,  do  not  consist  in  an 
/  knoio  not  ivhat.^     I  distinguish  extension  and  matter,  contrary 

1  Cf.  Letter  to  Des  Bosses,  June  16, 1712,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  2,  p.  450 ;  Erdmann, 
p.  682,  b:  "  Spatiura  fit  ordo  coexistentium  phfeuomenorum,  iit  tempiis  succes- 
sivorum,"  i.e.  "  Space  is  tlie  order  of  co-existing,  as  time  of  successive  plie- 
nomena";  also  the  letters  to  Clarke,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  7,  pp.  345  sq.;  Erdmaun, 
pp.  746  .s^.,  translation,  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  pp.  238  .s^.  ,•  Kant, 
Kritik  d.  r.  Vernunft,  Erst.  Th.,  Abscb.  1  und  2,  §§  2-7,  and  translations  of 
Max  Miiller,  and  Watson  in  The  Fhilosophy  of  Kant,  as  contained  in  extracts 
from  his  own  icritinr/s.    New  York:  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1888.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Descartes,  Prin.  Fhilos.  II.,  §§  8-15;  Veitch's  translation,  pp.  236-240. 
—  Tr. 

3  Leibnitz's  expression  is  "nnje  ne  say  qiioi."  Schaarschmidt  trans- 
lates it"ein  undenkbares  Etwas."  It  seems  to  be  equivalent  to  an  indef- 
inite somewhat  which  is  the  ultimate  essence  of  thinos,  and  which  is  the 
cause  of,  and  by  differentiation  becomes,  the  particular.  Leibnitz,  then, 
means  to  say  that  the  ideas  of  extension  and  solidity  are  distinct.  Cf.  John 
Dewey,  Ph.D.,  Leibniz's  Neio  Essays  concerninr/  the  Human  Understand inrj, 
a  Critical  Exposition,  p.  1.34.  As  applied  to  personal  beings,  it  seems  to  he 
equivalent  to  the  "unconscious  presentations" — i.e.  "the  dark  side  of  the 
soul-life,"  "  the  proper  basis  of  Individuality."  "  Genius,  disposition,  feeling, 
are  the  tenns  by  which  a  later  time  has  designated  what  Leibnitz  calls  the 
je  ne  sais  quoi,  whereby  eveiy  one  is  preformed  by  natui-e  to  something  par- 
ticular" ("Ganz  wie  bei  dem  blossen  Monaden  ihre  iiidividuelle  Beschaffen- 
heit  in  dem  jNIomente  der  Schranke,  der  materia  prima,  lag,  ganz  so  werden 


cii.  v]  ON   HUMAN   UNDEKSTANDING  129 

to  the  view  of  the  Cartesians.  Still  I  do  not  believe  that  there 
are  two  extensions ;  and  since  those  who  dispute  over  the  dif- 
ference between  extension  and  solidity  are  agreed  on  several 
truths  upon  this  subject  and  have  some  distinct  notions,  they 
can  find  therein  the  means  of  extricating  themselves  from  their 
disagreement;  thus  the  assumed  difference  upon  ideas  ought 
not  to  serve  as  a  pretext  for  eternal  disputes,  although  I  know 
that  certain  Cartesians,  otherwise  very  able,  are  accustomed 
to  intrench  themselves  in  the  ideas  which  they  pretend  to 
have.  But  if  they  would  avail  themselves  of  the  means  which 
I  have  before  given  for  recognizing  ideas  true  and  false,  and 
of  which  we  shall  speak  also  in  the  sequel,  they  would  retire 
from  a  position  which  is  not  tenable. 


CHAPTER  V 

OF    SIMPLE    IDEAS    WHICH    COME    BY    DIFFERENT    SENSES 

Ph.  The  ideas,  the  perception  of  which  comes  to  us  from 
more  than  one  sense,  are  those  of  space,  or  extension,  or  fig- 
ure, of  motion  and  rest. 

Th.  [The  ideas  which  are  said  to  come  from  more  than  one 
sense,  like  those  of  space,  figure,  motion,  rest,  are  rather  from 
common-sense,  that  is  to  say,  from  the  mind  itself,  for  they 
are  ideas  of  the  pure  understanding,  but  related  to  externality, 
and  which  the  senses  make  us  perceive ;  they  are  also  capable 
of  definition  and  demonstration.] 

hler  diese  unbewussteu  Vorstellungen,  d.  h.  wird  die  dunkle  Seite  des  Seelen- 
lebeiis,  als  der  eigeutliclie  Gruiid  der  Individualitiit  bestimmt.  Geuius, 
Gemiitli,  Gefiilil  sind  die  Worte,  mit  denen  eine  spiltere  Zeit  das  bezeicbiiet 
hat,  was  Leibnitz  das  je  ne  sais  qiioi  neiint,  wodureh  Jeder  von  Natur  zu 
etwas  Besouderein  priiformirt  ist."  Erdmann,  Grimdriss  d.  Gesch.  d.  Philos., 
3te  Aullage  2te  Bd.  §  288,  5,  s.  IGl.  Berlin,  1878;  English  translation,  Vol.  2, 
p.  191,  London:  Swan  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  1889).  Cf.  also  Leibnitz,  Neio 
Essays,  Preface,  vid.  ante,  pp.  47  sq..  Book  II.,  chap.  1,  §  15,  Th.,  sq.,  and 
Erdmann's  exposition  of  the  same,  op.  cit.,  s.  160, 161.  Also  Professor  Dewey's 
most  excellent  work  cited  above.  —  Tr. 

K 


180  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


CHAPTER  VI 

OF    SIMPLE    IDEAS    AVHICH    COME    BY    REFLECTION 

Ph.  The  simple  ideas  which  come  by  reflection  are  the  ideas 
of  the  understanding  and  of  the  will  [for  we  ourselves  per- 
ceive them  in  reflecting  upon  ourselves.] 

Th.  [It  is  doubtful  if  all  these  ideas  are  simple,  for  it  is 
clear,  for  example,  that  the  idea  of  the  will  includes  that  of 
the  understanding,  and  that  the  idea  of  motion  contains  that 
of  figure. 

CHAPTER   VII 

OF    IDEAS    WHICH    COME    BY    SENSATION    AND    REFLECTION 

§  1.  Ph.  There  are  some  simple  ideas  which  make  themselves 
perceived  in  the  mind  by  all  the  avenues  of  sensation  and  by 
reflection  also  —  viz.:  pleasure,  pain,  power,  existence,  unity. 

Th.  [It  seems  that  the  senses  cannot  convince  us  of  the  exist- 
ence of  sensible  things  without  the  aid  of  the  reason.  Thus  I 
should  think  that  the  idea^  of  existence  comes  from  reflection. 
That  of  power  also  and  of  unity  come  from  the  same  source, 
and  are  of  a  wholly  different  nature  from  the  perceptions  of 
pleasure  and  pain.] 

CHAPTER  VIII 

OTHER    CONSIDERATIONS    UPON    SIMPLE    IDEAS 

§  2.  Ph.  What  shall  we  say  of  ideas  of  privative  qualities? 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  ideas  of  rest,  darkness,  and  cold  are  as 
positive  as  those  of  motion,  light,  and  heat.  jSTevertheless,  in 
proposing  these  privations  as  the  causes  of  privative  ideas  I 
follow  the  common  view ;  but  in  the  main  it  will  be  difiicult 
1  The  French  is  "  la  consideration  de  I'existence."  — Tr. 


CH.  VIII]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  131 

to  determiue  whether  there  is  really  any  idea  which  arises 
from  a  privative  cause  until  it  has  been  determined  whether 
rest  any  more  than  motion  is  a  privation. 

Th.  [I  had  not  believed  that  we  could  have  reason  to  doubt 
the  privative  nature  of  rest.  It  suffices  it  that  motion  in  the 
body  be  denied,  but  it  does  not  suffice  for  motion  to  deny  rest, 
and  it  is  necessary  to  add  something  more  to  determine  the  de- 
gree of  motion,  since  it  receives  materially  more  or  less,  while 
all  rest  is  equal.  It  is  another  thing  when  we  speak  of  the 
cause  of  rest,  which  must  be  positive  in  the  secondary '  matter 
or  mass.  I  should  furthermore  regard  the  very  idea  of  rest  as 
privative  —  i.e.,  that  it  consists  only  in  negation.  It  is  true 
that  the  act  of  denial  is  positive.] 

§  9.  Ph.  The  qualities  of  things  being  the  faculties  they  have 
of  producing  in  us  perception  of  ideas,  it  is  well  to  distinguish 
these  qualities.  They  are  primary  and  secondary.  Extension, 
solidity,  figure,  number,  mobility  are  the  original  qualities 
inseparable  from  body  which  I  call  primary.     §  10.  But  I  call 

1  Leibnitz  constantly  distinguislies  between  primary  and  secondary  matter. 
Primary  matter  is  the  primitive  passive  power  belonging  to  eacli  separate 
being  as  such,  by  wliieli  it  is  distinguished  from  God  and  in  which  is  grounded 
the  possibility  of  representing  itself  as  different.  It  is  essential  to  and  insepa- 
rable from  the  entelechy,  or  principle  of  activity,  which  it  completes,  the  two 
united  jn'oducing  the  perfect  substance  or  monad.  By  itself  it  is  a  pure 
abstraction  or  potentiality,  and  not  a  substance.  It  is  equivalent  to  confused 
ideas,  thus  to  an  imperfect  manifestation  or  phenomenon  of  spirit  —  since  all 
matter  is  ultimately  spirit  or  has  its  final  reason  or  source  in  spirit  —  but  a 
potentiality  of  spirit  capable  sometime  of  realizing  perfectly  all  its  intrinsic, 
but  now  latent,  activity.  Secondary  matter  is  a  mass  resulting  from  the  union, 
of  many  monads  or  complete  substances,  each  having  its  own  jirimary  matter 
and  its  own  entelechy,  with  their  derived  forces,  activities,  receptivities.  It 
is  not,  however,  a  substance ;  and  its  extension  resulting  from  the  union  of 
non-extended  simple  substances  is  only  phenomenal,  though  not  on  that 
account  unreal,  being  due  to  our  confused  perception,  and  consisting  in  the 
impenetrability,  resistance,  or  inertia  of  the  monad  on  its  passive  side ;  an 
extension  which  will  disappear  when  the  activity  of  the  monad  becomes  pure 
and  perfect.  Cf.  Letters  to  Tolomei,  Dec.  17,  1705,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  7,  pp.  407- 
468;  Des  Bosses,  March  11,  Oct.  16,  1706,  March  16,  1709,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  2, 
pp.  304,  324,  368  ;  Erdmann,  pp.  435,  440,  456;  De  anima  hrutorvm,  1710,  G.  7, 
328;  E.  463;  Letters  to  Rud.  Christ.  Wagner,  June  4,  1710,  G.  7,  528,  E.  405; 
translation,  Duncan,  Phi.los.  Work.'i  of  Leibnitz,  p.  190  sq.;  Bierling,  Aug.  12, 
1711,  G.  7,  .500-.502,  E.  077-678  ;  Reraond,  Nov.  4,  1715,  G.  3,  656-(i(!0  ;  E.  735- 
737  ;  Feb.  11, 1715,  §  4  (reply  to  Remond's  fourth  difficulty  stated  in  his  letter  to 
Leibnitz,  Jan.  9,  1715),  G.  3,  636,  E.  725  ;  also  the  writing  dated  July,  1714,  and 
first  published  by  Gerhardt,  3,  622-(i24.  Cf.  also  Erdmann,  Gnind.  d.  Ge.srh 
Philos.,  3d  ed.,  §  288,  2,  3  ;  Dewey,  Leibnitz,  New  Essays,  chaps.  7  and  8.  —  Tr. 


132  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


secondary  (]ualities  the  faculties  or  powers  of  bodies  to  produce 
certain  sensations  in  us,  or  certain  effects  in  other  bodies,  as 
the  tire,  for  example,  produces  a  certain  effect  in  the  wax  when 
melting  it. 

Th.  [I  think  Ave  can  say  that  when  the  power  is  intelligible, 
and  can  be  distinctly  exj^lained,  it  should  be  reckoned  among 
the  2>rimari/  qualities;  but  when  it  is  only  sensible  and  gives 
only  a  confused  idea,  it  should  be  put  among  the  secondary  qual- 
ities.^ 

§  11.  Ph.  These  primary  qualities  show  how  bodies  act  upon 
one  another.  Now,  bodies  act  only  by  impulse,  at  least  so  far 
as  we  can  conceive  the  process,  for  it  is  impossible  to  under- 
stand how  bodies  can  act  upon  what  they  do  not  touch,  which 
is  equivalent  to  imagining  that  they  can  act  where  they  are 
not. 

Th.  [I  am  also  of  the  opinion  that  bodies  act  only  by  impulse. 
Yet,  there  is  some  difficulty  in  the  proof  of  what  I  have  just 
heard ;  for  attraction  sometimes  occurs  without  contact,  and  we 
can  touch  and  draw  without  any  visible  impulse,  as  I  have 
shown  above  ^  in  speaking  of  hardness.  In  the  case  of  the  atoms 
of  Epicurus,  the  one  part  pushed  would  draw  the  other  with 
it,  and  would  touch  it  in  putting  it  in  motion  without  impulse. 
And  in  the  case  of  attraction  between  contiguous  things  we 
cannot  say  that  the  one  which  draws  with  itself  acts  where  it 
is  not.  This  reason  would  militate  only  against  attractions 
from  a  distance,  as  would  be  the  case  in  reference  to  what  are 
called  vires  centrij^etce  advanced  by  some  scholars.] 

§  13.  Ph.  Now,  certain  particles,  striking  our  organs  in  a  cer- 
tain way,  cause  in  us  certain  sensations  of  colors  or  tastes  or 
other  secondary  qualities  which  have  the  power  of  producing 
these  sensations.  And  it  is  no  more  difficult  to  conceive  that 
God  can  attach  such  ideas  (as  that  of  heat)  to  motions,  with 
which  they  have  no  resemblance,  than  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
that  he  has  attached  the  idea  of  pain  to  the  motion  of  a  piece 
of  iron  which  divides  our  flesh ;  Avhich  motion  the  pain  in  no 
manner  resembles. 

Th.  [It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  ideas  like  those  of 
color  or  of  pain  are  arbitrary  and  without  relation  or  natural 
connection  with  their  causes ;  it  is  not  the  custom  of  God  to 

1  Cf.  Bk.  n.,  Chap.  4,  §  4,  Th.,  ante,  p.  125,  sq. —Tr. 


CH.  viii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  133 

act  with  so  little  oixler  and  reason.  I  should  rather  say  that 
there  is  a  kind  of  resemblance,  not  complete  and,  so  to  speak, 
m  terminis,  but  expressive,  or  a  kind  of  orderly  relation,  as  an 
ellipse,  and  even  a  parabola  or  hyperbola  resemble  in  some 
sense  the  circle  of  which  they  are  a  projection  upon  a  plane, 
since  there  is  a  certain  exact  and  natural  relation  between 
what  is  projected  and  the  projection  which  is  made,  each  point 
of  the  one  corresponding  by  a  certain  relation  to  each  point  of 
the  other.  This  the  Cartesians  do  not  sufficiently  consider, 
and  for  once  you  have  deferred  to  them  more  than  has  been 
customary  with  you,  and  without  reason  for  so  doing.] 

§  15.  Ph.  I  tell  you  what  appears  to  me,  and  the  appear- 
ances are  that  the  ideas  of  the  primary  qualities  of  bodies 
resemble  these  qualities,  but  the  ideas  produced  in  us  by  the 
secondary  qualities  resemble  them  in  no  way. 

Th.  [I  have  just  shown  how  there  is  resemblance  or  exact 
relation  in  respect  to  the  secondary  as  well  as  the  primary 
qualities.  It  is  certainly  reasonable  that  the  effect  correspond 
to  its  cause ;  and  how  assert  the  contrary,  since  you  know  dis-  )c' 
tinctly  neither  the  sensation  of  blue  (for  example)  nor  the 
motions  which  produce  it  ?  It  is  true  that  pain  does  not. . 
resemble  the  motion  of  a  pin,  but  it  may  very  well  resemble 
the  motions  which  this  pin  causes  in  our  body,  and  represent 
these  motions  in  the  soul,  as  I  have  no  doubt  it  does.  It  is 
also  for  this  reason  that  we  say  that  the  pain  is  in  our  body 
and  not  that  it  is  in  the  pin  ;  but  we  say  that  the  light  is  in  the 
fire,  because  there  are  in  the  fire  motions  which  are  not  dis- 
tinctly sensible  apart  from  it,  but  whose  confusion  or  con- 
junction becomes  sensible,  aiid  is  represented  to  us  by  the  idea 
of  light. 

§  21.  Ph.  But  if  the  relation  between  the  object  and  the 
sensation  be  natural,  how  can  it  be,  as  we  notice  in  fact,  that 
the  same  water  may  appear  warm  to  one  hand  and  cold  to  the 
other  ?  which  shows  that  the  heat  is  no  more  in  the  water 
than  the  pain  is  in  the  pin. 

Th.  [This  proves  all  the  more  that  heat  is  not  a  sensible 
quality  or  power  of  making  itself  felt  absolutely  all  at  once, 
but  that  it  is  relative  to  the  suitable  organs ;  for  a  particular 
motion  in  the  hand  may  be  mixed  with  it  and  change  its  appear- 
ance.    Light,  furthermore,   does    not  make  itself   evident  to 


134  LEIBNITZ'S   CUITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

l»;i(lly  constituted  eyes,  and  wlien  they  are  themselves  filled 
with  a  groat  light,  they  are  insensible  to  a  less.  Even  the 
primary  qualities  (according  to  our  classification) — for  ex- 
ample, unity  and  number  —  may  not  appear  as  they  should; 
for,  as  Descartes  has  already  stated,  a  globe  touched  by  the 
fingers  in  a  certain  way  appears  double,  and  mirrors  or  glasses 
!  cut  in  facets  multiply  the  object.  It  does  not  then  follow  that 
what  does  not  always  appear  the  same  is  not  a  quality  of  the 
object,  and  that  its  image  does  not  resemble  it.  And  as  for 
the  heat,  when  our  hand  is  very  warm,  the  medium  heat  of  the 
water  does  not  make  itself  felt,  and  modifies  rather  that  of 
the  hand,  and  consequently  the  water  appears  to  us  cold ;  as 
the  salt  water  of  the  Baltic  Sea  mixed  with  the  water  of  the 
Sea  of  Portugal^  would  lessen  its  specific  saline  quality, 
although  the  former  be  itself  salt.  Thus,  in  any  case,  we  can 
say  that  the  heat  belongs  to  the  water  of  a  bath,  although  it 
may  appear  cold  to  any  one,  as  honey  is  called  absolutely 
sweet,  and  silver  white,  although  the  one  appears  bitter,  the 
other  yellow  to  some  diseased  persons,  for  the  classification  is 
made  upon  the  basis  of  the  most  common  (conditions)  ;  and 
yet  it  remains  true  that,  when  the  organ  and  the  medium  are 
constituted  as  they  should  be,  the  internal  motions  and  the 
ideas  which  represent  them  to  the  soul  resemble  the  motions 
of  the  object  which  cause  color,  heat,  pain,  etc.,  or,  what  is 
here  the  same  thing,  express  it  by  means  of  a  relation  suffi- 
ciently exact,  although  this  relation  does  not  distinctly  appear 
to  us,  because  we  cannot  disentangle  this  multitude  of  small 
impressions  either  in  our  soul  or  our  body  or  in  what  is  with- 
out. 

§  24.  Ph.  We  consider  the  qualities  which  the  sun  has  of 
blanching  or  melting  wax  or  hardening  mud  only  as  simple 
powers,  without  thinking  of  anything  in  the  sun  correspond- 
ing to  this  blanching,  softness,  or  hardness  ;  but  heat  and  light 
are  commonly  regarded  as  real  qualities  of  the  sun.  Properly 
considered,  however,  these  qualities  of  light  and  heat  which  in 
me  are  perceptions  are  not  in  the  sun  in  any  other  manner 
than  the  changes  produced  in  the  wax  when  it  is  blanched  or 
melted. 

1  Obsolete  name  for  that  part  of  the  Atlantic  which  washes  the  coast  of 
Portuc'al.  — Tr. 


cii.  IX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  135 

Th.  [Some  have  pushed  this  doctrine  so  far  that  they  have 
desired  to  persuade  us  that  if  any  one  could  tovich  the  sun  he 
would  find  there  no  heat.  The  counterfeit  sun  which  makes 
itself  felt  in  the  focus  of  a  mirror  or  a  burning-glass  may  disa- 
buse people  of  this  notion.  But  as  to  the  comparison  between 
the  power  of  heating  and  that  of  melting,  I  dare  affirm  that  if 
the  melted  or  blanched  wax  had  feeling,  it  would  feel  some- 
thing similar  t6  what  we  feel  when  the  sun  warms  us,  and 
would  say,  if  it  could,  that  the  sun  is  warm,  not  because  its 
whiteness  resembles  the  sun  —  for  when  faces  are  tanned  in 
the  sun  their  brown  color  should  likewise  resemble  it  —  but 
because  there  are  in  the  wax  motions  which  are  related  to 
those  in  the  sun  which  cause  them ;  its  whiteness  may  come 
from  another  cause,  but  not  the  motions  which  it  has  had  in 
receiving  it  (whiteness)  from  the  sun.] 


CHAPTER   IX 

OF    PERCEPTION 

§  1.  Ph.  Come  we  now  to  the  ideas  of  reflection  in  particu- 
lar. Perception  is  the  first  faculty  of  the  soul  which  is  occu- 
pied with  our  ideas.  It  is  also  the  first  and  simplest  idea 
which  we  receive  by  reflection.  Thought  signifies  often  the 
mind's  working  upon  its  own  ideas,  when  it  acts  and  considers 
a  thing  with  a  certain  degree  of  voluntary  attention :  but  in 
what  we  call  perception  the  mind  is  ordinarily  purely  passive, 
not  being  able  to  avoid  perceiving  what  it  actually  perceives. 

Th.  [We  might  perhaps  add  that  the  animals  have  percep- 
tion, and  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  they  have  thought,  that 
is  to  say,  that  they  have  reflection  or  what  may  be  its  object. 
We  ourselves  also  have  minute  pt^^'f^^ptions  of  which  we  are  not 
conscious  in  our  present  state.  It  is  true  that  we  might  very 
well  perceive  them  ourselves,  and  reflect  upon  them,  if  we 
were  not  turned  aside  by  their  multitude,  which  distracts  our 
mind,  or  if  they  were  not  effaced,  or  rather  obscured,  by 
greater  ones. 

§  4.  Ph.    I  admit  that  when  the  mind  is  strongly  occupied 


130  LEIBNITZ'S   CUITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk. 


in  contemplating  certain  objects  it  does  not  perceive  in  any 
way  the  imi>ression  whieli  certain  bodies  make  upon  the  organ 
of  iiearing,  although  the  impression  may  be  quite  strong ;  but 
no  perception  arises  therefrom  if  the  soul  takes  no  cognizance 
thereof. 

Th.  [I  should  prefer  to  distinguish  between  perception  and 
consciousness  {s'appercevoir)}  The  perception  of  light  and 
color,  for  example,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  is  composed  of 
many  minute  perceptions,  of  which  we  are  not  conscious ;  and 
a  uoise  which  we  perceive,  but  of  which  we  take  no  notice, 
becomes  apperceptihle  by  a  little  addition  or  increase;  for  if 
what  precedes  make  no  impression  upon  the  soul,  this  little 
addition  would  also  make  none,  and  the  whole  would  make 
no  more.  I  have  already  touched  upon  this  point  (Ch.  II,-  of 
this  book,  §§  11,  12,  15,  etc.)]. 

§  8.  Ph.  It  is  proper  to  remark  here  that  the  ideas  which 
arise  from  sensation  are  often  altered  by  the  mental  judgment 
of  grown  persons  without  their  perceiving  the  fact.  A  flat 
circle  with  various  light  and  shade  represents  the  idea  of  a 
globe  of  uniform  color.  But,  as  we  are  accustomed  to  distin- 
guish the  images  of  bodies  and  the  changes  of  the  reflections 
of  light  according  to  the  figures  of  their  surfaces,  we  put  in  the 
place  of  what  appears  to  us  the  cause  the  image  itself,  and 
confuse  the  judgment  with  the  appearance. 

Til.  Nothing  is  truer,  and  this  it  is  which  gives  to  painting 
the  means  of  deceiving  us  by  the  artifice  of  a  very  extended 
perspective.  When  bodies  have  flat  surfaces,  they  can  be  rep- 
resented without  employing  shadows  by  giving  only  their  con- 
tours and  by  simply  making  pictures  after  the  fashion  of  the 
Chinese,   but    better   proportioned    than    theirs.      The   same 

^  Cf.  Leibnitz,  Principes.  de  la  nature  et  de  la  grace  fonde's  en  raison,  §  4. 
"  It  is  well  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  perception,  which  is  the  internal 
condition  of  the  monad  representing  external  things,  and  apperception,  which 
is  consciousness  or  the  reflective  knowledge  of  this  internal  state:  the  latter 
not  being  given  to  all  sonls,  nor  at  all  times  to  the  same  soul."  For  the 
entire  piece,  which  is  a  brief  statement  of  his  philosophical  system  prepared 
by  Leibnitz  himself,  with  the  greatest  care,  about  1714.  rf.  Gerhardt,  Vol.  fi, 
pp.  598-(i06;  Erdmann,  pp.  714-718;  translation,  Duncan.  PhiJos.  Works  of 
Leibnitz,  pp.  20t>-217,  and  note  r,fi,  p.  .387  op.  cit.  Also  Hamilton's  Reid,  8th 
ed.,  Vol.  2,  p.  877,  note,  and  Kranth-Fleming,  Vocah.  Philos.,  ed.  of  1877, 
articles  "Apperception,"  p.  .^S,  "Consciousness,"  pp.  1(B-11.3,  613,  "Percep- 
tion," pp.  .37.3-374,  807-809,  "Perceptions  (Obscure),"  pp.  374-376.— Tr. 

2  This  should  be  chap.  1,  I  think.— Tr. 


cii.  IX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  137 

custom  is  observed  in  designing  medals,  in  order  that  the 
draughtsman  may  be  less  likely  to  depart  from  the  precise 
form  of  the  antique.  But  we  cannot  distinguish  exactly  by 
means  of  the  design  the  interior  of  a  circle  from  the  interior  of 
a  spherical  surface  bounded  by  this  circle  without  the  aid  of 
shadows,  the  interior  of  each  having  neither  points  distin- 
guished nor  distinguishing  features,  although  there  is,  however, 
a  great  difference  which  ought  to  be  indicated.  Desargues  ^ 
has  accordingly  given  precepts  upon  the  force  of  tints  and 
shades.  When,  then,  a  painting  deceives  us  there  is  a  double 
error  in  our  judgments ;  for  first  we  put  the  cause  for  the  effect, 
and  think  we  see  immediately  the  cause  of  the  image,  in  which 
we  resemble  a  little  a  dog  who  barks  at  a  mirror ;  for,  properly 
speaking,  we  see  only  the  image,  and  we  are  affected  only  by- 
the  rays  of  light.  And  since  the  rays  of  light  require  time  (how- 
ever little  it  be),  it  is  possible  for  the  object  to  be  destroyed  in 
this  interval,  and  for  it  no  longer  to  exist  when  the  ray  reaches 
the  eye,  and  that  which  no  longer  exists  cannot  be  the  object 
present  to  the  sight.  In  the  second  place,  we  further  deceive 
ourselves  when  we  put  one  cause  for  another,  and  think  that 
what  comes  only  from  a  flat  picture  is  derived  from  a  body,  so 
that  in  this  case  there  is  in  our  judgments  all  at  once  a  me- 
toni/mj/  and  a  metaphor ;  for  even  the  figures  of  rhetoric  pass 
into  sophisms  when  they  impose  on  us.  This  confusion  of  the 
effect  with  the  cause,  whether  true  or  false,  often  enters  into 
our  judgments,  moreover,  upon  other  things.  Thus  we  feel 
our  bodies7  oF  "what  touches  them,  and  we  move  our  arms  by 
means  of  an  immediate  physical   influence,    which  we  think 

1  Gaspare!  Desarsjnes,  1593-16n2,  a  French  geometer  and  engineer,  a  friend 
of  Descartes,  Gassendi,  Pascal,  and  Roberval,  who  wrote  on  the  application  of 
geometry  to  the  arts  as  well  as  on  geometry  itself.  These  writings  have  been 
lost  and  their  titles  are  known  only  through  the  engraver  Bosse.  Of  his 
Methode  univer.ielle  de  mettre  en  perspective  des  objects  donnes  riellement, 
oil  en  derns,  avec  leurs  proportions,  mesxires,  eloignments,  sans  employer 
aucun  point  qui  soit  hors  du  champ  de  I'ouvraf/e,  1630  or  1636,  Descartes  thus 
speaks  in  a  letter  to  Mersenne  ("written  toward  the  end  of  April,  1637," 
according  to  Cousin,  CEuvres  de  Descartes,  Vol.  6,  pp.  250-250,  Paris:  1824- 
1S26),  "  Je  n'ai  reiju  que  depuis  pen  de  jours  le  petit  livre  in  folio,  qui  traite 
de  la  perspective:  il  n'est  pas  a  dcsapprouver,  outre  que  la  curiosite  et  la 
nettete  du  langage  de  son  anteur  sont  a  estimer,"  I  received  only  a  few 
days  ago  the  little  hook  in  folio  treating  of  perspective:  it  is  not  to  be  con- 
demned :  further  the  exactness  and  perspicuity  of  the  author's  language  are  to 
1)0  admired.  — Tr. 


i;j8  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [inc.  ii 

constitutes  the  connection  of  the  soul  with  the  body,  while  in 
truth  we  feel  and  change  in  that  way  only  what  is  in  us. 

Fh.  I  will  at  this  time  propose  to  you  a  problem  which  the 
h-'arnod  a\Ir.  j\Iolyneux/  who  employs  so  profitably  his  excel- 
k>nt  genius  in  the  promotion  of  the  sciences,  communicated  to 
the  illustrious  Mr.  Locke.  Here  it  is  nearly  in  his  own 
terms  :  Suppose  a  man  blind  from  birth,  now  grown  up,  who 
has  learned  to  distinguish  by  touch  a  cube  from  a  globe  of  the 
same  metal,  and  almost  of  the  same  size,  so  that  when  he 
touches  the  one  or  the  other  he  can  tell  which  is  the  cube  and 
which  the  globe.  Suppose  that  the  cube  and  the  globe  being 
placed  upon  the  table,  this  blind  man  comes  to  enjoy  his  sight. 
The  question  is,  if  in  seeing  them  without  touching  them  he 
could  distinguish  them,  and  tell  which  is  the  cube  and  which 
the  globe.  I  pray  you,  sir,  tell  me  what  is  your  opinion  upon 
the  matter. 

Th.  I  ought  to  give  some  time  to  thought  upon  this  ques- 
tion, which  appears  to  me  quite  curious :  but  since  you  press 
me  for  an  immediate  reply,  I  would  venture  to  say  between 
ourselves  that  I  think  that  supposing  the  blind  man  knows 
that  these  two  figures  which  he  sees  are  those  of  the  cube  and 
the  globe,  he  could  distinguish  them  and  say,  without  touch- 
ing, This  is  the  globe,  this  the  cube. 

Ph.  I  fear  lest  it  may  be  necessary  to  put  you  in  the  crowd 
of  those  who  have  failed  to  answer  Mr.  Molyneux ;  for  he  sent 
word  in  the  letter  which  contained  this  question,  that,  having 
proposed  it  upon  the  occasion  of  Mr.  Locke's  Essay  on  Under- 
standing to  different  persons  of  very  penetrating  minds,  he 
had  found  scarcely  one  among  them  who  at  once  gave  such  a 
reply  upon  that  point  as  he  thinks  should  be  made,  although 
they  were  convinced  of  their  error  after  having  heard  his 
reasons.  The  reply  of  this  penetrating  and  judicious  author 
is  negative  ;  for  (he  adds)  while  this  blind  man  has  learned 
by  experience  of  some  kind  the  globe  and  the  cube  as  they 
affect  his  touch,  he  does  not,  however,  yet  know  that  what 
affects  the  touch  in  such  or  such  manner  must  strike  the  eyes 

1  William  Molyneux,  1656-1698,  an  eminent  mathematician.  He  founded  in 
Dublin,  in  January,  1()84,  a  Pliilosopliical  Society  on  the  model  of  the  Royal 
Society  at  London.  His  principal  work,  Bioptrica  N'ova,  in  two  parts,  was 
published  at  London  in  1G92-1709,  in  4to.  — Xb. 


cii.  IX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  .    130 

in  sucli  or  such  manner,  nor  that  the  projecting  angle  of  the 
cube,  which  presses  his  hand  in  an  unequal  manner,  must 
appear  to  his  eyes  as  it  appears  in  the  cube.  The  author  of 
the  Essay  declares  himself  at  once  of  the  same  opinion. 

Th.  Perhaps  Mr.  Molyneux  and  the  author  of  the  Essay  are 
not  so  far  from  my  opinion  as  at  first  appears,  and  the  reasons 
for  their  view,  contained  apparently  in  the  letter  of  the  for- 
mer, who  has  employed  them  with  success  in  order  to  convince 
men  of  their  error,  have  been  purposely  suppressed  by  the 
latter  in  order  to  give  more  exercise  to  the  minds  of  his 
readers.  If  you  will  weigh  my  reply,  you  will  find,  sir,  that 
I  have  placed  therein  a  condition  which  can  be  considered  as 
comprised  in  the  question  —  viz.  :  that  the  question  is  that  of 
distinguishing  alone,  and  that  the  blind  man  knows  that  the 
two  figured  bodies,  which  he  should  distinguish,  are  there,  and 
that  thus  each  of  the  appearances  which  he  sees  is  that  of  the 
cube  or  that  of  the  globe.  In  this  case  it  appears  to  me 
beyond  doubt  that  the  blind  man  who  ceases  to  be  such  can 
distinguish  them  by  the  principles  of  reason,  united  with  that 
sense-knowledge  with  which  touch  has  before  furnished  him. 
For  I  do  not  speak  of  that  which  he  will  do  perhaps  in  fact 
and  immediately,  dazzled  and  confused  by  the  novelty,  or  from 
some  other  cause  little  accustomed  to  draw  inferences.  The 
basis  of  my  view  is  that  in  the  globe  there  are  no  points  dis- 
tinguished by  the  side  of  the  globe  itself,  all  there  being  level 
and  without  angles,  while  in  the  cube  there  are  eight  points 
distinguished  from  all  the  others.  If  there  were  not  this  ^ 
means  of  discerning  the  figures,  a  blind  man  could  not  learn  * 
the  rudiments  of  geometry  by  touch.  But  we  see  that  those 
born  blind  are  capable  of  learning  geometry,  and  have  indeed 
always  certain  rudiments  of  a  natural  geometry,  and  that 
most  often  geometry  is  learned  by  sight  alone,  without  the 
use  of  touch,  as  indeed  a  paralytic  or  other  person  to  whom 
touch  has  been  almost  denied  might  and  even  must  do. 
And  these  two  geometi'ies  —  that  of  the  blind  man  and  that  of 
the  paralytic  —  must  meet  and  agree,  and  indeed  return  to  the 
same  ideas,  although  there  are  no  common  images.  This  again  _ 
shows  how  necessary  it  is  to  distinguish  images  from  exacts* 
ideas,  which  consist  in  definitions.  It  would  really  be  very  • 
interesting  and  instructive  to  make  a  complete  examination  of 


140 


LKlHNirZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [isk.  ii 

the  ideas  of  a  man  born  blind,  to  understand  the  descriptions 
ho  makes  of  figures.  For  he  may  come  to  this,  and  he  may 
■  even  understand  tlie  doctrine  of  optics,  so  far  as  it  is  depeud- 
'  ent  ujion  distinct  and  mathematical  ideas,  although  he  could 
not  attain  to  a  conception  of  dair-confus,  that  is  to  say,  the 
image  of  light  and  of  colors.  This  is  why  a  certain  one  born 
blind,  after  having  attended  lessons  in  optics,  which  he 
ajtpeared  fully  to  understand,  replied  to  some  one  who  asked 
him  what  he  thought  light  was,  that  he  thought  it  must  be 
something  pleasant  like  sugar.  It  would  likewise  be  very 
im])ortant  to  examine  the  ideas  which  a  man  born  deaf  and 
dumb  may  have  of  things  not  figured,  whose  description  we 
usually  have  in  words,  and  which  he  must  have  in  a  manner 
wholly  different  from,  though  it  may  be  equivalent  to  ours,  as 
Chinese  writing  is  in  fact  equivalent  to  our  alphabet,  although 
it  is  infinitely  different,  and  might  appear  to  have  been  in- 
vented by  a  deaf  man.  I  learn,  through  the  favor  of  a  great 
prince,  of  one  born  deaf  and  dumb  in  Paris,  whose  ears  have 
at  last  attained  to  the  performance  of  their  function,  that  he 
has  now  learned  the  French  language  (for  it  is  from  the  court 
of  France  that  he  was  summoned  not  long  since),  and  that  he 
could  say  very  curious  things  about  the  conceptions  he  had  in 
his  former  condition  and  about  the  change  of  his  ideas  when 
he  commenced  to  exercise  the  sense  of  hearing.  These  per- 
sons born  deaf  and  dumb  can  go  farther  than  we  think. 
There  was  one  in  Oldenburg  in  the  time  of  the  last  Count 
'  who  became  a  good  painter,  and  showed  himself  very  rational 
in  other  respects.  A  very  learned  man,  a  Breton  by  nation, 
told  me  that  at  Blainville,  about  ten  leagues  from  K'antes, 
belonging  to  the  Duke  of  Rohan,  there  was,  about  1690,  a 
poor  man,  who  lived  in  a  hut  near  the  castle  outside  of  the 
town,  who  was  born  deaf  and  dumb,  and  who  carried  letters 
and  other  things  to  the  town  and  found  the  houses,  following 
some  signs  which  the  persons  accustomed  to  employ  him 
made  him.  Finally  the  poor  man  became  blind  also,  but  did 
not  give  up  rendering  some  service  and  carrying  letters  into 
the  town  to  whatever  place  they  indicated  to  him  by  touch. 
He  had  a  board  in  his  hut  which,  extending  from  the  door  to 
the  place  where  his  feet  were,  informed  him  by  its  motion 
when  any  one  entered  his  house.     j\Ien  are  very  negligent  in 


CH.  IX]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  141 

not  obtaining  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  modes  of  thought 
of  such  persons.  If  he  no  longer  lives,  there  is  probably 
some  one  in  the  vicinity  who  could  still  give  some  information 
respecting  him,  and  make  us  understand  how  they  showed  him 
the  things  he  was  to  do.  But  to  return  to  what  the  man  born 
blind,  who  begins  to  see,  would  think  of  the  globe  and  the 
cube,  seeing  them  without  touching  them,  I  reply  that  he  will 
distinguish  them,  as  I  have  just  said,  if  any  one  informs  him 
that  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  appearances  or  perceptions 
which  he  has  of  them  belongs  to  the  cube  or  to  the  globe ; 
but,  without  this  previous  instruction,  I  admit  that  he  will 
not  at  first  venture  to  think  that  the  kinds  of  pictures  which 
they  make  of  themselves  in  the  depths  of  his  eyes,  and  which 
might  come  from  a  flat  picture  upon  the  table,  represent  the 
bodies,  until  touch  convinces  him  of  the  fact,  or  until,  by 
force  of  reasoning  upon  the  rays  of  light  according  to  optics, 
he  understands  by  the  lights  and  shades  that  there  is  a  some- 
thing which  arrests  these  rays  of  light,  and  that  it  must  be 
exactly  what  remains  for  him  in  touch,  which  result  he  will 
finally  reach  when  he  sees  this  globe  and  this  cube  revolve, 
and  change  the  shadows  and  the  appearances  in  accordance 
with  the  motion,  or  even  when,  these  two  bodies  remaining  at 
rest,  the  light  which  illumines  them  changes  its  place,  or  his 
eyes  change  their  position.  For  these  are  about  the  means 
we  have  of  distinguishing  from  afar  a  picture  or  a  perspec- 
tive, which  represents  a  body,  from  the  body  itself. 

§  11.  Ph.  [Let  us  return  to  perception  in  general.]  It  dis- 
tinguishes animals  from  inferior  beings. 

Th.  [I  am  inclined  to  the  belief  that  there  is  some  percep- 
tion and  appetition  also  in  the  plants,  because  of  the  great 
analogy  which  exists  between  plants  and  animals  ;  and  if,  as 
is  commonly  supposed,  there  is  a  vegetable  soul,  it  of  necessity 
has  perception.  Yet  I  do  not  cease  to  attribute  to  mechanism 
all  that  takes  places  in  the  bodies  of  plants  and  animals, 
except  their  first  formation.  Thus  I  agree  that  the  move- 
ment of  the  plant  called  sensitive  arises  from  mechanism,  and 
I  do  not  approve  of  having  recourse  to  the  soul  when  the 
question  is  that  of  explaining  the  detail  of  the  phenomena 
of  plants  and  animals.] 

§  14.  Ph.    It  is  true  that  for  myself,  indeed,  I  cannot  help 


142  LKIBXITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


believing  that  even  in  those  kinds  of  animals  which  are  like 
the  oysters  and  mussels  there  is  some  feeble  perception ;  for 
quick  sensations  would  serve  only  to  discommode  an  animal 
which  is  constrained  to  live  always  in  the  place  where  chance 
has  put  it,  where  it  is  watered  with  water,  cold  or  warm,  pure 
or  salt,  according  as  it  comes  to  it. 

Th.    [Very  well,  I  also  believe  that  we  can  say  almost  as 

"  much  of  plants;  but  in  man's  case,  his  perceptions  are  accom- 
panied with  the  power  of  reflection,  which  passes  to  the  act 
when  there  is  any  occasion.  But  when  he  is  reduced  to  a  state 
in  which  he  is  as  it  were  in  a  lethargy  and  almost  without 
feeling,  reflection  and  consciousness  cease,  and  universal  truths 
are  not  thought  of.  But  the  innate  and  acquired  faculties  and 
dispositions,  and  even  the  impressions  which  are  received  in 

'  this  state  of  confusion,  do  not  cease  on  that  account,  and  are 
not  effaced,  though  they  are  forgotten.  They  will  even  have 
their  turn  one  day  in  contributing  to  some  notable  result,  for 
nothing  is  useless  in  nature ;  all  confusion  must  develop 
itself;  the  animals  even,  having  attained  to  a  condition  of 
stupidity,  ought  some  day  to  return  to  perceptions  more  ele- 
vated ;  and,  since  simple  substances  always  endure,  we  must 
not  judge  of  eternity  by  a  few  years.] 


CHAPTER  X 

OF    RETEXTION 

§§  1,  2.  Ph.  The  other  faculty  of  the  mind,  by  which  it 
advances  farther  toward  the  knowledge  of  things  than  by  sim- 
ple 2^erception,  is  that  which  I  call  retention,  which  conserves 
the  knowledge  received  by  the  senses  or  by  reflection.  Reten- 
tion works  in  two  ways :  in  actually  conserving  the  present 
idea,  which  I  call  contemplation ;  and  in  preserving  the  power 
to  bring  them  again  before  the  mind,  and  this  is  what  is  called 
memory. 

Th.  [One  retains  also  and  contemplates  innate  knowledge, 
and  very  often  one  cannot  distinguish  the  innate  from  the 
acquired.     There  is  also  a  perception  of  images  —  either  those 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  143 


which  have  already  existed  for  some  time,  or  those  which  are 
formed  anevv  in  us.] 

§  2.  Ph.  But  you  believe  with  us  that  these  images  or  ideas 
cease  to  be  anything  as  soon  as  they  are  not  actually  matters 
of  consciousness ;  and  that  to  say  that  there  are  ideas  reserved 
in  the  memory  means  at  bottom  only  that  the  soul  has  in  some 
instances  the  power  of  reviving  the  perceptions  it  has  already 
had  with  a  feeling  which  at  the  same  time  convinces  it  that  it 
has  previously  had  these  kinds  of  perceptions. 

Th.  [If  ideas  were  only  forms  or  modes  of  thoughts,  they 
would  cease  with  them;  but  you  yourself  have  admitted,  sir, 
that  they  are  internal  objects,  and  in  this  way  can  subsist. 
And  I  am  astonished  that  you  can  always  be  satisfied  with 
these  naked  powers  or  faculties,  which  you  would  apparently 
reject  in  the  scholastic  philosophers.  It  would  be  necessary 
to  explain  a  little  more  distinctly  in  what  this  faculty  consists 
and  how  it  is  exercised ;  and  that  would  make  known  that 
there  are  dispositions  which  are  the  remains  of  past  impres- 
sions in  the  soul  as  well  as  in  the  body,  but  of  which  we  are 
conscious  only  when  the  memory  finds  some  occasion  for  them. 
And  if  nothing  restored  past  thoughts,  as  soon  as  we  no  longer 
think  of  them,  it  would  be  impossible  to  explain  how  the 
memory  can  preserve  them ;  and  to  recur  for  this  purpose  to 
this  naked  faculty  is  to  speak  nowise  intelligibly. 


CHAPTER  XI 

OP    DISCERNMENT    OR   THE    FACULTY  OF    DISTINGUISHING    IDEAS 

§  1.  Ph.  Upon  the  faculty  of  distinguishing  ideas  depends 
the  evidence  and  certainty  of  several  propositions  which  pass 
for  innate  truths. 

Th.  I  admit  that  to  think  of  these  innate  truths  and  to 
unravel  them  discernment  is  necessary ;  but  they  do  not  on 
that  account  cease  to  be  innate.] 

§  2.  Ph.  Now,  vivacity  of  mind  consists  in  recalling 
promptly  ideas ;  but  judgment  in  representing  them  clearly 
and  distinguishing  them  exactly. 


in  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

Th.  [IVrliaps  cacli  is  vivacity  of  imagination,  and  judg- 
ment consists  in  the  examination  of  propositions  according  to 

IVJISOU.] 

Ph.  [I  am  not  averse  to  this  distinction  of  mind  and  judg- 
ment. And  sometimes  there  is  judgment  in  not  employing  it 
too  much.  For  example :  to  examine  certain  witty  thoughts 
by  the  severe  rules  of  truth  and  good  reasoning  is  in  a  certain 
sense  an  insult. 

Til.  [This  remark  is  a  good  one  ;  witty  thoughts  must  have 
at  least  some  apparent  foundation  in  reason,  but  it  is  not 
necessary  to  examine  them  minutely  with  too  much  scrupu- 
lousness, as  it  is  not  necessar}^  to  look  at  a  picture  from  a 
position  too  near  it.  It  is  in  this,  it  seems  to  me,  that 
Father  Bouhours  fails  more  than  once  in  his  Art  cle  penser 
dans  les  ouvrages  cC esprit^  as  when  he  despises  this  sally  of 
Lucan :  ^ 

Victrix  causa  diis  placuit,  sed  victa  Catoni. 

§  4.  Ph.  Another  operation  of  the  mind  in  respect  to  its 
ideas  is  the  comparison  it  makes  of  one  idea  with  another  as 
regards  extension,  degrees,  time,  place,  or  some  other  circum- 
stance ;  it  is  upon  this  that  the  great  number  of  ideas  com- 
prised under  the  term  relation  depends. 

Th.  [According  to  my  view,  relation  is  more  general  than 
comparison,  for  relations  are  either  of  comparison  or  of  concur- 
rence. The  first  concern  the  congruity  or  incongruity  (I  take 
these  terms  in  a  less  extended  sense)  which  comprises  resem- 
blance, equality,  inequality,  etc.  The  second  comprise  some 
connection,  as  that  of  cause  and  effect,  of  whole  and  parts,  of 
position  and  order,  etc.] 

§  6.  Ph.  The  composition  of  simple  ideas,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  complex  ideas,  is  also  an  operation  of  our  mind. 
We  may  refer  to  this  the  faculty  of  extending  ideas  by  uniting 
those  of  the  same  kind,  as  in  forming  a  dozen  from  several 
units. 

Th.    [The  one  is   doubtless    as    much   composition   as   the 

1  Dominique  Bouhours,  1628-1702,  one  of  the  ablest  masters  of  the  French 
language  in  the  seventeenth  century.  The  title  of  his  work  here  given  follows 
Gerhardt's  text.  The  correct  title  is:  Maniere  de  bien  pettser  da)is  les 
ouvrages  d' esprit,  Paris,  1687.    There  were  several  editions.  —  Tr. 

2P7iars.  1,128.  — Tr. 


CH.  xi]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  145 


other ;  but  composition  of  similar  ideas  is  simpler  than  that  of 
different  ideas.] 

§  7.  Ph.  A  dog  will  nurse  young  foxes,  will  play  with 
them,  and  will  have  for  them  the  same  fondness  as  for  her 
own  puppies,  if  they  can  be  made  to  suck  her  so  long  as  is 
needful  for  the  milk  to  spread  through  their  entire  body. 
Moreover  it  does  not  appear  that  animals,  who  have  a  large 
number  of  young  at  once,  have  any  knowledge  of  their  num- 
ber. 

Th.  [The  love  of  animals  arises  from  a  pleasure  which  is 
increased  by  habit.  But  as  for  the  precise  number,  men  even 
can  know  the  numbers  of  things  only  by  some  skill,  as  in  using 
numerical  names  in  order  to  count,  or  figural  arrangements 
which  make  them  know  at  once  without  counting  if  anything 
is  wanting.] 

§  10.    Ph.    Animals  do  not  form  abstract  thoughts. 

Tli.  [I  agree.  They  apparently  recognize  whiteness,  and 
notice  it  in  the  chalk  or  the  snow ;  but  this  is  not  yet  abstrac- 
tion, for  that  demands  a  consideration  of  what  is  common, 
separated  from  what  is  particular,  and  consequently  there 
enters  into  it  the  knowledge  of  universal  truths,  which  is  not 
given  to  the  animals.  It  is  well  said  also  that  the  animals 
which  speak  do  not  use  words  to  express  general  ideas,  and 
that  men  deprived  of  the  use  of  speech  and  of  words  do  not 
cease  to  invent  other  general  signs.  I  am  pleased  also  to  see 
that  you  here  and  elsewhere  so  well  observe  the  advantages  of 
human  nature.] 

§  11.  Ph.  If  animals  have  some  ideas,  and  are  not  pure  ma- 
chines, as  some  maintain,  we  cannot  deny  that  they  have  reason 
in  a  certain  degree,  and,  for  myself,  it  appears  as  evident  that 
they  reason  as  that  they  feel.  But  it  is  only  upon  particular 
ideas  that  they  reason  according  as  their  senses  represent  these 
ideas  to  them. 

Th.  [Animals  pass  from  one  imagination  to  another  by  the 
connection  which  they  have  felt  here  before ;  for  example,  when 
his  master  takes  a  stick,  the  dog  fears  a  whipping.  And  in 
many  instances  children  with  the  rest  of  mankind  proceed 
nowise  differently  in  their  passages  from  thought  to  thought. 
This  might  be  called  consecution  and  reasoning  in  a  very  broad 
sense.    But  I  prefer  to  conform  to  the  received  usage  in  conse- 


146  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  Iuk.  n 


crating  these  terras  to  man  and  in  limiting  them  to  the  knowl- 
edge ot  some  reason  of  the  connection  of  perceptions,  which 
sensations  alone  cannot  give ;  their  effect  being  only  to  cause 
us  naturally  to  expect  at  another  time  this  same  connection 
which  we  have  noticed  before,  although  perhaps  the  reasons 
are  no  longer  the  same,  a  fact  which  often  deceives  those  who 
are  governed  only  by  the  senses.] 

§  13.  Ph.  Idiots  lack  vivacity,  activity,  and  movement  in 
the  intellectual  faculties,  whereby  they  are  deprived  of  the  use 
of  reason.  Madmen  seem  to  be  at  the  opposite  extreme,  for  it 
does  not  appear  to  me  that  these  latter  have  lost  the  power  to 
reason,  but  having  wrongly  united  certain  ideas,  they  take 
them  for  truths,  and  deceive  themselves  in  the  same  way  as 
those  Avho  reason  justly  upon  false  principles.  Thus  you  will 
see  a  madman  who  thinks  he  is  king  maintaining  by  a  just 
consequence  that  he  should  be  served,  honored,  and  obeyed 
according  to  his  rank. 

Th.  \_Idiots  do  not  exercise  reason,  and  they  differ  from  some 
stupid  persons  who  have  good  judgment,  but,  not  having  prompt 
conception,  they  are  despised  and  disturbed  as  he  would  be 
who  wished  to  play  ombre  with  persons  of  distinction  and 
thought  too  long  and  too  often  of  the  part  he  must  take.  I 
remember  a  learned  man  who,  having  lost  his  memory  by  the 
use  of  certain  drugs,  was  reduced  to  this  condition,  but  his 
judgment  alwaj^s  appeared.  A  man  wholly  mad  lacks  judg- 
ment on  nearly  every  occasion ;  but  the  vivacity  of  his  imagi- 
nation may  make  him  agreeable.  But  there  are  particular 
madmen  who  make  a  false  supposition  at  an  important  point 
in  their  lives,  and  reason  justly  thereupon,  as  you  have  well 
said.  There  is  such  a  man,  well  known  at  a  certain  court, 
who  believes  himself  destined  to  redress  the  affairs  of  the 
Protestants  and  to  bring  France  to  reason,  for  which  purpose 
God  caused  the  greatest  personages  to  pass  through  his  body 
in  order  to  ennoble  it ;  he  desires  to  marry  all  the  princesses 
he  sees  to  be  marriageable,  but  after  having  made  them  hoi}', 
in  order  to  have  a  holy  progeny  who  are  to  rule  the  land ; 
he  attributes  all  the  misfortunes  of  war  to  the  little  attention 
paid  to  his  advice.  In  speaking  with  a  certain  sovereign, 
he  takes  every  necessary  measure  not  to  lower  his  dignity. 
When  they  enter  into  conversation  with  him,  he  maintains 


CH.  xii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  147 

himself  so  well  that  I  have  doubted  more  than  once  whether 
his  madness  is  not  feigned,  for  he  is  not  inconvenienced  by 
it.  However,  those  who  know  him  more  intimately  assure  me 
that  his  madness  is  wholly  genuine.] 


CHAPTER  XII 

OF    COMPLEX    IDEAS 

PJi.  The  understanding  bears  not  a  little  resemblance  to 
a  room  wholly  dark,  which  has  only  certain  small  openings  to 
let  in  from  outside  exterior  and  visible  images,  so  that  if  these 
images,  coming  to  be  painted  in  this  dark  room,  could  remain 
there  and  be  placed  in  order,  so  that  they  could  be  found  upon 
occasion,  there  wou.ld  be  a  great  resemblance  between  this 
room  and  the  human  understanding. 

Th.  [To  make  the  resemblance  greater,  you  should  suppose 
that  in  this  room  there  was  a  canvas  to  receive  the  images,  not 
even,  but  diversified  by  folds,  representing  the  (kinds  of)  in- 
nate knowledge ;  further,  that  this  canvas  or  membrane  being 
stretched  would  have  a  kind  of  elasticity  or  power  of  action, 
and  also  an  action  and  reaction  accommodated  as  much  to  the 
past  folds  as  to  the  newly  arrived  kinds  of  impressions.  And 
this  action  would  consist  in  certain  vibrations  or  oscillations, 
such  as  are  seen  in  a  stretched  string  so  touched  that  it  gives 
forth  a  kind  of  musical  sound.  For  not  only  do  we  receive 
images  or  outlines  in  the  brain  ;  but  we  form  besides  new  ones, 
when  we  look  at  complex  ideas.  Thus  the  canvas  that  repre- 
sents our  brain  is  necessarily  active  and  elastic.  This  com- 
parison would  explain  tolerably  well  what  passes  in  the  brain ; 
but  as  for  the  soul,  which  is  a  simple  substance  or  moyiad,  it 
represents  without  extension  these  same  varieties  of  extended 
masses  and  perceives  them.^] 

§  3.  Ph.  Now  complex  ideas  are  either  modes  or  substances 
or  relations. 

1  According  to  the  principle  of  Pre-established  Harmony.  Cf.  Systeme 
nouveau  de  la  nature,  etc.,  1(J95,  §§  14,  15;  Gerhardt,  4,  484,  485;  Erdmaun, 
127,  128;  Jacques,  1,  475,  476;  translation.  Appendix,  p.       .— Tk. 


148  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


Th.  [This  division  of  the  objects  of  our  thought  into  sub- 
stances, modes,'  and  rehations  is  sufficiently  to  my  taste.  I  be- 
lieve that  qualities  are  only  modifications  of  substances,  and 
that  the  understanding  adds  thereto  the  relations.-  From  this 
follows  more  than  you  think.] 

Ph.  Modes  are  either  simple  (as  a  dozen,  a  score,  which  are 
composed  of  simple  ideas  of  the  same  kind,  i.e.  of  units)  or 
mixed  (as  beauty),  into  which  enter  simple  ideas  of  different 
kinds. 

Th.  Perhaps  dozen  or  score  are  only  relations,  and  are  con- 
stituted only  in  connection  with  the  understanding.  Units  are 
separate,  and  the  understanding  gathers  them  together  how- 
ever dispersed  they  be.  Yet,  although  relations  are  from  the 
understanding,  they  are  ndC  groundless  or  unreal.  For  in  the 
first  place  understanding  is  the  origin  of  things ;  and  indeed 
the  reality  even  of  all  thiJfigs,  simple  substances  excepted,  ulti- 
mately consists  only  of  perceptions  of  the  phenomena  of  sim- 
ple substances.  It  is  often  the  same  with  regard  to  the  mixed 
modes ;  i.e.  it  is  necessary  to  refer  them  rather  to  the  rela- 
tions.] 

§  6.  Ph.  The  ideas  of  substances  are  certain  combinations  of 
simple  ideas,  which  are  supposed  to  represent  particular  and 
distinct  things,  subsisting  by  themselves,  among  which  ideas 
the  obscure  notion  of  substance, .  which  is  assumed  without 
knowing  what  it  is  in  itself,  is  always  considered  as  the  first 
and  chief. 

TJi.  [The  idea  of  substance  is  not  so  obscure  as  you  think. 
You  can  know  what  it  ought  to  be,  and  what  it  knows  of  itself 
in  other  things ;  and  indeed  the  knowledge  of  the  concrete 
always  precedes  that  of  the  abstract;  the  hot  (thing)  rather 
than  the  heat.] 

§  7.  Ph.  In  regard  to  substances  there  are  also  two  kinds  of 
ideas:  the  one  of  single  substances,  like  that  of  a  man,  or  a 
sheep;  the  other  of  several  substances  joined  together,  as  of 
an  army  of  men,  or  a  flock  of  sheep.  These  collections  form 
also  a  single  idea. 

1  Cf.  Descartes,  Prin.  Philos..  I.,  §  56;  Veitch's  translation,  8th  ed.,  p.  217; 
Spinoza,  Ethica,  Pt.  I.,  Def.  3;  Elwes'  translation,  Vol.  2,  p.  46;  Locke,  Essay, 
Bk.  IL,  chap.  12,  §  4,   Vol.  1,  p.  280  (Bohn's  ed.).  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Leibnitz,  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  30,  §  4.  — Tr. 


CH.  xiii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  149 

Til.  [This  unity  of  the  idea  of  aggregates  is  very  true ;  but 
ultimately  you  must  admit  that  this  collective  unity  is  only  a 
congruity  or  relation,  whose  ground-  is  in  that  which  is  found 
in  each  of  the  single  substances  separately.  Thus  these  beings 
by  aggregation  have  no  other  completed  unity  than  the  mental; 
consequently  their  entity  also  is  in  some  mental  shape  or  phe- 
nomenon, as  that  of  the  rainbow.] 


CHAPTER  XIII 

OF    SIMPLE    MODES,    AND    FIRST    OF    THOSE    OF    SPACE 

§  3.  Ph.  Space  considered  with  respect  to  the  length  which 
separates  two  bodies  is  called  distance;  with  respect  to  length, 
breadth,  and  depth  it  may  be  called  cajKicity. 

Th.  [To  speak  more  distinctly,  the  distance  between  two 
fixed  things  (be  they  points  or  extensions)  is  the  length  of  the 
shortest  possible  line  that  can  be  drawn  from  one  to  the  other. 
This  distance  may  be  considered  absolutely  or  in  a  certain 
figure  which  comprises  the  two  distant  things.  For  example, 
the  straight  line  is  absolutely  the  distance  between  two  points. 
But  these  two  points,  being  in  the  same  spherical  surface,  the 
distance  of  these  two  points  in  this  surface  is  the  length  of 
the  shortest  great  arc  of  a  circle,  which  may  be  drawn  from 
one  point  to  the  other.  It  is  well  also  to  notice,  that  distance 
is  not  only  between  bodies,  but  also  between  surfaces,  lines, 
points.  It  may  be  said  that  the  cwpacity  or  rather  the  intervcd 
between  two  bodies  or  two  other  extensions,  or  between  an 
extension  and  a  point,  is  the  space  constituted  by  all  the 
shortest  lines  which  may  be  drawn  between  the  points  of  each. 
This  interval  is  filled,  exce])t  when  the  two  fixed  things  are 
in  the  same  surface,  when  the  shortest  lines  between  the 
points  of  the  fixed  things  must  also  fall  in  this  surface  or 
must  there  be  expressly  formed.] 

§  4.  Ph.  Besides  that  which  is  in  nature,  men  have  estab- 
lished in  their  minds  the  ideas  of  certain  determinate  lengths, 
as  an  inch  or  a  foot. 

Th.    [They  cannot  do  it.     For  it  is  impossible  to  have  the 


160 


LEIBNITZ'S  CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


idea  of  a  precisely  detennined  length.  You  can  neither  say 
nor  understand  by  the  mind  what  an  inch  or  a  foot  is.  And 
you  can  preserve  the  meaning  of  these  terms  only  by  real 
measures,  which  you  suppose  unchanging,  by  means  of  which 
you  can  always  recover  them.  Thus  Mr.  Greaves,^  an  Eng- 
lish mathematician,  desired  to  make  use  of  the  pyramids  of 
Egypt,  which  have  endured  a  long  time  and  will  endure  appar- 
ently some  time  longer,  to  conserve  our  measures,  by  showing 
posterity  the  propositions  ^  which  have  been  sketched  in  defi- 
nite lengths  in  one  of  these  pyramids.  It  is  true  that  a  little 
after  it  was  discovered  that  pendulums  serve  to  perpetuate 
measures  {mensuris  rerum  ad  posteros  transmittendis) ,  as  Huy- 
gens,"  jNIouton,*  and  Buratini,  formerly  maistre  de  monnoye  in 
Poland,  have  demonstrated  ^  by  showing  the  proportion  of  our 
measures  of  length  to  that  of  the  pendulum,  which  beats  pre- 
cisely a  second  (for  example),  i.e.  the  86400th ^  part  of  a 
revolution  of  the  fixed  stars,  or  of  an  astronomical  day  ;  and 
Buratini  has  composed  a  treatise  expressly  thereupon,  which 

1  John  Greaves,  1602-1652,  Savilian  Professor  of  Astronomy  at  Oxford, 
1(>43-1648.  His  Pyramidoyraphia,  or  a  Discourse  on  the  Pyramids  in  Eyypt, 
1646.  —  Tk. 

2  Gerhardt  and  Erdmann  read:  "propositions";  Jacques  reads:  "propor- 
tions "  ;  Sehaarschmidt  translates  "  Verhaltnisse."  —  Tr. 

3  Christian  Huygens,  1629-1695,  a  Dutch  physicist,  geometer,  and  astronomer. 
He  discovered  the  laws  of  double  refraction,  and  was  the  first  to  establish  on 
a  sure  foundation  the  wave  theory  of  light,  in  his  Traite  de  la  lumiere; 
Leyden,  1690.  His  researches  in  physical  optics  constitute  his  chief  claim  to 
scientific  immortality.  His  application  of  the  pendulum  to  regulate  the  move- 
ment of  clocks,  arising  from  his  felt  need  of  an  exact  measure  of  time  in 
astronomical  observations,  dates  from  1656.  He  published  his  Description 
de  I'horloge  a  pendicle  in  1657,  and  presented  his  first  "pendulum-clock"  to 
the  States-General  June  16,  1657.  This  Description  was  republished  as  chap.  1 
of  his  magnum  opus,  the  Horologiuin  oscillatorium,  sive  de  motu  pendulorum 
ad  horologia  adaptato,  dedicated  to  Louis  XIV.,  March  25,  167-3.  In  chap.  4  of 
this  work  he  determined  the  centre  of  oscillation  of  a  pendulum,  and  conse- 
quently the  length  of  the  simple  i.sochronous  pendulum.  His  works  were 
published  in  two  vols.  4to,  Opera  varia,  Leyden,  1724,  and  two  supplementary 
vols.  4to,  Opera  reliqua,  Amsterdam,  1728. — Tr. 

4  Galjriel  Mouton,  1618-1694,  a  French  mathematician  and  astronomer, 
principally  known  by  his  Observationes  diametrorum  solis  et  lunx  apparen- 
tium,  Lyons,  1670.  His  principal  title  to  honorable  mention  in  the  history 
of  science  is  the  invention  of  the  method  of  differences  for  the  calculation  of 
tables  of  every  kind,  afterwards  reduced  to  a  system  by  Sir  Isaac  Newton, 
1642-1727,  and  known  by  us  as  our  method  of  interpolation.  —  Tr. 

5  Erdmann  and  Jacques  read :  "  pretendu  montrer,"  i.e.  claimed  to  demon- 
strate. —  Tr. 

6  Erdmann  and  Jacques  read :  "  864,000th,"  evidently  an  error.  — Tr. 


CH.  xm]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  151 

I  have  seen  in  mauuscript.  But  there  is,  however,  this  imper- 
fection in  this  measure  of  pendulums,  wliich  must  be  limited 
to  certain  countries,  for  pendulums  to  beat  in  the  same  time 
need  to  be  shorter  at  the  equator.  And  it  is  furthermore 
necessary  to  assume  the  constancy  of  the  really  fundamental 
measure,  viz. :  the  length  of  a  day  or  of  a  revolution  of  the 
globe  of  the  earth  around  its  axis,  and  also  of  the  cause  of 
gravitation,  not  to  speak  of  other  circumstances.] 

§  5.  Ph.  Observing  how  extremities  are  terminated  either 
by  straight  lines  which  form  distinct  angles,  or  by  curved  lines 
in  which  no  angle  can  be  perceived,  we  form  the  idea  ol  figure. 

Th.  [A  superficial  figure  is  terminated  by  a  line  or  by  lines  : 
but  the  figure  of  a  body  can  be  limited  without  determined 
lines,  as  for  example  that  of  a  sphere.  A  single  straight  line 
or  plane  surface  cannot  enclose  any  space  or  make  any  figure. 
But  a  single  line  can  enclose  a  superficial  figure,  for  example 
the  circle,  the  oval,  as  also  a  single  curved  surface  can  enclose 
a  solid  figure,  like  the  sphere  and  the  spheroid.  Yet,  not  only 
several  straight  lines  or  plane  surfaces,  but  also  several  curved 
lines  or  several  curved  surfaces,  can  concur  together  and  form 
even  angles  between  themselves,  when  the  one  is  not  the  tan- 
gent of  the  other.  It  is  not  easy  to  give  the  definition  of  figure 
in  general  according  to  the  usage  of  geometers.  To  say  that  it 
is  a  limited  extension  would  be  too  general,  for  a  straight  line, 
for  example,  although  terminated  by  the  two  ends,  is  not  a 
figure  and  even  two  straight  lines  cannot  make  one.  To  say 
that  it  is  an  extension  limited  by  an  extension  is  not  general 
enough,  for  the  entire  spherical  surface  is  a  figure  and  yet  it  is 
not  limited  by  any  extension.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that 
figure  is  a  limited  extension,  in  which  there  are  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  paths  from  one  point  to  another.  This  definition  com- 
prises limited  surfaces  without  terminating  lines  which  the 
preceding  definition  did  not  comprise,  and  excludes  the  lines, 
because  from  one  point  to  another  in  a  line  there  is  only  one 
path  or  a  determined  number  of  paths.  But  it  will  be  still 
better  to  say  that  figure  is  limited  extension,  which  may  admit 
an  extended  section,  or  better  which  has  breadth,  a  term  which 
hitherto  had  not  been  further  defined.] 

§  6.  Ph.  At  the  least  all  figures  are  only  simple  modes  of 
space. 


152  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


Th.  [According  to  your  view,  the  simple  modes  repeat  the 
same  idea,  but  in  figures  there  is  not  always  the  repetition  of 
the  same  mode.  Curves  differ  much  from  straight  lines  and 
between  themselves.  So  I  do  not  know  how  the  definition  of 
the  simple  mode  will  be  in  place  here.] 

§  7.  Ph.  [We  need  not  take  our  definitions  too  strictly. 
But  let  us  pass  from  figure  to  place.']  When  we  find  all  the 
pieces  upon  the  same  squares  of  the  chess-board  where  we  left 
them,  we  say  that  they  are  all  in  the  same  place,  although  per- 
haps the  chess-board  has  been  moved.  We  say  also  that  the 
chess-board  is  in  the  same  place,  if  it  remains  in  the  same  part 
of  the  cabin  of  the  vessel,  although  the  vessel  has  sailed.  The 
vessel  is  also  said  to  be  in  the  same  place  supposing  it 
keeps  the  same  distance  with  reference  to  the  parts  of  the 
neighboring  countries,  although  the  earth  has  perhaps  turned 
round. 

Til.  \_Place  is  either  particular  when  considered  with  regard 
to  certain  bodies,  or  universal  when  it  relates  to  all,  and  with 
reference  to  which  all  the  changes  possible  in  relation  to  any 
body  are  taken  into  account.  And  if  there  were  nothing  fixed 
in  the  universe,  the  place  of  each  thing  could  still  be  deter- 
mined by  reasoning,^  if  there  were  means  of  making  a  record  of 
all  the  changes,  or  if  the  memory  of  a  creature  could  suffice  for 
them,  as  they  say,  the  Arabs  play  chess  by  memory  and  on 
horseback.  What  we  cannot  understand,  however,  is  neverthe- 
less determined  in  the  truth  of  things.] 

§  15.  Ph.  If  any  man  asks  me  what  space  is,  I  am  ready  to 
tell  him  when  he  tells  me  what  extension  is. 

Th.  [I  wish  I  could  speak  of  the  nature  of  fever  or  any  other 
malady  with  the  same  certainty  with  which  I  believe  the  nature 
of  space  is  expounded.  Extension  is  the  abstract  of  the  ex- 
tended. Xow  the  extended  is  a  continuum  whose  parts  are 
coexistent,  or  exist  at  the  same  time.] 

§  17.  Ph.    If  any  one  asks  whether  space  without  body  is 

1  Schaarsclimidt  says  that  the  statements  here  made  hy  Leihuitz  liave  since 
found  their  confirmation  and  accomplishment  through  Gauss'  Theoria  motus 
corporurn  coelestium.  The  work  was  puhlished  at  Hamburg,  in  180i),  and 
"gave  a  powerful  impulse  to  the  true  methods  of  astronomical  observation." 
The  author,  Carl  Friedrich  Gauss,  1777-185.5,  was  an  eminent  German  mathe- 
matician. His  collected  works,  edited  by  E.  J.  Schering,  have  l)een  published 
by  the  Royal  Society  of  Giittingen,  7  vols.,4to.    Gottingen:  1803-1871.  —  Tr. 


xin]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  153 


substance  or  accident,  I  should  reply  without  hesitation  that  I 
know  nothing  about  it. 

Til.  [I  fear  you  may  think  me  vain  in  wishing  to  determine 
Avhat  you,  sir,  admit  you  do  not  know.  But  if  it  is  expedient 
to  judge,  (I  fear)  that  you  know  more  about  the  matter  than 
you  state  or  think  you  do.  Some  have  believed  that  God  is 
the  place  of  things.^  Lessius  and  Guericke,  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken, were  of  this  opinion,  but  then  place  contains  something 
more  than  what  we  attribute  to  the  space  which  we  deprive  of 
all  activity ;  and  in  this  way  it  is  no  more  a  substance  than 
time,  and  if  it  has  parts  it  cannot  be  God.  It  is  a  relation,  an 
order,  not  only  between  existences,  but  also  between  possibili- 
ties as  they  may  exist.  But  its  truth  and  reality,  like  all 
eternal  truths,  is  grounded  in  God.] 

Ph.  [I  am  not  far  from  your  view,  and  you  know  the  pas- 
sage of  St.  Paul,  who  says  that  we  live  and  move  and  have 
our  being  in  God.^  Thus,  according  to  different  ways  of  con- 
sidering the  matter,  it  may  be  said  that  space  is  God,  and  also 
that  it  is  only  an  order  or  a  relation.] 

Th.  [The  better  statement  then  will  be  that  space  is  an 
order,  but  that  God  is  its  source.] 

§  18.  Ph.  [Yet  to  know  whether  space  is  a  substance,  it 
would  be  needful  to  know  in  what  the  nature  of  substance  in 
general  consists.  But  in  this  there  is  a  difficulty.  If  God, 
finite  spirits,  and  bodies  participate  in  common  in  an  identical 
substantial  nature,  would  it  not  follow  that  they  differ  only  as 
different  modifications  of  this  substance  ?] 

1  This  doctrine  appeared  very  early.  Schaarschmidt  refers  to  tlie  collection 
of  poems  of  nncertaiu  origin  called  Orphica,  where  (Fragt.  vi.,p.  457,  ed.  Her- 
matm,  v.  8  and  9)  it  is  poetically  expressed  thus :  "  All  that  has  heen  and  here- 
after will  be,  is  formed  together  in  the  hosom  of  Zeus."  Again  (v.  17-20) : 
"One  is  the  ruling  Being,  in  whom  the  All  moves,  fire,  water,  earth  and  air, 
day  and  night,  reason,  the  first  principle  and  joyful  love  — all  this  lies  in  the 
great  bosom  of  Zeus,"  etc.  Malebranche  rejiresents  a  phase  of  the  same  view 
in  his  doctrine  that  we  see  all  things  iu  God.  Cf.  his  De  la  Eecherche  de  la 
Verit.e,  III.,  ii.,  6:  "We  abide  thus  in  the  view  that  God  is  the  intelligible 
world  or  the  place  of  spirits,  just  as  the  material  world  is  the  place  of  bodies. 
From  His  power  they  receive  all  their  modifications,  in  His  wisdom  they  find 
all  their  ideas,  by  His  love  they  are  moved  in  all  tlieir  moral  inclinations.  But 
because  His  power  and  His  love  are  nothing  else  than  Himself,  we  will  believe 
with  St.  Paul,  that  He  is  not  far  from  any  one  of  us,  and  that  iu  Him  we  live 
and  move  and  have  our  being."  Cf.  also  James  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical 
Theory,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  1,  p.  170  sq.     New  York:  Macmillan  &  Co.,  lS8(i.  —  Tr. 

2  Acts  17  :28.— Tr. 


]f,4  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [kk.  ii 


Th.  [If  this  result  follows,  it  would  follow  also,  that  God, 
liuite  spirits,  and  bodies,  participating  in  common  in  an  iden- 
tical nature  of  being,  would  differ  only  as  different  modifica- 
tions of  this  being.] 

§  19.  Ph.  Those  who  first  thought  of  regarding  accidents  as 
a  kind  of  real  beings,  which  need  something  in  which  to  inhere, 
wore  constrained  to  invent  the  word  substance  to  serve  as  a 
support  to  the  accidents. 

Th.  [Do  you  then  think,  sir,  that  the  accidents  can  subsist 
apart  from  the  substance  ?  or  do  you  mean  that  they  are  not 
real  beings  ?  You  seem  to  multiply  difficulties  without  reason, 
and  I  have  remarked  above  that  substances  or  concretes  are 
conceived  rather  than  accidents  or  abstracts.] 

Ph.  The  words  substance  and  accident  are  in  my  view  of 
little  use  in  philosophy. 

Th.  [I  admit  that  I  am  of  another  opinion,  and  I  believe 
that  the  consideration  of  substance  ^  is  one  of  the  most  important 
and  fruitful  points  of  philosophy.] 

§  21.  Ph.  [We  have  now  spoken  of  substance  only  by  the 
way,  while  asking  if  space  is  a  substance.  But  it  is  sufficient 
for  us  that  it  is  not  a  body.]  No  one  will  dare  to  make  body 
infinite  like  space. 

Th.  [Descartes  and  his  followers  have  said,  nevertheless, 
that  matter  has  no  limits,  in  making  the  world  indefinite,  so  that 
it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  conceive  of  its  extremities.  And 
they  have  changed  the  term  infinite  into  indefinite  with  some 
reason ;    for  there  never  is  an  infinite  whole  in  the  world, 

1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  23,  §  2;  De  primie  pMlosfiphiie  emenda- 
tione  et  de  notione  substantias,  1(394,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4<J8-470;  Erdmann, 
pp.  121-122;  A.  Jacques,  (Euvres  de  Leibniz,  Vol.  1,  pp.  452-454  (in  French) ; 
translation.  Appendix,  pp.  ;  Systeme  nouveau  de  la  nature  et  de  la 

communication  des  substances,  aussi  bien  que  de  l' union  qu'il  y  a  entre  Vdme 
et  le  corps,  1695,  §§  2,  3,  Gerhardt,  Vok  4,  pp.  477  sq. ;  Erdmann,  pp.  124^128; 
Jacques,  Vol.  1,  pp.  469  sq.;   translation.  Appendix,   pp.  ;    Be   ipsa 

natura,  sive  de  vi  insita  actionibusque  creaturum,  1698,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  4,  pp. 
504-516 ;  Erdmann,  pp.  154-160 ;  Jacques,  Vol.  1,  pp.  455-468  (in  French) ;  trans- 
lation. Appendix,  pp.  ;  Considerations  sur  le  princijye  de  vie  et  sur 
les  natures  plastiqiies,  1705,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  6,  pp.  539-546;  Erdmann,  pp. 
429-4.32;  translation,  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  pp.  1(53-169;  Prin- 
cipes  de  la  nature  et  de  la  grace  fond^s  en  raison,  c.  1714,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  6, 
pp.  598-606;  Erdmann,  pp.  714-718;  translation,  Duncan,  op.  dt..  pp.  209-217: 
La  Monadologie,  1714,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  6,  pp.  607-623 :  Erdmann,  pp.  705-712; 
translation,  Duncan,  op.  cit.,  pp.  218-232 ;  also  F.  H.  Hedge,  in  "  The  Jour.  Spec. 
Philos.,"  Vol.  1,  pp.  129-137.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XIV]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  155 


altliougli  there  are  always  some  wholes  greater  than  others  to 
infinity,  and  the  universe  even  cannot  pass  for  a  whole  as  I 
have  elsewhere  ^  shown. 

Ph.  Those  who  take  matter  and  extension  as  one  and  the 
same  thing  maintain  that  the  inner  sides  of  a  hollo^v  vacuous 
body  would  touch.  But  the  space  which  is  between  two  bodies 
suffices  to  prevent  their  mutual  contact. 

Th.  [I  am  of  your  opinion,  for  although  I  do  not  admit  a 
vacuum,  I  distinguish  matter  from  extension,  and  I  admit  that 
if  there  were  a  vacuum  in  a  sphere,  the  opposite  poles  in  the 
hollow  space  would  not  on  that  account  touch.  But  I  believe 
that  this  is  a  case  which  the  divine  perfection  does  not  allow.] 

§  23.  Ph.  It  seems,  however,  that  motion  proves  a  vacuum. 
When  the  least  part  of  the  divided  body  is  as  large  as  a  grain 
of  mustard-seed,  a  void  space  equal  to  the  size  of  a  grain  of 
mustard  is  requisite  in  order  to  make  room  for  the  parts  of 
this  body  to  move  freely  ;  the  same  condition  will  hold  good 
when  the  parts  of  the  matter  are  one  hundred  million  times 
smaller. 

Th.  [It  is  true,  that  if  the  world  were  full  of  hard  corpus- 
cles, which  could  neither  yield  nor  divide,  as  the  atoms  are, 
depicted,  motion  would  be  impossible.  But  in  truth,  there  is  no ' 
original  hardness ;  on  the  contrary,  fluidity  is  the  original 
condition,  and  bodies  are  divided  as  needful,  since  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  it.  This  takes  away  all  the  force  in  the 
argument  for  a  vacuum  drawn  from  motion.] 


CHAPTER   XIV 

OF    DURATION    AND    ITS    SIMPLE    MODES 

§  10.  Ph.  To  extension  corresponds  duration.  And  a  part 
of  duration  in  which  we  remark  no  successions  of  ideas  we 
call  an  instant. 

Th.  This  definition  of  an  instant  ought  (I  believe)  to  mean 
tlie  popular  notion,  like  that  which  the  common  people  have 

1  Cf.  ante,  pp.  16, 17;  also  New  Esscnj.%  Bk.  II.,  chap.  17,  §  1.  The  proof  that 
the  universe  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  wliole,  is  s^iven  in  the  letter  to  Des 
Bosses,  March  11,  170G,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  2,  p.  304  sq.,  Erdniann,  pp.  4.'55-4;i(J.  —  Tr. 


i:,G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

of  a  point.  For  strictly  the  point  and  the  instant  are  not 
parts  of  time  or  space,  neither  have  they  parts.  They  are 
extremities  only. 

§  1().  Ph.  It  is  not  motion,  but  a  constant  succession  of 
ideas  which  gives  us  the  idea  of  duration. 

Th.  [A  succession  of  perceptions  awakes  in  us  the  idea  of 
duration,  but  it  does  not  make  it.  Our  perceptions  never  have 
a  succession  sufficiently  constant  and  regular  to  corresjjond  to 
that  of  time,  which  is  a  continuum  uniform  and  simple,  like  a 
straight  line.  Changing  perceptions  furnish  us  the  occasion 
for  thinking  of  time,  and  we  measure  it  by  uniform  changes. 
But  were  there  nothing  uniform  in  nature,  time  could  not  be 
determined,  as  space  likewise  could  not  be  determined  if  there 
were  no  fixed  or  immovable  body.  So  that  knowing  the  rules 
of  different  motions,  we  can  always  refer  them  to  the  uniform 
intelligible  motions,  and  see  beforehand  by  this  means  what 
will  happen  through  the  different  motions  taken  together. 
And  in  this  sense  time  is  the  measure  of  motion,  i.e.  uniform 
motion  is  the  measure  of  non-uniform  motion.] 

§  21.  Ph.  Xo  two  parts  of  duration  can  certainly  be  known 
to  be  equal;  [and  you  must  admit  that  observations  can  attain 
only  approximate  equality.]  After  exact  research  the  dis- 
covery has  been  made  that  there  is  really  an  inequality  in  the 
diurnal  revolutions  of  the  sun,  and  we  do  not  know  but  that 
the  annual  revolutions  are  unequal  also. 

Th.  [The  pendulum  has  made  us  realize  and  see  the  in- 
equality of  the  days  from  one  noon  to  another :  Solem  dicere 
falsiim  audet.  It  is  true  that  men  knew  this  already,  and  that 
this  inequality  has  its  rules.  As  for  the  annual  revolution, 
which  makes  good  the  inequalities  of  solar  days,  it  may  change 
in  the  course  of  time.  The  revolution  of  the  earth  about  its 
axis  which  is  commonly  attributed  to  the  x>rimum  mobile,^  is  our 
best  measure  up  to  the  present  time,  and  clocks  and  watches 
serve  to  divide  it  for  us.     Furthermore  this  same  daily  revolu- 

1  In  Aristotle's  philosophy,  rh  np^rov  ki.-oOi',  i.e.  God,  who,  himself  unmoved, 
is  the  necessary  first  and  unceasing  source  of  the  eternal  movement  of  the  uni- 
verse. Cf.  Metaphys.,  A,  G-10,  1071  sq.;  Phys.,  \^^.,  0,258''  10:  also  Zeller, 
Outlines,  §  56,  3,  and  Die  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  3d  ed.,  1879,  Vol.  4,  p.  358; 
Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  3d  ed.,  §  39;  Hegel,  Gesch.  d. 
Philos.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  2,  p.  289 sg.;  Benn,  The  Greek  Philosophers,  Vol.  1,  pp. 
348-350.  — Tr. 


cii.  xiv]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  157 

tion  of  the  earth  may  also  change  in  the  course  of.  time:  and 
if  any  pyramid  could  endure  long  enough,  or  if  we  should  build 
new  ones  we  could  perceive  it  by  observing  there  the  length  of 
pendulums  a  known  number  of  whose  beats  occurs  now  during 
this  revolution ;  we  could  also  know  in  some  way  the  change 
by  comparing  this  revolution  with  others,  as  with  those  of 
Jupiter's  satellites,  for  it  is  not  apparent  that,  if  there  is  any 
change  in  one  or  the  other,  it  will  always  be  proportional. 

Ph.  Our  measure  of  time  would  be  more  exact  if  we  could 
preserve  a  past  day  in  order  to  compare  it  with  the  days  to 
come,  as  we  preserve  the  measures  of  space. 

Th.  [But  instead  of  that  we  are  reduced  to  preserving  and 
watching  bodies  which  move  in  nearly  equal  times.  Also  we 
cannot  say  that  a  measure  of  space,  as  for  example,  an  ell 
which  is  preserved  in  wood  or  metal  remains  perfectly  the 
same.] 

§  22.  Ph.  Now  since  all  men  manifestly  measure  time  by 
the  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  it  is  very  strange  that  one 
is  not  permitted  to  define  time  as  the  measure  of  motion. 

Th.  [I  just  stated  (§  16)  how  that  should  be  understood.  It 
is  true  that  Aristotle  saysHhat  time  is  the  number  and  not  the 
measure  of  motion.  And  in  fact,  it  may  be  said  that  duration 
is  known  by  the  number  of  periodic  equal  motions  of  which 
one  begins  when  another  ends,  for  example,  by  so  many  revolu- 
tions of  the  earth  or  the  stars.] 

§  24.  Ph.  Nevertheless  to  anticipate  these  revolutions  and 
say  that  Abraham  was  born  in  the  year  2712  of  the  Julian  era, 
is  to  speak  as  unintelligibly,  as  if  you  counted  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  world,  although  you  suppose  that  the  Julian  era 
commenced  several  hundred  years  before  there  were  any  days, 
nights,  or  years  marked  by  any  revolution  of  the  sun. 

Th.  [This  vacuum  which  may  be  conceived  in  time,  indicates, 
like  that  of  space,  that  time  and  space  extend  to  the  possible  as 
Avell  as  to  the  actual.  Besides,  of  all  the  chronological  methods, 
that  of  reckoning  the  years  since  the  beginning  of  the  world  is 
the  least  convenient,  although  this  would  be,  without  touching 
upon  other  reasons,  only  because  of  the  great  difference  exist- 
ing between  the  Septuagint  and  the  Hebrew  text.] 

1  Pln/s.,  IV.,  11,  2inbi,  210b  8;  (•/.  Wallace,  OvtUncs  of  the  Philos.  of  Arin- 
totlc,  M  ed.,  §  44.  Wallace  quotes  the  Greek  of  the  first  passage  here  referred 
to.  —  Tr. 


ir.8  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.   ii 

§  IT).  Ph.  One  may  conceive  the  beginning  of  motion,  al- 
thongli  he  may  not  comprehend  that  of  duration  taken  in  all 
its  extension.  One  may  give  limits  to  the  body,  but  cannot  do 
it  with  regard  to  space. 

Th.  [It  is  as  I  just  said  that  time  and  space  indicate  the 
possibilities  beyond  the  supposition  of  existences.  Time  and 
space  are  of  the  nature  of  eternal  truths  which  consider  equally 
the  possible  and  the  actual.] 

§  27.  Ph.  In  fact  the  ideas  of  time  and  eternity  come  from 
the  same  source,  for  we  can  in  our  thought  add  certain  lengths 
of  duration  to  one  another  as  often  as  we  please. 

Th.  [Hut  in  order  to  draw  from  them  the  notion  of  eternity, 
it  is  necessary  to  think  besides  that  the  same  reason  always 
exists  for  going  farther.  It  is  this  rational  consideration  which 
achieves  the  notion  of  the  infinite  or  the  indefinite  in  possible 
progress.  Thus  the  senses  alone  cannot  suffice  to  cause  the 
formation  of  these  notions.  And  ultimately  it  may  be  said 
that  the  idea  of  the  absolute^  is  anterior  in  the  nature  of  things 
to  that  of  the  limits  which  are  added,  but  we  notice  the  former 
only  as  we  commence  with  Avhat  is  limited  and  strikes  our 
senses.] 

CHAPTER  XV 

OF    DURATION    AXD    EXPAXSIOX    CONSIDERED    TOGETHER 

§  4.  Ph.  One  admits  more  easily  an  infinite  duration  of 
time  than  an  infinite  expansion  of  space,  because  we  conceive 
infinite  duration  in  God,  and  attribute  extension  only  to  matter 
which  is  finite,  and  call  the  space  beyond  the  universe  imaginary. 
But  (§2)  Solomon  seems  to  have  other  thoughts  when,  speak- 
ing of  Go4r  he  says  :  the  heaven  and  the  heaven  of  heavens  can- 
not contain  Thee;-  and  for  myself  I  believe  that  he  magnifies 
too  highly  the  capacity  of  his  own  understanding  who  imag- 
ines he  can  extend  his  thoughts  farther  than  the  place  where 
God  exists. 

1  Tlie  idea  of  the  absolute  belongs  to  our  reason  as  such,  cf.  New  Esmiis, 
Bk.  II.,  chap.  17,  §  3,  Th.,  §  Ifi.  Th.,  though  we  first  heconie  aware  of  it  through 
our  consciousness  of  the  particuhir  ideas  of  the  reason  as  limitations  of  tie 
idea  of  the  absolute.  — Tr. 

2  1  Kings  8 :  27 ;  2  Chron.  G :  18.  —  Tr. 


C^ — // 

CH.  xvj  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  169 

Til.  If  God  were  extended,  he  would  have  parts.  But  dura- 
tion grants  these  only  to  his  works.  However  in  relation  to 
space  immensity  must  be  attributed  to  him,  which  gives  also 
parts  and  order  to  the  immediate  works  of  God.  He  is  the 
source  of  possibilities  as  of  actualities,  of  the  one  by  his 
essence,  of  the  other  by  his  will.  Thus  space  like  time  has 
its  reality  only  from  him,  and  he  can  fill  the  void  when  it 
seems  to  him  good.  Thus  it  is  that  in  this  respect  he  is 
everywhere.^] 

§  11.  Pli.  We  do  not  know  what  relations  spirits  have  with 
space,  nor  how  they  participate  therein.  But  we  know  that 
they  participate  in  duration. 

Th.  [All  finite  spirits  are  always  united  to  some  organic 
body,  and  they  represent  to  themselves  other  bodies  by  means 
of  relations  to  their  own.  Thus  their  relation  to  space  is  as 
evident  as  that  of  bodies.  For  the  rest,  before  leaving  this 
subject,  I  would  add  a  comparison  between  time  and  space  to 
those  which  you  have  given ;  viz. :  —  if  there  were  a  vacuum 
in  space  (as,  for  instance,  if  a  sphere  were  hollow  within),  you 
could  determine  its  size ;  but  if  there  were  a  vacuum  in  time, 
i.e.  a  duration  without  changes,  it  would  be  impossible  to 
determine  its  length.  Whence  it  comes  that  you  may  refute 
the  one  who  would  maintain  that  two  bodies,  between  which 
there  is  a  vacuum,  touch ;  for  geometry  defends  the  proposition 
that  two  opposite  poles  of  a  hollow  sphere  would  not  touch : 
but  you  cannot  refute  the  one  who  would  maintain  that  two 
worlds,  the  one  of  which  succeeds  the  other,  touch  as  to  dura- 
tion, so  that  the  one  necessarily  begins  when  the  other  ends, 
without  the  possibility  of  an  interval.  You  could  not  refute 
it,  I  say,  because  this  interval  is  indeterminable.  If  space 
were  only  a  line,  and  if  body  were  immovable,  it  would  no 
longer  be  possible  to  determine  the  length  of  the  vacuum 
between  two  bodies. 

1  God,  according  to  Leibnitz,  is  actxia  purus,  a  pure  spirit,  without  body  and 
without  extension.  All  other  beings  require  bodies.  His  onuiipresence  is 
dynamic.  Cf.  Nev)  Essays,  Bk.  H.,  chap.  1,  §  12,  Th.,  ante,  p.  113;  Letter  to 
Des  Bosses,  Oct.  16,  1706,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  2,  p.  325,  Erdmann,  p.  440,  b.  — Tr. 


1,J0  LKIHXirZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

OF    NUMBER 

§  4,  Ph.  In  numbers  ideas  are  both  more  precise  and  more 
accurately  to  be  distinguished  the  one  from  the  other  than  in 
extension,  wliere  you  cannot  observe  or  measure  each  equality 
and  each  excess  of  size  as  easily  as  in  numbers,  because  in 
space  we  cannot  by  thought  attain  a  certain  definite  smallness 
beyond  which  we  cannot  go,  like  the  unit  in  number. 

Th.  [That  should  be  understood  of  the  integer.  For  other- 
wise number  in  its  extent.,  comprising  the  fraction,  the  surd,  the 
transcendent,  and  all  that  may  be  assumed  between  two  inte- 
gers, is  proportional  to  the  line,  and  there  is  there  as  little  of 
a  minimum  as  in  the  continuum.  Thus  the  definition  of  num- 
ber as  a  multitude  of  units  is  in  place  only  among  the  integers. 
The  precise  distinction  of  ideas  in  extension  does  not  consist 
in  size:  for  to  distinguish  size  clearly  one  must  have  recourse 
to  integers,  or  to  other  (measures)  known  by  means  of  inte- 
gers ;  thus  from  continuous  quantity  it  is  necessary  to  recur  to 
discrete  quantity,  in  order  to  have  a  distinct  knowledge  of  size. 
Thus  the  modifications  of  extension,  when  not  joined  to-  num- 
bers, cannot  be  distinguished  by  figure,  taking  this  term  so 
generally  that  it  means  everything  which  makes  two  exten- 
sions dissimilar  the  one  to  the  other.] 

§  5.  Ph.  By  repeating  the  idea  of  a  unit  and  joining  it  to 
another  unit,  we  make  a  collective  idea,  which  we  call  ttoo. 
And  whoever  can  do  that  and  advance  always  by  adding  one 
more  to  the  last  collective  idea  to  which  he  gives  a  particular 
name,  can  count  so  long  as  he  has  a  set  of  names  and  sufiicient 
memory  to  retain  them. 

Th.  [By  this  means  alone  one  cannot  advance  very  far. 
For  memory  would  be  too  heavily  loaded  if  it  must  retain  an 
entirely  new  name  for  each  addition  of  a  new  unit.  That  is 
why  a  certain  order  and  a  certain  repetition  of  these  names  is 
necessary  by  recommencing  in  accordance  with  a  certain  pro- 
gression.] 

Ph.  The  different  modes  of  numbers  are  capable  of  no  other 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  161 

difference  than  that  of  more  or  less ;  [this  is  why  there  are 
simple  modes  like  those  of  extension.] 

Th.  [That  may  be  said  of  time  and  of  the  straight  line,  but 
not  of  figures,  and  still  less  of  numbers,  which  are  not  only 
different  in  size  but  further  unlike.  An  even  number  may  be 
divided  into  two  equal  numbers,  but  not  an  uneven.  Three 
and  six  are  triangular  numbers,  four  and  nine  are  squares, 
eight  is  a  cube,  etc.  And  this  principle  has  place  in  numbers 
still  more  than  in  figures,  for  two  unequal  figures  may  be  per- 
fectly similar  to  each  other,  but  never  two  numbers.  But  I 
am  not  astonished  that  you  are  often  deceived  thereupon,  be- 
cause one  does  not  commonly  have  a  distinct  idea  of  what  is 
similar  or  dissimilar.  You  see  then,  sir,  that  your  idea  or 
your  application  of  simple  or  mixed  modes  is  greatly  in  need  of 
correction.] 

§  6.  Ph.  [You  were  right  in  remarking  that  it  is  well  to 
give  numbers  their  own  names  to  be  retained.]  Thus  I  believe 
that  it  would  be  convenient  in  computation  to  say  a  billion  for 
brevity's  sake  instead  of  a  million  of  millions,  and  instead  of  a 
million  of  millions  of  millions,  or  a  million  of  billions,  to  say 
a  trillion,  and  thus  in  order  to  nonillions,  for  there  is  little 
need  of  going  farther  in  the  use  of  numbers. 

Th.  These  denominations  are  good  enough.  Let  x=10. 
That  posited,  a  million  will  be  x^,  a  billion  a;'',  a  trillion  x^^, 
etc.,  and  a  nonillion  x^^. 


CHAPTEE  XVII 

OF    INFINITY 

§  1.  Ph.  One  of  the  most  important  notions  is  that  of 
the  finite  and  the  infinite,  which  are  regarded  as  modes  of 
quantity. 

Th.  [Properly  speaking,  it  is  true  that  there  is  an  infinite 
number  of  things,  i.e.  that  there  are  always  more  of  them  than 
can  be  assigned.  But  there  is  no  infinite  number,  neither  line 
nor  other  infinite  quantity,  if  these  are  understood  as  veritable 
wholes,  as  it  is  easy  to  j^rove.  The  schools  have  meant  or  have 
been  obliged  to  say  that,  in  admitting  a  syncategorematic  in- 

M 


102  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

finite,'  us  they  call  it,  and  not  a  categorematic  infinite.  The 
true  infinite  exists,  strictly  speaking,  only  in  the  absolute,  which 
is  anterior  to  all  composition,  and  is  not  formed  by  the 
additions  of  parts.^] 

Fit.  Wlien  we  apply  our  idea  of  the  infinite  to  the  first 
Being,  we  do  it  primarily  in  respect  to  his  duration  and  ubi- 
quity, and,  more  figuratively,  to  his  power,  his  wisdom,  his 
goodness,  and  his  other  attributes. 

Th.  [Not  more  figuratively,  but  less  immediately,  because 
the  other  attributes  make  their  importance  known  through 
relation  to  those  into  which  enters  the  consideration  of 
parts.] 

§  2.  Ph.  I  thought  it  was  established  that  the  mind  regards 
the  finite  and  the  infinite  as  modifications  of  extension  ^  and 
duration. 

Th.  [I  do  not  find  that  it  has  been  established  that  the  con- 
sideration of  the  finite  and  the  infinite  takes  place  wherever 
there  is  bulk  and  magnitude.  And  the  true  infinite  is  not  a 
mod[lication,  it  is  the  absolute ;  on  the  contrary,  when  it  is 
modified,  it  is  limited  and  forms  a  finite.] 

§  3.  Ph.  We  have  believed  that  since  the  power  of  the 
mind  to  expand  without  limit  its  idea  of  space  by  new  addi- 
tions is  always  the  same,  it  is  thence  that  the  idea  of  an  infi- 
nite space  is  derived. 

Th.  [It  is  well  to  add  that  this  is  because  the  same  ratio  is 
seen  always  to  hold  good.  Let  us  take  a  straight  line  and 
prolong  it  until  it  is  double  the  length  of  the  first.  Now  it 
is  clear  that  the  second  line,  being  perfectly  similar  to  the 
first,  may  be  itself  doubled  in  order  to  have  a  third,  which  is 
still  similar  to  the  preceding  ;  and  the  same  ratio  holding 
good  always,  it  is  never  possible  to  stop  the  process  ;  thus 
the  line  may  be  prolonged  to  infinity,  so  that  the  consideration 
of  the  infinite  arises  from  that  of  similarity  or  from  the  same 
ratio,  and  its  origin  is  the  same  with  that  of  universal  and 
necessary  truths.     This  shows  us  how  what  gives  completion 

1  An  incompletely  defined  infinite,  capable  of  or  needing  still  further  defini- 
tion, but  infinite  only  so  far  as  it  cannot  really  be  defined,  the  indefinite- 
infinite  (infinitum-indefinitum).  —  Tr. 

■-  Cf.  ante,  pp.  16,  IT ;  also  ^etv  Essai/i^,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  13,  §  21.  — Tr. 

3  Locke  has:  "expansion,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  331  (Bohn's  ed.).— 


cii.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  163 

to  the  conception  of  this  idea  is  found  in  ourselves,  and  can- 
not come  from  the  experience  of  our  senses,  just  as  necessary 
truths  cannot  be  proved  by  induction  nor  by  the  senses.  The 
idea  of  the  absolute  is  in  us  internally,  like  that  of  being;  these 
absolutes  are  nothing  else  than  the  attributes  of  God,  and  it 
may  be  said  that  they  are  not  less  the  source  of  ideas,  because 
God  is  himself  the  principle  of  beings.  The  idea  of  the  abso- 
lute in  relation  to  space,  is  only  that  of  the  immensity  of 
God,  and  so  of  the  others.  But  you  deceive  yourself  in  wish- 
ing to  imagine  an  absolute  space  which  is  an  infinite  whole 
composed  of  parts ;  there  is  none  such,  it  is  a  notion  which 
implies  a  contradiction,  and  these  infinite  wholes,  and  their 
opposed  infinitesimals,  are  used  only  in  the  calculations  of 
geometers,  just  like  the  imaginary  roots  of  algebra.] 

§  6.  Ph.  [We  conceive  furthermore  a  magnitude  without 
understanding  thereby  parts  outside  of  parts.]  If  to  the  most 
perfect  idea  I  have  of  the  whitest  whiteness,  I  add  another  of 
an  equal  or  less  brilliant  whiteness  (for  I  cannot  add  the  idea 
of  a  whiter  than  I  have,  which  I  suppose  the  whitest  that  I 
actually  conceive),  it  neither  increases  nor  extends  my  idea  in 
any  way ;  therefore  the  different  ideas  of  whiteness  are  called 
degrees.'] 

Th.  [I  do  not  fully  understand  the  force  of  this  reasoning, 
for  nothing  prevents  me  from  receiving  the  perception  of  a 
whiter  whiteness  than  what  is  actually  conceived.  The  true 
reason  why  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that  whiteness  cannot  be 
infinitely  increased  is  because  it  is  not  an  original  quality  ; 
the  senses  give  us  only  a  confused  knowledge  of  it ;  and  when 
we  have  a  distinct  knowledge  of  it,  we  shall  see  that  it  arises 
from  the  structure,  and  is  limited  by  that  of  the  organ  of 
vision.  But  as  regards  original  or  distinctly  knowable  quali- 
ties, we  see  that  there  are  sometimes  means  of  going  to 
infinity,  not  only  in  the  case  of  extension  or,  if  you  prefer, 
diffusioyi  or  what  the  scholastic  philosophy  calls  partes  extra 
partes,  as  in  time  and  place,  but  also  in  the  case  of  intention  or 
degrees,  for  example,  as  regards  velocity.] 

§  8.  Ph.  We  have  no  idea  of  infinite  space,  and  nothing  is 
plainer  than  the  absurdity  of  an  actual  idea  of  an  infinite 
number. 

Th.    [I  am  of  the  same  opinion.     But  this  is  not  because  we 


l,;i  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk. 


cannot  have  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  but  because  the  infinite 
cannot  be  a  true  whole.] 

§  l(j.  Ph.  For  the  same  reason  we  have  then  no  positive 
idea  of  an  infinite  duration  or  of  eternity,  any  more  than  of 
innnensity. 

Th.  [1  believe  we  have  a  positive  idea  of  both,  and  this 
idea  is  a  true  one,  provided  it  is  not  conceived  as  an  infinite 
whole,  but  as  an  absolute  or  attribute  without  limits  which 
exists  in  reference  to  eternity,  in  the  necessity  of  the  existence 
of  God,  without  depending  upon  parts  and  without  the  notions 
being  formed  b}^  an  addition  of  time.  We  see  furthermore  in 
that  way,  as  I  have  said  already,  that  the  origin  of  the  notion 
of  the  infinite  comes  from  the  same  source  as  that  of  necessary 
truths.] 

CHAPTER   XVIII 

OF    OTHER    SIMPLE    MODES 

Ph.  There  are  besides  many  simple  modes  formed  from 
simple  ideas.  Such  are  (§  2)  modes  of  motion,  as  sliding, 
rolling;  those  of  sound  (§3)  which  are  modified  by  notes  and 
airs,  as  colors  by  degrees,  not  to  speak  of  tastes  and  smells 
(§6).  These  always^  have  neither  measures  nor  distinct 
names  any  more  than  in  the  case  of  the  complex  modes  (§  7), 
because  use  regulates  them,  and  we  will  speak  of  them  more 
fully  when  we  come  to  words. 

Th.  [The  majority  of  modes  are  not  sufficiently  simple  and 
can  be  reckoned  with  the  complex,  for  example,  to  explain  what 
sliding  and  rolling  is  besides  motion,  you  must  consider  sur- 
face-resistance.] 

CHAPTER   XIX 

OF    THE    MODES    OF    THIXKIXG 

§  1.  Ph.  [Let  us  pass  from  the  modes  which  come  from  the 
senses  to  those  given  us  by  reflection.]  Sensation  is,  so  to 
speak,  the  actual  entrance  of  ideas  into  the  understanding  by 

1  Locke:  "ordinarily,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  346  (Bohn's  ed.).  — Tk. 


cii.  xix]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  165 

means  of  the  senses.  When  the  same  idea  comes  again  into 
the  mind,  without  the  action  upon  our  senses,  of  tlie  external 
object  which  at  first  caused  it  to  spring  up,  the  act  of  the 
mind  is  called  remembrance;  if  the  mind  tries  to  recall  it,  and 
only  after  considerable  effort  finds  and  brings  it  to  view,  it  is 
recollection  (i-ec\ieiUement) }  If  the  mind  looks  upon  it  atten- 
tively for  a  long  time  it  is  contemplation;  when  the  idea  floats 
about  in  the  mind  without  any  attention  on  the  part  of  the 
understanding,  it  is  called  reverie.  When  the  mind  reflects 
upon  ideas,  which  present  themselves,  and  when  it,  so  to  speak, 
registers  them  in  its  memory,  it  is  attention ;  and  when  the 
mind  fixes  itself  upon  an  idea  with  much  application,  considers 
it  on  all  sides,  and  will  not  be  turned  aside  notwithstanding 
other  ideas  which  come  in  the  way,  we  call  it  study  or  intense- 
ness  of  thoixght.  Slee})  accompanied  by  no  dream  is  a  cessa- 
tion of  all  these  things  ;  and  dreaming  is  having  these  ideas  in 
the  mind  while  the  outer  senses  are  closed,  so  that  they  do 
not  receive  the  impressions  of  external  objects  with  their 
usual  quickness.  It  is,  I  say,  having  ideas  without  any  sug- 
gestion from  any  external  objects  or  known  occasion,  and 
apart  from  any  choice  or  determination  in  any  way  of  the 
understanding.  As  for  that  which  we  call  ecstasy,  I  leave 
others  to  judge  whether  it  is  not  dreaming  with  the  eyes  open. 
Th.  [It  is  well  to  clear  up  these  notions  and  I  will  try  to 
aid  in  the  work.  I  will  say  tlien  that  it  is  sensation  when  an 
external  object  is  perceived;  that  remembrance  consists  in  the 
repetition  without  the  reappearance  of  the  object ;  but  when 
we  know  we  have  had  it,  it  is  memory.  Recollection  (recueille- 
ment)  is  commonly  understood  in  a  sense  different  from  yours, 
viz.  :  as  a  state  in  which  we  disengage  ourselves  from  things 
in  order  to  apply  ourselves  to  some  meditation.  But  since 
there  is  no  word  known  to  me  corresponding  to  your  notion, 
sir,  one  may  apply  to  it  that  which  you  employ.  We  give 
attention  to  objects  which  we  distinguish  and  prefer  to  others. 
Attention  contimiing  in  the  mind,  whether  the  external  object 
continues  or  not,  and  even  whether  it  is  found  there  or  not,  is 

1  Cf.  below,  where  the  Frencli  "  recueillement,"  here  employed  as  a  trans- 
lation of  the  English  "recollection,"  is  sliown  to  have  a  different  meaning 
and  nse  from  that  of  the  English  word.  As  "  recueillement "  is,  however,  used 
as  an  equivalent  for  the  English  word,  I  have  translated  it  in  the  second  para- 
grai^h  accordingly.  —  Tr. 


lUG  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


consideration;  which,  tending  to  knowledge  without  reference 
to  action,  will  be  contemi^lation.  Attention,  whose  aim  is  to 
learn  {i.e.  the  attainment  of  knowledge  for  the  sake  of  keep- 
ing it),  is  study.  To  consider  in  order  to  form  a  plan  is  to 
meditate;  but  reverie  appears  to  be  nothing  else  than  following 
certain  thoughts  for  the  pleasure  one  takes  therein,  with  no 
other  end ;  this  is  why  reverie  may  lead  to  madness  ;  we  forget 
ourselves,  we  forget  the  die  cur  hie,  we  approach  dreams  and 
chimeras,  we  build  castles  in  Spain.  We  can  distinguish 
dreams  from  sensations  only  because  they  are  not  united  with 
them,  they  are  like  a  world  apart.  Sleep  is  a  cessation  of  sen- 
sations, and  in  this  way  ecstasy  is  a  very  deep  sleep  from  which 
one  finds  difficulty  in  being  awakened,  a  condition  which  arises 
from  some  internal  passing  cause,  which  is  added  in  order  to 
exclude  this  profound  sleep,  arising  from  some  narcotic  or 
from  some  continuous  injury  to  the  functions,  as  in  lethargy. 
Ecstasy  is  sometimes  accompanied  with  visions;  but  there  is 
vision  without  ecstasy,  and  vision  seems  to  be  nothing  but  a 
dream  wdiich  passes  for  a  sensation  just  as  if  it  acquainted  us 
with  the  truth  of  objects.  And  when  visions  are  divine,  there  is 
actually  truth  in  them,  which  may  be  known  for  instance  when 
they  contain  particular  prophecies  which  the  outcome  justifies.] 

§  4.  Ph.  From  the  different  degrees  of  intensity^  or  relaxa- 
tion of  the  mind,  it  follows  that  thought  is  the  act  and  not  the 
essence  of  the  soul. 

Th.  [Doubtless  thought  is  an  act  and  cannot  be  the  essence : 
but  it  is  an  essential  act,  and  all  substances  are  of  this  charac- 
ter. I  have  shown  above  that  we  always  have  an  infinite 
number  of  little  perceptions,  without  being  conscious  of  them. 
We  are  never  without  perceptions,  but  we  are  necessarily  often 
without  a];)perceptions,  viz.  :  when  there  are  no  distinct  per- 
ceptions. It  is  from  not  having  considered  this  important 
point  that  a  relaxed  philosophy,  as  little  noble  as  solid,  has 
prevailed  with  so  many  excellent  minds,  and  that  we  have 
hitherto  almost  ignored  that  which  is  most  beautiful  in  the 
soul.  This  is  also  the  reason  why  so  much  probability  has 
been  found  in  that  error,  which  teaches  that  souls  are  by 
nature  perishable.] 

1  Locke  has:  "iuteutiou  aud  remission,"  Philos.  Works  (Boliii's  ed.),  Vol. 
1,  p.  349.  — Tr. 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  167 

CHAPTER   XX 

OF    MODES    OF    PLEASURE    AND    PAIN" 

§  1.  Ph.  As  the  sensations  of  the  body,  like  the  thoughts 
of  the  mind,  are  either  indifferent  or  followed  by  pleasure  or 
pain,  the  ideas  of  them  cannot  be  described  any  more  than  all 
other  simple  ideas,  nor  can  the  words  which  serve  to  designate 
them  be  defined. 

Th.  [I  believe  that  there  are  no  perceptions  which  are 
wholly  indifferent  to  us,  but  it  is  enough  that  their  effect  be 
not  notable  in  order  that  they  may  be  thus  spoken  of,  for 
2)leasure  and  ^ja('M  appear  to  consist  in  a  notable  aid  or  impedi- 
ment. I  admit  that  this  definition  is  not  at  all  nominal  and 
that  one  may  give  none  at  all.] 

§  2.  Ph.  The  good  is  that  which  is  fitted  to  produce  and 
increase  pleasure  in  us,  or  to  diminish  and  cut  short  some 
pain.  Evil  is  fitted  to  produce  or  increase  pain  in  us,  or  to 
diminish  some  pleasure. 

Th.  [I  am  also  of  this  opinion.  The  good  is  divided  into 
the  virtuous,  the  agreeable,  and  the  useful,  but  ultimately  I 
believe  that  it  must  be  either  agreeable  itself,  or  serving  some- 
thing else  which  may  give  us  an  agreeable  feeling,  that  is  to 
say,  the  good  is  agreeable  or  useful,  and  virtue  itself  consists 
in  a  pleasure  of  mind.] 

§§  4,  5.  Ph.  From  pleasure  and  pain  come  the  passions. 
We  have  love  for  that  which  can  produce  pleasure,  and  the 
thought  of  sadness  or  of  pain  that  a  present  or  absent  cause 
can  produce  is  hatred.  But  hatred  or  love  which  relates  to 
beings  capable  of  happiness  or  misery  is  often  an  uneasiness  or 
delight  which  we  feel  to  be  produced  in  us  by  the  considera- 
tion of  their  existence  or  of  the  happiness  which  they  enjoy. 

Th.  [I  also  gave  nearly  this  definition  of  love  when  I 
explained  the  principles  of  justice,  in  the  preface  to  my 
"  Codex  juris  gentium  diplomaticus,"  ^  viz.  :  that  to  love  is  to 

1  Tlie  Codex  juris  fjentium  diplomaticus,  KJO;!,  :x  collection  of  public  acts 
and  treatises,  etc.  An  excerpt  from  the  Preface  of  this  work,  entitled  Dc  no- 
tionibus  juris  et  justitise,  is  given  by  Erdmann,  pp.  ll.S-120;  translation,  Dun- 
can, Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  note  48,  pp.  379-382. — Tr. 


1118  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

be  inclined  to  take  pleasure  in  the  complete  perfection  or  hap- 
piness of  the  object  loved.  And  for  that  reason  one  neither 
considers  nor  asks  for  any  other  pleasure  proper  than  that 
indeed  which  is  found  in  the  good  or  pleasure  of  the  one  who 
is  loved ;  but  in  this  sense  Ave  do  not,  properly  speaking,  love 
Avhat  is  incapable  of  pleasure  or  happiness,  and  we  enjoy  things 
of  this  nature  without  loving  them  for  that  reason,  unless  by 
a  prosopopoeia,  and  as  if  we  imagined  that  they  themselves 
enjoy  their  perfection.  It  is  not,  then,  properly  love  when 
one  says  that  he  loves  a  beautiful  picture  for  the  pleasure 
which  he  takes  in  feeling  its  perfections.  But  it  is  allowable 
to  extend  the  sense  of  terms,  and  their  usage  varies.  Philoso- 
phers and  theologians  even  distinguish  two  kinds  of  love,  viz. : 
the  love  which  they  call  the  love  of  complacency,  which  is 
nothing  but  the  desire  or  feeling  which  we  have  for  the  one 
who  gives  us  pleasure,  without  concerning  ou^rselves  whether 
he  receives  it;  and  the  love  of  benevolence,  which  is  the  feeling 
that  one  has  for  the  one  who,  by  his  pleasure  or  happiness, 
gives  us  some.  The  first  makes  us  have  in  view  our  pleasure 
and  the  second  that  of  another,  but  as  making  or  rather  consti- 
tuting ours,  for  if  it  did  not  reflect  upon  us  in  some  way  we 
could  not  concern  ourselves  with  it  since  it  is  impossible, 
although  they  affirm  it,  to  be  separated  from  the  good  proper. 
And  see  how  it  is  needful  to  understand  disinterested  or  non- 
mercenary  love,  in  order  to  reach  a  favorable  conception  of 
nobility  and  not  to  fall  meanwhile  into  the  chimerical  one.] 

§  6.  Ph.  The  uneasiness  (French  inquietude)  which  a  man 
feels  in  himself  at  the  absence  of  anything  which  if  present 
would  give  him  pleasure  is  called  desire.  Uneasiness  is  the  prin- 
cipal, not  to  say  the  only  stimulus  which  excites  human  industry 
and  action  for  whatever  good  is  proposed  to  man  ;  if  the  absence 
of  this  good  is  followed  by  no  displeasure  or  pain,  and  he  who  is 
deprived  of  it  can  be  content  and  at  his  ease  Avithout  its  pos- 
session, he  does  not  think  of  desiring,  and  less  still  of  making 
any  efforts  to  enjoy  it.  He  feels  for  this  kind  of  good  only  a 
bare  velleity,^  the  term  used  to  signify  the  lowest  kind  of  desire, 

1  Schaarschmidt  translates  the  French  "  velleite' "  by  the  German  "  "Willens- 
nei.scuiif?,"  i.e.  inclination  of  will.  The  term  is  borrowed  from  the  Scholastic 
"  velleitas,"  and  is  here  equivalent  to  imperfect  volition  (imperfecta  volitio) 
or  that  condition  of  the  soul  in  which  the  will,  though  not  in  a  state  of  indiffer- 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  169 

which  approaches  nearest  to  that  state  in  which  the  soul  finds 
itself  with  regard  to  anything  which  is  wholly  indifferent  to 
it,  when  the  displeasure  which  the  absence  of  anything  causes 
is  so  inconsiderable  that  it  is  carried  only  to  feeble  longings 
without  being  compelled  to  avail  itself  of  the  means  of  obtain- 
ing it.  Desire  is  moreover  extinguished  or  abated  by  the 
opinion  that  the  wished  for  good  cannot  be  obtained  in  propor- 
tion as  the  soul's  uneasiness  is  cured  or  allayed  by  that  con- 
sideration. [For  the  rest,  I  have  found  what  I  stated  to  you 
about  uneasiness  in  this  celebrated  English  author,  whose 
views  I  often  relate  to  you.  I  was  a  little  in  difficulty  as  to 
the  definition  of  the  English  word  uneasiness.  But  the  French 
translator  ^  whose  skill  in  the  fulfilment  of  this  task  cannot 
be  called  in  question,  remarks  at  the  foot  of  the  page  (chap. 
20,  §  6,)  that  by  this  word  the  English  author  understands 
the  state  of  a  man  not  at  his  ease,  the  lack  of  ease  and  of  tran- 
quillity of  soul,  which  in  this  regard  is  purely  passive,  and  that 
it  must  be  translated  by  the  (French)  word  inquietude,  which 
does  not  express  exactly  the  same  idea,  but  approaches  it  very 
nearly.  This  caution  (he  adds)  is  above  all  needful  with, 
regard  to  the  following  chapter,  "Of  Power,"  in  which  the 
author  reasons  much  upon  this  kind  of  uneasiness ;  for  if  you 
should  not  attach  to  this  word  the  idea  which  has  just  been 
indicated,  it  would  be  impossible  exactly  to  understand  the 
matters  treated  of  in  this  chapter  and  which  are  the  most 
important  and  delicate  in  the  entire  work.] 

Th.  [The  translator  is  right  and  the  reading  of  his  excellent 
author  shoAvs  me  that  this  consideration  of  uneasiness  is  a  capi- 
tal point,  in  which  this  author  has  particularly  shown  his  pene- 
trating and  profound  mind.  For  this  reason  I  gave  it  some 
attention,  and  after  having  well  considered  the  matter,  it  al- 
most appears  to  me  that  the  (French)  word  inquietude  {restless- 
ness), if  it  does  not  express  quite  the  meaning  of  the  author, 
nevertheless  sufficiently  agrees  with  the  nature  of  the  thing ; 
and  that  the  (English)  word  uneasiness,  if  it  indicated  a  dis- 
pleasure, fretfulness  (chagrin),  inconvenience,  in  a  word  some 
effective  pain,  would  not  suit  his  meaning.     For  I  should  pre- 

ence,  has  not  as  yet  sufficient  force  to  pass  over  into  action  (volitio).    Cf.  New 
Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  21,  §  5  s^.,  also  §  30,  Th.  — Tb. 
1  M.  Pierre  (Joste.  — Tr. 


170  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

fer  to  say  that  in  the  desire  in  itself  there  is  rather  a  disposi- 
tion and  preparation  for  pain  than  pain  itself.  It  is  true  that 
this  perception  sometimes  differs  from  that  which  is  iu  pain 
only  more  or  less,  but  it  is  the  degree  which  is  the  essence  of 
pain,  for  it  is  a  notable  perception.  The  same  is  also  seen  in 
the  difference  between  appetite  and  hunger,  for  when  the 
stomach's  irritation  becomes  too  strong  it  is  uncomfortable,  so 
that  we  must  also  apply  here  our  doctrine  of  perceptions  too 
small  to  be  perceived,  for  if  that  which  goes  on  in  us  when  we 
have  appetite  and  desire,  were  great  enough,  it  would  cause  us 
pain.  Hence  the  infinitely  wise  author  of  our  being  arranged 
it  for  our  good,  when  he  so  arranged  it  that  we  should  often 
be  in  ignorance  and  among  confused  perceptions,  in  order  to 
act  more  promptly  by  instinct,  and  in  order  not  to  be  disturbed 
by  too  distinct  sensations  of  a  multitude  of  objects,  which  do 
not  recur  immediately  and  the  nature  of  which  could  not  go  on 
to  obtain  their  ends.  How  many  insects  we  swallow  without 
noticing  them,  how  many  persons  we  see  who,  having  a  too 
penetrating  odor,  are  annoying,  and  how  many  disgusting  ob- 
jects Ave  should  see  if  our  vision  were  penetrating  enough.  It 
is  also  for  the  sake  of  this  skill  that  nature  has  given  us  the 
stimuli  of  desire,  like  the  rudiments  or  elements  of  pain,  or  so 
to  speak,  of  semi-pains,  or  (if  you  wish  to  speak  extravagantly 
in  order  to  express  yourself  more  forcibly)  the  little  impercep- 
tible pains,  in  order  that  we  might  enjoy  the  advantage  of  evil 
without  its  inconvenience ;  for  otherwise  if  this  perception 
were  too  distinct,  we  would  always  be  miserable  while  await- 
ing the  good,  while  this  continual  victory  over  these  semi- 
pains  which  are  felt  in  pursuing  our  desire  and  satisfying  in 
some  way  this  appetite,  or  this  longing,  gives  us  a  quantity  of 
semi-pleasures,  whose  continuity  and  mass  (as  in  the  continuity 
of  the  impulse  of  a  heavy  body  which  falls  and  acquires  im- 
petuosity) becomes  at  last  a  complete  and  genuine  pleasure. 
And  finally,  without  these  semi-pains  there  would  be  no  pleas- 
ure at  all,  nor  any  means  of  perceiving  that  something  aids 
and  relieves  us  while  there  are  some  obstacles  which  prevent 
us  from  putting  ourselves  at  ease.  It  is  furthermore  in  this 
that  we  recognize  the  affinity  of  pleasure  and  pain  which  Soc- 
rates in  Plato's  "  Phsedo,"  ^  noticed  when  his  feet  itched.  This 
1  P/iKdo,  60  b.— Tr. 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  171 

consideration  of  little  aids  or  little  releases  and  imperceptible 
delivei'ances  from  the  fixed  tendency,  whose  result  at  last  is  a 
notable  pleasure,  serves  also  to  give  a  more  distinct  knowl- 
edge of  the  confused  idea  which  we  have,  and  ought  to  have,  of 
lileasiire  and  of  pain  ;  just  as  the  sensation  of  heat  and  of  light . 
results  from  a  quantity  of  little  motions  which  express  those 
of  objects,  as  I  said  above  (chap.  9,  §  13)  and  differ  from  them 
only  in  appearance  and  because  we  ourselves  are  not  conscious 
of  this  analysis :  while  many  to-day  believe  that  our  ideas  of 
sense-qualities  differ  toto  genere  from  notions  and  from  all  that 
goes  on  in  objects,  and  are  something  primitive  and  inexpli- 
cable, and  indeed  arbitrary,  as  if  God  made  the  soul  sensible  of 
whatever  seems  good  to  him,  instead  of  what  goes  on  in  the 
body,  a  view  which  is  far  removed  from  the  true  analysis  of  our 
ideas.  But  to  return  to  uneasiness,  that  is  to  say  to  the  little 
imperceptible  solicitations  which  keep  us  always  in  suspense; 
these  are  confused  determinations,  so  that  often  we  do  not 
know  what  we  lack,  while  in  the  case  of  the  inclinations  and 
passions  we  at  least  know  what  we  ask  for,  although  confused 
perceptions  enter  also  into  their  methods  of  acting,  and  the 
passions  themselves  also  cause  this  uneasiness  or  longing. 
These  impulses  are  like  so  many  little  springs  which  try  to 
release  themselves,  and  which  make  our  machine  go.  And  I 
have  already  remarked  above  that  it  is  in  this  way  that  we  are 
never  indifferent,  when  we  most  appear  to  be  so,  for  example, 
in  turning  to  the  right  rather  than  to  the  left  at  the  end  of  a 
path.  For  the  side  we  take  arises  from  these  insensible  deter- 
minations, mixed  with  the  actions  of  objects  and  the  interior  of 
the  body,  which  makes  us  find  ourselves  more  at  ease  in  the  one 
or  the  other  manner  of  bestirring  ourselves.  The  pendulum  of 
a  clock  is  called  UnrnJie  in  German,  i.e.  uneasiness.  We  may 
say  that  the  same  condition  exists  in  our  body  which  can 
never  be  perfectly  at  ease ;  because  if  it  might  be  so,  a  new 
impression  of  objects,  a  slight  change  in  the  organs,  in  the  ves- 
sels and  in  the  viscera  would  at  once  alter  the  balance  and 
cause  them  to  make  some  slight  effort  to  put  themselves  again 
in  the  best  state  possible :  this  produces  a  perpetual  strife, 
which  causes,  so  to  speak,  the  uneasiness  of  our  clock,  so  that 
this  appellation  is  quite  to  my  taste.] 

§  6.  Ph.    Joy  is  a  pleasure  felt  by  the  soul  when  it  consid- 


LEIBNITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [i-.k. 


ers  the  possession  of  a  present  or  future  good  as  assured,  and 
we  are  in  jwstiession  of  a  good  when  it  is  so  in  our  power  that 
we  can  enjoy  it  when  we  wish. 

Th.  [Languages  hick  words  sufficiently  suitable  to  distin- 
guish kindred  notions.  Perhaps  the  Latin  gaudium  draws 
nearer  this  definition  of  joy  than  Icetitia,  which  is  also  trans- 
lated by  the  word  joy;  but  then  it  appears  to  me  to  signify  a 
state  in  which  pleasure  predominates  in  us,  for  during  the  pro- 
foundest  sorrow  and  in  the  midst  of  the  most  poignant  grief 
one  may  take  some  pleasure  as  in  drinking  or  hearing  music, 
but  the  unpleasant  feeling  predominates  and  so  in  the  midst 
of  the  most  acute  pain  the  mind  can  be  joyful,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  martyrs.] 

§  8.  Ph.  Sorroiv  is  an  uneasiness  of  the  soul  when  it 
thinks  of  a  lost  good  which  it  might  have  enjoyed  a  longer 
time,  or  when  it  is  tormented  by  an  actually  present  evil. 

Th.  [Not  only  the  actual  presence,  but  also  the  fear  of 
coming  evil  may  make  one  sad,  so  that  I  believe  the  definitions 
of  joy  and  sorrow  which  I  have  just  given  agree  the  better 
with  usage.  As  to  uneasiness,  there  is  in  pain  and  consequently 
in  sorrow  something  more :  and  there  is  uneasiness  even  in 
joy,  for  it  makes  a  man  awake,  active,  full  of  hope  to  go  farther. 
Joy  has  been  capable  of  causing  death  by  excess  of  emotion, 
and  then  there  was  in  it  still  more  than  uneasiness.] 

§  9.  Ph.  Hope  is  the  contentment  of  the  soul  which  thinks  of 
the  enjoyment  which  it  is  destined  probably  to  have  in  a  thing 
suited  to  give  it  pleasure.  §  10.  And  fear  is  an  uneasiness 
of  the  soul,  at  the  thought  of  a  future  evil  that  may  happen. 

Th.  [If  uneasiness  signifies  trouble  I  admit  that  it  always 
accompanies  fear ;  but  taking  it  as  this  insensible  spur  which 
pushes  us  on,  it  may  be  applied  also  to  hope.  The  Stoics 
regarded  the  passions  as  thoughts ;  thus  hope  was  to  them  the 
thought  of  a  future  good,  and  fear  the  thought  of  a  future 
evil.  But  I  prefer  to  say  that  the  passions  are  neither  satis- 
factions nor  displeasures,  nor  thoughts,  but  tendencies  or 
rather  modifications  of  the  tendency,  which  come  from  thought 
or  feeling  and  which  are  accompanied  by  pleasure  or  displeas- 
ure.] 

§  11.  Ph.  Despair  is  the  thought  one  has  that  a  good 
cannot  be  obtained,  causing  sometimes  pain  and  sometimes 
rest. 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  173 

Th.  [Despair  taken  as  passion  is  a  kind  of  strong  tendency 
wliicli  finds  itself  suddenly  arrested,  a  condition  which  causes 
a  violent  struggle  and  much  displeasure.  But  when  despair 
is  accompanied  with  rest  and  indolence  it  is  rather  a  thought 
than  a  passion.] 

§  12.  Ph.  Anger  is  the  uneasiness  or  discomposure  we  feel 
after  having  received  some  injury,  and  which  is  accompanied 
with  a  present  desire  to  avenge  ourselves. 

Th.  [Anger  seems  to  be  something  simpler  and  more  gen- 
eral, since  animals  are  susceptible  to  it  to  whom  no  injury  is 
done.  There  is  in  anger  a  violent  effort  tending  to  annul  the 
evil.  The  desire  for  vengeance  may  remain  when  one  is  in 
cold  blood  and  has  hatred  rather  than  anger.] 

§  13.  Ph.  Envy  is  the  uneasiness  (displeasure)  of  the  soul 
which  arises  from  the  consideration  of  a  good  we  desire,  but 
which  another  possesses,  who  in  our  opinion  should  not  have 
had  it  in  preference  to  ourselves. 

Th.  [According  to  this  notion  envy  would  be  always  a 
praiseworthy  passion  and  always  based  upon  justice,  at  least 
in  our  opinion.  But  I  know  not  whether  men  do  not  often  bear 
envy  towards  recognized  merit,  which  they  would  not  hesitate 
to  treat  ill,  if  they  had  the  power.  They  even  bear  envy 
toAvards  persons  regarding  a  good  which  they  themselves 
would  not  care  to  have.  They  would  be  content  to  see  them 
deprived  of  it,  without  thinking  of  profiting  from  their  despoil- 
ments, and  indeed  without  being  able  to  hope  for  it.  For 
some  good  things  are  like  pictures  painted  in  fresco,  which  can 
be  destroyed,  but  Avhich  cannot  be  taken  away.] 

§  17.  Ph.  Most  of  the  passions  mak6  in  many  persons 
impressions  on  the  body,  and  cause  therein  various  changes, 
but  these  changes  are  not  always  sensible ;  for  example,  shame 
which  is  a  felt  uneasiness  of  the  soul  when  it  comes  to  consider 
that  it  has  done  something  indecent  or  which  may  lessen  the  esti- 
mate others  have  of  us,  is  not  always  accompanied  by  blushing. 

Th.  [If  men  would  study  to  observe  more  closely  the  ex- 
ternal movements  which  accompany  the  passions,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  conceal  them.  As  for  shame,  it  is  worthy  of  consid- 
eration that  modest  persons  sometimes  feel  movemeuts  similar 
to  those  of  shame,  when  they  are  Avitnesses  only  of  an  indecent 
action.] 


174  J.KUkNirZ'S    CUITIQUK    OF   LOCKE  [hk.  ii 


CHAPTER  XXI 

OF    POWKK    AX1>    FREEDOM 

§  1.  Ph.  [The  mind  observing  how  one  thing  ceases  to  be, 
and  how  another  Avhich  was  not  before  comes  to  exist,  and 
concluding  that  there  Avill  be  in  the  future  parallel  cases,  pro- 
duced by  parallel  agents,  comes  to  consider  in  one  thing  the 
possibility  that  one  of  its  simple  ideas  may  be  changed,  and  in 
another  the  possibility  of  producing  that  change,  and  in  that 
Avay  the  mind  forms  the  idea  of  power.] 

Th.  [If  jyoioer  corresponds  to  the  Latin  2>otentia,  it  is  opposed 
to  act,  and  the  passage  from  poAver  to  act  is  change.  This  is 
Avhat  Aristotle  understands  by  the  word  motion,  when  he  says  ^ 
that  it  is  the  act  or  perhaps  the  actuation  of  that  which  is  in 
power.  It  may  be  said  then  that  power  in  general  is  the  possi- 
bility of  change.  Now  change  or  the  act  of  this  possibility, 
being  action  in  one  subject  and  passion  in  another,  there 
Avill  be  two  poAvers,  one  passive,  the  other  active.  The  active 
may  be  called  faculty,  and  perhaps  the  passive  might  be  called 
capacity  or  receptivity.  It  is  true  the  active  power  is  sometimes 
taken  in  a  more  complete  sense,  when  besides  the  simple  faculty 
there  is  a  tendency  ;  and  it  is  thus  that  I  take  it  in  my  dynamical 
considerations.^  The  Avord  force  might  be  appropriated  to  it 
in  particular ;  and  force  Avould  be  either  entelechy  or  effort ; 
for  entelechy  (although  Aristotle  takes  it  so  generally  that  it 
comprises  also  all  action,  and  all  effort)  appears  to  me  more 
appropriate  to  i^r/witYz-ue  acting  forces,  and  that  of  effort  to  the 
derivative.  There  is  even  also  a  kind  of  passive  p>ower  more 
particular  and  more  endoAved  Avith  reality ;  namely,  that  Avhich 
■  is  in  matter  in  which  there  is  not  only  mobility,  Avhich  is  the 

1  Cf.  PJuji<.  III.,  1,  201«10;  Meta-pMjs.  K,  9,  1065'' 16.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Be  primss  philosophise  emcndatione,  etc.,  published  in  the  "Acta 
Eruditorum,"  161)4,  p.  110  «(?.,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  4,  pp.  4(!8-470;  Erdmanu,  i^p. 
121-122 ;  Jacques,  Vol.  1,  pp.  452-454,  iu  French ;  translation,  Duncan.  Philns. 
Works  of  Leibnitz,  pp.  68-70;  also,  Beilage.May,  1702,  appended  l>y  Gerhanlt 
to  the  letter  to  Fahri,  Gerhardt,  Leibnizens  Math.  Schriften,  Vol.  6,  pp.  98  sq., 
especially  p.  101 ;  Specimen  dynamicum,  published  in  the  "  Acta  Erudi- 
torum," April,  1695,  Gerhardt,  Leibnizens  Math.  Schriften,  Vol.  6,  pp.  234  sq 
—  Tr. 


cii.  xxi]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  175 

capacity  or  receptivity  for  motion,  but  also  resistance,  which 
includes  impenetrability  ^nd  inertia.  Entelechies,  i.e.  primitive 
or  svibstantial  tendencies,  when  accompanied  by  perception,  are 
souls.] 

§  3.  Ph.  The  idea  of  power  expresses  some  kind  of  relation. 
But  what  one  of  our  ideas  of  whatever  kind  does  not  include  some 
relation?  Our  ideas  of  extension,  of  duration,  of  number,  do 
they  not  all  contain  in  themselves  a  secret  relation  of  parts  ? 
The  same  thing  is  noticed  in  a  still  more  visible  manner  in 
figure  and  motion.  Sensible  qualities,  what  are  they  but  the 
powers  of  different  bodies  in  relation  to  our  perception,  and 
do  they  not  depend  in  themselves  upon  bulk,  figure,  the  con- 
texture and  motion  of  the  parts  ?  which  puts  a  kind  of  rela- 
tion between  them.  Thus  our  idea  of  power  may  very  well  be 
placed  in  my  opinion  among  the  other  simple  ideas. 

Th.  [At  bottom  the  ideas  which  we  have  just  enumerated 
are  composite ;  those  of  sensible  qualities  hold  their  place 
among  the  simple  ideas  only  because  of  our  ignorance,  and  the 
others  which  we  know  distinctly,  keep  their  place  only  by  an 
indulgence  which  it  were  better  they  should  not  have.  It  is 
almost  the  same  with  regard  to  the  common  axioms,  which 
might  be  and  which  deservedly  should  be  proved  among  the 
theorems,  and  which  are  allowed  to  pass  nevertheless  as 
axioms,  as  if  they  were  primitive  truths.  This  indulgence 
does  moi'e  harm  than  we  think.  It  is  true  we  are  not  always 
in  a  position  to  do  without  it.] 

§  4.  Ph.  If  we  consider  the  matter  carefully,  bodies  do  not 
furnish  us  by  means  of  the  senses  Avith  so  clear  and  so  distinct 
an  idea  of  active  power  as  that  which  we  have  from  reflection 
upon  the  workings  of  our  mind.  There  are,  I  believe,  but  two 
kinds  of  actions  of  which  we  have  an  idea,  viz. :  thinking  and 
motion.  Of  thought,  body  gives  us  no  idea,  and  it  is  only 
through  reflection  that  we  have  it.  Neither  have  we  from  the 
body  any  idea  of  the  beginning  of  motion. 

Th.  [These  considerations  are  most  excellent,  and  although 
here  I  take  thought  in  a  manner  so  general  that  it  includes  all 
perception,  I  do  not  wish  to  dispute  the  use  of  terms.] 

Ph.  When  the  body  is  itself  in  motion,  this  motion  in  the 
body  is  an  action  rather  than  a  passion  ;  but  when  a  billiard- 
ball  yields  at  the  stroke  of  the  cue,  it  is  not  an  action  of  the 
ball,  but  a  simple  passion. 


170  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


Th.  [There  is  something  to  be  said  upou  that  point,  for  the 
bodies  did  not  receive  motion  in  the  impact,  according  to  the 
hxws  observed  therein,  if'  they  already  had  not  motion  in 
themselves.     But  pass  we  now  this  point.] 

Ph.  The  same  is  true  when  it  pushes  another  ball  which  it 
tinds  in  its  way  and  puts  in  motion ;  it  only  communicates  to 
it  the  motion  it  had  received,  and  itself  loses  just  as  much. 

Th.  [I  see  that  this  erroneous  view,  which  the  Cartesians 
have  brought  into  fashion,  as  if  bodies  lost  as  much  motion  as 
they  give  to  others,  which  is  to-day  overthrown  by  experi- 
ments and  by  reason,  and  abandoned  moreover  by  the  illustri- 
ous author  of  "  The  Search  after  Truth,"  ^  who  has  published 
a  brief  treatise  for  the  express  purpose  of  retracting  it,  still 
gives  scholars  occasion  to  be  mistaken  in  constructing  trains 
of  reasoning  upon  so  ruinous  a  foundation.] 

Ph.  The  transfer  of  motion  gives  us  only  a  very  obscure 
idea  of  an  active  power  of  motion  in  the  body  so  long  as  we 
see  nothing  else  than  that  the  body  transfers  motion  but  does 
not  in  any  way  produce  it. 

Th.  [I  do  not  know  whether  they  here  maintain  that  motion 
passes  from  subject  to  subject,  and  that  the  same  motion (?V?em 
numero)  is  transferred.  I  knoAV  that  some,  contrary  to  the 
view  of  the  entire  scholastic  philosophy,  have  gone  that  far, 
among  others  the  Jesuit,  Father  Casati.  But  I  doubt  whether 
this  is  your  view  or  that  of  your  scholarly  friends,  ordinarily  far 
removed  from  such  fancies.  If,  however,  the  same  motion  is 
not  transferred,  we  must  admit  that  a  new  motion  is  produced 
in  the  body  which  receives  it :  thus  the  one  which  gives 
would  really  act,  although  it  would  be  passive  at  the  same 
time  while  losing  its  force.  For  although  it  is  not  true  that 
the  body  loses  as  much  motion  as  it  gives,  it  is  always  true 
that  it  loses  some  motion  and  that  it  loses  as  much  force  as  it 
gives,  as  I  have  elsewhere  explained,  so  that  it  is  always  nec- 
essary to  admit  in  it  force  or  active  power.  I  understand 
power  in  the  more  noble  sense  which  I  have  explained  a  little 
before,  in  which  tendency  is  united  with  faculty.    Nevertheless, 

1  Malebranclie,  De  la  Recherche  de  la  Verite,  Hui.  The  "brief  treatise" 
referred  to  is  entitled:  Traite  de  la  communication  du  mot^ement,  and  may 
be  found  in  Vol.  3  of  the  German  translation  of  Malebranclie's  works,  Halle, 
1777-80.  — Tr. 


cii  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  177 

I   am    always    agreed   with    you,   that   the   clearest   idea   of 
active   power   comes   to  us  from  the  mind.      It  is  also  only      / 
in  things  which  are  analogous  to  the  mind,  that  is  to  say,  in 
entelechies,  for  matter  properly  speaking  shows  only  passive 
power.] 

§  5.  Ph.  We  find  in  ourselves  the  power  to  begin  or  not  to 
begin,  to  continue  or  to  end  many  actions  of  our  soul  and 
many  motions  of  our  body,  and  this  simply  by  a  thought  or 
choice  of  our  mind,  which  determines  and  commands,  so  to 
speak,  that  such  a  particular  action  be  done  or  not  done.  This 
power  we  call  Will.  The  actual  use  of  this  power  is  called 
Volition ;  the  cessation  or  production  of  the  action  which  fol- 
lows such  a  command  of  the  soul,  is  called  voluntary,  and  all 
action  done  without  such  direction  of  the  soul  is  called  invol- 
untary. 

Th.  [I  find  all  that  very  good  and  just.  However,  to  speak 
more  fairly,  and  to  go  perhaps  a  little  farther,  I  will  say  that 
volition  is  the  effort  or  tendency  (conatus)  towards  what  is 
considered  good  and  against  that  considered  bad,  so  that  this 
tendency  results  immediate^  from  the  consciousness  one  has 
of  them.  And  the  corollary  of  this  definition  is  this  cele- 
brated axiom :  that  will  and  power  united,  action  follows, 
since  from  all  tendency  action  follows  when  it  is  not  hin- 
dered. Thus  not  only  the  internal  voluntary  actions  of  our 
minds  follow  from  this  conatus,  but  also  the  external,  that  is  to 
say,  the  voluntary  movements  of  our  bodies,  in  virtue  of  the 
union  of  the  soul  and  the  body,  the  reason  of  which  I  have 
elsewhere  given.  There  are  besides  the  efforts  resulting  from 
the  insensible  perceptions,  of  which  we  are  not  conscious,  . 
which  I  prefer  to  call  appetitions  rather  than  volitions  (al-  ■ 
though  there  are  also  apperceptible  appetitions),  for  those 
actions  alone  are  called  voluntary  of  which  we  may  be  con- 
scious, and  upon  which  our  reflection  may  fall  when  they  fol- 
low the  consideration  of  good  and  evil.] 

Ph.  The  power  of  perceiving  we  call  understanding :  it  in- 
cludes the  perception  of  ideas,  the  perception  of  the  signifi-i 
cation  of  signs,  and,  finally,  the  perception  of  the  agreement 
or  disagreement  existing  between  any  of  our  ideas. 

Th.    [We    perceive   many   things   within   and   without   us,  H 
which  we  do  not  understand,  and  we  understand  them,  when 

N 


178  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

wo  have  distinct  ideas  of  them,  together  with  the  power  of 
reflection  and  of  drawing  from  them  necessary  truths.  Ani- 
mals therefore  have  no  understanding,  at  least  in  this  sense, 
although  they  have  the  faculty  of  perceivijig  impressions 
more  remarkable  and  more  distinct,  as  theiisoar  perceives  a 
person  who  shouts  at  him,  and  goes  straight  for  this  person,  of 
whom  he  had  had  before  only  a  cloudy  perception,  but  con- 
fused as  of  all  other  objects  which  fell  under  his  eyes,  and 
whose  rays  struck  his  crystalline  humor.  Thus  in  my  view 
the  understanding  corresponds  to  what  among  the  Latins  is 
called  intelledus,  and  the  exercise  of  this  faculty  is  called 
intellection,  which  is  a  distinct  perception  united  with  the  fac- 
ulty of  reflection,  which  is  not  in  animals.  Every  perception 
united  with  this  faculty  is  a  thought,  which  I  do  not  accord  to 
the  animals  any  more  than  understanding,  so  that  we  may  say 
there  is  intellection  when  thought  is  distinct.  For  the  rest, 
the  perception  of  the  signification  of  signs  does  not  deserve 
to  be  distinguished  here  from  the  perception  of  the  ideas 
signified.] 

§  6.  Fh.  It  is  commonly  said  that  the  understanding  and 
the  will  are  two  faculties  of  the  soul,  a  term  suitable  enough  if 
used  as  we  ought  to  use  all  words,  taking  care  that  they  cause 
no  confusion  to  spring  up  in  the  thoughts  of  men,  as  I  suspect 
has  happened  here  in  the  case  of  the  soul.  And  when  we  are  told 
that  the  will  is  that  superior  faculty  of  the  soul  which  rules 
and  orders  all  things,  that  it  is  or  is  not  free,  that  it  deter- 
mines the  lower  faculties,  that  it  follows  the  dictamen  of  the 
understanding ;  although  these  expressions  may  be  understood 
in  a  sense  clear  and  distinct,  I  fear,  however,  that  they  have 
caused  to  arise  in  many  persons  the  confused  idea  of  so  many 
distinct  agents  acting  distinctly  in  us. 

Th.  The  question  has  exercised  the  scholastics  a  long  time 
whether  there  is  a  real  distinction  between  the  soul  and  its 
faculties,  and  whether  one  faculty  is  really  distinct  from 
another.  The  Realists  have  said  yes,  and  the  Xominalists, 
no,  and  the  same  question  has  been  agitated  as  to  the  reality 
of  many  other  abstract  entities,  which  should  meet  the  same 
fate.  But  I  do  not  think  we  need  here  decide  this  question 
and  plunge  into  these  difficulties,  although  I  remember  that 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  179 

Episcopius  ^  found  it  of  such  importance  that  he  thought  he 
coukl  not  maintain  the  freedom  of  man  if  the  faculties  of  the 
soul  were  real  entities.     However,  if  they  were  real  and  dis- 
tinct entities,  they  can  pass  for  real  agents  only  in  extravagant  i 
speech.     It  is  not  the  faculties  or  qualities  which  act,  but  sub-  ) 
stances  by  means  of  the  faculties.  / 

§  8.  Ph.  So  long  as  man  has  the  power  to  think  or  to 
refrain  from  thinking,  to  move  or  not  to  move  according  to 
the  preference  or  choice  of  his  own  mind,  so  long  he  is  free. 

Th.  [The  term  freedom  is  very  ambiguous.  There  is  free- 
dom of  right  and  of  fact.  As  regards  that  of  right  a  slave  is 
not  at  all  free,  a  subject  is  not  wholly  free,  but  a  poor  man  is 
as  free  as  a  rich  man.  Freedom  of  fact  consists  either  in  the 
power  to  loill  as  one  ought,  or  in  the  power  to  do  what  one  wills. 
It  is  of  the  freedom  to  do  of  which  you  speak,  and  it  has  its 
degrees  and  varieties.  Generally  he  who  has  the  most  means 
is  the  freest  to  do  what  he  wills  :  but  in  2^cirticular  freedom  is 
understood  of  the  use  of  things  which  are  ordinarily  in  our  io^ 
power,  and  above  all,  of  the  free  use  of  our  body.  Thus  the  ^  (p'' 
prison  and  the  diseases  which  prevent  us  from  giving  to  our 
body  and  our  limbs  the  motion  we  wish  and  which  we  can 
ordinarily  give  them  detract  from  our  freedom :  thus  a  prisoner 
is  not  at  all  free,  and  a  paralytic  has  no  free  use  of  his  limbs. 
Freedom  of  ivill  is  furthermore  understood  in  two  different 
senses.  The  first  is  when  it  is  opposed  to  the  imperfection  or 
the  slavery  of  the  spirit,  which  is  a  coaction  or  constraint,  but 
internal  like  that  arising  from  the  passions.  The  other  sense 
has  place  when  freedom  is  opposed  to  necessity.  In  the  first 
sense  the  Stoics  said  that  the  wise  man  alone  is  free ;  and  in 
fact  the  spirit  is  not  at  all  free  when  it  is  filled  with  a  great 
passion,  for  one  cannot  then  will  as  he  should,  that  is  to  say, 
with  the  deliberation  which  is  requisite.  Thus  God  alone  is 
perfectly  free,  and  created  spirits  are  so,  only  to  the  extent 
that  they  are  superior  to  their  passions.  And  this  freedom 
concerns  properly  our  understanding.  But  the  freedom  of 
spirit,  opposed  to  necessity,  concerns  the  naked  will,  and  in  so 
far  as   it   is  distinguished  from  the  understanding.     This  is 

1  Simon  Episcopius,  1583-1G43.  The  piece  referred  to  is  the  De  libero  arhi- 
trio,  particiilarly  the  second  chapter;  it  is  found  in  his  Opera  Theologica,  Yo\. 
1,  p.  198,  Div.  II.,  2d  ed.    London  and  Rotterdam,  1GG5-1(378,  2  vols.,  foh  — Tk. 


ISO 


LKIUNI'IZ'S   CUITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [inc.  ii 


what  is  called  free-ioill  (franc-arbilre)  and  it  consists  in  this, 
that  wo  will  tiiat  the  strongest  reasons  or  impressions  which 
the  understanding  presents  to  the  will  do  not  prevent  the  act 
of  the  will  from  being  contingent,  and  do  not  give  it  an  abso- 
lute, and,  so  to  speak,  metaphysical  necessity.  And  it  is  in 
this  sense  that  I  am  accustomed  to  say  that  the  understanding 
can  determine  the  will,  according  to  the  prevalence  of  percep- 
tions and  reasons,  in  a  manner  which,  even  where  it  is  certain 
and  infallible,  inclines  without  compelling.^ 

§  9.  Ph.  It  is  well  also  to  consider  that  no  one  has  yet 
thought  of  taking  as  a/ree  agent  a  ball,  whether  in  motion  by 
the  stroke  of  a  racket  or  at  rest.  This  is  because  we  do  not 
conceive  of  a  ball  as  thinking  or  as  having  any  volition,  which 
makes  it  prefer  motion  to  rest. 

Th.  [If  that  were  free  which  acts  without  hindrance,  a  ball 
once  in  motion  in  a  level  horizon  would  be  a  free  agent.  But 
Aristotle  has  already  well  remarked  that  to  call  acts  free,  Ave 
demand  not  only  that  they  be  spontaneous,  but  further  that 
they  be  deUherate.^~\ 

Ph.  This  is  why  we  consider  the  motion  or  rest  of  balls 
under  the  idea  of  a  necessary  thing. 

Til.  [The  appellation  necessary  requires  as  much  circumspec- 
tion as  that  oi  free.  This  conditional  truth,  viz.:  siLpposing  the 
ball  to  be  in  motion  in  a  level  horizon  ivithout  hindrance,  it  ivill 
continue  the  same  motion,  may  pass  as  in  some  sort  necessar}', 
although  at  bottom  this  consequence  is  not  entirely  geometri- 
cal, being  only  presumptive,  so  to  speak,  and  based  upon  the 
wisdom  of  God  who  changes  not  his  influence  without  a 
reason,  which  it  is  presumed  is  not  at  present  to  be  found. 
But  this  absolute  proposition :  the  ball  here  is  noiv  in  motion  in 
this  p?a»e,  is  only  a  contingent  truth,  and  in  this  sense  the  ball 
is  a  contingent,  not  a  free,  agent.^ 

§  10.  Ph.  Suppose  that  a  man,  while  in  a  profound  sleep,  is 
carried  into  a  room,  wdiere  is  a  person,  whom  he  much  longs  to 

1  Cf.  Essais  de  TModic^e,  Pt.  I.,  §§  51,  52,  Gerhardt,  6, 1.30-131 ;  Erdmann, 
517;  also  Eduard  Dillmann,  Eine  neue  Larstellung  der  Leibnizischen  Monad- 
enlehre  auf  Grund  der  Quellen,  pp.  41()  sq. ;  Leipzig:  0.  R.  Reisland,  1891.— 
Tr. 

2  Cf.  Eth.  Nic,  IIL,  4,  ad  fin.,  5;  1111  sq.;  translation  by  F.  H.  Peters, 
M.A.,  London:  C.  Kegan  Paul  &  Co.,  1881.  — Tr. 


cir.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  181 

see  and  to  meet,  and  that  the  door  is  locked  upon  him ;  this 
man  wakes  up  and  is  delighted  to  find  himself  with  this  per- 
son, and  lives  thus  in  the  room  with  pleasure.  I  think  no  one 
presumes  to  doubt  that  he  remains  voluntarily  in  that  place. 
Yet  he  is  not  at  liberty  to  go  out  if  he  wishes.  Thus  freedom 
is  not  an  idea  belonging  to  volition. 

Th.  [I  find  this  example  very  well  chosen  to  show  that  in  a 
sense,  an  act  or  a  state  may  be  voluntary  without  being  free. 
Still  when  philosophers  and  theologians  dispute  upon/?-ee  loill, 
they  have  altogether  another  sense  in  view.] 

§  11.  Ph.  Ereedom  is  wanting  when  paralysis  prevents  the 
limbs  from  obeying  the  determination  of  the  mind,  although, 
in  the  case  of  the  paralytic  even,  to  remain  sitting  still  might 
be  voluntary  so  long  as  lie  prefers  sitting  still  to  changing 
his  place.  Voluntary  is  not  then  opposed  to  necessary,  but  to 
involuntary. 

Til.  [This  precision  of  expression  would  be  agreeable  enough 
to  me,  but  usage  is  far  from  it ;  and  those  who  oppose  freedom 
to  necessity,  mean  to  speak  not  of  external  acts,  but  of  the  act 
itself  of  willing.] 

§  12.  Ph.  A  man  awake  is  no  more  at  liberty  to  think  or 
not  to  think,  than  he  is  at  liberty  to  prevent  or  not  to  prevent 
his  body  from  touching  any  other  body.  But  to  transfer  his 
thoughts  from  one  idea  to  another  is  often  within  his  deter- 
mination. And  in  that  case  he  is  as  much  at  liberty  as  regards 
his  ideas,  as  he  is  as  regards  the  bodies  upon  which  he  rests, 
being  able  to  transfer  himself  from  one  to  the  other  as  the 
fancy  arises.  There  are,  however,  ideas,  which,  like  certain 
(bodily)  movements,  are  so  fixed  in  the  mind,  that,  in  certain 
circumstances,  you  cannot  avoid  them  whatever  effort  you 
make.  A  man  upon  the  rack  is  not  at  liberty  to  put  aside  the 
idea  of  pain,  and  sometimes  a  violent  passion  acts  upon  our 
mind  as  the  most  violent  wind  acts  upon  our  body. 

Til.  [There  is  order  and  connection  in  ideas,  as  there  is  in 
(bodily)  movements,  for  the  one  corresponds  perfectly  to  the 
other,  although  the  determination  in  the  movements  be  uncon- 
scious and  free,  or  with  choice  in  the  thinking  being  whom  good 
and  evil  only  cause  to  incline  withoiit  forcing  him.  For  the  soul, 
Avhile  representing  bodies,  preserves  its  (own)  perfections,  and 
although  dependent  upon  the  body  (in  seizing  the  good)  in  the 


lt,2  LElliNliZ'S   CKiriQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk. 


vDluiitary  acts,  it  is  independent  and  makes  the  body  depend 
upDn  itself  in  others.  lUit  this  dependence  is  only  metaphysical, 
anil  consists  in  the  considerations  which  God  has  for  the  one 
while  ruling  the  other,  or  rather  for  both,  according  to  the 
original  perfections  of  each  ;  whilst  physical  dependence  would 
consist  in  an  immediate  influence,  which  the  one  would  receive 
from  the  other  on  which  it  depends.  For  the  rest,  there  come 
to  us  involuntary  thoughts,  partly  from  outside  by  means  of 
objects  which  strike  our  senses,  and  partly  from  within  by 
reason  of  the  impressions  (often  insensible)  which  remain 
from  preceding  perceptions  whose  action  continues  and  which 
mingle  with  those  which  appear  for  the  first  time.  As  regards 
these  we  are  passive,  and  even  when  we  wake  up,  images 
(under  which  designation  I  include  not  only  the  representa- 
tions of  figures,  but  also  those  of  sounds  and  other  sensible 
qualities)  come  to  us,  as  in  dreams,  without  being  called. 
The  German  language  calls  them.  Jliegende  Gedaiiken,  that  is, 
flying  thoughts  {pensees  volantes),  which  are  not  within  our 
control,  and  among  which  there  are  sometimes  many  absurdi- 
ties which  raise  scruples  in  good  people,  and  furnish  exercise 
to  casuists  and  directors  of  consciences.  It  is  as  in  the  magic 
lantern,  which  makes  figures  appear  upon  the  wall  according 
as  something  within  is  turned.  But  our  mind,  perceiving 
some  image  which  recurs  to  it,  may  say ;  stop  there,  and,  so  to 
speak,  arrest  it.  Moreover,  the  mind  enters,  as  seems  good 
to  itself,  into  certain  trains  of  thought,  Avhich  lead  it  on  to 
others.  But  this  is  true  only  when  internal  or  external  impres- 
sions do  not  at  all  prevail.  It  is  true  that  in  this  thing  men 
differ  very  much,  both  according  to  their  temperament  and 
according  as  they  have  exercised  their  control,  so  that  one  can 
master  impressions  where  another  lets  them  go. 

§  13.  Ph.  Necessity  takes  place  wherever  thought  is  wholly 
wanting.  And  this  necessity,  when  found,  is  an  agent  capable 
of  volition,  and  when  the  commencement  or  continuation  of 
any  action  is  contrary  to  the  preference  of  his  mind,  I  call  it 
compulsion;  when  the  hindering  or  stopping  of  an  action  is 
contrary  to  his  volition,  I  may  call  it  restraint.  Agents  which 
have  absolutely  neither  thought  nor  volition  are  in  all  respects 
necessary  agents. 

Th.    [It   seems   to   me   that,    properly   speaking,    although 


cii.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  183 

volitions  are  contingent,  necessity  should  not  be  opposed  to 
volition,  but  to  contingency,  as  I  have  already  remarked  in  §  9, 
and  that  necessity  should  not  be  confounded  with  determina- 
tion, for  there  is  no  less  connection  or  determination  in  thoughts 
than  in  movements  (to  be  determined  being  a  wholly  different 
thing  from  being  pushed  or  forced  by  compulsion).     And  if 
we  do  not  always  notice  the  reason  which  determines  us  or 
by  which  we  determine   ourselves,   it  is   because  we  are  as 
little  capable  ourselves  of  perceiving  the  entire  play  of  our 
mind  and  its  thoughts,  very  often  imperceptible  and  confused, 
as  we  are  of  recognizing  all  the  machinery  which  nature  causes 
to  play  in  the  body.     Thus,  if  by  necessity,  you  mean  the  cer- 
tain determination  of  man,  which  a  perfect  knowledge  of  all 
the  circumstances  within  and  without  could  make  a  perfect 
mind  foresee,  it  is  certain  that  thoughts  being  as  determined 
as  the  motions  they  represent,  every  free  act  would  be  a  neces- 
sary act.     But  necessity  must  be  distinguished  from  contingency  » . 
although  determined ;  and  not  only  are  contingent  truths  not  < 
at  all  necessary,  but  fiirther,  their  connections  are  not  always  , 
of  an  absolutely  necessary  character ;  for  it  must  be  admitted 
that  there  is  some  difference  in  the  manner  of  determining   ' 
between  consequences  which  take  place  in  necessary  matter 
and  those  which  take  place  in  contingent  matter.     Geometrical  . 
and  metaphysical  consequences  necessitate,  but  physical  and  . 
moral  incline  without  necessitating;  the  physical  even  having 
something  of  the  moral  and  voluntary  as  related  to  God,  since 
the  laws  of  movement  have  no  other  necessity  than  that  of  (the  ; 
principle,  or  choice,  of — Tr.)  the  best.    Now  God  chooses  freely 
although  he  is  determined  to  choose  the  best;  and  as  bodies 
themselves  do  not  choose  (God  having  chosen  for  them),  usage 
has  decided  that  they  be  called  necessary  agents,  to  which  I  am' 
not  opposed,  provided  we  do  not  confound  the  necessary  and 
the  determined,  and  do  not  suppose  that  free  beings  act  in 
an  indeterminate  manner,  an  error  which  has  prevailed  in  cer- 
tain minds  and  which  destroys  the  most  important  truths,  even 
this  fundamental  axiom:  that  nothing  happens  without  reason,  .'. 
without  which  neither  the  existence  of  God  nor  other  great   • 
truths  could  be  satisfactorily  demonstrated.     As  for  compulsion 
it  is  well  to  distinguish  two  kinds,  the  one  physical,  as  when 
a  man  is  carried  in  spite  of  himself  into  prison,  or  thrown 


Ksj  LLLBNITZ'S   CIUTIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [uk.  ii 

ilown  a  precipice ;  the  other  moral,  as,  for  example,  the  con- 
straint of  a  greater  evil,  and  this  act,^  although  in  a  sense 
forced,  does  not  cease  to  be  voluntary.^  One  may  be  compelled 
also,  by  the  consideration  of  a  greater  good,  as  when  a  man  is 
tempted  by  proposing  to  him  a  too  great  advantage,  although  it 
is  not  customary  to  call  this  constraint.] 

§  14.  Ph.  Let  us  see  now  if  we  cannot  put  an  end  to  that 
long  agitated,  and  in  my  opinion  very  unreasonable,  because 
unintelligible,  question:    WJiether  man's  icill  is  free  or  no. 

Th.  [There  is  much  reason  for  the  exclamation  with  respect 
to  the  strange  manner  of  men  who  torment  themselves  by  agi- 
tating badly  conceived  questions  :  They  seek  for  lohat  they  knoiv, 
and  knoiv  not  for  v:hat  they  seek.~\ 

Ph.  Freedom,  which  is  only  a  pov.'er,  belongs  only  to  agents 
and  cannot  be  an  attribute  or  modification  of  the  will,  which  is 
itself  nothing  else  than  a  power. 

Th.  [You  are  right,  sir,  according  to  the  proper  use  of 
words.  One  can,  however,  in  some  measure  excuse  received 
usage.  Thus  it  is  customary  to  attribute  power  to  heat  or  to 
other  qualities,  i.e.  to  the  body  in  so  far  as  possessed  of  that 
quality :  and  in  like  manner  the  intent  here  is  to  ask  if  man  is 
free  in  willing.] 

§  15.  Ph.  Freedom  is  the  power  a  man  has  of  doing  or  not 
doing  any  act  conformably  to  his  will. 

TJi.  If  men  understood  onh'  that  by  freedom,  when  they  ask 
whether  the  will,  or  the  arbiter  is  free,  their  question  would  be 
truly  absurd.  But  you  will  see  presently  what  they  ask,  and 
indeed  I  have  already  touched  upon  it.  It  is  true  but  by 
another  principle,  that  they  (at  least  many)  do  not  cease  to 
ask  for  the  absurd  and  the  impossible,  in  desiring  a  freedom 
of  equilibrium  absolutely  imaginary  and  impracticable,  and 
which  indeed  would  not  serve  them,  were  it  possible  for  them 
to  have  it,  i.e.  to  have  the  freedom  of  willing  against  all  the 
impressions  which  can  come  from  the  understanding,  which 
would  destroy  true  freedom  together  with  the  reason,  and  lower 
us  below  the  beasts. 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "et  cette  action,  qiioyque  forcee  en  quelque  fa^on"; 
Erdmann  and  Jacques:  "  ear  raction,  qu'elle  fait  faire,"  i.e.  for  the  act  which 
it  makes  you  do.  —  Tr. 

2  Cy.  Kant,  Kritik  d.  jrrakt.  Vernunft,  Th.  I.,  Bd.  I.,  Hpst.  1,  §  6,  Anm.; 
translation  by  T.  K.  Abbott,  4th  ed.,  revised  and  enlarged.  London :  Lonsrmans, 
1889.  — Te. 


cii.  xxi]  ON  HUMAN  UNDEESTANDING  185 

§  17.  Ph.  He  who  should  say  that  the  power  of  speaking 
directs  the  power  of  singing,  and  that  the  power  of  singing^ 
obeys  or  disobeys  the  power  of  s})eaking,  would  express  him- 
self in  as  proper  and  intelligent  a  manner,  as  he  who  says,  as 
has  been  usual,  that  the  will  directs  the  understanding,  and 
that  the  understanding  obeys  or  disobeys  the  will.  §  18. 
Nevertheless  this  manner  of  speaking  has  prevailed,  and  has 
caused,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  much  confusion,  although  the 
power  of  thinking  operates  no  more  upon  the  power  of  choos- 
ing and  the  contrary,  than  the  power  of  singing  upon  that  of 
dancing.  §  19.  I  grant  that  this  or  that  thought  may  furnish 
man  the  occasion  of  exercising  his  power  of  choosing  and  that 
the  mind's  choice  may  be  the  cause  of  its  actually  thinking  on 
this  or  that  thing,  just  as  actually  singing  a  certain  tune  may 
be  the  occasion  of  dancing  such  a  dance. 

Th.  [There  is  a  little  more  than  the  furnishing  of  occasions, 
since  there  is  some  dependence ;  for  you  can  will  only  what 
you  find  to  be  good,  and  according  as  the  faculty  of  under- 
standing is  improved  the  choice  of  the  will  is  better,  as  on  the 
other  hand,  according  as  man  has  vigor  of  ivill  he  determines 
his  thoughts  according  to  his  choice,  instead  of  being  deter- 
mined and  carried  away  by  involuntary  perceptions.] 

Ph.    Powers  are  relations,  not  agents. 

Th.  [If  the  essential  faculties  are  only  relations  and  add 
nothing  whatever  to  the  essence,  the  qualities  and  t!ie  faculties 
that  are  accidental  or  subject  to  change  are  something  else,  and 
we  may  say  of  these  last  that  the  one  often  depends  upon  the 
other  in  the  exercise  of  their  functions.] 

§  21.  Ph.  In  my  opinion  the  question  should  not  be,  whether 
the  will  is  free,  —  that  is  to  speak  in  a  very  improper  manner, 
—  but  whether  the  man  is  free.  That  granted,  I  say  that  so 
lung  as  any  one  can  by  the  direction  or  choice  of  his  mind 
])refer  the  existence  of  an  action  to  its  non-existence,  and  the 
contrary,  i.e.  can  make  it  exist  or  not  exist  according  as  he 
wills,  so  long  he  is  free.  And  we  can  scarcely  say  how  we 
could  possibly  conceive  a  being  freer  than  so  far  as  he  is  able 
to  do  what  he  wills.     So  that  man  seems  to  be  as  free  in  refer- 

1  Geiiianlt  reads:  "parler,"  a  MS.  or  typographical  error;  cf.  Locke, 
Fhilos.  Wiirks  (Bolm's  e<l.),  Vol.  1,  p.  370.  Erdinann  and  Jacques  read: 
"chanter,"  which  the  translation  follows.  — Tr. 


ISr,  LKUiMTZ'S   ClUTKiUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


pncp  to  those  actions  which  depend  upon  this  power  he  finds 
in  liiniself,  as  it  is  possible  for  freedom  to  make  him,  if  I  may 
so  express  myself. 

Th.  [When  Ave  reason  about  the  freedom  of  the  Avill  or  upon 
five-will  {franc  arbitre),  we  do  not  ask  if  man  can  do  what 
he  wills,  but  if  tliere  is  enough  independence  in  his  will  itself. 
We  do  not  ask  if  he  has  free  limbs  or  elbow-room,  but  if  he 
has  a  free  spirit,  and  in  what  it  consists.  In  this  respect  one 
intelligence  might  be  freer  than  another,  and  the  supreme 
intelligence  will  exist  in  perfect  freedom  of  Avhich  creatures 
are  not  at  all  capable.] 

§  22.  Ph.  Men  naturally  inquisitive,  and  who  love  to  remove 
as  much  as  they  can  from  their  minds  the  thought  of  guilt, 
although  it  be  by  reducing  themselves  to  a  state  worse  than 
that  of  a  fatal  necessity,  are  not,  however,  satisfied  with  this. 
Unless  freedom  extends  still  farther,  it  is  not  to  their  taste, 
and  in  their  opinion  it  is  a  very  good  proof  that  man  is  not  at 
all  wholly  free,  unless  he  has  as  well  the  freedom  to  will  as  that 
of  doing  what  he  wills.  §  23.  Concerning  which  I  believe 
that  man  cannot  be  free  in  reference  to  this  particular  act  of 
willing  an  action  which  is  in  his  power,  when  this  action  has 
been  once  proposed  to  his  mind.  The  reason  therein  is  wholly 
manifest,  for  the  action  depending  upon  his  will,  must  una- 
voidably exist  or  not  exist,  and  its  existence  or  non-exist- 
ence following  without  fail  exactly  the  determination  and 
choice  of  his  Avill,  he  cannot  avoid  willing  the  existence  or 
non-existence  of  this  action.  • 

Til.  [I  should  think  he  could  suspend  his  choice,  and  that 
this  happens  very  often ;  above  all,  when  other  thoughts  inter- 
rupt deliberation :  thus,  although  the  action  deliberated  upon 
necessarily  exists  or  not,  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  you 
must  necessarily  determine  upon  its  existence  or  non-existence  ; 
for  non-existence  may  happen  again  for  want  of  resolution. 
Thus  the  Areopagites  actually  released  the  man  whose  case 
they  had  found  too  difficult  to  decide,  deferring  it  to  a  term 
far  distant,  and  taking  a  hundred  years  to  consider  it.] 

Ph.  In  making  man  free  in  this  fasiiion,  I  mean  in  making 
the  act  of  Avilling  depend  upon  his  will,  another  will  or  ante- 
rior faculty  of  volition  is  necessary  in  order  to  determine  the 
acts  of  this  will,  and  another  to  determine  that,  and  thus  to 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  187 

infinity ;  for  wherever  you  stop,  the  actions  of  the  last  will 
could  not  be  free. 

Th.  [It  is  true  yoii  speak  incorrectly  when  yon  speak  as  if 
■\ve  willed  to  will.  We  do  not  will  to  will,  but  we  will  to  do, 
and  if  we  willed  to  Avill,  we  should  will  to  will  to  Avill,  and 
this  would  go  on  to  infinity  :  meanwhile  it  is  not  necessary  to 
conceal  that  by  some  voluntary  acts  we  contribute  often  indi- 
rectly to  other  voluntary  acts,  and  although  one  cannot  will 
what  he  will,  as  he  cannot  even  judge  what  he  will,^  he  can, 
however,  so  act  in  advance  that  he  judges  or  wills  at  the  time 
what  he  would  wish  to  be  able  to  will  or  judge  to-day.  Men 
attach  themselves  to  persons,  lectures,  and  considerations  favor- 
able to  a  certain  party,  they  give  no  attention  to  that  which 
comes  from  the  opposite  party,  and  by  these  addresses  and  a 
thousand  others  which  they  employ,  most  frequently  without 
definite  design  and  without  thought,  they  succeed  in  deceiving 
themselves  or  at  least  in  changing  and  converting  or  per- 
verting themselves  according  to  what  they  meet.] 

§  25.  Ph.  Since  then  it  is  evident  that  man  is  not  at  lib- 
erty to  ^i:ill  to  tvill  or  not,  the  next  thing  demanded  is,  whether 
man  is  at  liberty  to  ivill  which  of  the  two  he  pleases,  for  example, 
motion  or  rest?  But  this  question  is  in  itself  so  visibly  absurd 
that  it  may  suffice  to  convince  any  one  who  will  reflect  that 
freedom  in  no  case  concerns  the  will.  For  to  ask  whether  a  man 
is  free  to  will  what  he  pleases,  motion  or  rest,  speech  or  silence, 
is  to  ask  whether  a  man  can  will  what  he  wills,  or  be  pleased 
with  that  with  which  he  is  pleased,  a  question  which,  in  my 
opinion,  needs  no  answer. 

Th.  [It  is  true,  nevertheless,  that  men  find  here  a  difficulty 
Avhich  deserves  to  be  removed.  They  say  that  after  having 
known  and  considered  all,  it  is  still  within  their  power  to  will 
not  only  what  pleases  them  the  most,  but  furthermore  wholly 
the  contrary,  merely  to  show  their  freedom.  But  you  must 
consider  that  this  caprice  or  obstinacy,  or  at  least  this  reason 
which  hinders  them  from  following  other  reasons,  also  enters 
into  the  balance  and  makes  that  please  them  which  would 
otherwise  not  do  so,  so  that  choice  is  always  determined  by 
perception.     They  do  not  then  will  what  they  would,  but  what 

1  The  French  is:  "  et  quoyqu'  on  ne  puisse  point  vouloir  ce  qu'  on  veut, 
comme  on  ne  pent  pas  menie  jnger  ce  qu'  on  veut."  — Til. 


188  LEIBNITZ'S   CU ITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  n 

pleases,  although  the  will  can  contribute  indirectly  and  as  it 
were  from  afar  to  make  anything  pleasurable  or  otherwise,  as 
I  have  already  remarked.  And  as  men  scarcely  recognize  all 
these  separate  considerations,  it  is  not  astonishing  that  the 
mind  is  so  perplexed  in  regard  to  this  matter  which  has  so 
many  concealed  windings.] 

§  L'O.  Ph.  When  men  ask  what  it  is  that  determines  the 
will,  the  true  reply  is,  the  mind.  If  this  answer  is  not  satis- 
factory, it  is  plain  that  the  meaning  of  the  question  reduces  to 
tliis:  Wliat  moves  the  mind  on  eMcli  2Kirticular  occasion  to  deter- 
mine to  such  jjarticidar  motion  or  rest  its  genercd  x>ower  of  direct- 
ing its  facidties  totvards  motion  or  rest?  To  this  I  reply  that 
what  leads  us  to  remain  in  the  same  state  or  continue  the 
same  action,  is  solely  the  present  satisfaction  we  find  therein. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  motive  which  incites  to  change  is 
always  some  uneasiness. 

Th.  [This  uneasiness,  as  I  have  shown  (in  the  preceding 
chapter),  is  not  always  a  displeasure,  as  ease  when  found  is 
not  always  a  satisfaction  or  pleasure.  It  is  often  an  insensible 
perception,  which  cannot  be  distinguished  or  recognized,  which 
makes  us  lean  to  one  side  rather  than  the  other,  without  our 
being  able  to  give  a  reason  for  so  doing.] 

§  30.  Ph.  Will  and  desire  should  not  be  confounded  :  a  man 
desires  to  be  freed  from  the  gout,  but  understanding  that  the 
removal  of  this  pain  may  cause  the  transfer  of  a  dangerous 
humor  into  some  more  vital  part,  his  will  cannot  be  determined 
to  any  action,  which  may  serve  to  remove  this  pain. 

Th.  [This  desire  is  a  kind  of  an  inclination  of  will  {velleitey 
as  compared  with  a  complete  volition.  We  should  will,  for 
example,  if  there  were  no  greater  evil  to  be  feared,  if  we 
obtained  what  we  wish,  or  if  perhaps  there  were  a  greater 
good  to  be  hoped  for  if  we  went  forward.  But  we  can  say 
that  man  wills  to  be  delivered  from  the  gout  with  a  certain 
degree  of  volition,  but  which  does  not  always  go  on  to  the  last 
effort.  This  volition  is  called  Velleity  when  it  includes  some 
imperfection  or  impotency.] 

§  31.  Ph.  It  is  well  to  consider,  however,  that  what  deter- 
mines the  will  to  act  is  not  the  greater  good,  as  is  ordinarily 
supposed,  but  rather  some  actual  uneasiness,  and  ordinarily 
1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Book.  II.,  chap.  20,  §  6,  Ph.  and  note,  ante,  p.  168.  —  Tr. 


CH.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNPERSTANDING  189 

that  which  is  most  pressing.  We  may  give  it  the  name  of 
desire,  which  is  really  an  uneasiness  of  mind,  caused  by  the 
want  of  some  absent  good,  over  and  above  the  desire  of  being 
freed  from  pain.  All  absent  good  does  not  produce  a  pain 
proportionate  to  the  degree  of  excellence  which  it  has  or  which 
we  acknowledge  it  to  have;  whilst  all  pain  causes  a  desire 
equal  to  itself;  because  the  absence  of  good  is  not  always  an 
evil,  as  is  the  presence  of  pain.  Therefore  we  can  look  upon 
and  consider  an  absent  good  without  pain.  But  in  proportion 
as  there  is  anywhere  desire,  so  is  there  uneasiness.  §  32.  Who 
is  there  who  has  not  felt  in  desire  what  the  wise  man  says 
of  hope,  "that  being  deferred  it  makes  the  heart  sick" 
(Prov.  13: 12)  ?  Eachel  cries  "Give  me  children,  or  I  die  " 
(Gen.  30:1).  §  34.  When  man  is  perfectly  content  with 
the  state  he  is  in,  or  when  he  is  absolutely  free  from  all 
uneasiness,  what  will  can  remain  to  him  but  to  continue 
in  that  state  ?  Thus  the  wise  Author  of  our  being  has 
put  in  men  the  inconvenience  of  hunger  and  thirst  and  other 
natural  desires,  in  order  to  arouse  and  determine  their  wills  to 
the  proper  conservation  and  continuation  of  their  species. 
"  It  is  better  to  marry  than  to  burn,"  says  St.  Paul  (1  Cor.  7:9). 
So  true  it  is  that  the  present  sensation  of  a  little  burning  has 
more  power  over  us  than  the  attractions  of  greater  pleasures 
looked  at  in  the  distance.  §  35.  It  is  true  that  this  maxim, 
it  is  the  good  and  the  greatest  good  which  determines  the 
will,  is  so  firmly  established  that  I  am  not  at  all  surprised  at 
having  formerly  regarded  it  as  beyond  doubt.  But  after  strict 
inquiry  I  am  forced  to  conclude  that  the  good  and  the  greatest 
good,  although  judged  and  acknowledged  such,  does  not  deter- 
mine the  will ;  unless  coming  to  desire  it  in  a  manner  propor- 
tional to  its  excellence  this  desire  makes  us  uneasy  at  our 
deprivation  of  it.  Suppose  a  man  convinced  of  the  utility  of 
virtue  so  far  as  to  see  that  it  is  necessary  to  the  man  who  pro- 
poses anything  great  in  this  world,  or  hopes  to  be  happy  in 
the  other :  but  until  this  man  hungers  and  thirsts  after  right- 
eousness, his  will  will  never  be  determined  to  any  action  in 
search  for  this  excellent  good,  and  any  other  uneasiness  com- 
ing in  the  way  will  drag  his  will  to  other  things.  On  the 
other  hand,  suppose  a  man  given  to  wine  considers  that  by 
leading  the  life  he  leads  he  is  ruining  his  health  and  Avasting  his 


190  LEIBMTZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [i3k.  ii 

jiropiM-tv,  that  he  is  coming  to  be  dishonored  in  the  world,  to 
hrini,'  upon  himself  disease  and  to  fall  at  last  into  poverty 
until  ho  no  longer  has  wherewith  to  satisfy  this  passion  for 
drink  which  so  strongly  possesses  him :  nevertheless,  the 
returns  of  uneasiness  which  he  feels  in  being  absent  from  his 
companions  in  debauch,  drag  him  to  the  tavern  at  the  hours  he 
has  been  wont  to  go  there,  though  at  the  time  he  has  before 
his  eyes  the  loss  of  his  health  and  estate,  and  perhaps  even 
that  of  the  happiness  of  the  other  life,  happiness  which  he 
cannot  regard  as  a  good  inconsiderable  in  itself,  since  he 
admits  that  it  is  much  more  excellent  than  the  pleasure  of 
drinking  or  the  vain  chatter  of  a  company  of  debauchees.  It  is 
not  then  for  want  of  casting  the  eyes  upon  the  sovereign  good 
that  he  persists  in  this  intemperance  ;  for  he  sees  it  and 
acknowledges  its  excellence,  to  the  extent  that  during  the 
time  that  intervenes  between  his  drinking  hours,  he  resolves 
to  apply  himself  to  the  search  for  this  sovereign  good ;  but 
when  the  uneasiness  of  being  deprived  of  his  accustomed 
pleasure  comes  to  torment  him,  this  good  which  he  acknowl- 
edges more  excellent  than  that  of  drinking,  has  no  longer 
power  over  his  mind,  and  it  is  this  actual  uneasiness  which 
determines  his  will  to  the  action  to  which  it  is  accustomed, 
and  which  thereby  making  very  strong  impressions  prevails 
again  at  the  first  occasion,  although  at  the  same  time  he  binds 
himself,  so  to  speak,  by  secret  promises  no  longer  to  do  the 
same  thing,  and  imagines  that  this  "will  be  the  last  time  that 
he  will  act  against  his  highest  interest.  Thus  he  finds  himself 
from  time  to  time  reduced  to  saying : 

Video  meliora  proboque, 
Deteriora  sequor.^ 

I  see  the  better  way,  I  approve  it,  and  I  take  the  worse. 
This  sentence  which  we  acknowledge  as  true,  and  which  is 
only  too  well  confirmed  by  a  constant  experience,  is  easy  to 
understand  in  this  way,  and  there  is  perhaps  no  other  sense  in 
which  it  can  be  taken. 

T1i.  [There  is  something  beautiful  and  solid  in  these  consid- 
erations. But  I  would  not  have  you  believe  on  that  account 
tliat  we   must   abandon  those  ancient  axioms  that   the  will 

1  Ovid,  Metu)nor2>/i.  T.lil.— Tk. 


CH,  XX i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  191 

follows  the  greatest  good,  or  that  it  flies  from  the  greatest  evil 
that  it  perceives.  The  source  of  the  little  application  to  true 
goods  arises  mainly  from  the  fact  that  in  matters  and  on  the 
occasions  where  the  senses  act  but  little,  the  greater  part  of  our 
thoughts  are,  so  to  speak,  surd^  (I  call  them  cogitationes  coecm 
in  Latin)  i.e.  void  of  perception  and  feeling,  and  consisting 
in  the  wholly  empty  employment  of  characters,  as  happens  in 
the  case  of  those  who  make  algebraic  calculations  without  con- 
sidering from  time  to  time  that  the  geometrical  figures  in 
question  and  the  words  ordinarily  produce  the  same  effect  in 
this  regard  as  the  characters  of  arithmetic  or  algebra.  One 
often  reasons  in  words  without  having  quite  the  same  object 
in  mind.  Now  this  knowledge  cannot  move ;  something  living 
is  necessary  in  order  to  arouse  us.  But  thus  it  is  that  men 
most  frequently  think  of  God,  of  virtue,  of  happiness ;  they 
speak  and  reason  without  definite  ideas.  Not  that  they  can- 
not have  them,  since  they  are  in  their  mind.  But  they  do  not 
trouble  themselves  to  press  their  analysis.  Sometimes  they 
have  ideas  of  an  absent  good  or  evil,  but  very  feeble.  It  is 
then  no  wonder  that  they  are  scarcely  affected.  Thus  if  we 
prefer  the  bad  it  is  because  we  perceive  the  good  which  it 
includes  without  perceiving  either  the  bad  therein  or  the  good 
in  the  contrary  consideration.  We  assume  and  believe,  or 
rather  we  make  the  statement  merely  upon  another's  belief,  or 
at  most  upon  belief  in  the  memory  of  our  past  reasonings,  that 
the  greatest  good  is  on  the  better  side,  or  the  greatest  evil  on 
the  other.  But  when  we  do  not  look  at  these  at  all,  our 
thoughts  and  reasonings  contrary  to  the  feeling  are  a  kind  of 
jysittacism  ^  which  furnishes  nothing  at  present  to  the  mind ; 
and  if  we  take  no  measures  to  remedy  it,  it  is  idle  talk,  as  I 
have  already  remarked  above  (Bk.  I.,  chap.  2,  §  11),  and  the 
most  beautiful  precepts  of  morality  together  with  the  best 
rules  of  prudence  take  effect  only  in  a  soul  which  is  sensible 
(either  directly,  or,  because  that  cannot  always  be,  at  least  in- 
directly, as  I  shall  show  presently)  and  which  is  no  longer 
sensible  to  that  which  is  contrary  thereto.     Cicero  well  says 

1  The  French  is :  "  sourdes."     Cf.  p.  193,  near  the  end  of  Th.  —  Tr. 

2  Littre  thus  defines  "  psittacisnie,"  q^uoting  this  passage  and  tlie  one  further 
on,  §  r>7,  Th.,  l)y  way  of  illustration :  "  Etat  d'esprit  dans  lequel  on  ne  pense  on 
n"  parle  qu'eu  pcrroijuet,"  i.e.  a  state  of  the  mind  in  which  one  thinks  or 
speaks  only  as  a  parrot.  —  Tr. 


192  LEIBNITZ'S   CHITKilE   OF   LOCKE  [iik.  n 


somewhere  *  that  if  our  eyes  could  see  the  beauty  of  virtue,  we 
■shouhl  love  it  warmly;  but  that  not  being  at  all  the  case,  nor 
anything  C(iuivalent,  we  must  not  be  astonished  if  in  the  strug- 
gle between  the  flesh  and  the  spirit,  the  spirit  so  many  times 
yields,  since  it  does  not  clearly  perceive  its  advantages.  The 
struggle  is  nothing  else  than  the  opposition  of  different  ten- 
dencies, which  spring  from  confused  and  distinct  thoughts. 
Confused  thoughts  often  make  themselves  clearly  felt,  but 
our  distinct  thoughts  are  ordinarily  clear  only  potentially; 
they  might  be  clear,  if  we  would  apply  ourselves  to  the 
penetration  of  the  sense  of  the  words  or  characters ;  but  not 
doing  so,  either  through  negligence,  or  because  of  the  shortness 
of  time,  we  oppose  mere  words,  or  at  least,  too  feeble  images 
to  living  feelings.  I  knew  a  man  influential  in  church  and 
state,  whose  infirmities  made  him  resolve  to  diet ;  but  he  ad- 
mitted that  he  had  not  been  able  to  resist  the  odor  of  the 
viands,  which,  passing  before  his  apartment,  were  carried  to 
others.  It  is  doubtless  a  disgraceful  weakness,  but  it  is  just 
what  men  have  done.  But  if  the  mind  made  good  use  of  its 
advantages,  it  would  triumph  grandly.  It  would  be  necessary 
to  begin  with  education,  which  should  be  so  regulated  as  to 
render  true  good  and  true  evil  as  sensible  as  possible,  by  in- 
vesting the  notions  which  are  formed  of  them  with  circum- 
stances more  suited  to  this  design ;  and  a  full-grown  man  who 
lacks  this  excellent  education  should  commence  rather  late, 
than  never,  to  seek  pleasures  enlightened  and  reasonable,  in 
order  to  oppose  them  to  those  of  the  senses,  which  are  con- 
fused but  impressive.  And  in  fact,  divine  grace  itself  is  a 
pleasure  ^  which  gives  light.  Thus  when  a  man  is  in  the  midst 
of  good  impulses,  he  ought  to  make  laws  and  regulations  for 

1  Perhaps  in  De  Fin.,  2,  16,  §  52:  "  Oculorum,  inquit  Plato,  est  in  nobis 
sensus  acerrimus,  quibus  sapientiam  non  ceruimus.  Quani  ilia  ardentes  amores 
excitaret  sui,  si  videretur,"  where,  however,  the  discourse  is  concerned  with 
the  particular  virtue  of  wisdom,  rather  than  with  virtue  in  general.  The  pas- 
sage of  Plato  referred  to  is  in  the  Phsedrus,  250  D.  Cf.  also,  De  Off.,  2,  37: 
"  Quis  non  admiretur  spleudorem  pulchritudinemque  virtutis  "  ;  and  De  Off., 
1,5:  "  Formam  quidem  ipsam,  Marce  fili,  et  tanquam  faciem  bonesti  %ides; 
quae  si  oculis  cerneretur,  niirabiles  amores  excitaret  sapientiae."  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Spinoza,  Ethica,  Part  V.,  Props.,  32,  33,  sq.;  translation  by  R.  H.  M. 
Elwes,  The  Chief  Works  of  Benedict  de  Spinoza,  Vol.  2,  pp.  263  sq.  (Bohn's 
Philos.  Library),  London:  George  Bell  &  Sons,  188i.  The  best  edition  of 
Spinoza's  AVorks  is  that  of  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  The  Hague,  1882-1883. —  Tr. 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  193 

the  future,  and  execute  them  rigorously,  tearing  himself  away 
from  those  causes  able  to  corrupt  him,  either  brusquely  or 
gradually,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  circumstances,  A 
journey  expressly  undertaken  will  cure  a  lover;  a  retreat  will 
draAV  us  from  the  companions  who  support  us  in  some  bad  in- 
clination. Francis  of  Borgia,  General  of  the  Jesuits,  who  has 
at  last  been  canonized,  being  wont  to  drink  largely  when  he 
was  a  man  in  high  life,  reduced  himself  little  by  little  upon  a 
small  scale,  when  he  thought  of  retiring  (from  the  world)  by 
causing  a  drop  of  wax  to  fall  daily  into  the  bottle  which  he 
was  wont  to  emj^ty.  To  dangerous  sensibilities  we  shall  op- 
I'jose  some  other  innocent  sensibility,  as  agriculture,  garden- 
ing; we  shall  shun  idleness;  we  shall  collect  curiosities  of 
nature  and  art ;  we  shall  make  experiments  and  researches ; 
we  shall  engage  in  some  indispensable  occupation,  if  we  have 
none,  or  in  conversation,  or  useful  and  agreeable  reading. 
In  a  word,  we  must  profit  from  good  impulses  as  from  the 
voice  of  God  which  summons  us  to  make  effective  resolutions. 
And  as  we  cannot  always  analyze  the  notions  of  true  goods 
and  true  evils  until  we  perceive  the  pleasure  and  pain  they  in- 
clude, we  must  once  for  all  make  this  law  in  order  to  be  moved 
by  them  :  to  attend  to  and  follow  henceforth  the  conclusions 
of  reason  once  for  all  understood,  although  perceived  after- 
ward and  ordinarily  only  by  thoughts  surcV  merely,  and  desti- 
tute of  sense  attractions ;  and  this  in  order  to  put  yourselves 
finally  in  possession  of  control  over  the  passions  as  well  as  of  the 
insensible  inclinations  or  uneasinesses,  by  acquiring  this  habit 
of  acting  according  to  reason,  which  makes  virtue  pleasant, 
and  as  it  were  natural.  But  it  is  not  our  business  here  to  give 
and  teach  the  precepts  of  morality,  or  the  spiritual  directions 
and  address  for  the  exercise  of  true  piety ;  it  is  enough  that 
in  considering  the  procedure  of  our  soul,  we  see  the  source  of 
our  weaknesses,  the  knowledge  of  which  gives,  at  the  same 
time,  that  of  their  remedies.] 

§  36.  Ph.  The  present  uneasiness  which  presses  us,  works 
only  upon  the  will,  and  naturally  determines  it  in  view  of  that 
happiness  to  which  we  all  aim  in  all  our  actions ;  because  every 
one  regards  pain  and  uneasiness  (i.e.  the  restlessness,  or  rather 
inconvenience,  which  prevents  us  from  being  at  our  ease)  as 

1  Cf.  p.  191,  near  the  beginning  of  Tli.,  and  note.  —  Tr. 
O 


194  LKIiiMTZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

incompatible  with  happiness.  A  little  pain  suffices  to  corrupt 
all  the  pleasures  we  enjoy.  Consequently  that  which  deter- 
mines incessantly  the  choice  of  our  will  to  the  succeeding 
action  will  always  be  the  removing  of  pain,  as  long  as  we  feel 
any  touch  of  it;  this  removal  being  the  first  step  towards 
happiness. 

Th.  It'  you  take  your  uneasiness  or  inquietude  as  a  veritable 
displeasure,  in  this  sense  I  do  not  admit  that  it  is  the  sole  in- 
centive. Most  frequently  these  are  the  little  insensible  per- 
ceptions which  might  be  called  imperceptible  pains  if  the 
notion  of  2>«''i  did  not  include  apperception.  These  little  im- 
pulsions consist  in  delivering  themselves  continually  from 
little  obstacles  towards  which  our  nature  works  withoiit  think- 
ing of  them.  This  tineasiness  consists  in  truth  in  this,  that 
we  feel  without  knowing  it,  which  fact  makes  us  act  in  passion 
as  well  as  when  we  appear  most  tranquil;  for  we  are  never 
without  some  action  and  motion,  which  arises  only  from  the 
fact  that  nature  always  labors  to  put  herself  more  at  her  ease. 
And  this  it  is  which  determines  also  before  all  consultation  in 
the  cases  lohich  appear  to  us  the  most  indifferent,  because  we  are 
never  perfectly  in  suspense  and  we  cannot  be  exactly  equally 
divided  between  two  cases.  Now  if  these  elements  of  pain 
(which  degenerate  into  veritable  pain  or  displeasure  sometimes 
Avhen  they  overgrow)  were  true  pains,  w^e  should  always  be 
miserable  in  pursuing  the  good  that  we  seek  with  uneasiness 
and  spirit.  But  it  is  wholly  the  contrary ;  and  as  I  have 
already  said  above  (§  6  of  the  preceding  chapter),  the  mass 
of  these  continual  little  successes  of  nature,  which  puts  it  more 
and  more  at  ease  in  reaching  for  the  good  and  enjoying  its 
image,  or  lessening  the  feeling  of  pain,  is  already  a  consider- 
able pleasure,  and  often  worth  more  than  the  enjoyment  even 
of  the  good;  2a\^  very  far  from  being  obliged  to  regard  this  un- 
easiness as  incompatible  loith  hcqypiness,  I  find  that  uneasiness  is 
essential  to  the  happiness  of  created  beings  which  never  con- 
sists in  complete  possession,^  —  this  makes  them  insensible,  and 

1  Cf.  the  famous  passage  of  Lessing,  1729-1781,  regarding  the  '  search  after 
truth,  rather  than  its  possession,'  in  the  Theoloc/.  Streitsrhnften,  Eine  Duplik, 
1778, 1,  ad  Jin.,  Werke,  Bd.lO,  s.  Ill,  Stuttgart,  1809:  "  Xicht  die  Wahrheit,  in 
deren  Besitz  irgend  ein  Mensch  ist,  oder  zu  sein  vermeiut,  sondern  die  auf- 
richtige  Muhe,  die  er  angewandt  hat,  hinter  die  Wahrheit  zukommen,  macht 
den  Werth  des  Menscheu.    Deun  uicht  durch  den  Besitz,  sondern  dureh  die 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  195 

as  it  were  stupid,  —  but  in  a  progress  continuous  and  uninter- 
rupted towards  the  greatest  good,  which  cannot  fail  to  be  ac- 
companied by  a  desire,  or  at  least,  a  continual  uneasiness,  but 
Avhich,  as  I  have  just  explained,  does  not  go  so  far  as  to  incon- 
venience, but  limits  itself  to  those  elements  or  rudiments  of 
pain,  partly  unconscious,  which  do  not  cease  to  be  sufficient  to 
serve  as  an  incentive  and  to  arouse  the  will ;  as  does  appetite 
in  a  man  who  is  well  when  it  does  not  go  to  that  inconvenience 
which  makes  us  impatient  and  torments  us  by  a  too  great  at- 
tachment to  the  idea  of  what  we  lack.  These  appetitions,  small 
or  great,  are  what  are  called  in  the  schools  mohis  primo  lyrimi, 
and  are  truly  the  first  steps  which  nature  makes  us  take  not 
so  much  towards  happiness  as  towards  joy,  for  they  relate  only 
to  the  present ;  but  experience  and  reason  teach  us  to  rule 
these  appetitions  and  to  control  them  so  that  they  may  con- 
duce to  happiness.  I  have  already  spoken  to  this  effect  (Book 
I.,  chap.  2,  §  3).  The  appetitions  are  like  the  natural  ten- 
dency of  the  stone,  which  goes  the  most  direct,  but  not  always 
the  best  path  towards  the  centre  of  the  earth,  not  being  able 
to  see  beforehand  that  it  will  meet  rocks  upon  which  it  will 
break  in  pieces,  whilst  it  would  approach  its  end  more  directly 
if  it  had  mind  and  the  means  of  turning  aside  from  them. 
Thus  it  is  that  going  straight  towards  present  pleasure  we 
sometimes  fall  over  the  precipice  of  misery.  Hence,  reason 
opposes  thereto  images  of  the  greatest  good  or  evil  to  come, 
and  a  firm  resolution  and  habit  of  thinking  before  acting,  and 
then  of  following  what  shall  have  been  recognized  as  the  best, 

Nachforschunjj  der  Wahrheit  erweitern  sich  seine  Kriifte,  woriii  allein  seine 
immer  wachsende  Volllvommenheit  besteht.  Der  Besitz  maclit  ruhiij,  trage, 
stolz  .  .  ."  ;  i.e.  "  Not  the  truth,  in  possession  of  which  at  any  time  a  man  is, 
or  thinks  he  is,  hut  the  genuine  effort  he  lias  made  to  discover  the  trutli,  con- 
stitutes the  woi'th  of  the  man.  For  not  tlirougli  possession,  hut  through  the 
search  after  the  trutli,  are  his  powers  expanded,  wherein  alone  consists  his  ever 
growing  perfection.     Possession  makes  (him)  qniet,  lazy,  proud  .  .  ." 

The  real  significance  of  this  famous  passage  in  relation  to  the  problem  of 
knowledge  is  not  that  knowledge  is  impossible,  i.e.  Agnosticism,  for  this  is 
strictly  the  meaning  of  the  term ;  but  ratlier  that  the  attainment  of  truth  is 
possible,  and  that  the  human  mind,  having  in  its  very  constitution  infinite 
elements  and  a  capacity  for  an  infinite  ideal,  can  never  rest  satisfied  with  any 
present  attainment  or  form  of  expression  as  final,  but  must  continue  to  strive 
after  the  perfect  truth  as  embodied  in  the  infinite.  Cf.  an  article  by  the 
translator,  entitled  "  Revelation,  Inspiration,  and  Authority,"  in  "  The  Andover 
Review,"  April,  1891.  — Tr. 


lOG  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  n 


even  when  the  sensible  reasons  of  our  conclusions  are  no  longer 
present  in  the  mind,  and  consist  of  scarcely  more  than  feeble 
impressions  or  even  of  sunl  thoughts,  which  give  Avords  or 
signs  destitute  of  an  actual  explanation,  so  that  all  consists  in 
tlie:  Consider  it  well,  and  in  the:  Be  mindful;  the  first  in 
order  to  the  making  of  laws,  the  second  for  their  following, 
even  when  you  do  not  think  of  the  reason  which  has  called 
tlieni  into  existence.  It  is,  however,  Avell  to  think  of  them  as 
much  as  possible,  in  order  that  the  soul  may  be  filled  with  a 
rational  joy  and  a  pleasure  accompanied  with  light.] 

§  37.  Fh.  These  precautions  are  doubtless  so  much  the 
more  necessary  as  the  idea  of  an  absent  good  can  counter- 
balance the  feeling  of  some  uneasiness  or  displeasure  by  which 
we  are  at  present  tormented,  only  so  far  as  this  good  arouses 
any  desire  in  us.  How  many  men  there  are  to  whose  minds 
the  unspeakable  joys  of  paradise  are  represented  by  lively 
pictures  which  they  recognize  as  possible  and  probable,  who 
nevertheless  would  willingly  content  themselves  with  the  hap- 
piness which  they  enjoy  in  this  world.  It  is  the  uneasiness  of 
their  present  desire  getting  the  better  of  them  and  bearing 
them  rapidl}'  towards  the  pleasures  of  this  life  which  deter- 
mines their  wills  to  seek  them :  and  during  all  this  time,  they 
are  wholly  insensible  to  the  goods  of  the  other  life. 

Th.  [This  arises  in  part  from  the  fact  that  men  very  often 
are  but  little  persuaded ;  and,  although  ifiey  say  they  are,  a 
hidden  unbelief  reigns  in  the  depths  of  their  souls ;  for  they 
have  never  understood  the  excellent  reasons  which  verify  this 
immortality  of  souls,  worthy  of  the  justice  of  God,  which  is 
the  foundation  of  true  religion,  or  rather  they  no  longer  re- 
member that  they  understood  them,  one  or  the  other  of  which 
conditions  however  is  necessary  in  order  to  conviction.  Few 
men  indeed  think  that  the  future  life,  as  true  religion  and 
indeed  true  reason  teaches  it,  is  possible,  and  they  are  still 
farther  from  thinking  it  probable,  not  to  say  certain.  All  that 
they  do  think  about  it  is  but  a  j)sittacism,  or  gross  and  vain 
images  after  the  Mahometan  fashion,  in  which  they  them- 
selves see  little  likelihood.  For  thej^  are  very  far  from  being 
moved  by  them,  as  (according  to  report)  were  the  soldiers 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Assassins,  the  Old  Man  of  the  Moun- 


cii.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  197 

tain/  who  were  carried  away  Avhen  fast  asleep  into  a  place  full 
of  delights,  where,  believing  themselves  in  the  paradise  of  Ma- 
homet, they  were  imbued  by  the  angels  or  counterfeit  saints  with 
such  opinions  as  this  prince  desired,  and  whence  after  having 
been  stupefied  anew  they  were  carried  to  the  place  whence  they 
had  been  taken;  this  emboldened  them  afterwards  to  undertake 
everything,  even  attempts  u})on  the  lives  of  princes,  enemies  of 
their  chief.  I  do  not  know  whether  this  Lord^  or  Old  Man  of  the 
Mountain  was  injured  ;  for  not  a  few  great  princes  may  be  named 
whom  he  had  caused  to  be  assassinated,  although  you  may  see 
in  the  English  historians  the  letter,  attributed  to  him,  exon- 
erating King  llichard  I.  of  the  assassination  of  a  Count  or 
Prince  of  Palestine,^  whom  this  Old  Man  of  the  Mountain  ad- 
mitted he  had  had  killed  because  he  had  been  insulted  by  him. 

1  Tlie  usual  translation  of  "  Sheikh-al  Jebal,"  the  title  of  the  supreme  ruler 
of  the  Assassins,  a  secret  society  whose  distinguishing  feature  was  the  employ- 
ment of  secret  assassination  against  all  enemies;  a  practice  introduced  by 
Hassan  Ben  Sabbah,  the  first  chief  of  the  sect.  Otherwise  the  principles  of 
the  society  were  the  same  as  those  of  the  Ismaelites,  viz.  1.  No  fixed  rules 
of  religion  or  morality,  all  actions  indifferent,  internal  disposition  alone  of 
value.  2.  Belief  that  the  Immams  of  Ismael's  line  were  now  invisible,  hence 
implicit  obedience  on  part  of  true  believers  due  to  their  vicegerents  on  earth. 
3.  Allegorical  interpretation  of  the  Koran,  defending  or  rejecting  any  doctrine 
at  pleasure,  as  occasion  required. 

The  society  was  made  up  of  seven  ranks  or  orders :  1.  The  Sheikh  ;  2.  the 
Daial-Kirbal,  or  grand-priors ;  3.  the  Dais,  or  priors ;  4.  Refiks,  associates 
not  initiated,  as  were  t^  former,  into  all  the  secret  doctrines;  5.  the  Fedais, 
"devoted  ones,"  a  band  of  youths  uniuitiated  and  blindly  obedient  to  the 
chief;  G.  Lasiks,  or  novices;  7.  common  people,  laborers,  and  mechanics.  On 
these  was  enjoined  the  most  rigid  observance  of  the  Koran.  The  initiated 
regarded  all  positive  religion  and  morality  as  worthless.  The  Fedais  were  the 
assassins  proper.  Whenever  the  chief  wished  for  their  service  he  had  them 
intoxicated  with  hashish,  or  the  hemp-plant,  and  transported  into  his  splendid 
gardens,  where  they  were  surrounded  with  every  sensual  pleasure,  and  by  this 
foretaste  of  Paradise  which  the  chief  alone  could  grant  led  to  obey  his  shghtest 
command  implicitly,  even  to  the  surrender  of  their  own  lives.  From  this  cir- 
cumstance they  were  called  Hashishin,  or  hemp-eaters.  This  word  the  Euro- 
peans changed  into  Assassins,  and  thus  it  was  transplanted  into  the  Western 
languages  with  the  signification  of  murderers.  See  Von  Hammer,  Geschichte 
der  Assassinen,  1818;  Michaud,  Histoire  des  Croisades,  2,  pp.  465-484; 
F.  Walpole,  The  Ansayrii,  or  Assassins,  3  vols.,  1851 ;  Gayard,  Fragments 
relatifs  a  la  Doctrine  des  Ismaelis,  1874;  De  Sacy,  Memoires  de  V  Institut,  4, 
1818,  discusses  the  etymology  fully.  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads  :  "  Seigneur  on  Senior  (Vieux)  de  la  Montagne."  —  Tr. 

3  The  Margrave  Conrad  of  Montferrat,  one  of  Saladiu's  brave  adversaries. 
Cf.  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall,  Milman's  ed.,  chap.  59,  and  note  74,  also  Milman's 
note  ;  Weil,  Gesch.  d.  Chalifen,  Vol.  3,  p.  423;  Wilken,  Gesch.  d.  Kreuzzuge, 
Vol.4,  p.  485S5.  — Tr. 


U)S  LEIBNITZ'8   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

Although  that  may  be  so,  it  was  perhaps  because  of  his  great 
zeal  for  his  religion  that  this  Prince  of  the  Assassins  wished 
to  give  his  people  a  favorable  idea  of  paradise  which  should 
always  'accompany  their  thoughts  of  it  and  prevent  them 
from  being  surd;  without  claiming  on  that  account  that  they 
should  believe  that  they  had  been  in  paradise  itself.  But 
supposing  he  had  made  this  claim,  it  would  not  necessarily  be 
astonishing  if  these  pious  frauds  had  been  more  efficacious  than 
the  truth  badly  managed.  Yet  nothing  would  be  stronger  than 
truth  if  we  devoted  ourselves  to  its  complete  knowledge  and 
cultivation  ;  and  we  should  have  in  it  without  doubt  the  means 
of  strongly  influencing  men.  When  I  consider  how  much 
ambition  or  avarice  can  accomplish  in  all  those  who  once 
place  themselves  in  this  course  of  life,  almost  destitute  of  sen- 
sible and  present  attractions,  I  despair  of  nothing,  and  I  hold 
that  virtue  would  be  infinitely  more  effective  accompanied  as 
it  is  by  so  many  solid  goods,  if  some  happy  revolution  of  the 
human  race  brought  it  for  a  day  into  demand  and  made  it  as 
it  were  fashionable.  It  is  very  certain  that  we  could  accustom 
the  youth  to  find  their  greatest  pleasure  in  the  practice  of  vir- 
tue. And  even  grown  up  men  could  make  themselves  laws 
and  a  habit  of  conforming  to  them,  which  would  influence  them 
as  strongly  and  with  as  much  uneasiness  if  they  were  turned 
aside  from  them,  as  a  drunken  man  would  feel  when  he  is 
prevented  from  going  to  the  ale-house.  I  am  very  happy  to 
add  these  considerations  upon  the  possibility  and  even  upon  the 
ease  of  the  remedies  for  our  evils,  in  order  not  to  assist  in  dis- 
couraging men  from  the  pursuit  of  true  goods  by  the  mere 
exposition  of  our  weaknesses.] 

§  39.  Pit.  [Xearly  everything  consists  in  making  constant 
the  desire  for  true  good.]  And  it  rarely  happens  that  any 
voluntary  action  is  produced  in  us  unless  some  desire  accom- 
])anies  it ;  this  is  why  loill  and  desire  are  so  often  confounded. 
])ut  we  must  not  regard  the  uneasiness  ^\nch.  makes  a  part  of, 
<^r  which  at  least  accompanies  most  of  the  other  passions,  as 
(  ntirely  excluded  in  this  case.  For  hatred,  fear,  anger,  envy, 
.shame,  have  each  their  uneasiness,  and  thereby  influence  the 
will.  I  doubt  if  any  one  of  these  passions  exists  entirely  alone. 
I  believe  indeed  that  it  would  be  diffieult  to  find  any  passion 
unaccompanied  by  desire.     I  am  sure,  however,  that  wherever 


CH.   xAi]  ON   HUMAN  UNDEKSTANDING  199 

there  is  uneasiness  there  is  desire.  And  as  our  eternity  does 
not  depend  on  the  present  moment,  we  look  beyond  the  present, 
whatever  be  the  pleasures  which  we  actually  enjoy,  and  desire, 
accompanying  these  glances  anticipative  of  the  future,  always 
impels  the  will  to  follow ;  so  that  even  in  the  midst  of  joy 
that  which  maintains  the  action  upon  which  the  present  pleas- 
ure depends,  is  the  desire  to  continue  it,  and  the  fear  of  being 
deprived  of  it,  and  whenever  a  greater  uneasiness  than  that 
takes  possession  of  the  mind  it  immediately  determines  the 
mind  to  a  new  action  and  the  present  pleasure  is  neglected. 

Th.  [Many  perceptions  and  inclinations  concur  in  perfect 
volition,  which  is  the  result  of  their  conflict.  There  are 
some  imperceptible  by  themselves,  whose  mass  makes  an  un- 
easiness which  impels  us  without  our  seeing  the  cause;  there 
are  many  joined  together  which  tend  to  some  object  or  which 
remove  it,  and  then  it  is  desire  or  fear  accompanied  also  by 
an  uneasiness,  but  which  does  not  always  go  so  far  as  pleasure 
or  displeasure.^  Finally,  there  are  impulses  really  accompanied 
by  pleasure  and  by  pain,  and  all  these  perceptions  are  either 
new  sensations  or  ideas  resting  upon  some  past  sensation 
(accompanied  or  not  by  memory),  which  renewing  the  attrac- 
tions these  same  images  had  in  the  preceding  sensations,  renew 
also  the  former  impulses  in  proportion  to  the  vividness  of  the 
idea.  From  all  these  impulses  results  at  last  the  prevailing 
effort  which  makes  the  will  complete.  But  the  desires  and 
tendencies  which  are  perceived  are  often  also  called  voli- 
tions though  less  complete,  whether  they  prevail  and  influence 
or  not.  It  is  thus  easy  to  believe  that  volition  can  have  but 
little  force  without  desire  and  without  aversion  (fidte)  ;  for 
such  I  believe  we  may  call  the  opposite  of  desire.  Uneasi- 
ness exists  not  only  in  the  troublesome  passions,  as  hatred, 
fear,  anger,  envy,  shame,  but  further  in  their  opposites,  as 
love,  hope,  favor,  and  glory.  We  may  say  that  whenever 
there  is  desire,  there  will  be  uneasiness ;  but  the  contrary  is 
not  always  true,  because  often  one  is  in  a  state  of  uneasiness 
Avithout  knowing  what  he  wants,  and  then  there  is  no  full- 
grown  desire.] 

§  40.   Ph.    Ordinarily  the  most  pressing  of  the  uneasinesses 

1  Gerhardt  adds :  "  ou  deplaisir."  —  Tb. 


2()0  LHIIJNITZ'S  CKITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [hk.  ii 

wliii'li  aiv  jiulgvd  capable  of  bi'ing-  removed  at  that  time  deter- 
mines the  will  to  action. 

Th.  As  the  result  of  the  balance  makes  the  final  deter- 
mination, 1  should  think  it  may  happen  that  the  most  press- 
ing uneasiness  does  not  prevail;  for  though  it  might  prevail 
over  each  of  the  opposed  tendencies  taken  by  themselves,  the 
others  united  may  overcome  it.  The  mind  can  indeed  use 
skilfully  the  dicliotomies  in  order  to  cause  sometimes  the  one, 
sometimes  the  others,  to  prevail,  as  in  an  assembly  we  can 
cause  one  party  to  prevail  by  plurality  of  votes,  according  as 
we  shape  the  order  of  the  question.  It  is  true  the  mind 
ought  to  look  far  into  the  future ;  for  in  the  moment  of 
struggle  there  is  no  time  to  use  these  artifices.  All  that  then 
makes  an  impression,  bears  hard  upon  the  balance,  and  helps 
to  form  a  com2)ound  direction  almost  like  that  in  mechanics, 
and  which  without  some  prompt  diversion  we  cannot  stop, 

Fertur  equis  auriga  nee  audit  currus  liabenas.i 

§  41.  Ph.  If  3'ou  ask  further  ivhat  it  is  that  arouses  desire, 
I  reply,  hapjyiness  and  nothing  else.  Hajypiness  and  misery 
are  the  names  of  two  extremes  of  whose  utmost  bounds  we 
are  ignorant.  It  is  what  "eye  hath  not  seen,  ear  hath  not 
heard,  and  the  heart  of  man  hath  never  conceived."  ^  But  both 
make  in  us  lively  impressions  by  means  of  different  kinds 
of  satisfaction  and  joy,  of  torment  and  sorrow,  which  for 
brevity's  sake  I  comprehend  under  the  names  of  pdeasure  and 
liain,  both  of  wdiich  happen  to  the  mind  as  w^ell  as  to  the 
body,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  pertain  only  to  the  mind, 
although  sometimes  they  originate  in  the  mind  upon  the 
occasion  of  certain  thoughts,  and  sometimes  in  the  body 
from  certain  modifications  of  motion.  §  42.  Thus  happiness, 
taken  in  its  full  extent,  is  the  utmost  j^leasure  of  wdiich  we  are 
capable,  as  misery,  taken  in  the  same  way,  is  the  greatest 
pain  we  can  feel.  And  the  lowest  degree  of  what  can  be 
called  happiness  is  that  state,  in  which  delivered  from  all 
pain,  we  enjoy  such  measure  of  present  pleasure  that  we  can- 
not be  content  with  less.  We  call  that  a  good  which  is 
adapted  to  produce  in  us  pleasure,  and  we  call  that  an  evil 
which  is  adapted  to  produce  in  us  pain.     But  it  often  happens 

1  Verg.  Georg.  1 :  514.  —  Tk.  21  Cor.  2:9.  —  Tb. 


cii.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  201 

that  we  do  not  so  name  it  when  one  or  another  of  these  goods 
or  of  these  evils  is  found  in  competition  with  a  greater  good 
or  a  greater  evil. 

Th.  [I  do  not  know  whether  the  greatest  pleasure  is  possi- 
ble. I  should  think  rather  that  it  can  grow  infinitely ;  for 
we  know  not  how  far  our  knowledge  and  our  organs  may 
be  carried  in  all  that  eternity  which  awaits  us.  I  should 
think  then  that  happiness  is  a  lasting  pleasure ;  which  can- 
not exist  without  a  continual  progression  to  new  pleasures. 
Thus  of  two,  one  of  whom  will  advance  incomparably  more 
rapidly  and  by  greater  pleasures  than  the  other,  each  will  be 
happy  in  himself  although  their  hajopiness  will  be  unequal. 
Happiness  is  then  so  to  speak  a  road  through  pleasures,  and 
pleasure  is  only  a  step  and  an  advance  towards  happiness,  the 
shortest  that  can  be  made  according  to  present  impressions, 
but  not  always  the  best,  as  I  said  towards  the  end  of  §  36. 
One  may  miss  the  true  road,  in  desiring  to  follow  the  short- 
est, as  the  stone  going  straight  may  meet  too  soon  obstacles 
which  prevent  it  from  advancing  directly  towards  the  centre 
of  the  earth.  Thus  we  know  that  it  is  the  reason  and  the 
will  which  lead  us  towards  happiness,  but  that  feeling  and 
appetite  carry  us  only  towards  pleasure.  Now  although 
pleasure  cannot  receive  a  nominal  ^  definition,  any  more  than 
light  or  color,  it  can  nevertheless  receive  like  them  a  causal,^ 
and  I  believe  that  at  bottom,  pleasure  is  a  feeling  of  perfec- 
tion and  pain  a  feeling  of  imperfection,  provided  it  be  marked 
enough  to  make  us  capable  of  perceiving  it :  for  the  little 
insensible  perceptions  of  a  perfection  or  imperfection,  which 
are  like  the  elements  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  of  which  I  have 
spoken  so  many  times,  form  the  inclinations  and  propensities, 
but  not  yet  the  passions  themselves.  Thus  there  are  insensi- 
ble inclinations  and  these  we  do  not  perceive;  there  are  sensi- 
ble ones  whose  existence  and  object  we  know,  but  whose 
formation  we  do  not  feel,  and  there  are  confused  inclinations 
which  we  attribute  to  the  body,  although  there  is  always 
something  corresponding  in  the  mind;  finally,  there  are  dis- 
tinct inclinations,  which  reason  gives  us,  ^whose  force  and 
formation  we  feel ;  and  the  pleasures  of  this  kind  which  are 
found  in  the  knowledge  and  production  of  order  and  harmony 
1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  3,  §  18.  — Tr. 


202 


].i;iBNri//s  c'luriQUE  of  locke  [hk. 


arc  the  most  estimable.  You  are  right  in  saying  that  in 
ijeneral  all  these  inclinations,  passions,  pleasures  and  pains 
U'long  only  to  the  ininil  or  soul ;  I  will  add,  indeed,  that  their 
origin  is  in  the  soul  itself,  taking  things  in  a  certain  meta- 
physical strictness,  but  that,  nevertheless,  you  are  right  in  say- 
ing that  confused  thoughts  come  from  the  body,  because 
thereupon  the  consideration  of  the  body  —  and  not  that  of 
the  soul  —  furnishes  something  distinct  and  explicable.  The 
good  is  that  which  conduces  or  contributes  to  pleasure,  as  the 
evil  is  that  which  contributes  to  pain.  But  in  collision  with  a 
greater  good,  the  good  of  which  we  should  be  deprived  would 
become  in  truth  an  evil,  in  so  far  as  it  should  contribute  to 
the  pain  which  would  spring  from  it. 

§  47.  Ph.  The  soul  has  the  power  of  suspending  the  accom- 
plishment of  some  of  these  desires,  and  is  consequently  at  lib- 
ert}^  to  consider  one  after  another  and  to  compare  them.  In 
this  consists  the  freedom  of  man,  and  what  we  call,  tliough  in 
my  view  improperly,  free-will ;  and  it  is  from  the  bad  use  we 
make  of  it  that  all  this  variety  of  mistakes,  errors,  and  faults 
proceeds,  into  which  we  rush  when  we  determine  our  will  too 
promptly  or  too  late. 

Th.  The  execution  of  our  desire  is  suspended  or  stopped 
when  this  desire  is  not  strong  enough  to  move  us  and  to  over- 
come the  trouble  or  inconvenience  there  is  in  satisfying  it ; 
and  this  trouble  consists  sometimes  only  in  an  inactivity  or 
insensible  lassitude  which  discourages  without  our  taking 
notice  of  it,  and  which  is  greatest  in  persons  reared  in  indo- 
lence or  whose  temperament  is  phlegmatic,  and  in  those  who 
are  discouraged  by  age  or  by  poor  success.  But  when  desire 
is  strong  enough  in  itself  to  move,  if  nothing  prevents  it,  it 
can  be  stopped  by  contrary  inclinations  ;  whether  they  consist 
in  a  simple  propensity  Avhich  is  as  it  were  the  element  or  be- 
ginning of  desire,  or  go  as  far  as  desire  itself.  But  as  these 
inclinations,  these  propensities,  and  these  contrary  desires  S.re 
to  be  found  already  in  the  soul,  it  does  not  have  them  in  its 
power,  and  consequently  it  could  not  resist  them  in  a  free  and 
voluntary  way  in  which  the  reason  can  share,  if  it  had  no 
other  means  of  diverting  the  mind  elsewhere.  But  how  does 
it  presume  to  do  it  in  case  of  need  ?  For  there  is  the  point, 
especially  when  one  is  occupied  with  a  very  strong  passion. 


CH.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  203 

It  is  then  necessary  for  the  mind  to  be  prepared  in  advance, 
and  to  find  itself  already  in  process  of  going  from  thonght  to 
thought,  in  order  not  to  hesitate  too  much  at  a  slippery  and 
dangerous  step.  It  is  well  for  that  reason  to  accustom  our- 
selves in  general  not  only  to  think  as  it  were  in  passing  of 
certain  things  in  order  the  better  to  preserve  the  freedom  of 
the  mind ;  but  it  is  better  to  accustom  ourselves  to  proceed 
methodically,  and  to  fasten  ourselves  to  a  train  of  thoughts 
whose  connection  reason  and  not  chance  (?'.e.  insensible  and 
casual  impressions)  makes.  And  for  this  purpose  it  is  well 
from  time  to  time  to  accustom  ourselves  to  collect  our  thoughts 
and  to  raise  ourselves  above  the  present  tumult  of  impres- 
sions, to  go  forth,  so  to  speak,  from  the  place  where  we  are,  to 
say  to  ourselves:  ^' Die  cur  hie?  respice  finem,^  \y\\Q\:e  are  we 
then  ?  or  let  us  come  to  the  purpose,^  let  us  come  to  the  point." 
Men  would  very  often  need  some  one  officially  appointed  (as 
Philip,  the  father  of  Alexander  the  Great,  had)  to  interrupt 
and  call  them  to  their  duty.  But  in  default  of  such  an  officer, 
it  is  well  for  us  to  be  accustomed  to  render  ourselves  this  ser- 
vice. Now  being  once  in  a  condition  to  stop  the  effect  of  our 
desires  and  passions,  i.e.  to  suspend  (their)  action,  we  can  find 
means  to  combat  them,  Avhether  by  contrary  desires  or  inclina- 
tions or  by  diversion,  i.e.  by  occupations  of  another  nature. 
It  is  by  these  methods  and  artifices  that  we  become  as  it  were 
masters  of  ourselves,  and  can  make  ourselves  think  and  do  at 
the  time  what  we  should  wish  to  will  and  what  reason  com- 
mands. But  it  is  always  through  determined  paths,  and  never 
without  a  reason  or  by  means  of  the  imaginary  principle  of 
perfect  indifference  or  equilibrium,  in  which  some  would  make 
the  essence  of  freedom  to  consist ;  as  if  one  could  determine 
himself  without  a  subject,  and  even  against  every  subject,  and 
go  directly  against  the  entire  prevalence  of  impressions  and 
propensities.  Witliout  a  reason,  I  say,  i.e.  without  the  opposi- 
tion of  other  inclinations,  or  without  being  in  advance  dis- 
posed to  turn  aside  the  mind,  or  without  any  other  means 
equally  ex})licable  ;   (to  act)  otherwise  is  to  recu^-  to  the  chimer- 

1  Literally :  Why  are  we  here  ?    Consider  tlie  end  !  — Tr. 

2  Erdniaun  and  Jacqnes   omit:    "ou   venous  au   propos,"   fonnd    in  Ger- 
hardt.— Tr. 


2i»4  LKir.NlTZ'S    CUiriQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.   ii 

ical,  as  in  the  empty  faculties  or  occvilt  qualities  of  the  scho- 
lastics, iu  which  there  is  neither  rhyme  nor  reason.] 

§  48.  Ph.  [I  am  also  for  this  intelligent  determination  of 
the  will  by  what  is  in  the  perception  and  the  understanding.] 
To  will  and  do  conformably  to  the  final  result  of  a  sincere 
examination  is  rather  a  perfection  than  a  defect  of  our  nature. 
And  this  so  far  from  being  a  suppression  or  an  abridgement 
of  freedom,  is  its  greatest  perfection  and  advantage.  And  the 
more  we  are  prevented  from  determining  ourselves  in  this 
way,  the  nearer  we  are  to  misery  and  slavery.  In  fact,  if  you 
supiwse  in  the  mind  a  perfect  and  absolute  indifference  which 
cannot  be  determined  by  the  final  judgment  which  it  makes  of 
good  or  evil,  you  put  it  in  a  very  imperfect  state. 

Th.  [All  this  is  very  much  to  my  taste,  and  shows  that 
the  mind  has  not  entire  and  direct  power  always  to  stop  its 
desires,  else  it  would  never  be  determined,  whatever  examina- 
tion it  might  make,  and  whatever  good  reasons  or  efficacious 
sentiments  it  might  have,  and  it  would  always  remain  irreso- 
lute and  fluctuate  eternally  between  fear  and  hope.  It  must, 
then,  after  all,  be  determined,  and  thus  it  could  itself  oppose 
only  indirectly  its  desires,  by  itself  preparing  in  advance  the 
arms  which  fight  them  in  time  of  need ;  as  I  have  just  ex- 
plained.] 

Ph.  But  a  man  is  at  liberty  to  lift  his  hand  to  his  head  or 
to  let  it  lie  quiet.  He  is  perfectly  indifferent  regarding  either 
of  these  acts,  and  it  would  be  an  imperfection  in  him  if  he 
lacked  that  power. 

Til.  [To  speak  accurately,  one  is  never  indifferent  regard- 
ing two  alternatives,^  whatever  they  may  propose ;  for  exam- 
ple, turning  to  the  right  or  the  left,^  putting  the  right  foot 
forward  (as  was  necessary  in  the  case  of  Trimalchio)  or  the 
left ;  for  we  do  the  one  or  the  other  without  thinking  of  it, 
and  this  is  an  indication  that  a  concurrence  of  internal  disposi- 
tions and  external  impressions  (although  insensible)  deter- 
mines us  to  the  side  that  we  take.     But  the  prevalence  is  very 

1  After  "partis,"  Gerhardt  reads:  " quelsqu'on  puisse  proposer,"  which 
Erdmanu  and  Jacques  omit.  —  Tr. 

2  After  "  gauche,"  Gerhardt  reads :  "  de  niettre  le  pied  droit  devant  (comma 
il  falloit  chez  Trimalcion)  ou  le  srauche, "which  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit. 
For  the  allusion  c/.  Petronius,  Satyricon,  chap.  30.  —  Tk. 


CH.   XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  205 


small,  and  in  case  of  need  it  is  as  if  we  were  indifferent  in  this 
respect,  since  the  least  sensible  subject  which  presents  itself 
to  us  is  capable  of  determining  us  without  difficulty  to  one 
rather  than  to  the  other ;  and  although  there  is  a  little  trouble 
in  lifting  the  arm  to  raise  the  hand  to  the  head,  it  is  so  small 
that  we  overcome  it  without  difficulty ;  otherwise,  I  admit  it 
would  be  a  great  imperfection  if  man  were  less  indifferent, 
and  if  he  were  wanting  in  power  to  determine  easily  to  raise 
or  not  to  raise  his  arm.] 

Ph.  But  it  would  be  as  great  an  imperfection  if  he  had  the 
same  indifference  on  all  occasions,  as  when  he  would  defend 
his  head  or  his  eyes  from  a  blow,  by  which  he  saw  he  was 
about  to  be  struck.  [That  is  to  say,  it  were  as  easy  for  him 
to  stop  this  movement  as  others  of  which  we  have  just  spoken, 
and  in  which  he  is  almost  indifferent ;  for  that  would  make 
its  influence  insufficiently  strong  and  prompt  in  time  of  need. 
Thus  determination  is  useful  to  us,  and,  indeed,^  very  often 
necessary ;  for  if  we  were  less  determined  on  every  sort  of 
occasion,  and  as  it  were  insensible  to  reasons  drawn  from  the 
perception  of  good  or  evil,  we  would  be  without  effective 
choice.]  And^  if  we  were  determined  by  something  else  than 
the  final  result,  which  we  have  formed  in  our  own  mind  accord- 
ing as  we  have  judged  a  certain  action  good  or  evil,  we  should 
not  be  free. 

Th.  [Nothing  is  truer,  and  those  who  seek  another  free- 
dom know  not  Avhat  they  ask.] 

§  49.  Ph.  The  superior  beings  who  enjoy  perfect  happi- 
ness are  determined  in  the  choice  of  the  good  more  strongly 
than  we,  and  yet  we  have  no  reason  to  think  them  less  free 
than  ourselves. 

Th.  [For  this  reason  theologians  say  that  these  blessed 
substances  are  confirmed  in  the  good  and  exempt  from  all 
danger  of  falling.] 

Ph.  I  believe  indeed  that,  if  it  were  proper  for  poor  finite 
creatures  like  ourselves  to  judge  of  what  an  infinite  wisdom 
and  goodness  could  do,  we  could  say  that  God  himself  can- 
not choose  what  is  not  good,  and  that  the  freedom  of  this  all 

1  Gerbardt  omits  "  nierae,"  which  Erdmaiin  and  Jacques  insert  after 
"et."— Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads :  "  et  "  ;  Erdinann  and  Jacques,  "  comiue." — Tk. 


■2M  LKlliMTZ'S   ClUTlCiUE    UF   LOCKE  [i3k.  ji 


poworful  being  docs  not  liinder  him  from  being  determined  by 
what  is  best. 

Th.  [I  am  so  persuaded  of  this  truth  that  I  believe  we  can 
boldly  assure  ourselves  of  it,  wholly  poor  and  finite  creatures 
that  we  are,  and  that  we  should  be  very  wrong  in  doubting 
it;  for  by  so  doing  we  should  derogate  from  his  wisdom, 
goodness  and  other  infinite  perfections.  But  choice,  however 
determined  the  will  be,  should  not  be  called  necessarily  and 
rigorously  absolute;  the  prevalence  of  perceived  good  in- 
clines without  necessitating,  although  considered  as  a  whole, 
this  inclination  is  determinate  and  never  fails  to  produce  its 
effect.] 

§  50.  Ph.  To  be  determined  by  the  reason  to  the  best, 
is  to  be  the  freest.  Who  would  wish  to  be  foolish  for  the 
reason  that  a  fool  is  less  determined  by  wise  reflections  than 
a  man  of  good  sense  ?  If  freedom  consists  in  throwing  off 
the  yoke  of  reason,  fools  and  madmen  will  be  the  only  free- 
men; but  I  do  not  believe  that  for  love  of  such  freedom 
any  one  would  wish  to  be  a  fool,  save  he  who  is  one  already. 

TJi.  [There  are  people  to-day  who  consider  it  clever  to 
declaim  against  reason,  and  to  treat  it  as  an  inconvenient 
pedant.  I  see  little  books,  discourses  about  nothing,  which 
make  great  pretensions,  and  I  sometimes  see  verses  even  too 
beautiful  to  be  employed  in  such  false  thoughts.  In  fact, 
if  those  who  mock  at  reason  spoke  in  earnest,  it  would  be  a 
new  kind  of  extravagance  unknown  to  past  centuries.  To 
speak  against  reason  is  to  speak  against  truth ;  for  reason  is  a 
concatenation  of  truths.  It  is  to  speak  against  one's  self, 
against  one's  good,  since  the  principal  point  of  reason  con- 
sists in  knowing  the  truth  and  following  the  good.] 

§  51.  Ph.  As  then  the  highest  perfection  of  an  intelligent 
being  consists  in  applying  himself  carefully  and  constantly  to 
the  search  for  true  happiness,  so  the  care  we  should  employ 
not  to  take  as  real  happiness  that  which  is  only  imaginary,  is 
the  foundation  of  our  freedom.  The  more  we  are  bound  to 
the  invariable  search  for  happiness  in  general  ivhich  never 
ceases  to  he  the  object  of  our  desires,  the  more  our  will  finds 
itself  freed  from  the  necessity  of  being  determined  by  the 
desire  which  bears  us  towards  some  particular  good,  until  we 
have  examined  Avhether  it  agrees  with  or  is  opposed  to  our 
true  happiness. 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  207 

Til.  The  true  good  should  always  be  the  object  of  our 
desires,  but  there  is  room  for  doubt  whether  it  is  so :  for  often 
one  thinks  but  little  of  it,  and  I  have  remarked  here  more 
than  once,  that  unless  appetite  is  guided  by  Iteason  ib  tends  to 
present  pleasure  and  not  to  happiness,  i.e.  to  enduring  pleas- 
vire,  although  it  tends  to  protract  it ;  see  §  36  and  §  41. 

§  53.  Pli.  If  some  extreme  disturbance  takes  entire  pos- 
session of  our  mind,  as  the  pain  of  a  cruel  torture,  we  are  not 
enough  masters  of  our  mind.  But  in  order  to  control  our^ 
passions  as  much  as  possible,  we  should  make  our  mind  relish 
good  and  evil  really  and  effectively,  and  not  permit  an  ex- 
cellent and  considerable  good  to  escape  our  mind  without  leav- 
ing there  some  relish,  until  we  have  excited  in  ourselves 
desires  proportioned  to  its  excellence  so  that  its  absence 
renders  us  uneasy  as  well  as  the  fear  of  losing  it  when  we 
enjoy  it. 

Th.  [That  sufficiently  agrees  Avith  the  remarks  I  have 
just  made  in  §§31  and  35,  and  with  what  I  have  said  more 
than  once  of  luminous  pleasures,  where  we  understand  how 
they  improve  us  without  putting  us  in  danger  of  some  greater 
imperfection,  as  do  the  confused  pleasures  of  sense,  against 
which  we  must  guard  ourselves,  especially  when  we  have  not 
learned  by  experience  that  we  shall  be  able  surely  to  avail 
ourselves  of  them.] 

Ph.  And  let  no  one  say  here  that  he  cannot  master  his  pas- 
sions nor  hinder  them  from  breaking  loose  and  forcing  him  to 
act ;  for  what  he  can  do  before  a  prince  or  great  man,  he  can 
do,  if  he  will,  when  alone  or  in  the  presence  of  God. 

Th.  [That  remark  is  very  good  and  worthy  of  frequent 
reflection.] 

§  54.  Ph.  But  the  different  choices  men  make  in  the  world, 
prove  that  the  same  thing  is  not  equally  good  for  each  of 
them.  And  if  the  interests  of  men  did  not  extend  beyond 
this  life,  the  reason  of  this  diversity  which  causes,  for  exam- 
ple, these  to  plunge  into  luxury  and  debauchery,  and  those  to 
prefer  temperance  to  pleasure,  would  arise  onl}^  from  the  fact 
that  they  placed  their  happiness  in  these  different  things. 

Th.  [It  arises  thence  even  now,  although  they  all  have  or 
should  have  before  their  eyes  this  common  object  of  the 
future  life.     It  is  true  that  the  consideration  of  true  happi- 


o„s  LKIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uiv.  ii 

ness,  oven  in  this  life,  should  suffice  to  make  those  who  dis- 
card it  prefer  virtue  to  pleasure ;  although  the  obligation 
would  not  then  be  so  strong  or  so  decisive.  It  is  also  true 
that  men's  tastes  are  different,  and  it  is  said  that  we  should 
not  dispute  about  tastes.  But  as  these  are  only  confused  per- 
ceptions, we  should  hold  fast  to  them  only  in  the  case  of  ob- 
jects found  to  be  indifferent  and  incapable  of  harm  ;  otherwise, 
if  one  had  a  relish  for  poisons  which  w^ould  kill  him  or  render 
him  miserable,  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  say  that  his  taste 
should  not  be  called  in  question.] 

§  55.  Ph.  If  there  is  nothing  to  hope  for  beyond  the  grave, 
the  inference  is  certainly  very  just :  let  us  eat  and  drink,  let 
us  enjoy  all  that  gives  us  pleasure,  for  to-morroiv  ice  die. 

Til.  [There  is  something  to  be  said,  in  my  opinion,  regard- 
ing this  inference.  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics  and  many  other 
ancient  philosophers  held  another  view,  and  I  believe,  indeed, 
that  they  were  right.  If  there  were  nothing  beyond  this  life, 
the  peace  of  the  soul  and  health  of  the  body  would  not  cease 
to  be  preferable  to  the  pleasures  Avhich  would  be  contrary 
thereto.  And  it  is  no  reason  whatever  for  neglecting  a  good 
because  it  will  not  endure  forever.  But  I  admit  that  there 
are  cases  where  there  would  be  no  means  of  demonstrating 
that  the  most  virtuous  course  would  be  the  most  useful.  It  is 
then  the  thought  of  God  and  of  immortality  only  which  ren- 
ders the  obligations  of  virtue  and  justice  absolutely  indispen- 
sable.] 

§  68.  Ph.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  present  judgment  we 
make  of  good  and  evil  is  always  right.  And  as  for  present 
happiness  or  misery,  when  reflection  goes  no  farther,  and  all 
consequences  are  wholly  put  aside,  man  never  chooses  amiss. 

Th.  [That  is  to  say,  if  everything  were  limited  to  the  pres- 
ent moment,  it  wou-ld  not  be  right  to  refuse  the  pleasure  which 
presents  itself.  In  fact,  I  remarked  above  that  all  pleasure  is  a 
feeling  of  perfection.  But  there  are  certain  perfections  which 
bring  with  them  greater  imperfections.  If  some  one  devoted 
himself  during  his  entire  life  to  throwing  peas  against  pins,  in 
order  to  learn  not  to  fail  to  make  them  pierce  them,  after  the 
example  of  him  to  whom  Alexander  the  Great  caused  to  be 
given  as  a  recompense  a  bushel  of  peas,  this  man  would  attain 
a  certain  perfection,  but  very  slight  and  unworthy  of  being 


CH.  XXI]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  209 

compared  with  so  many  other  very  necessary  perfections 
which  he  would  have  neglected.  Thus  the  perfection  which 
is  found  in  certain  present  pleasures  should  yield  especially 
to  the  regard  for  the  perfections  which  are  necessary ;  in  order 
that  we  be  not  plunged  into  misery,  which  is  the  state  in 
which  we  go  from  imperfection  to  imperfection,  from  pain  to 
pain.  But  if  there  be  only  the  present,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  be  contented  with  the  perfection  which  is  present,  i.e.  with 
present  pleasure.] 

§  62.  Ph.  No  one  would  voluntarily  render  his  condition 
unhappy  unless  he  were  led  by  false  judgments.  I  do  not 
speak  of  mistakes  which  are  the  result  of  invincible  error, 
and  Avhich  scarcely  deserve  the  name  of  false  judgment,  but 
of  that  false  judgment  which  every  man  must  confess  in 
himself  to  be  such.  §  63.  In  the  first  place,  then,  the  soul 
is  mistaken  when  we  compare  present  pleasure  or  pain  with 
one  to  come  which  we  measure  by  the  different  distance  at 
which  they  are  found  with  respect  to  us ;  like  a  spendthrift 
heir  Avho  for  the  present  possession  of  a  little  something 
would  renounce  a  large  heritage,  which  could  not  fail  him. 
Every  one  should  recognize  this  false  judgment,  for  the  future 
will  become  present,  and  will  then  have  the  same  advantage 
of  nearness.  If  at  the  moment  the  man  takes  the  glass  in 
his  hand,  the  pleasure  of  drinking  were  accompanied  with  the 
headache  and  pains  in  the  stomach,  which  will  follow  in  a 
few  hours,  he  would  not  in  the  least  wish  to  taste  the  wine. 
If  a  little  difference  in  time  causes  so  much  illusion,  with 
much  stronger  reason  a  greater  distance  will  produce  the 
same  effect. 

Til.  There  is  some  congruity  here  between  the  distance 
of  places  and  that  of  times.  But  there  is  also  this  difference, 
that  visible  objects  diminish  their  action  upon  the  sight 
very  nearly  in  proportion  to  their  distance,  and  it  is  not 
at  all  the  same  as  regards  the  future  objects  which  act  upon 
the  imagination  and  the  mind.  Visible  rays  are  straight 
lines  proportionally  distant,  but  there  are  curved  lines  which 
after  some  distance  appear  to  fall  into  the  straight  line 
and  are  no  longer  sensibly  divergent:  thus  are  made  the 
asymptotes,  whose  apparent  interval  diverges  from  the  straight 
lines,  although  in  the  truth  of  things  they  abide  eternally 
p 


ilO  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  n 


separate.  We  find  indeed  that  at  last  the  appearance  of  ob- 
jects does  not  diminish  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  the 
distance,  for  tlie  appearance  soon^  disappears  entirely  al- 
though the  distance  be  not  infinite.  Thus  a  short  distance  of 
time  robs  us  entirely  of  the  future,  as  if  the  object  had  en- 
tirely disappeared.  There  often  remains  only  the  name  in 
the  mind  and  that  kind  of  thoughts  of  which  I  have  already 
spoken,  which  are  surd,  and  incapable  of  making  an  impres- 
sion, unless  you  have  attended  to  them  methodically  and 
habitually.] 

Ph.  I  do  not  speak  here  of  that  kind  of  false  judgment 
by  which  what  is  absent  is  not  only  diminished  but  suddenly 
annihilated  in  men's  minds,  when  they  enjoy  all  they  can 
obtain  for  the  present,  and  then  conclude  that  no  evil  will 
happen  to  them. 

Til.  [It  is  another  kind  of  false  judgment  when  the  expec- 
tation of  good  or  evil  to  come  is  annihilated,  because  the 
result  drawn  from  the  present  is  denied  or  made  doubtful; 
but  beyond  that,  the  error  which  annihilates  the  thought  of 
the  future  is  the  same  thing  as  this  false  judgment  of  which 
I  have  already  spoken,  which  arises  from  a  too  feeble  repre- 
sentation of  the  future,  which  is  considered  only  a  little 
or  not  at  all.  For  the  rest,  we  might  perhaps  distinguish 
here  between  bad  taste  and  false  judgment,  for  often  we 
do  not  even  question  whether  the  future  good  should  be  pre- 
ferred, and  act  only  upon  impression  without  presuming  to 
come  to  the  examination.  But  when  we  think,  one  of  two  things 
happens,  either  we  do  not  continue  suflB.ciently  our  thought, 
and  we  pass  on  Avithout  pressing  the  question  which  has 
been  touched ;  or  we  pursue  the  examination  and  form  a 
conclusion.  And  sometimes  in  each  case  there  remains  greater 
or  less  self-condemnation :  sometimes  also  there  is  no  formido 
oppositi  or  scrupulousness  at  all,  whether  the  mind  turns  aside 
at  once,  or  is  deceived  by  its  prejudices.] 

§  64.^  Ph.  The  limited  capacity  of  our  mind  is  the  cause 
of  the  false  judgments  we  make  in  comparing  good  and  evil. 
We  cannot  well  enjoy  two  pleasures  at  once,  and  still  less  can 

^  Gerhardt  reads  after  "  entieremeiit,"  "bientost,"  which  Erdinann  and 
Jacques  omit.  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt.  So  also  Lonlve,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  402'(Bohii  ed.).  Erd- 
mann  has  §  29 :  Jacques,  §  59.  — Tr. 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  211 

we  enjoy  any  pleasure  in  the  time  that  we  are  beset  by  pain. 
A  little  bitterness  mixed  in  the  cup  prevents  us  from  tasting 
its  sweetness.  The  evil  we  feel  is  always  the  worst ;  we  cry  : 
Ah  !  any  other  pain  rather  than  this  ! 

Th.  [There  is  much  variety  in  all  this  according  to  men's 
temperaments,  the  force  of  their  feelings,  and  the  habits  they 
have  contracted.  A  man  who  has  the  gout  might  be  joyful 
because  a  large  fortune  fell  to  him,  and  a  man  who  swims  in 
delights,  and  who  might  live  at  his  ease  upon  the  earth,  is 
{)lunged  into  sadness  because  of  a  disgrace  at  court.  The  fact 
is,  joy  and  sadness  arise  from  the  result  or  from  t\iQ  prevalence 
of  pleasures  or  pains,  when  there  is  a  mixture  of  them.  Lean- 
der  scorned  the  inconvenience  and  danger  of  swimming  over 
the  sea  at  night,  urged  on  by  the  attractions  of  the  beautiful 
Hero.^  There  are  people  who  can  neither  drink  nor  eat^  nor 
satisfy  other  appetites  without  much  pain,  on  account  of  some 
weakness  or  inconvenience ;  and  yet  they  satisfy  these  appe- 
tites even  beyond  necessity  and  just  limits.  Others  are  so 
effeminate  or  so  delicate  that  they  refuse  pleasures  with  which 
any  pain,  disgust  or  any  inconvenience  is  mingled.  There 
are  some  persons  who  bravely  place  themselves  beyond  pains 
and  pleasures  present  and  ordinary,  and.  act  almost  alone 
through  fear  and  hope.  Others  are  so  effeminate  that  they 
complain  of  the  least  inconvenience,  or  run  after  the  least  sen- 
sible and  present  pleasure  nearly  like  children.  These  are 
the  people  to  whom  the  present  pain  or  pleasure  always  ap- 
pears the  greatest ;  they  are  like  preachers  or  panegyrists  of 
little  judgment,  with  whom,  according  to  the  proverb  :  The  idol 
of  the  day  is  always  the  greatest  saint  of  paradise.^  But  what- 
ever variety  is  found  among  men,  it  is  always  true  that  they 
act  only  according  to  present  perceptions,  and  when  the  future 
impresses  them,  it  is  always  by  means  of  an  image  they  have 
of  it,  or  by  resolution  and  habit  which  they  have  contracted 

1  Cf.  Vergil,  Georcj.  3,  258;  Ovid,  Heroides,  18,  19  (17,  18,  Ovid.  Opera,  ex 
rccog.  Rud.  Merkelii,  Vol.  1,  p.  141  sq.,  Lipsise :  B.  G.  Teubner,  1887)  ;  and,  for 
"  the  final  form  "of  "  this  poem  of  love  and  death,"  the  poem  of  340  hexameters 
by  Miisffius,  the  grammarian  of  the  fifth  century  a.d.,  an  extended  abstract  of 
which  is  given  in  J.  A.  Symonds'  Studies  of  the  Greek  Poets,  Vol.  2,  chap.  22, 
pp.  345-362.     New  York :  Harper  &  Bros.,  1880.  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads  after  "manger,"  "  ou  qni  ne  sanroient  satisfaire  d'autres 
appetits,"  which  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit.  —  Tr. 

3  The  italics  are  mine.  —  Tr. 


•212  LEIBNIl'Z'S   CKITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [hk.  ii 


in  following  even  a  simple  name  or  other  arbitrary  cliaracter, 
without  liaving  any  picture  or  natural  sign,  because  it  would 
not  be  without  uneasiness,  and  sometimes  without  a  feeling  of 
chagrin,  that  they  would  oppose  themselves  to  a  strong  reso- 
lution already  made,  and,  above  all,  to  a  habit.] 

§  G~K  Ph.  'Men  are  apt  enough  to  diminish  future  pleasure, 
and  to  conclude  in  themselves  that,  when  it  comes  to  trial,  it 
may  perhaps  not  correspond  to  the  hope  it  gives  nor  to  the 
opinion  they  generally  have  of  it ;  having  often  found  by  their 
own  experience  that  not  only  the  pleasures  which  others  have 
magnified  have  appeared  to  them  very  insipid,  but  that  what 
has  caused  themselves  much  pleasure  at  one  time,  has  offended 
and  displeased  them  at  another. 

Th.  [These  are  mainly  the  reasonings  of  voluptuaries,  but 
we  ordinarily  find  that  the  ambitious  and  avaricious  judge 
wholly  otherwise  honors  and  wealth,  although  they  enjoy 
only  moderately,  and  often,  indeed,  very  little,  these  same 
goods  when  they  possess  them,  being  always  occupied  in  going 
farther.  I  find  it  a  beautiful  invention  of  nature's  architect 
to  have  rendered  men  so  sensible  to  what  appeals  so  little  to 
their  senses ;  and  if  they  could  not  become  ambitious  or  avari- 
cious, it  would  be  difficult  in  the  present  state  of  human  nature 
for  them  to  be  able  to  become  virtuous  and  reasonable  enough 
to  labor  for  their  perfection  in  the  face  of  the  present  pleas- 
ures which  turn  them  aside  from  it. 

§  66.  Ph.  As  to  things  good  or  bad  in  their  consequences 
and  by  their  aptness  to  procure  us  good  or  evil,  we  judge 
them  in  different  ways ;  either  when  we  judge  them  incapable 
of  really  doing  us  as  much  evil  as  in  fact  they  do,  or  when 
we  judge  that  while  the  consequence  is  important  it  is  not  so 
certain  that  it  may  not  happen  otherwise,  or  at  least  that  it 
may  not  be  avoided  by  some  means,  as  by  industry,  address, 
change  of  conduct,  repentance. 

Th.  It  seems  to  me  that  if  by  the  importance  of  the  conse- 
quence we  understand  that  of  the  consequent,  i.e.  the  great- 
ness of  the  good  or  evil  that  may  follow,  we  must  fall  into  the 
preceding  kind  of  false  judgment,  in  which  future  good  or 
evil  is  poorly  represented.  Thus  there  remains  only  the  sec- 
ond kind  of  false  judgment,  of  which  we  shall  presently  treat, 
namely,  that  in  which  the  consequence  is  doubtful.] 


cii.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  213 

Ph.  It  would  be  easy  to  shoAv  in  detail  that  the  subterfuges 
which  I  have  just  alluded  to  are  so  many  unreasonable  judg- 
ments ;  but  I  shall  content  myself  with  remarking  in  general 
that  it  is  acting  directly  contrary  to  reason  to  hazard  a  greater 
good  for  a  less  [or  to  expose^  ourselves  to  misery  in  order  to 
acquire  a  little  good  or  to  avoid  a  little  evil],  and  that,  too, 
upon  uncertain  conjectures  and  before  we  have  entered  upon  a 
due  examination. 

Tli.  [As  these  are  two.  heterogeneous  considerations  {i.e. 
considerations  which  cannot  be  compared  with  each  other), 
that  of  the  greatness  of  the  consequence  and  that  of  the 
greatness  of  the  consequent,  moralists  in  desiring  to  compare 
them  are  much  perplexed,  as  appears  in  the  case  of  those  who 
have  treated  of  probability.  The  truth  is  that  here  as  in 
otlier  estimates  disparate  and  heterogeneous  and,  so  to  speak, 
of  more  than  one  dimension,  the  greatness  of  that  which  is 
discussed  is  in  reason  composed  of  both  estimates,  and  is  like  a 
rectangle,  in  which  there  are  two  considerations,  viz.  that  of 
length  and  that  of  breadth  ;  and,  as  for  the  greatness  of  the 
consequence  and  the  degrees  of  probability,  we  still  lack  that 
part  of  Logic  which  is  to  estimate  them,-  and  the  most  of  the 

1  Gerhardt  reads :  "  exposer  "  ;  Erdmann  and  Jacques :  "  opposer."  —  Tb. 

2  I.e.  the  Calculus  of  Probabilities,  the  founder  of  which  was  Pascal, 
1023-1062,  who  developed  the  mathematical  theory  of  probability  iu  his  cor- 
respoudeuce  with  Fermat,  l()01-l(iG5,  concerning  certain  questions  on  the 
equitable  division  of  the  stakes  in  games  of  chance  proi^osed  to  Pascal  by  the 
Chevalier  de  Mere.  Cf.  I.  Todhunter,  History  of  the  Theory  of  Probability 
from  the  time  of  Pascal  to  that  of  Laplace,  pp.  7-21,  8vo.  Cambridge  and 
London,  LSfiS.  Contributions  were  made  to  the  theory  by  many  of  the  dis- 
tinguished mathematicians  of  the  period  and  after,  including  James  Bernoulli, 
1()54-1705;  Huygens  (vid.  ante,  p.  150,  note  3)  ;  Demoivre,  l&il-llM,  in  his 
Doctrine  of  chances,  or  method  of  calcidatimj  the  probabilities  of  events  at 
play,  3ded.,  London,  1756;  Laplace,  1749-1827,  in  his  Th^orie  analytiqne  des 
probabilite's  (Vol.  7  of  his  CEuvres  completes,  pvbliees  sous  les  auspices  de 
I'Arademie  des  Sciences,  seven  vols.,  4to  Paris,  1878-1886),  since  which 
Imt  little  advance  has  been  made  in  the  theory;  and  Poisson,  1781-1840,  in 
liis  Eccherchcs  sur  la  jirobabilite  des  jiu/ements  en  matieres  criminelles,  etc., 
4to  Paris,  18.37.  Leibnitz  became  acquainted  with  Pascal's  labors  during 
his  residence  in  Paris,  1672-1676;  cf.  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz.  Leben,  1,  113  sq. 
He  recognized  the  immense  importance  of  this  new  "  part  of  Logic,"  and 
thought  to  substitute  it  for  the  old  and  crude  casuistry  which  had  so  long 
]>revailed.  In  the  letter  to  Bourguet,  March  22,  1714,  Gerhardt,  3,  570;  Erd- 
mann, 723,  Leibnitz  glances  briefly  at  the  historical  rise  of  tlie  calculus  of 
]n-o1iiibilities.  For  the  pliilosophical  side  of  the  question,  cf.  J.  S.  Mill,  Lor/ic, 
Bk.  HI.,  chaps  18,  23,  pp.  .")7!>  sq.,  41()  sq.,  8tli  cd.,  Harper  and  Bros.,  New 


2U  LEIBNITZ'S   CHITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [inc.  n 


casuists  who  have  written  on  probability  have  not  even  under- 
stood its  nature,  founding  it  with  Aristotle,^  upon  authority, 
instead  of  founding  it  as  they  ought  upon  likelihood  (vraisevi- 
bhiuce),  authority  being  only  one  of  the  reasons  which  pro- 
duce likelihood.] 

§  G7.  Ph.  Here  are  some  of  the  ordinary  causes  of  this 
false  judgment.  First,  ignorance,  second,  inattention,  when  a 
man  does  not  reflect  upon  that  of  which  he  is  aware.  This 
is  an  affected  and  present  ignorance  which  misleads  the  judg- 
ment as  well  as  the  will. 

Th.  [It  is  always  present,  but  not  always  affected ;  for  we 
do  not  always  take  it  into  our  heads  to  think,  when  it  is 
necessary,  of  what  we  know  and  the  memory  of  which  we 
should  recall  if  we  were  master  of  it.  Affected  ignorance  is 
always  mixed  with  some  attention  at  the  time  it  is  affected  ;  in 
the  future,  it  is  true,  it  may  ordinaril}^  include  somewhat  of  in- 
attention. The  art  of  thinking  in  time  of  need  of  what  we  know 
would  be  one  of  the  most  important  if  it  were  found ;  but  I 
do  not  see  that  men  up  to  the  present  time  have  even  thought 
of  forming  the  elements  of  it,  for  the  art  of  memory^  of 
which  so  many  authors  have  written  is  wholly  another  thing.] 

Ph.  If  then  they  bring  together  in  confusion  and  hastily 
the  reasons  from  one  side  and  allow  through  neglect  several 
sums  which  ought  to  enter  into  the  reckoning  to  escape,  this 

York,  1881;  F.  H.  Bradley,  The  Principles  of  Logic,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  7,  §§  32 
sq.,  pp.  201  sq.,  Kegau  Paul,  Trench  and  Co.,  London,  1883;  J.  Venn,  The 
Logic  of  Chance,  3d  ed.,  Macmillan  and  Co.,  London,  1888;  W.  S.  Jevons,  The 
Principlea  of  Science,  3d  ed.,  Macmillan  and  Co.,  London,  1889. — Tr. 

1  For  Aristotle's  definition  of  probability,  cf.  Anal.  Prior.,  II.,  27,  70^3: 
"The  probable  is  a  generally  admitted  pro]3osition.  For -what  is  known  for 
the  most  jjart  as  thus  happening  or  not  happening,  or  being  or  not  being,  this 
is  probable  ";  '■/.  also  Wallace,  Outlines,  §  21,  who  quotes  the  Greek  of  the 
pas.sage.  Phet.L,  2,  1.3.57*34:  "For  the  probable  is  that  which  for  the  most 
part  happens."  Aristotle  accordingly  rests  much  more  upon  experience 
than  upon  authority,  and  Leibnitz  has  not  given  his  definition  accurately. 
"The  probable  conclusion,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  is  for  Aristotle,  "an  incom- 
plete induction,  whose  problematic  character  he  well  understood,  but  did  not 
determine  more  closely.  Later  Greek  philosophers  of  a  sceptical  creed  began 
to  speak  of  grades  of  probability,  but  the  moderns  have  been  the  first  to 
fall  upon  the  fruitful  thoughts  of  a  mathematical  estimate  of  probability." 
—  Tr. 

2  Mnemonics,  the  invention  of  which  was  ascribed  to  the  poet  Simonides, 
of  Ceos,  5.56^169  B.C.,  perhaps  because  he  was  famous  for  the  strength  of  his 
own  memory.     Cf.  Cicero,  De  Oratore,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  82.  —  Tr. 


cii.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  215 

haste  produces  no  less  false  judgments  than  if  it  were  perfect 
ignorance. 

Th.  [In  reality  many  things  must  be  taken  into  account,  as 
should  be  the  case,  when  the  balance  of  reasons  is  discussed ; 
and  the  process  is  almost  like  that  in  the  account-books  of 
merchants.  For  no  sum  must  be  neglected,  each  must  be 
properly  estimated  by  itself,  they  must  be  properly  arranged, 
and  finally  an  exact  collection  must  be  made  of  them.  But 
we  neglect  many  weighty  points  either  by  its  not  occurring  to 
us  to  think  of  them  or  by  passing  lightly  over  them ;  and  we 
do  not  give  each  its  proper  value,  like  the  book-keeper,  who 
was  careful  properly  to  calculate  the  columns  of  each  page, 
but  who  calculated  very  badly  the  particular  sums  of  each 
line  or  posting,  before  putting  them  in  the  columns ;  this 
causes  the  examiners  to  be  deceived,  who  look  principally  at 
what  is  in  the  columns.  Finally,  after  having  carefully  noted 
all,  they  may  be  deceived  in  the  collection  of  the  sums  of  the 
columns  and  even  of  the  final  collection,  in  which  is  the  sum 
of  the  sums.  Thus  we  should  still  need  the  art  of  thinking 
and  that  of  estimating  probabilities,  and  besides  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  value  of  goods  and  evils  in  order  properly  to 
employ  the  art  of  consequences ;  and  furthermore,  attention 
and  patience  would  be  necessary  after  all  that,  in  order  to 
push  to  the  conclusion.  Finally,  a  firm  and  constant  resolu- 
tion to  execute  the  conclusion  arrived  at  is  necessary ;  and 
address,  method,  particular  laws,  and  habits  entirely  formed 
in  order  to  maintain  the  course  in  the  future,  when  the  con- 
siderations, which  have  caused  it  to  be  taken,  are  no  longer 
present  to  the  mind.  It  is  true,  thank  God,  that  in  what  is  of 
the  greatest  importance  and  which  concerns  the  siimmam 
renim,  hajipiness  and  misery,  there  is  no  need  of  so  much 
knowledge,  aid,  and  address,  as  it  would  be  necessary  to  have 
in  order  properly  to  judge  in  a  council  of  state  or  of  war,  in 
a  tribunal  of  justice,  in  a  medical  consultation,  in  some  theo- 
logical or  historical  controversy,  or  in  some  point  of  mathe- 
matics or  mechanics  ;  but  as  a  recompense  more  firmness  and 
habit  is  necessary,  in  what  concerns  this  great  point  of  fe- 
licity and  virtue,  in  order  always  to  adopt  good  resolutions 
and  to  follow  them.  In  a  word,  for  true  happiness  less 
knowledge  suffices  with  more  good  will ;  so  that  the  greatest 


jia  l,i:il5NITZ'S    CUirKiUK    of   LOCKE  [hk. 


idiot  may  attain  it  as  easily  as  the  most  learned  and  most  skil- 
ful.] 

I'h.  You  see  then  that  without  liberty  the  understanding 
wouhl  be  of  no  use,  and  that  liberty  without  understanding 
would  signify  notliing.  If  a  man  could  see  what  may  do  him 
good  or  evil  without  being  able  to  move  a  step  in  advance 
towards  the  one  or  in  removal  from  the  other,  would  he  be 
the  better  for  the  sight  ?  He  would  be  indeed  more  miserable 
for  this  reason,  for  he  would  uselessly  pine  after  the  good  and 
would  fear  the  evil,  that  he  sees  is  inevitable  ;  and  he  who  is 
at  liberty  to  run  here  and  there  in  the  midst  of  perfect  dark- 
ness, in  what  respect  is  he  better  than  if  he  were  tossed  about 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  wind  ? 

Th.  [His  caprice  would  be  a  little  better  satisfied,  but  he 
would  be  in  no  better  condition  to  meet  good  or  to  shun  evil.] 

§  68.  Fh.  Another  source  of  false  judgment.  Content  with 
the  first  pleasure  which  comes  to  hand  or  which  custom  has 
rendered  agreeable,  we  do  not  look  farther.  This  then  is 
also  an  occasion  for  men  to  judge  wrongly  when  they  do  not 
regard  as  essential  to  their  happiness  that  which  really  is  so. 

Th.  [It  seems  to  me  that  this  false  judgment  is  comprised 
under  the  preceding  kind  where  one  is  mistaken  as  to  the 
consequences.] 

§  G9.  Ph.  The  inquiry  remains  whether  a  man  has  the 
power  to  change  the  pleasure  or  displeasure  which  accom- 
panies any  particular  action.  In  many  cases  he  can.  ^len 
may,  and  ought  to,  correct  their  palates  and  make  them  acquire 
a  taste.  They  can  change  also  the  taste  of  the  soul.  A  due 
consideration,  practice,  application,  custom  will  bring  about 
this  result.  Thus  it  is  that  men  accustom  themselves  to 
tobacco,  which  usage  or  custom  at  last  makes  them  find  agree- 
able. It  is  the  same  as  regards  virtue.  Habits  have  powerful 
charms  and  we  cannot  depart  from  them  without  uneasiness. 
You  will,  perhaps,  regard  it  as  a  paradox  that  men  can  make 
things  or  actions  more  or  less  agreeable  to  themselves,  so  much 
do  they  neglect  this  duty. 

Th.  [I  have  already  made  this  statement  above,  §  37, 
towards  the  end,  and  §  47,  also  towards  the  end.  We  can 
make  ourselves  will  anything  and  form  our  taste.] 

§  70.  Ph.    Morality,  established  upon  true  foundations,  can 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  217 

only  diitermine  to  virtue  :  it  suflfices  that  infinite  happiness 
and  misery  after  this  life  are  possible.  We  must  admit  that 
a  good  life,  joined  with  the  expectation  of  possible  eternal 
felicity,  is  preferable  to  a  bad  life,  accompanied  by  the  fear  of 
terrible  misery,  or,  at  least,  of  the  terrible  and  uncertain  hope 
of  annihilation.  All  this  is  in  the  highest  degree  self-evident, 
although  virtuous  men  should  have  only  evil  to  endure  in  this 
world,  and  the  wicked  should  taste  therein  perpetual  pleas-- 
ure,  which  is  ordinarily  quite  otherwise.  For  rightly  consid- 
ering all  things,  I  believe  they  have  the  worst  part  even  in 
this  life. 

Th.  [Thus  were  there  no  life  beyond  the  grave  an  epicurean 
life  would  not  be  the  most  reasonable.  And  I  rejoice,  sir,  that 
you  rectify  what  you  said  to  the  contrary  above,  §  55.]. 

Ph.  Who  could  be  so  foolish,  as  to  resolve  (if  he  had  his 
senses)  to  expose  himself  to  a  possible  danger  of  being  infin- 
itely unhappy  so  that  he  has  nothing  to  gain  therefrom  for 
himself  but  pure  annihilation ;  instead  of  putting  himself  in 
the  condition  of  the  good  man  who  has  nothing  to  fear  but 
annihilation,  and  who  has  eternal  felicity  to  hope  for  ?  I 
have  forborne  to  speak  of  the  certainty  or  probability  of  the 
future  state,  because  I  have  no  other  design  in  this  place  than 
to  show  the  false  judgment  of  which  each  should  acknowledge 
himself  guilty  on  his  own  principles. 

Th.  [The  wicked  are  very  prone  to  believe  that  the  other 
life  is  impossible.  But  they  have  no  reason  for  their  belief 
other  than  that  which  compels  them  to  limit  themselves  to 
what  they  learn  by  their  senses,  and  that  no  one  to  their 
knowledge  has  come  back  from  the  other  world.  There  was  a 
time  when  upon  the  same  principle  we  could  reject  the  anti- 
podes, when  we  were  unwilling  to  unite  mathematics  and  the 
popular  notions ;  and  we  could  do  so  with  as  much  reason  as 
we  can  now  have  in  rejecting  the  other  life,  when  we  are 
unwilling  to  unite  true  metaphysics  and  the  notions  of  the 
imagination.  For  there  are  three  degrees  of  notions  or  ideas, 
viz.  :  popular,  mathematical,  metaphysical.  The  first  do  not 
suffice  to  make  us  believe  in  the  antipodes  ;  the  first  and  the 
second  do  not  yet  suffice  to  make  lis  believe  in  the  other 
world.  It  is  true  they  furnish  already  favorable  conjectures  ; 
but  if  the  second  established  certainly  the  antipodes  before 


»18  l.KULMTZ'S    CKirUiUE    OF   LUCKE  [inc.  ii 


tlie  expiTifiK-e  we  now  have  of  it  (I  speak  not  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, but  of  the  phiee  at  least  which  the  knowledge  of  the 
roundnoss  of  the  earth  gave  them  among  geographers  and 
a.stronomers-),  the  last  give  no  less  certitude  of  another  life 
from  this  time,  and  before  you  have  gone  to  see.] 

§  72.  Ph.  Let  us  now  return  to  power  which  is  properly 
the  subject  of  this  chapter,  liberty  being  only  one  form  of  it, 
but  the  most  important.  In  order  to  have  more  distinct  ideas 
of  power,  it  will  be  neither  beside  the  purpose  nor  useless  to 
obtain  a  more  exact  knowledge  of  what  is  called  action.  I 
said  at  the  beginning  of  our  discourse  on  power  that  there 
are  two  kinds  of  actions,  of  which  we  have  some  idea,  viz. : 
motion  and  thought.^ 

Th.  [I  thought  you  could  avail  yourself  of  a  more  general 
term  than  that  of  thought,  viz. :  that  of  perception,  attributing 
thought  only  to  minds,  Avhile  perception  belongs  to  all  the 
entelechies.  But  I  do  not  wish,  however,  to  contest  with  any 
one  the  liberty  to  take  the  term  thought  in  the  same  general 
way.  And  for  myself  indeed  I  shall  perhaps  do  so  some  time 
without  being  aware  of  it.] 

Ph.  iSTow,  although  we  give  to  those  two  things  the  name  of 
action,  we  shall  find  however  that  it  does  not  always  suit  them 
perfectly,  and  that  there  are  some  examples  which  we  shall 
recognize  rather  as  passions.  For  in  these  examples  sub- 
stance, in  which  we  find  movement  or  thought,  receives  purely 
from  without  the  impression  through  which  action  is  com- 
municated to  it,  and  acts  only  by  the  sole  capacity  it  has 
of  receiving  this  impression,  which  is  only  a  passive  power. 
Sometimes  substance  or  the  agent  puts  itself  in  action  by  its 
own  power,  and  it  is  there  properly  an  active  poiver. 

Til.  I  have  already  said  that,  taking  action  in  metaphysical 
strictness  as  that  which  takes  place  in  substance  spontaneously 
and  from  its  own  depths,  that  alone  is,  properly  speaking,  a 
substance  which  is  active,^  for  all  arises  for  it  from  itself  after 
God ;   it  being  impossible  for  one  created  substance  to  have 

1  Locke  has:  "thinking,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.l,p.413  (Bohn'sed.).— Tr. 

2  Cf.  De  ipsa  natura,  etc.,  1698,  §  9  ad  fin.;  Gerhardt,  4,  509;  Erdmann, 
157;  Jacques,  1,  461  (in  French);  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann,  Die  klein.  philos. 
wicht.  Schrift.  V.  G.  W.  Leibniz  (Philos.  Bibliothek,  Bd.  81),  p.  121  (in  Ger- 
man), ErickKoschny,  Leipzig,  1879;  also  Kuno  Fischer,  Ge.Hch.  d.  neuern  Philos., 
Vol.  2  (G.  W.  Leibniz),  p.  334,  3d  ed.,  Heidelberg:  C.  Winter,  1889.  — Tk. 


cii.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  219 

influence  upon  another.  But  taking  action  as  an  exercise  of 
perception  and  jmssion  as  its  contrary,  there  is  action  in  true 
substance  only  wlien  their  perception  (for  I  grant  it  to  all)  is 
developed  and  becomes  more  distinct,  as  there  is  passion  only 
when  it  becomes  more  confused ;  so  that  in  substances  capable 
of  pleasure  and  of  pain,  all  action  is  a  step  towards  pleasure 
and  all  passion  a  step  towards  jiain.  As  for  motion,  it  is 
only  a  real  phenomenon,  because  matter  and  mass  to  which 
motion  belongs  is  not  properly  speaking  a  substance.  But 
there  is  an  image  of  action  in  motion  as  there  is  an  image  of 
substance  in  mass ;  and  in  this  respect  we  can  say  that  the 
body  acts  (agit)  when  there  is  spontaneity  in  its  change  and 
that  it  is  j^cissive  (patit)  when  it  is  urged  on  or  hindered  by 
another ;  as  in  the  veritable  action  or  passion  of  a  veritable 
substance  we  may  take  as  its  action,  and  attribute  to  itself, 
the  change  by  which  it  tends  to  its  perfection.  And  in  the 
same  manner  we  can  take  as  |>assjon  and  attribute  to  a 
foreign  cause  the  change  by  which  the  contrary  happens  to  it ; 
although  this  cause  is  not  immediate,  because,  in  the  first  case, 
the  substance  itself,  and  in  the  second  the  foreign  things  serve 
to  explain  this  change  in  an  intelligible  way.  I  allow  bodies 
only  an  image  of  substance  and  action,  because  that  which  is 
composed  of  parts  cannot  pass,  to  speak  accurately,  as  one 
substance,  any  more  than  a  flock ;  but  we  can  say  that  there 
is  therein  something  substantial,  of  which  the  unity,  that 
which  makes  it  as  it  were  one  being,  comes  from  thought.] 

Ph.  I  have  thought  that  the  power  to  receive  ideas  or 
thoughts  by  the  operation  of  some  foreign  substance  was 
called  power  of  thought,  although  at  bottom  it  is  only  a  pas- 
sive p)oioer  or  a  simple  capacity  making  abstraction  from  the 
reflections  and  internal  changes  which  always  accompany  the 
.received  image,  for  the  expression,^  which  is  in  the  soul  is,  as 
it  should  be,  that  of  a  living  mirror  ;  but  the  power  which  we 
have  of  recalling  absent  ideas  at  our  choice,  and  of  comparing 
together  those  that  we  think  to  the  purpose,  is  truly  an  active 
poiver. 

Th.  [This  also  agrees  with  the  notions  I  have  just  pre- 
sented, for  there  is  in  this  a  passage  to  a  more  perfect  state. 

1  Gerhardt  and  Erdmaim  read;  "  I'expressiou  "  ;  Jacques:  "  I'impres- 
sion."  —  Tk. 


220  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [luv.  u 


But  I  should  suppose  that  there  is  also  action  in  sensations  so 
far  as  they  give  us  more  distinct  perceptions  and  consequently 
the  opportunity  of  making  remarks  and  so  to  speak  of  devel- 
oping ourselves.] 

§  73.  Ph.  Is^ow  I  think  it  appears  that  we  can  reduce  the 
primitive  and  original  ideas  to  this  small  number :  extension, 
soUdUrj,  mobility  {i.e.  passive  power,  or  rather  capacity  of 
being  moved),  which  come  to  us  in  the  mind  by  way  of  reflec- 
tion, and  finally,  existence,  duration,  and  number,  which  come 
to  us  by  the  two  ways  of  sensation  and  reflection ;  for  by 
these  ideas  we  could  explain,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  nature 
of  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  odors,  and  all  the  other  ideas  we 
have,  if  our  faculties  were  subtile  enough  to  perceive  the  dif- 
ferent motions  of  the  minute  bodies  which  produce  these  sen- 
sations. 

Th.  To  speak  the  truth,  I  believe  that  these  ideas,  which 
you  here  call  original  and  primitive,  are  for  the  most  part  not 
wholly  so,  being  susceptible  in  my  view  of  further  resolution ; 
but  I  do  not  blame  you  at  all,  sir,  for  having  limited  yourself 
and  for  not  having  pushed  the  analysis  farther.  Moreover,^  I 
believe  that  if  their  number  can  be  diminished  by  this  means, 
it  can  be  increased  by  adding  other  ideas  more  original  or  as 
much  so.  As  to  the  question  concerning  their  arrangement,  I 
should  consider,  following  the  order  of  the  analysis,  exist- 
ence anterior  to  the  others,  number  to  extension,  duration  to 
motioity  or  mobility ;  although  this  analytic  order  is  not 
ordinarily  that  of  the  occasions  which  make  us  think  of  them. 
The  senses  furnish  us  the  material  for  reflection  and  we  should 
not  even  think  of  thought,  if  we  did  not  think  of  something 
else,  i.e.  of  the  particular  things  which  the  senses  furnish. 
And  I  am  persuaded  that  created  souls  and  minds  are  never 
without  organs  and  never  without  sensations,  as  they  cannot 
reason  without  characters.  Those  who  have  desired  to  main- 
tain a  complete  separation  and  mode  of  thinking  in  the  sepa- 
rated soul,  inexplicable  by  all  that  we  know,  and  separated 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "D'ailleurs  je  crois  que  si  le  nombre  en  pourroit  estre 
diminue  par  ee  moyen,  il  pourroit  estre  augmente,"  etc. ;  Erdmann  and  Jacques 
read  :  "D'ailleurs  si  e'est  vrai,  que  le  nombre  en  pourroit  etre  diminue'  par  ce 
moyen,  je  crois  qu'il  pourroit  etre  augumente  en  y  ajoutant  d'autres  Idees 
plus  originales  ou  autaut."  —  Tk. 


cii.  xxii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  221 

not  only  from  our  present  experiences,  but,  what  is  much 
more,  from  the  general  order  of  things,  have  given  too  much 
influence  to  so-called  strong  minds,  and  have  made  the  finest 
and  the  grandest  truths  objects  of  suspicion  to  many  people, 
having  indeed  deprived  themselves  thereby  of  some  excellent 
means  of  proving  them,  which  this  order  furnishes  us.] 


CHAPTER  XXII 

OF     MIXED    MODES 

§  1.  Ph.  Pass  we  on  to  the  mixed  modes.  I  distinguish 
them  from  the  more  simple  modes,  which  are  composed  only  of 
simjile  ideas  of  the  same  kind.  Moreover,  the  mixed  modes 
are  certain  combinations  of  simple  ideas  wliich  are  not  re- 
garded as  characteristic  marks  of  any  real  being,  which  has  a 
fixed  existence,  but  as  scattered  and  independent  ideas  which 
the  mind  joins  together;  and  they  are  thereby  distinguished 
from  the  complex  ideas  of  sitbstances. 

Th.  [Properly  to  understand  these  we  must  recall  our  for- 
mer divisions.  "According  to  you  ideas  are  simple  or  complex. 
The  complex  are  either  substances,  modes,  or  relations.  Modes 
are  either  simple  (composed  of  simple  ideas  of  the  same  kind) 
or  mixed.  Thus,  in  your  view,  there  are  simple  ideas,  ideas 
of  modes,  both  simple  and  mixed,  ideas  of  substances  and 
ideas  of  relations.  We  could,  perhaps,  divide  the  terms  or 
the  objects  of  ideas  into  abstract  and  concrete  ;  the  abstract 
into  absolute  and  into  those  which  express  relations ;  the 
absolute  into  attributes  and  into  modifications ;  both  into 
simple  and  composite ;  the  concrete  into  substances  and  into 
substantial  things,  made  up  of  or  the  resultants  of  true  and 
simple  substances.] 

§  2.  Ph.  The  mind  is  purely  passive,  respecting  its  simple 
ideas,  which  it  receives  as  sensation  and  reflection  present 
them  to  it.  But  it  often  acts  by  itself,  indeed,  in  reference 
to  the  mixed  modes,  for  it  can  combine  the  simple  ideas  in 
making  com})lex  ideas  without  considering  whether  they  so 
exist  united  in  nature.  This  is  why  we  give  to  these  kinds  of 
ideas  the  name  of  notion. 


LKIBNITZ'S   CIUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

Th.  [But  reflection  which  makes  us  think  of  simple  ideas 
is  often  voluntary  also,  and,  moreover,  the  combinations,  which 
naluri'  has  not  made,  can  })r()duce  themselves  iu  us,  as  it  were 
in  dreams  and  reveries  by  means  of  memory  alone,  without 
the  mind's  acting  more  than  in  the  simple  ideas.  As  for  the 
term  notion,  many  apply  it  to  all  sorts  of  ideas  or  conceptions, 
to  the  original  as  well  as  to  the  derived.] 

§  4.  /'//.  The  nuirk  of  several  ideas  combined  in  one  alone 
is  the  name. 

Th.  [That  means,  if  they  can  be  combined,  in  which  respect 
they  are  often  lacking.] 

Ph.  The  crime  of  killing  an  old  man,  not  having  a  name 
like  parricide,  is  not  at  first  regarded  as  a  complex  idea. 

Th.  [The  reason  why  the  murder  of  an  old  man  has  no  name 
is  that,  the  laws  not  having  attached  thereto  a  particular  pun- 
ishment, this  name  would  be  useless  ;  but  ideas  do  not  depend 
on  names.  An  ethical  author  who  should  invent  one  for  the 
crime  and  treat  in  a  special  chapter  of  Gerontophony,  showing 
what  is  due  to  old  men  and  how  it  is  a  barbarous  act  not  to 
spare  them,  would  not  on  that  account  present  us  with  a  new 
idea.] 

§  6.  Ph.  It  is  always  true  that  the  manners  and  usages 
of  a  nation,  making  combinations  familiar  to  it,  cause  each, 
language  to  have  particular  terms,  which  cannot  always  be 
translated  word  for  word.  Thus  ostracism  among  the  Greeks 
and  inoscriptio  among  the  Ilomans  were  words  which  other 
languages  cannot  express  by  equivalent  words.  Therefore, 
change  of  customs  makes  also  new  words. 

Th.  [Chance  also  plays  its  part,  for  the  French  do  not  use 
horses  as  much  as  other  neighboring  peoples ;  but  having 
abandoned  their  old  word,  which  corresponded  to  the  cavalcar 
of  the  Italians,  they  are  forced  to  say  by  j^aixqyhrase :  aller  d 
cheval  —  to  go  on  horse-back.] 

§  9.  Ph.  We  acquire  ideas  of  mixed  modes  by  observation, 
as  when  Ave  see  two  men  wrestling ;  we  acquire  them  also  by 
invention  (or  a  voluntary  union  of  simple  ideas),  thus,  he  who 
invented  printing  had  the  idea  of  it  before  this  art  existed. 
We  acquire  them  finally  by  explaining  terms,  affecting  actions 
which  Ave  liaA^e  never  seen. 

Th.    [We  can  further  acquire  them  Avhile  dreaming  or  in  a 


CH.   XXII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  223 

state  of  reveiy  without  the  combinations  being  voluntary,  for 
example,  when  we  see  in  a  dream  a  golden  palace  without 
having  thought  of  it  before.] 

§  10.  Ph.  The  simple  ideas  which  have  been  most  modified 
are  those  of  thought,  motion,  and  power,  whence  actions  are 
conceived  to  floAv;  for  the  great  business  of  mankind  consists 
in  action ;  all  actions  are  thoughts  or  motions.  The  power  or 
aptitude  to  do  anything  which  is  found  in  man  constitutes 
the  idea  which  we  call  habit,  when  this  power  has  been 
acquired  by  often  doing  the  same  thing;  and  when  we  can 
force  it  to  action  upon  each  occasion  that  presents  itself,  we 
call  it  disposition.  Thus,  tenderness  is  a  disposition  to  friend- 
ship or  love. 

Th.  [By  tenderness  you  understand  here,  I  presume,  the 
tender  heart,  but  elsewhere  you  seem  to  me  to  regard  tender- 
ness as  a  quality  which  one  has,  as  a  lover,  which  renders  him 
very  sensible  to  the  good  and  evil  of  the  object  loved.  This  it 
is  to  which  it  seems  to  me  the  chart  of  affection  is  moving  in 
the  excellent  romance  Clelie.^  And,  as  charitable  persons  love 
their  neighbor  with  some  degree  of  tenderness,  they  are  sensi- 
ble to  the  good  and  evil  of  another,  and  generally  those  who 
have  the  tender  heart  have  some  disposition  to  love  with  ten- 
derness.] 

Ph.  Boldness  is  the  power  to  do  or  say  before  others  what 
you  wish  without  being  put  out  of  countenance,  a  self-confi- 
dence, which,  in  relation  to  this  last  j^art  which  concerns  dis- 
course, had  a  particular  name  among  the  Greeks. 

Th.  [It  would  be  well  to  seek  a  word  for  this  notion,  which 
is  here  attributed  to  that  of  boldness,  bvit  which  is  often  em- 
ployed wholly  otherwise,  as  when  we  say  Charles  the  Bold. 
Not  to  be  put  out  of  countenance  is  a  strength  of  mind,  but 
one  which  bad  men  abuse  when  they  have  become  impudent; 
as  shame  is  a  weakness,  but  excusable  and  even  praiseworthy 
in  certain  circumstances.  As  for  parrhesia,^  which  you  per- 
haps understand  by  the  Greek  word,  it  is  still  attribiited  to 
Avriters  who  speak  the  truth  without  fear,  although,  then  not 

1  Clelie,  Histoire  Romaine,  a  romance  by  Mile.  Scudery,  1007-1701.  The 
s<'ene  is  laid  early  in  Roman  history ;  the  heroine  is  Cloelia,  who  escaped  Irom 
Porsena  l)y  swimming  the  Tiber.  — Tr. 

2  irapp-qcria. — Tr. 


224  Li:iBM'iy/S   nUTIQUK   OF   LOCKE  [hk. 


spoakinjj  in  the  presence  of  people,  they  are  not  liable  to  be 
ilisi'ountonani'eil.] 

§  11.  Ph.  As  poH-cr  is  the  source  whence  proceed  all  adjo?js, 
tlio  name  of  cause  is  given  to  the  substances  in  which  these 
powers  reside,  when  they  reduce  their  poiver  to  act;  and  they 
call  effects  the  substances  produced  by  this  means,  or  rather 
the  simple  ideas  (i.e.  the  objects  of  simple  ideas),  which,  by 
the  exercise  of  power  are  introduced  into  a  subject.  Thus  the 
e(ficacij  by  which  a  new  substance  or  idea  (quality)  is  pro- 
duced, is  called  actioji  in  the  subject  exercising  this  power  and 
2}assion  in  the  subject  in  which  some  simple  idea  (quality)  is 
altered  or  produced. 

Th.  [If  poicer  is  taken  as  the  source  of  action,  it  means 
something  more  than  an  aptitude  or  facility,  by  which  power 
was  explained  in  the  preceding  chapter ;  for  it  includes,  be- 
sides, tendency  as  I  have  already  more  than  once  remarked. 
This  is  why  in  this  sense  I  have  been  wont  to  appropriate  to 
it  the  term  entelechy,  which  is  either  primitive  and  answers  to 
the  soul  taken  as  an  abstract  thing,  or  derivative  as  it  is  con- 
ceived in  conation  (Ze  conatus)  and  in  vigor  and  impetuosity. 
The  term  cause  is  here  vmderstood  only  as  efficient  cause ;  but 
it  is  also  understood  as  Jinal  or  the  motive,  not  to  speak  here 
of  matter  and  form  which  are  also  called  causes  in  the  schools. 
I  do  not  know  whether  we  can  say  that  the  same  being  is 
called  action  in  the  agent  and  passion  in  the  patient,  and  is 
thus  found  in  two  subjects  at  once  like  relation,  and,  whether 
it  is  not  better  to  say  that  there  are  two  beings,  one  in  the 
agent,  the  other  in  the  patient.] 

Ph.  Many  words  which  seem  to  express  some  action  signify 
only  the  cause  and  the  effect ;  as  creation  and  annihilation 
contain  no  idea  of  action  or  of  the  manner,  but  simply  of  the 
cause  and  the  thing  Avhich  is  produced. 

Th.  [I  admit  that  in  thinking  of  creation,  we  do  not  con- 
ceive a  mode  of  acting,  capable  of  any  detail,  which  cannot 
indeed  there  be  expedient;  but,  since  we  express  something 
besides  God  and  the  world,  for  we  think  that  God  is  the  cause 
and  the  world  the  effect,  or  else  that  God  has  produced  the 
Avorld,  it  is  manifest  that  we  think  still  of  action.]^ 

1  Leibnitz  regards  the  concept  of  creation  in  the  sense  of  the  origination  of 
substances  as  incapable  of  further  explanation  because  we  can  form  no  idea 


CH.  xxiii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  225 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

OF    OUR    COMPLEX    IDEAS    OF     SUBSTANCES 

§  1.  Ph.  The  mind  notices  that  a  certain  number  of  simple 
ideas  constantly  go  together,  which,  presumed  to  belong  to  one 
thing  onl}',  are  called  by  one  name  when  thus  united  in  one 
subject.  Whence  it  comes  that,  although  this  is  in  truth  a 
mass  of  many  ideas  joined  together,  we  are  afterwards  led  by 
inadvertence  to  speak  of  them  as  a  single,  simple  idea. 

Tli.  [I  see  nothing  in  the  accepted  expressions  which  de- 
serves to  be  taxed  with  inadvertence ;  and  although  we  recog- 
nize only  one  subject  and  one  idea,  we  do  not  recognize  only 
one  simple  idea.] 

Ph.  ISTot  being  able  to  imagine  how  these  simple  ideas  can 
subsist  by  themselves,  we  are  accustomed  to  assume  something 
which  sustains  them  (^substratum),  in  which  they  subsist  or 
whence  they  result,  to  which  for  this  effect  we  give  the  name 
of  substa7ice.~\ 

Th.^    [I  believe  that  there  is  reason  in  thus  thinking,  and 
we  have  only  to  accustom  ourselves  to  it  or  to  assume  it,  since, 
at  first,  we  conceive  several  predicates  in  one  and  the  same     ' 
subject,  and  these  metaphorical  words,  s^ipport  (soutien)  or  sub--  ' 
stratum  mean  only  this ;  so  that  I  do  not  see  why  it  should 
cause  any  difficulty.    On  the  contrary,  it  is  rather  the  concretum,  '■ 
as  wise,  warm,  shining,  which   arises    in  our  mind,  than   the 
abstractions  or  qualities  (for  these   and  not  the  ideas  are  in 
the  substantial  object),  as  knowledge,  heat,  light,  etc.,  which 
are  much  more  difficult  to  comprehend.     We  may  even  doubt 
whether  these   accidents  are  veritable  existences,  as   in  fact 
they  are  very  often  only  relations.     We  know  also  that  it  is 
these   abstractions    which   cause   the    greatest    difficulties   to 
spring  up  when  we  wish  to  examine  them  minutely,  as  those 

of  the  process.  For  some  other  expressions  couceriiiiii;;  it,  cf.  La  Moiiado- 
lixjic,  §  47,  Gerhanlt,  (),  ()14  ;  Erdmauii,  708,  h. ;  Letter  to  Bayle,  Gerhardt,  3, 
58;  Erduiann,  191.  Gerhardt,  ?■>,  (Jl,  and  note,  says  the  original  is  without 
date;  Erdmann  gives  it  1702.  Cf.  also  Dillniann,  ?'inc  ncuc  iJarstf/.  d.  Leib- 
niz. Monadenlehre ,  p.  4.51  aq.  —  Tr. 

1  Erdmann  has  "  Ph.,"  a  typographical  error.  —  Tr. 
Q 


2l>(S  LKlllMlV/S    llJirKiL  K    OF    LOCKE  [uic.  ii 

know  who  are  familiar  with  the  subtilties  of  the  scholastics, 
the  most  intricate  of  which  falls  at  once  if  we  will  banish 
abstract  existence  and  resolve  to  speak  ordinarily  only  by 
concretes  and  admit  no  other  terms  in  scientific  demonstra- 
tions bnt  tliose  which  represent  substantial  subjects.  Thus  it 
is  iiodum  quaerere  in  scirpo,^  if  I  may  so  speak,  and  reversing 
things  to  take  the  qualities  or  other  abstract  terms  as  the 
easier  ;uid  the  concrete  as  something  very  difficult.] 

$  1'.  J'h.  We  have  no  other  notion  at  all  of  pure  substance 
in  general,  than  of  an  indescribable  subject,  which  is  to  us 
altogether  unknown  and  which  is  supposed  to  be  the  support 
of  qualities.  We  speak  like  children  to  one  who  has  no 
sooner  asked  them  what  a  certain  thing  unknown  to  them  is, 
than  they  make  this  reply  very  satisfactory  to  their  taste  that 
it  is  something,  but,  which  employed  in  this  way,  means  that 
they  do  not  know  what  it  is. 

Til.  [In  distinguishing  two  things  in  substance,  the  attri- 
butes or  predicates,  and  the  common  subject  of  these  predi- 
cates, it  is  no  wonder  that  we  can  conceive  nothing  particular 
in  this  subject.  It  must  be  so,  indeed,  since  we  have  already 
separated  from  it  all  the  attributes  in  which  we  could  conceive 
any  detail.  Thus  to  demand  something  more  in  this  pure  subject 
in  general  than  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  conceive  that  it 
is  the  same  thing  (for  example,  which  understands  and  wills, 
which  imagines  and  reasons),  is  to  demand  the  impossible, 
and  to  act  contrary  to  our  own  supposition,  which  has  been 
made  in  making  abstraction  and  conceiving  separately  the 
subject  and  its  qualities  or  accidents.  We  could  apply  the 
same  pretended  difiiculty  to  the  notion  of  being  and  to  all  that 
is  clearer  and  more  primitive ;  for  we  could  demand  of  the 
philosophers  what  they  conceive  when  conceiving  pure  being 
in  general;  for  all  detail  being  excluded  by  that  means  there 
will  also  be  little  to  say,  when  we  are  asked  what  is  ^)?<re  sub- 
stance in  general.  Thus  I  believe  that  the  philosophers  do 
not  deserve  to  be  laughed  at,  as  is  here  done,  in  comparing 
them  with  an  Indian  philosopher,  who,  being  asked  upon  what 
the  earth  rested,  replied,  upon  a  great  elephant ;  and  then 
Avhen  asked  what  sustained  the  elephant,  replied,  a  great  tor- 

1  To  seek  a  knot  in  a  bulrush,  to  find  a  difficulty  when  there  is  none.  Cf. 
Plaut.  3Ie7i.  2,  1,  22  ;  Ter.  And.  5,  4,  38.  —Tr, 


CH.  xxiii]  ON    IIUMxVN   UNDERSTANDING  227 

toise ;  and,  at  last,  when  pressed  to  say  upon  what  the  tortoise 
rested,  was  compelled  to  say  something,  I  knoiv  not  ivhat.  But 
this  consideration  of  substance,^  entirely  slender  as  it  appears, 
is  not  so  empty  and  sterile  as  you  think.  It  gives  rise  to 
many  consequences  of  greatest  importance  in  philosophy,  and 
which  are  capable  of  giving  it  a  new  aspect.] 

§  4.  Ph.  We  have  no  clear  idea  of  substance  in  general,  and 
§  5,  we  have  as  clear  an  idea  of  mind  as  of  body;  for  the 
idea  of  corporeal  substance  in  matter  is  as  far  from  our  con- 
ceptions as  that  of  spiritual  substance.  It  is  almost  as  the 
promoter  said  to  this  young  doctor  of  law,  who  cried  to  him 
in  the  solemnity,  to  say  utriusque :  You  are  right,  sir,  for  you 
know  as  much  in  tlie  one  case  as  the  other. 

Th.  [As  for  myself,  I  believe  that  this  opinion  of  our  igno- 
rance arises  from  that  which  demands  a  kind  of  knowledge  of 
which  the  object  does  not  admit.  The  true  mark  of  a  clear 
and  distinct  notion  of  an  object  is  the  means  we  have  of 
knowing  therein  many  truths  by  a  priori  ^  proofs,  as  I  have 
shown  in  a  discourse  on  truths  and  ideas,''  published  in  the 
"  Actes  de  Leipzig  "  of  the  year  1684. 

§  12.  Ph.  If  our  senses  were  sufficiently  penetrating,  the 
sensible  qualities,  for  example,  the  yellow  color  of  gold,  would 
disappear,  and  instead  of  that  we  should  see  a  certain  admir- 
able contexture  of  parts.  This  appears  evident  by  means  of 
microscopes.  This  present  knowledge  is  suitable  to  the  state 
in  which  we  find  ourselves.     A  perfect  knowledge  of  things 

1  lu  Leibnitz's  philosophy  substance  is  a  unitary,  individual,  spontane- 
ously active  being,  as  opposed  to  the  "  empty  and  sterile  "  conception  of  Aris- 
totelian scholasticism;  cf.  ante,  p.  15i  and  note.  Locke's  criticism  concerns 
the  scholastic  conception  only.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Neio  Kssuys,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  17,  §  1,  Th.;  Theodicee,  I.,  §  44,  Gerhardt, 
6,  127;  Erdmann,  515,  b.  For  a  brief  critical  history  of  the  concepts  of  the 
(/  priori  and  the  a  posteriori,  cf.  Rudolph  Eucken,  The  Fundamental  Concepts 
of  Modern  Philosophic  Thought,  pp.  81-91,  D.  Appleton  and  Co.,  New  York, 
1880  ;  and  for  Leibnitz's  use  of  the  terms,  op.  cit.,  p.  82,  with  the  note  contain- 
ing references  to  the  places  where  a  priori  occurs  in  ErdiiKinn's  and  Foncher 
de  Careil's  editions  of  his  works.  —  Tr. 

3  Meditationes  de  Cognitione,  Veritate  et  Ideis,  in  the  "  Acta  Eruditorum," 
Nov.,  1G84.  Gerhardt,  4,  422  sq. ;  Erdmann,  79  sq.  The  passage  referred  to 
is  found  in  Gerhardt,  425 ;  Erdmann,  80  b. ;  translation,  Dnucnu,  Philos.  Works 
of  Leibnitz,  PiO.  The  piece  has  been  translated  into  German,  witJi  notes,  by 
J.  H.  V.  Kirchniann  in  his  Philos.  Bihliothek,  Bd.  81,  Bic  klein.  philos.  ivicht, 
Schriften  v.  G.  W.  Leibniz  ;  Bd.  82,  Erlauternngen.  —  Tr. 


'2-2S  LKllJNllZS    CKri'lQL'K    OF   LUCKE  [bk. 


which  surrouud  us,  is,  perhaps,  beyond  the  capacity  of  every 
tiuite  being.  Our  faculties  suffice  to  make  us  know  the  Crea- 
tor, and  to  instruct  us  as  to  our  duties.  Should  our  senses 
bocome  more  acute,  such  change  would  be  incompatible  with 
our  nature. 

Th.  [All  that  is  true;  and  I  have  said  something  to  the 
same  effect  above.  But  the  color  yellow  does  not  cease  to 
be  a  reality  like  the  rainbow,  and  we  are  apparently  destined 
to  a  state  far  beyond  the  present,  and  can  even  go  on  to  the 
intinito,  for  there  are  no  elements  in  the  corporeal  nature.  If 
there  were  atoms,  as  the  author  appeared  to  believe  in  another 
place,  perfect  knowledge  of  the  body  could  not  be  beyond 
every  finite  being.  For  the  rest,  if  some  colors  or  qualities 
should  disappear  from  our  eyes  better  armed  or  become  more 
penetrating,  others  would  apparently  spring  into  being,  and 
it  would  require  a  new  growth  of  our  perspicacity  to  make 
these  also  disappear,  and  this  could  go  on  to  infinity,  as  the 
actual  division  of  matter  effectively  proceeds.] 

§  13.  Ph.  I  do  not  know  but  that  one  of  the  great  advan- 
tages which  some  spirits  have  over  us  consists  in  the  fact  that 
they  can  assume  to  themselves  organs  of  sensation  which  are 
precisely  suited  to  their  present  design. 

Th.  [We  do  this  indeed  in  making  for  ourselves  micro- 
scopes ;  but  other  creatures  can  go  much  farther.  And,  if  we 
could  transform  our  eyes  themselves,  which  we  do  effectively 
to  some  extent  according  as  we  wish  to  see  near  at  hand  or  at 
a  distance,  we  should  be  obliged  to  have  something^  belonging 
more  exclusively  to  us  than  they  in  order  to  shape  them  by 
its  means,  for  it  is  necessary,  at  least,  that  all  be  done  mechan- 
ically, because  the  mind  cannot  operate  immediately  upon  the 
body.  For  the  rest,  I  am  also  of  the  opinion  that  genii  per- 
ceive things  in  a  manner  which  is  somewhat  related  to  ours, 
even  if  they  should  have  the  agreeable  advantage  which  the 
imaginative  Cyrano-  attributes  to  some  animated  natures  in 

1  I.e.  the  soul  to  make  use  of  the  capacity  of  the  eyes  for  accommodation. 
—  Tr. 

2  Cyrano  de  Bergerac,  c.  1620  — 1655,  in  his  philosophical  romance,  Ilistoire 
comique  des  etats  et  empires  du  soleil.  He  was  author  also  of  the  Histoire 
comique  des  etats  et  empires  de  la  lune,  or,  as  the  title  is  sometimes  given, 
Voyage  dans  la  lune. — Tr. 


cii.  xxiii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  229 

the  sun,  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of  little  winged  crea- 
tures, which,  by  transporting  themselves  according  to  the 
command  of  the  ruling  soul,  form  all  kinds  of  bodies.  There 
is  nothing  so  marvellous  that  the  mechanism  of  nature  cannot 
produce  it;  and  I  believe  that  the  learned  fathers  of  the 
Church  were  right  in  attributing  bodies  to  the  angels.^] 

§  15.  Ph.  The  ideas  of  thinking  and  of  moving  a  body, 
which  we  find  in  that  of  the  mind,  can  be  conceived  as  clearly 
and  distinctly  as  those  of  extension,  solidity,  and  mobility, 
which  we  find  in  matter. 

Th.  [As  regards  the  idea  of  thought  I  agree.  But  I  am 
not  of  this  opinion  as  regards  the  idea  of  moving  bodies,  for, 
according  to  my  system  of  Pre-established  Harmony,  bodies 
are  so  made  that  being  once  put  in  motion,  they  continue 
therein,  according  as  the  actions  of  the  mind  require.  This 
hypothesis  is  intelligible  ;  the  other  is  not.] 

Ph.  Each  act  of  sensation  gives  us  an  equal  view  of  things 
corporeal  and  spiritual ;  for  while  sight  and  hearing  give  me 
the  knowledge  that  there  is  some  corporeal  being  without  me, 
I  know  in  a  way  still  more  certain  that  there  is  within  me  a 
spiritual  being  which  sees  and  hears. 

Th.  [It  is  very  well  said  and  very  true  that  the  existence 
of  the  spirit  is  more  certain  than  that  of  sensible  objects.-] 

§19.  Ph.  Spirits  as  well  as  bodies  can  operate  only  where 
they  are  and  in  different  times  and  places ;  thus  I  can  only 
attribute  change  of  place  to  all  finite  spirits. 

Th.  [I  believe  that  is  reasonable,  place  being  only  an  order 
of  coexistences.] 

Ph.  It  is  only  necessary  to  reflect  upon  the  separation  of 
the  soul  and  the  body  by  death  to  be  convinced  of  the  move- 
ment of  the  soul. 

Th.  [The  soul  might  cease  to  operate  in  this  visible  body  ; 
and  if  it  could  cease  thinking  all  at  once,  as  the  author  has 
maintained  above,  it  might  be  separated  from  the  body  with- 
out being  united  to  another;  thus  its  separation  would  be 
without  movement.     But  for  myself,  I  believe  that  it  thinks 

1  Cf.  Letters  to  Des  Bosses,  Sept.  20,  Oct.  4,  1706,  Gerhardt,  2,  316,  319; 
Erdmanii,  439.    Also  Descartes'  letters,  passim.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Descartes,  Meditations,  especially  II.  aud  VI.  Veitch's  trauslation, 
8t]i  ed",  pp.  104  sq..  151  sq. —  Tr. 


o;;o  1,1:1  bnh'zs  currKiric  of  locke  [hk.  u 

iind  feels  always,  that  it  is  always  united  to  some  body,  and, 
indeed,  that  it  never  leaves  entirely  and  all  at  once  the  body 
to  wliii'h  it  is  united.] 

{}  L'l.  Ph.  If  anyone  says  that  si)irits  are  not  in  loco  sed  in 
ali(jiio  ubi  I  do  not  suppose  that  now  we  would  rely  much 
upon  this  method  of  speaking.  But  if  anyone  thinks  that 
it  can  receive  a  reasonable  sense,  I  pray  him  to  express  it  in 
langnage  generally  intelligible,  and  to  draw  therefrom  after- 
wards a  reason  showing  that  spirits  are  not  capable  of  motion. 

Th.  [The  schools  have  three  kinds  of  JJheity,  or  modes  of 
existing  somewhere.  The  first  is  called  circumscriptive,  which 
they  attribute  to  bodies  in  space  which  are  there  jnmctatim,  in 
such  wise  that  they  are  measures  according  to  which  we  can 
assign  the  points  of  the  thing  placed  corresponding  to  the 
points  of  space.  The  second  is  the  definitive,  when  we  can 
define,  i.e.  determine,  that  the  situated  thing  is  in  such  a  space, 
Avithout  being  able  to  assign  the  precise  points  or  the  peculiar 
places  exclusive  of  what  is  there.  Thus  it  has  been  con- 
sidered that  the  soul  is  in  the  body,  not  supposing  it  possible 
to  assign  a  precise  point  at  which  the  soul  or  some  portion  of 
the  soul  is,  without  its  being  also  at  some  other  point.  More- 
over, many  learned  men  have  thus  viewed  the  matter.  It  is 
true  that  Descartes  desired  to  place  narrower  limits  to  the 
soul  by  locating  it  properly  in  the  pineal  gland. ^  iSTeverthe- 
less  he  did  not  dare  to  say  that  it  is  exclusively  at  a  certain 
point  in  this  gland  ;  and  this  not  being  so  he  gains  nothing, 
and  it  is  in  this  respect  precisely  as  if  he  gave  it  the  entire 
body  as  its  prison  or  place.  I  believe  that  nearly  the  same 
statement  as  that  made  regarding  souls,  must  be  made  in 
respect  to  the  angels,  whom  the  great  doctor,  a  native  of 
Aquino,  believed  to  be  in  a  place  only  by  operation  ^  which  in 
my  view  is  not  immediate  and  reduces  itself  to  pre-established 
harmony.  The  third  ubeity  is  the  repletive,  which  is  attrib- 
uted to  God,  who  fills  all  the  universe  in  a  still  more  eminent 
degree  than  the  disembodied  spirits,  for  he  works  immediately 

1  Cf.  Descartes,  Biojytrica,  IV.,  1  sq.;  Passioncs  Animas,  I.,  31  sq.;  also 
Prin.  Philos.,  IV.,  189,  19fi,  197,  altlioiigli  here  the  point  of  contact  in  the 
brain  of  the  soul  and  hody  is  not  designated  by  name.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Thomas  Aquinas,  1225  or  1227-1274,  Summa  Theologica,  Pt.  I.  Quest. 
52,  Article,  2;  also  Quest.  53.  — Tr. 


cir.  xxiii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  231 

upon  all  creatures  by  continually  producing  them,  while  finite 
spirits  cannot  exercise  any  ininiediate  influence  or  operation. 
I  do  not  know  whether  this  doctrine  of  the  schools  deserves 
to  be  ridiculed,  as  it  seems  some  try  to  do.  But  we  can 
always  attribute  a  kind  of  movement  to  souls  at  least  in  rela- 
tion to  the  bodies  with  which  they  are  united,  or  in  relation 
to  their  mode  of  perception.] 

§  23.  Ph.  If  any  one  says  he  knows  not  how  he  thinks,  I 
reply  that  he  knows  no  more  how  the  solid  particles  of  the 
body  are  united  to  make  an  extended  whole. 

Th.  [It  is  difficult  enough  to  explain  cohesion;  but  this 
cohesion  of  parts  does  not  appear  necessary  to  make  an 
extended  whole,  since  we  can  say  that  matter  perfectly  subtile 
and  fluid  constitutes  an  extension,  without  the  particles  being 
united  the  one  to  the  other.  But,  to  speak  the  truth,  I 
believe  that  perfect  fluidity  belongs  only  to  the  prhnary 
matter,^  i.e.  matter  in  the  abstract,  and,  as  an  original  quality, 
just  as  repose ;  but  not  to  secondary  matter,  such  as  is 
actually  found,  invested  with  its  derivative  qualities ;  for,  I 
believe  that  there  is  no  mass,  which  is  of  the  utmost  subtil- 
ity ;  and  that  there  is  more  or  less  connection  everywhere, 
which  arises  from  movements  so  far  as  they  are  conspirant 
and  would  be  disturbed  by  separation,  which  cannot  take 
place  without  some  violence  and  resistance.  For  the  rest,  the 
nature  of  perception  and  thus  of  thought  furnishes  a  notion 
of  the  most  original  conditions.  I  believe,  further,  that  the 
doctrine  of  substantial  unities  or  monads  will  throw  much 
light  upon  it.] 

Ph.  As  for  cohesion,  many  explain  it  by  means  of  the  sur- 
faces by  which  two  bodies  touch,  which  an  ambient  fluid  ^  (for 
example,  the  air)  presses  one  against  another.  It  is  very 
true  that  the  pressure  §  24  of  an  ambient  fluid  can  hinder  the 
avulsion  of  two  polished  surfaces  from  one  another  in  a  line 
perpendicular  to  them ;  but  it  cannot  hinder  them  from  separat- 
ing by  a  movement  parallel  to  tliese  surfaces.  This  is  why, 
if  there  were  no  other  cause  of  the  cohesion  of  bodies,  it 
would  be  easy  to  separate  all  their  parts,  by  making  them  thus 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  131  and  note.  — Tr. 

2  Locke's  term,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  438,  §  21  (Bolm's  ed.).  — Tr. 


:.'.".:>  LElliNITZ'S   CKiriQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  a 

slide  latorally,  taking  therefor  any  ])lane  you  wish  wliich 
intersects  any  mass  of  matter. 

Th.  [Ves,  no  doubt  if  all  the  smooth  particles  applied  to 
each  other  were  in  one  and  the  same  plane  or  in  parallel 
planes;  but  that  not  being  so  nor  capable  of  so  being,  it  is 
manifest  that  in  trying  to  make  the  one  slide,  you  Avill  act 
altogether  differently  upon  an  infinite  number  of  others,  whose 
plane  will  make  an  angle  with  the  first ;  for  you  must  know 
that  it  is  difficult  to  separate  two  congruent  surfaces,  not  only 
when  the  direction  of  the  movement  of  separation  is  perpen- 
dicular, but  fui-ther  when  it  is  oblique  to  the  surfaces.  Thus 
it  may  be  conceived  that  there  are  leaves  applied  to  one 
another  in  every  direction  in  the  polyhedral  bodies  that  nature 
forms  in  ores  and  elsewhere.  But  I  admit  that  the  pressure 
of  the  ambient  fluid  \ipon  smooth  surfaces  applied  to  each 
other  does  not  suffice  to  exj^lain  the  basis  of  all  cohesion,  for 
it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  the  tables  applied  the  one  against 
the  other  already  have  cohesion.] 

§  27.  Ph.  I  have  always  supposed  that  the  extension  of  a 
body  was  something  else  than  the  cohesion  of  solid  particles. 

Th.  [That  does  not  appear  to  me  to  agree  with  your  o^^ti 
preceding  explanations.  It  seems  to  me  that  a  body  in  which 
there  are  internal  movements  or  whose  particles  are  in  the  act 
of  detaching  themselves  one  from  another  (as  I  believe  hap- 
pens always)  cannot  be  extended.  Thus  the  notion  of  exten- 
sion ai)pears  to  me  wholly  different  from  that  of  cohesion.] 

§  28.  Ph.  Another  idea  we  have  of  body  is  the  2>oice7-  of 
communicating  'motion  by  imjndse;  and  another  we  have  of  the 
soul  is  the  poiver  of  2'>t'oducing  motion  hy  thought.  Experience 
clearly  fiu-nishes  us  each  day  these  two  ideas  ;  but  if  we  wish 
to  investigate  further  how  this  is  done,  we  find  ourselves 
equally  in  the  dark.  For,  as  regards  the  communication  of 
motion,  wherein  one  body  loses  as  much  motion  as  another 
receives,  which  is  the  most  ordinary  case,  we  conceive  there 
nothing  else  than  a  motion  which  passes  from  one  body  into 
another;  which  is,  I  think,  as  obscure  and  as  inconceivable 
as  the  manner  in  which  our  mind  moves  or  stops  our  bodies  by 
thouglit.  It  is  still  more  difficult  to  explain  the  increase  of 
motion  by  means  of  impulse,  which  is  observed  or  believed  to 
happen  in  certain  cases. 


CH.  xxiii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  233 

Th.  [I  am  not  astonished  that  yon  find  insurmountable  dif- 
ficulties where  you  seem  to  assume  a  thing  so  inconceivable 
as  the  passage  of  an  accident  from  one  subject  to  another ; 
but  I  see  nothing  which  compels  us  to  an  assumption  which  is 
no  less  strange  than  that  of  the  scholastics  of  accidents  with- 
out a  subject,  which  they  have  taken  care  however  to  attribute 
only  to  the  miraculous  action  of  the  divine  omnipotence, 
while  here  this  passage  would  be  merely  an  ordinary  one.  I 
have  already  said  something  about  it  above  (chap.  21,  §  4^), 
where  I  also  remarked  that  it  is  not  true  that  a  body  loBes  as 
much  motion  as  it  gives  to  another ;  which  they  seem  to  conceive 
as  if  motion  were  a  substantial  thing  and  resembled  salt  dissolved 
in  water,  which  comparison  is  actually  the  one  M.  Eohaut,^  if 
I  mistake  not,  has  used.  I  add  here  that  this  is  not  even  the 
most  usual  case,  for  I  have  elsewhere  demonstrated  that  the 
same  quantity  of  motion  is  maintained  only  when  the  two 
bodies  which  come  into  collision  proceed  in  one  and  the  same 
direction  before  the  collision  and  still  proceed  in  one  and  the 
same  direction  after  the  collision.  It  is  true  that  the  veritable 
laws  of  motion  are  derived  from  a  cause  superior  to  matter. 
As  for  tJie  power  of  producing  motion  by  thought,  I  do  not  think 
we  have  any  idea  of  it,  as  we  have  no  experience  of  it.  The 
Cartesians  themselves  admit  that  souls  cannot  give  a  new 
force  to  matter,  but  they  pretend  that  they  give  it  a  new 
determination  or  direction  of  the  force  it  has  already.  For 
myself,  I  maintain  that  souls  change  nothing  in  the  force  nor 
in  the  direction  of  bodies ;  that  the  one  would  be  as  incon- 
ceivable and  unreasonable  as  the  other,  and  that  you  must 
avail  yourself  of  the  pre-established  harmony  in  order  to 
ex])lain  the  union  of  the  soul  and  the  body.] 

Ph.  It  is  worth  our  consideration  whether  active  power  is 
not  the  proper  attribute  of  spirits  and  passive  power  of 
bodies  ?     Whence  we   might  conjecture  that  created  spirits, 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  176.  — Tr. 

2  James  Roliaut  or  Rohault,  1620-1675,  a  French  physicist,  a  follower  of 
Descartes.  His  chief  work,  the  Physics,  was  written  in  Frencli,  and  trans- 
lated into  Latin,  with  valuable  notes,  hy  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  11)75-1729,  and 
into  English  by  his  brother  Dr.  John  Clarke.  It  was  a  text-book  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Cambridge,  until  supplanted  by  the  treatises  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton. 
The  original  work  first  appeared  in  1071,  and  enlarged,  in  two  vols.,  in  1682. 
Clarke's  Latin  version,  8vo.,  in  1097;  the  4th  and  best  edition,  Jacobi  Rohaulti 
Physica,  8vo.,  1718. —Tr. 


234  LEIBNITZ'S   CUITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


Wm'j;  ai'tivo  and  passive,  are  not  totally  separate  from  simply 
passrve  matter ;  and  that  these  other  beings,  which  are  active 
and  passive  at  the  same  time,  partake  of  Ijoth. 

Th.  [These  thoughts  greatly  please  me  and  entirely  express 
my  conviction,  provided  you  explain  the  word  spirit  so  gener- 
ally that  it  comprises  all  souls,  or  rather  (to  speak  still  more 
generally)  all  the  entelechies  or  substantial  -unities,  which  are 
analogous  to  spirits.] 

§  oi.  Fh.  I  much  wish  that  you  woiiLd  show  me  in  the 
notion  we  have  of  spirit  anything  more  confused '  or  nearer  a 
contradiction  than  what  the  very  notion  of  body  includes.  I 
mean  inhnite  divisibility. 

Th.  [What  you  here  say  further  in  order  to  make  evident 
tliat  we  understand  the  nature  of  the  spirit  as  well  or  better 
than  that  of  the  body  is  very  true  ;  and  Fromondus,-  who  has 
published  a  book,  De  compositione  continui,  was  right  in  enti- 
tling it  Labyrinth.  But  the  question  arises  from  a  false  idea 
you  have  of  the  nature  of  body  as  well  as  of  space.] 

§  33.  Ph.  The  idea  of  God  indeed  comes  to  us  as  others 
do,  the  complex  idea  of  God  we  have  being  composed  of  the 
simple  ideas  which  we  receive  from  reflection  and  which  we 
extend  by  the  idea  we  have  of  the  infinite. 

Th.  [Upon  that  question  I  refer  to  what  I  have  already 
said  in  several  places  in  order  to  make  evident  that  all  these 
ideas,  and  particularly  that  of  God,  are  in  us  originally,  and 
that  we  only  make  ourselves  take  notice  of  them,  and  that 
above  all,  the  idea  of  the  infinite  is  not  formed  by  an  extension 
of  finite  ideas.^] 

§  37.  Ph.  The  majority  of  the  simple  ideas  Avhieh  compose 
our  complex  ideas  of  substances  are,  properly  considered,  only 
fiowers,  whatever  our  inclination  to  take  them  as  positive  quali- 
ties. 

1  Locke's  word  is  "perplexed,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  443  (Bolm's  ed.). 
—  Tr. 

2  Libert  Froidmont  or  Fromont  —  Latin,  Fromondus  — 1587-1653,  a  Flemish 
theologian,  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Theology  in  the  University  of  Lou- 
vain.  His  theological,  philological,  and  scientific  knowledge  was  very  exten- 
sive. Descartes  esteemed  highly  both  his  knowledge  and  his  person.  Cf. 
Descartes'  letters.  His  book,  Lahyrinthus  sive  de  compositione  continui,  ap- 
peared at  Antwerp  in  1631.  —  Tr. 

8  Cf.ante,  pp.  16,17;  JVeio  Essays,  Book  H.,  chap.  14,  §  27,  Th.,  and  note  1, 
ante,  p.  158;  chap.  17,  §  1,  Th.,  ante,  p.  162.  — Tr. 


cii.  XXV]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  235 

Th.  [I  think  that  the  iwwers,  which  are  not  essential  to 
substance  and  which  include  not  only  an  cqUitade,  but  also  a 
certain  tendency,  are  properly  what  is  or  ought  to  be  under- 
stood by  reed  qualities.'] 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

OF    COLLECTIVE    IDEAS    OF    SUBSTANCES 

§  1.  Ph.  After  simple  substances  we  come  to  the  aggregates. 
Is  it  not  true  that  the  idea  of  this  mass  of  men  composing  an 
army,  is  as  much  a  single  idea  as  that  of  one  man? 

Th.  [You  are  right  in  saying  tliat  this  aggregate  {ens  per 
aggregationem,  to  use  the  language  of  the  school),  makes  one 
single  idea,  although,  properly  speaking,  this  mass  of  sub- 
stances does  not  form  in  truth  one  substance.  This  is  a  result 
to  wliich  the  soul  by  its  perception  and  its  thought  gives  its 
last  achievement  of  unity.  You  may,  however,  say  in  a  sense 
that  it  is  something  substantial,  i.e.  comprising  substances.] 


CHAl'TER   XXV 

OF    KELATION 

§  1.  Ph.  It  remains  to  consider  the  ideas  of  relations  which 
are  the  poorest  in  reality.  When  the  mind  regards  one  thing 
in  com})arison  with  another,  this  is  a  relation  or  respect,^  and 
the  denominations  or  relative  terms,  which  are  produced,  are 
like  so  many  marks  which  serve  to  lead  our  thoughts  beyond 
the  subject  to  something  distinct  from  it,  and  these  two  are 
called  subjects  of  the  relation  (relata).  '~^ 

Th.  [Relations  and  orders  have  something  of  the  essence  of 
reason,  although  they  have  their  foundation  in  tilings ;  for  we 
can  say  that  tlieir  reality,  like  that  of  eternal  truths  and  possi- 
bilities, comes  from  the  supreme  reason.]  -_j 

§  5.  Ph.  There  may,  however,  be  a  change  of  relation  witli- 
out  any  change  happening  in  the  subject.     Titius,  whom  to- 

1  Locke's  word,  Philos.  Wurkx,  Vol.  1,  p.  ii'J  (Bohu's  cd.).— Tu. 


'2M  LKinXlTZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [nic.  ii 

(lay  I  consider  as  a  father,  ceases  to  be  such  to-morrow  without 
any  chaiii,'e  being  made  iu  liimself,  by  the  sole  fact  of  his 
son's  (h'ath. 

Th.  [Tliat  statement  may  very  well  be  made  in  view  of 
things  which  are  perceived;  although  in  metaphysical  strict- 
ness it  is  true  that  there  is  no  entirely  exterior  denomination 
(deuomiiuUio pure  extrinseca)  because  of  the  real  connection  of 
all  things.] 

§  (5.  Ph.    [I  think  that  relation  is  only  between  two  things.] 

Til.  [There  are,  however,  examples  of  relation  between  sev- 
eral things  at  once,  as  that  of  order  or  that  of  a  genealogical 
tree,  which  expresses  the  rank  and  connection  of  all  the  terms 
or  members,  and  even  a  figure  like  that  of  a  polygon  includes 
the  relation  of  all  the  sides.] 

§  8.  Fh.  It  is  well  to  consider  also  that  the  ideas  of  rela- 
tions are  often  clearer  than  those  of  the  things  Avhich  are  the 
subjects  of  the  relation.  Thus  the  relation  of  father  is  clearer 
than  that  of  man. 

Th.  [That  is  because  this  relation  is  so  general  that  it  may 
also  suit  other  substances.  Moreover,  as  a  subject  may  have 
clearness  and  obscurity,  the  relation  might  be  grounded  in  the 
clear.  But  if  the  form  itself  of  the  relation  involved  the 
knowledge  of  that  which  is  obscure  in  the  subject,  it  would 
participate  in  this  obscurity.] 

§  10.  Ph.  The  terms \vhich.necessarUy lead  the  mind  to  other 
ideas  than  those  which  are  supposed  really  to  exist  in  the 
thing  to  which  the  term  or  word  is  applied  are  relative  ;  the 
others  are  absolute. 

Th.  [You  have  well  added  this  "  necessarily"  and  you  might 
add  "  expressly  "  or  "  at  first,"  for  you  can  think  of  black,  for 
example,  without  thinking  of  its  cause ;  but  it  is  by  remaining 
within  the  limits  of  a  knowledge  which  presents  itself  at  first 
and  which  is  confused  or  very  distinct,  but  incomplete ;  the 
one  when  there  is  no  resolution  of  the  idea,  the  other  when 
you  limit  it.  Otherwise  there  is  no  term  so  absolute  or  so 
loose  as  not  to  include  relations  and  the  perfect  analysis  of 
which  does  not  lead  to  other  things  and  even  to  all  others ;  so 
that  you  can  say  that  relative  terms  indicate  expressly  the  rela- 
tion they  contain.  I  here  oppose  the  absolute  to  the  relative, 
and  it  is  in  another  sense  that  I  have  opposed  it  above  to  the 
limited.'^ 


CH.  xxvi]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  237 

CHArTER   XXVI 

OB^    CAUSE    AND    EFFECT    AND    SOME    OTHER    RELATIONS 

§§  1,  2.  Ph.  Cause  is  that  which  produces  a  simple  or  in- 
complex  idea ;  effect  is  that  which  is  produced. 

Th.  [I  see,  sir,  that  you  often  understand  by  idea  the  objec- 
tive reality  of  the  idea  or  the  quality  which  it  represents.  You 
define  only  efficient  cause,  as  I  have  already  remarked  above. 
You  must  admit  that,  in  saying  that  efficient  cause  is  that 
which  produces  and  effect  that  which  is  produced,  you  make 
use  only  of  synonyms.  It  is  true  that  I  have  heard  you  say  a 
little  more  distinctly,  that  ccmse  is  that  which  makes  another 
thing  commence  to  exist,  though  this  word  "makes''  passes 
over  also  the  principal  difficulty  entirely.  But  that  will  be 
explained  better  elsewhere.] 

Ph.  In  order  further  to  touch  some  other  relations,  I  remark 
that  there  are  terms  employed  to  designate  time  which  are 
ordinarily  regarded  as  signifying  only  positive  ideas,  which 
are  nevertheless  relative,  as  young,  old,  etc.,  for  they  involve  a 
relation  to  the  ordinary  duration  of  the  substance  to  which 
you  attribute  them.  Thus  a  man  is  called  young  at  the  age  of 
twenty  years,  and  very  young  at  the  age  of  seven  years.  But 
we  call  a  horse  old  at  twenty  years,  and  a  dog  at  seven.  But 
we  do  not  say  that  the  sun  and  the  stars,  a  ruby  or  a  diamond, 
is  young  or  old,  because  we  do  not  know  the  ordinary  periods 
of  their  duration.  §  5.  The  same  is  true  regarding  place  or 
extension,  as  when  a  thing  is  said  to  be  high  or  loiv,  great  or 
small.  Thus  a  horse  which  will  be  large  according  to  the  idea 
of  a  Welshman,  appears  very  small  to  a  Fleming ;  each  thinks 
of  the  horses  which  are  raised  in  his  country. 

Th.  [These  remarks  are  very  good.  It  is  true  we  some- 
times SAverve  a  little  from  this  sense,  as  when  we  say  that  a 
thing  is  old  when  comparing  it  not  with  those  of  its  kind,  but 
Avith  other  kinds.  For  example,  we  say  that  the  world  or  the 
sun  is  very  old.  Some  one  asked  Galileo  if  he  believed  that 
the  sun  was  eternal.  He  replied :  eterno  nd  ma  ben  a)dico  — 
eternal,  no,  but  very  ancient. 


o;Js  Li:iliMT//S    CKiniiUK    OF   LOCKE  Lbk.  ii 

CHAPTER   XXVII 

WHAT    TDKXTITV    OK    DIVERSITY    IS 

§  1.  /'//.  A  relative  idea  of  the  greatest  importance  is  that 
of  kh'utitif  or  diversity.  We  never  find  and  we  cannot  conceive 
it  possible  that  two  tilings  of  the  same  kind  exist  in  the  same 
time  in  the  same  place.  Therefore  when  we  ask  ichether  a 
thing  is  the  same  or  not,  the  question  always  relates  to  a  thing 
which  at  such  a  time  exists  in  such  a  place ;  whence  it  follows 
that  a  thing  cannot  have  two  beginnings  of  existence,  nor  two 
things  one  beginning  only  in  relation  to  the  time  and  the 
place. 

TJi.  [It  is  always  necessary  that  besides  the  difference  of 
time  and  place  there  be  an  internal  jninciple  of  distinction,  and, 
though  there  are  many  things  of  the  same  kind,  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  none  of  them  are  ever  perfectly  alike  :  thus 
although  time  and  place  (i.e.  external  relation)  serve  us  in 
distinguishing  things  which  we  do  not  easily  distinguish  by 
themselves,  the  things  do  not  cease  to  be  distinguishable  in 
themselves.  The  essence  {le  precis)  of  identity  and  diversity 
consists,  then,  not  in  time  and  place,  although  it  is  true  that 
the  diversity  of  things  is  accompanied  by  that  of  time  or  of 
place,  because  they  bring  with  them  different  impressions  of 
the  thing ;  not  to  say  that  it  is  rather  by  the  things  that  one 
place  or  one  time  must  be  distinguished  from  another,  for  in 
themselves  they  are  perfectly  alike,  but  they  are  not,  there- 
fore, substances  or  complete  realities.  The  mode  of  distin- 
guishing which  you  seem  to  propose  here,  as  unique  in  things 
of  the  same  kind,  is  based  upon  the  supposition  that  penetra- 
tion is  not  conformable  to  nature.  This  supposition  is  reason- 
able, but  experience  indeed  makes  it  evident  that  it  is  not 
closely  applied  here,  when  the  question  concerns  distinction. 
We  see,  for  example,  two  shadows  or  rays  of  light  which  in- 
terpenetrate, and  we  might  invent  for  ourselves  an  imaginaiy 
world  wherein  bodies  would  act  in  the  same  way.  But  we  do 
not  cease  to  distinguish  one  ray  from  another  by  the  very 
rate  of  their  passage  even  when  they  cross  each  other.] 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDEESTANDING  239 

§  3.  Ph.  What  is  called  the  principle  of  individuation  {prin- 
cipium  individiiatioms)  in  the  schools,  where  they  torment 
themselves  so  much  to  know  what  it  is,  consists  in  existence 
itself  which  determines  each  being  to  a  particular  time  and 
place  incommunicable  to  two  beings  of  the  same  kind. 

Th.  The  2yrincipJe  of  individuation  '  reappears  in  individuals 
in  the  principle  of  distinction  of  which  I  just  spoke.  If  two 
individuals  were  perfectly  alike  and  equal  and  (in  a  word) 
indistinguishable  in  themselves,  there  would  be  no  principle 
of  individuation ;  and  I  even  venture  to  assert  that  there 
would  be  no  individual  distinction  or  different  individuals 
under  this  condition.  This  is  Avhy  the  notion  of  atoms  is 
chimerical,  and  arises  only  from  the  incomplete  conceptions 
of  men.  For  if  there  were  atoms,  i.e.  bodies  perfectly  hard 
and  perfectly  unalterable  or  incapable  of  internal  change  and 
capable  of  differing  among  themselves  only  in  size  and  shape,  ' 
it  is  plain  that  in  the  possibility  of  their  being  of  the  same 
shape  and  size  they  would  then  be  indistinguishable  in  them- ' ' 
selves,  and  could  be  distinguished  only  by  means  of  external 
denominations  without  an  internal  basis,  which  is  contrary  to 
the  highest  principles  of  reason.  But  the  truth  is  that  every 
body  is  alterable,  and  indeed  actually  changes  so  that  it  differs 
in  itself  from  every  other.  I  remember  that  a  distinguished  • 
princess,^  wdio  is  of  a  pre-eminently  excellent  mind,  said  one 

1  Leibnitz  discussed  this  principle  in  his  disputation  for  the  degree  of 
Bachelor  of  Philosophy,  entitled,  Disputatio  metapliysica  de  privcipio  indi- 
vidui,  which  in  his  sixteenth  year  he  publicly  defended  at  Leipzij;-,  IMarch  30, 
1(563;  cf.  Guhrauer,  Leibniz.  Leben,  1,  27  .^q.  This  piece  is  found  in  Gcrliardt, 
4,  15-26,  where  the  title-page  gives  the  date  of  the  public  defence,  May  30, 
1663;  Erdmanu,  1-5;  it  has  also  been  edited,  with  an  extended  critical  intro- 
duction, from  a  copy  found  in  the  Library  at  Hannover  by  Dr.  G.  E.  Guhrauer, 
and  published  at  Berlin  in  1837.  J.  H.  von  Kirclnnanu  has  published  a  German 
translation  with  elaborate  and  extensive  notes  in  his  Philos.  Bihliothek,  Bd. 
81,  Die  Jdeiii.  pjhilos.  ivieht,  ScTiriften  G.  W.  Leilmix  ;  Bd.  82,  IJrliiutervnfjen. 
For  a  recent  discussion  of  the  principle  of  individuality,  cf.  R.  Eucken,  The 
Fundamental  Concepts  of  Mod.  Philos.  Thow/ht,  pp.  231-248.  New  York, 
1880.  —  Tr. 

2  Sophie  Charlotte,  1668-1705,  the  first  Queen  of  Prussia,  the  friend  and  in 
a  certain  sense  the  pupil  of  Leil)nitz  in  philosophy.  The  Tli.eodicee  originated 
in  his  philosophical  conversations  with  her.  Cf.  Gerhardt,  6,  3'.);  Erdmanu, 
474  b.  Leibnitz's  correspondence  with  her  is  found  in  ().  Klopp,  Die  Werke 
von  Leibniz,  Yo].  10,  Hannover,  1877;  the  letters  of  philosopliical  importance 
in  Gerhardt,  .3,  343  sq. ;  (>,  488  .sq.  ■  7,  544 ;  tlie  letter  in  (x.  6,  4'.)',)  sq.  is  translated 
in  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  14!)  sq.  Cf.  also  Kuuo  Fischer,  Uesch. 
d.  n.  Philos.,  Vol.  2,  p.  261  sq.,  3d  ed.,  1889.  —Tii." 


210  I.KinNITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.it 

(lay  whilo  walking  in  her  garden  that  she  did  not  believe 
there  were  two  h-aves  perfeetly  alike.  A  gentleman  of  dis- 
tinction, who  was  walking  with  her,  thought  he  would  easily 
iind  some.  But  although  he  searched  long,  he  was  convinced 
hy  his  eyes  that  he  could  always  note  the  difference.  We  see 
by  these  considerations,  hitherto  neglected,  how  far  we  have 
wandered  in  philosophy  from  the  most  natural  notions,  and 
how  far  W(>  have  departed  from  the  great  principles  of  true 
metaphysic] 

§  4.  Ph.  That  which  constitutes  the  unity  (identity)  of  one 
and  the  same  plant  is  the  possession  of  such  an  organization 
of  parts  in  a  single  body,  as  participates  in  a  common  life 
which  endures  while  the  plant  subsists,  although  the  parts 
change. 

Th.  [The  organization  or  configuration  Avithout  an  existing 
principle  of  life,  which  I  call  a  monad,  would  not  suffice  to 
cause  the  continuance  of  idem  nuviero  or  the  same  individual ; 
for  the  configuration  can  abide  specifically  Avithout  abiding  ^ 
individually.  When  a  horseshoe  is  changed  into  copper  in  a 
mineral  spring  of  Hungary,  the  same  figure  in  kind  remains, 
but  not  the  same  as  cm  individual ;  for  the  iron  is  dissolved, 
and  the  copper,  Avith  Avhich  the  water  is  impregnated,  is  pre- 
cipitated and  insensibly  takes  its  place.  N"ow  figure  is  an 
accident  Avhich  does  not  pass  from  one  subject  to  another  (de 
sicbjedo  in  subjection).  So  we  must  say  that  bodies  as  well 
organized  as  others  do  not  remain  the  same  in  appearance, 
and,  speaking  strictly,  not  at  all.  It  is  almost  like  a  river 
Avhich  ahvays  changes  its  Avater,  or  like  the  ship  of  Theseus 
which  the  Athenians  Avere  ahvays  repairing.-     But  as  regards 

J  Erdmanu  and  Jacques  omit  "siiecifiquement,  sans  demeurer,"  the  reading 
of  Gerhardt.  — Tr. 

2  Cy.  Plato,  PhsBclo.  58  A;  Xenophou,  Memorabilia,  4,  8,  2.  The  sacred 
slup,  sent  yearly  to  Delos  hy  the  Athenians  in  consequence  of  a  vow  made  to 
Apollo  hy  Theseus  when  on  his  way  to  Crete  with  the  seven  youths  and  seven 
maidens,  the  annual  tribute  of  the  Athenians  to  the  Minotaur,  that  if  rescued 
he  would  send  annually  to  Delos  a  ship  with  gifts  and  sacrifices  as  a  thank- 
offering  for  their  deliverance,  was  repaired  piece  hy  piece  as  necessary,  so 
that  in  form  and  appearance  it  remained  the  same  old  ship  in  which  Theseus 
himself  sailed,  while  its  substance  continually  changed.  The  vessel  served 
the  philosophers  as  an  instance  in  discussions  concerning  identity  and  what 
constitutes  it,  and  as  an  illustration  of  a  numerical  substance  continuously 
the  same,  though  constantly  changing  by  the  decay  and  rejection  of  old  and 
the  growth  and  acquisition  of  new  parts,  as  in  the  case  of  the  living  body. 
—  Tk. 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  241 

substances,  which  are  in  themselves  a  true  and  real  substantial 
unity,  to  which  may  belong  actions  properly  called  vital,  and 
as  regards  substantial  beings,  qam  uao  spiritu  continentur,  iu 
the  words  of  an  ancient  ■  jurisconsult,^  i.e.  which  a  certain' 
indivisible  spirit  animates,  you  are  right  iu  saying  that  they 
remain  perfectly  the  same  individual  through  this  soul  or  this 
spirit  which  constitutes  the  ego  in  thinking  beings.] 

§  5.  Ph.  The  case  is  not  very  different  in  animals  and  in 
plants. 

Th.    [If  vegetables  and  animals  have  no  soul,  their  identity 
is  only  apparent ;  but  if  they  have,  individual  identity  is  in  , 
truth  strictly  speaking  there,  although  their  organized  bodies 
do  not  preserve  it.] 

§  6.  Ph.  This  also  shows  wherein  the  identity  of  the  same 
man  consists,  viz.  in  the  fact  alone  that  he  enjoys  the  same 
life,  continued  by  particles  of  matter  which  are  in  a  perpetual 
flux,  but  which  in  this  succession  are  vitally  united  with  the 
same  organized  body. 

Th.  [That  may  be  understood  in  my  sense.  In  fact,  the 
organized  body  is  not  the  same  from  one  moment  to  another ; 
it  is  only  equivalent.  And  if  it  were  not  related  to  the  soul, 
there  would  no  longer  be  the  same  life  or  vital  union.  Thus 
this  identity  would  be  only  apparent.] 

Ph.  Whoever  shall  connect  the  identity  of  man  with  any- 
thing else  than  a  well-organized  body,  in  a  certain  instant,  and 
which  thence  continues  in  this  vital  organization  by  a  succes- 
sion of  different  particles  of  matter  which  are  united  to  it, 
will  have  difficulty  in  making  an  embryo,  a  man  of  years,  a 
fool,  and  a  wise  man  the  same  man,  unless  it  follows  from  this 
supposition  that  it  is  possible  for  Seth,  Ismael,  Socrates,  Pilate, 
St.  Augustine  ^  to  be  one  and  the  same  man,  .  .  .  and  this  would 
agree  still  worse  with  the  notions  of  those  philosophers  who 
recognize  transmigration  and  believe  that  men's  souls  can  be 
sent  for  punishment  of  their  irregularities  into  the  bodies  of 
animals ;  for  I  do  not  believe  that  any  one  who  was  assured 
that  the  soul  of  Heliogabalus  existed  iu  a  hog  would  mean 
that  this  hog  was  a  man,  and  the  same  man  as  Heliogabalus. 

1  Sextus  Pomponius,  died  1.'58  A.d.  The  phrase  occurs  in  the  Di,i,'est,  41,  3, 
30,  Vol.  2,  p.  522,  ed.  TJi.  Mommsen,  Berlin:  Weidmaiin,  1870.  — Tk. 

2  Locke  has  "  St.  Austin,"  Fliilos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  4(J3  (Bohn's  ed.).  — Tii. 

R 


..J2  LHIBM  rZ'S    CMMTKiUK    OF   LOCKE  [mc.  ii 


Th.  [There  is  liere  a  question  of  name  and  of  thing.  As  for 
the  thing,  tlie  identity  of  one  and  tlie  same  individual  sub- 
stance cau  be  maintained  only  by  the  conservation  of  the  same 
•soul,  for  the  body  is  in  a  continual  Hux,  and  the  soul  does  not 
dwell  in  certain  atoms  appropriated  to  itself,  nor  in  a  little 
incorruptible  {indomptable)  bone,  such  as  the  Liiz'^  of  the 
Kabbis.  ^loreover  there  is  no  transmigration  by  which  the 
soul  wholly  leaves  its  body  and  passes  into  another.  It  keeps 
always,  even  in  death,  an  organized  body,  a  part  of  the  pre- 
ceding, although  what  it  keeps  is  always  subject  to  insensible 
dissipation  and  to  reparation,  and  indeed  to  undergoing  in  a 
certain  time  a  great  change.  Thus  instead  of  a  trans migra- 
,.tion  of  the  soul  there  is  a  transformation,  envelopment,  or 
•development,  and  finally  a  fluxion  of  the  body  of  this  soul. 
A'an  Helmont,-  the  son,  thought  that  souls  pass  from  body  to 
body,  but  always  within  their  kind,  so  that  there  will  always 
be  the  same  number  of  souls  of  one  and  the  same  kind,  and 
consequently  the  same  number  of  men  and  of  wolves,  and  that 
the  wolves  if  diminished  or  extirpated  in  England  would  be 
proportionally  increased  elsewhere.     Certain  meditations  pub- 

1  The  bone  which  the  Jews  regarded  as  incapable  of  decay,  remaining  until 
the  hist  day  and  forming  the  nucleus  of  the  resurrection  body.  Schaarschmidt 
says:  "  According  to  the  opinion  of  the  Rabbis,  says  Ulrich  in  his  note  to  this 
place,  the  body  which  we  are  to  receive  at  the  resurrection  is  already  at  hand 
iu  our  backbone.  This  body  or  bone,  VO  {Laz),  as  it  is  properly  called,  they 
held  for  this  reason  to  be  incorruptible.  In  the  Jalkut  chadasch,  Fol.  142, 
title  Mafichiarh,  n.  44,  the  following  account  is  given  of  it :  This  Ijone  decays 
not,  and  the  lioly  giving  God  will  make  it  soft  with  the  dew,  and  out  of  it  will 
build  the  body.  The  reason  why  this  little  bone  is  not  to  be  exposed  to  cor- 
rnption,  they  ijlace  in  the  fact  that  it  has  not  enjoyed  the  pleasures  of  this 
world,  as  the  rest  of  the  members.  This  doctrine  is  with  them  no  empty 
.speculation.  The  old  Rabbis  of  blessed  memory  have  not  only  seen  this  boue, 
but  have  found  it  actually  so  strong  and  hard  that  their  hammer  and  rock 
flew  iu  pieces  before  this  little  bone  was  injured  iu  the  least.  See  Axkafh 
Jiiiclirl  in  the  4th  part,"  etc.  —  Tr. 

-  Francois  Mercure  van  Helmont,  1()18-1(598,  a  particTilar  friend  of  the 
Countess  of  Connaway,  in  whose  Opusriila  philosophica,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  6,  §§  7, 
8,  and  cliap.  7,  §  4,  London,  KJDO,  this  view  of  his  is  found  in  detail.  On 
Leibnitz's  relations  with  Van  Helmont,  cf.  Stein,  Leibniz  and  Spinoza,  pp. 
'2Wnq.,  and  the  refereuces  in  Stein's  notes;  also  Beil<(f/en,  XV.,  XVI.,  op.  cit. 
pp.  o2!)-3:J7.  Leibnitz  composed  for  him,  at  the  request  of  his  cousin,  the 
Baroness  of  Merode,  a  Latin  epitaph;  cf.  Burckhard,  Historia  Bihlioth.  Aii- 
r/ustx,  II.,  p.  320;  also  Stein,  op.  cit.  pp.  33(5-337.  Leibnitz  treats  of  him  and 
his  doctrine  iu  his  Miscellanies,  cf.  Otium  Uanoveranum,  ed.  J.  F.  Feller, 
pp.  226-230,  Lipsiaj,  1718.  — Tr. 


CH.  xxviij  ON   HUMAN  UNDEESTANDING  243 

lished  in  France  would  also  seem  to  tend  in  that  direction.  If 
transmigration  is  not  taken  strictly,  i.e.  if  any  one  thought 
that  souls  dwelling  in  the  same  subtile  body  change  only  from 
a  coarser  body,  it  would  be  possible,  even  to  the  passage  of 
the  same  soul  into  a  body  of  a  different  kind  after  the  fashion 
of  the  Brahmins  and  Pythagoreans.  But  all  that  is  possible 
is  not  for  that  reason  conformed  to  the  order  of  things.  But 
the  question  whether,  in  case  such  a  transmigration  were  true, 
Cain,  Ham,  and  Ismael,  supposing,  according  to  the  Rabbis, 
they  were  the  same  soul,  would  deserve  to  be  called  the  same 
man,  is  only  one  of  name ;  and  I  have  observed  that  the  cele- 
brated author,  whose  opinions  you  have  maintained,  recognizes 
and  explains  it  very  well  (wi  the  last  j^aragrwpli  of  this  chapter). 
The  identity  of  substance  would  occur  therein,  but  in  case 
there  were  no  connection  of  memory  between  the  different 
persons,  as  the  same  soul  would  make,  there  would  not  be 
sufficient  moral  identity  to  say  that  it  would  be  one  and  the 
same  person.  And  if  God  willed  that  the  human  soul  should 
go  into  the  body  of  a  hog,  forgetting  the  man  and  performing 
no  rational  acts,  it  would  not  constitute  a  man.  But  if  in  the 
body  of  the  animal  it  had  the  thoughts  of  a  man,  and  even  of 
the  man  whom  it  animated  before  the  change,  like  the  Golden 
Ass  of  Apuleius,  one  would  perhaps  have  no  difficulty  in  say- 
ing that  the  same  Lucius,  who  had  come  into  Thessaly  to  see 
his  friends,  lived  under  the  ass's  hide,  where  Photis  had  put 
him  in  spite  of  herself,  and  wandered  from  master  to  master 
until  the  roses  he  ate  restored  him  to  his  natural  form.^ 

1  Cf.  Apuleius,  Metamorph.,  Bk.  III.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  229  sq.  ■  Bk.  XL,  pp.  770  sq., 
edition  in  6  vols.,  paging  continuous,  A.  J.  Valpy,  Loudon,  1825.  The  Meta- 
morphoses is  in  contents  very  similar  to  a  work  entitled,  Aoiixto?  ij  oro;  (Lucius 
or  Ass),  ascribed  to  Lucian,  a  contemporary  of  Apuleius  who  flourished  about 
160  A.D.,  and  is  most  probably  an  imitation  of  it.  The  incidents  and  adven- 
tures in  both  are  nearly  identical,  the  names  only  being  changed,  both  writers, 
however,  calling  the  hero  Lucius.  In  the  course  of  his  adventures  Lucius 
became  involved  in  a  love-affair  with  a  waiting-woman  by  the  name  of  Fotis, 
whose  mistress  practised  tlie  art  of  magic,  and  changed  at  will  herself  and 
others  into  various  animals  by  the  use  of  certain  ointments.  Lucius,  very 
desirous  to  learn  all  about  this  wonderful  art,  finally  persuaded  Fotis,  who 
claimed  that  she  understood  her  mistress's  art,  to  try  it  on  him.  She  did  so, 
intending  to  change  him  into  an  owl,  into  which  form  her  mistress  in  the 
sight  of  them  both  had  just  changed  herself,  but  in  her  haste  and  confusion 
using  the  wrong  ointment,  she  changed  him,  "in  spite  of  herscslf,"  into  an  ass. 
The  work  of  Apuleius  is  much  more  extcndtid  tlian  that  of  I^ician,  and,  in 


-11  LiaiiMTZ'S   CKlTiQLK    OF  LuCKE  [niv.  ii 


§  '.►.  I'h.  I  think  we  can  boldly  advance  the  idea  that  who- 
ever of  us  saw  a  creature  made  and  formed  like  himself, 
although  it  had  never  exhibited  more  reason  than  a  cat  or  a 
parrot,  would  not  cease  to  call  it  a  man ;  or  if  he  heard  a 
parrot  discoursing  rationally  and  in  a  philosophical  manner 
would  call  or  think  it  only  a  parrot,  and  would  say  of  the 
former  of  these  animals  that  it  is  an  uncultivated  man,  dull 
and  destitute  of  reason,  and  of  the  latter  that  it  is  a  parrot  full 
of  intelligence  and  good  sense. 

Th.  [I  should  be  more  of  the  same  opinion  upon  the  second 
point  than  upon  the  first,  although  there  is  still  something  to 
be  said  thereupon.  Few  theologians  would  be  venturesome 
enough  to  agree  at  once  and  absolutely  to  the  baptism  of  an 
animal  in  human  form,  but  without  appearance  of  reason,  if 
he  were  taken  while  young  in  the  woods  and  some  priest  of 
the  Roman  church  should  perhaps  say  conditionally,  if  you 
are  a  man  I  bajjtize  you;  for  they  would  not  know  whether 
he  is  of  the  human  race  and  whether  a  rational  soul  dwells 
therein,  and  this  might  be  an  ourang-outang,  an  ape  externally 
very  like  a  man,  such  as  that  one  whom  Tulpius  ^  speaks  of  as 
having  seen,  and  that  one  an  account  of  whose  anatomy  a 
learned  physician  has  published.  It  is  certain  (I  admit)  that 
man  can  become  as  stupid  as  an  ourang-outang,  but  the  interior 
of  a  rational  soul  would  abide  there  in  spite  of  the^uapansion 
of  the  exercise  of  reason  as  I  have  explained  above ;  thus  it  is 
a  point  of  which  we  cannot  judge  by  appearances.  As  for  the 
second  case,  nothing  prevents  there  being  rational  animals  of 
a  different  kind  from  ourselves,  as  those  inhabitants  of  the 
poetic  kingdom  of  the  birds  in  the  sun,  where  a  parrot  having 
come  from  this  world  after  its  death,  saved  the  life  of  a  trav- 
eller who  had  treated  him  well  here  below.  But  if  it  hap- 
pened, as  it  happens  in  the  country  of  the  fairies  or  of  Mother 

spite  of  its  irony,  abounds  in  a  mysticism  not  found  in  the  Au'kio?  t)  oi/os.  A  brief 
sketch  of  Lucian's  work  may  be  found  in  the  Encyclopsedia  Britannk-a, 
9th  ed.,  under  the  article  "Lucius."  On  Apuleius,  and  the  relation  of  his 
work  to  that  of  Lucian,  cf.  Teuffel,  Gesch.  d.  Rom.  Lit.,  §  367,  3,  4th  ed., 
Leipzig :  B.  G.  Teubner,  1882 ;  §  367,  1,  5th  ed.  by  Ludwig  Schwabe,  Leipzig : 
Teubner,  1890,  and  from  this  ed.,  the  English  translation  in  2  vols.,  by  Geo. 
C.  W.  Warr,  M.A.,  Geo.  Bell  and  Sous,  London,  1891.  — Tr. 

1  Xicolas  Tulp,  1.59:^1674,  a  Dutch  physician  and  magistrate,  in  Bk.  III., 
chap.  .t6,  of  his  Ohi^ervdtwnum.  medicarum  lihritres,  Amsterdam,  1641,  8th  ed., 
revised  with  additions,  Leyden,  1752.  —  Te. 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  245 

Goose,  that  a  parrot  was  a  transforiued  daughter  of  a  king  and 
became  known  as  such  while  speaking,  doubtless  her  father 
and  mother  would  caress  her  as  their  daughter  whom  they 
thought  they  possessed  though  concealed  under  this  strange 
form.  I  should  not  oppose  myself,  however,  to  him  who  should 
say  that  in  the  Golden  Ass  as  the  self  or  the  individual  re- 
mained for  the  sake  of  the  same  immaterial  spirit,  so  Lucius 
or  the  person  remained  for  the  sake  of  the  apperception  of 
this  ego,  but  that  this  is  no  longer  a  man ;  asQn  fact  it  seems 
necessary  to  add  something  of  the  figure  and  constitution  of 
the  body  to  the  definition  of  man,  when  we  say  that  he  is  a 
rational  animal ;  otherwise  in  my  view  the  genii  would  also  be 
menj 

§  9.  Ph.  The  word  person  carries  with  it  a  thinking  and 
intelligent  being,  capable  of  reason  and  reflection,  that  can 
consider  itself  indeed  as  the  same,  as  one  and  the  same  thing 
which  thinks  at  different  times  and  in  different  places ;  which 
it  does  only  by  that  consciousness  ^  which  it  has  of  its  own 
acts.  And  this  knowledge  always  accompanies  our  sensations 
and  our  present  perceptions  [when  they  are  sufficiently  dis- 
tinguished, as  I  have  more  than  once  before  remarked]  and  it 
is  by  this  that  each  one  is  to  himself  what  he  calls  himself. 
It  is  not  considered  in  this  case  whether  the  same  self  is  con- 
tinued in  the  same  or  in  different  substances.  For  since 
consciousness  ^  always  accompanies  thought,  and  is  that  which 
makes  each  one  to  be  what  he  calls  himself  and  by  which  he 
is  distinguished  from  every  other  thinking  being ;  it  is  also  in 
this  alone  that  personal  identity  consists,  or  that  which  makes 
a  rational  being  always  to  be  the  same  ;  and  as  far  as  this 
consciousness  can  be  extended  over  actions  or  thoughts  already 
past,  so  far  the  identity  of  this  person  extends,  and  the  self 
is  at  present  the  same  as  it  was  then. 

Th.  [I  am  also  of  this  opinion  that  consciousness  or  the 
perception  of  the  ego  proves  a  moral  or  personal  identity. 
And  it  is  by  this  that  I  distinguish  the  incessahility  ^  of  the 
soul  of  an  animal  from  the  immortality  of  the  soul  of  man ; 

1  The  French  is  "  sentiment."  —  Tr. 

2  The  French  text  is  "la  conscience  {conscious7iess  ou  conscienciosite)," 
Gerhardt;  "  consciosite,"  Ertlmann  and  Jacques.  —  Tr. 

3  The  French  is  "  incessabilitc,"  i-c.  continuity  or  perpetuity.  —  Tii. 


24(5  l.KlMNirZ'S   iKirHilK    OF    LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

both  preserve  physical  and  real  identity,  but  as  for  man,  he  is 
couformeil  to  the  rules  of  diviue  providence  so  that  the  soul 
preserves  also  identity  moral  and  apparent  to  ourselves,  in  order 
to  eonstitute  the  same  person,  cai)able  consequently  of  feeling 
chastisements  and  rewards.  It  seems  that  you,  sir,  hold  that 
this  apparent  identity  could  be  preserved,  if  there  were  no 
real  identity.  I  should  think  that  that  might  perhaps  be  by 
the  absolute  power  of  God,  but  according  to  the  order  of  things, 
identity  apparent  to  the  person  himself  who  perceives  the 
same,  supposes  real  identity  to  every  jiroximate  transition, 
accompanied  by  reflection  or  perception  of  the  ego,  a  perception 
intimate  and  immediate  naturally  incapable  of  deception.  If 
man  could  be  merely  a  machine  and  with  that  have  conscious- 
ness, it  would  be  necessary  to  be  of  your  opinion,  sir ;  but  I 
hold  that  this  case  is  not  possible  at  least  naturally.  jSTeither 
would  I  say  that  x>ersonal  identity  and  even  the  self  do  not 
dwell  in  us  and  that  I  am  not  this  ego  which  has  been  in  the 
cradle,  under  pretext  that  I  no  more  remember  anything  of 
all  that  I  then  did.  It  is  sufficient  in  order  to  find  moral 
identity  by  itself  that  there  be  a  middle  bond  of  consciousness 
between  a  state  bordering  upon  or  even  a  little  removed  from 
another,  although  a  leap  or  forgotten  interval  might  be  mingled 
therein.  Thus  if  a  disease  had  caused  an  interruption  of  the 
continuity  of  the  bond  of  consciousness  so  that  I  did  not  know 
how  I  came  into  the  present  state,  although  I  remember  things 
more  remote,  the  testimony  of  others  could  fill  the  void  in  my 
memory.  I  could  even  be  punished  upon  this  testimony,  if  I 
had  just  done  something  bad  of  deliberate  purpose  in  an  inter- 
val that  I  had  forgotten  a  little  after  on  account  of  this 
disease.  And  if  I  had  just  forgotten  all  past  things  and^ 
would  be  obliged  to  let  myself  be  taught  anew  even  to  my 
name  and  even  to  reading  and  writing,  I  could  always  learn 
from  others  my  past  life  in  m}^  previous  state,  as  I  have  kept 
my  rights  without  its  being  necessary  for  me  to  share  them 
with  two  persons,  and  to  make  me  the  heir  of  myself.  All 
this  suffices  to  maintain  moral  identity,  which  makes  the  same 
person.  It  is  true  that  if  others  should  conspire  to  deceive 
me  (as  I  might  indeed  be  deceived  by  myself,  by  some  vision, 
dream,  or  illness,  believing  that  what  I  had  dreamed  had  hap- 
1  Gerhardt  reads :  "et";  Erdmann  and  Jacques :  "  que,"  so  that. — Tr. 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  247 

pened  to  me)  the  appearance  would  be  false.  But  there  are 
cases  in  which  we  can  be  morally  certain  of  the  truth  upon  the 
relation  of  another,  and  with  God  whose  social  connection 
with  us  constitutes  the  principal  point  of  morality,  the  error 
cannot  have  place.  As  for  the  self,  it  will  be  well  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  phenomenon  of  self  and  from  conscious- 
ness. The  self  constitutes  identity  real  and  physical,  and  the 
2)henomenon  of  self,  accompanied  by  truth,  joins  thereto  per- 
sonal identity.  Thus  not  wishing  to  say  that  personal  iden- 
tity extends  no  farther  than  memory,  I  would  say  still  less 
that  the  self  or  physical  identity  depends  upon  it.  Eeal  and 
personal  identity  is  proved  with  the  utmost  possible  certainty 
by  present  and  immediate  reflection ;  it  is  proved  sufficiently- 
for  ordinary  purposes  by  our  memory  of  the  interval  or  by  the 
conspiring  testimony  of  others.  But  if  God  should  change  in 
an  extraordinary  manner  real  identity,  personal  identity  would 
remain,  provided  man  preserved  the  appearances  of  identity, 
as  well  the  internal  (that  is  to  say,  consciousness)  as  the 
external,  like  those  which  consist  in  that  which  appears  to 
others.  Thus  consciousness  is  not  the  sole  means  for  consti- 
tuting personal  identity,  and  the  testimony  of  another  or  even 
other  proofs  can  supply  it.  But  there  is  some  difficulty  if 
contradiction  occurs  between  those  diverse  appearances.  Con- 
sciousness may  be  silent  as  in  forgetfulness ;  but  if  it  should 
alter  very  clearly  things  which  were  contrary  to  the  other 
appearances,  we  should  be  embarrassed  in  the  decision  and  as 
it  were  suspended  sometimes  between  two  possibilities,  that 
of  the  error  of  our  memory  and  that  of  some  deception  in 
external  appearances.] 

§  11.  Ph.  [You  will  say]  that  the  members  of  the  body  of 
every  man  are  a  part  of  himself  [and  that  thus,  the  body 
being  in  a  perpetual  flux,  the  man  cannot  remain  the  same]. 

Th.  [I  should  rather  prefer  to  say  that  (he  I  and  the  He  are 
without  parts,  because  it  is  said,  and  witli  reason,  that  the 
same  substance,  or  the  same  physical  ego,  is  really  preserved. 
But  we  cannot  say,  speaking  according  to  the  exact  truth  of 
things,  that  the  same  whole  is  preserved  wlien  a  part  is  lost. 
Now  whatever  has  corporeal  parts  cannot  fail  to  lose  some  of 
them  at  every  moment.] 

§  13.   Ph.   The    consciousness  whic^li    one    has   of   his   past 


248  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.   ii 

actions  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  thinking  substance  to 
anotiior  [and  it  would  be  certain  that  the  same  substance 
abides,  because  we  feel  ourselves  the  same],  if  this  conscious- 
ness were  a  single  and  indeed  an  individual  act  [i.e.  if  the  act 
of  rertecting  were  the  same  as  the  act  upon  which  you  reflect 
in  perceiving  it].  But  as  it  is  only  an  actual  representation 
of  a  past  act  it  remains  to  be  shown  how  it  is  impossible  for 
what  has  never  really  been  to  be  represented  to  the  mind  as 
truly  having  been. 

Th.  [Memory  after  an  interval  may  deceive ;  we  have  ex- 
perienced it  often,  and  there  are  means  of  conceiving  a  natural 
cause  of  this  error.  But  present  or  immediate  memory,  or  the 
memory  of  what  passed  immediately  before,  i.e.  the  conscious- 
ness or  reflection  which  accompanies  internal  action,  cannot 
naturally  deceive  ;  otherwise  we  should  not  be  certain  indeed 
that  we  think  of  this  or  that  thing,  for  this  statement  is 
made  internally  only  of  the  action  already  past,  and  not  in 
connection  with  the  action  itself.  Xow  if  these  internal, 
immediate  experiences  are  not  certain,  there  will  be  no  truth 
of  fact  of  which  we  can  be  assured.  And  I  have  already  said 
that  there  may  be  intelligible  reasons  for  the  error  which  ex- 
poses itself  in  perceptions  mediate  and  external,  but  in  those 
immediately  internal  we  cannot  find  any  unless  by  recurring 
to  the  omnipotence  of  God.] 

§  14.  Ph.  As  for  the  question  whether  the  same  immaterial 
substance  remaining  there  may  be  two  distinct  persons,  see 
upon  what  it  is  based.  It  is  this :  If  the  same  immaterial 
being  can  be  deprived  of  all  consciousness  (sentiment)  of  its  past 
existence,  and  lose  it  wholly,  without  the  power  of  ever  recov- 
ering it,  so  that  beginning,  so  to  speak,  a  new  account  from  a 
new  period,  it  has  a  consciousness  (conscience)  which  cannot 
extend  beyond  this  new  state.  All  those  who  believe  in  the 
pre-existence^  of  souls  are  evidently  of  this  mind.     I  have  seen 

1  I.e.  existence  before  this  earthly  life.  The  doctrine  was  set  forth  with 
more  or  less  fulness  by  the  Pythagoreans,  Plato,  Philo,  Origen,  and  more 
recently,  among  others,  by  Lessing,  Erziehuncj  des  Menschenf/eschlechtes, 
§  94  s^. ;  Kant,  Die  Relif/ion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft, 
Bk.  I.,  4;  Julius  Miiller,  Die  christ.  Lehre  von  der  Siinde,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  4, 
Vol.  2,  pp.  486  sq.,  Breslau,  1844,  and  English  translation  of  the  same,  2d  ed., 
from  the  5th  German  ed.,  Halle,  1866,  Vol.  2,  pp.  .357  .■<q.,  Edinburgh:  T.  &  T. 
Clark,  1868.     The  doctrine  has  been  used  chiefly  to  explain  the  origin  of 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  249 

a  man  who  was  persuaded  that  his  soul  had  been  the  soul  of 
Socrates ;  and  I  can  assure  you  that  in  the  post  he  filled  and 
which  was  not  one  of  little  importance  he  passed  for  a  very- 
rational  man,  and  he  appeared  by  his  works  which  have  seen 
the  light  to  lack  neither  intelligence  nor  learning.  Now  souls 
being  ^  indifferent  to  any  portion  of  matter  whatever  this  may  be, 
as  far  as  we  can  know  it  by  their  nature,  this  supposition 
(of  the  same  soul  passing  into  different  bodies)  involves 
no  apparent  absurdity.  But  he  who  now  has  no  conscious- 
ness of  that  which  Nestor  or  Socrates  ever  did  or  thought, 
does  he  or  can  he  conceive  himself  the  same  person  as  Nestor 
or  Socrates?  Can  he  take  part  in  the  actions  of  these  two 
ancient  Greeks?  Can  he  attribute  them  to  himself  or  think 
them  his  own  actions  rather  than  those  of  some  other  man 
who  has  already  existed?  He  is  no  more  the  same  person 
with  one  of  them  than  if  the  soul  now  present  in  him  had 
been  created  when  it  began  to  animate  the  body  which  it  now 
possesses.  This  would  no  more  contribute  to  make  him  the 
same  person  as  Nestor,  than  if  some  of  the  particles  of  matter 
which  once  formed  part  of  Nestor  were  now  a  part  of  this 
man.  For  the  same  immaterial  substance  without  the  same 
consciousness  no  more  makes  the  same  person  to  be  united  to 
such  or  such  a  body  than  tJte  same  x>artides  of  matter,  united  to 
a  body  without  a  common  consciousness,  can  make  the  same 
person.  ^ 

Th.  [An  immaterial  being  or  a  spirit  cannot  he  stripped 
oi  all  perception  of  its  past  existence.  There  remain  for  it 
some  impressions  of  all  that  has  formerly  happened  to  it,  and 
it  even  has  some  presentiments  of  all  that  will  happen  to  it ; 
but  these  feelings  are  most  often  too  small  to  be  capable  of 
being  distinguished  and  perceived,  although  they  may  perhaps 
sometime  be  developed.     This  continuation  and  bond  of  per- 

evil  or  sin;  but  it  is  an  explanation  which  does  not  explain,  its  assumed  solu- 
tion being  merely  an  evasion  of  the  real  difficulty  by  pushing  the  problem 
back  unsolved  into  past  time.  Cf.  O.  Ptleiderer,  Relifjionsphilosophie  auf 
gesch.  Grundlarje,  Vol.  2,  p.  382,  2d  ed.,  Berlin:  G.  Reimer,  1884;  English 
translation.  Vol.  4,  p.  29,  London  :  Williams  &  Norgate,  1888.  For  a  critique 
of  the  theory  as  held  l)y  Julius  Miiller,  vf.  I.  A.  Dorner,  System  d.  chrintlichcn 
Glauhenslehre,  §  77,  3 ;  §  82,  2,  Berlin  :  Wm.  Hertz,  1881 ;  English  translation, 
Edinburgh:  T.  &  T.  Clark,  1882.  — Tr. 

1  Gerhardt  and  Jacques  read:  "les  ^raes  estaut"  ("  etaut,"  J.) ;  Erdmann 
reads:  "taut." — Tr. 


250  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 


ceptions  constitutes  in  reality  the  same  individual,  but  the 
a] 'percept ions  {i.e.  when  past  feelings  are  perceived),  prove 
besides  a  moral  identity  and  make  real  identity  appear.  .  The 
pre-oxistence  of  souls  does  not  appear  to  us  through  our  per- 
ceptions, but  if  it  were  true,  it  might  sometime  make  itself 
known.  Thus  it  is  not  reasonable  that  the  restitution  of 
memory  becomes  forever  impossible,  the  insensible  percep- 
tions (whose  use  I  have  set  forth  on  so  many  important  occa- 
sions) serving  here,  moreover,  to  preserve  the  seeds.  The  late 
Henry  More,  a  theologian  of  the  English  church,  was  con- 
vinced of  the  truth  of  pre-existence  and  has  written  in  its 
defence.^  The  late  M,  Van  Helmont,  the  son,  went  much 
farther,  as  I  just  said,  and  believed  in  the  transmigration  of 
souls,  but  always  into  bodies  of  one  and  the  same  species,  so 
that  according  to  him  the  human  soul  always  animated  a  man. 
He  believed  with  some  Eabbis  in  the  passage  of  the  soul  of 
Adam  into  the  Messiah  as  into  the  new  Adam.  And  I  do  not 
know  but  that  he  thought  he  had  himself  been  some  ancient, 
altogether  clever  man  that  he  ■was  elsew^here.  i^ow  if  this  pas- 
sage of  souls  was  true,  at  least  in  the  possible  way  that  I  have 
explained  above  (but  which  does  not  appear  probable),  i.e. 
that  souls,  keeping  their  subtile  bodies,  pass  at  once  into  other 
coarse  bodies,  the  same  individual  would  always  subsist  in 
Nestor,  in  Socrates,  and  in  any  modern,  and  he  could  even 
make  his  identity  known  to  any  one  wdio  w^ould  penetrate 
sufficiently  into  his  nature,  on  account  of  the  impressions  or 
marks  which  would  there  remain  of  all  that  jSTestor  or  Soc- 
rates have  done,  and  W'hich  any  genius  sufficiently  penetrat- 
ing could  there  read.  But  if  the  modern  man  had  no  means 
internal  or  external  of  knowing  what  he  had  been,  it  w^ould  be 
as  far  as  the  moral  is  concerned  as  if  he  had  not  been.  But 
it  appears  that  nothing  is  neglected  in  the  world  in  relation 
even  to  the  moral,  because  God  is  the  monarch  thereof  whose 
government  is  perfect.  Souls  according  to  my  hypothesis  are 
not  indifferent  regarding  any  portion  of  matter  whatever,  as  it 
seems  to  you ;  on  the  contrary,  they  originally  express  those 
portions  to  which  they  are  and  ought  to  be  united  by  nature. 

1  Cf.  Opera,  1,  750-754,  London,  1679;  following  the  Kabbala,  he  thinks  all 
souls  were  created  at  the  same  time  as  the  world,  2,  539;  and,  like  Leibnitz, 
regards  them  as  always  united  with  some  kind  of  matter,  2,  395,  396.  —  Tr. 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  251 

Thus,  if  they  pass  into  a  new  body  coarse  or  sensible,  they 
would  always  preserve  the  expression  ^  of  all  that  they  had 
perceived  in  the  old,  and  it  would  even  be  necessary  for 
the  new  body  to  manifest  it  so  that  the  individual  continuity 
will  always  have  its  real  marks.  But  whatever  our  past  state 
may  have  been,  the  effect  it  leaves  cannot  always  be  for  us 
apperceivahle.  The  clever  author  of  the  Essay  on  Understand- 
ing, whose  views  you  had  espoused,  had  remarked  (Bk.  II., 
chap.  27.  On  Identity,  §  27)  that  a  part  of  these  suppositions 
or  fictions  of  the  passage  of  souls,  assumed  as  possible,  is 
founded  upon  the  common  view  of  the  mind  as  not  only  inde- 
pendent of  matter  but  also  as  indifferent  to  every  sort  of  mat- 
ter. But  I  hope  that  what  you  have  said,  sir,  on  this  subject 
here  and  there  will  serve  to  clear  up  this  doubt  and  to  make 
better  known  what  is  naturally  possible.  We  see  thereby 
how  the  acts  of  an  ancient  might  belong  to  a  modern  who  had 
the  same  soul,  although  he  did  not  perceive  them.  But  if  he 
should  come  to  recognize  it,  still  more  would  personal  identity 
follow.  For  the  rest  a  portioyi  of  matter  passing  from  one 
body  into  another  does  not  constitute  the  same  human  indi- 
vidual, nor  what  is  called  the  ego,  but  it  is  the  soul  which 
constitutes  it.] 

§  16.  Ph.  It  is,  however,  true  that  I  am  as  much  concerned 
and  as  justly  responsible  for  an  action  done  a  thousand  years 
since,  which  is  now  adjudged  as  mine  by  this  present  con- 
sciousness (self-consciousness^)  thereof,  as  having  been  done 
by  myself,  as  I  am  for  what  I  have  just  done  in  the  j)reced- 
ing  moment. 

Th.  [This  view  of  having  done  something  may  deceive  in 
distant  actions.  Men  have  taken  as  true  by  force  of  repetition 
what  they  dreamed,  or  what  they  invented  ;  this  false  view 
may  embarrass,  but  it  cannot  make  them  punishable,  unless 
others  agree  therewith.  On  the  other  hand,  you  can  be  respon- 
sible for  what  you  have  done,  when  you  have  forgotten  it, 
provided  the  action  be  verified  elsewhere.] 

§  17.  Ph.    Every  one  finds  every  day  that  while  his  little 

1  Gerliardt  and  Erdmann  read:  "  I'expression " ;  Jacques:  "  rimpression." 
—  Tr. 

-  Gerhardt's  reading ;  Erdmann  and  Jacques  have,  as  before  (p.  245,  note  2) , 
"  consciositc  ou  consciousness."  —  Tr. 


LTC  LKIBMTZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.ii 

fint^iM-  is  c'omiiivlu'iKU'd  iiiulor  this  consciousness,  it  constitutes 
as  niucli  a  part  of  liiint<i'lf  {vi  him)  iis  that  which  is  most  so. 

Th.  [1  have  said  (§11)  why  I  would  not  advance  the  view 
that  my  linger  is  a  part  of  me  ;  but  it  is  true  that  it  belongs  to 
me  and  tliat  it  constitutes  a  part  of  my  body.] 

Ph.  [Those  who  hold  another  view  will  say  that]  in  the 
event  of  this  little  linger  being  separated  from  the  rest  of  the 
body,  if  this  consciousness  accompanies  the  little  linger  and 
leaves  the  rest  of  the  body,  it  is  evident  that  the  little  finger 
would  be  the  person,  the  same  person,  and  that  then  the  self 
would  have  notliing  to  do  with  the  rest  of  the  body. 

Th.  [Nature  does  not  admit  these  fictions,  Avliich  are  de- 
stroyed by  the  System  of  Harmony  or  the  perfect  correspon- 
dence of  tlie  soul  and  the  bod}'.] 

§  18.  Ph.  It  seems,  however,  that  if  the  body  should  con- 
tinue to  live  and  to  have  its  particular  consciousness,  in  which 
the  little  finger  had  no  share,  and  that  meanwhile  the  soul 
was  in  the  finger,  the  finger  could  not  own  any  of  the  actions 
of  the  rest  of  the  body,  and  we  could  no  longer  impute  them 
to  it.i 

Til.  [The  soul  also  which  would  be  in  the  finger  would  not 
belong  to  this  body.  I  admit  that  if  God  caused  conscious- 
nesses to  be  transferred  to  other  souls,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  treat  them  in  accordance  with  moral  notions,  as  if  they 
were  the  same ;  but  this  would  disturb  the  order  of  things 
without  reason,  and  make  a  divorce  between  the  appercepti- 
ve and  the  truth,  which  is  conserved  by  the  insensible  percep- 
tions, which  would  not  be  reasonable,  because  the  perceptions 
insensible  at  present  may  some  day  be  developed,  for  there  is 
nothing  useless,  and  eternity  gives  a  large  field  for  changes.] 

§  20.  Ph.  Human  laws  do  not  punish  the  madman  for  the 
acts  which  the  sober  ^  man  does,  nor  the  sober  man  for  what 
the  madman  does,  thereby  making  them  two  persons.  Thus 
they  say :  he  is  beside  himself. 

Th.  [The  laws  threaten  to  chastise  and  promise  to  recom- 
pense in  order  to  prevent  bad  and  further  good  acts.  Now  a 
madman  may  be  such  tliat  the  threats  and  i^romises  do  not 
operate  sufficiently  upon  him,  reason  no  longer  being  master ; 

1  Locke  reads:  "  him,"  Philos.  Worlcs,  Vol.  1,  p.  475  (Bohn's  eel.).  —  Tr. 

2  Locko's  word;  Philon.  Woi-ks,  Vol.  1,  p.  475  (Bohn's  ed.).  —  Tr. 


cii.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  253 

thus  in  proportion  to  his  weakness  the  severity  of  the  pain 
shouhl  cease.  On  the  other  hand  we  wish  tlie  criminal  to  feel 
the  effect  of  the  evil  he  has  done  in  order  that  he  may  fear 
further  to  commit  crimes,  but  the  madman  not  being  sensitive 
enough,  we  are  well  content  to  wait  a  good  while  in  order  to 
execute  the  sentence  which  punishes  him  for  what  he  did 
when  sober.  Thus  what  the  laws  or  the  judges  do  in  these 
instances  comes  not  from  the  conception  of  two  persons.] 

§  22.  Ph.  In  fact  in  the  party  whose  opinions  I  represent 
to  you,  this  objection  is  made,  that  if  a  man  who  is  drunk  and 
who  is  afterwards  no  longer  drunk,  is  not  the  same  person,  he 
should  not  be  punished  for  what  he  did  while  drunk,  since  he 
is  no  longer  conscious  of  his  act.  But  they  reply  that  he  is 
altogether  as  much  the  same  person  as  a  man  who  during  his 
sleep  walks  and  does  many  other  things  and  who  is  responsi- 
ble for  all  the  evil  he  has  happened  to  do  in  that  state. 

Th.  [There  is  much  difference  between  the  acts  of  a 
drunken  man  and  those  of  a  true  and  recognized  somnambu- 
list. We  punish  drunkards  because  they  can  avoid  drunken- 
ness and  can  even  have  some  memory  of  pain  while  drunk. 
But  it  is  not  so  much  within  the  power  of  somnambulists  to 
abstain  from  their  nocturnal  walk  and  from  what  they  do. 
But  if  it  were  true  that  by  giving  them  a  good  flogging  we  could 
make  them  stay  in  bed,  we  should  be  right  in  doing  it,  and  we 
should  not  fail  either,  although  this  Avould  be  rather  a  remedy 
than  a  punishment.  In  fact  it  is  said  that  this  remedy  has 
restored  them.] 

Ph.  Human  laws  punish  both  in  accord  with  a  justice  con- 
formed to  the  mode  in  which  men  understand  things,  because 
in  these  sorts  of  cases  they  cannot  certainly  distinguish  what 
is  real  from  what  is  counterfeit ;  thus  ignorance  is  not  re- 
ceived as  an  excuse  for  what  they  have  done  while  drunk  or 
asleep.  The  deed  is  proved  against  the  one  who  has  done  it, 
and  you  cannot  prove  in  his  case  lack  of  consciousness. 

Th.  [The  question  is  not  so  much  about  this,  as  about  what 
must  be  done  when  it  has  been  verified,  as  it  may  be,  that  the 
drunkard  or  somnambulist  were  beside  themselves.  In  this 
case  the  somnambulist  would  be  considered  only  as  a  maniac ; 
but  as  drunkenness  is  voluntary,  and  the  disease  is  not,  the  one 
is  punished  but  not  the  other.] 


254  LEIBNITZ'S   ClUTK^UE   UF   LUCKE  [uk.  ii 

Ph.  But  iu  tlie  great  and  terrible  day  of  judgment,  when 
the  secrets  of  all  hearts  shall  be  uncovered,  it  is  right  to  think 
that  no  one  will  have  to  answer  for  what  is  wholly  unknown 
to  him  and  that  each  one  will  receive  what  is  due  him,  his 
own  conscience  accusing  or  excusing  ^  him. 

Th.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  will  be  necessary  for  the 
memory  of  man  to  be  exalted  at  the  day  of  judgment  in  order 
for  him  to  remember  all  he  had  forgotten,  or  whether  the 
knowledge  of  others  and  above  all  of  the  just  judge  who  can- 
not be  deceived  will  not  suffice.  We  might  devise  a  fiction  lit- 
tle agreeing  with  the  truth,  but  nevertheless  conceivable,  to  the 
effect  that  a  man  at  the  day  of  judgment  believed  he  had 
been  bad  and  that  the  same  appeared  true  to  all  other  created 
spirits,  who  would  be  able  to  judge  of  it,  without  its  having 
been  true  :  could  we  say  that  the  supreme  and  just  judge,  who 
alone  knows  the  contrary,  could  condemn  this  person  and 
judge  contrary  to  his  knowledge  ?  -  Yet  it  seems  that  that 
would  follow  from  the  notion  you  gave  of  moral  personality. 
You  will  perhaps  say  that  if  God  judges  contrary  to  appear- 
ances he  will  not  be  sufficiently  glorified  and  will  bring  pain 
upon  others ;  but  the  reply  could  be  made  that  he  is  for  him- 
self his  unique  and  supreme  law,  and  that  in  this  case  others 
should  consider  themselves  mistaken.] 

§  23.  Ph.  Could  we  suppose  either  tico  distinct  and  incom- 
municable consciousnesses  acting  by  turns  in  the  same  body, 
the  one  constantly  during  the  day,  the  other  by  night,  or  that 
the  same  consciousness  acts  at  intervals  in  two  different  bodies  ; 
I  ask  if,  in  the  first  case,  the  day  and  night  man,  if  I  may 
so  express  myself,  would  not  be  two  as  distinct  persons  as 
Socrates  and  Plato,  and  in  the  second  case  would  he  not  be  a 
single  person  in  two  distinct  bodies  ?  It  matters  not  that  this 
same  consciousness  which  affects  two  different  bodies,  and 
these  consciousnesses  which  affect  the  same  body  at  different 
times,  belong  the  one  to  the  same  immaterial  substance,  and 
the  two  others  to  two  distinct  immaterial  substances,  which 
introduce  these  different  consciousnesses   into   these   bodies, 

1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "ou  excuse."  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads :  "  juger  centre  ce  qu'il  salt?"  Erdmann  and  Jacques: 
"  juger  centre  ce  qu'ils  font?"  i.e.  "pass  a  judgment  contrary  to  what  they 
do."  — Tr. 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HITMAN  UNDERSTANDING  255 


since  personal  identity  would  equally  be  determined  by  the 
consciousness,  whether  that  consciousness  were  attached  to 
some  individual  immaterial  substance  or  not.  Further,  an 
immaterial  thinking  thing  may  sometimes  lose  sight  of  its 
past  consciousness,  and  recall  it  anew.  Now  suppose  these 
intervals  of  memory  and  forgetfulness  return  with  every  day 
and  night,  then  you  have  two  persons  with  the  same  immate- 
rial spirit.  Whence  it  follows  that  the  self  is  not  determined 
by  the  identity  or  diversity  of  substance,  Avhich  it  cannot  be 
sure  of,  but  only  by  the  identity  of  consciousness. 

Th.  [I  admit  that  if  all  the  appearances  were  changed  and 
transferred  from  our  spirit  to  another,  or  if  God  made  an 
exchange  between  two  spirits,  giving  the  visible  body  and  the 
appearances  and  consciousnesses  of  the  one  to  the  other,  per-  * 
sonal  identity,  instead  of  being  attached  to  that  of  substance, 
Avuiikl  follow  the  constant  appearances  which  human  morality 
must  have  in  view ;  but  these  appearances  would  not  consist^ 
in  the  consciousnesses  alone ;  and  it  will  be  necessary  for  God  to 
make  the  exchange  not  only  of  the  apperceptions  or  conscious- 
nesses of  the  individuals  in  question,  but  also  of  the  appear- 
ances which  present  themselves  to  others  regarding  these 
persons,  otherwise  there  would  be  a  contradiction  between 
the  consciousnesses  of  the  one  and  the  testimony  of  the  others, 
which  would  disturb  the  moral  order  of  things.  But  you 
must  also  agree  with  me  that  the  divorce  between  the  insensi- 
ble and  sensible  world,  i.e.  between  the  insensible  perceptions 
which  would  remain  in  the  same  substances,  and  the  appercep- 
tions which  would  be  changed,  would  be  a  miracle,  as  when 
you  suppose  that  God  makes  the  vacuum ;  for  I  have  stated 
above  why  that  is  not  in  agreement  with  the  natural  order. 
Here  is  another  supposition  much  more  suitable :  it  may  be 
that  in  another  place  in  the  universe  or  at  another  time  a  globe 
may  be  found  which  does  not  differ  sensibly  from  this  earthly 
globe,  in  which  we  live,  and  that  each  of  the  men  who  inhabit 
it  does  not  differ  sensibly  from  each  of  us  who  corresponds  to 
him.  Thus  there  are  at  once  more  than  a  hundred  million  pairs 
of  similar  persons,  i.e.  of  two  persons  with  the  same  appear- 
ances and  consciousnesses ;  and  God  might  transfer  spirits 
alone  or  with  their  bodies  from  one  globe  to  the  other  without 
their  perceiving  it ;  but  be  they  transferred  or  let  alone,  what 


256  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [inc.  n 

will  yon  say  of  their  person  or  self  according  to  your  authors  ? 
Are  they  two  persons  or  the  same?  since  the  consciousness 
and  tlie  internal  and  external  appearance  of  the  men  of  these 
globes  cannot  make  the  distinction.  It  is  true  that  God  and 
the  spirits  capable  of  seeing  the  intervals  and  external  rela- 
tions of  times  and  places,  and  even  internal  constitutions, 
insensible  to  the  men  of  the  two  globes,  could  distinguish 
them ;  but  according  to  your  hypotheses  consciousness  alone 
discerning  the  persons  without  being  obliged  to  trouble  itself 
with  the  real  identity  or  diversity  of  the  substance,  or  even 
of  that  which  would  appear  to  others,  how  is  it  prevented 
from  saying  that  these  two  persons  who  are  at  the  same  time 
in  these  two  similar  globes,  but  separated  from  each  other  by 
an  inexpressible  distance,  are  only  one  and  the  same  person ; 
which  is,  however,  a  manifest  absurdity.  For  the  rest,  speak- 
ing of  what  may  be  in  the  course  of  nature,  the  two  similar 
globes  and  the  two  similar  souls  of  the  two  globes  would 
remain  so  only  for  a  time.  For  since  there  is  an  individual 
diversity,  this  diffV-rence  must  consist  at  least  in  the  insensible 
constitutions  which  must  be  developed  in  the  course  of  time.] 

§  26.  Fh.  Suppose  a  man  punished  now  for  what  he  has 
done  in  another  life  and  of  which  he  could  cause  himself  to 
have  absolutely  no  consciousness;  what  difference  is  there 
between  such  treatment  and  that  which  would  be  done  him  in 
creating  him  miserable  ? 

Th.  [The  Platonists,  disciples  of  Origen,  some  Hebrews 
and  other  defenders  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls  believed  that 
the  souls  of  this  world  were  placed  in  imperfect  bodies,  in 
order  to  suffer  for  the  crimes  committed  in  a  preceding  world. 
But  it  is  true,  if  they  neither  know  nor  have  ever  learned  the 
truth,  neither  by  recall  of  memory,  nor  by  any  traces,  nor  by 
the  knowledge  of  another,  you  cannot  call  it  punishment  ac- 
cording to  ordinary  notions.  There  is,  however,  some  room 
for  doubt,  while  speaking  of  punishments  in  general,  whether 
it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  those  who  suffer  should  one  day 
learn  the  reason  for  their  suffering,  and  whether  it  w^ould  not 
very  often  suffice  that  better  informed  minds  should  find 
therein  a  motive  for  glorifying  the  divine  justice.  However, 
it  is  more  likely,  at  least  in  general,  that  the  sufferers  will 
know  the  reason  of  their  suffering.] 


CH.  xxvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  257 

§  29.  Ph.  [Perhaps  in  the  main  you  can  agree  with  my 
author  who  concludes  his  chapter  on  identity  by  saying :  that 
the  question  whether  tlie  same  man  abides,  is  a  question  of 
name,  according  as  you  understand  by  man  eitlier  the  rational 
spirit  alone  or  the  body  alone  of  this  form  which  is  called 
human,  or  finally  the  spirit  united  to  such  a  body.  In  the  first 
case  the  spirit  separated  (at  least  from  the  coarse  body)  will 
be  still  the  man ;  in  the  second  an  ourang-outang,  perfectly 
similar  to  us,  reason  excepted,  would  be  a  man ;  and  if  man 
were  deprived  of  his  rational  soul  and  received  a  soul  of  an 
animal,  he  would  continue  the  same  man.  In  the  third  case 
both  must  remain  together  with  the  union  itself ;  the  same 
spirit,  and  the  same  body  in  part,  or  at  least  equivalent,  as 
far  as  the  sensible  corporeal  form  is  concerned.  Thus  you 
could  continue  the  same  being  physically  or  morally,  i.e.  the 
same  person  without  remaining  man,  in  case  you  consider  this 
figure  an  essential  to  man  according  to  this  last  sense.] 

Th.  [I  admit  that  in  this  respect  it  is  a  question  of  name, 
and  in  the  third  sense  the  same  animal  is  as  it  were  now 
caterpillar  or  silk-worm  and  now  butterfly,  and  some  as  it 
were  have  imagined  that  the  angels  of  this  world  were  men  in 
a  past  world.  But  we  have  devoted  ourselves  in  this  confer- 
ence to  discussions  more  important  than  those  about  the 
meaning  of  words.  I  have  shown  you  the  source  of  true 
physical  identity ;  I  have  made  it  appear  that  morality  con- 
tradicts it  no  more  than  memory ;  that  they  cannot  always 
assign  physical  identity  to  the  person  indeed,  whose  (iden- 
tity) is  at  stake,  nor  to  those  who  are  in  connection  with  him; 
but  that  nevertheless  they  never  contradict  physical  identity 
and  never  are  completely  ^  divorced  from  it ;  that  there  are 
always  some  created  spirits  who  know  or  may  know  what  it 
is ;  but  that  there  is  room  to  consider  that  what  is  indifferent 
regarding  the  persons  themselves  can  be  so  only  for  a  time.] 

1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit :  "entier."  —  Tr. 
S 


258  LKlli.Ml/S    C'KiriQL'E    OF    LOCKE  [i:k. 


CHAPTER   XXVIII 

OF     SOME     OTHER      RELATIOXS,     AXD      ESPECIALLY      OF      MORAL 
BELATIOXS 

§  1.  Ph.  Besides  the  relations  founded  upon  time,  space, 
and  causality,  of  which  we  have  just  been  speaking,  there  are 
an  infinite  number  of  others,  some  of  which  I  am  going  to 
propose  for  discussion.  Every  simple  idea  capable  of  parts 
and  of  degrees,  furnishes  an  occasion  for  comparing  the  sub- 
jects in  which  it  is  found,  for  example,  the  idea  of  more  (or 
less  or  equally)  white.  This  relation  may  be  called  xiropor- 
tional. 

Th.  [There  may  be,  hoAvever,  excess  without  proportion  ; 
and  this  is  in  reference  to  a  magnitude  which  I  call  imjjerfect, 
as  when  ^ye  say  that  the  angle  which  the  ray  makes  with  the 
arc  of  its  circle  is  less  than  a  right  angle,  for  it  is  impossible 
that  there  be  a  proportion  between  these  two  angles,  or 
between  one  of  them  and  their  difference,  which  is  the  angle 
of  contingence.] 

§  2.  Ph.  Another  occasion  of  comparing  is  furnished  by 
the  circumstances  of  origin  which  found  the  relations  of  father 
and  child,  brothers,  cousins,  countrymen.  With  us  people 
seldom  think  of  saying  this  bull  is  grandfather  of  such  a  calf, 
or  these  two  pigeons  are  cousins-german ;  for  languages  are 
proportioned  to  use.  But  there  are  countries  in  w^hicli  men  less 
curious  about  their  own  pedigree  than  about  that  of  their 
horses  have  not  only  names  for  each  particular  horse,  but  also 
for  their  different  degrees  of  relation. 

Th.  [We  can  furthermore  join  the  family  idea  and  names 
to  those  of  relationship.  It  is  true  we  do  not  observe  under 
the  empire  of  Charlemagne  and  for  a  sufficiently  long  time 
before  and  after  family  names  in  Germany,  France,  and  Lom- 
bardy.  It  is  moreover  not  long  that  there  have  been  families 
(even  noble)  in  the  ISTorth  who  had  no  name,  and  in  which  a 
man  would  be  recognized  in  his  natal  place  only  by  calling  his 
name  and  that  of  his  father,  and  besides  (in  case  he  trans- 
planted himself)  by  joining  to  his  own  the  name  of  the  place 


cii.  xxviii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  250 

whence  he  came.  The  Arabs  and  the  Turcomans  have  also  the 
same  custom  (I  believe),  having  but  few  particular  family 
names,  and  content  themselves  with  naming  the  father  and 
grandfather,  etc.,  of  any  one,  and  they  pay  the  same  honor  to 
their  valuable  horses,  which  they  call  by  a  proper  name  and 
the  name  of  the  father  and  even  beyond.  Thus  they  spoke  of 
the  horses  which  the  Monarch  ^  of  the  Turks  sent  to  the 
emperor  after  the  peace  of  Carlowitz ;  ^  and  the  late  count 
of  Oldenburg,  the  last  of  his  branch,  whose  studs  were 
famous,  and  who  lived  a  very  long  time,  had  genealogical 
trees  of  his  horses  so  that  he  could  prove  their  nobility, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  have  portraits  of  their  ancestors  (imag- 
ines majonmi)  which  were  so  much  in  demand  among  the 
Romans.  'But  to  return  to  men,  there  are  among  the  Arabs 
and  the  Tartars  names  of  tribes,  which  are  like  great  families, 
which  are  much  enlarged  in  the  course  of  time.  And  these 
names  are  taken  either  from  the  progenitor  as  in  the  time  of 
Moses,  or  from  the  place  of  abode,  or  from  some  other  circum- 
stance. Mr.  Worsley,  an  observing^  traveller,  who  is  inforined 
of  the  present  state  of  Arabia  Deserta,  where  he  has  been  for 
some  time,  affirms  that  in  all  the  countries  between  Egypt  and 
Palestine,  and  where  Moses  passed,  there  are  to-day  only  three 
tribes,  who  can  bring  together  five  thousand  men,  and  that 
one  of  these  tribes  is  called  Scdi  from  the  progenitor  (as  I 
believe)  whose  tomb  posterity  honors  as  that  of  a  saint,  casting 
upon  it  dust  which  the  Arabs  put  upon  the  heads  of  themselves 
and  their  camels.  For  the  rest  consa7igiiinity  exists  when  there 
is  a  common  origin  of  those  whose  relation  is  considered ;  but 
we  could  say  there  is  cdliance  or  affinity  between  two  persons, 
when  they  may  have  consanguinity  with  one  and  the  same 
person  without  there  being  any  for  that  reason  between  them- 
selves, which  happens  through  the  intervention  of  marriages. 
But  as  it  is  not  customary  to  say  that  there  is  affinity  between 
husband  and  wife,  although  their  marriage  may  cause  affinity 
in  relation  to  other  persons,  it  would  perhaps  be  better  to 
say  that  there  is  affinity  between  those  who  would  have  con- 

1  Erdmaiin  and  Jacques  read:  "grand  Seigneur."  —  Tr. 

2  Jan.  26,  1()9!».  —  Tk. 

3  Erdmann  and  Jacques  read :  "curieux";  Gerhardt.  roads:  "observatif." 
—  Tk. 


2ti0  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

sanguinity  between  themselves  if  liusband  and  wife  were 
taken  as  one  and  the  same  person. 

§  o.  Ph.  The  foundation  of  a  relation  is  sometimes  a  moral 
riglit,  as  the  relation  of  a  general  of  an  army  or  of  a  citizen. 
These  relations  depending  upon  the  agreements  men  have 
made  between  themselves  are  voluntary  or  by  institution,  and 
may  be  distinguished  from  the  natural.  Sometimes  the  two 
correlatives  have  each  its  name,  as  patron  and  client,  general 
and  soldier.  But  it  is  not  so  always  ;  as,  for  example,  it  is  not 
so  in  the  case  of  those  who  are  related  to  the  chancellor. 

Til.  [There  are  sometimes  natural  relations  which  men  have 
invested  and  enriched  with  certain  moral  relations,  as,  for 
example,  children  have  the  right  to  claim  the  legitimate  por- 
tion of  the  estate  of  their  fathers  or  mothers ;  young  persons 
are  under  certain  restraints  and  the  aged  have  certain  immu- 
nities. But  it  also  happens  that  some  relations  are  taken  as 
natural  which  are  not  so  ;  as  when  the  laws  say  that  the 
father  is  he  who  married  the  mother  within  the  time  which 
makes  it  possible  for  the  child  to  be  attributed  to  him ;  and 
this  substitution  of  the  instituted  in  the  place  of  the  natural  is 
sometimes  only  j^resumj^tion,  that  is  to  say,  a  judgment  which 
causes  that  to  pass  as  true  which  perhaps  is  not  so,  whilst  its 
falsity  is  not  at  all  proved.  Thus  it  is  that  the  maxim :  pater 
est  quern  nuptioe  demonstrant  is  understood  in  Roman  law  and 
among  the  most  of  the  peoples  where  it  is  received.  But  they 
tell  me  that  in  England  it  avails  nothing  in  proving  his  alibi; 
l^rovided  he  has  been  in  one  of  the  three  kingdoms,  so  that 
the  presumption  in  that  case  changes  into  Jiction  or  into  what 
some  doctors  call  j^i'^^sumtio  juris  et  de  jure.'\ 

§  4.  Ph.  A  moral  relation  is  the  conformity  or  disagreement 
which  is  found  between  the  voluntary  acts  of  men  and  a  rule 
which  makes  us  judge  whether  they  are  morally  good  or  bad. 
§  5.  And  moral  good  or  moral  evil  is  the  conformity  or  the 
opposition  which  is  found  between  voluntary  acts  and  a  cer- 
tain law  which  brings  upon  us  good  or  evil  (physical)  by  the 
will  and  power  of  the  lawgiver  (or  of  him  who  wills  to  main- 
tain the  law)  and  it  is  this  we  call  reu-ard  and  punishment. 

Th.  [Authors,  as  clever  as  he  whose  views  you,  sir,  repre- 
sent, are  allowed  to  adapt  their  terms  as  they  think  proper. 
But  it  is  also  true  that  according  to  this  notion  one  and  the 


CH.  xxviii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  261 

same  act  would  be  morally  good  and  morally  bad  at  the  same 
time  under  different  legislators,  entirely  as  our  clever  author 
understood  virtue  above  as  that  which  is  praised,  and  conse- 
quently the  same  act  would  be  virtuous  or  not  according  to 
the  opinions  of  men.  Now  that  not  being  the  ordinary  sense 
that  is  given  to  morally  good  and  virtuous  acts,  I  prefer  for 
myself,  to  take  as  the  measure  of  moral  good  and  of  virtue 
the  invariable  rule  of  reason  which  God  is  charged  with  main- 
taining. We  can  also  be  assured  that  by  his  mediation  all 
moral  good  becomes  physical,'  or  as  the  ancients  say,  every 
thing  virtuous  is  useful^;  while  in  order  to  express  the  notion 
of  the  author,  it  would  be  necessary  to  say  that  moral  good  or 
evil  is  an  imposed  or  instituted  good  or  evil,  which  he  who  has 
the  power  tries  to  make  us  follow  or  shun  by  punishments 
and  rewards.  The  good  is  that  which  by  the  general  institu- 
tion of  God  is  conformed  to  nature  or  to  reason.] 

§  7.  Ph.  There  are  three  sorts  of  laws :  the  divine  law,  the 
civil  laio,  and  the  law  of  opinion  or  rex)utation.  The  first  is 
the  rule  of  sins  or  duties,  the  second  of  actions  criminal  or 
innocent,  the  third  of  virtues  or  vices. 

Th.  [According  to  the  ordinary  sense  of  terms  virtties  and 
vices  differ   from  duties   and   sins   only  as   habits  differ  from 

1  What  does  Lei))uitz  here  mean  hy  "  physical  "  ?  Possibly  "  physical "  is 
here  equivalent  to  "  real,"  i.e.  actual,  concrete,  objectively  realized  as  distin- 
,<;uished  from  that  whicli  is  purely  subjective  and  abstract,  and  exists  in  idea 
only  ((/.  Bk.  II.,  chap.  27,  §  9,  Th.  prozjejin.,  ante,  p.  217,  line  7,  where  the  two 
terms  are  united  in  one  plirase  "  real  and  physical,"  and  seem  to  be  mutually 
interpretative  and  emphatic).  Or,  possibly,  "physical"  is  here  used  in  the 
sense  of  "natural,"  the  meaning  of  the  passage  being  that  moral  good  is 
realized  by  the  mediation  of  God  through  the  natural  forces  and  in  accord 
with  the  natural  laws  of  the  universe,  which  with  Leibnitz  have  their  ultimate 
source  and  ground  in  the  nature  of  God  and  his  cl)oice  of  "  tlie  best  and  most 
perfect,"  as  the  universal  principle  of  creation.  The  true  view  of  the  world 
is,  according  to  Leil)nitz,  both  physico-mechanical  and  moral-teleological,  tlie 
two  finding  a  higher  unity  in  this  principle  of  "  the  best  and  most  perfect," 
the  moral-teleological  i)revailing  in  case  of  collision,  because  of  this  princi- 
ple and  because  tlie  physical  is  in  its  last  analysis  and  ground  sjjiritual  and 
Ijossessed  of  an  inner  teleological  character  whicli  is  realized  by  means  of 
mechanism  while  resting  upon  the  principle  of  the  divine  choice  of  tlie  best. 
Cf.  Discours  de  Metaphynigue,  §  19  sq.,  Gerhardt,  4,  444  sq.;  letter  to  Bayle, 
G.  .3,  .54;  Erdmann,  lOfi.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Cicero,  Be  Offinix,  Bk.  III.,  chaps.  .3  and  7,  who  shows  on  the  author- 
ity of  Pansetius  and  others  that  the  virtuous  and  the  useful  —  honestum  and 
utile  —  are  identical,  a  cliief  point  of  the  Stoic  philosnpliy.  Cf.  also  Zeller, 
Lie  Philos.  d.  Gricch.,  III.,  1  [Vol.  5] ,  p.  212,  3d  ed.  ISSO.  —  Tr. 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [mc. 


actions,  and  virtue  and  vice  are  not  understood  as  something 
dependent  upon  opinion.^  A  great  sin  is  called  a  crime,  and 
the  innocent  is  not  opposed  to  the  criminal  but  to  the  blame- 
ivorthy.  The  divine  law  ^  is  of  two  sorts,  natural  and  positive. 
Civil  law  is  positive.  The  law  of  reputation  deserves  the 
name  of  law  only  improperly,  or  is  comprised  under  the 
natural  law,  as  though  I  said,  the  law  of  health,  the  law  of 
the  family,  when  actions  naturally  attract  some  good  or  evil, 
as  the  approbation  of  another,  health,  gain.] 

§  10.  Ph.  The  claim  is  in  fact  everywhere  made  that  the 
terms  virtue  and  vice  signify  actions  good  and  bad  in  their 
nature,  and  so  far  as  they  are  really  applied  in  this  sense,  vir- 
tue agrees  perfectly  with  the  divine  (natural)  law.  But  what- 
ever the  claims  of  men,  it  is  evident^  that  these  names,  con- 
sidered in  their  particular  aj^plications,  are  constantly  and 
solely  attributed  to  such  or  such  actions  as  in  each  country  or 
in  each  society  are  reputed  honorable  or  shameful :  otherwise 
men  tvould  condemn  themselves.  Thus  the  measure  of  what  is 
called  virtue  and  vice  is  this  approbation  or  this  contempt, 
this  esteem  or  this  blame,  which  is  formed  by  a  secret  or  tacit 
consent.  For  although  men  united  in  political  societies  have 
resigned  into  the  hands  of  the  public  the  disposition  of  all 
their  forces,  so  that  they  cannot  employ  them  against  their 
fellow-citizens  beyond  what  the  law  permits,  they  nevertheless 
always  retain  the  power  of  thinking  well  or  ill,  of  approval 
or  disapproval. 

TJi.  [If  the  clever  author,  who  thus  explains  himself,  shoidd 
declare  with  you,  sir,  that  it  has  pleased  him  to  assign  this 
present  arbitrary  nominal  definition  to  the  terms  virtue  and 
vice,  we  could  only  say  that  it  is  allowed  him  in  theory  for  the 

1  Leibnitz  maintains,  as  against  Locke's  theory  of  relativity,  the  ahsohite 
and  ohjective  cliaracter  of  Moral  Law.  It  is  objective  and  universal,  not  sub- 
jective and  particular ;  not  dependent  upon  the  opinions  of  men,  but  grounded 
in  "the  general  institution  of  God,"  and  ultimately  in  his  infinitely  perfect 
moral  nature,  and  is  thus  valid  for  and  binding  upon  all  moral  beings  as  such. 
This  is  Moral  Law  absolute  and  ideal  which  changes  not ;  it  is  progressively 
and  approximately  attained  or  realized  in  the  history  of  the  individual  and 
the  race  according  to  men's  apprehension  of  its  nature  and  requirements  and 
their  strength  of  purpose  and  effort  in  its  pursuit.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  the  discussion  of  Moral  Law,  in  Principles  and  Practice  of  Morality, 
pp.  79  57.,  by  E.  G.  Robinson,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  Ex-President  of  Brown  University. 
Boston:  Silver,  Burdett  &  Co.,  1888.— Tr. 

3  Locke  has:  "visible,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  1,  p.  488  (Bohn's  ed.).  — Tr. 


CH.  xxviii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  263 

convenience  of  expression  for  want  perhaps  of  other  terms  ;  but 
we  shall  be  obliged  to  add  that  this  meaning  is  not  conformed 
to  usage,  nor  indeed  useful  for  edification,  and  that  it  would 
sound  ill  in  the  ears  of  many  people,  if  any  one  should  intro- 
duce it  into  practical  life  and  conversation,  as  this  author 
seems  himself  to  admit  in  his  preface.  But  it  is  (for  us)  to 
go  on  farther  here,  and  although  you  admit  that  men  claim  to 
speak  of  tliat  which  is  naturally  virtuous  or  vicious  according 
to  immutable  laws,  you  maintain  that  in  fact  they  mean  to 
speak  only  of  that  which  depends  on  opinion.  But  it  seems 
to  me  that  by  the  same  reasoning  you  could  further  maintain 
that  truth  and  reason  and  all  that  could  be  named  as  most  real, 
depends  upon  opinion,  because  men  are  mistaken  when  they 
judge  of  it.  Is  it  not  better  then  on  all  accounts  to  say,  that 
men  understand  by  virtue  as  by  truth,  that  which  is  conformed 
to  nature,  but  that  they  are  mistaken  often  in  its  application ; 
besides  they  are  mistaken  less  than  they  think,  for  what  they 
praise  ordinarily  deserves  it  in  certain  respects.  The  virtue 
of  drinking,  i.e.  of  well  carrying  wine,  is  an  advantage,  which 
served  Bonosus,  in  conciliating  the  Barbarians  and  in  drawing 
from  them  their  secrets.^  The  nocturnal  powers  of  Hercules,  in 
which  the  same  Bonosus  claimed  to  resemble  him,  were  no  less 
a  perfection.  The  craft  of  thieves  was  praised  among  the 
Spartans,  and  it  is  not  the  skill,  but  the  unseasonable  use 
which  has  been  made  of  it,  which  is  blamable,  and  those  whom 
we  harass  in  (time  of)  complete  peace  may  serve  sometimes  as 
excellent  partisans  in  time  of  war.  Thus  all  depends  upon  the 
application  and  the  good  or  bad  use  of  the  advantages  you  pos- 
sess. It  is  also  very  often  true  and  should  not  be  taken  as  a 
very  strange  thing,  that  men  condemn  themselves,  as  when  they 
do  what  they  blame  in  others,  and  there  is  often  a  contradiction 
between  actions  and  words  which  scandalizes  the  public,  when 
what  a  magistrate  or  preacher  does  and  defends  leaps  to  the 
eyes  of  the  whole  world.] 

§  11. '-^  Ph.  Everywliere  that  which  passes  as  virtue  is  that 
which  is  thought  worthy  of  praise.  Virtue  and  praise  are  often 
designated  by  the  same  name.  Su7it  hie  etiam  sua  proimia 
laudi,  says  Vergil  {Aen.  I.  461)  and  Cicero,  Nihil  habet  natura 

1  C/.  Vopiscus,  Script,  hist.  Avr/ust.,  Vol.  2,  pp.  21.3,  214,  ed.  Peter.  — Tb. 

2  Gerhardt  and  Locke;  Erdraann  and  Jacques  have  §  12.  —  Tk. 


•2(ii  LElliNiTZ'S   CKITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [uk.  ii 

]>mestanlii(s  quam  honestatem,  quam  kmdem,  quavi  dignitatem, 
qnam  di'cus.^  {Qiuesf.  2'hscuI.  Bk.  2.  chap.  20)  and  lie  adds 
a  little  after:  Ilisce  ego  jiluribus  nominibus  unavi  rem  dedamri 
volo} 

Th.  [It  is  true  that  the  ancients  have  designated  virtue  by 
the  name  honesty  {Vhonneste),  as  when  they  have  praised  in- 
coctum  generoso  pectus  houesto.-  It  is  true  also  that  honesty 
{rhonneste)  has  its  name  of  honor  or  of  i^raise.  But  this 
means  not  that  virtue  is  that  which  is  praised  but  that  it  is 
that  Avhich  is  worthy  of  praise  and  wdiich  depends  upon  truth, 
and  not  upon  opinion.] 

Fh.  Many  do  not  think  at  all  seriously  of  the  km  of  God,  or 
hope  that  they  will  one  day  be  reconciled  with  its  author,  and 
as  regards  the  km  of  the  state  they  flatter  themselves  with  im- 
punity. But  they  do  not  think  that  he  who  does  anything 
contrary  to  the  opinions  of  those  with  whom  he  associates,  and 
to  whom  he  wishes  to  commend  himself,  can  avoid  the  pain  of 
their  censure  and  of  their  disdain.  No  one  who  retains  any 
consciousness  of  his  own  nature  can  live  in  society  constantly 
despised ;  this  is  the  force  of  the  knc  of  reputation. 

Til.  [I  have  already  said  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  pain  of  a 
law,  as  a  natural  pain  which  the  act  draws  upon  itself.  It  is, 
however,  true  that  many  people  are  but  little  concerned  about 
it,  because  ordinarily,  if  they  are  despised  by  some  on  account 
of  some  blameworthy  act,  they  find  accomplices  or  at  least 
partisans,  who  do  not  despise  them,  if  they  are  ever  so  little 
commendable  in  some  other  respect.  They  forget  even  acts 
the  most  infamous,  and  it  often  suffices  to  be  bold  and  im- 
pudent like  that  Phormio  of  Terence  in  order  that  all  may  be 
overlooked.  If  excommunication  produced  a  truly  constant 
and  general  contempt,  it  Avould  have  the  force  of  this  law  of 
which  our  author  speaks  :  and  it  had  in  fact  this  force  with  the 
first  Christians  aud  for  them  took  the  place  of  the  right,  which 
they  lacked,  to  punish  the  guilty ;  nearly  as  artisans  maintain 
certain  customs  among  themselves  in  spite  of  the  laws,  through 

1  The  quotation  is  not  exact.  Cf.  op.  cit.,  ed.  Klotz,  Lipsiae,  B.  G.  Teiib- 
ner,  1870,  where  the  text  reads  thus:  "Nihil  enim  hal)et  i^raestantius,  nihil 
quod  magis  expetat  quam  honestatem,  quam  laudem,  qiiam  dignitatem,  quam 
deeus.  Hisce  ego  pluribus  noniinibus  uiiam  rem  declarari  volo,  sed  utor,  ut 
quam  maxime  significem,  pluribus."  —  Tr. 

2  Persius.  Sat.  2,  74.— Tr. 


cii.  xxix]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  265 

the  contempt  which  they  show  for  those  who  do  not  observe 
them.  And  it  is  this  which  has  also  maintained  duels  con- 
trary to  the  ordinances.  It  would  be  desirable  for  the  public 
to  agree  Avith  itself  and  with  reason  in  its  praise  and  blame ; 
and  that  the  great  above  all  do  not  encourage  the  bad  by  laugh- 
ing at  their  bad  actions,  in  which  it  oftenest  seems  that  not  he 
who  has  done  them,  but  he  who  has  suffered  them  is  punished 
by  contempt  and  ridiculed.  We  shall  see  also  generally  that 
men  despise  not  so  much  vice  as  weakness  and  misfortune. 
Thus  the  law  of  reputation  would  need  to  be  greatly  reformed, 
and  also  to  be  better  observed.] 

§  19.  Ph.  Before  leaving  the  consideration  of  relations,  I 
would  remark  that  we  usually  have  a  notion  as  clear  or  clearer 
of  the  relation  than  of  its  ground.  If  I  believed  that  Sempronia 
took  Titus  from  beneath  a  cabbage,  as  they  used  to  tell  little 
children,  and  that  afterwards  she  had  had  Cains  in  the  same 
manner,  I  should  have  as  clear  a  notion  of  the  relation  of 
brother  between  Titus  and  Caius,  as  if  I  had  all  the  knowledge 
of  tlie  midwives. 

Th.  But  when  they  once  said  to  a  child,  that  his  little 
brother,  who  had  just  been  born,  had  been  drawn  from  a  well 
(a  reply  which  they  make  use  of  in  Germany  to  satisfy  the 
curiosity  of  children  upon  this  subject)  the  child  replied  that 
he  wondered  that  they  did  not  throw  him  back  again  into  the 
same  well  when  he  cried  so  much  and  disturbed  his  mother. 
The  fact  is  this  explanation  did  not  make  him  know  any  rea- 
son for  the  love  his  mother  showed  for  the  child.  We  can  say 
then  that  those  who  do  not  know  the  ground  of  relations  have 
only  concerning  them  what  I  call  thoughts,  surd  in  part  and 
insufficient,  although  these  thoughts  may  suffice  in  certain 
respects  and  upon  certain  occasions.] 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

OF    CLEAR    AND    OBSCUKE,    DISTINCT    AND    CONFUSED    IDEAS 

§  2.  Ph.  We  come  now  to  some  differences  of  ideas.  Our 
simj)le  ideas  are  dear  when  they  are  such  as  the  objects  them- 
selves,   from   whence   they   are   received,    represent    or   may 


o,;0  LF-TT^NITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [kk.  ii 

ivpreseut  them  with  all  the  circumstances  requisite  to  a  well- 
ordered  sensation  or  perception.  While  the  memory  retains 
them  in  this  way,  they  are  in  this  case  clear  ideas,  and  so  far 
as  they  lack  this  original  exactness  or  have  lost  anything  so 
to  speak  of  their  first  freshness,  and  are,  as  it  were,  tarnished 
or  faded  by  time,  so  far  are  they  obscure.  Complex  ideas  are 
dear,  when  the  simple  ideas  which  compose  them  are  clear  and 
the  number  and  order  of  these  simple  ideas  are  fixed. 

Th.  [In  a  brief  discourse  on  ideas,^  true  or  false,  clear  or 
obscure,  distinct  or  confused,  inserted  in  the  "  Leipsic  Acts " 
of  the  year  1684,  I  have  given  a  definition  of  clear  ideas, 
common  to  the  simple  and  complex  and  which  gives  the  rea- 
son of  what  you  say  here.  I  said  then  that  an  idea  is  clear 
when  it  suffices  to  recognize  and  distinguish  the  thing:  as 
when  I  have  a  very  clear  idea  of  a  color,  I  shall  not  take 
another  instead  of  that  which  I  ask  for,  and  if  I  have  a  clear 
idea  of  a  plant,  I  shall  distinguish  it  among  other  neighboring 
ones ;  without  this  the  idea  is  obscure.  I  believe  that  we  have 
but  few  perfectly  clear  ideas  of  sensible  things.  There  are 
colors  which  approach  each  other  in  such  a  way  that  we  can- 
not distinguish  them  by  memory,  and  yet  we  will  sometimes 
distinguish  them  by  placing  one  near  the  other.  And  when 
we  think  we  have  fully  described  a  plant,  we  can  bring  one 
from  the  Indies  which  will  have  all  we  have  put  into  our 
description  and  which  will  not  cease  making  itself  known  as 
a  different  species :  thus  we  can  never  perfectly  determine 
species  infamoe,  or  the  lowest  species.] 

§  4.  Ph.  As  a  clear  idea  is  that  whereof  the  mind  has  such 
a  full  and  evident  perception  as  it  receives  from  an  external 
object  operating  duly  upon  a  well-disposed  organ ;  so  a  distinct 
idea  is  that  wherein  the  mind  perceives  a  difference,  which 
distinguishes  it  from  every  other  idea ;  and  a  confused  idea  is 
that  which  cannot  be  sufficiently  distinguished  from  another 
from  which  it  should  be  different. 

Th.  [According  to  this  notion  which  you  give  of  the  dis- 
tinct idea,  I  do  not  see  how  you  distinguish  it  from  the  clear 
idea.  This  is  why  I  have  been  wont  to  follow  here  the  lan- 
guage of  Descartes,  with  whom  an  idea  may  be  clear  and  con- 

^  Meditationes  de  Cor/nitione,  Veritate  et  Ideis.  Cf.  ante,  p.  14,  note  2; 
p.  227,  notes.  — Tr. 


xxix]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  267 


fused  at  the  same  time ;  and  such  are  the  ideas  of  sensible 
qualities,  appropriate  to  the  organs,  such  as  color  or  heat.  They 
are  clear,  for  they  are  easily  recognized  and  distinguished  the 
one  from  the  other,  but  they  are  not  distinct,  because  they  are 
not  distinguished  by  what  they  include.  Thus  we  cannot  give 
a  definition  of  them.  We  make  them  known  only  by  examples, 
and  for  the  rest  we  must  say  it  is  an  indefinite  somewhat, 
until  we  can  decipher  its  contexture.  Thus  although  in 
our  view  distinct  ideas  distinguish  one  object  from  another ; 
nevertheless,  as  the  ideas  clear,  but  confused  in  themselves,  do 
so  also,  we  call  distinct  not  all  those  which  are  very  discrimi- 
nating or  which  distinguish  objects,  but  those  which  are  well 
distinguished,  i.e.  which  are  distinct  in  themselves  and  dis- 
tinguish in  the  object  the  marks  which  make  it  known,  which 
an  analysis  or  definition  of  it  gives  ;  otherwise  we  call  them 
confused.  And  in  this  sense  the  confusion  which  reigns  in 
ideas  can  be  exempt  from  blame,  being  an  imperfection  of  our 
nature;  for  we  cannot  discern  the  causes,  for  example,  of  odors 
and  tastes,  nor  the  content  of  these  qualities.  This  confusion 
can,  however,  be  blameworthy,  when  it  is  important  and 
within  my  power  to  have  distinct  ideas,  as,  for  example,  if  I 
took  adulterated  gold  as  the  true,  for  want  of  making  the 
necessary  assays  which  contain  the  marks  of  good  gold. 

§  5.  Ph.  But  you  will  say  that  there  is  no  idea  confused  (or 
rather  according  to  your  view,  obscure)  in  itself^  for  it  can  be 
only  such  as  it  is  perceived  by  the  mind,  and  that  distin- 
guishes it  sufficiently  from  all  others.  §  6.  And  in  order  to 
remove  this  difficulty  it  is  needful  to  know  that  the  defect  of 
ideas  is  related  to  names,  and  what  renders  it  faulty  is  the 
fact  that  it  can  as  well  be  designated  by  another  name  as  the 
one  which  we  use  to  express  it. 

Th.  [It  seems  to  me  that  we  ought  not  to  make  this  depend 
upon  names.  Alexander  the  Great  had  seen  (they  say)  in  a 
dream  a  plant  able  to  cure  Lysimachus,  which  has  since 
been  called  LysimacMa,  because  it  effectually  cured  this  friend 
of  the  king.  When  Alexander  had  a  quantity  of  plants 
brought,  among  which  he  recognized  that  which  he  had  seen 
in  his  dream,  if  unfortunately  he  had  not  had  a  sufficient  idea 
of  it  to  recognize  it  and  had  needed  as  Nebuchadnezzar  a 
1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "  en  elle  luCme."  — Tr. 


2(i8  LKIBMTZ'S    fKirigi  K    OF   LOCKE  [hk.  ii 

Daniel  to  enable  him  to  recall  his  dream,  it  is  plain  that  the 
iilea  he  would  have  had  of  it  would  have  been  obscure  and 
iiniH>rfoct  (for  it  is  thus  I  should  prefer  to  call  it  rather  than 
a»i/i(S(>il),  not  for  want  of  appositeness  in  a  certain  name,  for 
there  was  none,  but  for  want  of  ax)i)licatiou  to  the  thing,  i.e. 
to  the  plant  Avhich  was  to  heal.  In  this  case  Alexander  would 
be  reminded  of  certain  circumstances,  but  he  would  have  been 
in  doubt  about  others  ;  and  the  name  serving  us  to  designate 
auythiug  makes  us,  when  we  fail  in  the  application  to  names, 
fail  ordinarily  in  regard  to  the  thing  which  is  promised  by 
this  name.] 

§  7.  Ph.  As  complex  ideas  are  the  most  subject  to  this 
imperfection,  it  may  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  idea  is 
composed  of  too  small  a  number  of  simple  ideas,  as  is,  for 
example,  the  idea  of  an  animal  which  has  the  skin  spotted,  (a 
term)  Avhich  is  too  general,  and  which  does  not  suffice  to  dis- 
tinguish the  lynx,  the  leopard,  or  the  panther,  which  are 
besides  distinguished  by  particular  names. 

TJi.  [If  we  were  in  the  condition  Adam  was  in  before  he 
had  given  names  to  the  animals,  this  defect  would  not  cease 
to  have  place.  Yov  supposing  we  knew  that  among  the 
spotted  animals  there  is  one  Avhich  has  extraordinarily  pene- 
trating sight,  but  tliat  we  did  not  know  whether  it  is  a  tiger 
or  a  lynx,  or  some  other  species  ;  it  is  an  imperfection  not 
to  be  able  to  distinguish  it.  Thus  the  question  is  not  so 
much  about  the  name  as  about  that  which  may  give  occa- 
sion for  it,  and  which  renders  the  animal  worthy  of  a  particu- 
lar name.  It  thereby  appears  also  tliat  the  idea  of  a  spotted 
animal  is  good  in  itself,  and  without  confusion  and  obscurity, 
wlien  it  is  to  serve  only  the  genus ;  but  when  joined  with 
some  other  idea  which  is  not  sufficiently  remembered  it  is 
to  designate  the  species,  the  complex  idea  is  obscure  and 
imperfect.] 

§  8.  Ph.  There  is  an  opposite  defect  when  the  simple  ideas 
which  make  up  the  complex  idea  are  sufficient  in  number,  but 
too  confused  and  involved,  like  some  pictures,  which  appear 
so  confused  that  they  must  be  only  the  representation  of  the 
sky  covered  with  clouds,  in  which  case  also  we  could  not  say 
that  there  is  confusion  any  more  than  if  it  were  another  pic- 
ture made  to  imitate  that  one ;   but  when  we  say  that  this 


en.  xxix]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  269 

picture  should  make  us  see  a  portrait,  we  shall  have  reason 
to  say  that  it  is  confused  because  we  cannot  say  whether 
it  is  that  of  a  man,  or  of  a  monkey,  or  of  a  fish,  but  it  may  be 
that  when  we  look  at  it  in  a  cylindrical  mirror,  the  confusion 
will  disappear,  and  that  we  shall  see  that  it  is  a  Julius  Caesar. 
Thus  some  mental  paintings  (if  I  may  so  express  myself)  can- 
not be  called  confused  from  any  way  in  which  the  parts  are 
joined  together ;  for  whatever  these  paintings  are,  they  can 
obviously  be  distinguished  from  every  other,  until  they  are 
ranked  under  some  ordinary  name,  to  which  we  cannot  see 
that  they  belong  any  more  than  to  some  other  name  of  a 
different  signification. 

Th.  [This  picture  whose  parts  we  see  distinctly,  without 
noticing  the  result  to  which  they  in  a  certain  way  point, 
resembles  the  idea  of  a  heap  of  stones,  which  is  truly  confused 
not  only  in  your  sense,  but  also  in  mine,  so  far  as  we  have 
distinctly  conceived  their  number  and  other  properties.  If 
there  were  thirtj^-six  of  them  (for  example),  we  would  not 
know,  looking  at  them  heaped  together  without  arrangement, 
that  they  may  produce  a  triangle  or  indeed  a  square,  as  in 
fact  they  can,  because  thirty-six  is  a  square  as  well  as  a  tri- 
angular number.  Thus  it  is  that,  in  looking  at  a  figure  of  a 
thousand  sides,  we  shall  have  only  a  confused  idea  of  it,  until 
we  know  the  number  of  the  sides  which  is  the  cube  of  ten. 
The  question,  then,  is  not  of  names  but  of  the  distinct  proper- 
ties which  are  to  be  found  in  the  idea  when  we  have  cleared 
up  its  confusion.  And  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  find  the 
key,  or  the  manner  of  looking  at  it  from  a  certain  point,  either 
by  the  intervention  of  a  certain  mirror  or  glass  in  order  to  see 
the  purpose  of  him  who  has  caused  the  thing.] 

§  9.  Pli.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  yet  a  third  defect 
in  ideas,  which  depends  in  truth  upon  the  bad  use  of  names ; 
it  is  when  our  ideas  are  uncertain  or  undetermined.  Thus 
we  may  see  every  day  men  who,  making  no  difficulty  of 
availing  themselves  of  the  ordinary  words  of  their  mother 
tongue,  before  they  have  learned  their  precise  meaning,  change 
the  idea  which  they  attach  to  them  almost  as  often  as  tliey 
use  them  in  their  discourse.  §  10.  Thus  we  see  how  much 
names  contribute  to  this  denomination  of  ideas  distinct  and 
confused,  and,  without  the    consideration   of   distinct   names 


270  Li:iL5MTZ'S   CKiriQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

understood  as  signs  of  distinct  things,  it  will  be  very  difficult 
to  s;iy  what  a  confused  idea  is. 

Th.  [I  have,  however,  just  explained  it  without  consideriug 
the  names,  whether  in  the  case  where  the  confusion  is  under- 
stood with  you  as  what  I  call  obscurity,  or  in  that  where  it  is 
understood  in  my  sense  as  the  defect  in  the  analysis  of  the 
notion  we  have.  And  I  have  also  shown  that  every  obscure 
idea  is  in  fact  indeterminate  or  uncertain,  as  in  the  example 
of  the  spotted  animal  we  have  seen,  where  we  know  that  some- 
thing further  must  be  added  to  this  general  notion,  without 
clearly  remembering  it ;  so  that  the  first  and  third  defect 
which  you  have  specified  come  to  the  same  thing.  It  is,  how- 
ever, very  true  that  the  abuse  of  words  is  a  great  source 
of  errors,  for  a  kind  of  error  in  calculating  occurs  therefrom, 
as  if  in  calculating  we  did  not  notice  carefully  the  place  of 
the  counter,  or  if  we  wrote  the  figures  so  badly  that  we  could 
not  distinguish  a  2  from  a  7,  or  if  we  omitted  or  changed 
them  through  inadvertence.  This  abuse  of  words  consists 
either  in  not  connecting  ideas  with  the  whole  or  in  connecting 
them  with  an  imperfect  one,  of  which  a  part  is  empty  and 
abides  so  to  speak  in  blank  ;  and  in  these  two  cases  there  is  a 
certain  void  and  surd  in  the  thought  which  is  filled  only 
by  the  name.  Or,  finally,  the  defect  is  in  attaching  to  the 
word  different  ideas,  whether  we  are  uncertain  which  should 
be  chosen,  which  makes  the  idea  obscure  as  well  as  when  a 
part  of  it  is  surd  ;  or  whether  we  select  them  by  turns,  and 
avail  ourselves  sometimes  of  one,  sometimes  of  the  other  as 
the  sense  of  the  same  word  in  one  and  the  same  course  of 
reasoning  in  a  way  capable  of  causing  error,  without  consider- 
ing that  the  ideas  do  not  agree.  Thus  the  uncertain  thought 
is  either  void  and  without  idea,  or  fluctuates  between  several 
ideas.  This  does  harm  whether  ^  we  wish  to  designate  some 
definite  thing  or  whether  we  wish  to  give  a  word  a  certain 
sense  corresponding  either  to  that  of  which  we  have  already 
availed  ourselves,  or  to  that  which  others  have  used,  above 
all  in  ordinary  language,  common  to  all,  or  to  the  artisans. 
And  from  this  arise  an  infinite  number  of  vague  and  vain  dis- 
putes in  conversation,  in  lecture-rooms,  and  in  books,  which  we 

lErdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "soit  qu"ou  veuille  designer  quelque  eliose 
determinee,"  the  reading  of  Gerhardt.  —  Te. 


CH.  XXIX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  271 

may  sometimes  avoid  by  distmctioyis,  but  which  most  fre- 
quently serve  only  to  confuse  the  more,  by  putting  in  the 
place  of  a  vague  and  obscure  term  other  terms  still  more 
vague  and  obscure,  as  those  often  are  which  the  philosophers 
employ  in  tlieir  distinctions,  without  having  good  definitions 
of  them.] 

§  12.  Ph.  If  there  is  any  other  confusion  in  ideas,  than  this 
which  has  a  secret  relation  to  names,  this  at  least  casts  more 
disorder  than  any  other  into  the  thoughts  and  discourse  of 
men. 

Th.  [I  agree,  but  most  frequently  some  notion  of  the  thing 
and  the  purpose  which  we  have  in  availing  ourselves  of 
the  name  is  mixed  with  it ;  as,  for  exaiBple,  Avhen  we  speak 
of  the  church,  many  have  in  view  a  government,  while  others 
think  of  the  truth  of  the  doctrine.] 

Ph.  The  way  to  prevent  this  confusion  is  constantly  to 
apply  the  same  name  to  a  certain  mass  of  simple  ideas  united 
in  a  fixed  number  and  into  a  deterjnined  order.  But  as  that 
suits  neither  the  laziness  nor  the  vanity  of  men,  and  as  it  can 
be  used  only  in  the  discovery  and  the  defence  of  the  truth, 
which  is  not  always  the  end  they  propose  to  themselves,  such 
precision  is  one  of  the  things  that  is  rather  to  be  wished  than 
hoped  for.  The  vague  application  of  names  to  ideas  inde- 
terminate, variable,  and  almost  wholly  empty  (in  the  surd 
thoughts)  is  on  one  side  a  covering  of  our  ignorance  and 
on  the  other  a  confusing  and  embarrassing  of  others,  which 
passes  as  true  learning  and  as  a  mark  of  superiority  in  point 
of  knowledge. 

Th.  [The  affectation  of  elegance  and  wit  has  further  con- 
tributed much  to  this  intricacy  of  language ;  for  in  order  to 
express  thoughts  beautifully  and  agreeably  we  make  no  diffi- 
culty of  giving  words  in  a  tropical  manner  a  sense  different 
from  the  ordinary,  sometimes  more  general  or  more  limited, 
which  is  called  synecdoche,  sometimes  transferred  according  to 
the  relations  of  things  whose  names  we  change,  either  by 
concurrence  in  metonymy,  or  by  comparison  in  metcqfhor,  not 
to  speak  of  irony,  which  makes  use  of  a  term  in  a  sense 
directly  opposite  to  its  real  meaning.  Thus  these  changes  are 
named  when  recognized  ;  but  they  are  recognized  only  rarely. 
And  in  this  indeterminateness  of  language,  in  which  there  is 


272  Li;illNnV/S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [niv.  ii 

lacking  a  kind  of  law  wliicli  regulates  the  meauing  of  words, 
as  there  is  something  in  the  title  of  the  digests  of  the  Roman 
Law,  De  Verborum  JSigniJicationibus,  persons  the  most  judic- 
ious, when  they  write  for  ordinary  readers,  would  be  deprived 
of  that  which  gives  charm  and  force  to  their  expression  if 
they  should  confine  themselves  rigorously  to  the  fixed  mean- 
ings of  terms.  They  need  only  take  care  that  their  variation 
does  not  cause  any  error  or  false  reasoning  to  spring  up.  The 
distinction  of  the  ancients  between  the  exoteric,^  i.e.  popular, 
and  the  acroaniatic  ^  mode  of  writing,  which  belongs  to  those 
who  are  occupied  in  the  discovery  of  truth,  has  place  here. 
And  if  any  one  wished  to  write  in  mathematical  fashion  in 
metaphysics  or  ethics,  nothing  would  prevent  him  from  so 
doing  with  rigor.  Some  have  professed  to  do  this,  and  we 
have  a  promise  of  mathematical  demonstrations  outside  of 
mathematics ;  but  it  is  very  rare  that  they  have  been  success- 
ful. This  is,  I  believe,  because  they  are  disgusted  with  the 
trouble  it  is  necessary  to  take  for  a  small  number  of  readers 
where  they  could  ask  as  in  Persius :  Quis  leget  Jiaec,  and 
replay :  Vel  duo  vel  nemo.^  I  believe,  however,  that  if  they 
would  undertake  it  in  the  proper  way  they  would  not  be 
likely  to  repent  it.     And  I  have  been  tempted  to  try  it.] 

§  13.  Ph.  You  will  agree  with  me,  however,  that  complex 
ideas  may  be  very  clear  and  distinct  in  one  aspect,  and  very 
obscure  and  confused  in  another. 

Til.  [There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  it ;  for  example,  we  have 
very  distinct  ideas  of  a  good  part  of  the  solid  visible  parts 
of  the  human  body,  but  we  have  but  few  of  the  liquids  which 
enter  therein.] 

Ph.   If  a  man  speaks  of  a  figure  of  a  thousand  sides,  the 

1  Cf.  Leibnitz,  De  Stilo  philos.  Nizolii,  Gerhardt,  Vol.  4,  p.  146;  Erdmann, 
p.  63.  "  AcToamatic  "  (ante,  p.  42),  from  axpoajxa,  anything  heard,  the  verb 
axpoaffflai,  the  regular  word  for  hearing  or  attending  lectures,  the  adjective 
a/cpoa^ariKos,  designed  for  hearing  only,  and,  when  used  of  the  doctrines  of 
philosophers,  meaning  the  esoteric,  i.e.  the  doctrines  in  their  most  rigorous 
and  exact  scientific  form,  their  custom  being  to  give  these  orally  to  their 
puxjils,  while  treating  them  in  a  more  popular,  exoteric  manner  in  their  writ- 
ings. Such  was  the  method  of  Plato  and  of  Aristotle,  one  of  whose  works  is 
called  <t>v(TiKr)  dicpoacris.  Scliaarsclimidt  refers  to  Bernays,  Die  Dialoge  d.  Aris- 
totles,  p.  .SO  sq.  Berlin,  1863,  and  Mad\ig,  Excursus  YII.  to  his  edition  of 
Cicero's  De  Finihus.  —  Tr. 

^Sat.  1,  lines  2,  3.— Tr. 


OH.  xxix]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  273 


idea  of  this  figure  may  be  very  obscure  in  his  mind,  although 
that  of  the  number  may  be  very  distinct  therein. 

Th.  [This  example  is  not  in  point  here ;  a  regular  polygon 
of  a  thousand  sides  is  known  as  distinctly  as  the  millenary 
number,  because  we  may  discover  and  demonstrate  all  kinds 
of  truth.] 

Ph.  But  we  do  not  have  a  precise  idea  of  a  figure  of 
a  thousand  sides,  so  that  we  can  distinguish  it  from  another, 
which  has  only  nine  hundred  ninety-nine. 

Th.  [This  example  shows  that  you  here  confound  the  idea 
with  the  image.  If  any  one  places  before  me  a  regular  poly- 
gon, sight  and  imagination  cannot  make  me  comprehend  the 
millenary  therein ;  I  have  only  a  coyifused  idea  both  of  the 
figure  and  of  its  number,  until  I  distinguish  the  number  by 
counting.  But  having  found  it,  I  know  very  well  the  nature 
and  the  properties  of  the  proposed  polygon,  as  far  as  they 
are  those  of  the  chiliagon,  and  consequently  I  have  this  idea 
of  it ;  but  I  cannot  have  the  image  of  a  chiliagon,  and  it  would 
be  necessary  to  have  senses  and  imagination  more  exquisite 
and  better  exercised  in  order  to  distinguish  it  thereby  from 
a  polygon  which  had  one  side  less.  But  the  knowledge  of 
figures  no  more  than  that  of  numbers  depends  upon  the  imag- 
ination, although  it  is  of  service  therein ;  and  a  mathematician 
can  know  exactly  the  nature  of  a  nonagon  and  a  decagon, 
because  he  has  the  means  of  making  and  examining  them, 
though  he  could  not  discern  them  at  sight.  It  is  true  that  a 
workman  or  an  engineer,  who  does  not  perhaps  know  their 
nature  sufficiently,  can  have  this  advantage  beyond  a  great 
geometer  that  he  can  discern  them  by  sight  only  without 
measuring  them,  as  there  are  some  street-porters^  (faqtiins)  or 
pedlers,  who  will  state  the  weight  of  what  they  are  to  carry 
within  a  pound,  in  which  respect  they  will  surpass  the  most 
skilful  statistician  in  the  world.  It  is  true  that  ^  this  empiri- 
cal knowledge  acquired  by  a  long  practice  may  be  very  useful 
for  prompt  action,  such  as  an  engineer  very  often  needs  to 
perform  because  of  the  danger  to  which  he  is  exposed  in 
delaying.     But  this  clear  image  or  this  feeling  which  we  may 

1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "  faquins  on,"  tlie  rearliii.ijof  Gerhardt.  —  Tr. 
-  Erdmanu  aud  Jacques  omit:  "  II  est  vray  que,"  the  reading  of  Gerhardt. 
—  Tr. 


27-t  LEIBNITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

have  of  a  regular  decagon  or  of  a  weight  of  ninety-nine  pounds 
consists  only  in  a  confused  idea,  since  it  is  of  no  avail  in  dis- 
covering the  nature  and  properties  of  this  weight  or  of  this 
regular  decagon,  which  demands  a  distinct  idea.  And  this 
example  conduces  to  the  better  understanding  of  the  differ- 
ence of  ideas,  or  rather  that  of  the  idea  and  the  image.] 

§  15.^  Fh.  Another  example  :  We  are  led  to  believe  that  we 
have  a  positive  and  complete  idea  of  eternity,  which  is  as 
much  as  to  say  that  there  is  no  part  of  that  duration  which 
is  not  clearly  known  in  our  idea ;  but,  however  great  may  be 
the  duration  that  is  represented,  as  it  is  a  question  of  an 
extension  without  limits,  there  always  remains  a  part  of  the 
idea  beyond  what  is  represented  which  continues  obscure  and 
undetermined;  and  thence  it  comes  that,  in  discussions  and 
reasonings  concerning  eternity  or  any  other  infinite,  we  are 
apt  to  involve  ourselves  in  manifest  absurdities. 

Th.  [This  example  does  not  appear  to  me  to  square  with 
your  design  either ;  but  it  is  very  appropriate  to  mine,  which 
is  to  disabuse  you  of  your  notions  on  this  point.  For 
the  same  confusion  of  the  image  with  the  idea  reigns  here. 
We  have  a  complete  or  just  idea  of  eternity,  since  we  have  a 
definition  of  it,  although  we  have  no  image  of  it.  But  the 
idea  of  the  infinite  is  not  formed  by  the  composition  of  parts, 
and  the  errors  which  we  meet  in  reasoning  upon  the  infinite 
do  not  arise  from  the  defect  of  the  image.-] 

§  16.^  Pit.  But  is  it  not  true  that  when  we  speak  of  the 
infinite  divisibility  of  matter,  although  we  have  clear  ideas  of 
the  division,  we  have  only  very  obscure  and  very  confused 
ideas   of  the   parts  ?     "For  I  ask  whether  a  man  taking  the 

1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  have  §  25.  Gerhardt  aud  Locke,  Philos.  Works, 
Vol.  1,  p.  505  (Bolm's  ed.),  have  §  15.— Tr. 

■^  The  difficulties  and  errors  in  the  discussion  of  the  infinite  arise  not  "  from 
the  defect  of  the  image"  but  from  the  attempt  to  imagine  or  picture  that 
which  can  only  he  thought.  We  can  think  the  infinite  and  absolute,  but  we 
cannot  form  an  adequate  image  or  picture  of  it.  The  "  confusion  of  the  image 
witli  tlie  idea,"  whicli  Leibnitz  here  speaks  of,  is  one  of  the  causes  vitiating 
much  of  the  "  reasoning  upon  the  infinite  "  in  the  history  of  thought,  and 
lying  at  the  basis  of  all  theories,  like  those  of  Hamilton,  Mansel,  and  Spencer, 
which  maintain  the  impossibility  on  man's  part  of  a  knowledge  of  the  infinite. 
(Jf.  John  Caird,  An  Introduction  to  the  Philos.  of  Religion,  p.  36.  New  York: 
Macmillan  &  Co.,  1880.  — Tr. 

3  So  Gerhardt  and  Locke;  Philos.  Works  (Bohn's  ed.),  Vol.  1,  p.  505;  Erd- 
mann has  §  18 ;  Jacques  §  30.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XXX]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  275 

smallest  atom  of  dust  he  ever  saw  has  any  distinct  idea 
of  the  difference  between  the  one  hundred  thousandth  ^  and 
the  millionth  part  of  this  atom  ? 

Th.  It  is  the  same  qui  pro  quo  of  the  image  for  the  idea, 
which  I  am  astonished  to  see  so  confused.  The  possession  of 
an  image  of  so  great  a  smallness  is  not  at  all  the  question. 
It  is  impossible  according  to  the  present  constitution  of 
our  body,  and  if  we  could  have  it,  it  would  be  much  the  same 
as  that  of  those  things  which  noAV  appear  to  us  apperceplible  ; 
but  in  compensation  what  is  now  the  object  of  our  imagination 
would  escape  us  and  become  too  great  to  be  imagined.  Size 
has  no  images  in  itself,  and  those  which  it  has  depend  only 
upon  comparison  with  the  organs  and  other  objects,  and  it  is 
useless  here  to  employ  imagination.  Thus  it  appears  by  all 
that  you,  sir,  have  said  to  me  here  that  you  are  ingenious 
in  devising  difficulties  without  reason,  in  demanding  more 
than  is  necessary.] 


CHAPTEE  XXX 

OF   REAL    AKD    FANTASTICAL    IDEAS 

§  1.  Ph.  Ideas  in  relation  to  things  are  real  or  fantastical, 
adequate  or  inadequate,  true  or  false.  By  real  ideas  I  under- 
stand those  which  have  a  foundation  in  nature,  and  which  are 
conformed  to  a  real  being,  to  the  existence  of  things,  or  to 
their  archetypes ;  otherwise  they  are  fantastic  or  chimerical. 

Th.  [There  is  a  little  obscurity  in  this  explication.  The 
idea  may  have  a  foundation  in  nature,  without  being  con- 
formed to  this  foundation,  as  when  we  maintain  that  the  per- 
ceptions we  have  of  color  and  heat  do  not  resemble  any  orig- 
inal or  archetype.  An  idea  is  also  real  when  it  is  possible, 
although  no  existing  being  corresponds  thereto.  Otherwise 
if  all  the  individuals  of  a  species  were  lost,  the  idea  of  the 
species  would  become  chimerical.] 

§  2.  Fh.  Simple  ideas  are  all  real,  for,  although  [according 
to  many]  whiteness  and  coldness  are  no  more  in  snow  than  is 
pain,  yet  their  ideas  are  in  us  as  effects  of  powers  connected 
1  Erdmauu  and  Jacques  read ;  "la  10,000iiie  et  l;i  l(K)()nie."  —  Tit. 


27G  LELBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk.  ii 

■with  external  things,  and  these  constant  effects  serve  us  in 
distinguishing  things  as  much  as  if  they  were  exact  images  of 
that  which  exists  in  the  things  themselves. 

Th.  [1  have  examined  this  point  above :  but  it  appears 
thereby  that  you  do  not  always  demand  a  conformity  to  an 
archetype,  and,  according  to  the  opinion  (which,  hoAvever,  I  do 
not  approve)  of  those  who  think  that  God  has  arbitrarily 
assigned  us  ideas,  destined  to  mark  the  qualities  of  objects 
without  any  resemblance  or  even  natural  relation,  there  would 
be  also  in  that  case  less  conformity  between  our  ideas  and 
the  archetypes  than  there  is  between  the  words  which  we  use 
by  institution  in  language  and  the  ideas,  or  the  things  them- 
selves. ] 

§  3.  Ph.  The  mind  is  passive  as  regards  its  simple  ideas; 
but  the  combinations  it  makes  of  them  to  form  complex  ideas, 
where  many  simple  ideas  are  comprised  under  one  and  the 
same  name,  have  somewhat  of  the  volitional  element ;  for  one 
man  admits  into  the  complex  ideas  he  has  of  gold  or  of 
justice  simple  ideas  which  another  does  not  admit. 

Til.  [The  mind  is,  however,  active  in  reference  to  simple 
ideas  when  it  detaches  them  one  from  another  to  consider 
them  separately,  —  an  act  which  is  voluntary  as  well  as  the 
combination  of  many  ideas ;  whether  it  is  done  to  call  atten- 
tion to  a  complex  idea  resulting  therein,  or  whether  it  is  the 
purpose  to  comprehend  them  under  the  name  given  to  the 
combination.  And  the  mind  cannot  be  deceived  therein  pro- 
vided it  does  not  unite  incompatible  ideas  and  provided  this 
name  is  still  virginal,  so  to  speak,  that  is  to  say,  a  name  to 
which  some  notion  has  not  already  been  attached,  which  might 
cause  confusion  with  that  which  is  newly  attached  thereto,  and 
make  arise  either  impossible  notions  by  joining  together  what 
cannot  take  place,  or  notions  superfluous  and  containing  some 
ohreption,^  by  joining  ideas,  one  of  which  may  and  ought  to 
be  derived  from  the  other  by  demonstration.] 

§  4.  Ph.  Mixed  modes  and  relations  having  no  other  reality 
than  that  which  they  have  in  men^s  minds,  all  that  is  requisite 
to  make  these  sorts  of  ideas  real  is  the  possibility  of  existence 
or  of  compatibility  together. 

Th.    \_Relations   have  a  reality  dependent   upon   the  mind 

1  I.e.  Concealment  of  the  truth.  —  Tr. 


en.  xxx]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  277 

like  truths ;  but  not  the  mind  of  men,  since  there  is  a  supreme 
intelligence  which  determines  them  all  for  all  time.  Mixed 
modes,  which  are  distinct  from  relations,  may  be  real  acci- 
dents. But  be  they  dependent  or  not  dependent  upon  the 
mind,  it  suffices  for  the  reality  of  their  ideas  that  these  modes 
be  x>ossible  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  distinctly  intelligible. 
And  for  this  result  it  is  necessary  that  their  ingredients  be 
com2JOSsible,  i.e.  capable  of  existing  together.] 

§  5.  Ph.  But  the  complex  ideas  of  substances,  as  they  are 
all  formed  in  relation  to  things  existing  outside  of  us,  and 
as  representative  of  substances  such  as  really  exist,  are  real 
only  so  far  as  they  are  combinations  of  simple  ideas  really 
both  united  and  coexisting  in  things  coexisting  without  us. 
On  the  contrary  those  are  chimerical  ^  which  are  composed  of 
such  collections  of  simple  ideas  as  have  never  been  really 
united  and  found  together  in  any  substance  ;  like  those  which 
form  a  centaur,  a  body  resembling  gold,  save  in  weight,  and 
lighter  than  water,  a  body  similar  in  relation  to  the  senses, 
but  endowed  with  perception,  voluntary  movement,  etc. 

Th.  [If  I  take  in  this  manner  the  terms  real  and  chimeri- 
cal otherwise  in  relation  to  the  ideas  of  the  modes  than  in 
relation  to  those  which  form  a  substance,  I  do  not  see  what 
common  notion  in  each  case  you  give  to  real  or  chimerical 
ideas ;  for  the  modes  are  real  to  you  when  they  are  possible, 
and  substances  have  real  ideas  with  you  only  when  they 
are  existent.  But  in  desiring  to  tally  with  existence,  we 
can  determine  but  little  whether  an  idea  is  chimerical  or 
not,  because  what  is  possible,  although  not  found  in  our 
place  or  time,  may  have  existed  formerly  or  will  perhaps 
some  day  exist,  or  may  indeed  be  found  already  present  in 
another  world,  or  even  in  ours  without  our  knowing  it,  like 
the  idea  which  Democritus  had  of  the  Milky  Way  ^  which  the 
telescopes  have  verified :  so  that  it  seems  better  to  say  that 
possible  ideas  only  become  chimerical  when  we  attach  to  them 
without  foundation  the  idea  of  effective  existence,  as  those  do 
who  promise  themselves  the  philosopher's  stone  or,  as  those 

1  Locke  lias:  "  fantastical,"  P/ii'tos.  Works,  Yol.  1,  p.  510  (Pxiliii's  ed.). — 
Til. 

2  Of.  Aristotle,  Meteorolof/ica.  Bk.  I.,  chap.  8,  345a,  25:  "Tlie  Milky  Way 
is  the  lij^ht  of  certain  stars."  Zeller,  Die  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  .'?d  ed.,  Vol.  1, 
p.  724,  note  1 ;  5th  ed.,  18<.)2,  I.  2  [Vol.  2] ,  p.  8<)7,  note  8.  —  Tr. 


278  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

would  do  who  should  believe  that  there  had  been  a  nation 
of  centaurs.  Otherwise  in  not  regulating  ourselves  by  exist- 
ence we  shall  deviate  unnecessarily  from  the  received  language, 
which  does  not  allow  us  to  say  that  he  who  speaks  in  winter 
of  roses  or  pinks  speaks  of  a  chimera,  unless  he  imagines  he  is 
able  to  find  them  in  his  garden,  as  the  story  is  told  of  Albert 
the  Great  ^  or  of  some  other  pretended  Magician.] 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

OF    ADEQUATE^   AXD    IISTADEQUATE    IDEAS 

§  1.  Ph.  Real  ideas  are  complete  when  they  represent  per- 
fectly the  originals  whence  the  mind  supposes  them  to  be 
taken,  which  they  represent,  and  to  which  it  refers  them. 
Incomplete  ideas  rej^resent  only  a  part  of  these  originals. 
§  2.  All  our  simple  ideas  are  complete.  The  idea  of  white- 
ness or  of  sweetness,  which  is  noticed  in  sugar,  is  complete, 
because  it  suffices  for  this, — that  it  corresponds  entirely  to  the 
powers  that  God  has  put  into  this  body  to  produce  these 
sensations. 

Th.  [I  see,  sir,  that  you  call  complete  or  incomplete  ideas 
those  which  your  favorite  author  calls  idecie  adoiquatce  aut 
inadcequatce ;  you  might  call  them  'perfect  or  imperfect.  I 
have  sometimes  defined  idea  adcequata  (a  pe?/eci  idea)  as  that 
which  is  so  distinct  that  all  its  ingredients  are  distinct,  and 
such  is  nearly  the  idea  of  a  number.  But  when  an  idea  is 
distinct  and  contains  the  definition  or  the  reciprocal  marks 
of  the  object,  it  may  be  inadcequata  or  imperfect,  viz. :  when 

1  Albertus  Magniis,  119.3-1280.  Scliaarschmidt  states  that  "  like  many  other 
scholars  of  those  dark  centuries  (Michael  Scotus,  Roger  Bacon,  etc.)  he  was 
suspected  of  Magic,"  and  adds  that  "  Trithemius  in  particular,  who,  moreover, 
takes  the  philosopher  into  his  protection,  gives  an  account  thereof  in  his  An- 
nales Hirsaugienaes,  Vol.  2,  p.  40.  Naude  in  his  Apologie  des  Grands  Hommes 
Soupconnes  de  Mac/ie,  chap.  18,  Bayle  in  his  Bictionary,  sSe  under  Albert 
Le  Grand,  and  Brucker.  Hist.  PhUosophife,  3,  793  sq.,  have  likewise  defended 
him."  On  his  life  and  philosophy,  cf.  Erdmann,  Gruridrlss  d.  Gesch.  d. 
Philos.^^  199-202,  Vol.  1,  pp.  356  s^.,  and  English  translation  of  same;  also 
Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  MitUdalters,  Vol.  2,"^pp.  3.52  sq.,  §§  101-119.  — Tr. 

^Locke's  title;  the  French  might  be  rendered  "  complete  and  incomplete," 
as  in  the  text.  —  Tb. 


CH.  XXXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  279 

these  marks  or  these  ingredients  are  not  also  all  distinctly 
known ;  for  example,  gold  is  a  metal  which  resists  the  cupel 
and  aqua  fortis ;  it  is  a  distinct  idea,  for  it  gives  the  marks 
or  the  definition  of  gold;  but  it  is  not  perfect  for  the  nature 
of  cupellation  and  the  working  of  aqua  fortis  is  not  sufficiently 
known  to  us.  Whence  it  comes  that,  when  there  is  only  an 
imperfect  idea,  the  same  subject  is  susceptible  of  many  defini- 
tions independent  the  one  of  the  other,  so  that  we  cannot 
always  derive  one  from  the  other  nor  see  beforehand  that  they 
must  belong  to  one  and  the  same  subject,  and  then  experience 
alone  teaches  us  that  they  all  belong  to  it  at  once.  Thus  gold 
may  still  be  defined  as  the  heaviest  of  our  bodies,  or  the  most 
malleable,  without  speaking  of  other  definitions  which  might 
be  invented.  But  we  shall  be  able  to  see  why  it  belongs 
to  the  heaviest  of  metals  to  resist  these  two  tests  of  the  assay- 
ers  only  when  men  shall  have  penetrated  farther  into  the 
nature  of  things ;  whilst  in  geometry,  where  we  have  perfect 
ideas,  the  case  is  different,  for  we  can  prove  that  the  sec- 
tions of  the  cone  and  of  the  cylinder,  made  by  a  plane,  are  the 
same,  viz.  ellipses,  and  this  cannot  be  unknown  to  us,  if  we 
take  notice  of  it,  because  the  notions  we  have  of  them  are 
perfect.  With  me  the  division  of  ideas  into  perfect  and  im- 
perfect is  only  a  sub-division  of  distinct  ideas,  and  it  appears 
to  me  that  only  the  confused  ideas,  like  that  we  have  of  sweet- 
ness, of  which  you,  sir,  speak,  deserve  this  name ;  for  although 
they  express  the  power  which  produces  the  sensation,  they 
do  not  express  it  wholly,  or  at  least  we  cannot  know  this,  for 
if  we  comprehended  what  is  in  this  idea  of  sweetness  we  have 
we  could  judge  whether  it  is  sufficient  as  a  rational  expression 
of  all  that  experience  causes  us  to  notice  therein.] 

§  3.  Fh.  From  simple  ideas  let  us  come  to  the  complex; 
they  are  either  of  modes  or  of  substances.  Those  of  modes 
are  the  voluntary  collections  of  simple  ideas  which  the  mind 
puts  together  without  regard  to  certain  archetypes  or  real  and 
actually  existing  models ;  they  are  complete  and  cannot  be 
otherwise,  because  not  being  copies  but  archetypes,  which  the 
mind  forms  in  order  to  avail  itself  of  them  in  laiiking  things 
under  certain  denominations,  they  can  lack  nothing,  because 
each  includes  such  a  combination  of  ideas  as  the  ndnd  has 
desired  to  form,  and  consequently  such    perfection  as  it  had 


280  LEIBMTZ'S   CIIITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

})liuiiied  to  give  thereto,  and  we  cannot  conceive  that  the 
understanding  of  any  one  can  have  a  more  complete  or  more 
perfect  idea  of  a  triangle  than  that  of  a  figure  of  three  sides 
and  three  angles.  He  who  put  together  the  ideas  of  danger, 
of  execution,  of  the  trouble  that  fear  produces,  of  a  calm  con- 
sideration of  what  it  would  be  reasonable  to  do,  and  of  an 
actual  application  to  its  execution  without  being  frightened 
by  the  danger,  formed  the  idea  of  courage,  and  had  what  he 
desired,  viz. :  a  complete  idea  conformed  to  his  good  pleasure. 
It  is  otherwise  in  our  ideas  of  substances  in  which  we  main- 
tain that  which  really  exists. 

Th.  [The  idea  of  triangle  or  of  courage  has  its  archet3qDe  in 
the  possibility  of  things  as  well  as  the  idea  of  gold.  And  it  is 
a  matter  of  indifference,  so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  idea 
is  concerned,  whether  it  was  invented  in  advance  of  experi- 
ence, or  whether  it  was  retained  after  the  perception  of  a 
combination  which  nature  had  made.  Combination  also, 
which  produces  the  modes,  is  not  wholly  voluntary  or  arbi- 
trary, for  we  can  put  together  what  is  incompatible,  as  those 
do  who  invent  machines  for  perpetual  motion,  while  others 
can  invent  those  which  are  good  and  practicable  which  have 
no  other  archetypes  with  us  than  the  idea  of  the  inventor 
which  has  as  its  archetype  the  possibility  of  things  or  the 
divine  idea.  Now  these  machines  are  substances.  We  can 
also  invent  impossible  modes,  as  "uhen  we  maintain  the 
parallelism  of  parabolas,  by  imagining  that  we  can  find  two 
parabolas  parallel  to  each  other,  like  two  straight  lines  or 
two  circles.  An  idea,  then,  whether  it  be  that  of  a  mode,  or 
that  of  a  substance,  may  be  complete  or  incomplete  according 
as  we  understand  well  or  ill  the  partial  ideas  which  form  the 
total  idea  :  and  it  is  a  mark  of  a  perfect  idea  when  it  makes 
known  perfectly  the  possibility  of  the  object.] 


cii.  xxxiii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  281 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

OF  TRUE  AND  FALSE  IDEAS 

§  1.  Ph.  As  truth  ^  or  falsehood  belongs  only  to  proposi- 
tions,^ it  follows  that  when  ideas  are  termed  true  or  false 
there  is  some  tacit  proposition  or  affirmation;  §  3.  or  a  tacit 
assumption  of  their  conformity  to  something,  §  5.  above  all 
with  what  others  designate  by  this  name  (as  when  they  speak 
of  justice)  item  to  what  really  exists  (as  man  exists  but  not 
the  centaur)  item  to  the  essence,  upon  which  depend  the  prop- 
erties of  the  thing ;  and  in  this  sense  our  ordinary  ideas  of 
substances  are  false  when  we  think  of  certain  substantial 
forms.  Besides,  ideas  deserve  rather  to  be  called  accurate 
or  faulty,  than  true  or  false. 

Th.  I  believe  that  true  or  false  ideas  might  be  so  under- 
stood, but  as  these  different  senses  do  not  agree  between  them- 
selves and  cannot  be  conveniently  ranked  under  a  common 
notion,  I  prefer  to  call  the  ideas  true  or  false  in  relation  to 
another  tacit  affirmation  which  they  all  include,  which  is  that 
of  possibility.     Thus  possible  ideas  are  trxie,  impossible /aZse.] 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

OF    THE    ASSOCIATION    OF    IDEAS 

§  1.  Ph.  We  often  notice  something  odd  in  the  reasonings 
of  people,  and  everybody  is  subject  to  this.  §  2.  It  is  not 
alone  obstinacy  or  self-love ;  for  often  people  who  are  well 
disposed  are  guilty  of  this  fault.     It  does  not  indeed  suffice  to 

1  Cf.  Nev)  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  5.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Aristotle  De  Anima,  III.  0,430'^,  27,  and  E.  Wallace,  Aristotle's  Psychol- 
Of/y  in  Greek  and  English,  loith  Introduction  and  Notes,  pp.  KiO,  101,  Cam- 
bridge: University  Press,  1882;  also  De  Interj)ret.  1,  Ki'',  12,  and  E.  Wallace, 
Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  .3d  ed.,  §  11,  p.  27.  For  Leibnitz,  tbe  true 
is  the  thinkable,  i.e.  that  whicli  is  free  from  contradiction  in  itself  and  of 
other  truth.  Thought-necessity  is  his  criterion  of  possibility  and  of  truth. — 
Tr. 


282  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  n 


attribute  it  to  education  and  to  prejudice.  §  4.  It  is  rather 
a  kind  of  madness,  and  Ave  should  be  foolish  if  we  should 
always  act  thus.  §  5.  This  fault  arises  from  a  non-natural 
connection  of  ideas,  which  has  its  origin  in  chance  or  custom. 
§  6.  Inclination  and  interest  enter  into  it.  Certain  tracts  of 
the  repeated  course  of  animal  spirits  become  beaten  roads ; 
Avhen  we  know  ^  a  certain  air,  we  find  it  as  soon  as  we  begin 
it.  §  7.  Thence  arise  the  sympathies  or  antipathies  which 
are  not  born  with  us.  A  child  has  eaten  too  much  honey  and 
has  been  surfeited  by  it,  and  then  having  become  a  full-grown 
man,  he  cannot  hear  the  name  honey  without  a  rising  of  the 
stomach.  §  8.  Children  are  very  susceptible  to  these  impres- 
sions, and  it  is  well  to  be  careful  of  them.  §  9.  This  irregu- 
lar association  of  ideas  has  a  great  influence  in  all  our  actions 
and  passions  natural  and  moral.  §  10.  Darkness  revives  the 
idea  of  ghosts  in  children  because  of  the  stories  told  them 
about  them.  §  11.  You  do  not  think  of  a  man  whom  you 
hate  without  thinking  of  the  evil  he  has  done  or  may  do. 
§  12.  You  shun  the  room  in  which  you  have  seen  a  friend  die. 
§  13.  A  mother  w^ho  has  lost  a  very  dear  child  sometimes 
loses  with  it  all  her  joy,  until  time  effaces  the  impression 
of  this  idea,  which  sometimes  never  ^  happens.  §  14.  A  man 
perfectly  cured  of  madness  by  an  extremely  painful  operation 
acknowledged  all  his  life  his  obligation  to  the  one  who  per- 
formed this  operation ;  but  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
endure  the  sight  of  the  operator.  §  15.  Some  hate  books  all 
their  life  because  of  the  bad  treatment  they  received  in  school. 
Some  one  having  once  gotten  the  upper  hand  of  another  upon 
some  occasion  keeps  it  always.  §  16.  A  man  was  found 
who  had  learned  to  dance  finely,  but  could  not  execute  the 
dance  unless  there  was  in  the  room  a  trunk  like  the  one 
which  had  been  in  the  room  where  he  had  learned.  §  17. 
The  same  non-natural  bond  is  found  in  the  intellectual  habits ; 
you  bind  matter  to  being,  as  if  there  were  nothing  immaterial. 
§  18.  The  sectarian  party  in  philosophy,  religion,  and  the 
state  is  attached  to  its  opinions. 

Th.    [This  remark  is  important  and  wholly  to  my  taste,  and 
can  be  fortified  by  an  infinite  number  of  examples.     Descartes 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "salt";  Erdmann  and  .Jacques:  "suit,"  follow.  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads :  "jamais";  Erdmann  and  Jacques :  "pas." — Tr. 


CH.  xxxiri]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  283 

having  had  in  his  youth  some  affection  for  a  squint-eyed  per- 
son could  not  prevent  himself  from  having  all  his  life  an  incli- 
nation towards  those  who  had  this  defect.  Hobbes,  another 
great  philosopher,  could  not  (they  say)  remain  alone  in  a 
dark  place,  without  having  his  mind  frightened  by  images  of 
ghosts,  although  he  did  not  believe  in  them,  this  impression 
having  remained  from  the  stories  told  to  children.  Many 
persons  well  informed  and  sensible,  and  who  are  decidedly 
superior  to  superstition,  cannot  bring  themselves  to  be  thir- 
teen at  a  repast  without  being  extremely  disconcerted,  having 
sometime  been  impressed  by  the  fancy  that  one  of  them  must 
die  during  the  year.  There  was  a  gentleman  who,  having 
been  injured,  perhaps  in  his  infancy,  by  a  badly  fastened  pin, 
could  not  see  one  in  this  condition  without  being  ready  to  fall 
into  a  swoon.  A  prime  minister,  who  bore  in  the  court  of  his 
master  the  name  of  President,  was  offended  by  the  title  of  the 
book  of  Ottavio  Pisani,  called  Lycurgus,  and  wrote  against  this 
book,  because  the  author,  in  speaking  of  the  officers  of  justice 
whom  he  thought  superfluous,  had  named  also  the  Presidents, 
and  although  this  term  in  the  person  of  this  minister  meant  a 
totally  different  thing,  he  had  so  attached  the  word  to  his 
person  that  he  was  wounded  in  this  word.  And  this  is  a  case 
of  the  most  usual  of  the  non-natural  associations,  capable  of 
misleading,  as  those  of  words  to  things,  when  indeed  there  is 
any  ambiguity.  In  order  the  better  to  understand  the  source 
of  the  non-natural  bond  of  ideas,  you  must  consider  what  I 
have  already  said  above  (Chap.  11,  §  11^),  in  speaking  of  the 
reasonings  of  animals,  that  man  as  well  as  the  animal  is 
inclined  to  put  together  in  his  memory  and  imagination  what 
he  has  observed  united  in  his  perceptions  and  experience.  It 
is  in  this  that  all  the  reasoning,  if  so  it  may  be  called,  of 
animals  consists,  and  often  that  of  men,  so  far  as  they  are 
empirical  and  govern  themselves  only  by  the  senses  and 
examples,  without  examining  whether  the  same  reason  still 
has  force.  And  as  often  the  reasons  are  unknown  to  us,  we  must 
have  regard  to  the  examples  in  proportion  to  their  frequency, 
for  then  the  expectation  or  the  reminiscence  of  one  perception 

1  Of.  ante,  p.  145.  Gerhardt  has  §  1 ;  Erdmaiiii  aiul  Ja<!ques  §  11 ;  the  latter 
reference  is  the  correct  one,  and  has  therefore  been  phiced  in  the  text  of  the 
translation.  —  Tk. 


284  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ii 

on  the  occasion'  of  another  perception  which  is  ordinarily 
connected  therewith  is  reasonable ;  particularly  when  the 
question  is  about  taking  precautions.  But  as  the  vehemence 
of  a  very  strong  impression  often  produces  as  much  effect 
at  once  as  the  frequency  and  repetition  of  many  moderate 
impressions  would  be  able  to  make  in  a  long  time,  it  happens 
that  this  vehemence  engraves  upon  the  fancy  an  image  as 
profound  and  as  vivid  as  long  experience.^  Whence  it  comes 
that  a  chance  but  violent  impression  unites  in  our  imagination 
and  memory  two  ideas,  at  that  time  together  there,^  altogether 
as  strongly  and  durably  and  gives  us  the  same  inclination  to 
connect  them  and  to  attend  to  them  one  after  the  other,  as  if  a 
long  usage  had  verified  the  connection ;  thus  the  same  result 
of  association  is  found,  although  the  same  reason  does  not 
exist.  Authority,  party,'*  custom,  produce  also  the  same  effect 
as  experience  and  reason,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  deliver  one's 
self  from  these  inclinations.  But  it  would  not  be  very 
difficult  to  keep  one's  self  from  being  deceived  in  these  judg- 
ments, if  men  would  attach  themselves  seriously  enough  to 
the  search  for  truth,  or  proceed  methodically,  when  they 
recognize  that  it  is  important  to  them  to  find  it.] 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "d'une  perception  a  I'occasion,"  which  Erdmann  and 
Jacques  omit.  —  Tr. 

2  Erdmann  and  Jacques  add :  "  auroit  pu  le  faire,"  could  have  done.  —  Tr. 

3  Gerhardt  reads :  "  qui  y  estoient  ensemble  alors,  tout  aussi  fortement  et 
durableraeut;  et  nous  donue,"  etc.  Erdmann  and  Jacques,  "  qui  deja  y 
e'taient  ensemble,  et  nous  donne,"  etc.  —  Tr. 

*  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit :  "  le  parti."  —  Tr, 


NEW  ESSAYS  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING 


Book  111. — Words 
CHAPTER   I 

OF   WORDS    OR    LANGUAGE    IN    GENERAL 

§  1.  Ph.  God  having  made  man  to  be  a  social  being,  has  not 
only  inspired  him  with  the  desire,  and  placed  him  under  the 
necessity  of  living  with  those  of  his  species,  but  has  given 
him  also  the  faculty  of  speech  which  is  to  be  the  great  instru- 
ment and  common  bond  of  this  society.  Hence  it  is  that 
words  arise,  which  serve  to  represent  and  also  to  explain 
ideas. 

Th.  [T  rejoice  to  see  that  you  are  averse  to  the  view  of 
Hobbes,^  who  did  not  admit  that  man  was  made  for  society, 

1  Thomas  Hobbes,  1588-1679,  in  his  De  Cive,  1642,  and  Leviathan,  1051, 
maintained  that  man,  being  by  nature  a  selfish  and  solitary  animal,  had  no 
natural  impulse  for  society,  and  that  social  union  sprang  simply  from  fear 
and  from  motives  of  gain,  the  natural  condition  being  that  of  universal  war. 
Leibnitz  maintains,  in  agreement  with  Aristotle  and  Hugo  Grotius,  1583-1645, 
that  Nature  herself  has  destined  man  for  society  in  order  not  only  that  he 
may  the  better  and  more  easily  realize  his  highest  being,  but  that  he  may 
realize  it  at  all,  such  realization  being  impossible  in  isolation  and  solitude. 

Cf.  Aristotle,  Polit.  I.,  2,  1253^,  2:  on  tmv  (|>uo-ei  17  n-dAis  icni,  Kai  on  ovSpooTTOs  (f)ii<Tfi. 
TToAiTi/cbi'  fuSoi';  III.,  6,  1278*^,  19:  <j>v<Tei.  fxev  eariv  avepM^o:;  fuoi/  TroAtTiKor,  Sio  Kai 
Ix-qSev  Seofj.ei'oi  rfj?  Trap'  aAAijAoii'  PorjOeia^  ovk  eXarrov  opiyoi'Tai  toC  o-kcTt"',  English  trans- 
lation by  B.  Jowett,  Vol.  1,  pp.  4,  78,  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1885;  also  FAh. 

NiC.  IX.,  9,  1169'^,  3  sq.,  espec.  16-19:  arouov  6'  itroj?  Kai  t6  fioi'tiirrtv  TTOieij'  Toi' 
lxa.Ka.pioV  oiifle'i?  yap  cAoit'  af  KaB'  avTov  Ta  ttolvt'  exeiv  ayada.'   ttoAitikoi'  yap  o  ai'Bponro^ 

Ka.\  a-v^^v  ne<l>vK6^^  J.,  1,  1094*',  6  sq.,  English  translation  by  F.  H.  Peters,  pp.  307 
sq.,3;  cf.  also  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Grieclu,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  pp'.  680,  ()62,  3d  ed.,  1879. 
Grotius,  De,  Jure  Belli  et  Pan's,  1625,  Preliminary  Discourse,  §  6:  "Amongst 
the  things  peculiar  to  man,  is  his  desire  of  society,  that  is,  a  certain  inclination 
to  live  with  those  of  his  own  kind,  not  in  any  manner  whatever,  but  peace- 

285 


280  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

conceiving  that  he  has  been  forced  into  it  by  necessity  and  by 
the  wickedness  of  those  of  his  species.  But  he  did  not  con- 
sider that  the  best  men,  free  from  all  wickedness,  united  them- 
selves the  better  to  obtain  their  purposes,  as  the  birds  flock 
together  the  better  to  travel  in  company,  and  the  beavers  unite 
in  large  numbers  to  make  great  dams,  in  which  work  a  small 
number  of  these  animals  could  not  succeed ;  and  these  dams 
are  necessary  to  them,  to  provide  reservoirs  of  water  or  little 
lakes,  in  which  they  build  their  huts  and  catch  the  fish  upon 
which  they  feed.  This  then  is  the  foundation  of  the  society 
of  the  animals  which  are  adapted  to  it,  and  nowise  the  fear  of 
their  kind,  which  is  rarely  found  among  animals.] 

Ph.  Very  true,  and  it  is  the  better  to  cultivate  this  society 
that  man  by  nature  has  his  organs  so  fashioned  that  they  are 
adapted  to  the  formation  of  the  articulate  sounds  which  we 
call  tvords. 

Th.  [As  for  organs,  monkeys  have  them  apparently  as  suit- 
able as  ours  for  the  formation  of  words,  but  they  do  not  take 
the  least  step  in  this  direction.^  Thus  it  must  be  that  they 
lack  an  invisible  something.     We  must  also  consider  that  we 

ably,  and  in  a  community  re.arnlated  according  to  the  best  of  his  understand- 
ing, which  disposition  the  Stoicks  termed  olKeioxrt?  " ;  quoted  from  English 
translation  with  "all  the  large  notes  of  Mr.  J.  Barbeyrac,"  etc.,  London: 
Printed  for  W.  Innj-s  and  R.  Manby,  and  others,  1738.  A  French  translation 
by  Jean  Barbeyrac,  professor  of  law  at  Grouingen,  "with  the  author's  notes 
which  had  not  3-et  appeared  in  French,  and  new  notes  by  the  translator," 

2  vols.,  4to,  Amsterdam,  1724;  a  later  translation  into  English  by  Whewell, 

3  vols.,  8vo,  Cambridge,  1853 ;  a  German  translation  in  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmaun's 
Philos.  Bibliothek,  3  vols.,  12mo,  Leipzig,  1879. 

In  the  formation  of  society,  language  —  Adyo?,  rational  speech  —  plays  an 
important  part,  serving  as  a  special  means  of  communication  between  men. 
Cf.  Aristotle,  Polit.l.,  2-18,  1253'';  Grotius,  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads,  Prelim. 
Disc.  §  7:  "A  man  grown  up  .  .  .  has  besides  an  exquisite  desire  of  society, 
for  the  satisfaction  of  which  he  alone  of  all  animals  has  received  from  nature 
a  peculiar  instrument,  viz.  the  use  of  speech."  —  Tr. 

1  Schaarschmidt  states  that  "this  earlier  generally  diffused  view,  that  the 
apes  had  organs  of  speech  —  an  opinion  still  at  the  present  day  firmly  held  by 
the  negroes  —  has  already  been  refuted  by  Peter  Camper,"  1722-1789,  a  dis- 
tinguished Dutch  anatomist  and  naturalist,  in  his  Natuurkxindige  Verhand- 
elingen  or-er  den  Oranrf-Outanf/  an  eenirfe  nndere  Aapsoorten ;  cf.  p.  147  s<]., 
of  the  German  translation  by  J.  F.  M.  Herbell.  Diisseldorf,  1791,  4to.  The 
most  important  of  Camper's  works  bearing  on  comparative  anatomy,  trans- 
lated into  French  Ijy  H.  C.  Jansen,  were  published  in  CEwres  de  P.  Camper 
qui  ont  pour  objet  I'hiMoire  naturelle,  la  phi/siolor/ie,  et  FaJiatoitiie  compar^e. 
Paris,  1803,  3  vols.,  8vo.  The  piece  referred  to  in  this  note  is  found  in  Vol.  1 
of  thised.  — Tr. 


CH.  I]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  287 

could  sjyeak,  i.e.  make  ourselves  understood  by  the  sounds  of 
the  mouth  without  forming  articulate  sounds,  if  we  availed 
ourselves  of  musical  tones  for  this  effect ;  but  more  art  would 
be  necessary  to  invent  a  language  of  tones,  whilst  that  of 
ivords  may  have  been  formed  and  perfected  gradually  by  per- 
sons who  found  themselves  in  a  state  of  natural  simplicity. 
There  are,  however,  people  like  the  Chinese,  who  by  means  of 
tones  and  accents  vary  their  words,  of  which  they  have  only  a 
small  number.  Thus  it  was  the  opinion  of  Golius,^  a  cele- 
brated mathematician  and  great  linguist,  that  their  language  is 
artiiicial,  i.e.  had  been  invented  all  at  once  by  some  clever  man 
in  order  to  establish  verbal  intercourse  between  the  large  num- 
ber of  different  nations  inhabiting  this  great  country  which 
we  call  China,  although  this  language  may  now  be  found 
altered  by  long  use.] 

§  2.  Ph.  [As  orang-outangs  and  other  monkeys  have  organs 
without  forming  words,  we  can  say  that  parrots  and  some 
other  birds  have  words  without  language],  for  we  can  train 
these  birds  and  many  others  to  form  sounds  quite  distinct ; 
but  they  are  nowise  capable  of  language.  Man  only  is  in  a 
condition  to  avail  himself  of  these  sounds  as  signs  of  internal 
conceptions,  in  order  that  thereby  they  may  be  manifested  to 
others. 

Th.  [I  believe  in  fact  that  apart  from  the  desire  of  making 
ourselves  understood  we  should  never  have  formed  language  ; 
but  being  formed,  it  further  serves  man  in  reasoning  within 
himself,  both  by  the  means  words  give  him  of  remembering 
his  abstract  thoughts,  and  the  benefit  he  finds  in  availing  him- 
self in  reasoning  of  characters  and  surd  thoughts  ;  for  he 
would  require  too  much  time,  if  he  were  obliged  to  explain 
everything  and  always  to  substitute  definitions  in  the  place  of 
terms.] 

§  3.    Ph.  But  as  the  multiplication  of  words  would  produce 

1  Jacob  Gobi  — Latin,  Golius  —  159f)-lG()7,  an  eminent  Dutch  orientalist, 
who  distinguislied  himself  at  Leydeu  University  in  classics,  matliomatii^s,  and 
philosophy,  was  a  pujiil  of  Erpenius  in  Arabic,  and  in  Ki'i-l  succeeded  him  as 
professor  of  Arabic  at  Leyden.  In  1629  he  returned  from  Asia  Minor  and  tlie 
East,  where  he  had  spent  four  years,  brinj,nn,i>;  witli  him  a  largo  and  valuable 
collection  of  Mss.  which  he  placed  in  the  liljrary  of  the  university.  His  prin- 
cipal work,  still  to-day  esteemed,  is  the  Lexicon  Arabieo-Latinam,  1U53, 
folio.  —  Tu. 


288  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk. 


confusion  in  tlieir  use,  if  a  distinct  term  were  necessary  to 
designate  each  particular  thing,  hxnguage  has  been  further 
perfected  by  the  use  of  general  terms  when  they  signify  general 
ideas. 

Th.  [^General  terms  serve  not  only  for  the  perfection  of 
languages,  but  they  are  necessary  even  to  their  essential 
constitution.  For  if  hj  particular  things  we  mean  individual 
things,  it  would  be  impossible  to  speak  if  there  were  only 
proper  names  and  not  appellatives,  i.e.  if  there  were  words 
only  for  the  individuals,  since  at  every  moment  something 
now  presents  itself  (to  the  mind)  when  individuals,  accidents, 
and  particularly  acts,  which  are  most  frequently  designated, 
are  in  question.  But  if  by  particular  things  we  understand 
the  lowest  species  {species  infimce),  besides  the  fact  that  it  is 
difficult  very  often  to  determine  them,  it  is  manifest  that  they 
are  already  universals  formed  upon  similitude.  Then  as  the 
question  is  only  of  a  similitude  more  or  less  extended,  accord- 
ing as  we  speak  of  genera  or  species,  it  is  natural  to  indicate 
every  sort  of  similitude  or  agreement  and  consequently  to 
employ  general  terms  of  all  degrees  ;  and  indeed  the  most 
general  being  less  burdened  with  relation  to  the  ideas  or 
esselices  they  include,  although  they  are  more  comprehensive 
in  relation  to  the  individuals  to  which  they  apply,  were  very 
often  the  easiest  to  form  and  are  the  most  useful.  Thus  you 
see  that  children  and  those  who  know  only  little  of  the  lan- 
guage which  they  wish  to  speak,  or  of  the  matter  of  which 
they  speak,  avail  themselves  of  general  terms  as  thing,  plant, 
animal,  instead  of  employing  the  proper  terms  which  they  lack. 
And  it  is  certain  that  all  proper  or  individual  names  were 
originally  appellative  or  general.^] 

1  Leibnitz  seems  here  to  be  in  error  in  deciding  from  a  logical  or  meta- 
physical point  of  view  that  language  originated  in  or  proceeded  from  general 
terms  and  relations  rather  than  in  those  which  are  individual.  In  the  order 
of  experience  the  individual  thing  or  relation  is  first,  and  first  receives  its 
name  either  wholly  arbitrarily  or  by  convention,  or  by  this  in  combination 
with  natural  imitation  or  suggestion ;  the  generalizing  process  and  its  result, 
the  general  name  or  term,  comes  afterwards.  Children,  it  is  true,  use  terms 
of  general  import,  but  with  no  consciousness  that  they  are  general.  Every- 
thing is  for  them  individual,  particular,  separate  and  by  itself  until  continued 
observation  and  increasing  knowledge  enable  them  to  detect  similarities  and 
differences  and  to  classify  and  generalize  accordingly.  Then  only  do  they, 
strictly  speaking,  possess  or  use  general  terms.  ^Tr. 


CH.   I]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  289 

§  4.  Ph.  There  are  also  words  which  men  employ  not  to 
signify  an  idea,  but  the  lack  or  absence  of  a  certain  idea,  as 
nothing,  ignorance,  sterility. 

Th.  [I  do  not  see  why  we  could  not  say  that  there  are 
privative  ideas,  as  there  are  negative  truths,  for  the  act  of 
denial  is  positive.     I  had  already  touched  upon  this.] 

§  5.  Ph.  Without  disputing  about  this  point,  it  will  be  more 
useful  to  approach  a  little  nearer  the  origin  of  all  our  notions 
and  knowledge,  to  observe  how  the  words  employed  to  form 
actions  and  notions  wholly  removed  from  the  senses,  derive 
their  origin  from  sensible  ideas,  whence  they  are  transferred 
to  significations  more  abstruse. 

Th.  [The  fact  is  our  needs  have  compelled  us  to  leave  the 
natural  order  of  ideas,  for  this  order  would  be  the  same  for 
angels,  men,  and  all  intelligences  in  general,  and  would  have  to 
be  followed  by  us,  if  we  had  no  regard  for  our  interests.  It 
has  been  necessary  to  attach  thereto  what  the  occasions  and 
accidents  to  which  our  species  is  subject  have  furnished  us ; 
and  this  order  gives  not  the  origin  of  the  notions,  but  so  to  speak 
the  history  of  our  discoveries.^'\ 

Ph.  [Very  true,  and  it  is  the  analysis  of  Avords  which  may 
teach  us  by  means  of  the  names  themselves  this  concatenation 
which  that  of  the  notions  cannot  give  by  means  of  the  reason, 
which  you  have  brought  forward.]  Thus  the  following  words  : 
imagine,  comprehend,  to  attach,  conceive,  instil,  disgust,  trouble, 
tranquillity,  etc.,  are  all  derived  from  the  operations  of  sensible 
things  and  applied  to  certain  modes  of  thought.  The  word 
spirit  in  its  primary  signification  is  breath,^  and  angel  signifies 
a  messenger.     Whence  we  can  conjecture  what  kind  of  notions 

1  "The  natural  order  of  ideas,"  according  to  Leibnitz,  proceeds  from  the 
general  to  the  particular,  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete,  while  language 
shows  that  "we  have  advanced  from  sense-impressions  to  abstract  ideas," 
and  thus  "  expresses  not  the  essence  of  our  knowledge,  but  only  the  history  of 
its  development.  In  a  still  broader  sense  the  history  of  language  is  the  history 
of  the  development  of  the  human  spirit  in  general." — -Tr. 

2  Cf.  the  Hebrew  111"!  (Spinoza,  Tract.  Theol.  Polit.,  chap.  1,  Opera,  ed.  Van 
Vloten  and  Land,  Vol.  1,  p.  384;  English  translation  by  Elwes,  Vol.  1,  p.  19) ; 
the  Greek  nvedixa  from  nvelv  (Cremer,  Bib.  Theol.  Lexicon  of  N.  T.  Greek,  2d 
English  from  2d  German  ed.,  p.  504,  Edinburgh:  T.  and  T.  Clark,  1878,  says 
that  as  "  the  element  of  life  "  ..."  in  a  physiolof/ical  sense,  wo  often  find  it 
(' TTveviJ.a')  in  profaTie  Greek,  especially  in  the  poets  and  in  later  Greek;  in  a 
psychological  sense,  as  the  element  of  human  existence  and  personal  life, 
never")  ;  and  the  Latin  spiritus  from  spirare.  —  Tn. 

U 


290  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [hk.  hi 

they  had  who  spoke  these  first  languages  and  how  nature  will 
suggest  unexpectedly  to  men  the  origin  and  the  principle  of  all 
their  knowledge  by  the  terms  themselves. 

Th.  [I  have  already  remarked  to  you  that  in  the  credo  of 
the  Hottentots  they  called  the  Holy  Spirit  by  a  term  which 
signifies  among  them  a  breath  of  air  benign  and  sweet.-^  The 
same  is  true  as  regards  the  majority  of  other  words,  and  indeed 
the  fact  is  not  always  recognized  because  most  frequently  the 
true  etymologies  are  lost.  A  certain  Dutchman,  with  little 
regard  for  religion,  abused  this  truth  (that  the  terms  theology, 
ethics,  and  metaphysics  are  taken  originally  from  gross  things) 
in  order  to  ridicule  theology  and  the  Christian  faith  in  a  little 
Flemish  dictionary,  in  which  he  gave  to  the  terms  definitions 
or  explications  not  such  as  usage  demands,  but  such  as  the 
original  force  of  the  words  seemed  to  bear,  and  put  upon  them 
a  malicious  interpretation ;  and  as  he  elsewhere  had  given 
indications  of  impiety  he  is  said  to  have  been  punished  in  the 
Raspel-huys?  It  will,  however,  be  well  to  consider  tliis  analogy 
of  sensible  and  non-sensible  things  which  has  served  as  the  basis 
of  tropes :  a  matter  that  you  will  understand  the  better  by  con- 
sidering a  very  extended  example  such  as  is  furnished  by  the 
use  oi  prepositions,  like  to,  toith,  from,  before,  in,  without,  by,  for, 
upon,  toivards  (d,  avec,  de,  devant,  en,  hors,  par,  pour,  sur,  vers), 
which  are  all  derived  from  place,  from  distance,  and  from 
motion,  and  afterwards  transferred  to  every  sort  of  change, 
order,  sequence,  difference,  agreement.  To  ((>)  signifies 
approach,  as  in  the  expression :  I  go  ^o  (a)  Rome.  But  as  in 
order  to  attach  anything  we  bring  it  near  that  to  which  we 
wish  to  unite  it,  we  say  that  one  thing  is  attached  to  (d) 
another.  And  further,  as  there  is,  so  to  speak,  an  immaterial 
attachment,  when  one  thing  follows  the  other  from  moral 
reasons ;  we  say  that  what  follows  the  movements  and  voli- 
tions of  any  one  belongs  to  (d)  that  person  or  adheres  to  him 
as  if  it  gave  signs  to  this  person  to  go  near  it  or  with  it.     A 

1  Cf.  Book  I.,  chap.  3,  §  8,  Th.  The  Apostle's  Creed,  the  Ten  Command- 
ments, and  the  Lord's  Prayer  in  the  Hottentot  language,  as  sent  to  Leibnitz 
by  N.  Witsen,  are  given  in  Dutens,  Leihnit.  opera  omnia.  Vol.  6,  Pt.  2,  pp. 
2(M-206.  Schaarschmidt  remarks  that  "  this  observation  of  both  philosophers, 
that  the  meaning  of  words  has  proceeded  and  still  proceeds  from  the  concrete 
to  the  abstract,  is  the  guide  to  sound  etymology  and  word-explanation."  — Tk. 

2  Erdmaun  and  Jacques  have ;  "  Raspel-huyss."  —  Tii. 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  291 

body  is  with  (avec)  another  when  they  are  in  the  same  place; 
bnt  they  say  also  that  a  thing  is  with  [avec)  that  which  is  found 
in  the  same  time,  in  the  same  order,  or  part  of  an  order,  or 
which  concurs  in  one  and  the  same  act.  When  we  come  fro7n 
(cle)  any  place,  the  place  has  been  our  object  through  the 
sensible  things  it  has  furnished  us,  and  it  is  still  in  our 
memory,  which  is  entirely  filled  with  it;  and  thence  it  comes, 
that  the  object  is  signified  by  the  preposition  of  (de)  as  in  the 
expression,  the  question  is  of  (cle)  that,  they  speak  of  (de) 
that,  i.e.  as  if  it  arose  from  it.  And  as  what  is  included  in 
any  place  or  in  any  whole  is  supported  by  and  carried  away 
with  it,  the  accidents  are  in  the  same  way  considered  as  in 
(dans)  the  subject,  sunt  in  subjecto,  inhmrent  subjecto.  The 
particle  tqjon  (sur)  is  also  applied  to  the  object;  they  say  he 
is  iq)07i  (sur)  this  matter,  very  much  as  a  workman  is  iipoji 
(sur)  the  wood  or  U2wn  (stir)  the  stone,  that  he  cuts  or  forms; 
and  as  these  analogies  are  extremely  variable  and  do  not  de- 
pend on  any  determinate  notions,  it  thence  comes  that 
langiiages  vary  much  in  the  use  of  these  particles  and  cases 
which  the  prepositions  govern,  or  rather  in  which  they  are 
found  as  things  understood  and  virtually  included.] 


CHAPTER  II 

ON    THE     SIGNIFICATION    OF    WORDS 

§  1.  Ph.  Now  as  words  are  employed  by  men  as  signs  of 
their  ideas,  we  may  ask  in  the  first  place  how  their  words  have 
been  determined ;  and  we  find  that  it  is  not  by  any  natural 
connection  existing  between  certain  articulate  sounds  and  cer- 
tain ideas  (for  in  this  case  there  would  be  only  one  language 
among  men),  but  by  an  arbitrary  institution  in  virtue  of  which 
a  given  word  has  been  purposely  made  a  sign  of  a  given  idea.^ 

1  For  early  discussions  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  language,  and  tlic  ques- 
tion whether  words  were  given  by  nature  or  convention,  (/.  Flato,  Cnili/liis, 
English  translation  by  B.  Jowett,  The  Dialoijnes  of  Plato,  2d  cd.,  1875,  Vol.  2, 
p.  20:'..sf/. ;  .3d  ed.,  1892,  Vol.1,  p.  323  sq.,  New  York:  Macmillan  &Co.;  Aristo- 
tle, Dtt  Interpret.,  2,  16'',  19  sq.;  E.  Wallace,  Outline.^  of  the  I'/tilos.  of  Aris- 
totle, 3d  ed.,  §  11,  p.  27.     For  modern  discussions,  cf.  W.  D.  Whitney,  Lawjuarje 


292  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

Th.  [I  know  it  has  been  customary  to  say  in  the  schools 
and  almost  everywhere  else  that  the  meanings  of  words  are 
arbitrary  {ex  instituto)  and  it  is  true  that  they  are  not  deter- 
mined by  a  natural  necessity,  but  they  are  nevertheless 
determined  by  reasons  sometimes  natural,  in  which  chance  has 
some  share,  sometimes  moral,  where  choice  enters.  There  are 
perhaps  some  artificial  languages  which  are  wholly  of  choice 
and  entirely  arbitrary,  as  that  of  China  is  believed  to  have 
been,  or  as  those  of  George  Dalgarno  ^  and  the  late  Mr.  Wil- 
kins,'  bishop  of  Chester.  But  those  which  are  known  to  have 
been  coined  from  languages  already  known,  are  from  choice 
mixed  with  what  there  is  of  nature  and  chance  in  the  lan- 
guages they  suppose.  Thus  it  is  in  the  case  of  those  languages 
which  thieves  have  coined  in  order  to  be  understood  only  by 
those  of  their  gang,  which  the  Germans  call  Hothicelsch,^  the 

and  the  Study  of  Language,  Lect.  XI.,  p.  395  sq.,  4th  ed.,  New  York,  1869; 
B.  Jowett,  in  his  Introduction  to  Plato's  Cratylus,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  2,  p.  189 
sq.;  3d  ed.,  Vol.  1,  p.  281  sq. ;  H.  Steiuthal,  Einleitung  in  die  Psychologic  und 
Sp)rtchicissenschaft ;  Herm.  Paul,  Principien  der  Sprachgeschichte ,  Halle, 
1880;  B.  Delbriick,  Einleitung  in  das  Sprachstudium,  Leipsic,  1880,  2d  ed., 
1884.  Leibnitz  rightly  points  out  that  both  nature  and  freedom  of  choice 
share  in  the  formation  of  language.  "  Nature  furnishes  to  a  certain  extent 
the  material  which  the  mind  in  its  progressive  self-absorption  shapes  within 
certain  limits  arbitrarily;  and  every  human  individual  in  the  use  of  the 
language  already  formed  is  himself  still  so  situated  as  to  be  able  up  to  a 
certain  point  freely  to  ajipropriate  and  use  that  which  is  given."  —  Tr. 

1  George  Dalgarno,  c.  1626-1687,  published  at  London  in  1661,  his  Ars  sig- 
norum,  vulgo  character  universalis  et  lingua  philosophica.  Qua  poterunt, 
homines  diversissimorum  idiomatum,  spatio  duarum  septimanarum,  omnia 
animi  sua  sensa  (in  rebus  familiarihus)  non  minus  intelligihiliter,  sive  scri- 
bendo,  sive  loquendo,  mntuo  communicare,  quam  Unguis  j^ropiis  vernaculis, 
from  which  Bishop  John  Wilkins,  1614-1672,  derived  the  idea  of  his  Essay 
towards  a  real  character  and  a  philosophical  language  ivith  an  alphabetical 
dictionary.  London,  1668.  For  Leibnitz's  plan  of  a  General  Characteristic 
{Characteristica  Universalis  —  Sp^cieuse  generale)  and  the  extent  to  which 
he  followed  Dalgarno  and  Wilkins,  cf.  Trendelenburg's  paper :  Ueber  Leibni- 
zens  Entivurf  einer  allgemeinen  Charakteristik,  in  his  Historische  Beitrcige 
zur  Philos.,  Vol.  3,  p.  1  sq.,  Berlin,  1867 ;  cf.  also  Gerhardt,  Die  philos.  Schrift. 
V.  G.  W.  Leibniz,  Vol.  7,  p.  3sg.  ,■  Vol.  3, p.  216;  Duteus,  Leibnit. opera  omnia, 
Vol.  6,  p.  262.  Dalgarno  is  credited  with  the  invention  of  the  first  manual 
alphabet.     His  works  were  reprinted  at  Edinburgh,  18:34,  4to.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Ave'  Lallemant,  Das  deutsche  Gaunerihum,  4  vols.,  Leipzig,  1858-1862, 
in  which,  says  Schaarschmidt,  "the  so-called  Rothwalsch,  the  artificial  lan- 
guage of  thieves  in  Germany,  prominent  already  in  the  sixteenth  and  more  so 
in  the  seventeenth  century,  is  treated  with  especial  thoroughness  of  detail. 
In  this  work  it  is  shown  that  the  Hebrew  especially  has  contributed  to  the 
Gaunersprache  a  strong  word-contingent,  while  its  grammar  is  conformed  to 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  293 

Italians  Lingua  Zerga,^  the  French  Narquois,  but  which  they 
usually  form  upon  (the  basis  of)  the  languages  commonly 
known  to  them,  either  by  changing  the  received  significations 
of  the  words  by  means  of  metaphors,  or  by  making  new  words 
by  means  of  a  composition  or  derivation  in  their  own  fashion. 
Languages  are  also  formed  through  the  intercourse  of  different 
peoples,  either  by  mingling  indifferently  neighboring  lan- 
guages, or  as  most  frequently  happens,  by  taking  the  one  as  a 
base  which  is  mutilated  and  altered,  mixed  and  corrupted  by 
neglecting  and  changing  that  which  it  observes,  and  even  by 
grafting  thereupon  new  words.  The  Lingua  Franca,  which  is 
used  in  the  commerce  of  the  Mediterranean,  is  made  from 
the  Italian,  and  no  regard  is  paid  to  the  rules  of  grammar. 
An  Armenian  Dominican,  with  whom  I  conversed  at  Paris, 
had  himself  made,  or  perhaps  learned  from  his  fellows,  a  kind 
of  Lingua  Franca,  made  from  Latin,  which  I  found  intelligible 
enough,  although  it  had  neither  case,  nor  tense,  nor  other 
inflections,  and  he  spoke  it  with  ease,  being  accustomed  to  it. 
Father  Labb^,-  a  French  Jesuit,  very  learned,  known  by  many 
other  works,  has  made  a  language  of  which  Latin  is  the  base, 
which  is  easier  and  has  less  constraint  than  our  Latin,  but 
which  is  more  regular  than  the  Lingua  Franca.  He  has  made 
a  book  expressly  of  it.  As  for  the  languages  which  are  found 
made  a  long  time  ago,  there  are  but  few  which  are  not  greatly 

the  German.  In  Italy  the  Gaunersprache  bears  the  name  Gergo,  whi(!h  corre- 
sponds to  the  French  Argot.  To  what  extent  in  Leibnitz's  time  attention  was 
directed  to  the  Rothwiilsch  the  romance  literature  shows ;  but  especially  the 
Gcsichte  I'hiktnders  von  Sitteivald,"  a  remarkable  work,  in  which,  under  the 
name  of  Philander  von  Sittenwald,  the  author.  Job.  Mich.  Moscherosch,  KiOO- 
1()(J9,  a  German  litterateur,  whose  true  name  was  Kall)kopf ,  has  given  a  series 
of  satirical  pictures  of  the  caprices  and  the  vices  of  society  in  his  time,  and 
which  placed  him  among  the  best  prose  writers  of  his  century.  It  was  jjub- 
lished  at  Strasburg,  1044-1650,  2  vols.,  8vo.  — Tr. 

1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  read :  "  Gergo."  —  Tr. 

2  Philip  Labljc,  KiOT-KJiiT,  a  learned  French  chronologer,  a  man  of  vast 
memory,  astonishing  erudition,  and  great  mental  activity ;  a  voluminous 
writer,  and  though  gentle  in  personal  character,  a  fierce  and  abusive  contro- 
versialist. Leibnitz  mentions  him  in  a  letter,  July  15,  17011,  to  Geheimrath 
von  Ilgen;  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  phUos.  Schrift.,1,  3(i:  "  iioch  des  P.  Labl)e' 
(der  die  Lateinische  mittelst  einiger  Veranderungen  zur  allgemeinen  Spracli 
machen  wollen)."  He  was  the  author  of  Concordia  chronnlor/ira,  technica  ct 
luatorira,  lf!5();  but  is  chiefly  known  to-day  by  liis  work  on  Latin  pronuncia- 
tion, Eriiditip,  promintintinnis  catholici  indices,  enlarged  by  E.  Leeds,  and 
republished  in  London,  1751. — Ti'.. 


291  LEIBNITZ'S   CKiTlQUE   UF   LOCKE  [uk. 


iiltered  to-day.  This  is  evident  by  comparing  them  with  their 
ancient  books  and  monuments  wliich  remain.  The  old  French 
approached  nearer  the  Proven9al  and  the  Italian,  and  we  see 
the  Theotisque  *  Avith  the  French  or  Eomance  rather  (some- 
times called  Lingua  Romana  rustica)  as  they  were  in  the 
ninth  century  after  Jesus  Christ  in  the  forms  of  the  oaths  of 
the  sons  of  the  Emperor  Louis  le  Debonnaire,  which  Xithard, 
their  kinsman,  has  preserved  for  us.-  We  find  little  elsewhere 
of  so  old  French,  Italian,  or  Spanish.  But  for  the  Theotisque, 
or  ancient  German,  there  is  the  gospel  of  Otfried/  a  monk  of 

1  Cf.  Grimm,  Deutsrhes  Worterbiich,  sub  "  Deutsch." — Tr. 

2  For  the  text  of  these  famous  oaths,  taken  at  Strasburg,  Feb.  14,  842,  cf. 
Nitbard,  c.  790-c.  8.58,  Hist.,  written,  at  the  command  of  Charles  the  Bald, 
between  841  and  843,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  5,  pp.  .38,  39,  ed.  Pertz,  and  Pertz,  Momi- 
mi'nta  Germanias  Historica,  Vol.  2,  pp.  Giio,  666,  where  they  are  jjreserved  in  the 
old  Romance  —  lingua  Romana  rustica  —  and  old  German  —  liiu/va  Teotis^-a 
—  languages.  Cf.  also  Duteus,  Leibnitii  opera  omnia,  Vol.  6,  Pt.  11.,  pp.  141- 
144,  where  "  utramque  formulam  ('  jurarunt  Ludovicus  Romane,  Carolus 
Teutonice ')  eodem  significatu,  conceptis  verbis  ex  Nithardo  exliibebimus 
interlineariter  coUigatam,  quia  sibi  verljotenus  respondent,  et  ipso  parallelismo 
illustrantur."  The  best  edition  for  the  study  of  the  old  German  part  of  the 
oaths  is  in  Karl  Miillenhoif  vi.  Wilhelm  Scherer,  Denkmuler  deutscher  Poesie 
u.  Prosa  aus  VIII-XII  Jahrh.,  Denkm.  No.  67,  2  Ausg.  Berlin,  1873;  3  Aufl. 
bearbeitet  v.  E.  Steinmeyer.  Vol.  2  contains  notes  summing  up  the  best  results 
of  critical  study.  Explanations  of  the  old  German  text  have  also  been  made 
by  J.  Grimm,  1785-1863,  in  his  Kleinere  Schriften,  Vol.  6,  pp.  403  sq.,  see 
also  Monumenta  Germanise  Historica,  Vol.  2,  pp.  465  sq. ;  and  by  H.  F. 
Massmann,  1797-1874,  in  his  Die  kleinen  Sprachdenkhiale  des  VIII  bis  XII 
Jahrh.  Quedlinburg  u.  Leipzig,  1839.  Fr.  Ch.  Diez,  1794-1876,  "the  real 
founder  of  Scientific  Romance  philology  and  linguistics,"  in  his  Altromanische 
Sprachdenkmliler,  Bonn,  1846,  has  explained  the  Romance  portion  of  the  text, 
and  gives,  op.  cit.  pp.  3-5,  a  good  portion  of  the  literature  on  this  interesting 
linguistic  monument.  The  best  textual  notes  on  the  Romance  or  old  French 
part  of  the  oaths  are  in  W.  Foerster  u.  E.  Koschwitz,  Altfranzosisches  Uebunys- 
biirh,  Heilbronn,  1884;  while  the  best  facsimile  of  the  whole  fragment,  both 
French  and  German,  is  the  Album  of  the  Societe  des  anciens  textes  francais 
{Les  plus  anciens  monuments  dc  la  langue  fran<;aise),  Paris,  1875.  The  old 
Romance  text,  the  earliest  sjiecimen  of  French  in  existence,  with  a  modern 
French  translation,  is  found  in  Brachet,  A  Historical  Grammar  of  the  French 
Toncjae,  6th  English,  fi-om  20th  French  ed.,  pp.  17,  18,  Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press,  1884;  while  to  these  a  Latin  version  is  added  for  comparison  in  the 
article  on  the  "Latin  Language"  prope  Jin.,  in  the  Encyclop.  Brit.,  9th  ed.. 
Vol.  14,  pp.  340,  341  (American  Reprint).  — Tk. 

3  The  gospel  of  Otfrid,  usually  called  the  Life  of  CJirist,  was  written  in  the 
South-Frankish  dialect  of  the  Old  High  German  in  867  or  868,  and  dedicated 
to  King  Louis  the  German.  Editions  of  it  were  published  by  Matthias  Flacius 
Illyricus,  1520-1.575,  at  Basle  in  1571,  8vo,  "a  book  as  curious  as  rare,"  and 
by  Schilter-Scberz  in  the  Thesaurus  antiquitatum  teutonicum.  Vol.  1.  Ulrase, 
1727-1728,  3  vols.,  fol.  These  have  now  no  critical  worth,  but  merely  an  historical 


cii.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  295 

Weissenburg  of  this  same  time,  which.  Hacius  has  published 
and  which  Schilter^  wished  to  edit  anew.  The  Saxons  who 
passed  into  Great  Britain  have  left  us  books  still  more  ancient. 
They  have  a  version  or  paraphrase  of  the  beginning  of  Genesis 
and  of  some  other  parts  of  the  Sacred  History,  made  by  a 
Caedmon  whom  Bede  already  mentions.^  But  the  most  ancient 
book,  not  only  of  the  Germanic  languages,  but  of  all  the  lan- 
guages of  Europe,  except  Greek  and  Latin,  is  that  of  the 
gospel  of  the  Goths  of  the  Pontus  Euxinus,  known  by  the 
name  of  Codex  Argenteus,^  written  in  characters  entirely  pecu- 

interest  and  value.  Cf.  H.  Paul,  Grunclriss  d.  r/ertn.  Philolocjie,  II,  214,  Stras- 
burg,  1889 — .  It  has  also  been  edited  by  E.  Tli.  Graff,  Konigsberg,  1831,  4to,  an 
edition  good  iu  its  day,  but  now  antiquated ;  and  more  recently  by  J.  Kelle, 
with  grammar  and  glossai'y  in  3  vols.,  Regeiisburg,  185()-1881 ;  by  P.  Piper, 
Paderborn,  1878,  containing  the  fullest  critical  ajiparatus;  and  by  Erdmann, 
Halle,  1882,  the  most  convenient.  Piper  has  also  published  a  student's  edition, 
Freiburg,  1884;  and  Kelle  a  ti'anslation,  Christi  Lebeii  vnd  Lehre  besungen 
von  Otfrid,  Prag.  1870.  Cf.  also  W.  Sclierer,  Gesrh.  d.  dcnischen  Lit.  (Jth  ed., 
pp.  48-51.  Berlin,  1801;  Eng.  trans.,  from  3d  Germ,  ed..  Vol.  1,  pp.  44-46, 
New  York,  Chas.  Scribner's  Sons,  188G.  To  Otfrid  is  due,  for  the  most  part, 
the  introduction  into  German  poetry,  in  place  of  the  earlier  alliterative  metre, 
of  the  rhymed  stanza  imitated  from  that  of  the  Latin  Church  hymns.  —  Tr. 

1  John  Schilter,  1G32-1705,  a  distinguished  German  jurisconsult  and  archae- 
ologist, Pni^essor  of  Law  at  Strasburg,  and  anthor  of  the  work  referred  to  in 
note  3,  Thcsaunis  antiquitatum  teutonicum,  which  was  edited,  after  Schilter's 
death,  by  Job.  Geor.  Scherz,  and  is  filled  with  documents  of  great  value  for 
the  civil  and  literary  history  of  Germany  at  the  time  of  tlie  Carlovingians. 
Schilter  was  led  to  linguistic  studies  through  Ids  legal  and  antiquarian  investi- 
gations. Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  opera  omnia,  6,  Pt.  II.,  p.  222,  where  Leibnitz 
remarks:  "I  am  told  that  Mr.  Schilter,  of  Strasburg,  is  none  too  well,  and 
as  he  is  an  old  man,  I  fear  that  his  edition  of  Notger  and  Otfried  will  not 
appear.  .  .  .  Mr.  Schilter  makes  use,  moreover,  of  the  Gothic  Gospels  ot 
Ultilas,  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  also  of  the  Icelandic,  as  well  as  of  other  old 
books  and  glossaries;  for  we  must  unite  the  different  dialects  of  all  the  Teu- 
tonic peoples  in  order  to  explain  the  old  books."  —  Tr. 

2  On  Csedmon,  died  080,  cf.  Bede,  iiVcfe.s.  Hist.,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  24,  pp.  217- 
220,  5th  ed.  (Bohu's  Lib.),  London:  Geo.  Bell  and  Sons,  1884;  H.  Morley,  Eng- 
lish Writers,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  4,  Vol.  2,  p.  71  sq.,  London:  Cassell  and  Co.,  1888; 
B.  Ten  Brink,  Earl;/  Eng.  Lit.,  trans,  by  H.  M.  Kennedy,  pp.  39-48  and  371- 
386,  New  York  :  Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1884 ;  S.  A.  Brooke,  Hist  of  EurUj  Eng.  Lit., 
pp.  275-;>10,  New  York:  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1892.  For  the  text  of  the  poems 
ascribed  to  him,  cf.  Benj.  Thorpe,  Cxdmon's  Metrical  Paraphrase  of  Fart  of 
the  Holy  Scriptxire  in  Anglo-Saxon ;  with  an  Eng.  Trans.,  Notes,  and  a  Verbal 
Index,  London:  1832;  C.  W.  M.  Grein,  Bibliothek  der  Angel-Sachsischen 
Poesie,  18.57,  Vol.  1 ;  new  ed.  by  R.  Wiilker,  Vols.  1-3,  188:3-1889,  still  in  prog- 
ress ;  the  vol.  containing  Credmon  has  not  yet  (1892)  appeared ;  T.  W.  Hunt, 
Csedmon's  Exodus  and  Daniel,  Boston:  Ginn  &  Co.,  4th  (id.,  1889.  —  Tr. 

3  The  Coilex  Argenteus  —  Silver  Cod(!x  —  so  calhid  because  written  in  silver 
and  gold  letters  upon  purple-stained  vellum  and  bound  iu  silver,  as  was  the 


200  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 


liar,  whioh  was  found  in  tlie  ancient  monastery  of  the  Benedic- 
tines of  Wei-den  in  Westphalia,  and  has  been  carried  into 
Sweden,  where  it  is  preserved,  as  with  reason  it  should  be, 
with  as  much  care  as  the  original  of  the  Pandects  in  Florence, 
although  this  version  was  made  by  the  Eastern  Goths  and  in  a 
dialect  far  removed  from  the  Scandinavian  German ;  but  it  is 
because  they  believe,  with  some  probability,  that  the  Goths 
of  the  Pontus  Euxinus  came  originally  from  Scandinavia,  or 
at  least  from  the  Baltic  Sea.  Now  the  language  or  the  dialect 
of  these  ancient  Goths  is  very  different  from  the  modern 
German,  although  it  has  the  same  linguistic  basis.  The 
ancient  Gallic  was  still  more  different,  to  judge  by  the  lan- 
guage most  nearly  approaching  the  true  Gallic,  wdiich  is  that 
of  the  country  of  Wales,  Cornwall,  and  Basse-Bretagne ;  but 
the  Irish  differs  therefrom  still  more  and  shows  us  traces  of  a 
Britannic,  Gallic,  and  Germanic  language,  still  more  ancient. 
But  all  these  languages   come  from  one  source,  and  may  be 

case  with  costly  Mss.  in  those  days,  originally  consisted  of  330  leaves  con- 
taining the  Gospels  in  the  following  order:  Matt.,  John,  Luke,  Mark,  trans- 
lated into  the  Gotliic  language,  about  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century,  by 
Bishop  Umias  (Vulfila),  311-383.  Only  177  leaves  now  remain.  Cf.  F.  L. 
Stamm,  Vlfilas,  1872,  new  ed.  by  M.  Heyne,  Paderborn,  1885,  Einleitung,  p.  ix. 
The  Ms.,  like  all  existing  Gothic  Mss.,  seems  to  have  been  written  in  Italy 
during  the  rule  of  the  East  Goths  in  the  first  half  of  the  sixth  century,  and, 
after  many  adventures,  was  at  last  carried  in  16G9  to  Upsala,  where  it  now 
is.  It  is  one  of  the  few  sources  of  our  knowledge  of  Gothic,  and,  as  Ulfilas 
was  a  fine  scholar,  and  made  his  translation  of  the  New  Testament  from  the 
Greek  original,  with  frequent  comparison  of  the  Latin  versions,  it  is  of  some 
value  in  New  Testament  textual  criticism.  Editions  of  Ulfilas  may  be  named 
as  follows:  The  two  earlier,  by  H.  C.  v.  d.  Gabelentz  and  J.  Loebe,  3  vols., 
Altenburg  u.  Leipzig,  184;>-1846,  and  H.  F.  Massmaun,  Stuttgart,  1855-1856, 
2  vols.  Svo,  rest  upon  still  older  single  editions  with  many  faults.  Cf. 
H.  Paul.  Grundriss  d.  f/erm.  Philolor/ie,  II,  69,  Anm.  2.  The  critical  editions 
of  A.  Uppstrom:  Codex  Arfjenteus,  Upsala,  1854-1855;  Decern  codicis  arg. 
redtviva  folia,  ih.  1857;  Fragmenta  gothica  selecta,  ib.  18G1;  Codices  gothici 
Ambrosiani,  Stockh.  u.  Leipzig,  18(54-1868,  in  whose  work  for  the  first  time 
was  laid  an  entirely  secure  foundation  for  Gothic  text-criticism,  and  upon 
whom  the  later  editions  rest.  Cf.  H.  Paul,  oj).  cit.;  and  Stamm-Heyne, 
Ulfilas,  Einl.  p.  xi.  The  larger  ed.  of  E.  Bernhardt,  Vulfila,  oder  die  gotische 
Bibcl,  Halle,  1875,  is  the  best  for  comparison  with  the  Greek  ;  while  his  smaller 
ed.,  Bie  gotische  Bibel  des  Vulfila,  Halle,  1884,  and  that  of  Stamm-Heyne  cited 
above  are  the  most  convenient.  The  best  introduction  to  Gothic  in  English  is 
J.  Wright,  A  Primer  of  Gothic,  London  and  New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co., 
1892.  Cf.  also  W.  Scherer,  Gesch.  d.  deutschen  Lit.,  6th  ed.,  pp.  33-36,  Eng. 
trans..  Vol.  1,  pp.  28-32;  Waitz,  Bas  Leben  des  Ulflas,  1840:  KraiTt.  Kirchen- 
geschichte  d.  Beutschen  Volker,  Abth.  1, 1854,  and  article  "  Ulfilas,"  in  Herzog, 
Sealencyklopiidie,  Vol.  16,  1885.  — Te. 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  297 

taken  as  modifications  of  one  and  the  same  language,  which 
may  be  called  the  Keltic.  Thus  the  ancients  called  both  the 
Germans  and  the  Gauls  Kelts ;  and  in  going  back  farther  in 
order  to  understand  the  origin  both  of  the  Keltic  and  the 
Latin  and  the  Greek,  which  have  many  roots  in  common  with 
the  Germanic  or  Keltic  tongues,  we  may  conjecture  that  this 
fact  arises  from  the  common  origin  of  all  these  peoples  de- 
scended from  the  Scythians,  who,  having  come  from  the  Black 
Sea,  passed  the  Danube  and  the  Vistula,  and  of  whom  one  part 
may  have  gone  into  Greece,  the  other  have  filled  Germany  and 
the  Gauls ;  a  consequence  of  the  hypothesis  which  makes  the 
Europeans  come  from  Asia.  The  Sarmatian  (sixpposing  it  to 
be  the  Sclavonic)  has  at  least  half  its  origin  either  Germanic 
or  common  with  the  Germanic.  The  case  appears  to  be  some- 
what similar,  indeed,  in  the  Finnish  language,  which  is  that  of 
the  most  ancient  Scandinavians,  before  the  Germanic  peoples, 
i.e.  the  Danes,  Swedes,  and  Norwegians,  had  taken  possession 
of  the  land  which  is  the  best  and  nearest  the  sea;  and  the 
language  of  the  Finns  or  of  the  northeast  of  our  continent, 
which  is  also  that  of  the  Lapps,  extends  from  the  German  or 
jSTorwegian  Ocean  even  to  the  Caspian  Sea  (although  inter- 
rupted by  the  Sclavic  peoples  which  have  been  thrust  in 
between  the  two)  and  has  some  relation  to  the  Hungarian, 
having  come  from  the  countries  which  are  now  in  part  under 
the  Muscovites.  But  the  Tartar  language,  which  has  filled  the 
northeast  of  Asia,  with  its  variations,  appears  to  have  been  that 
of  the  Huns  and  Cumans  as  it  is  of  the  Uzbeks  or  Turkomans, 
of  the  Kalmuks  and  of  the  Mongols.  Now  all  these  languages  of 
Scythia  have  many  roots  common  among  themselves  and  with 
ours,  and  it  is  found  that  even  the  Arabic  (under  which  the 
Hebrew,  the  ancient  Punic,  the  Chaldee,  the  Syriac,  the  Etlii- 
opic  of  the  Abyssinians  are  to  be  comprised)  has  so  great  a 
number  of  them  and  an  agreement  so  manifest  with  ours  that 
it  cannot  be  attributed  to  chance  alone,  nor  even  to  commerce 
alone,  but  rather  to  the  migrations  of  the  peoples.  So  that 
there  is  nothing  in  tliis  to  combat  and  not  rather  to  favor  the 
view  of  the  common  origin  of  all  nations,  and  of  a  primitive 
root  language.^     If  the  Hebrew  or  the  Arabic  approaches  the 

1  Leibnitz  was  the  first  wlio,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  presentiment  of  the 
kindred  connection,  first  of  the  European,  and  then  of  tho  remaining  Ian- 


298  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  in 

nearest  to  it,  it  must  be  at  least  much  changed,  and  the 
Gorman  seems  to  have  preserved  more  completely  the  natural 
and  (to  use  the  language  of  Jacob  Boehme)  the  Adamic;^  for 
if  we  had  the  primitive  language  in  its  purity,  or  sufficiently 
preserved  to  be  recognizable,  the  reasons  of  the  connections 
whether  natural  or  of  an  arbitrary  institution  would  necessa- 
rily appear  wise  and  worthy  of  the  primitive  author.  But 
supposing  that  our  languages  are  derivative  as  regards  their 
foundation,  they  nevertheless  have  something  primitive  in 
themselves  which  has  arisen  from  them  in  relation  to  new 
root  Avords^  since  formed  among  them  by  chance  but  upon 
natural  grounds.  Those  which  signify  the  sounds  of  animals 
or  have  come  from  them  furnish  examples.  Such,  for  exam- 
ple, is  the  Latin  coaxare  attributed  to  the  frogs,  which  has 
some   relation  to   couaquen   or  quaken   in   German.     Now  it 

guages,  demanded  and  hinaself  urged  on  the  comparative  study  of  languages, 
and  in  this,  as  in  so  many  other  things,  was  far  in  advance  of  his  time.  For 
his  linguistic  work,  cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  opera  omnia,  Vols.  5  and  6. — Tr. 

1  Jacob  Boehme,  1575-1()24,  a  celebrated  theosophist,  in  whom  Protestant 
mysticism  reached  its  highest  point.  He  is  called  philosophus  teutonicus,  and 
"  in  reality  through  him,  for  the  first  time  in  Germany,  did  jahilosophy  come 
forward  with  a  characteristic  stamp  "  ;  Hegel,  Vorlesung.  ti.d.  Gesch.  d.  Philos., 
Vol.  3,  p.  270,  2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1833.  O.  Pfleiderer,  Religionsphilosophie,  Vol. 
1,  p.  20,  2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1883,  says,  "The  theosophy  of  Boehme  shows  itself  as 
the  direct  forerunner  of  tlie  metaphysic  of  Leibnitz,  1646-171(5,  Schelling,  1775- 
1854,  Baader,  1765-1841,  Schopenhauer,  1788-1860,  etc."  For  his  philosophy, 
etc.,  cf.  his  Sdmmtliche  Werke,  hrsg.  v.  K.  W.  Schiebler,  Leipzig,  1831-47,  2d 
ed.,  1861  sq.;  also  Hegel,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  3,  pp.  270-297:  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos. 
d.  Mittelalters,  Vol.  5,  pp.  569-608,  §§  122-128;  O.  Pfleiderer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1, 
pp.  15-23,  Eng.  trans..  Vol.  1,  pp.  13-23;  B.  Piinjer,  Gesch.  d.  Christ.  Beligions- 
philos.,  1880-83,  Vol.  1,  pp.  180-194;  Eng.  trans..  Vol.  1,  pp.  243-265,  f.  and 
T.  Clark,  Edinburgh,  1887.  Vaughan,  Houis  ivith  the  Mystics,  Vol.  2,  pp.  79-125, 
3<1  ed.,  London :  1879.  According  to  Boehme,  cf.  Das  dreyfache  Leben,  chap.  8, 
2-4;  Princ,  10,  8-12;  Myst.  May.,  cliap.  15,  1-9,  etc.;  also  Stockl,  op.  cit.,  §§ 
125,  126,  A''ol.  3,  pp.  586  sg. ;  Adam,  who  stands  here  in  Leibnitz's  text  "  as  the 
symbol  and  representative  of  the  original  unity  of  the  race,"  and  of  its  lan- 
guage, "  was  destiired  to  propagate  his  race  in  angel-like  jnirity  without 
endangering  its  integrity."  Leibnitz,  while  acquainted  with  Boehme's  writ- 
ings, made  little  use  of  them  in  his  own  thinking,  and  speaks  thus  of  them  in 
a  letter  to  Fr.  S.  Loeflfler,  Jan.  13, 1693,  cf.  Dutens,  op.  cit..  Vol.  5,  p.  409 :  "  The 
controversies  over  the  opinions  of  Boehme  I  consider  idle,  and  think  that  he 
neither  understood  himself  nor  have  others  understood  him."  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt's  text  reads:  "Qui  leur  e.st  survenu  par  rapport  a  des  mots 
radicaux  nouveaux,  formes  depuis  chez  elles."  etc.  Erdmann  and  Jacques 
read:  "qui  leur  est  survenu  par  i-apport  a  des  mots  I'adicaux  et  nouveaux 
radicaux  forme's  depuis  chez  elles,"  etc.;  i.e.  new  root  words  and  new  roots 
since  formed  among  them,  etc.  —  Tr. 


J 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  299 

seems  that  the  noise  of  these  animals  is  the  primordial  root  of 
other  words  of  the  German  language.  For  as  these  animals 
make  much  noise,  the  term  is  attributed  to-day  to  idle  talk  and 
to  babblers,  who  are  called  quakeler  in  the  diminutive  form  ; 
but  apparently  this  same  word  quaken  was  formerly  under- 
stood in  a  good  sense  and  signified  all  sorts  of  sounds  made 
with  the  mouth  not  even  excepting  speech.  And  as  these 
sounds  or  noises  of  animals  are  an  evidence  of  life,  and  as  we 
know  thereby  before  we  see  it  that  there  is  life  there,  quek  in 
old  German  has  come  to  signify  life  or  living,  as  may  be 
observed  in  the  most  ancient  books,  and  there  are  also  traces 
of  the  same  in  the  modern  language,  for  Quecksilber  is  quick- 
silver (vif-argent) ,  and  erquicken  is  to  strengthen,  and,  as  it 
were,  to  vivify  or  recreate  after  exhaustion  or  some  great 
labor.  Certain  weeds  are  called  also  in  Low  German  Quaken, 
alive  so  to  speak  and  running,  as  they  say  in  German,  which 
spread  and  propagate  themselves  easily  in  the  fields  to  the 
detriment  of  the  grain  ;  and  in  English  quickly  means  promptly 
and  in  a  wide-awake  manner.  Thus  we  may  consider  that  as 
regards  these  words  the  German  language  may  pass  as  the 
primitive,  the  ancients  having  no  need  to  borrow  elsewhere  a 
sound  which  is  the  imitation  of  that  of  the  frogs.  And  there 
are  many  others  in  which  the  same  thing  appears.  For  it 
seems  that  the  ancient  Germans,  Kelts,  and  other  peoples 
allied  to  them  have  employed  by  a  natural  instinct  the  letter  R 
to  signify  a  violent  movement  and  a  noise  like  that  of  this 
letter.^  It  appears  in  pew,  fluo,  rinnen,  riiren  (Jluere),  rutir 
(flKxirm),  the  Rhine.  Rhone,  Roer  (Rhenus,  Rhoclanus,  Erida- 
Mis,  Rura),  ratiben  (rapere,  ravir),  Radt  {rota),  radere  (raser), 
rauschen,  a  word  difficult  to  translate  into  French;  it  signifies 
a  noise  like  that  which  the  wind  or  a  passing  animal  stirs  up 
in  the  leaves  or  the  trees,  or  is  made  by  a  trailing  dress ; 
reckken  (to  stretch  with  violence),  whence  it  comes  that  reichen 
is  to  reach ;  that  der  Rick  signifies  a  long  stick  or  perch  useful 
for  suspending  anything,  in  this  kind  of  Plat-tiitscli  or  Low 
Buxon  which  is  (spoken)  near  Brunswick;  that  Rige,  Reihe, 

1  Cf.  Plato,  Cratylus,  434  sq.;  English  Translation  by  B.  Jowett;  2d  ed., 
1875,  Vol.  2,  p.  259  sq.;  3d  od.,  1892,  Vol.  1,  p.  .381  sq.,  wliere  the  author  has 
already  made  an  attempt,  similar  to  that  ninde  here  and  many  times  Ix-lore 
hy  Leihiiitz,  to  fix  the  original  sijj;nificauce  oi  single  letters  in  the  formation 
of  words.  —  Tr. 


800  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

retjula,  rerjere,  refer  to  length  or  a  straight  course ;  and  that 
lieck  lias  signified  a  thing  or  person  very  extended  and  long, 
and  in  particular  a  giant,  and  then  a  powerful  and  rich  man, 
as  it  appears  in  the  reich  of  the  Germans  and  in  the  riche  or 
rkco  of  the  Semi-Latins.  In  Spanish  ricos  hombres  means  the 
nobles  or  chief  men  ;  and  this  makes  it  plain  at  the  same  time 
how  metaphor,  synecdoche,  and  metonymy  have  caused  words 
to  pass  from  one  signification  to  another  without  our  being 
able  always  to  trace  them.  This  noise  and  violent  movement 
is  noticed  also  in  Hiss  (rupture)  Avith  which  the  Latin  rximpo, 
the  Greek  prjyvvfjn,  the  French  arracher,  the  Italian  straccio  are 
connected.  Xow  as  the  letter  R  signifies  naturall}^  a  violent 
movement,  the  letter  L  designates  a  gentler  one.  Thus  we  see 
that  children  and  others  who  find  the  R  too  harsh  or  too  difii- 
cult  to  pronounce  substitute  for  it  the  letter  L,  saying,  for 
example,  moii  levelend  pUe}  This  gentle  movement  appears  in 
lehen  (yivre  —  live),  lahen  {confoHer  —  comfort,  faire  vivre  — 
make  live).  Unci,  lenis,  lentus  {lent  —  slow),  lieben  (aimer  — 
love),  lauffen  {glisser  promptement  comme  Veau  qui  coule  —  to 
glide  quickly  like  flowing  water),  labi  (glisser  —  to  touch 
lightly,  labitur  uncta  vadis  abies^),  legen  (mettre  doncement  —  to 
place  gently),  whence  comes  liegen  (coucher  —  to  lie  down), 
lage  or  laye  (un  lit,  comme  un  lit  de  pjierres  —  a  bed,  as  a  bed  of 
rocks),  Lay-stein  (pierre  iX  couches,  ardoise  — slate),  lego,  icJi  lese 
(Je  remasse  ce  qu'on  a  mis  —  I  collect  what  has  been  invested, 
it  is  the  opposite  of  mettre  —  to  place,  and  then  je  lis  —  I  read, 
and  finally  among  the  Greeks  je  parle  —  I  speak ^),  Laub 
(feuille  —  leaf),  a  thing  easy  to  stir,  to  which  are  related  also 
laj),  lid,*  lenken,  luo,  \vw  (solco),  leien^  (in  Low-Saxon)  to  dis- 
solve, to  melt  like  the  snow,  whence  the  Leine  has  its  name, 
a  river  of  Hanover,  which,  rising  in  the  mountainous  coun- 
tries, is  greatly  enlarged  by  the  melted  snows ;  not  to  speak 
of  an  infinite  number  of  other  similar  appellations,  which  prove 
that  there  is  something  natural  in  the  origin  of  words  which 
indicates  a  relation  between  things  and  the  sounds  and  move- 

1  I.e.  "  Reverend  pere."  —  Tr.  2  Qf^  Vergil,  ^n.  8,  91.  —  Tr. 

3  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "  Et  puis  je  lis  et  enfin  chez  les  Grecs  je 
parle,"  the  reading  of  Gerhardt.  —  Tr. 

*  Gerhardfs  reading ;  Erdmann  and  .Jacques  have  "  liel."  —  Tr. 
3  Gerhardfs  reading;  Erdmann  and  Jacques  have  "lien." — Tr. 


CH.  II]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  301 

inents  of  the  vocal  organs  ;  and  it  is  furthermore  for  that 
reason  that  the  letter  L  joined  to  other  nouns  makes  their 
diminutives  with  the  Latins,  the  Semi-Latins,  and  the  High 
Germans.  But  it  must  not  be  pretended  that  this  reason  can 
be  noticed  everywhere,  for  the  lion,  the  lynx,  the  wolf,  are 
anything  but  gentle.  But  it  may  be  attached  to  another  acci- 
dent, the  speed  (/a«/),  which  makes  them  feared  or  compels 
flight ;  as  if  the  one  who  sees  such  an  animal  coming  should 
cry  to  the  others :  lauf  {fuyez  !  —  fly  !) ;  besides  by  many  acci- 
dents and  changes  the  majority  of  words  are  very  much 
altered  and  diverted  from  their  pronunciation  and  original 
signification. 

Ph.  Yet  an  example  would  make  it  better  understood. 

Th.  Here  is  one  plain  enough  and  which  comprehends  many 
others.  The  word  oe.il  (eye)  and  its  parentage  may  serve  us. 
To  show  it  I  will  begin  a  little  further  back.  A  (the  first 
letter)  followed  by  a  little  aspiration  makes  Ah,  and  as  this 
is  an  emission  of  the  air  which  produces  a  sound  clear  enough 
at  its  beginning  and  then  vanishing,  this  sound  naturally  sig- 
nifies a  light  breath  {spiritus  lenis)  when  A  and  H  are  not 
very  strong.  Thence  it  is  that  aw,  aer,  aura,  haugh,  halare, 
haleine,  ar/xos,  Athem,  Oclem  (in  German)  have  had  their  origin. 
But  as  water  is  also  a  fluid  and  makes  a  noise,  it  has  come 
(it  seems)  that  ah  made  rougher  by  doubling,  i.e.  aha  or  ahha, 
has  been  taken  as  water.  The  Teutons  and  other  Kelts,  the 
better  to  indicate  the  motion,  have  placed  their  W  before 
both.  Thence  wehen,  Wind,  vent,  indicate  the  motion  of  the 
air,  and  loaten,  vadum,  water,  motion  of  or  in  the  water.  But 
to  return  to  aha,  it  appears  to  be  (as  I  have  said)  a  kind  of 
root  which  means  water.  The  Icelanders,  who  preserve  some- 
what of  the  Scandinavian  Teutonic,  have  lessened  the  aspira- 
tion of  some  by  saying  aa;  others,  who  say  Aken  (meaning 
Aix,  Aqnae  grani^),  have  increased  it,  as  do  also  the  Latins  in 
their  aqua,  and  the  Germans  in  certain  places,  who  say  ach 
in  compositions  to  indicate  water,  as  when  Schivarzach^  means 
black  water,  Biberach  water  of  the  beavers.  And  instead  of 
Wiser  or  Weser  they  said  Wiseraha  in  the  old  titles,  and 
WisKvarh-  among  the  ancient  inhalntants,  of  which  the  Latins 

1  I.e.  A(|iiis  Graiuim,  Aix-l;i-Cbai)elle.  —  Tr. 

'■2  (icilianlt's    reading;     Enlmanu     ami    .Jacqnos    road:     "  Rolnvartzacli," 
"  Wiscracli."  —  Tr. 


;;()-  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  jii 

have  made  Visurgis,  as  from  Her,  llerach,  tliey  have  made 
Jlargus.  From  aqua,  aiyues,  auue  the  French  have  finally 
made  eau,  which  they  pronounce  oo,  in  which  there  no  longer 
remains  anything  of  its  origin,  Auive,  Auge  with  the  Ger- 
mans is  to-day  a  place  Avhich  water  often  overflows,  suitable 
for  pasturage,  locus  irrignus,  jMsmius;  but  more  particularly 
it  signifies  an  island,  as  in  the  name  of  the  monastery  of 
Bi'ichenaii  {Augia  dives),  and  many  others.  And  this  (process) 
must  have  gone  on  among  many  of  the  Teutonic  and  Keltic 
peoples,  for  thence  it  has  come  that  everything  which  is,  as 
it  were,  isolated  in  a  kind  of  plain  has  been  called  Aiige  or 
Ouge,  oculus.  Thus  it  is  they  name  spots  of  oil  upon  water 
among  the  Germans  ;  and  among  the  Spaniards  ojo  is  a  hole. 
But  Auge,  Ooge,  oculus,  occliio,  etc.,  have  been  applied  more 
particularly  to  the  oe,il,  as  it  were,  pre-eminently,  which  makes 
this  isolated  brilliant  foramen  in  the  countenance ;  and  doubt- 
less the  French  ceil  comes  from  it  also,  bu.t  its  origin  is  not 
at  all  recognizable,  unless  by  the  concatenation  I  have  just 
given ;  and  the  o/x/xa  and  oi/'ts  of  the  Greeks  appear  to  come 
from  the  same  source.  Oe  or  Oeland  is  an  island  among  the 
inhabitants  of  the  North,  and  there  is  some  trace  of  it  in  the 
Hebrew,  where  *i^,  Ai,  is  an  island.  Bochart  ^  believed  that 
the  Phoenicians  derived  the  name  which  he  thinks  they  gave 
to  the  ^gean  Sea,  full  of  islands,  from  the  same  source. 
Augere,  augmentation,  comes  also  from  Auue  or  Auge,  i.e.  from 
the  effusion  of  waters,  as  ooJcen,  auken  in  old  Saxon  was  to 
augment ;  and  Augustus,  when  speaking  as  Emperor,  was  trans- 
lated by  OoJcer.  The  river  of  Brunswick,  which  comes  from 
the  Hartz  Mountains,  and  consequently  is  much  subject  to 
sudden  accretions,  is  called  Ocker,  formerly  Ouacra.  And  I 
mention  in  passing  that  the  names  of  rivers,  having  ordinarily 

1  Samuel  Bochart,  1599-1667,  an  eminent  French  scholar  and  Protestant 
theologian,  a  distinguished  orientalist,  and  a  man  of  profound  erudition, 
thoroughly  familiar  with  all  the  principal  oriental  languages,  including 
Hebrew,  Chaldaic,  Syriac,  and  Arabic,  and  so  enthusiastic  in  linguistic  studies 
that  even  when  far  advanced  in  years  he  desired  to  learn  Ethiopic.  His 
favorite  study  was  Phoenician,  and  though  modest  and  candid  he  seeks  to 
derive  all  languages  etymologically  "  from  the  Hebrew  or  Phoenician,"  a  pro- 
cedure which  led  him  into  many  fanciful  etymologies.  Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit. 
opera  omnia,  Vol.  6,  Pt.  H.,  pp.  223,  226.  His  complete  works  were  published 
under  the  title,  Sam.  Bochart,  opera  omnia.  Leyden,  1675,  2  vols,  fol.,  1692, 
1712,  3  vols.  fol.    Leibnitz  jirized  and  often  cited  them.  — Tk. 


I 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  303 

come  from  the  farthest  known  antiquity,  show  best  the  old 
hmguage  and  the  ancient  inhabitants  ;  hence  they  deserve 
particular  investigation.  And  languages  in  general  being  the 
most  ancient  monuments  of  peoples,  before  writing  and  the 
arts,  show  best  the  origin  of  cognations  and  migrations. 
Hence  etymologies  much  extended  would  be  curious  and  sig- 
nificant; but  it  is  necessary  to  unite  the  languages  of  many 
peoples,  and  not  to  make  too  many  leaps  from  one  nation  to 
another  far  distant  without  having  good  verifications,  in  which 
process  it  is  especially  useful  to  have  intervening  peoples  as 
guarantees.  And  in  general  credence  must  be  given  to  ety- 
mologies only  when  there  is  a  quantity  of  concurrent  evidence ; 
to  do  differently  is  to  goropise. 

Ph.   To  gorojnse?     What  does  that  mean? 

Th.  It  means  that  the  strange  and  often  ridiculous  etymol- 
ogies of  Goropius  Becanus,^  a  learned  physician  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  have  passed  into  a  proverb,  although  otherwise  he 
may  not  have  been  excessively  wrong  in  claiming  that  the 
German  language,  which  he  calls  Cimbric,  has  as  many,  yes, 
more,  marks  of  a  primitive  character  than  the  Hebrew  itself. 
I  remember  that  the  late  Mr.  Clanberg,-  an  excellent  philoso- 

1  John  Becan,  1518-1572,  a  Belgian  physician  and  scholar,  wliose  real  name 
was  Van  Gorp  —  Latinized  as  Goropius  Becanus.  He  practised  medicine  for 
some  years  at  Antwerp,  but  finally  gave  himself  wholly  to  the  study  of 
antiquity,  belles-lettres,  and  ancient  languages.  In  a  public  lecture  at  Liege, 
he  attempted  to  demonstrate  that  the  language  of  Adam  was  the  Flemish  or 
Teutonic,  a  \iew  which  he  set  forth  at  length  in  his  Orirjines  Antwerpianm  sive 
Cimmeriorum  Becceselana,  etc.,  Antwerp,  1569,  fol. ;  and,  as  at  that  time  he 
considered  the  Netherlands  to  be  the  site  of  Paradise,  to  derive  language  in 
general  from  the  Low-German,  which  he  calls  the  Cimbric,  in  his  paper 
Hermathena,  Bk.  II.,  p.  26  sq.  Cf.  Joannis  Goropii  Becani  opera  hactenus  in 
lucem  non  eclita;  nempe,  Hermathena,  etc.,  Antwerp,  1580,  fol.  —  Tr. 

2  John  Clauberg,  1622-16(55,  a  German  philosopher  of  the  Cartesian  school, 
who,  first  as  a  comifeentator  merely  and  afterwards  more  independently, 
introduced  and  expounded  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  in  the  universities  at 
Herhorn  and  Duisburg,  where  he  was  professor  successively  of  theology  and 
philosophy.  He  wrote  a  commentary  on  the  Meditations  of  Descartes,  and  in 
his  own  speculations  anticipated  much  of  the  snl)sequeTit  develojiment  of  Car- 
tesianism.  In  his  Be  conjunctione  animx  et  corporis  human i  sfriptnm.,  he 
maintained  that  bodily  movements  are  antecedents  only  and  not  strictly  causes 
of  mental  action,  a  view  similar  to  that  of  Malebranche.  He  pro])osed  for 
metaphysics  the  name  Ontosophy  or  Ontology,  a  hint  which  Christian  Wolf, 
1679-1754,  afterwards  followed.  Of.  Erdmann,  Gnind.  d.  Gesrh.  d.  Philns., 
§§  268,  4,  290,  4,  Vol.  2,  pp.  33,  187,  "3d  ed.,  Berlin,  1878,  and  English  trans,  ad 
lor.    His  Ontosophia,  de  corjnitione  Dei  et  nostri  appeared  at  Muhlberg,  1087, 


:\i)l  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

plior,  has  jmblislied  a  brief  essay  upon  the  sources  of  the 
Gennan  hiiiguage  which  makes  one  regret  the  loss  of  that 
which  he  had  promised  upon  this  subject.  I  have  myself 
published  some  thoughts  upon  the  subject,  besides  inducing 
the  late  Gerard  Meier,^  a  theologian  of  Bremen,  to  work  upon 
it,  which  he  did  till  death  interrupted  him.  I  hope,  however, 
that  the  public  will  yet  one  day  profit  from  his  labors  as  well 
as  from  the  similar  labors  of  Mr.  Schilter,-  a  celebrated  juris- 
consult at  Strasburg,  but  who  also  has  just  died.  It  is  certain 
at  least  that  the  Teutonic  language  and  antiquities  enter  into 
the  majority  of  the  researches  into  European  origins,  customs, 
and  antiquities.  And  I  wish  that  learned  men  w^ould  make 
as  much  of  them  in  the  languages  of  the  Wallachians,  Bis- 
cayans,  Slavonians,  Finns,  Turks,  Persians,  Armenians,  Geor- 
gians, and  others,  the  better  to  discover  the  harmony  which 
would  particularly  be  of  service,  as  I  have  just  said,  in  clearing 
up  the  origin  of  nations.] 

§  2.  Ph.  [This  design  is  important,  but  at  present  it  is  time 
to  leave  the  matter  of  ivorcls,  and  to  return  to  their  form,  i.e.  to 

1  vol.,  r2mo;  and  his  Opera  2^hilosop7iica  at  Amsterdam,  1691,  2  vols.,  4to. 
Leibnitz  liad  a  Ligli  regard  for  him,  both  as  a  philologist  and  philosopher, 
and  in  one  expression  apparently  places  him  even  above  Descartes;  "  Carte- 
sius  voliiit  quaedam  emendare  in  physicis,  disjilicet  tamen  audacia  et  fastiis 
nimius  conjunctus  cum  stili  obscuritate,  conf usione,  maledicentia.  Longe  magis 
mihi  probatus  Claubergius,  discipuliis  ejus,  pleuus,  perspicuus,  brevis,  method- 
icus."  Cf.  Otium  Hanoveranum,  ed.-J.  F.  Feller,  p.  181,  Lipsire,  1718;  Dutens, 
Leihnit.  opera  omnia,  Vol.  6,  Pt.  I.,  p.  311.  Leibnitz  frequently  mentions  him 
and  his  works,  particularly  the  Meditationes  et  collectanea  linguss  Teutonicse, 
Duisburgi,  IGBS,  and  the  booklet  Ars  etynioloriica  Teutonvm;  cf.  Dutens, 
op.  cit.,  Vols.  5,  p.  334;  6,  Pt.  II.,  pp.  28,  179,  22o!  In  the  Ar.?  etymol.  Teuton. 
Clauberg  puts  it  forth  as  a  fundamental  proposition  that  the  German  must  be 
explained  as  an  original  language.  Cf.  L.  Neff..  G.  W.  Leibniz  als  Sprach- 
forscher  rind  Etifmologe,  Pt.  I.,  p.  16  sq.,  Heidelberg,  1870.  — Tr. 

1  Gerard  or  Gerhard  Meier  or  Sleyer,  who  was  incited  by  Leibnitz  to  the 
study  of  German  philology,  and  collected  an  abundance  of  select  materials  for 
a  Grammatica  Germanica  and  Glo.tsarium  Sayonicum,  but  was  prevented 
from  completing  the  work  be.gvin  by  his  early  and  sudden  death;  cf.  Eccard, 
Collectanea  etymologica,  2  vols.,  8vo,  Hannoverse,  1717,  Eiuleitung,  p.  52,  and 
Dutens,  Leihnit.  opera  omnia,  Vol.  6,  Pt  II.,  p.  145,  note.  Leibnitz  states  that 
the  Glo.ssar.  Saxon,  was  planned  and  undertaken  with  his  encouragement,  and 
that  it  will  contain  much  erudition;  cf.  Dutens,  op.  r;7..  Vols.  5,  p.  115;  C,  114, 
and  note.  For  the  correspondence  between  Mej'er  and  Leibnitz,  which  exhib- 
its Meyer's  method  in  his  etymological  work,  cf.  Dutens,  op.  cit..  Vol.  6,  Pt. 
II.,  pp.  14.5-176.  Leibnitz  says  :  "  His  learning  and  character  are  esteemed  by 
all  "  —  "  Doctrina  ejus,  et  virtus  apud  omnes  in  pretio  habentur,"  Dutens,  op. 
cit..  Vol.  5,  p.  105.  —  Tk.  2  Cf.  ante,  p.  295,  note  1.  — Tr. 


CH.  II]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  305 

the  meaning  wliicli  is  common  to  the  different  languages.] 
Now  you  will  agree  with  me  in  the  first  place,  sir,  that  when 
one  man  speaks  to  another  it  is  of  his  own  ideas  that  he  wishes 
to  give  signs ;  the  words  cannot  be  applied  by  him  to  things 
which  he  does  not  know.  And  until  a  man  has  ideas  of  his 
own  he  cannot  suppose  them  to  correspond  to  the  qualities  of 
things  or  to  the  conceptions  of  another. 

Th.  [It  is  true,  however,  that  he  intends  very  often  to 
indicate  what  others  think  rather  than  what  he  himself 
thinks,  as  happens  only  too  much  in  the  case  of  the  laity, 
whose  faith  is  implicit.  But  I  admit  that  he  always  means 
something  general,  however  hollow  and  destitute  of  intelli- 
gence the  thought  may  be;  and  he  takes  pains  at  least  to 
arrange  his  words  .according  to  the  custom  of  others,  content- 
ing himself  with  the  belief  that  their  sense  can  be  apprehended 
at  need.  Thus  he  is  sometimes  only  the  interpreter  (truche- 
man)  of  thoughts,  or  the  bearer  of  the  word  of  another,  just  as 
a  letter  would  be  ;  and  indeed  this  is  the  case  oftener  than  you 
think.] 

§  3.  Ph.  [You  are  right  in  adding  that  he  always  means 
something  general,  however  idiotic  it  may  be.]  A  child  hav- 
ing noticed  in  what  he  hears  called  gold  only  a  brilliant  yellow 
color,  gives  the  name  of  gold  to  this  same  color  which  he  sees 
in  a  peacock's  tail;  others  will  add  great  weight,  fusibility, 
malleability. 

Th.  [I  admit  it ;  but  often  the  idea  you  have  of  the  object 
of  which  you  speak,  is  still  more  general  than  that  of  this 
child,  and  I  doubt  not  that  a  blind  person  can  speak  pertinently 
of  colors  and  make  a  speech  in  praise  of  the  light  which  he 
does  not  know,  because  he  has  learned  its  effects  and  circum- 
stances.] 

§  4.  Ph.  Your  remark  is  quite  true.  Men  often  apply  their 
thoughts  more  to  words  than  to  things,  and  because  they  have 
learned  most  of  these  words  before  becoming  acquainted  with 
the  ideas  which  they  signify,  not  only  children,  but  also  grown- 
up men  often  speak  like  parrots.  §  5.  But  men  ordinarily  mean 
to  indicate  their  own  thoughts,  and  further  they  attribute  to 
words  a  secret  relation  to  the  ideas  of  another  and  to  things 
themselves.  For  if  the  sounds  were  attached  to  another  idea 
by  the  one  with  whom  we  are  conversing,  it  would  be  necessary 

X 


306  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

to  speak  twi)  languages.  It  is  true  that  one  does  not  stop  too 
much  to  examine  what  the  ideas  of  others  are,  and  our  idea  is 
supposed  to  be  that  which  the  common  people  and  the  scholars 
of  the  country  attach  to  the  same  word.  §  G.  This  is  particu- 
larly the  case  as  regards  simple  ideas  and  modes ;  but  as 
regards  substances  the  belief  is  more  particularly  that  the 
words  signify  also  the  reality  of  things. 

Th.  [Substances  and  modes  are  equally  represented  by 
ideas;  and  things,  as  well  as  ideas,  in  both  cases  are  indi- 
cated by  words  ;  thus  I  see  but  little  difference,  save  that 
ideas  of  substances  and  of  sensible  qualities  are  more  fixed. 
For  the  rest,  it  sometimes  happens  that  our  ideas  and  thoughts 
are  the  matter  of  our  discourse  and  constitute  the  thing  itself 
which  we  desire  to  signify,  and  that  reflective  notions  enter 
more  than  we  think  into  those  of  things.  We  speak,  indeed, 
sometimes  of  words  in  a  material  way,  without  in  this  case 
being  able  to  substitute  with  precision  in  the  place  of  the 
word  its  signification  or  its  relation  to  the  ideas  or  things.^ 

1  Leibnitz  here  points  out  a  source  of  manifold,  far-reaching  and  influential 
errors,  especially  fatal  in  philosophy,  viz.  the  hypostasizing  of  concepts,  i.e. 
regarding  and  using  universal  thouglit-symbols  as  substances,  a  consequence 
of  the  excessive  use  of  abstract  terms.  To  these  errors  thus  arising  from  the 
imperfection  and  abuse  of  words  and  their  influence  on  the  mind,  Francis 
Bacon,  15()l-lti2tj,  in  his  Nov.  Org.  Bk.  I.,  Aphor.  43,  59,  60,  gives  the  name 
of  idolafori,  idols  of  the  market-place,  and  says  they  are  "omnium  molestis- 
sima  "  —  "  the  most  troublesome  of  all."  These  words  are  either  names  merely 
of  non-existent  things  or  of  things  sujiposed  to  exist  because  of  these  names, 
or  are  names  obtained  by  "  vicious  and  unskilful  abstraction"  — "mala  et 
imperita  abstractione  "  —  from  a  few  objects  and  indiscriminately  applied  to 
all  other  things  having  tlie  faintest  analogy  thereto.  The  best  ed.  of  Bacon's 
Works  is  that  of  Ellis,  Spedding,  and  Heath,  2d  ed.,  7  vols.,  London:  Long- 
mans, 1870-72.  The  Nov.  Org.,  in  Latin,  is  in  Vol.  1,  the  Eng.  trans,  in  Vol.  4 
of  this  ed.  Editions  of  the  Nov.  Org.  (Latin)  have  been  published  with  Eng. 
notes,  and  an  Eng.  trans,  in  a  separate  vol.,  by  G.  W.  Kitchin,  Oxford:  Clar- 
endon Press,  1855;  and  with  Introd.,  Notes,  etc.,  by  Thos.  Fowler,  Oxford: 
Clarendon  Press,  1878. 

For  Leibnitz's  estimate  of  Bacon,  whose  Be  Aug.  Scient.  he  mentions 
among  the  writings  which  happily  chanced  to  come  into  his  hands  when  a 
youth,  and  with  others  helped  to  direct  his  studies  in  the  right  path,  whom  he 
enumerates  among  "  the  founders  of  modern  philosophy,"  and  whose  method 
he  applied  in  his  reform  of  the  science  of  language,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Die  philos. 
Schrift.  ".  G.  W.  Leibniz,  Vols.  1  :  196;  .3  :  7,  16;  4  :'l4.3,  Erdmann,  Leibnit. 
' opera  philos.,  p.  61,  b;  G.  4  :  64,  E.  23,  a;  G.  4  :  105,  E.  45,  a,  also  G.  7  :  325, 
E.  110,  b;  G.  4  :  3.37,  343;  7  :  52,  53,  E.  91,  b,  92;  G.  7  :  67;  7  :  495,  Dutens. 
Lpibnit.  opera  omnia,  5  :  368;  6  :  303;  G.  7  :  51S,  E.  421,  a.  Cf.  also  John 
Nichol,  Bacon,  Vol.  2,  pp.  238-239  (Philos.  Classics),  Edinburgh:  Wm.  Black- 


cH.  in]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  307 

This  occurs  not  only  in  speaking  as  a  grammarian,  but  also  in 
speaking  as  a  lexicographer,  in  giving  the  explication  of  the 
term.] 


CHAPTER   III 

OF    GENERAL    TERMS 

§  1.  Ph.  Although  particular  things  alone  exist,  the  larg- 
est number  of  words  are  general  terms,  because  it  is  impossible, 
§  2,  for  each  particular  thing  to  have  a  particular  and  distinct 
name;  besides  the  fact  that  in  such  case  a  prodigious  memory- 
would  be  necessary,  in  comparison  with  which  that  of  certain 
generals  who  could  call  by  name  all  their  soldiers  would  be 
nothing.  The  matter  indeed  becomes  infinite,  if  every  animal, 
every  plant,  and  even  every  leaf  of  a  plant,  every  grain,  in 
short  every  grain  of  sand,  which  might  need  a  name  must 
have  its  name.  [And  how  name  the  parts  of  things  sensibly 
uniform,  as  water,  fire  ?]  §  3.  Besides,  these  particular  names 
would  be  useless,  the  principal  end  of  language  being  to 
excite  in  the  mind  of  him  who  listens  to  me  an  idea  similar  to 
mine.  [Thus  the  similitude  suffices,  which  is  indicated  by 
general  terms.]  §  4.  And  particular  words  alone  Avould  not 
serve  to  extend  our  knowledge,  [nor  to  make  us  judge  of 
the  future  by  the  past,  or  of  one  individual  by  another.] 
§  5.  But  as  it  is  often  necessary  to  mention  certain  individuals, 
particularly  of  our  species,  use  is  made  oi propernames ;  which 
are  given  also  to  countries,  towns,  mountains  and  other  dis- 
tinctions of  place.  And  horse-jockeys  give  proper  names 
even  to  their  horses,  as  well  as  Alexander  to  his  Bucephalus, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  distinguish  this  or  that  particular  horse 
when  he  is  out  of  their  sight. 

Th.  [These  remarks  are  good,  and  some  of  them  agree 
with  those  I  was  about  to  make.  But  I  would  add,  in  accord- 
ance Avith  the  observation  I  have  already  made,  that  proper 
names  have  been  ordinarily  appellatives,  that  is  to  say,  general 

wood  &  Sf)iis,  18S0.  For  a  brief  comparison  of  lAMbnitz  and  Bacon  and  of 
tlii'ir  i)liilos()|iiii(',s,  cf.  J.  T.  iMcrz,  Leibniz,  pp.  21,  71  (Blackwood's  Philos. 
Clas.sics),  Edinburjjli:  1884. — Tk. 


308  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 


in  their  origin,  as  Brutus,  Ca3sar,  Augustus,  Capito,  Lentulus, 
l*iso,  Cicoro,  Elbe,  Rhiue,  Kulir,  Leine,  Ocker,  Bucephalus, 
Alps,  Brenner  or  Pyrenees ;  for  you  know  that  the  first 
Brutus  had  this  name  from  his  apparent  stupidity,  that 
Ciesar  was  the  name  of  a  child  drawn  by  incision  from  the 
womb  of  his  mother,  that  Augustus  was  a  name  of  veneration, 
that  Capito  is  a  large  head  as  also  Bucephalus,  that  Lentulus, 
Piso,  and  Cicero  were  names  given  in  the  beginning  to  those 
who  cultivated  in  particular  certain  kinds  of  vegetables.  I 
have  already  said  what  the  names  of  these  rivers  signify, 
Rhine,  Ruhr,  Leine,  Ocker.  And  you  know  that  all  rivers  are 
still  called  Elbe  in  Scandinavia.  Einally  Alps  are  mountains, 
covered  with  snow  (with  which  agrees  album,  white)  and 
Brenner  or  Pyrenees  signifies  a  lofty  pride,  for  &ren  was  high 
or  chief  (as  Brennus)  in  Keltic,  as  also  hrinck  with  Low- 
Saxons  is  pride,  and  there  is  a  Brenner  between  Germany  and 
Italy  as  the  Pyrenees  are  between  Gaul  and  Spain.  Thus  I 
would  venture  to  say  that  nearly  all  words  are  originally  gen- 
eral terms,  because  it  will  only  rarely  happen  that  an  express 
name  will  be  invented  without  reason  to  indicate  one  such 
individual.  We  can  say  then  that  the  names  of  individuals 
were  names  of  a  species  which  was  given  par  excellence  or 
otherwise  to  some  individual,  as  the  name  large  head  to  that 
one  of  the  whole  city  who  had  the  largest  or  who  was  the 
most  important  of  the  large  heads  which  were  known.  Thus 
it  is  indeed  that  we  give  names  of  genera  to  the  species,  i.e. 
that  we  shall  content  ourselves  with  a  term  more  general  or 
more  vague  to  designate  more  particular  species,  when  we 
have  no  concern  for  their  differences.  Por  example,  we  are 
contented  with  the  general  name,  wormwood,  although  there 
are  so  many  species  of  it  that  one  of  the  Bauhins  ^  has  filled  a 
book  expressly  with  them.] 

1  Jean  Bauhin,  1541-1613,  a  Swiss  physician  and  naturalist,  who  devoted 
himself  chietly  to  hotany,  and  with  his  brother  Gaspard,  15(30-1()24,  also  a 
physician  and  botanist,  was  horn  at  Basel,  whither  his  father,  an  eminent 
French  physician,  had  tied  in  exile  because  of  his  conversion  to  Protestant- 
ism. He  studied  with  the  celebrated  botanist  Fuchs  at  Tubingen,  and  after 
travelliuff  and  collecting  plants  in  the  Alps,  in  France,  and  in  Italy,  became, 
in  1570,  physician  to  Duke  Ulrich  of  Wiirtemberg  at  Montbeliard,  where  he 
reniained  till  his  death.  The  work  of  his  to  which  Leibnitz  here  alludes  is 
entitled  De  plantis  ahsinthii  nomen  hubcntibus.    It  appeared  at  Montbeliard 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  309 

§  G.  Ph.  Your  reflections  upon  the  origin  of  2jroj)er  names 
are  very  just ;  but  to  come  to  that  of  appellative  names  or 
general  terms,  you  will  doubtless  agree,  sir,  that  words 
become  general  when  they  are  signs  of  general  ideas,  and 
ideas  become  general  when  sej^arated  by  abstraction  from 
time,  place,  or  such  other  circumstances  as  may  determine  them 
to  this  or  that  particular  existence. 

Th.    [I  do  not  deny  this  use  of  abstraction,  but  it  is  rather 
in  ascending  from  species   to  genera  than  from  individuals 
to  species.     For  (paradoxical  as  it  may  appear)   it  is  impos- 
sible for  us  to  have   the   knowledge  of    individuals,  and  to 
obtain  the  means  of  detennining  exactly  the  individuality  of 
anything,  at  least  of  keeping  it  by  itself ;  for  all  the  circum- 
stances may  reappear ;  the  smallest  differences  are  to  us  insen- 
sible ;  place  or  time,  far  from  determining  themselves,  need 
themselves  to  be  determined  by  the  things  they  contain.     The^ 
most  important  factor  in  the  problem  is  the  fact  that  individu-  /\ 
ality  includes  infinity,  and  only  he  who  is  capable  of  com-  ^^ 
prehending  it  can  have  the  knowledge   of   the   principle   of 
individuation   of   this  or  that   thing.     This    arises  from   th^ 
influence   (understanding  it  healthfully)   of  all  things  in  the 
universe  upon   each   other.     It   is    true    that   this  would   be 
the  case,  if  the  atoms  of  Democritus  existed,  but  in  tliat  case 
also  there  would  be  no  difference  between  two  different  individ- 
uals of  the  same  form  and  size.]  • 

§  7.  Ph.  It  is,  however,  wholly  evident  that  the  ideas  which 
children  frame  of  persons  with  whom  they  converse  (to  con- 
fine ourselves  to  this  example)  are  similar  to  the  persons 
themselves,  and  particular  only.  The  ideas  they  have  of 
tlieir  nurse  aiid  their  mother  are  very  well  traced  in  their 
minds,  and  the  names  nurse  and  mamma,  which  children  use, 
relate  only  to  these  persons.  Afterwards  when  time  has 
shown  them  that   there   are    many  other    beings    resembling 

in  1593.  His  most  important  work,  composed  with  the  assistance  of  Iiis  fellow- 
countryman  and  son-in-law  Cherler,  and  containing  descriptions  of  about  5000 
plants  with  3577  figures,  is  the  Ilistorin  vniversalis  plantarum  nova  et  absolu- 
tismna,  Yverdun,  1(;50-1(!51,  3  vols.,  fol.  An  abridgment  of  this  great  work 
was  published  by  Clial)ree,  of  Geneva,  with  the  title  SdafiruphiK,  l(i()(i,  con- 
taining in  one  volume  all  the  figures,  together  witli  all  of  importance  on  the 
nomenclature  and  number  of  sjjccies  in  the  great  work.  Ho  was  one  of  the 
founders  of  modern  Itotany.  — Tu. 


310  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

their  father  or  mother,  they  form  an  idea  in  which  they  find 
tluit  all  these  particular  beings  equally  share,  and  they,  as 
others,  give  it  the  name  of  man.  §  8.  They  acquire  in  the 
same  way  names  and  notions  more  general ;  for  example,  the 
new  idea  of  animal  is  not  produced  by  any  addition,  but  only 
by  removing  the  figure  or  the  particular  properties  of  man, 
and  retaining  a  body  accompanied  by  life,  feeling,  and  spon- 
taneous movement. 

Th.  [Very  well ;  but  that  shows  only  what  I  just  said ;  for 
as  the  child  advances  by  abstraction  from  the  observation  of 
the  idea  of  man  to  that  of  the  idea  of  animal,  he  has  come 
from  the  more  specific  idea  observed  in  his  mother  or  father 
and  in  other  persons  to  that  of  human  nature.  For  in  order 
to  discern  that  he  had  not  the  precise  idea  of  the  individual, 
it  is  sufficient  to  consider  that  an  ordinary  resemblance  would 
deceive  him  easily  and  make  him  take  as  his  mother  another 
woman.  You  know  the  story  of  the  false  Martin  Guerre,^  who 
deceived  even  the  wife  of  the  true,  and  the  near  relatives,  by 
resemblance  united  with  skill,  and  embarrassed  for  a  long 
time  the  judges,  even  when  the  true  Martin  had  arrived.] 

§  9.  Ph.  Thus  this  whole  mystery  of  genus  and  species, 
which  makes  so  much  noise  in  the  schools,  but  which  outside 
of  them  is  with  reason  so  little  regarded,  this  whole  mystery, 
I  say,  reduces  itself  solely  to  the  formation  of  abstract  ideas 
more  or  less  extended,  to  which  certain  names  are  given.- 

1  Cf.  Essais  de  Theodic^e,  Discours  prelimiuaire,  §  42,  Gerliardt,  6,  74, 
Erdmanu,  491,  b,  Jacques,  2,  48.  In  the  sixteenth  century,  Martin  Guerre,  a 
gentleman  of  Gascony,  disappeared  from  home.  After  a  long  absence,  a  mau 
by  the  uame  of  Arnaud  du  Thil  suddenly  appeared,  claiming  to  be  Martin 
Guerre,  and  was  acknowledged  by  the  wife  of  Guerre  as  her  husband.  She 
had  by  him  two  children.  Learning,  afterwards,  that  her  true  husband  was 
in  Flanders,  she  angrily  delivered  the  impostor  into  the  hands  of  justice.  The 
long  trial,  one  of  the  most  celebrated  cases  of  the  century,  was  brought  to  an 
end  by  the  sudden  and  unexpected  arrival  of  the  true  Martin  Guerre,  and 
Du  Thil  was  sentenced  to  death.  For  further  details,  and  tlie  sentence  in  full, 
cf.  P.  Larousse,  Grand  Diet.  Universel  de  X/X«  Steele,  Vol.  8,  p.  1603,  b,  c. 
A  parallel  case  in  recent  times  was  the  Tichborne  trial  in  England.  —  Tr. 

2  The  philosophies  of  Locke  and  Leibnitz  present  a  sharp  contrast  on  the 
question  of  genera  and  species,  and  the  real  existence  of  the  universal.  Accord- 
ing to  Locke,  the  question  is  a  wholly  empty  one,  an  inheritance  from  the 
un])r()fitable  discussions  of  scholasticism.  The  general  term,  the  universal,  is 
a  purely  subjectiA^e  product  of  the  more  or  less  arbitrary  activity  of  man  in 
abstraction,  and  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  reality.  Leibnitz  maintains 
that  the  universal  is  the  inner  essence  of  things,  and  that  the  formation  of 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  311 

Th.  [The  art  of  classifying  things  into  genera  and  species 
is  of  no  little  importance  and  of  much  use  both  to  the  judg- 
ment and  the  memory.  You  know  how  important  this  is  in 
botany,  not  to  speak  of  animals  and  other  substances,  and 
without  mentioning  also  beings  moral  and  notional,^  as  some 
call  them.  Order  largely  depends  upon  it,  and  many  good 
authors  so  write  that  their  entire  discourse  can  be  reduced  to 
divisions  and  subdivisions,  according  to  a  method  which  has 
some  relation  to  genera  and  species,  and  is  of  use  not  only  in 
retaining  things,  but  also  in  finding  them.^  And  they  who 
have  arranged  all  sorts  of  notions  under  certain  titles  or  pre- 
dicaments subdivided  have  done  a  very  useful  tiling.] 

§  10.  Ph.    In  defining  words,  we  avail  ourselves  of  the  genus 

general  terms  is  not  a  mere  thought-expedient,  but  a  legitimate  and  proper 
appreliension  of  the  true  and  the  real.  Cf.  G.  Hartensteiu,  Locke's  Lehre  v.  d. 
menschl.  Erkenntniss  in  Vergleichung  in.  Leibniz's  Kritik  derselben,  V., 
pp.  52  sq.,  also  in  his  Histor.  Philos.  Ahhandl.,  Leipzig,  1870,  pp.  1G2  sq.  —  Tr. 

1  Notional  or  couceptional  beings,  he(jriffliche  TFe.sen,  entia  rationis,  are 
those  which,  as  Scliaarschmidt  says,  "  serve  to  indicate  tliat  which  witliout 
being  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  tlie  word  substantial  (first  substance  in  the 
language  of  Aristotle,"  cf.  C'atcf/or.  5,  2^,  11 ;  Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos. 
of  Aristotle,  §  10,  p.25  ;  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  p.  304  sq.,  3d  ed., 
1879;  but  cf.  also,  Metaphys.  VII.,  7,  1032b,  2;  Wallace,  op.  cit.  §  34,  p.  67, 
Zeller,  op.  cit.  II.  2  [Vol.  4],  p.  344  sq.)  "  can  still  lay  claim  to  an  ideal  reality." 
For  further  discussion  of  the  subjects  of  this  and  the  note  next  preceding, 
cf.  Neiv  Essays,  Bk.  III.,  chaps.  5,  6,  Bk.  IV.,  chaps.  4,  6.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.  7,  67:  "  Fuere  tamen  autores  non 
contemuendi,  qui  methodum  rebus  junxere  vit  Theodorus  Zwingerus,  Job. 
Thomas  Freigius,  Barthol.  Kecliermannus,  et  diligentissimus  Joh.  Henr. 
Alstedius,  cujus  Encyclopaedia  mihi  pro  captu  illorum  temporum  laudanda 
videtur."  Alsted,  1588-1638,  was  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Theology  at 
Herborn  in  Nassau,  but  applied  himself  chiefly  to  systemizing  the  several 
branches  of  art  and  science.  His  Encyclopsedia,HerhoTmTe,lCM0,7  \o\s.,iol., 
reprinted  Lugduni,  1C49,  4  vols.,  fol.  Leibnitz  often  mentions  it  ('•/'.  G.  4,  62, 
74,  E.  22,  a,  28,  b;  Dutens,  Leibnit.  opera  omnia,  5,  405,  567),  and  wrote  down 
some  thoughts  —  cof/itata  quxdam — for  its  enlargement  and  improvement; 
cf.  Dutens,  5,  183-185.  The  classified  contents  of  the  work  are  given  in  the 
article  "Encyclopaedia,"  in  the  Encyclop.  Brit.  9th  ed.,  Vol.  8,  p.  17(!,  I> 
(American  Reprint).  Schaarschmidt  states  that  the  different  works  of  K. 
Goclen,  as  well  as  those  of  Alsted,  are  of  the  kind  alluded  to  in  the  text. 
Goclen,  1,547-1626,  was  Professor  of  Philosophy  at  Marburg,  and  published  a 
Lexicon  philosophicnm,  Marburg,  1613,  1  vol.,  4to,  which,  though  of  little 
value,  enjoyed  from  its  novelty  considerable  celebrity  at  the  tinu'  of  its  ;i|)pear- 
ancc.  l-i-ibnitz  refers  to  this  woi'k  in  his  third  Icltcr  to  Clarke;  'f.  G.  7,  365, 
E.  752,  b,  J.  2,  426,  D.  2,  122.  Goclen  was  the  'discovc'rer  and  signalizer'  of 
the  Inverse,  Regressive,  or  Goclenian  Sorites,  in  comprehension  ;  <f.  Hamilton, 
Lects.  on  Loi/ic,  XIX.,  p.  27.'!,  Amer.  ed.,  and  Goclenii  Isayoge  in  Oryanum 
Aristotelis,  p.  255,  Francof.  1598. — Tu. 


312  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

or  the  next  general  term  ;  and  this  is  for  the  purpose  of  spar- 
ing ourselves  the  trouble  of  counting  the  different  simple  ideas 
which  this  genus  signifies,  or  sometimes  perhaps  for  the  pur- 
pose of  sparing  ourselves  the  disgrace  of  being  unable  to  make 
this  enumeration.  But  although  the  shortest  way  of  defining 
is  by  means  of  genus  and  difference,  as  the  logicians  say,  it  may 
be  doubted,  in  my  opinion,  whether  it  is  the  best ;  at  least  it 
is  not  the  only  way.  In  the  definition  which  states  that  man 
is  a  rational  animal  (a  definition  which  is  perhaps  not  the 
most  exact,  but  which  serves  well  enough  the  jjresent  pur- 
pose), instead  of  the  word  animal  you  might  put  its  definition. 
And  this  shows  the  little  necessity  of  the  rule  which  requires 
that  a  definition  must  he  composed  of  genus  and  difference,^  and 
the  little  advantage  there  is  in  its  strict  observance.  Thus 
languages  are  not  always  made  according  to  the  rules  of  logic, 
so  that  the  meaning  of  each  term  may  be  exactly  and  clearly 
expressed  by  two  others.  And  those  who  made  this  rule  have 
done  ill  in  giving  us  so  few  definitions  conformable  to  it. 

Th.  [I  agree  with  your  remarks  ;  it  would  be  advantageous, 
however,  for  many  reasons,  if  definitions  might  consist  of  tn-o 
terms :  it  would  without  doubt  greatly  shorten  them,  and  all 
divisions  could  be  reduced  to  dichotomies  which  are  the  best 
species  of  divisions,  and  are  particularly  useful  for  invention, 
judgment,  and  memory.  I  do  not,  however,  think  logicians 
always  demand  that  the  genus  or  the  difference  be  expressed 
in  a  single  word ;  for  example,  the  term  regular  polygon  may 
pass  as  the  genus  of  the  square,  and  in  the  figure  of  the  circle 
the  genus  might  be  a  plane  curvilinear  figure,  and  the  dif- 
ference might  consist  in  the  fact  that  all  points  of  the  circum- 
ference are  equally  distant  from  a  certain  point  as  centre.^ 

1  Cf.  Aristotle,  Topica,  VI.,  4,  Mlb,  26:  Set  ii.kv  SiaroO  yivov^  koj.  rSiV  SLa<f>opS>v 
opi^eaOaL  rbi'  (caAjJs  optfo^iei-or,  also  I.,  8,  IDS'*,  15  '.  fVeiSJ)  6  6pt<r/a6s  ex  -yeVous  Koi.  Sia<}>opuiv 

ecjTiV,  aud  Wallace,  Outlines,  §§  14,  15,  25;  Zellev,  Fhilos.  d.  Griec/t.,  U.,  2 
[Vol.  4],  p.  255.  — Tr. 

2  Leibuitz  rightly  takes  exception  to  Locke's  censure  of  Aristotle's  rule 
regarding  definition,  given  in  the  preceding  note,  viz. :  that  it  must  consist  of 
the  genus  and  the  species-forming  difference,  remarking  that  genus  and  dif- 
ference may  verj'  often  he  interchanged,  the  ijossibility  of  this  interchange 
depending  upon  the  principle  on  which,  or  the  point  of  -^iew  from  which,  the 
classification  is  made,  or  upon  the  closeness  with  which  the  genus  and  the 
species-forming  difference  approach  each  other,  it  being  essential  to  valid 
interchange  that  they  be  actually  alike,  or  so  nearly  so  that  the  difference  is 


cii.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  313 

For  the  rest,  it  is  also  well  to  remark  that  very  often  the  genus 
may  be  changed  into  a  difference  and  the  difference  into  a 
genus.  For  exam2)le,  the  sqnare  is  a  regular  cxuadrilateral,  or 
rather  a  four-sided  figure  that  is  regular,  so  that  the  genus 
or  the  difference  seems  to  differ  only  as  the  substantive  and 
adjective ;  as  if,  instead  of  saying  that  man  is  a  rational  living 
being  {animal  raisonnable) ,  language  allowed  the  statement 
that  man  is  a  living  rational  being  {rational  animahle),  i.e. 
a  rational  substance  endowed  with  an  auimal  nature ;  while 
genii  ^  are  rational  substances  whose  nature  is  not  animal  or 
common  with  the  animals.  And  this  interchange  of  genera 
and  differentia  depends  upon  the  variation  of  the  order  of  the 
sub-divisions.] 

§  11.  Ph.  It  follows  from  what  I  have  just  said,  that  what 
is  called  general  and  universal  belongs  not  to  the  being  (exist- 
ence) ^  of  tilings,  but  that  it  is  a  work  of  the  understanding, 
§  12,  and  the  essences  of  each  species  are  only  abstract  ideas. 

Th.  [I  do  not  quite  see  this  consequence.  For  generality 
consists  in  the  resemblance  of  separate  things  among  them- 
selves, and  this  resemblance  is  a  reality.] 

§  13.  Ph.  I  was  going  myself  to  say  to  you  that  these  species 
are  founded  upon  resemblances. 

Th.  [Why,  then,  not  seek  therein  also  the  essence  of  genera 
and  species  ?] 

§  14.  Ph.  You  will  be  less  surprised  to  hear  me  say  that 
these  essences  are  the  work  of  the  understanding,  if  you  con- 
sider that  there  are  at  least  complex  ideas  which  in  the  minds 
of  different  persons  are  often  different  collections  of  simple 
ideas,  and  thus  what  is  avarice  in  the  mind  of  one  man  is  not 
so  in  the  mind  of  another. 

practically  of  no  account.  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  3,  ante,  p.  308. 
Such  definitions,  while  not  strictly  logical  or  scientific  in  the  full  sense  of  these 
terms,  hut  tentative  rather,  and,  as  it  were,  popular,  are  nevertheless  useful, 
and  indeed  necessary,  in  ordinary  life  and  in  science,  where  we  must  classify 
to  a  certain  extent  for  tlie  sake  of  relative  clearness,  hut  where  strict  logical 
definition  is  not  essential,  or  is  impossihle  hecause  of  the  insufiiciency  of  our 
knowledge.  Logically  exhaustive  definition,  save  in  the  r(!alin  of  pure  thought 
and  in  such  sciences  as  the  pure  mathematics,  is  possihle  only  to  an  infinite 
mind  wlio  possesses  exhaustive  knowledge  of  all  principles  and  facts  involved. 
Exhaustive  knowledge  of  an  individual  demands  an  exhaustive  knowledge  of 
all  other  individuals.     Cf.  N.  E.,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  :!,  §  G,  TJi.,  ante,  p.  309.— Tr. 

1  I.e.  angels  and  archangels. — Tr. 

2  Locke  has :  "  real  existence,"  Philos.  Wks.,  Vol.  '1,  p.  14  (l5ohn's  Ed.).  — Tii. 


314  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

Til.  [I  admit,  sir,  that  there  are  few  cases  in  which  I  have 
less  understood  the  force  of  your  inferences  than  here,  and 
this  troubles  me.  If  men  differ  in  the  name,  does  it  change 
the  things  or  their  resemblances  ?  If  one  applies  the  name 
avarice  to  one  resemblance,  and  another  to  another,  there  will 
be  two  different  species  designated  by  the  same  name.] 

Ph.  In  that  species  of  substance  which  is  most  familiar  to 
us  and  with  which  we  are  most  intimately  acquainted,  it  has 
many  times  been  doubted  whether  the  offspring  brought  into 
the  world  by  a  woman  was  a  man,^  even  to  discussing  whether 
he  should  be  fed  and  baptized.  This  could  not  be  if  the  ab- 
stract idea  or  the  essence,  to  which  the  name  man  belongs, 
were  the  work  of  nature,  and  not  a  diverse,  uncertain  collection 
of  simple  ideas  which  the  understanding  put  together,  and  to 
which  it  attached  a  name,  after  having  made  it  general  by 
way  of  abstraction.  So  that  at  bottom  each  distinct  idea, 
formed  by  abstraction,  is  a  distinct  essence. 

Th.  [Pardon  me  for  telling  you,  sir,  that  your  language 
perplexes  me,  for  I  do  not  see  its  connection.  If  we  cannot 
always  discern  by  the  outside  the  internal  resemblances,  are 
there  less  of  them  in  nature  ?  When  we  doubt  whether  a 
monster  is  a  man,  we  doubt  whether  it  has  reason.  When  we 
know  it  has,  the  theologians  will  order  it  to  be  baptized,  and 
the  jurisconsults,  to  be  fed.  It  is  true  that  we  may  dispute 
about  the  lowest  species  logically  considered,  which  vary 'by 
accidents  in  one  and  the  same  physical  species,  or  species  by 
direct  descent  {tribu  de  generation),"^  but  we  do  not  need  to 
determine  these ;  we  may,  indeed,  vary  them  infinitely,  as  is 
seen  in  the  great  variety  of  oranges,  lemons,  and  citrons,  which 
experts  know  how  to  name  and  distinguish.  The  same  thing 
was  seen  in  tulips  and  pinks  when  these  flowers  were  in 
fashion.  For  the  rest,  the  fact  that  men  unite  these  or  those 
ideas,  or  even  that  nature  actually  unites  them  or  not,  makes 
no  difference  as  regards  essences,  genera,  or  species,  since  the 
question  only  concerns  possibilities,  which  are  independent  of 
our  thought.] 

1  Cf.  Locke,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2,  p.  17,  and  note  (Bohn's  Ed.).  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  New  Essays.  Bk.  III.,  chap.  6,  §  14,  Gerbardt,  5,  28S,  line  14 ;  Erdmann, 
313,  a;  Jacques,  1,  234.  The  term  "species,"  in  Leibnitz's  day,  denoted  not 
merely  similarity  of  external  form  and  characteristics,  but  more  essentially 
the  genetic  relationship  of  common  descent.  —  Tr. 


cii.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  315 

§  15.  Ph.  The  species  of  each  thing  is  ordinarily  supposed 
to  have  a  real  constitution,  and  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  some 
real  constitution  must  exist  vipon  which  every  collection  of 
simple  ideas  or  qualities  co-existing  in  this  thing  must  depend. 
But  as  it  is  evident  that  things  are  ranked  in  sorts  or  species 
under  certain  names  only  as  they  agree  with  certain  abstract 
ideas  to  which  we  have  attached  these  names,  the  essence  of 
each  genus  or  species  comes  thus  to  be  nothing  else  than  the 
abstract  idea  signified  by  the  general  or  specific  name,  and  we 
shall  find  this  to  be  the  import  of  the  word  essence,  according 
to  its  most  ordinary  use.  It  would  not  be  a  bad  thing,  in  my 
opinion,  to  designate  these  two  kinds  of  essences  by  two 
different  names,  and  to  call  the  one  real,  and  the  other,  nominal 
essence. 

Th.  [It  seems  to  me  that  our  language  makes  extreme  inno- 
vations in  the  method  of  expression.  We  have  indeed  spoken 
hitherto  of  nominal  and  causal  or  real  definitions,  but  not 
within  my  knowledge  of  essences  other  than  real,  at  least  by 
nominal  essences  have  not  been  understood  false  and  impos- 
sible essences,  which  appear  to  be  essences,  bu.t  are  not;  as, 
for  example,  would  be  that  of  a  regular  decahedron,  i.e.  of  a 
regular  body  comprised  within  ten  planes.^  Essence  is  at 
bottom  nothing  less  than  the  possibility  of  that  which  we 
think.  What  we  assume  as  possible  is  exj)ressed  by  the  defi- 
nition; but  this  definition  is  only  nominal  when  it  does  not 
express  at  the  same  time,  possibility ;  for  then  we  may  doubt 
whether  this  definition  expresses  anything  real,  i.e.  possible, 
until  experience  comes  to  our  aid  to  make  i;s  know  this  reality 
a  posteriori,^  when  the  thing  is  actually  found  in  the  world : 
and  this  sulfices  for  the  defect  of  the  reason,  which  made  us 
know  the  reality  a  priori  ^  by  exposing  the  cause  or  the  possible 
generation  of  the  definite  thing.  It  does  not  then  depend  on 
us  to  unite  ideas  as  seems  good  to  us  ;  at  least,  this  combination 
is  not  justified  either  by  reason  which  shows  it  as  possible,  or 
by  experience  which  shows  it  as  actual,  and  consequently,  also 
possible.     In  order  the  better  to  distinguish,  also,  essence  and 

1  This  figure  is  impossible,  the  only  possible  regular  polyhedrons  being 
tlie  tetrahedron,  hexahedron,  octohedron,  dodecahedron,  and  icosahedron. — 
Tr. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  227,  note  2.  —  Tr. 


lllli  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

definition,  3^011  must  consider  that  tliere  is  only  one  essence  of 
the  thing,  but  that  there  are  many  definitions  which  express 
one  and  the  same  essence,  as  the  same  structure  or  the  same 
city  may  be  represented  by  different  scenographies  according 
to  the  different  sides  from  which  it  is  regarded.] 

§  18.^  Ph.  You  will,  I  think,  agree  with  me  that  the  real 
and  the  nominal  are  always  the  same  in  simple  ideas  and  in 
the  ideas  of  the  modes  ;  but  in  the  ideas  of  substances,  they 
are  always  entirely  different.  A  figure  which  bounds  a  space 
by  three  lines  is  the  real  as  well  as  the  nominal  essence  of 
the  triangle ;  for  it  is  not  only  the  abstract  idea  to  which  the 
general  name  is  annexed,  but  the  essence  or  proper  being  of 
the  thing,  or  the  foundation  whence  proceed  its  properties, 
and  to  which  they  are  annexed.  But  it  is  wholly  otherwise 
as  regards  gold.  The  real  constitution  of  its  parts,  upon  which 
its  color,  weight,  fusibility,  firmness,  etc.,  depend,  is  unknown 
to  us ;  and,  having  no  idea  of  it,  we  have  no  name  that  is  its 
sign.  Yet  these  are  the  qualities  which  cause  the  matter  to 
be  called  gold,  and  are  its  nominal  essence,  i.e.  which  give  it  a 
right  to  the  name. 

Th.  [I  should  prefer  to  say,  in  accord  with  received  usage, 
that  the  essence  of  gold  is  that  which  constitutes  it  and  which 
gives  it  these  sensible  qualities,  which  make  it  known  and 
which  make  its  nominal  definition,  while  we  should  have  the 
real  and  causal  definition  if  we  could  explain  this  contexture 
or  internal  constitution.  But  the  nominal  definition  is  here 
found  real  also,  not  by  itself  (for  it  does  not  make  known 
a  priori  the  possibility  or  the  genesis  of  bodies),  but  by  experi- 
ence, because  we  have  experience  of  a  body  in  which  these 
qualities  are  found  together  :  but  without  this  we  might  doubt 
whether  so  much  weight  would  be  compatible  with  so  much 
malleability,  as  it  may  be  doubted,  even  at  present,  whether  a 
glass  malleable  by  cold  is  possible  in  nature.^  I  am  not,  for 
the  rest,  of  your  opinion,  sir,  that  there  is  here  the  difference 

1  §  18,  in  Locke,  Philos.  Works,  2,  p.  19  (Bolin's  ed.) ;  so  Gerhardt :  Erdmann, 
Jacques,  and  Schaarschmidt  in  his  German  translation,  have  §  19. —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Pliny  the  Elder,  23-79,  Histor.  Natur.,  Bk.  36,  chap.  66;  Eng.  trans. 
(Bohn's  Class.  Lih.),  Vol.  6,  p.  381,  London,  1857.  "  In  the  reign  of  Tiberius, 
it  is  said,  a  combination  was  devised  which  produced  a  flexible  glass.  .  .  .  This 
story,  however,  was,  for  a  long  time,  more  widely  sprijad  than  well  authenti- 
cated "  —  "  fama  crebrior  quam  certior."  — Tr. 


cii.  Ill]  UN   HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  317 

between  the  ideas  of  substances  and  the  ideas  of  predicates,  as 
if  the  definitions  of  predicates  (i.e.  of  the  modes  and  the 
objects  of  simple  ideas)  were  always  real  and  nominal  at 
the  same  time,  and  that  those  of  substances  were  only  nominal. 
I  quite  agree  that  it  is  more  difiicult  to  have  real  definitions 
of  bodies,  which  are  substantial  existences  because  their  con- 
texture is  less  sensible.  But  it  is  not  the  same  with  all  sub- 
stances ;  for  we  have  a  knowledge  of  true  substances  or  unities 
(as  God  and  the  soul)  as  intimate  as  we  have  of  the  most  of 
the  modes.  Besides,  there  are  some  predicates  as  little  known 
as  the  contexture  of  bodies  ;  yellow  or  bitter,  for  example, 
are  objects  of  simple  ideas  or  notions  (phantasies^),  and  yet  we 
have  only  a  confused  knowledge  of  them.^  The  case  is  the 
same  in  mathematics,  where  one  and  the  same  mode  may  have 
a  nominal  as  well  as  a  real  definition.  Few  people  have 
clearly  explained  in  what  consists  the  difference  between  these 
two  definitions  which  must  distinguish,  also,  essence  and  prop- 
erty. In  m.y  opinion,  this  difference  is  that  the  real  shows 
the  possibility  of  the  thing  defined,  and  the  nominal  does  not.^ 

1  Schaarschmidt  translates :  "  die  Gegenstande  einfacher  Vorstellimgen  oder 
Phantasiebilder."  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Neio  Essays,  Preface,  wite,  p.  48,  ad  fin,  and  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  6,  §  7,  Th. 
(2),  j«/Va,p.  458.  According  to  Leibnitz,  sense-knowledge  is  confused,  and  needs 
to  be  developed  into  clearness  and  consistency  by  the  discriminative  analysis 
and  unifying  power  of  thought.  Phenomena  such  as  colors,  sounds,  etc.,  the 
subjective  countei'ijart  or  resultant  of  specific  sense-energies,  resist  all  further 
analysis,  and  while  clear  as  wholes,  are  composite,  insoluble,  and  so  confused 
as  regards  their  single  elements.  Such  wholes  admit  only  descriptive,  not, 
strictly  speaking,  logical  definition.  Cf.  Med.  de  C'of/.,  Ver.,  et  Id.  ad  init., 
Gerhardt,  4.  422,  Erdmann,  78,  a,  trans.  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  27. 
—  Tr. 

3  Cf.  ante,  pp.  17,  201,  and  Med.  de  Cog.,  Ver.,  et  Id.,  Gerhardt,  4,  424, 
Erdmann,  80,  1),  trans.  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  30;  also  G.  G, 
405,  E.  f)37,  a,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  opera  omnia,  1,  439;  6,  44;  G.  7. 194  and  note. 
As  the  nominal  definition  explains  a  thing  according  to  the  name,  we  may  have 
nominal  definitions  of  objectively  non-existent  or  of  impossible  tilings,  as 
centaurs,  griffins,  or  any  of  the  creatures  of  the  fancy  or  the  imagination,  or 
the  decahedron  mentioned  in  §  15,  Th.,  of  this  chapter,  ante  p.  315.  The  real 
definition  explains  the  thing  to  be  defined  by  exhibiting  its  cause  or  generation, 
its  rise  out  of  its  conditions,  i.e.,  its  possibility;  it  is  thus  identical  with  the 
genetic  definition,  and  Leibnitz  accordingly  calls  it  the  causal  definition,  ante 
p.  31(i.  Cf.  also  Dewey,  Leibniz's  New  Essays,  210;  Hamilton,  Locjic,  343; 
Trendelenburg,  Ueber  d.  Element  d.  Definition  in  Leibniz.  Philosophie  in 
Histor.  Beitr.  z.  Philos.,  Berlin,  18()7,  Vol.  3,  pji.  48-()2.  Trendelon))nrg  calls 
special  attention  to  the  fact  tliat  Leibnitz,  in  drjinition,  has  in  mind  (^specially 
the  analytical  element,  explaining  definition  as  an  unfolding  of  the  concept, 


818  LEI13^'1TZ"S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  in 


The  definition  of  two  jjandlel  straight  lines,  which  states  that 
they  are  in  one  and  the  same  plane  and  will  not  meet  although 
continued  to  infinity,  is  only  nominal,  for  we  could  at  once 
doubt  whether  that  is  possible.  But  when  we  have  under- 
stood that  we  can  draw  a  straight  line  in  a  plane  parallel  to 
a  given  straight  line  provided  w^e  take  care  that  the  point  of 
the  style  describing  the  parallel  remains  always  equally  distant 
from  the  given  line,  we  see  at  once  that  the  thing  is  possible, 
and  why  they  have  this  property  of  never  meeting,  which  con- 
stitutes their  nominal  definition,  but  which  is  the  sign  of  the 
parallelism  only  when  the  two  lines  are  straight,  while  if  one 
at  least  were  curved,  they  might  be  by  nature  unable  ever  to 
meet,  and  yet  not  on  that  account  be  parallel. 

§  19.  Ph.  If  essence  was  something  else  than  the  abstract 
idea  it  would  not  be  ingenerable^  and  incorruptible.  A  uni- 
corn, a  mermaid,  a  perfect  circle,  perhaps  do  not  exist  in  the 
world. 

TJi.  [I  have  already  told  you,  sir,  that  essences  are  perpetual, 
because  here  the  question  concerns  only  the  possible.] 


CHAPTER   IV 

OF    THE    NAMES    OF    SIMPLE    IDEAS 

§  2.  Ph.  1  confess  I  have  always  believed  that  the  forma- 
tion of  the  modes  was  arbitrary  ;  but  as  regards  simple  ideas 
and  those  of  substances,  I  have  been  persuaded  that,  besides 
possibility,  these  ideas  should  signify  a  real  existence. 

T/i.<^f  I  see  no  necessity  for  it.  God  has  ideas  before  creating 
the  objects  of  these  ideas,  and  nothing  prevents  Him  from 
being  able  also  to  communicate  such  ideas  to  intelligent  creat- 
ures :  there  is  also  no  exact  demonstration  proving  that  the 
objects  of  our  senses  and  of  the  simple  ideas  which  the  senses 

or  its  resolution  into  several  concepts  equivalent  to  the  one  concept — •"  definire 
est  explicare  notionem,  resolvere  in  plures  uotiones  uni  aequivalentes ;  "  cf. 
Dutens,  0^3.  C(i.,4,  68  :  "  defiuitio  niliil  aliud,  quani  accurata  nominis  explicatio 
est";  G.  4,  140,  E.  60,  b  :  "definitio  enini  nihil  aliud  est,  quam  signiticatio 
verbis  expressa,  sive  brevius,  significatio  signiticata."  — Tr. 

1  Locke's  word,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2,  p.  20  (Bohn's  ed.).  —  Tr. 


cii.  IV]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  319 

present  to  us  are  outside  us.^  This  fact  has  especial  weight 
in  the  case  of  those  who  believe  with  the  Cartesians  and  with 
our  distinguished  author,  tliat  our  simple  ideas  of  sensible 
qualities  have  no  resemblance  to  tliat  which  is  outside  us  in 
the  objects  ;  there  would  then  be  nothing  requiring  these  ideas 
to  be  grounded  in  any  real  existence.-] 

§§  4,  5,  6,  7.  Ph.  You  will  grant  me  at  least  this  other 
difference  between  simple  and  complex  ideas,  that  the  names 
of  simple  ideas  cannot  be  defined,  while  those  of  complex  ideas 
can  be.  For  definitions  should  contain  more  than  one  term, 
each  of  which  signifies  one  idea.  Thus  you  see  what  can  or 
cannot  be  defined,  and  why  definitions  cannot  go  on  to  infinity; 
a  remark  which  no  one,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  up  to  this  time 
made. 

Th.  [I  have  also  made  the  statement  in  the  brief  Essay 
upon  Ideas,^  inserted  in  the  "  Actes  de  Leipzic  "  about  twenty 
years-^ince,  that  simple  terms  cannot  have  nominal  definitions  ; 
but  I  have  there  added  at  the  same  time  the  statement  that 
terms,  when  they  are  simple  only  as  regards  us  (because  we 
have  no  means  of  analyzing  them  so  as  to  reach  the  elementary 

1  The  demonstrability  of  the  reality  of  that  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  senses  is  one  of  the  most  diflficult  problems  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge  —  Erkenntnisslehre.  Leibnitz  seems  nowhere  to  have  discussed  the 
question,  at  least  in  this  form,  nor  to  have  asked  himself  how,  agreeably  to 
his  philosophical  system,  a  knowledge  of  the  reality  of  the  external  world 
could  be  demonstrated  or  a  belief  therein  justified.  So  far  as  his  system  sug- 
gests any  answer  consistent  with  itself,  that  answer  is  found  in  his  doctrine  of 
pre-established  harmony,  in  the  consciousness  of  w^hich  we  pass  immediately 
from  our  inner  representative  world  of  ideas  to  belief  in  the  reality  of  the 
external  things  thus  ideally  represented.  This,  however,  like  Descartes' 
attempt  to  bridge  the  chasm  from  the  subjective  to  the  objective  liy  his  doctrine 
of  God's  veracity,  is  mere  assumption,  not  "  exact  demonstration."  The 
jiroblem  belongs  to  both  psycliology  and  metaphysics,  and  is  satisfactorily 
discussed  and  solved  oidy  when  considered  in  these  two  aspects.  Leibnitz  was 
an  idealist  in  psychology,  and  a  realist  in  metaphysi('s,  and  never  really  har- 
monized or  united  these  two  points  of  view.  For  him,  therefore,  there  could 
be  ''no  exact  demonstration"  of  the  external  reality  of  "the  objects  of  our 
senses  and  of  the  simple  ideas  whicli  the  senses  present  to  us."  Cf.  Discours 
de  Metnphysiqur,  §§  21)  sq.,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Hchrift.,  4.  451  sq.,  E. 
Caird,  The  Crit.  Philo.s.  of  Immunuel  Kant,  1,  8G-95.  New  York,  Macmillan 
&Co.,  1889.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Nev)  Essays,  Bk.  XL,  chap.  8,  §§  21,  24,  ante,  pp.  1.3:5-135 ;  also  Bk.  IV., 
chap.  11.  The  constancy  of  sense-phenomena  is  the  constraining  reason  for 
referring  them  to  something  real.  Cf.  Dewey,  Leibniz's  New  Essays,  173  sq.; 
Gerlianit,  Leibniz,  pli Has.  Srhrift.  7,  319  .tq.  —  Tii. 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  14,  note  2 ;  p.  227,  note  3.  —  Tb. 


320  LEIBNITZ'S    CKITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

perceptions  of  which  they  are  composed),  as  heat,  cold,  yellow, 
green,  can  receive  a  real  definition  which  would  explain  their 
cause.  Thus,  the  real  definition  of  green  is  that  of  an  entity 
composed  of  blue  and  yellow  thoroughly  mixed,^  although 
green  is  no  more  susceptible  of  a  nominal  definition  by  which 
we  may  recognize  it  than  blue  or  yellow.  Terms  on  the  other 
hand  which  are  simple  in  .themselves,  i.e.  whose  conception  is 
clear  and  distinct,  cannot  receive  any  definition,  whether 
nominal  or  real.  Yoii  will  find  in  this  little  Essay,  placed  in 
the  "Actes  de  Leipzic,"  the  foundations  of  a  large  part  of 
the  doctrine  concerning  the  understanding,  briefly  explained.] 

§§  7,  8.  Ph.  It  were  well  to  explain  this  point  and  to  indi- 
cate what  can  be  defined,  what  not.  And  I  am  tempted  to 
believe  that  often  great  disputes  are  raised  and  much  nonsense 
introduced  into  men's  discourse  from  a  failure  to  consider  this 
matter.  These  celebrated  trifles  about  which  so  much  stir  is 
made  in  the  schools  have  arisen  from  the  fact  that  no  attention 
has  been  paid  to  this  difference  which  is  found  in  ideas.  The 
greatest  masters  in  the  art  have  been  constrained  to  leave 
the  majority  of  simple  ideas  without  defining  them,  and  when 
they  have  undertalven  to  define  them,  they  have  not  succeeded. 
What  more  superfine  nonsense,  for  example,  could  the  mind  of 
man  invent  than  that  which  is  contained  in  this  definition 
of  Aristotle  :  Motion  is  the  realization  of  that  which  is  possible 
so  far  as  it  is  possible  ?^  §  9.  And  the  moderns  who  define 
motion  as  passage  from  one  place  into  another,  merely  put  one 
synonymous  word  in  the  place  of  another. 

Th.  [I  have  already  remarked  in  one  of  our  past  conferences 
that  you  consider  many  ideas  as  simple  which  are  not  so. 
Motion  is  of  this  number  which  I  believe  to  be  definable ;  and 
the  definition  which  states  that  it  is  a  change  of  place  is  not 
to  be  despised.     Aristotle's  definition  is  not  so  absurd  as  you 

1  This  is  true  of  pigments,  but  uot  of  lights.  Blue  and  yellow  lights  when 
mixed  produce  white  light.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  New  Ess(t[/s,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  21,  §  1,  Th.  ante, -p.  174.    For  Aristotle's 

definition,  cf.  PhyS.  AcrOUS.,  III.,  1,  201b,  4;  ij  toO  Swarov,  jj  Swoltov,  ivreKixna 
(paviphv  oTi  kiVtjctis  etrrii',  201^^,  11  :  V  ^"P  Swifiei  ovTOS  ivTe\e\ei.a,  fi  roLOvTOV,  (ciyrjo-is 
ecTTii',  Metaphys.  K,  9,  1065^,  16 :  Trjv  toO  hwaim  fi  toioCtov  eanv  ivepyiav  Ae'yio 
KLi'y]aLi\    23  I    V   ^V  ''"0^  Svvd^et  ovTO?,  OTav  evTcXexeCa  ov  evepyrj  7j  avTO  rj  dAAo  tj  Kii'TJTOVf 

Kii'7)(Tis  ea-Tiv,  also  33  ;  Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  §  42,  p.  77 ; 
Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griec,  3d  ed.,  1879,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  p.  350  sq.,  with  the  notes 
-Til. 


CH.  IV]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  321 

tliink,  this  supposed  absurdity  arising  from  the  failure  to 
understand  that  the  Greek  KtV/yo-t?  Avith  him  did  not  signify 
what  we  call  motion,  but  what  Ave  would  express  by  the  word 
change,  whence  it  comes  that  he  gives  it  a  definition  so  abstract 
and  meta})liysical,  while  Avhat  Ave  call  motion  is  called  by  him 
^opd,   latio,  and  is  found  among  the  species  of  change   (r^s 

Ktvrjcrew'i   ).J 

§  10.  Ph.  But  you  Avill  not  apologize,  at  least,  for  the  same 
author's  definition  of  light  as  the  action  of  the  transparent.' 

Th.  [I  find  it,  as  you  do,  very  useless ;  ^  and  he  makes  too 
frequent  use  of  his  action,  which  does  not  tell  us  much. 
Dicq^hanous  is  for  him  a  medium  across  Avhich  Ave  can  see ; 
and  light  is,  according  to  him,  that  Avhich  consists  in  the 
actual  passage.     Well  and  good.] 

§  11.  Ph.  We  agree,  then,  that  our  simple  ideas  cannot 
have  nominal  definitions,  as  Ave  cannot  know  the  taste  of  pine- 
apples by  the  accounts  of  travellers,  unless  able  to  taste  things 
by  the  ears,  as  Sancho  Panza  had  the  power  to  see  Dulcinea  by 
hearsay,"*  or  as  that  blind  man  who,  having  been  heard  to  speak 
boldly  of  the  brilliancy  of  scarlet,  thought  it  must  resemble 
the  sound  of  the  trumpet. 

Th.    [You  are  right;    and  all  the  travellers  in  the  world 

1  Cf.  Phys.  Acroas.,  VII.  2,  243'',  6  sq.  :  end  Se  rpei?  eicrX  Ktfijo-ei;,  rj  t6  Kara  tottov 
Kai  Kara  to  ttocoj'  Kat  KaT<i  to  ttoctoi',  ai'dyKr)  Kai  to.  Kivovfj.ei'a  Tpt'a,  17  fxey  oir  KaTo.  tottoi' 
<j>opd,  17  5e  Kara,  to  Trotbr  aAAot'tuo't?,  i]  6e  KaTo.  to  tto<t'oi'  au^rjat?  Kat  tjiOiai';,   EtJl,  ^ic.  X., 

3,  1174^,  30:  ei  yap  iari-v  rj  ^opd  Ktfr)(ri,s  TrdSei'  irol  (Alex.  Grant,  The  Ethics  of 
Aristotle,  Vol.  2,  p.  324,  line  17,  3d  ed.,  London:  Longmans,  Green,  &  Co., 
1874);  Wallace,  Outlines.  §  42;  Zeller,  Fhilos.  d.  Griec.,  3d  ed.,  1879,  II.,  2 
[Vol.  4],  p.  389S7.  — Tr. 

^  Cf.  De  Aniina,  XL,  7,  418'*,  !):  <J>m^  &e  etrnv  17  toutou  ivepyna  ToO  Siaijiavovi  fj 
Sia4>aves,   419*,   11  :     »)  S'  evTeAexeia  toD  Siaipavov^  (j>u)^;  eariv.    E.   Wallace,  AristOtle's 

Psychology  in  Greek  and  Enr/lish  iv.  Introd.  and  Notes,  Cambridge :  Univ. 
Press,  1882,  pp.  95,  97,  translates  the  two  passages:  "  Liglit  tlien  is  the  expres- 
sion of  the  pellncid  qua  pellucid,"  "The  full  play  of  this  pellucid  constitutes 
light,"  and,  in  his  Introd.,  p.  lxxi.,comljines  them  tlius  :  "  Liglit  therefore  may 
itself  be  defined  as  tlie  actual  expression  or  full  play  of  the  pellucid  as  pellucid." 
Cf.  also  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griec,  3d  ed.,  1879,  II. ,2  [Vol.  4],  p.  477,  note  2. 

3  Schaarschmidt  calls  attention  to  "a  bad  typograpliical  error"  in  tlie  text 
of  Raspe's  eilition  of  the  Nouveaux  Essnis  at  tliis  point.  Raspo  ri'ads  "  fort 
ufcile,"  for  whicli  Scliaarsclimidt  proposes  "futile."  Gerliardt,  Erdniann,  and 
Jacques  all  read  "  fort  inutile,"  which  gives  the  requisite  sense,  and  is  accord- 
ingly followed  in  the  translation. — Tr. 

■»  Cf.  Cervantes,  1547-1G16,  Don  Quixote,  Pt,  2,  chap.  9,  ad  med. ;  also,  Pt.  1, 
chap.  31.  —  Tr. 

Y 


322  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [luc.  in 

could  not  give  by  their  words  what  we  owe  to  a  gentleman 
of  this  country  who  cultivates  successfully  pine-apples  three 
leagues  from  Hannover,  almost  upon  the  bank  of  the  Weser, 
and  who  has  found  means  of  multiplying  them  to  such  an 
extent  that  some  day  we  can  perhaps  have  them  of  our  own 
growing  in  as  great  abundance  as  the  oranges  of  Portugal, 
thoiigh  there  would  apparently  be  some  loss  in  the  flavor.] 

§§  12,  13.  Ph.  It  is  wholly  otherwise  with  complex  ideas. 
A  blind  man  can  understand  what  a  statue  is  ;  and  a  man  who 
had  never  seen  the  rainbow  could  uiaderstand  what  it  is,  pro- 
vided he  had  seen  the  colors  which  comj)ose  it.  §  15.  But 
tliough  simple  ideas  are  inexplicable,  they  are  the  least  doubt- 
ful.    [For  experience  accomplishes  more  than  definition.] 

Th.  [There  is,  however,  some  difficulty  as  to  the  ideas  which 
are  only  simple  as  regards  us.  For  example,  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  indicate  precisely  the  limits  of  blue  and  of  green,  and  in 
general  to  discriminate  colors  closely  approaching  one  another, 
while  we  can  have  precise  notions  of  the  terms  used  in  arith- 
metic and  geometr}'-.] 

§  16.  Ph.  Simple  ideas  have  further  this  peculiarity  that 
they  have  very  little  subordination  in  what  the  logicians  call 
the  line  of  predication  {ligne  predicamentale),'^  from  the  lowest 

1  Leibnitz  here  refers  to  the  Tabula  logica,  in  which  Porphyry,  233-304,  and 
after  him  the  Scholastic  logicians,  snch  as  Lambert  of  Auxerre,  c.  1250,  Petrus 
Hispauus,  c.  122(5-1277,  Raimnnd  Lulli,  1234-1315,  the  Pseudo-Thomas,  and 
Johannes  Majoris  Scotus,  1478-1540,  sought,  in  connection  with  the  five  pre- 
dicables,  to  arrange  in  strict  logical  subordination  by  the  process  of  dicho- 
tomic or  bifurcate  division,  all  genera  and  species  from  the  highest  genera  to 
the  lowest  species,  between  which  is  found  the  scale  of  subordinate  notions 
which  are  at  the  same  time  both  genus  and  species.  This  Tabula  loc/ica  was 
called  by  the  later  commentators,  who  added  the  diagram  illustrating  it,  not 
found  in  Porphyry,  the  arbor  Porphyriana  ov  the  arbor  pracdicamoitalis,  and 
the  line  of  subordination  from  the  highest  genus  to  the  lowest  species  was  called 
the  Ihiea  praedicamentalis  or  praedicabilis,  or  the  ordo  jiraedicamentalis.  Cf. 
Porphyry,  Eicravwy^  chap.  2,  1  b.  40  sq.  (in  Aristotle,  ed.  Berl.  Acad.,  Vol.  4, 
p.  1) ;  'Ef'JYio-'?,  f.  18  b.,  Paris,  1543,  4to  ;  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Loc/ik  im  Abend- 
lande,  Leipzig,  1855-1870,  Vol.  1,  pp.  627-8,  note  41,  63.3-4,  note  67,  Vol.  3,  pp. 
28,  note  14:  "Praedicaraentum  autem  nihil  aliud  est,  quam  ordinatio  prae- 
dicabilium  in  linea  praedicabile  secundum  sub  et  supra  et  a  latere  et  in  linea 
recta,  .  .  .  unde  ilia  tota  ordinatio,  quae  est  inter  genus  generalissiraum  et 
speciem  specialissimam  et  genera  subalterna  et  differentias  collaterales,  voca- 
tur  unum  praedicam«ntum,  sicut  patet  in  arbore  Porphyrii  in  tractatu  Prae- 
dicabilium."  (Lambert  of  Auxerre,  Summa  logicae,  Paris,  MS.,  Cod.  So7-bonn. 
1707),  46,  note  168,  151,  note  42,  252,  note  315,  cf.  n.  311,  Vol.  4,  p.  249,  note 
434 ;  also,  Jevons,  Elementary  Lessons  in  Logic,  p.  103  57.  —  Tr. 


CH.  IV]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  323 

species  to  tlie  highest  genus.  The  reason  is  that  the  lowest 
species  being  only  a  simple  idea,  nothing  can  be  taken  from 
it ;  for  example,  nothing  can  be  taken  from  the  ideas  of  white 
and  red  in  order  to  retain  the  common  appearance  in  which 
they  agree.  For  this  reason,  they  are  included  with  yellow 
and  others,  under  the  genus  or  the  name,  color.  And  when 
men  wisli  to  frame  a  still  more  general  term,  comprising,  also, 
sounds,  tastes,  and  tangible  qualities,  they  avail  themselves  of 
the  general  term,  quality,  in  the  sense  ordinarily  given  it  to 
distinguish  these  qualities  of  extension,  number,  motion,  pleas- 
ure, and  pain,  Avhich  act  upon  the  mind  and  introduce  into  it 
their  ideas  by  more  than  one  sense. 

Th.  [I  have  something  more  to  say  upon  this  remark.  I 
hope  that  here  and  elsewhere  you  will  do  me  the  justice,  sir, 
to  believe  that  this  is  not  from  a  spirit  of  contradiction, 
and  that  the  subject  seems  to  demand  it.  It  is  not  an  advan- 
tage that  the  ideas  of  sensible  qualities  have  so  little  subordina- 
tion and  are  capable  of  so  few  subdivisions ;  for  it  arises  only 
from  the  fact  that  we  know  little  of  them.  But  the  fact  itself 
that  all  colors  have  the  common  property  of  being  seen  by 
the  eyes,  of  all  passing  into  bodies  from  which  one  or  more 
of  them  reappear,  and  of  being  reflected  from  the  polished 
surfaces  of  bodies  which  do  not  allow  them  to  pass,  shoAvs  us 
that  something  can  be  taken  from  the  ideas  we  have  of  them. 
Colors  may  indeed  be  divided  with  good  reason  into  extremes 
(one  of  which  is  2)ositive,  viz.  white ;  and  the  other  privative, 
viz.  black)  ;  and  into  means,  which  are  called  colors,^  however, 
in  a  particular  sense,  and  which  spring  from  light  by  refrac- 
tion ;  which  furthermore  may  be  subdivided  into  those  of  the 
convex  side,  and  those  of  the  concave  side  of  the  broken  ray. 
And  these  divisions  and  subdivisions  are  of  not  a  little  conse- 
quence.] 

Ph.    Jjut  how  can  you  find  genera  in  simple  ideas  ? 

Th.  [As  they  are  simple  only  in  appearance,  they  are 
accompanied  by  circumstances  which  are  bound  up  with  tliem, 

1  Gerhard t  r(!ads:  "  et  en  moyens  qu'oii  appelle  encor  couleurs  dans  un 
sens  particulior  et  qui  naissent  de  la  lumierc  par  la  refraction;  qu'on  pent 
eneor,''  etc. ;  Erdmann  and  -Jacques  read:  "  et  en  moyens  qu'on  appelle  encore 
sous-diviser,"  etc. ;  i.e.  and  into  means  which  you  are  further  called  upon  to 
subdivide,  etc.  —  Tr. 


324  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  in 

altliougli  this  bond  is  not  understood  by  us,  and  these  circum- 
stances furnish  somewhat  that  is  explicable  and  susceptible 
of  analysis,  which  gives  also  some  hope  that  hereafter  the 
reasons  of  these  phenomena  may  be  discovered.  Thus  it 
happens  that  there  is  a  kind  of  pleonasm  in  our  perceptions  of 
sensible  qualities,  as  well  as  sensible  masses  ;  and  this  pleonasm 
is,  that  we  have  more  than  one  notion  of  the  same  subject. 
Gold  may  be  defined  nominally  in  several  ways ;  you  may  say 
that  it  is  the  heaviest  of  our  bodies,  that  it  is  the  most  malle- 
able, that  it  is  a  fusible  body  which  resists  the  cupel  and  aqua 
fortis,  etc.  Each  of  these  marks  is  good  and  is  sufficient  for 
the  recognition  of  gold,  at  least  provisionally  and  in  the  present 
state  of  our  bodies,  until  a  heavier  body  is  found,  as  some 
chemists  maintain  is  the  case  in  their  philosopher's  stone,  or 
until  that  Luna  fixa  ^  is  shown,  which  is  a  metal  said  to  have 
the  color  of  silver,  and  almost  all  the  other  qualities  of  gold, 
and  which  Chevalier  Boyle  ^  seems  to  say  he  has  produced. 
Thus  you  may  say  that  in  matters  which  we  know  only 
empirically,  all  our  definitions  are  merely  provisional,  as  I 
believe  I  have  already  remarked  above.  It  is  then  true  that 
we  do  not  know  demonstratively  whether  a  color  may  not  pos- 

1  Cf.  Fratris  Bosilii  Valentini  Bencdictlner  Ordens  Chymische  Schrift., 
Hamburg,  1700,  Pt.  I.,  p.  272:  "  Weun  das  Gold  seiner  Anima  auch  verlustig 
wird  /  giebt  es  ein  weiss  Corpus  und  einen  fixeii  weisseu  Gold-Leib  /  der  von 
den  sucbenden  Studenten  /  und  von  den  Jiingern  der  Kunst  eine  Luna  Jixa 
getaufft  und  genannt  wird ;  "  Pt.  II.,  p.  381,  Scbluss-Reden  Fr.  Basilii  Valentini, 
Tract.  1,  Sectio  iii.,  De  jNIagneta  vulgi,  §  3:  "Mitdem  Magnet  und  Antimonio 
wird  auch  eine  Lunaflxa  gemacbt  /  welcbe  alsdann  durcb  das  Oleum  Martis 
&  Veneris  gradirt  [sic] ,  und  zu  Gold  gemacht  wird :  Jedoch  kan  mans  mit 
Antimonio  und  Eisen  aucb  vei-ricbten."  Martin  Ruland,  Lexicon  alchemist, 
Francofurti,  1612,  p.  308:  "Luna  compacta  est  argentum  fixum  vel  aurum 
album:  Silber  fix  oder  weiss  Gold."  Robert  Boyle,  Works,  ed.  Birch,  5  vols., 
fol. :  London,  1744,  Vol.  1,  p.  215;  2d  ed.,  6  vols.,  4to  :  London,  1772,  Vol.  1,  p. 
335,  Vol.3,  p.  28.  — Te. 

2  Robert  Boyle,  1627-1091,  a  distinguished  natural  philosopher  and  chemist, 
the  discoverer  of  the  law  of  the  compressibility  of  gases,  which,  confirmed  by 
its  independent  discovery  by  Mariotte  in  1676,  has  since  been  known  as 
"  Boyle  and  Mariotte's  Law."  He  was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  Royal  Society 
of  London,  and  by  his  will  established  the  "  Boyle  Lectures."  Leibnitz  often 
refers  to  him,  cf.  Neio  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  47.  — The  title  of  Boyle's  work 
there  referred  to  is.  Of  Absolute  Rest  in  Bodies,  Works,  ed.,  Birch,  6  vols., 
4to,  London,  1772,  Vol.  1,  pp.  443-457,  in  which  he  opposes  the  doctrine  with 
convincing  reasons;— Bk.  IV.,  chap.  12,  §  13,  Th.,  infra,  p.  526;  Gerhardt, 
Leibniz  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  342  ;  Dutens,  Leibnit  op.  orn.,  5,  98:  6,  107;  Leib- 
nitz's estimate  of  his  experiments,  6,  318;  Eulogy,  6,  Pt.  II.,  217.— Tr. 


CH.  V]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  325 

sibly  be  produced,  by  reflection  alone  without  refraction,  and 
whether  the  colors  we  have  hitherto  noticed  in  the  concavity 
of  the  angle  of  ordinary  refraction  are  not  found  in  the  con- 
vexity of  a  kind  of  refraction  hitherto  unknown,  and  vice  versa. 
Thus  the  simple  idea  of  blue  would  be  stripped  of  the  genus 
Aviiich  we  have  assigned  it  in  our  experiences.  But  it  is  well 
to  stojj  at  the  blue  we  have  and  at  the  circumstances  attending 
it.  And  it  is  something  that  they  furnish  us  the  means  of 
making  genera  and  species.] 

§  17.  Ph.  But  what  say  you  of  the  remark  that  has  been 
made  that  simple  ideas,  since  they  are  taken  from  the  existence 
of  things,  are  nowise  arbitrary,  while  those  of  the  mixed  modes 
are  wholly  so,  and  those  of  substances  to  some  extent  ? 

Th.  [I  believe  that  the  arbitrary  quality  is  found  only  in 
the  words,  and  not  at  all  in  the  ideas.  Eor  they  express 
only  possibilities.  Thus,  if  there  had  never  been  a  parricide, 
and  if  all  the  legislators  had  been  as  cautious  as  Solon  in 
speaking  of  it,  parricide  would  be  a  possible  crime,  and  its 
idea  would  be  real.  For  ideas  are  in  God  from  all  eternity; 
and  indeed  they  are  in  us  before  we  actually  think  of  them, 
as  I  have  shown  in  our  previous  conversations.^  If  any  one 
wishes  to  take  them  as  the  actual  thoughts  of  men,  it  is  per- 
mitted him  to  do  so,  but  he  will  oppose  himself  without  reason 
to  the  accepted  language. 


CHAPTER  V 

OF    THE    NAMES    OF    MIXED    MODES    AKD    RELATIONS 

§§  2,  3,  seq.  Ph.  But  does  not  the  mind  form  mixed  ideas 
by  bringing  together  simple  ideas  as  suits  its  purpose,  without 
the  need  of  a  real  model ;    while  simple  ideas  arise  for   it 

1  Cf.  New  Essrq/.t,  Preface,  ante,  p.  42,  sq.,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  1,  §  1,  sq.,  ante, 
p.  70,  s(].,  where  Leibnitz  develops  more  fully  the  tliouglit  repeated  here. 
Leibnitz  assumes  that  ideas  —  the  pure  truths  of  reason—  exist  in  man,  and 
come  into  consciousness  1)y  tlie  self-developm(Mit  of  the  spirit.  These  ideas 
contain  in  themselves  the  potential  representation  of  all  possible  reality,  the 
realization  of  which  is  directly  proportional  to  tlie  measure  of  man's  self- 
development.  In  God  this  realization  is  complete,  since  iu  his  thought  all 
real  possibility  is  always  at-tually  represented.  — Tr. 


826  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

without  choice,  through  the  real  existence  of  things  ?  Is  not 
the  mixed  idea  often  seen  before  the  existing  thing  ? 

Th.  If  you  take  the  ideas  as  actual  thoughts,  you  are  right. 
But  I  do  not  see  that  it  is  necessary  to  apply  your  distinction 
to  that  which  concerns  the  form  itself,  or  the  possibility  of 
these  thoughts,  and  yet  this  is  the  question  in  the  ide^l  world 
which  is  distinguished  from  the  existing  world."  The  real 
existence  of  beings  which  are  not  at  all  necessary  is  a  matter 
of  fact  or  of  history ;  but  the  knowledge  of  possibilities  and 
necessities  (for  necessary  is  that  the  opposite  of  which  is  not 
at  all  possible)  constitutes  the  demonstrative  sciences.^. 

Ph.  But  is  there  more  connection  between  the  ideas  of 
killing  and  of  man  than  between  the  ideas  of  killing  and  of  a 
sheep  ?  Is  parricide  composed  of  more  connected  notions  than 
infanticide  ?  And  is  it  more  natural  that  what  the  English 
call  stabbing,  i.e.,  murder  by  a  thrust,  or  by  striking  with  the 
point,  which  is  a  greater  wrong  with  them  than  killing  by 
striking  with  the  edge  of  the  sword,  should  have  deserved  a 
name  and  an  idea  which  is  not  accorded,  for  example,  to  the 
act  of  killing  a  sheep,  or  of  killing  a  man  by  cutting  ? 

Th.  [If  the  question  concerns  only  possibilities,  all  these 
ideas  are  equally  natural.  Those  who  have  seen  sheep  killed 
have  had  an  idea  of  this  act  in  thought,  although  they  have 
not  deigned  to  give  it  their  attentio]i.-  Why,  then,  limit  our- 
selves to  names,  when  the  question  concerns  ideas  themselves, 
and  why  occupy  ourselves  with  the  worth  of  the  ideas  of 
the  mixed  modes,  when  the  question  concerns  these  ideas  in 
general ?] 

§  8.  Ph.  Men  form  arbitrarily  different  kinds  of  mixed 
modes,  so  that  words  are  found  in  one  language  for  which 
there  are  no  corresponding  words  in  another.  There  are  no 
words  in  other  languages  corresponding  to  the  word  Versura  ^ 

1  Cf.  JVeiv  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  43.  —  Tr. 

2  Erdniann  reads :  "  quoiqu'ils  ne  lui  aieiit  point  donne  de  nom  et  ne  I'aient 
point  daigne  de  leur  attention;  "  Jacques  reads,  after  "daigne,"  "  honorer," 
otherwise  like  Erdmann.  Tlie  rendering  tlien  is:  altliougli  they  have  not 
given  it  a  name,  nor  have  tliey  vouchsafed  (to  honor  —  Jacques)  it  (with) 
their  attention.  —  Tr. 

3  "Versura,"  literally  "a  turning  round,"  means,  in  classical  usage,  "the 
borrowing  of  money  to  pay  a  debt,"  a  process  wliich  resulted  simply  in 
changing  one's  creditor,  not  in  extinguishing  the  obligation.    Cf.  Cicero,  Epist. 


ni.  v]  ON   HUMAN   UNDEESTANDING  327 

used  among  the  Eonians,  nor  to  Corban,^  used  by  the  Jews. 
We  boldly  translate  the  Latin  words  hora,  lies,  and  libra,  by 
hour,  foot,  and  pound ;  but  the  ideas  of  the  Romans  were  very 
different  from  ours. 

Th.  I  see  that  many  things  which  we  discussed  when  the 
question  was  that  of  ideas  themselves  and  their  kinds,  come 
hack  now,  under  cover  of  the  names  of  these  ideas.  The 
statement  is  true  as  regards  the  names  and  the  customs  of 
men,  but  it  changes  nothing  in  the  sciences  and  in  the  nature 
of  things.  It  is  true  that  he  who  would  write  a  universal 
grammar  would  do  well  to  pass  from  the  essence  of  languages 
to  their  existence,  and  compare  the  grammars  of  many  lan- 
guages. In  like  manner,  an  author  who  should  write  a  univer- 
sal jurisprudence  drawn  from  reason,  would  do  well  to  unite 
with  it  the  parallel  laws  and  customs  of  peoples,  which  would 
1)6  of  service  not  only  in  practical  life,  but  also  in  his  reflec- 
tions, and  would  give  him  occasion  to  consider  many  points 
wluch  would  otherwise  escape  him.  But  in  science  itself, 
apart  from  its  history  or  existence,  it  is  of  no  consequence 
whether  people  are  or  are  not  conformed  to  the  dictates  of 
reason.] 

§  9.  Ph.  The  doubtful  signification  of  the  word  species  makes 
the  statement  that  the  species  of  mixed  modes  are  made  by 
the  understanding  offensive  to  some  people.  But  I  leave  it  to 
others  to  consider  who  fixes  the  limits  of  each  sort  or  species, 
for  these  two  words  are  for  me  wholly  synonymous. 

ad  Atticum,  5,  1.5,  2;  Tacitus,  Ann.,  6,  10.  As  a  proverb,  the  word  means 
"to  get  out  of  one  difficulty  by  getting  into  another."  Cf.  Terence,  Phormio, 
5,  2,  15;  Lactantius,  2,  8,  24.  — Tr. 

1  "Corban,"  Hebrew  f3']p,  N.T.  Kop^av,  i.e.  Supor,  originally  an  offering  to 
God  of  any  kind,  particularly  in  fulfilment  of  a  vow.  The  original  use  was 
in  coui-se  of  time  altered  by  the  traditionalists,  and  the  offerer  of  the  gift 
interdicted  from  using  it  for  himself,  or  giving  it  to  others.  The  "  corban" 
furnished  a  ready  means  to  any  one  who  wished  to  relieve  himself  from  any 
inconvenient  obligation,  as  of  assisting  his  parents  in  poverty  or  distress  ;  he 
simply  brought  his  gift  to  the  temple  and  offered  it  to  God,  saying,  "Let  it 
be  corban,"  and  departed  free,  as  he  said,  from  any  further  responsil)ility  in 
the  matter.  It  was  this  utter  perversion  of  the  spirit  of  the  law,  with  its 
resultant  positive  wrong-doing,  that  Christ  so  severely  rebuked.  Cf.  Mark 
7:11-1.'5;  Matt.  15:.'),  (!;  and  H.  A.  W.  Meyer,  Krit.  K.tp(i.  Ko7nmnrtar  ii.  d. 
N.T.,  fith  ed.,  Guttingen,  187()— I.,  2  [Vol.  2],  p.  104;  I.,  1  [Vol.  1],  p.  .333; 
Smith's  Diet,  of  the  Bible,  ed.  Hackett  and  Abbot,  New  York,  1877,  Vol.  1, 
p.  491.  — Tr. 


328  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

Til.  [The  nature  of  things  ordinarily  fixes  the  limits  of 
species;  for  example,  of  man  and  beast,  of  cut  and  thrust.  I 
admit,  however,  that  there  are  some  notions  in  which  the  limit 
is  truly  arbitrary' ;  for  example,  the  question  of  determining  a 
foot,  for,  the  straight  line  being  uniform  and  indefinite,  nature 
indicates  therein  no  limits.  There  are  also  essences,  vague 
and  im2:)erfect,  into  which  op)iniou  enters ;  as  when  you  ask 
how  little  hair  must  be  allowed  a  man  in  order  that  he  be  not 
bald.  This  was  one  of  the  sophisms  of  the  ancients,  when  one 
pressed  upon  his  adversary: 

Dum  cadat  elusus  ratione  ruentis  acervi.i 

But  the  true  answer  is  that  nature  has  not  determined  this 
notion,  and  that  the  opinion  has  its  share  therein  that  there 
are  some  persons  regarding  whom  it  may  be  questioned  whether 
they  are  bald  or  not,  and  that  there  are  some  doubtful  persons 
who  will  pass  as  bald  with  some  and  not  with  others,  as  you 
remarked  that  a  horse  which  will  be  considered  small  in 
Holland,  will  pass  as  a  large  one  in  the  country  of  the  Gauls. 
There  is  indeed  something  of  this  nature  in  simple  ideas,  for 
I  just  observed  that  the  final  limits  of  colors  are  doubtful. 
There  are  also  essences  truly  half-nomincd,  in  which  the  name 
enters  into  the  definition  of  the  thing ;  for  example,  the  degree 
or  quality  of  doctor,  chevalier,  ambassador,  king,  is  recognized 
when  a  person  has  acquired  the  recognized  right  to  avail  him- 
self of  this  name.  And  a  foreign  minister,  however  complete 
his  power  and  however  extended  his  train,  will  not  pass  as 
an  ambassador  unless  his  letter  of  credence  gives  him  the 
name.  But  these  essences  and  ideas  are  vague,  doubtfid,  arbi- 
trary, nominal,  in  a  sense  a  little  different  from  those  which 
you  have  mentioned.] 

§  10.  Ph.  But  it  seems  that  the  name  often  conserves  the 
essences  of  the  mixed  modes  which  you  think  are  not  arbitrary  ; 
for  example,  without  the  name  triumph,  we  should  have  but 
little  idea  of  what  took  place  among  the  Eomaus  upon  that 
occasion. 

Til.  [I  agree  that  the  name  serves  to  call  attention  to  things 
and  to  conserve  the  memory  and  the  actual  knowledge  of  them ; 

1  Horace,  Epist.  2,  1,  47.  — Tr. 


CH.  v]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  329 

but  that  accomplishes  nothing  as  regards  the  point  in  question, 
nor  does  it  render  the  essences  nominal ;  and  I  do  not  under- 
stand why  you  gentlemen  absolutely  require  that  the  essences 
themselves  should  depend  upon  the  choice  of  names.  It  would 
have  been  desirable  that  your  distinguished  author,  instead  of 
insisting  upon  that,  had  preferred  to  enter  into  a  much  more 
detailed  account  of  ideas  and  of  modes,  and  to  have  set  them 
in  order  and  developed  the  varieties.  I  would  have  followed 
him  on  this  road  with  pleasure  and  with  profit.  For  he  would 
doubtless  have  given  us  much  light.] 

§  12.  Ph.  When  we  speak  of  a  horse,  or  of  iron,  we  regard 
them  as  the  things  which  furnish  us  the  original  patterns  of 
our  ideas  ;  but  when  we  speak  of  mixed  modes  or,  at  least, 
of  the  most  important  of  these  modes,  which  are  moral  entities, 
—  iox  e,yi^m.iAe,  justice,  gratitude,  —  we  consider  their  original 
modes  as  existing  in  the  mind.  Therefore  we  say  the  notion 
of  justice,  of  temperance  ;  but  we  do  not  say  the  notion  of  a 
horse,  of  a  stone. 

Th.  [The  patterns  of  the  ideas  of  the  one  are  as  real  as 
those  of  the  ideas  of  the  other.  The  qualities  of  the  mind 
are  not  less  real  than  those  of  the  body.  It  is  true  you  do 
not  see  justice  as  you  see  a  horse,  but  you  understand  it  no 
less,  or  rather  you  understand  it  better ;  it  is  no  less  in  acts 
than  directness  or  obliqueness  is  in  motions,  whether  you 
consider  it  or  not.  And  to  show  you  that  men  are  of  my 
opinion,  and  men,  indeed,  the  most  capable  and  most  experi- 
enced in  human  affairs,  I  have  only  to  avail  myself  of  the 
authority  of  the  Iloman  jurisconsults,  followed  by  all  others, 
who  call  these  mixed  modes  or  these  moral  entities,  things, 
and  in  particular,  incorporeal  things.  For  servitudes,^  for  ex- 
ample (like  that  of  the  passage  through  the  ground  of  one's 
neighbor),  are  with  them  res  incorjyorales,  in  which  there  is  a 
property  which  may  be  acquired  by  long  use,  and  may  be 
possessed  and  reclaimed.  As  for  the  word  notion,  many  clever 
people  have  considered  it  as  large  as  that  of  idea ;  Latin  usage 

1  Cy.  Sandars,  Institutes  of  Jvstininn,  lAh.  II.,  Tit.  III.,  p.  118,  8tli  od., 
London:  Longmans,  (Jreon,  &  Co.,  1.SK8;  Postc,  Guiita,  Kletncnts  of  Roman 
Law,  Bk.  II.,  29,  31,  pp.  l(i5-(!,  ;id  cd.,  Oxford,  1890;  Moninisen,  Digest,  Lib. 
VIII.,  1,  Vol.  1,  p.  250,  Berlin:  Weidniann,  1870;  Hadley,  Introd.  to  Roman 
Law,  pp.  158-1(51,  180-190,  New  York,  D.  Appletou  &  Co.,  1881.— Tr. 


330  LEIIJNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [p.k. 


is  not  opposed  thereto,  nor  do  I  know  whether  that  of  the 
English  ur  the  French  is  contrary  to  it.^] 

§  15.  Ph.  It  is  further  to  be  remarked  that  men  learn  the 
names  before  the  ideas  of  the  mixed  modes  ;  the  name  showing 
them  that  this  idea  deserves  to  be  observed. 

Th.  [This  remark  is  a  good  one,  although  it  is  true  that 
uow-a-days  children,  with  the  aid  of  nomenclators,  ordinarily 
learn  the  names  not  only  of  the  modes,  but  also  of  substances, 
before  the  things,  and  indeed  rather  the  names  of  substances 
than  of  the  modes  5  for  it  is  a  defect  in  these  same  nomen- 
clators that  they  employ  nouns  only,  and  not  verbs  ;  not  con- 
sidering that  verbs,  although  signifying  the  modes,  are  more 
essential  in  conversation  than  the  majority  of  nouns,  which 
indicate  particular  substances.-] 


CHAPTER  VI 

OF    THE    NAMES    OF    SUBSTANCES 

§  1.  Ph.  The  genera  and  species  of  substances,  as  of  other 
beings,  are  only  sorts.  For  example,  suns  are  a  sort  of  stars, 
i.e.  they  are  fixed  stars,  for  it  is  not  Avithout  reason  that  we 
think  each  fixed  star  would  make  itself  known  as  a  sun  to 
a  person  jilaced  at  a  proper  distance.  §  2.  Xow  that  which 
limits  each  sort  is  its  essence.  It  is  known  either  by  its 
interior  structure,  or  by  external  indications  which  make  us 
recognize  it  and  call  it  by  a  certain  name  :  and  thus  it  is  that 
we  may  recognize  the  clock  of  Strasburg  either  as  the  clock- 
maker  who  made  it,  or  as  a  spectator  who  sees  its  effects. 

Til.  [If  this  is  your  statement,  I  have  nothing  to  oppose 
to  it.] 

1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  22,  §  2,  Th.  ante,  p.  222;  Discours  de  Meta- 
physiqne,  1G86,  §  29,  Gerhardt,  4,  4.52.  For  the  meaniu^  and  use  of  these  terms : 
in  Latin,  idea,  notio,  conceptus  or  conceptio ;  in  French,  idee,  notion,  concep- 
tion; in  German,  Idee,  Vorstelhinr/,  Berjrif;  in  English,  idea,  notion,  con- 
ception or  concept,  which  varies  according  to  the  period  in  the  history  of 
thought  in  which  thej'  are  employed,  and  according  to  the  theory  of  knowledge 
implicitly  or  consciously  held  by  the  author  using  them,  cf.  Kra'uth-Flemming, 
Vorab.  of  the  Philos.  Sciences,  ed.  of  1877,  sub  voc.  —  Tr. 

2  "  For,"  as  Schaarschmidt  says,  "  the  activity  is  first  perceived,  and  by  its 
means  the  substance  recognized  and  formulated."  —  Tk. 


en.   vij  ON    HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  331 

Ph.  I  express  myself  in  a  way  suited  not  at  all  to  renew 
our  discussions.  But  I  add  that  the  essence  is  related  only 
to  sorts,  and  that  nothing  is  essential  to  individuals.  An 
accident  or  a  disease  may  change  my  color  or  shape ;  a  fever 
or  a  fall  may  take  away  my  reason  or  memory;  apoplexy 
may  leave  me  neither  feeling,  understanding,  nor  life.  If 
you  ask  me  if  it  is  essential  to  me  to  have  reason,  I  reply : 
no. 

Th.  [I  think  that  there  is  something  essential  to  individuals 
and  more  than  you  suppose.  It  is  essential  to  substances  to 
act,  to  created  substances  to  suffer,  to  minds  to  think,  to  bodies 
to  have  extension  and  motion.  That  is,  there  are  some  sorts 
or  species  to  which  an  individual  cannot  (naturally  at  least) 
cease  to  belong,  when  it  has  once  been  of  their  number,  what- 
ever revolutions  may  happen  in  nature.  But  there  are  some 
sorts  or  species,  which  are  accidental  (I  admit)  to  the  indi- 
viduals, which  may  cease  to  belong  to  them.  Thus  you 
may  cease  to  be  healthy,  beautiful,  wise,  and  indeed  to  be 
visible  and  palpable,  but  you  cannot  cease  to  have  life  and 
organs  and  perception.  I  have  stated  sufficiently,  above,  why 
it  appears  to  men  that  life  and  thought  sometimes  cease, 
although  they  cease  not  to  endure  and  to  have  their  effects.] 

§  8.  Ph.  Many  individuals  ranked  under  a  common  name, 
considered  as  belonging  to  one  species  only,  have  nevertheless 
very  different  qualities  depending  upon  their  real  (particular) 
constitutions.  This  is  easily  observed  by  all  those  who  ex- 
amine natural  bodies ;  and  chemists  often  are  convinced  of  it 
by  sad  experience,  when  they  vainly  seek  in  one  portion  of 
antimony,  sulphur,  and  vitriol  for  the  qualities  which  they 
have  found  in  other  portions  of  these  minerals. 

Th.  [No  statement  has  more  truth,  and  I  could  myself  even 
furnish  intelligence  concerning  it.  Books  have  also  been  written 
expressly  de  infido  experimentorum  chymicorum  successu.  But 
the  error  consists  in  taking  these  bodies  as  similar  or  uniform, 
while  they  are  more  mixed  than  we  suppose  ;  for  in  dissimilar 
bodies  we  are  not  surprised  to  remark  differences  between 
individuals,  and  physicians  do  not  know  how  much  the  tem- 
peraments and  natural  dispositions  of  human  bodies  differ. 
In  a  word,  we  shall  never  find  the  final  logical  species,  as  I 
have  already  remarked  above,  and  two  real  or  complete  indi- 


;5;]2  T.EIHNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [hk.  hi 

vidnals  of  one  and  the  same  species  are  never  perfectly 
alike.'] 

Ph.  We  do  not  notice  all  these  differences,  because  we  do 
not  know  the  little  parts,  nor  consequently  the  interior  struct- 
ure of  things.  Thus  we  do  not  avail  ourselves  of  them  in 
order  to  determine  the  sorts  or  species  of  things,  and  if  we 
wished  to  do  so  by  means  of  these  essences,  or  by  Avliat  the 
schools  call  substantial  forms,  we  should  be  like  a  blind  man 
Avho  desired  to  arrange  bodies  according  to  colors.  §  11.  AVe 
do  not  indeed  know  the  essences  of  spirits,  we  know  not  how 
to  form  distinct  specific  ideas  of  angels,  although  we  well 
know  that  there  must  be  many  kinds  of  spirits.  Thus  it 
seems  that  in  our  ideas  we  put  no  difference  between  God  and 
the  spirits  by  any  number  of  simple  ideas,  save  that  we  attribute 
infinity  to  God. 

Th.  [There  is,  however,  another  difference  in  my  system 
between  God  and  created  spirits,  viz.  that  in  my  view  all 
created  spirits  must  have  bodies,  just  as  our  soul  has  one.^] 

§  12.  Ph.  I  think  at  least  that  there  is  this  analogy  between 
bodies  and  spirits,  that  as  there  is  no  gap  in  the  varieties  of 
the  corporeal  world,  so  there  will  be  no  less  variety  in  intelli- 
gent creatures.  Commencing  from  ourselves  and  proceeding 
even  to  the  lowest  things,  a  descent  is  made  by  very  small 

1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  51,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  27,  ante,  p.  238  sq. ; 
De  ipsa  natnra,  §  13,  Gerhardt,  4,  512,  Erdmann,  158,  b,  Jacques,  1,  4()4  (in 
French),  trans.  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  122,123;  Monadoloqie,  §  9, 
G.  6,  608,  E.  705,  J.  2,  31)2,  trans.  D.  219,  "f.  H.  Hedge,  "  Jour.  Spec.  Philos.," 

1,  129 ;  4th  letter  to  Clarke,  §§  4  sq.,  G.  7,  372,  E.  755,  b,  J.  2,  432,  trans.  D.  247, 
•  5th  letter  to  Clarke,  §  21,  G.  7,  393,  E.  765,  J.  2,  449,  trans.  D.  258.    This  is  the 

principle  of  the  identity  of  iudiscernibles,  principium  identitatis  iiidiscerni- 
bilium  —  i.e.  that  "  things  qualitatively  undistinguishable  are  absolutely  identi- 
cal." According  to  Leibnitz,  there  are  no  such  things,  there  being  in  the 
universe  no  two  objects  perfectly  alike ;  though  abstractly  possible,  they  are 
inconsistent  with  the  order  of  things,  and  with  the  divine  wisdom,  which 
admits  nothing  therein  without  reason.  Cf.  also  Kant's  development  and 
criticism  of  Leibnitz's  principles  in  his  Bilucidatio  nova,  1755.  Werke,  ed. 
Rosenkranz  &  Schubert,  Leipzig,  1838-42,  Vol.  1,  p.  1;  ed.  Hartenstein,  Leipzig, 
1867-68,  Vol.  1,  p.  365,  Erit.  d.  r.  Vernunft,  V.  d.  Amphibolie  d.  Refteyions- 
beuriffe,  ed.  R.  &  S.  2,  214,  ed.  H.  3,  225,  4th  ed.,  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann,  Leipzig, 
1877,  p.  268  sq.,  E.  Caird,  The  Crit.  Philos.  of  Immanuel  Kant,  1,  106  sq.,  445 
sq.,  .500  sq..  New  York,  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1889;  Ueberweg,  Hi.<it.  of  Philos., 

2,  144,  173,  Ueberweg-Heiuze,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  7th  ed.,  3,  215,  259. —Tr. 

■■2  Cf.  Nev;  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  52,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  1,  §  12,  Th.  ante,  p.  113, 
chap.  15,  §  4,  Th.  ante,  p.  159,  and  note.  — Tr. 


cii.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  333 

degrees,  and  by  a  continued  series  of  things,  wldeli  in  each 
remove  differ  very  little  one  from  the  other.  There  are  fishes 
that  have  wings,  and  to  Avhom  the  air  is  not  strange,  and  there 
are  birds  inhabiting  the  water  whose  blood  is  cold  like  that  of 
the  fishes,  and  whose  flesh  so  strongly  resembles  theirs  in 
taste  that  the  scrupulous  are  allowed  to  eat  them  on  fish- 
days.  There  are  animals  so  closely  approaching  the  species 
of  birds  and  of  beasts  that  they  hold  the  middle  ground  between 
them.  The  amphibia  contain  both  terrestrial  and  aquatic  ani- 
mals. Seals  live  upon  the  land  and  in  the  sea;  and  porpoises 
(whose  name  signifies  sea-hog)  have  the  warm  blood  and  the 
entrails  of  a  hog.  ISTot  to  speak  of  that  which  is  reported  of 
sea-men,^  there  are  some  animals  who  seem  to  have  as  much 
knowledge  and  reason  as  some  that  are  called  men ;  and  there 
is  so  close  a  relation  between  animals  and  vegetables,  that 
if  you  take  the  most  imperfect  of  the  one  and  the  most  perfect 
of  the  other,  you  will  scarcely  perceive  any  considerable  dif- 
ference between  them.  Thus,  until  we  reach  the  lowest  and 
least  organized  parts  of  matter,  we  shall  find  everywhere  species 
bound  together,  and  differing  only  by  degrees  almost  impercept- 
ible. And  when  we  consider  the  wisdom  and  infinite  power  of 
the  Author  of  all  things,  we  have  reason  to  think  that  it  is  con- 
formed to  the  magnificent  harmony  of  the  universe  and  to  the 
great  design  as  well  as  to  the  infinite  goodness  of  this  sovereign 
architect,  that  the  different  species  of  creatures  ascend,  also, 
little  by  little  from  us  towards  his  infinite  perfection.  Thus 
we  have  reason  to  be  persuaded  that  there  are  many  more 
species  of  creatures  above  us  than  below  us,  because  we  are 
much  more  distant  in  degrees  of  perfection  from  the  infinite 
being  of  God  than  from  that  which  approaches  nearest  to 
nothing.  Yet  we  have  no  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  all  these 
different  species. 

Th.  [I  had  intended  in  another  place  to  say  something  not 
ruilike  what  you,  sir,  have  just  set  forth ;  but  I  am  glad  to 
liave  been  anticipated  when  I  see  that  you  state  things  better 
than  I  could  hope  to  have  done.     Clever  philosophers  ^  have 

1  I.e.  mermaids;  so  Locke,  "mermaids  or  sea-men,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2, 
p.  49  (Bohu'sed.).  — Tr. 

2  C'f.  Theodicee,  Pt.  I.,  §  14,  Gerhardt,  6,  110,  Erdmaun,  507,  b,  Jacques, 
2,  80,  Dutens,  1,  131  (in  Latin)  ;  Reply  to  Bayle,  ad  fin.,  G.  4,  570,  E.  I'JO,  b. 


334  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  in 

discussed  this  question :  utrum  detur  vacuum  formarum,  I.e. 
whether  there  are  possible  species,  which,  however,  do  not 
sexist,  and' which  nature  may  seem  to  have  forgotten.  I  have 
reason  to  believe  that  all  possible  species  are  not  compossible 
in  the  universe,  great  as  it  is,  and  that,  too,  not  only  in  rela- 
tion to  things  which  exist  contemporaneously,  but  also  in 
relation  to  the  whole  series  of  things.  That  is  to  sa}^,  I  believe 
that  there  are  of  necessity  species  which  have  never  existed 
and  never  will  exist,  not  being  compatible  with  this  series  of 
creatures  which  God  has  chosen.  But  I  believe  that  all  things, 
Avhich  the  perfect  harmony  of  the  universe  can  receive,  exist 
therein.  That  there  may  be  intermediate  creatures  between 
those  which  are  far  apart  is  in  conformity  with  this  same 
harmony,  although  this  is  not  always  in  one  and  the  same 
globe  or  system,  and  that  which  is  between  two  species  is 
sometimes  so  in  relation  to  certain  circumstances  and  not  in 
/'^relation  to  others.  Birds,  so  different  from  man  in  other 
1  things,  approach  him  in  speech ;  but  if  monkeys  could  speak 
^v^like  parrots,  they  ^vould  go  farther.  The  laic  of  continuity  ^ 
declares  that  nature  leaves  no  gap  in  the  order  she  follows ; 
but  every  form  or  species  is  not  the  whole  order.  As  for 
spirits  or  genii,  as  I  hold  that  all  created  intelligences  have 
organized  bodies,  whose  perfection  corresponds  to  that  of  the 
intelligence,  or  the  mind,  which  is  in  this  body  in  virtue  of 
the  pre-established  harmony,  I  hold  that  in  order  to  gain  any 
conception  of  the  perfections  of  spirits  above  us,  it  will  be  of 
great  service  to  imagine  these  perfections  also  in  bodily  organs 
which  surpass  our  own.     It  is  a  case  in  which  the  liveliest 

D.  2,  93:  "n  sepeut  cependant,  que  ce  Chevalier  ait  encor  eu  quelque  bon  eu- 
thousiasme,  qui  I'ait  transporte  dans  ce  monde  invisible,  et  dans  cette  etendiie 
infinie,  doiit  il  parle,  et  qv\e  je  crois  estre  celle  des  ide'es  on  des  formes,  dont  out 
parle  encor  quelques  Scholastiques  en  mettant  en  question,  utrum  detur 
vacuum  formarum.''  —  Tr. 

1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  50,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  16,  §  12,  Th.,  infra, 
p.  552;  Theodic^e,  III.,  §  348,  Gerhardt,  G,  321,  Erdmann,  605,  b,  Jacques,  2, 
270;  Letter  to  Bayle,  in  the  "  Nouvelles  de  la  Ke'publique  des  Lettres,"  July, 
1(187,  G.  3,  52,  E.  104,  traus.  Duncan,  Philos.  Works  of  Leibnitz,  33;  Letter  to 
Aruauld,  1690,  G.  2,  136,  E.  107,  b,  J.  1,  444,  trans.  D.  38.  Animadversioiies  in 
partem  generulem  Principiorum  Cartesianorum,  Pt.  IL,  ad  Art.  45,  G.  4,  375, 
Duncan,  61 ;  Guhrauer,  G.  W.  Freiherr  v.  Leibniz,  eine  Bioyraphie,  1,  264, 
and  notes,  pp.  31-33,  a  letter  to  an  unknown  person,  Oct.  16,  1707,  containing 
a  very  clear  statement  of  the  principle  or  law  of  continuity;  translation, 
Appendix,  pp.  712-714. — Tk. 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  335 

and  richest  imagination,  and,  to  avail  myself  of  an  Italian 
term  which  I  cannot  well  express  otherwise,  the  invenzione  la 
2:>iu  vaga,  will  be  most  timely  in  raising  us  above  ourselves. 
And  what  I  have  said  in  justification  of  my  system  of  harmony, 
which  exalts  the  divine  perfections  beyond  what  we  had  dared 
to  think,  will  assist  us  also  in  having  ideas  of  creatures  in- 
comparably grander  than  we  have  had  hitherto. 

§  14.^  Ph.  To  return  for  a  little  to  the  reality  of  species 
even  in  substances,  I  ask  you  if  water  and  ice  are  different 
species  ? 

Th.  [I,  in  my  turn,  ask  you  if  gold  melted  in  the  crucible 
and  gold  cooled  in  bullion  are  of  one  and  the  same  species  ?] 

Ph.  He  does  not  reply  to  the  question,  who  proposes  an- 
other, 

Qui  litem  lite  resolvit.^ 

But  you  thereby  admit  that  the  reduction  of  things  to  species 
relates  solely  to  the  ideas  we  have  of  them,  which  suffice  to 
distinguish  them  b}^  names ;  but  if  we  suppose  that  this  dis- 
tinction is  founded  upon  their  real  and  internal  constitution, 
and  that  nature  distinguishes  existing  things  into  so  many 
species  by  their  real  essences,  in  the  same  manner  as  we 
ourselves  distinguish  them  into  species  by  these  or  those 
names,  we  shall  be  liable  to  great  mistakes. 

Th.  There  is  some  ambiguity  in  the  term  species,  or  a  being 
of  a  different  species,  which  causes  all  this  confusion ;  and 
when  we  have  removed  it,  there  will  no  longer  be  discussion 
save  perhaps  as  regards  the  name.  We  may  take  species 
mathematically  and  physically.  In  mathematical  strictness 
the  least  difference  making  two  things  in  any  respect  dissimilar, 
makes  them  different  in  species.  Thus,  in  geometry,  all  circles 
are  of  one  and  the  same  species,  for  they  are  all  perfectly  alike, 
and  for  the  same  reason  all  parabolas  are  also  of  the  same 
species  ;  but  it  is  not  the  same  with  ellipses  and  hyperbolas,  for 
of  these  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  sorts  or  species,  as 
well  as  an  infinite  number  of  each  species.    All  tlie  numberless 

1  Locke  has  §  13,  Philos.  Wo7-Jcs,  Vol.  2,  p.  60.  The  numbering  §  14  in  the 
French  text  of  all  the  editions  is  an  error,  as  will  he  seen  upon  comparing 
tlie  numbering  of  the  next  §,  also  14,  with  Locke's  text.  Here  also  the  texts 
coincide  with  Locke's.  —  Tr. 

-  Cf.  Horace,  Satires,  2,  3,  10.'}.  —  Tr. 


3:]G  LE1B2\ITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  in 

ellipses,  in  Avhicli  the  distance  of  the  foci  has  the  same  ratio  to 
the  distance  of  the  apices,  are  of  one  and  the  same  species  ;  bit* 
as  the  ratios  of  these  distances  vary  only  in  size,  it  follows  that 
all  these  infinite  species  of  ellipses  make  only  one  genus,  and  that 
there  are  no  subdivisions.  On  the  other  hand,  an  oval  of  three 
foci  would  have  indeed  an  infinite  number  of  such  genera,  and 
would  have  an  infinitely  infinite  number  of  sjyecies,  each  genus 
having  a  number  of  them  simply  infinite.  In  this  sense  two 
physical  individuals  will  never  be  perfectly  similar,  and  what  is 
more,  the  same  individual  will  pass  from  species  to  species,  for  it 
is  never  wholly  similar  to  itself  even  for  more  than  a  moment. 
But  the  men  who  establish  physical  species  do  not  adhere  to 
this  strictness,  and  it  depends  upon  them  to  say  that  a  mass 
which  the}^  can  make  return  to  themselves  under  its  first  form 
continues  to  be  one  and  the  same  species  in  their  view.  Thus 
we  say  that  water,  gold,  quicksilver,  common  salt,  continue 
the  same,  and  are  only  disguised  in  ordinary  changes  ;  but 
in  organized  bodies,  or  in  species  of  plants  and  of  animals,  we 
define  species  by  generation,  so  that  this  similarity,  which 
comes  or  may  have  come  from  one  and  the  same  origin  or 
seed,  would  be  of  one  and  the  same  species.^  In  man,  besides 
human  generation,  we  fasten  upon  the  attribute  rational  animal ; 
and,  although  there  are  men  who  live  like  beasts  all  their 
lives,  we  presume  that  it  is  not  for  want  of  faculty  or  principle, 
but  that  it  is  through  impediments  which  stand  in  the  way 
of  this  faculty.  But  it  is  not  yet  determined  as  regards  all 
the  external  conditions  which  we  wish  to  regard  as  sufficient 
to  give  this  presumption.  But  whatever  regulations  men 
make  for  their  denominations  and  for  the  rights  attached  to 
names,  provided  that  their  regulation  is  followed  or  made  fast 
and  intelligible,  it  will  be  founded  in  reality,  and  they  will 
not  be  able  to  imagine  species  which  nature,  which  includes 
even  possibilities,  has  not  produced  or  distinguished  before 
them.  As  for  the  interior,  although  there  is  no  external  ap- 
pearance which  is  not  based  upon  the  internal  constitution,  it 
is  nevertheless  true  that  one  and  the  same  appearance  may 
sometimes  result  from   two   different   constitutions.     But   in 


1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  3,  §  14,  Th.  (2),  ante,  p.  314;  Dewey,  Leib- 
niz's New  Essays,  p.  215  sq.  —  Tr. 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  337 

that  case  there  will  be  something  in  common,  and  this  is  what 
we  philosophers  call  the  proximate  formal  cause.  But  although 
this  should  not  be,  as  if  according  to  Mariotte  ^  the  blue  of 
the  rainbow  had  an  entirely  different  origin  from  the  blue 
of  the  turquoise,  unless  there  were  a  common  formal  cause  (in 
which  opinion  I  do  not  at  all  agree  with  him),  and  although 
we  should  agree  that  certain  apparent  natures  which  make  us 
give  names  have  nothing  internal  in  common,  our  definitions 
would  not  cease  to  be  grounded  in  real  species ;  for  the 
phenomena  themselves  are  realities.  We  can  say,  then,  that 
all  which  we  truthfully  distinguish  or  compare,  nature  dis- 
tinguishes or  makes  agree  also,  although  she  has  distinctions 
and  comparisons  which  we  do  not  know  and  which  may  per- 
haps be  better  than  ours.  Thus  much  care  and  experience  is 
yet  necessary  in  order  to  assign  genera  and  species  in  a  manner 
sufficiently  like  nature.  Modern  botanists  think  that  the  dis- 
tinctions taken  from  the  forms  of  flowers  most  resemble  the 
natural  order."  But  they  find  therein,  however,  still  much 
difficulty,  and  it  would  be  advantageous  to  make  comparisons 
and  arrangements  not  only  upon  a  single  character,  like  that 
of  which  I  have  just  spoken,  which  is  taken  from  flowers, 
and  is  perhaps  the  most  suitable  up  to  this  time  for  a  possible 
system  and  conveident  for  learners,  but  also  upon  characters 
taken  from  other  parts  and  relationships  of  plants  :  each 
basis  of  comparison  deserving  tables  of  its  own ;  ^  without 
which  we  shall  allow  many  subaltern  genera,  and  many  com- 
parisons, distinctions,  and  useful  observations  to  escape.  But 
the  more  thoroughly  we  examine  the  generation  of  species, 
and  the  more  we  follow  in  the  classifications  the  conditions 
which  are  there  requisite,  the  closer  we  shall  approach  the 
natural  order.  Therefore,  if  the  conjecture  of  some  intelligent 
persons  were  found  true,  that  there  is  in  the  plant  besides  the 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  121,  note  4.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  opera  omnia,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  II.,  p.  1G9  sq.,  Epistoln  G.  G. 
Leibnitii  ad  A.  C.  Gackenholtzium,  M.  D.  De  Methodo  liotaru'ca,  April  23, 
1701.  — Tr. 

3  Of.  Mor.  Willi.  Di-obisch,  Neuc  Darstg.  d.  Lor/ik,  .3d  ed.,  Leipzi.-?,  1803, 
p.  141  .sr/.,  where  tlie  so-called  Collateral  Distributions  or  Go-divisious,  which 
Leibnitz  here  calls  to  mind,  and  "  which  are  of  especial  importance  in  Statis- 
tics," are  discussed.  Drobisch's  woi'k  is  considered  "  one  of  the  most  jierfect 
presentations  ol  the  subject-matter  from  the  point  of  view  o£  formal  logic." 
—  Tr. 


&J8  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

seed  {la  graine)  or  the  recognized  seed  (la  semence)  correspond- 
ing to  the  egg  of  the  animal,  another  seed  which  would  deserve 
the  name  masculine,  i.e.  a  powder  {pollen,  visible  very  often, 
though  sometimes,  perhaps,  invisible,  as  the  seed  (la  graine) 
itself  is  in  certain  plants)  which  the  wind  or  other  ordinary- 
accidents  scatter  in  order  to  unite  it  with  the  seed  which  comes 
sometimes  from  one  and  the  same  plant,  and  sometimes,  also 
(as  in  the  hemp),  from  another  neighboring  plant  of  the  same 
species,  which  plant  consequently  will  be  analogous  to  the 
male,  though  perhaps  the  female  is  never  wholh'  destitute  of 
this  same  pollen;  if  this  conjecture,  I  say,  were  found  true, 
and  if  the  mode  of  generation  of  plants  became  better  known, 
I  do  not  doubt  that  the  varieties  which  would  be  noticed  would 
furnish  a  basis  for  very  natural  divisions.  And  if  we  had  the 
penetration  of  some  superior  geniuses  and  knew  enough  about 
things,  perhaps  we  should  find  therein  fixed  attributes  for 
each  species,  commou  to  all  the  individuals  and  always  sub- 
sisting in  the  same  living  organism,  whatever  alterations  or 
transformations  may  happen  to  it,  as  in  the  best  known  of  the 
physical  species,  the  human,  reason  is  such  a  fixed  attribute, 
granted  to  each  individual,  and  never  to  be  lost,  although 
it  cannot  always  be  perceived.  But  in  default  of  this  knowl- 
edge we  avail  ourselves  of  the  attributes  which  appear  to  us 
most  convenient  for  distinguishing  and  comparing  things,  and 
in  a  word,  for  recognizing  in  them  species  or  sorts ;  and  these 
attributes  have  always  their  real  grounds.] 

§  14.  Ph.  In  order  to  distinguish  substantial  beings  accord- 
ing to  the  usual  supposition,  that  there  are  certain  essences  or 
precise  forms  of  things,  whereby  all  existing  individuals  are 
naturally  distinguished  into  species,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
be  assured,  §  15.  first,  that  nature  always  proposes,  in  the 
production  of  things,  to  make  them  participate  in  certain 
regular  and  established  essences,  as  models ;  and,  §  16.  sec- 
ondly, that  nature  always  attains  this  end.  But  monsters 
give  us  reason  to  doubt  both.  §  17.  It  would  be  necessary 
to  determine,  in  tlie  tliird  pjlace,  whether  these  monsters  are 
really  a  distinct  and  new  species,  for  we  find  that  some  of 
these  monsters  have  few  or  none  of  those  qualities  which  are 
supposed  to  result  from  the  essence  of  that  species  whence 
they  derive  their  origin,  and  to  which  they  seem  to  belong  in 
virtue  of  theii-  birth. 


CH.  VI]  ON  HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  339 

Th.  When  it  is  a  question  of  determining  wliether  monsters 
belong  to  a  certain  species,  we  are  often  reduced  to  conjecture. 
This  shows  us  that  we  are  not,  then,  limited  to  external  con- 
siderations, since  we  should  divine  whether  the  internal  nature 
(as,  for  example,  reason  in  man)  common  to  the  iijdividuals  of 
such  a  species,  still  suits  (as  birth  makes  us  conjecture)  these 
individuals,  in  Avhoni  a  portion  of  the  external  characteristics, 
ordinarily  found  in  this  species,  is  lacking.  But  our  incerti- 
tude nowise  affects  the  nature  of  things,  and  if  there  is  such 
a  common  internal  nature,  it  will  or  will  not  be  found  in 
the  monster,  whether  we  know  it  or  not.  And  if  the  internal 
nature  of  any  species  is  not  found  therein,  the  monster  will  be 
of  its  own  species.  But  if  there  were  no  such  internal  nature 
in  the  species  under  discussion,  and  if  the  question  was  not 
decided  by  birth  either,  then  the  external  marks  alone  would 
determine  the  species,  and  monsters  would  not  belong  to  that 
species  from  which  they  deviate,  unless  taken  in  a  manner  a 
little  vague  and  with  some  latitude ;  and  in  this  case,  also, 
our  trouble  in  desiring  to  divine  the  species  would  be  in  vain. 
This  is  perhaps  what  you  mean  by  all  the  objections  you  make 
to  species  taken  as  real  internal  essences.  You  ought  then  to 
prove,  sir,  that  no  common  internal  specific  mark  exists,  since 
the  external  is  wholly  missing.  But  the  contrary  is  found  in 
the  human  species  in  which  sometimes  children  who  have 
some  monstrosity  reach  an  age  in  which  they  exhibit  reason. 
Why,  then,  could  there  not  be  something  similar  in  other 
species  ?  It  is  true  that  for  want  of  knowledge  of  them  we 
cannot  avail  ourselves  of  it  to  define  them,  but  the  exterior 
takes  its  place,  although  we  recognize  the  fact  that  it  is  insuffi- 
cient for  an  exact  definition,  and  that  the  nominal  definitions 
themselves  in  these  instances  are  only  conjectural ;  and  I 
have  already  stated  above  how  sometimes  they  are  only  pro- 
visioned. For  example,  w^e  might  find  a  way  to  counterfeit 
gold  so  that  it  might  satisfy  all  the  tests  which  we  have  up  to 
the  present  time  ;  but  we  might  also  then  discover  a  new  method 
of  testing  which  would  give  the  means  of  distinguishing  natural 
gold  from  this  tvhich  is  artificially  made.  The  old  joui'uals  at- 
tribute both  (discoveries)  to  Augustus,  Elector  of  Saxony ;  ^ 

1  Augustus  I.,  tlic  lirotlier  of  Mauriro,  was  Elector  155.3-1580,  and,  according  to 
Soliaaj'schuiidt,  "  shared  with  his  wile,  Auua  of  Denmark,  the  love  for  alchemy." 
—  Tk. 


340  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  in 

but  I  am  not  the  man  to  guarantee  tins  fact.  But  if  it 
were  true,  we  could  have  a  more  j)^i'f^ct  definition  of  gold 
than  we  have  at  present,  and  if  artificial  gold  could  be  made 
in  quantity  and  cheap,  as  the  alchemists  claim,  this  new  proof 
would  be  important ;  for  by  its  means  we  could  preserve  for 
the  human  race  the  advantage  which  natural  gold  gives  us  in 
commerce  by  its  rarity,  while  furnishing  ourselves  with  a 
substance  which  is  durable,  uniform,  easy  to  divide  and  to 
recognize,  and  precious  in  small  volume.  I  wish  to  avail 
myself  of  this  occasion  to  remove  a  difficulty  (see  §  50  of  the 
chapter,  "  On  the  iSTames  of  Substances,"  in  the  author  of 
the  Essay  on  Understanding).  The  objection  is  made  that  in 
saying :  All  gold  is  fixed,  if  we  understand  by  the  idea  of  gold 
the  mass  of  certain  qualities  in  which  fixedness  is  comprised, 
we  make  only  an  identical  and  useless  proposition,  as  if  we 
said :  Fixedness  is  fixedness ;  but  if  we  understand  thereby  a 
substance  given  a  certain  internal  essence,  of  Avhich  fixedness 
is  a  result,  we  shall  not  speak  intelligiblj",  for  this  real  essence 
is  wholly  unknown.  I  reply  that  the  body  given  this  internal 
constitution  is  designated  by  other  external  marks  in  which 
fixedness  is  not  comprised,  as  if  any  one  said :  the  heaviest 
of  all  bodies  is  also  one  of  the  most  fixed.  But  all  that  is 
only  provisional,  for  we  might  some  day  find  a  volatile  body, 
as  a  new  mercury,  which  would  be  heavier  than  gold,  and  upon 
which  gold  would  float,  as  lead  floats  upon  our  mercury. 

§  19.  Ph.  It  is  true  that  in  this  way  we  can  never  know 
precisely  the  number  of  properties  depending  on  the  real 
essence  of  gold  unless  we  know  the  essence  of  gold  itself. 
§  21.  [But  if  we  limit  ourselves  precisely  to  certain  properties, 
that  will  be  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  have  exact  nominal 
definitions  which  will  serve  us  for  the  present,  reserving  to 
ourselves  the  privilege  of  changing  the  signification  of  names, 
if  any  new  useful  distinction  is  discovered.]  But  it  is  neces- 
sary at  least  that  this  definition  correspond  to  the  use  of  the 
name,  and  be  capable  of  being  put  in  its  place.  This  serves 
to  refute  those  who  maintain  that  extension  constitutes  the 
essence  of  body,  for  when  it  is  said  that  one  body  gives  an 
impulse  to  another,  the  absurdity  would  be  manifest,  if  substi- 
tuting extension  (for  body)  we  should  say  that  one  extension 
puts  in  motion  another  extension  by  means  of  an  impulse,  for 


CH.   vi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  341 

in  aclclitiou  solidity  is  necessary.  In  like  manner  no  one  will 
say  that  reason,  or  that  which  makes  man  rational,  makes 
conversation ;  for  reason  does  not  constitute  the  entire  essence 
of  man ;  there  are  rational  animals  who  converse  with  each 
other. 

Th.  I  think  you  are  right :  for  the  objects  of  abstract  and 
incomplete  ideas  are  not  sufficient  to  give  the  subjects  of  all 
the  actions  of  things.  But  I  think  that  conversation  agrees 
with  all  minds  who  can  interchange  their  thoughts.  The 
scholastics  are  greatly  troubled  regarding  the  angelic  method 
of  communication ;  but  if  they  would  accord  the  angels  subtile 
bodies,  as  I  do,  following  the  ancients,  they  would  experience 
no  further  difficulty  in  that  regard.^ 

§  22.  Ph.  There  are  some  creatures  in  the  world  which 
have  forms  similar  to  ours,  but  are  hairy  and  use  neither 
language  nor  reason.  There  are  imbeciles  ^  among  us  who 
have  exactly  the  same  form  as  ourselves,  but  who  are  destitute 
of  reason,  and  some  of  them  make  no  use  of  language.  There 
are  some  creatures,  as  it  is  said,  which,  with  the  use  of  lan- 
guage and  of  reason  and  a  form  similar  in  every  other  respect 
to  ours,  have  hairy  tails ;  at  least,  it  is  not  impossible  that 
there  are  such  creatures.^  There  are  others,  where  the  males 
have  no  beard,  and  others,  where  the  females  have.  If  you 
ask  whether  all  these  creatures  are  men  or  not,  whether  they 

1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  52,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  R,  ante,  p.  .332,  note 
2  ;  also  letters  to  Des  Bosses,  Sept.  20,  Oct.  4,  1706,  Gerhardt,  2,  310,  319, 
Erdmann,  439,  440.  —Tr. 

^Loekelias:  "  naturals,"  P7»7o.s.  ^Fo?•^•,s,  Vol.  2,  p.53(Bohn's  ed.). — Tr. 

3  The  myth  of  men  with  tails,  here  mentioned  and  accepted  as  credible  by 
Locke,  arose  either  from  the  superficial  observation  of  African  travellers,  or 
from  their  uncritical  acceptance  and  rehearsal  of  the  stories  of  such  Negroes 
as  claimed  to  have  seen  such  beings,  assumed  by  them  to  be  endowed  with 
reason,  although  covered  with  hair  and  furnished  with  tails  —  stories  which 
seem  to  rest  upon  a  confusion  of  men  with  man-like  apes,  a  confusion  the 
more  naturally  suggested  as  many  tribes  of  negroes  regard  the  apes  as  rational 
but  uncivilized  human  beings.  The  myth  has  been  exploded  in  our  day  by  the 
knowledge  furnished  by  scientific  explorers  into  the  interior  of  Africa  (the 
assumed  abode  of  the.se  beings),  such  as  Dr.  Georg  August  Schweinfnrth,  who 
states  that  among  the  tribes  of  Central  Africa  the  Dyoor,  the  Niam-niam,  and 
the  Bongo,  Insten  upon  themselves  behind,  as  a  part  of  their  dr(!ss,  the  tails 
of  animals,  as,  for  example,  that  of  "the  quercza  monkey  (Colohns),"  or  tails 
"composed  of  the  bast  of  the  Sanseviera."  Of.  bis  Jm  Ilerzrn  ron  Afrika, 
English  trans,  by  Ellen  E.  Fr(>wer,  2  vols..  New  York:  Harper  &  Bros.,  1874, 
Vol.  1,  pp.  201,  294-0,  Vol.  2,  pp.  2,  0,  11,  137.  —Tr. 


342  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [ijk.  iu 

belong  to  the  human  species,  it  is  plain  that  the  question 
rt'i'ors  only  to  the  nominal  delinition,  or  to  the  complex  idea 
wi"  have  made  for  ourselves  in  order  to  indicate  it  by  this 
name ;  for  the  internal  essence  is  absolutely  unknown  to  us, 
although  we  have  reason  to  think  that  where  the  faculties,  or 
rather  the  external  hgure,  are  so  different,  the  internal  consti- 
tution is  not  the  same. 

Th.  I  think  we  have  in  the  case  of  man  a  definition  at  once 
real  and  nominal.  For  nothing  can  be  more  internal  to  man 
than  reason,  and  ordinarily  it  makes  itself  well  known.  There- 
fore the  beard  and  the  tail  will  not  be  considered  in  comparison 
with  it.  A  man  of  the  forest,  though  hairy,  will  make  himself 
recognized :  and  it  is  not  the  hair  of  a  magot  ^  which  excludes 
him.  Imbeciles  lack  the  use  of  reason;  but  as  we  know  by 
experience  that  reason  is  often  bound  and  cannot  appear,  and 
as  this  happens  in  the  case  of  men  who  have  exhibited  and 
will  exhibit  reason,  we  make,  probably,  the  same  judgment 
regarding  these  imbeciles  upon  other  indications,  i.e.  upon 
their  bodily  figure.  It  is  only  by  these  signs,  united  with 
their  birth,  that  we  presume  that  infants  are  men,  and  will 
manifest  reason ;  and  we  are  seldom  deceived.  But  if  there 
were  rational  animals  with  an  external  form  a  little  different 
from  ours,  we  should  be  embarrassed.  This  shows  that  our 
definitions,  when  dependent  upon  the  exterior  of  bodies,  are 
imperfect  and  provisional.  If  any  one  called  himself  an 
angel,  and  knew,  or  knew  how  to  do,  things  much  above  us,  he 
might  be  believed.  If  some  one  else,  like  Gonzales,^  came 
from  the  moon  l)y  means  of  some  extraordinary  machine,  and 
told  us  credible  things  about  his  native  country,  he  would  pass 

1  The  Barbary  ape.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  L'llomme.  davs  la  Inne,  ou  le  voyage  chim^riqiie  fait  au  monde  de  la 
lune,  nouvellement  de'couvert  par  Dominiqxie  Gonzales,  avanturier  Espar/nol, 
atitrernent  dit  le  courier  volant,  mis  en  nostre  lanque  par  J.  B.  D.  (Jean  Bau- 
doiii),  Paris,  1648,  8vo,  pp.  176;  reprinted  Paris,  16C(),  with  illustrations,  and 
also  Paris,  1731,  12mo.  Brunet  states  that  this  is  the  French  translation  of 
Franc.  Godwin,  7Vie  3fan  in  the  Moon,  or  a  discourse  of  a  voyage  thither  by 
Domingo  Consoles,  London,  1638,  also  1657,  etc.,  12mo;  that  it  had  some  suc- 
cess, and  that  it  is  supposed  that  Swift  borrowed  some  passages  from  it  for  his 
Gulliver's  Travels.  Cf.  E.  A.  Poe,  Works,  New  York,  1867,Vol.  1,  p.  49,  who 
gives,  in  a  note  at  the  end  of  the  story  of  "  The  unparalleled  adventure  of  one 
Hans  Pfaall,"  the  full  title  of  the  French  book,  together  with  some  account  of 
its  contents,  including  the  machine  of  Gonzales.  —  Tk. 


CH.  vi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  343 

as  a  lunar  being,  and  yet  we  miglit  accord  him  indigineity  and 
the  rights  of  citizenship,  with  tlie  title  of  man,  entire  stranger  as 
he  would  be  to  our  globe ;  but  if  he  asked  for  baptism  and 
wished  to  be  received  as  a  proselyte  of  our  law,  I  think  that 
we  should  see  great  discussions  arise  among  the  theologians. 
And  if  communication  were  opened  with  these  planetary  men, 
sufficiently  approaching  ourselves  according  to  Huygens,^  the 
question  would  require  a  universal  council  in  order  to  know 
whether  we  ought  to  extend  the  care  of  the  propagation  of  the 
faith  even  beyond  our  globe.  Many  would  doubtless  maintain 
that  the  rational  animals  of  these  countries,  not  being  of  the 
race  of  Adam,  have  no  part  in  the  redemption  of  Jesus  Christ ; 
but  others  would  perhaps  say  that  we  have  not  sufficient 
knowledge  either  of  the  place  where  Adam  has  always  been, 
or  of  what  has  been  done  with  all  his  posterity,  since  there 
have  been  theologians,  indeed,  who  believed  that  the  moon 
was  the  place  of  paradise  ;  and  perhaps  that  with  the  plurality 
we  should  conclude  for  the  surest  thing,  viz.,  to  baptize  these 
men  upon  condition  that  they  be  susceptible  of  baptism;  but 
I  doubt  whether  we  should  ever  wish  to  make  them  priests 
in  the  Roman  Church,  because  their  consecration  would  always 
be  doubtful,  and  we  should  expose  the  people  to  the  danger 
of  a  material  idolatry,  according  to  the  hypothesis  of  this 
church.  Happily  the  nature  of  things  exempts  us  from  all 
these  embarrassments ;  but  these  bizarre  fictions  are  useful  in 
speculation,  in  order  rightly  to  know  the  nature  of  our  ideas. 

§  23.  Ph.  Not  only  in  theological  questions,  but  also  on 
other  occasions  some  would  perhaps  wish  to  regulate  them- 
selves by  the  race,  and  to  say  that  in  animals  propagation  by 
the  copulation  of  the  male  and  the  female,  and  in  plants  by 
means  of  the  seeds,  keeps  the  supposed  real  species  distinct  and 
entire.  But  this  would  serve  only  to  fix  the  species  of  animals 
and  vegetables.  What  must  be  done  about  the  rest  ?  And 
even  as  regards  these  it  is  not  sufficient,  for  if  history  is  to  be 
believed,  women  have  been  gotten  with  children  by  magots. 
And  here  is  a  new  question  :  Of  what  S])ecios  must  sueli  a 
pr()(Uiction  be  ?     You  often  see  mules  and  jiini;u'ts  (sec  Dietioii- 

1  Cf.  nntp,  p.  1.50,  iHito  :'..  Lclhnizoia  it.  Iltii/i/hcn's  Rriefwcchseln,  v.  E. 
Gerlund,  Berlin,  issl.— Tii 


344  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

iiaire  fitymologique  de  M.  IMenage  '),  the  first  begotten  bjj^  an 
ass  and  a  luave,  tlie  last  by  a  bull  and  a  mare.  I  liave  seen  an 
animal  begotten  of  a  cat  and  a  rat,  wliicli  had  visible  marks  of 
these  two  animals.^  Whoever  will  add  thereto  the  monstrous 
productions,  will  find  that  it  is  very  hard  to  determine  species 
by  generation ;  and  if  it  can  only  be  done  by  that  means,  must 
I  go  to  the  Indies  to  see  the  father  and  mother  of  a  tiger,  and 
the  seed  of  the  tea-plant,  and  could  I  not  otherwise  decide 
whether  the  individuals  which  come  to  us  are  of  these  species  ? 
Til.  Generation  or  race  gives  at  least  a  strong  presumption 
(i.  e.  a  provisional  proof)  and  I  have  already  said  that  very 
often  our  signs  are  only  conjectural.  The  race  has  sometimes 
been  contradicted  by  the  figure,  as  when  the  child  is  unlike 
the  father  and  mother,  and  the  mixture  of  figures  is  not 
always  the  sign  of  the  mixture  of  races ;  for  it  may  happen 
that  a  female  gives  birth  to  an  animal  which  seems  to  belong 
to  another  species  and  that  the  mother's  imagination  alone 
has  caused  this  irregularity :  to  say  nothing  of  what  is  called 
mola.^  But  as  meanwhile  we  judge  provisionally  the  species 
by  the  race,  we  also  judge  the  race  by  the  species.  For  when 
a  forest  child,'*  taken  from  among  the  bears,  who  had  many  of 
their  ways,  but  who  made  himself  known  at  last  as  a  rational 
animal,  was  presented  to  John  Casimir,^  king  of  Poland,  he 
did  not  scruple  to  believe  him  of  the  race  of  Adam,  and  to 
baptize  him  under  the  name  of  Joseph,  although  perhaps  upon 
the  condition,  si  haptizatus  non  es,  according  to  the  usage  of 
the  Roman  church,  because  he  might  have  been  carried  off  by 
a  bear  after  baptism.    We  have  not  as  yet  sufficient  knowledge 

1  Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  07n.,  5,  350,  543;  6,  Pt.  II.,  21,  Gerhardt,  2,  5.30, 
539.  Grilles  Menage,  1613-1692.  The  first  ed.  was  entitled  Origines  de  la  langue 
fran<;oise,  Paris,  1650, 4to.  A  new  ed.  appeared  at  Paris,  1694,  fol.,  under  the 
name,  Bictionnaire  Etymologique  de  la  lanrjue  frawpise,  etc.;  and  this  was 
afterwards  enlarged  and  edited  by  A.  F.  Janlt,  Paris,  1750,  2  vols.,  fol. — Tr. 

2  An  instance  of  superficial  observation  and  hasty  inference,  like  that  of 
the  men  with  tails  above  mentioned,  ante,  p.  341,  note  3.  —  Tr. 

3  An  amorphous  fleshy  mass  in  the  uterus.  —  Tr. 

*  Schaarschmidt  states  that  J.  H.  F.  Ulrich,  in  his  German  trans.,  with  ad- 
ditions and  notes,  Halle,  1778-80,  of  Raspe's  (Eurres  ijhilosoph.  latines  etfran- 
<;aises  defeu  Mr.  Leibniz,  "gives  in  a  note,  p.  1-39-140,  information  concerning 
the  child  of  the  bears  found  in  the  forest,  without,  however,  quoting  the  source 
of  his  communications."  — Tr. 

5  John  II.,  Casimir  V.,  1609-1672.  He  was  elected  king  of  Poland  in  1614, 
and  abdicated  in  1088.  —  Tr. 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  345 


of  the  effects  of  the  intermixture  of  animals :  and  often  mon- 
sters are  destroyed,  instead  of  being  brought  up,  whilst  they 
are  seldom  long  lived.  The  belief  is  that  mixed  animals  do 
not  multiply  ;  but  Strabo  ^  attributes  propagation  to  the  mules 
of  Cappadocia,  and  letters  from  China  tell  me  that  in  neigh- 
boring Tartary  there  are  race-mules.  We  see  also  that  the 
mixtures  of  plants  are  capable  of  preserving  their  new  spe- 
cies.^ We  do  not  always  indeed  know  in  the  case  of  animals 
whether  it  is  the  male  or  the  female,  or  both,  or  neither, 
which  determines  the  species.  The  doctrine  concerning  the 
eggs  of  females  which  the  late  Mr.  Kerkring^  made  famous, 
seemed  to  reduce  the  males  to  the  condition  of  moist  air  as 
related  to  plants,  Avhich  furnishes  seeds  with  the  means  of 
pushing  and  raising  themselves  from  the  earth ;  following  the 
verses  of  Vergil  which  the  Priscillianists  *  were  wont  to  repeat ; 

1  Cf.  Geographica,  p.  212,  ed.  Casaubon,  1G20;  Bk.  V.,  chap.  1,  §  4,  ed.  by 
Gustav  Kramer,  Berlin,  1844-52,  3  vols.,  8vo;  English  trans.  Vol.  1,  p.  31(5 
(Bohu's  Class.  Lib.),  London,  1887.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  C.  Darwin,  1S09-1882,  Origin  of  Species,  and  the  new  inquiries  and 
investigations  consequent  upon  it.  —  Tr. 

3  Theodore  Kerkkrinck,  it!40-l()93,  a  Dutch  physician,  born  at  Amsterdam, 
died  at  Hamburg,  a  fellow-puiMl  with  Spinoza,  1G32-1677,  of  a  physician, 
Francis  Van  <ler  Ende,  and  author  of  works  on  medicine,  anatomy,  and  chem- 
istry, among  which  was  the  one  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz :  Anthropogeniss 
ichnographia  sive  conformatio  foetus  ab  ovo  usque  ad  ossificationis  principia, 
in  supplementum  osteogenic  fwtuum,  4to,  Amstelodami,  1671.  His  Opera 
omnia  anatomica,  2d  ed.,  4to,  Lugd.  Bat.,  1717.  Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om., 
5,  173,  199;  F.  Pollock,  Spinoza:  His  Life  and  Philosophij,  p.  13.  — Tr. 

4  The  Priscillianists  were  an  heretical  sect  which  appeared  in  Spain  toward 
the  close  of  the  fourth  century,  and  continued  till  about  the  middle  of  the 
sixth.  Their  speculative  doctrines  are  a  combination  of  Christianity  with 
Gnosticism  and  Manichfeism.  Their  moral  system  was  rigidly  ascetic,  and 
celibacy  was  required.  The  charges  of  immorality  and  licentiousness  so  fre- 
quently brought  against  them  by  their  adversaries,  "  are,  to  say  the  least,  not 
sufficiently  well  authenticated."  The  information  that  they  made  use  of  these 
verses  of  Vergil,  to  which  they  attached  a  religious  dogma,  as  a  foundation 
for  their  heresy  and  alleged  sexual  license  comes  from  a  letter  of  Jerome, 
c.  34f;-420,  to  Ctesiphon,  Epist.  133  ad  Ctesiphontem,  Opera,  ed.  Vallarsi, 
Veronffi,  1734-42,  Vol.  1,  p.  1029,  a;  2d  ed.,  Venetiis,  17t)()-72 ;  J.  P.  Migne, 
Patrol,  s.  Lat.,  Vol.  22,  p.  1150-51,  Paris,  1845,  latest  ed.,  Paris,  18(54-66.  Cf. 
also  Sulpicius  Severus,  363-406,  or  410,  IJistor.  Sacra,  or  Chronica,  Bk.  II., 
chaps.  46-51,  and  Dialog.,  III.,  11-13,  ed.  C.  Halm,  Vienna,  1866  (Vol.  1  of  the 
Corpus  Script.  Eccles.  Latinorum),  and  J.  Bernays,  Die  Chronik  des  Sulp. 
Severus,  Berlin,  1861;  A.  Neander,  Hist,  of  the  Christ.  Relig.  and  Church,  2, 
771-779,  Boston,  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.;  Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall, MUmnn's 
ed.,  chap.  27 ;  Smith  and  Wace,  Diet,  of  Christ.  Biog.,  4,  470-478,  London,  John 
Murray,  1887.  — Tr. 


346  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

Cum  pater  omiiipotens  fcEcundis  imbribus  aether 
Conjugis  ill  hftai  frrciniiiii)  descendit  et  omnes 
Magnus  alit  maguo  commistus  corpore  foetus.^ 

In  a  word  according  to  this  hypothesis  the  male  would  no 
longer  be  more  than  the  rain.  But  Leeuwenhoek^  has  reha- 
bilitated the  masculine  genus,  and  the  other  sex  is  in  its  turn 
degraded,  as  if  it  performed  only  the  earth's  function  as 
regards  seeds,  by  furnishing  them  place  and  nourishment;  a 
view  which  might  obtain  even  if  we  still  maintained  the 
theory  of  the  eggs.  But  this  does  not  prevent  the  imagination 
of  the  female  from  having  a  great  influence  iipon  the  form 
of  the  fcEtus,  even  if  we  supposed  that  the  animal  has  already 
come  from  the  male.  For  this  is  a  condition  destined  ordi- 
narily to  a  great  change,  and  much  more  susceptible  also  to 
extraordinary  changes.  It  is  asserted  that  the  imagination  of 
a  woman  in  this  condition,  who  was  shocked  by  the  sight  of  a 
cripple,  caused  the  separation  of  the  hand  of  the  foetus  very 
near  its  term,  and  that  this  hand  was  subsequently  found  in 
the  after-birth;  a  statement,  however,  which  requires  confir- 

1  Georrj.,  2,  325-327.  —  Tr. 

2  Antoon  van  Leeuwenhoek,  1632-1723,  a  distinguished  Dutch  naturalist, 
"the  father  of  scieutific  microscoi^y,"  who  shares  with  Malpighi,  1628-1694, 
the  discovery  of  the  capillary  circulation  of  the  hlood,  thus  corai^leting  the 
doctrine  of  Harvey,  1598-1657,  and  with  his  own  pupil,  Ludwig  Hamm,  the 
discovery  of  the  active  moving  constituents  of  the  seminal  duid,  which  he  called 
"animalcula  spermatica,"  or  "spermatozoa."  Leeuwenhoek  communicated 
his  discovery,  1677,  of  the  spermatozoa  in  a  letter  to  Sir  Christopher  Wren, 
1631-1723,  President  of  the  Royal  Society,  1681,  "  De  ovario,  et  imaginovis  ejus 
ovis;  homo  ex  animalculo  oritur."  The  letter  is  found  in  Leeuwenhoek's 
Arcana  naturse  detecta  sive  epistolse  ad  societatem  Regiam  Angliam  scriptse. 
Delft,  1695,  4to,  p.  28  sq.  Leeuwenhoek  strenuously  opi^osed  the  doctrine  of 
".spontaneous  generation,"  and  did  more  than  any  other  naturalist  to  over- 
throw it.  Cf.  Dutens,  Leihnit.  op.  om.,  5,  173,  174,  319,  337;  6,  Pt.  I.,  211,  213, 
218,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3,  562,  565,  571,  579,  580,  Dutens,  2, 
Pt.  I.,  329,  3.30;  Pt.  II.,  214,  Protogsea,  §  17;  Systhne  nouveau,  §  6,  Ger- 
hardt, 4,  480,  Erdmann,  125,  b,  Jacques,  1,  471,  trans.  Duncan,  Philos.  Wks.  of 
Leibnitz,  73;  Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Grace,  §  6,  G.,  6,  601,  E.,  715,  b, 
trans.  D.,  212;  G.,  7,  568.  He  published  the  greater  part  of  his  discussions  and 
investigations  in  112  papers  in  the  Philos.  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Society, 
and  in  26  papers  in  the  Memoirs  of  the  Paris  Academy  of  Sciences,  of  both 
of  which  bodies  he  was  a  member.  The  most  complete  collection  of  his  works 
is  the  Opera  omnia  sen  arcanas  natural  ope  microscopiorum  detecta,  Leyden, 
1719-22,  4  vols.,  4to ;  from  this.  Select  Works,  trans,  by  Samuel  Hoole,  London, 
1800-1807,  2  vols,  4to,  does  not  contain  the  letter  to  Wren.  There  is  a  Life  in 
Dutch  by  Haaxman,  Leyden,  1875.  —  Tr. 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  347 

niation.  Perhaps  some  one  will  arise  who  will  maintain  that, 
although  the  soul  can  come  only  from  one  sex,  both  sexes 
furnish  something  of  the  organism,  and  that  from  the  two 
bodies  one  is  made,  just  as  we  see  that  the  silk-worm  is  as  it 
were  a  double  animal,  and  encloses  a  flying  insect  under  the 
form  of  the  caterpillar :  in  such  darkness  are  we  still  upon  so 
important  a  point.  Some  day  perhaps  the  analogy  of  plants 
will  give  us  some  light,  but  at  present  we  have  but  little  in- 
formation regarding  the  generation  of  plants  themselves,  the 
surmise  concerning  the  pollen  which  has  been  remarked,  as 
that  which  might  correspond  to  the  masculine  semen,  not 
yet  being  very  clear.  Besides  a  slip  of  a  plant  is  very  often 
capable  of  giving  a  new  and  complete  plant,  to  which  no 
analogy  is  as  yet  seen  in  animals  ;  also  we  cannot  say  that 
the  foot  of  an  animal  is  an  animal,  as  each  branch  of  the  tree 
seems  to  be  a  plant  capable  of  fruit-bearing  by  itself.  Fur- 
thermore the  intermixture  of  species,  and  even  the  changes 
in  one  and  the  same  species  often  go  on  with  much  success 
in  plants.  Perhaps  at  some  time  or  place  in  the  universe 
the  si)ecies  of  animals  are,  or  were,  or  will  be  more  subject 
to  change  than  they  are  at  present  with  us,  and  many  animals 
who  have  somewhat  of  the  cat,  as  the  lion,  the  tiger,  and  the 
lynx,  might  have  been  of  one  and  the  same  race  and  may  now 
be  as  it  were  new  subdivisions  of  the  ancient  species  of  cats. 
Thus  I  always  return  to  what  I  have  more  than  once  said  that 
our  determinations  of  physical  species  are  provisional  and 
proportional  to  our  knowledge.^ 

§  24.  Ph.  Men  at  least  in  making  their  divisions  of  species 
have  never  thought  of  substantial  forms,  save  those  who,  in 
this  single  corner  of  the  world  where  we  are,  have  learned  the 
language  of  our  schools. 

Th.  It  seems  that  lately  the  term  substantial  forms  has 
come  into  disrepute  with  certain  classes  and  that  they  are 
ashamed  to  speak  of  them.  Meanwhile  there  is  perhaps  in 
that  circumstance  more  of  fashion  than  of  reason.  The  scho- 
lastics employed  inaptly  a  general  notion,  when  they  used  it 
to  ex[)lain  particular  phenomena ;  but  this  abuse  does  not  de- 
stroy the  thing.     The  soul  of  man  is  a  little  disconcerting  to 

1  Leibnitz  here  touclios  upon  the  theory  of  evolution,  or  development,  but 
keeps  himself  within  very  moderate  limits  in  tlie  statement  of  his  views.  --Tk. 


348  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [uk.  hi 

the  ilnLnnatisin  of  some  of  our  moderns.  There  are  some  who 
admit  that  it  is  the  form  of  man;  but  they  also  affirm  tliat  it 
is  the  only  substantial  form  of  known  nature.  Descartes  thus 
speaks  of  it,  and  he  censures  Kegius^  because  he  contested  this 
quality  of  a  substantial  form  of  the  soul  and  denied  that  man 
was  a  unum  per  se,  a  being  endowed  with  a  veritable  unity .^ 
Some  think  that  this  excellent  man  did  this  as  a  matter  of 
policy.  I  doubt  tliis  a  little  because  I  think  he  had  reason 
for  so  doing.  But  this  privilege  is  not  given  to  man  only,  as  if 
nature  were  made  of  broken  sticks.  There  is  room  for  the 
judgment  that  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  souls,  or,  to  speak 
more  generally,  of  primitive  entelechies,  which  have  something 
analogous  to  perception  and  appetite,  and  which  are  all,  and 
remain  always,  substantial  forms  of  bodies.  It  is  true  that 
species  apparently  exist  which  are  not  truly  a  unum  per  se  (i.e. 
bodies  endowed  with  a  veritable  unity,  or  with  an  invisible 
essence  wdiich  makes  their  entire  active  principle),  any  more 
than  a  mill  or  watch  might  be.  The  salts,  the  minerals,  and 
the  metals  may  be  of  this  nature,  i.e.  simple  contextures  or 
masses  in  which  there  is  a  certain  regularity.  But  the  bodies 
of  both,  i.e.  animate  bodies  as  well  as  the  contextures  without 
life  will  be  specified  by  their  internal  structure,  since  in  those 
indeed  which  are  animate,  the  soul  and  the  machine,^  each  by 


1  Pierre  Sylvain  Re'gis — Latin,  Regius  —  1G32-1707,  a  celebrated  Cartesian, 
at  first  destined  for  the  church,  but  who,  on  going  to  Paris  to  study  tlieology 
at  the  Sorboune,  heard  Rohault  (cf.  ante,  p.  233,  note  2)  on  Cartesiauism, 
became  a  zealous  adherent  of  the  doctrine,  renounced  the  priesthood,  and  gave 
himself  up  to  teaching  the  new  philosophy.  His  enormous  success  aroused  the 
opposition  of  Harlay,  the  Archbishop  of  Paris,  who  forbade  his  teaching.  He 
therefore  turned  to  composition,  expounding  his  philosophical  ideas  in  his 
Cours  entier  cle  philosophie,  or  Systeme  general  selon  les  2^rincipes  de  Des- 
cartes, 4  vols.,  4to,  Paris,  1(590,  2d  ed.,  3  vols.,  Amsterdam,  1691.  He  inter- 
preted Descartes  in  the  sense  of  empiricism,  and  thus  drew  upon  himself  the 
pliilosopher's  censure,  cf.  Descartes,  Remarks  on  the  Programme  of  Regius, 
Works,  ed.  Cousin,  Paris,  1824-2(),  Vol.  10,  pp.  70-111;  see  also  Veitch,"r/ie 
Method,  Meditations  and  Selections  from  the  Principles  of  Descartes,  8th  ed., 
Edinburgh,  1881,  pp.  278,  287.  His  doctrines  were  a  reaction  against  the  ultra 
idealism  of  Malebranche.  Other  works  of  his  are  Response  it  la  censura 
philosophise  cartesianse,  12mo,  Paris,  1691;  L'Usaije  de  la  Raison  et  de  la  Foi, 
4to,  Paris,  1704.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Descartes,  1596-1650,  Epist.,  I.,  89,  pp.  292-293,  ed.  of  1668,  p.  261,  ed. 
of  1692,  Cousin's  ed..  Vol.  8,  pp.  579-583;  Gerhardt,  Leihniz.  philos.  Schrift., 
6,  547,  550s(?.— Tr. 

3  I.e.  body,  according  to  the  linguistic  iisage  of  the  Cartesians.  —  Tr. 


en.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  349 

itself,  suffice  for  the  determination ;  for  they  agree  perfectly, 
and  although  having  no  immediate  influence  the  one  upon  the 
other,  they  are  mutually  expressive,  the  one  having  concen- 
trated into  a  perfect  unity  all  that  the  other  has  dispersed  in 
the  manifold.  Thus,  when  the  arrangement  of  species  is  the 
question,  it  is  useless  to  dispute  about  the  substantial  forms, 
although  it  may  be  well  for  other  reasons  to  know  if  there  are 
any  and  what  their  nature  is ;  for  without  this  one  would  be  a 
stranger  in  the  intellectual  world.  For  the  rest  the  Greeks 
and  the  Arabians  have  spoken  of  these  forms  as  well  as  the 
Europeans,  and  if  the  common  people  do  not  speak  of  them, 
no  more  do  they  speak  of  algebra  or  of  surds.^ 

§  25.  Ph.  Languages  were  formed  before  the  sciences,  and 
ignorant  and  unlettered  people  reduced  things  to  certain 
species. 

1  The  doctrine  of  the  substantial  forms,  of  which  the  Mediaeval  schoohnen 
made  so  much  use,  finds  its  origin  and  point  of  departure  in  the  elSo;  and  oixrCa 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Aristotle  used  oia-ia  in  two  senses;  in  its  primary  and 
proper  sit;nification,  as  a  concrete  and  individual  substance,  a  compound 
(o-ui-oAor)  of  matter  ({lArj)  and  the  determining  principle,  form  (elSos),  in  which 
sense  individual  tilings  were  called  "first  substances"  (npioTai.  ovo-i'ai ) ;  sec- 
ondly, as  applied  to  the  genus,  in  which  sense  species  were  called  "second 
substances"  (Sevrepoi  ouo-i'ai)-  According  as  they  Were  nominalists  or  realists, 
tlie  Schoolmen,  in  their  interpretation  of  Aristotle,  regarded  the  substantial 
forms  as  mere  concepts  of  genus  and  species,  the  product  of  the  abstraction- 
power  of  the  mind,  which  might  correspond  to,  though  they  did  not  constitute, 
tlie  reality  of  things  ;  or,  as  real  universals  existing  in  concrete  things,  consti- 
tuting their  inmost  essence  and  determining  its  nature.  Locke  adopts  the 
nominalistic  view  of  these  forms  as  purely  subjective  having  no  corresponding 
reality  in  nature.  Leibnitz  maintains  them  in  the  realistic  sense  as  expres- 
sions of  the  reality  of  the  "first  substances,"  and  in  direct  connection  with 
them  develops  his  doctrine  of  monads.  Cf.  Discours  de  Metaphys.,  1686,  §  10 
sq.,  Gerhardt,  4,  44.3;  Systems  nouveau,  1695,  §§  3,  4,  11,  G.  4,  478  sq.  (also 
ih/>I.  first  draft,  G.  4,  473),  Erdmann,  124,  Jacques,  1,  470,  trans.  Duncan, 
Philns.  Wl-s.  of  Leibnitz,  72;  De  ipsa  natura,  1698,  §§  11,  12,  G.  4,  510,  E.  157, 
J.  1,  462,  D.  120;  also  G.  Hartenstein,  Uehcr  Leibniz's  Lehre  v.  d.  VerhUltniss 
d.  Monaden  z.  Korperwelt,  in  his  Histor.  philos.  Abhandl.,  Leipzig,  1870,  4()9 
sq..  Stein,  Leibniz  u.  Spinoza,  Berlin,  1890,  158  sq.,  Dillmann,  Fyiue  n.  Darstf/. 
d.  Leibniz.  Mftnadenlehre,  Leipzig,  1891,  225  sq.  For  Leibnitz's  theological 
use  of  Aristotle's  f orms  —  er«7,  —  c/.  TModicee,  Pt.  IIL,  §§  335-6,  and  J.  H.  v. 
Kirchmann's  note  246  thereto,  Band  80,  p.  133,  and  note  62  f.,  Bd.  82,  p.  87,  of 
Iiis  Philos.  Bildiothek.  Leipzig,  1879.  On  tlie  elBo<;  and  ovaia.  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, rf.  Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  §§  10,  31,  32,  .34,  37,  and 
Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  II.,  i  [Vol.  3],  658  sq.,  4th  ed.  1889,  IL  2  [Vol.  4] ,  304 
sq.,  3d  ed.,  1879.  For  the  Scholastic  doctrine,  rf.  B.  Haurcau,  Histoire  de  la 
philos.  scholastique,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1872-80;  A.  Stockl,  Ge.sc/j.  d.  Philos.  d. 
Mittelalte.rs,  Mainz,  1862-66;  G.  Prantl,  Geseh.  d.  Ijoe/ik  im.  Abendlande,  Leip- 
zig, 18.55-1870,  iiassim.     Cf.  also  G.  1,  16,  22  sq.,  4,  208.  — Tr. 


SoO  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  in 


Th.  True,  but  persous  who  study  these  matters  rectify  the 
popuhir  notions.  Assayers  have  found  exact  means  of  dis- 
cerning and  separating  the  metals  ;  botanists  have  enriched 
Avonderfully  the  doctrine  of  plants,  and  the  experiments  made 
upon  insects  have  opened  for  us  a  new  path  in  the  knowledge 
of  animals,  but  we  are  still  very  far  distant  from  the  half  of 
our  course. 

§  26.  Ph.  If  species  were  a  work  of  nature  they  could  not 
be  conceived  so  differently  by  different  persons.  Man  appears 
to  one  person  an  animal  without  feathers,  with  two  feet  and 
with  large  nails,  and  another  after  a  more  profound  exami- 
nation adds  to  these  reason.  Many  people,  however,  deter- 
mine the  species  of  animals  by  their  external  form  rather  than 
by  their  birth,  since  the  question  has  been  put  more  than  once 
whether  certain  human /ceruses  should  be  admitted  to  baptism  or 
not,  for  the  sole  reason  that  their  external  configuration  differed 
from  the  ordinary  form  of  infants,  without  knoAving  whether 
they  were  not  as  capable  of  reason  as  infants  cast  in  another 
mould,  some  of  whom  are  found,  who,  although  of  an  approved 
form,  are  never  able  to  exhibit  during  their  eiitire  life  as  much 
reason  as  appears  in  an  ape  or  elephant,  and  who  never  give 
any  indication  of  being  governed  by  a  rational  soul.  Whence 
it  appears  evident  that  the  external  form  which  alone  has 
found  mention,  and  not  the  faculty  of  reasoning  which  no  one 
could  know  would  be  wanting  in  its  time,  has  been  regarded 
essential  to  the  human  species.  And  in  these  circumstances 
theologians  and  jurisconsults  the  most  learned  have  been 
compelled  to  renounce  their  sacred  definition  of  rational 
animal,  and  to  put  in  its  place  some  other  essence  of  the 
human  species.  "  Mr.  Menage,"  (Menagiana  Tom.  I.  p.  278, 
of  the  Dutch  edition  of  1694,)^  "  furnishes  us  the  example  of  a 
certain  abbot  of  St.  Martin,  which  deserves  to  be  related. 
When  this  abbot  of  St.  Martin,  he  says,  came  into  the  world, 
he  had  so  little  the  figure  of  a  man,  that  he  resembled  rather 
a  monster.  For  some  time  they  deliberated  whether  he 
should  be  baptized.  He  was  baptized  however,  and  declared  a 
man  provisionally,  i.e.  till  time  should  show  what  he  was.     He 

1  Menagiana  sive  excerpta  ex  ore  JEgiMi  Menagii,  1st  ed.,  1  vol.,  12mo, 
Paris,  1693,  3d  ed..  enlarged  and  corrected  by  La  Monnoye,  Paris,  1715.  Ei-d- 
niann,  Jacques,  and  Scliaarscliniidt  in  liis  German  trans,  erroneously  read  \M^. 
—  Tr. 


cii.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  351 

was  so  disfigured  by  nature,  that  they  called  him  all  his  life 
the  Abbot  Malotru.  He  was  of  Caen."  There  was  a  child 
who  came  very  near  being  excluded  from  the  human  species 
simply  because  of  his  shape.  He  narrowly  escaped  as  it  was, 
and  it  is  certain  that  a  figure  a  little  more  deformed  would 
have  deprived  him  of  it  for  ever  and  have  caused  him  to 
perish  as  a  being  Avho  ought  not  to  pass  for  a  man.  Yet  no 
reason  can  be  given  why  a  rational  soul  could  not  have  been 
lodged  in  him,  if  the  lineaments  of  his  face  had  been  a  little 
more  altered ;  why  a  visage  a  little  longer,  or  a  flatter  nose,  or 
a  wider  mouth  could  not  have  subsisted  as  well  as  the  rest  of 
the  irregular  figure  with  a  soul  and  with  qualities  which  made 
him  capable,  wholly  disfigured  as  he  was,  of  being  clothed 
Avitli  dignity  in  the  church. 

Til.  Up  to  the  present  time,  no  rational  animal  has  been 
found  with  an  external  figure  very  different  from  ours,  there- 
fore, when  the  question  arose  of  baptizing  a  child,  race  and 
figure  have  always  been  considered  only  as  marks  by  which  to 
judge  whether  it  was  a  rational  animal  or  not.  Thus  theo- 
logians and  jurisconsults  have  never  needed  to  renounce  for 
that  reason  their  sacred  definition. 

§  27.  Ph.  But  if  that  monster,  of  which  Licetus,^  Bk.  I., 
chap.  3,  speaks,  with  a  man's  head  and  a  hog's  body,  or  other 
monsters,  with  the  heads  of  dogs  and  of  horses,  etc.,  upon  the 
bodies  of  men  had  lived  and  could  have  spoken,  the  difficulty 
would  be  much  greater. 

1  Fortunio  Liceti,  1577-1657,  a  celebrated  Italian  physician  and  scholar,  who 
taught  logic  at  Pisa,  1600-1()09 ;  philosophy  at  Padua  till  1631 ;  then  philosophy 
at  Bologna ;  and  finally,  theoretic  medicine  at  Padua  from  1645  till  his  death. 
He  was  a  great  admirer  of  Aristotle,  and  wished  to  admit  nothing  beyond  his 
doctrines,  and  thus  contributed  to  render  both  philosophy  and  medicine  sta- 
tionary. For  the  matter  to  which  Leibnitz  here  refers,  cf.  Licetus,  De  spont.aneo 
riventiuin  ortu,  lib.  qiuU.,  fol.,  Vicentire,  IGIS,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  28,  pp.  34-o6,  Sexta 
confirniatio  spontanei  ortus  hominum  petita  ex  humanis  figuris  in  belluis,  ac 
lapidibus  enodatur  aperiendo  talium  figurarum  caussas,  in  which  chapter 
Licetus  treats  of  various  monsters,  referring  to  his  De  monstrornni  mentioned 
below,  and  to  his  father's,  Giuseppe  Liceti,  an  Italian  physician,  died  1599, 
Dialof/HS  de  rjenitalium.  vsu  et  dignitate,  or  II  Ceva,  dell'  ouvero  eccellenza  ed 
uso  de'  f/enitali,  1598,  Dc  monstrorum  ccmssis,  natura,  et  differentiis  lib.  duo, 
2d  ed.,  4to,  Petavii,  1634,  pp.  13,  183,  194  :  "  De  monstrorum  humanorum  reale 
existentia} " ;  the  same,  with  additions  by  Gerard  Blasius,  4to,  Amstelodami, 
1665,  ]^]^.  13,  183,  194 ;  the  same,  in  the  French  trans..  Traits  des  monslres,  by 
Jean  Palfyn,  1()50-1730,  in  his  Description  anatomique  dc.s  parties  de  lafemme 
qui  servent  a  la  (/eneration,  etc.,  4to,  Leyden,  1708,  pp.  l.'i,  197,  208. —Tr. 


852  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

Th.  I  admit  it,  and  if  that  occurred  and  if  any  one  had  done, 
as  a  certain  writer,  a  monk  of  the  olden  time,  named  Hans 
Kalb  (Jean  le  veau  —  John  the  calf)  who  ^  painted  himself 
with  a  calf's  head,  the  pen  in  his  hand,  in  a  book  he  had 
Avritten,  which  procedure  caused  some  foolishly  to  think  that 
this  writer  had  in  reality  a  calf's  head,  —  if,  I  say,  that  hap- 
pened, we  should  be  more  cautious  hereafter  in  getting  rid  of 
monsters.  For  there  is  some  probability  that  reason  would 
maintain  it  with  theologians  and  with  jurisconsults  in  spite  of 
the  figure  and  even  in  spite  of  the  differences  which  the 
anatomy  would  furnish  to  the  physicians,  which  would  as 
little  injure  the  quality  of  man  as  the  reversal  of  the  viscera 
in  that  man  whose  anatomy  some  persons  of  my  acquaintance 
have  seen  at  Paris,  which  has  made  some  stir,  in  which  nature 

' '  reu  sage  et  sans  doute  en  debauche 
riaga  le  foye  au  coste  gauche 
Et  de  meme  vice  versa 
Le  coeur  a  la  droite  pla^a," 

i.e.  "unwise  and  doubtless  in  debauch  placed  the  liver  upon  the 
left  side  and  likewise  vice  versa  the  heart  upon  the  right," 
if  I  rightly  remember  some  of  the  verses  which  the  late  Mr. 
Alliot-  the  father  (a  famous  physician  because  he  passed  as 
skilful  in  the  treatment  of  cancers)  showed  me  of  his  own 
making  upon  this  prodigy.  It  is  a  matter  of  course,  provided 
the  variety  of  conformation  does  not  go  too  far  in  the  case 
of  rational  animals  and  that  no  return  is  made  to  the  times 
when  animals  spoke,  for  then  we  should  lose  our  especially 
peculiar  advantage  of  reason  ^  and  should  henceforth  be  more 
attentive  to  birth  and  the  external  in  order  to  be  able  to  dis- 

1  Erdraann  and  Jacques  add  "  qui  "  after  "  le  veau."  — Tr. 

2  Pierre  Alliot,  a  French  physician  of  the  seventeenth  century,  born  at 
Bar-le-Duc,  reputed  to  have  great  skill  in  the  treatment  of  cancer  and  other 
malignant  ulcers.  His  most  distinguished  patient  was  Anne  of  Austria,  the 
mother  of  Louis  XIV.,  whom  he  treated  unsuccessfully  in  Paris  in  1665.  Not- 
withstanding his  failure,  he  was  appointed  physician  to  the  king.  His  published 
works  include  Theses  medicse  de  motu  sanguinis  circulato  et  de  morbis  ex  fere, 
Pont-a-Mousson,  1663,  8vo;  Epistola  de  cancro  apparente,  and  Nuntius  profli- 
f/ati  sine  ferro  et  igne  carcinomatis,  both  Bar-le-Duc,  l(i()4,  12mo.  His  son, 
Jean  Baptiste  Alliot,  was  physician  to  Louis  XIV.,  and  published  Traite  du 
cancer  oii  Von  expUqne  sa  nature  et  oil  Von  propose  les  moyens  les  plus  surs 
pour  le  guerir  methodiquement,  Paris,  16',t8,  12mo. — Tr. 

3  The  French  text  is:  "  nostre  i^rivilege  de  la  raison  en  preciput,"  etc.  —  Tr. 


cii.  VI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDEKSTANDING  353- 

cern  those  of  Adam's  race  from  those  who  may  descend  from 
a  king  or  patriarch  of  some  canton  of  apes  in  Africa ;  and  our 
learned  author  was  right  in  his  remark  (§  29)  that  if  Balaam's 
ass  had  all  her  life  discoursed  as  rationally  as  she  did  once 
with  her  master  (supposing  it  was  a  prophetic  vision),  she 
would  always  have  had  difficulty  in  obtaining  rank  and  a  seat 
among  women. 

Ph.  You  laugh,  I  see,  and  perhaps  the  author  laughed  also ; 
but,  to  speak  seriously,  you  see  that  you  cannot  always  assign 
fixed  limits  to  species. 

Th.  I  have  already  agreed  to  this ;  for  when  the  question 
concerns  fictions  and  the  possibility  of  things,  the  passage 
from  species  to  species  may  be  insensible,  and  to  discern  them 
would  sometimes  be  about  as  impossible  as  to  decide  how 
much  hair  a  man  must  be  allowed  that  he  may  not  be  bald. 
This  indeterminateness  would  be  true  even  when  we  knew 
perfectly  the  internal  nature  of  the  creatures  under  discussion. 
But  I  do  not  see  that  it  can  prevent  things  from  having  real 
essences  independent  of  the  understanding,  and  us  from  know- 
ing them.  It  is  true  that  the  names  and  limits  of  species 
Avould  sometimes  be  like  the  names  of  measures  and  weights, 
where  choice  is  necessary  in  order  to  have  fixed  limits.  But 
ordinarily  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  to  fear,  species  too 
much  alike  seldom  occurring  together. 

§  28.  Ph.  It  seems  we  agree  here  at  bottom,  although  we 
differ  somewhat  in  terms.  I  also  admit  that  there  is  less 
arbitrariness  in  the  denomination  of  substances  than  in  the 
names  of  the  mixed  modes.  For  few  venture  to  unite  the 
bleating  of  a  sheep  with  the  figure  of  a  horse,  or  the  color  of 
lead  with  the  weight  and  fixedness  of  gold,  and  we  prefer  to 
draw  copies  after  nature.^ 

Th.  This  is  not  so  much  because  in  substances  regard  is 
had  only  to  that  which  exists  effectively,  as  because  there  is  no 
certainty  in  the  case  of  physical  ideas  (which  are  not  very 
thoroughly  understood)  that  their  union  is  possible  and  useful, 
if  there  is  no  actual  existence  to  guarantee  it.  But  this  also 
takes  place  in  the  modes,  not  only  when  their  obscurity  is 
impenetrable  by  us,  as  sometimes  happens  in  physics,  but  also 

^  That  is,  to  follow  experience  in  the  formation  of  our  ideas,  and  to  conform 
our  inner  world  in  general  to  that  furnished  by  nature.  —  Tk. 

2  A 


854  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

wheu  it  is  difficult  of  penetration,  enough  examples  of  whicli 
occur  in  geometry.  For  in  both  of  these  sciences  it  is  not 
within  our  power  to  make  combinations  according  to  our  fancy, 
otherwise  we  should  be  right  in  speaking  of  regular  decahedrons, 
and  should  seek  in  the  semicircle^  a  centre  of  magnitude,  as 
there  is  in  it  a  centre  of  gravity.  For  it  is  in  fact  surprising 
that  the  first  is  there,  and  that  the  second  cannot  be.  Now 
while  in  the  modes  the  combinations  are  not  always  arbitrary, 
we  find  on  the  other  hand  that  in  substances  they  sometimes 
are  so ;  and  it  often  depends  on  ourselves  to  make  combina- 
tions of  qualities  in  order  further  to  define  substantial  beings 
in  advance  of  experience,  when  we  understand  enough  of  these 
qualities  to  judge  of  the  possibility  of  the  combination.  Thus 
it  is  that  expert  gardeners  in  the  orangery  can  rationally  and 
successfully  propose  to  produce  some  new  species  and  give  it 
a  name  in  advance. 

§  29.  Pli.  You  will  always  agree  with  me  that  Avhen  the 
question  arises  of  defining  species,  the  number  of  ideas  com- 
bined depends  upon  the  different  application,  industry,  or  fancy 
of  the  one  forming  this  combination,  as  it  is  the  figure  which 
regulates  most  frequently  the  determination  of  the  species  of 
vegetables  or  animals,  and  likewise  as  regards  the  majority  of 
natural  bodies  which  are  not  produced  by  seeds,  it  is  the  color 
which  is  most  strongly  adhered  to.  §  30.  In  truth  these  are 
often  only  confused  conceptions,  gross  and  inexact,  and  it  is 
very  essential  that  men  agree  as  to  the  precise  number  of 
simple  ideas  or  qualities  which  belong  to  a  given  species  or  a 
given  name,  for  pains,  skill,  and  time  are  needed  to  find  simple 
ideas  which  are  constantly  united.  However  a  few  of  the 
qualities  composing  these  inexact  definitions  are  ordinarily 
sufficient  in  conversation ;  but  in  spite  of  the  stir  about  gen- 
era and  species,  the  forms,  of  which  so  much  has  been  said  in 
the  schools,  are  only  chimeras  which  avail  us  nothing  in  fur- 
nishing an  entrance  into  the  knowledge  of  specific  natures. 

Th.  Whoever  makes  a  possible  combination,  is  not  at  all 
mistaken  therein,  nor  in  giving  it  a  name ;  but  he  is  mistaken 

1  Such  combinations  of  essentially  self-contradictory  ideas  may  easily  be 
united  in  a  complex  term,  and  be  apparently  clear  and  possible,  until  analyzed 
and  compared  with  reality,  when  their  confusion  and  impossibilitj'  is  at  once 
made  evident.  —  Tr. 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  355 

if  he  thinks  that  his  conception  is  altogether  that  which  others 
more  expert  have  conceived  under  the  same  name  or  in  the 
same  body.  He  perliaps  conceives  a  genus  too  common  instead 
of  another  more  specific.  There  is  nothing  in  all  this  contrary 
to  the  schools,  and  I  do  not  see  why  you  return  here  to  the 
charge  against  genera,  species,  and  forms,  since  it  is  necessary 
for  you  to  recognize  indeed  the  genera,  species,  and  even  the 
internal  essences  or  forms,  which  we  do  not  pretend  to  employ 
in  order  to  know  the  specific  nature  of  the  thing,  although  we 
admit  we  are  still  ignorant  of  them. 

§  30.  Ph.  It  is  at  least  evident  that  the  limits  we  assign  to 
species  are  not  exactly  conformed  to  those  established  by  nature. 
For  in  our  need  of  general  names  for  present  use,  we  do  not 
put  ourselves  to  the  trouble  of  discovering  the  qualities  which 
would  give  us  superior  knowledge  of  their  most  essential  dif- 
ferences and  agreements,  but  we  ourselves  distinguish  them 
into  species  in  virtue  of  certain  appearances  which  are  mani- 
fest to  everybody,  that  we  may  more  easily  communicate  with 
others. 

Th.  If  we  combine  compatible  ideas,  the  limits  we  assign  to 
species  are  always  exactly  conformed  to  nature ;  and  if  we  are 
careful  to  combine  ideas  actually  found  together,  our  notions 
are  also  conformed  to  experience ;  and  if  we  consider  them 
as  provisional  only  for  actual  bodies,  without  excluding  ex- 
periment made  or  to  be  made  for  further  discovery  therein, 
and  if  we  have  recourse  to  experts,  when  a  definite  question 
arises  with  reference  to  what  is  openly  understood  by  the 
name,  we  shall  not  err  in  the  matter.  Thus  nature  may 
furnish  ideas  the  most  perfect  and  most  convenient,  but  she 
will  not  give  the  lie  to  those  we  have  which  are  good  and 
natural,  although  not  perhaps  the  best  and  most  natural. 

§  32.  Ph.  Our  generic  ideas  of  substances,  as  that  of  metal, 
for  example,  do  not  follow  exactly  the  models  set  them  by 
nature,  since  you  cannot  find  any  body  including  simply  malle- 
ability and  fusibility  without  other  qualities. 

Th.  No  one  asks  for  such  models  and  it  would  not  be  reason- 
able to  ask  for  them ;  furthermore  they  do  not  occur  in  the 
most  distinct  notions.  We  never  find  a  number  in  which  there 
is  nothing  to  notice  but  multitude  in  general,  an  extension  in 
which  there  is  only  extension,  a  body  in  which  tlierc  is  only 


350  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE  OE  LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

solidity,  and  no  other  qualities ;  and  when  the  specific  differ- 
ences are  positive  and  contrary  it  is  very  essential  that  the 
genus  share  in  them. 

Ph.  If,  then,  any  one  thinks  that  a  man,  a  horse,  an  animal, 
a  plant,  etc.,  are  distinguished  by  real  essences  made  by  nature, 
he  must  think  that  nature  is  very  liberal  icith  these  real  essences, 
if  she  produces  one  of  them  for  the  body,  another  for  the 
animal,  and  still  another  for  the  horse,  and  that  she  bestows 
freely  all  these  essences  upon  Bucephalus ;  whilst  genera  and 
species  are  only  signs  more  or  less  comprehensive. 

TJi.  If  you  take  real  essences  as  these  substantial  models, 
which  exist  as  a  body  and  nothing  more,  an  animal  and  nothing 
more  specific,  a  horse  without  individual  qualities,  you  are 
right  in  treating  them  as  chimeras.  And  no  one  has  main- 
tained, I  think,  not  even  the  greatest  Realists  of  former  times, 
that  there  are  as  many  substances  confining  themselves  to  the 
generic  as  there  are  genera.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  if 
general  essences  are  not  this,  they  are  merely  signs;  for  I  have 
many  times  remarked  to  you  that  there  are  iwssibilities  in  the 
resemblances.  In  like  manner  from  the  fact  that  colors  are  not 
always  substances  or  extracted  dyes,  it  does  not  follow  that 
they  are  imaginary.  For  the  rest  you  cannot  think  nature  too 
liberal;  she  is  so  beyond  all  that  we  can  invent,  and  all  advan- 
tageous compatible  possibilities  are  found  realized  upon  the 
grand  theatre  of  her  representations.  There  were  formerly 
two  axioms  among  philosophers :  that  of  the  Realists  seemed 
to  make  nature  prodigal,  and  that  of  the  Nominalists  seemed 
to  declare  her  stingy.  The  one  says  that  nature  suffers  no 
vacuum,  and  the  other  that  she  does  nothing  in  vain.  These 
two  axioms  are  good  provided  you  understand  them ;  for  nature 
is  like  a  good  economist,  who  saves  where  it  is  necessary  in 
order  to  be  grand  at  times  and  places.  She  is  grand  in  effects, 
and  sparing  in  the  causes  she  employs. 

§  34.  Ph.  Without  amusing  ourselves  longer  with  this  dis- 
cussion upon  real  essences,  it  is  enough  that  we  obtain  the  pur- 
pose of  language  and  the  usage  of  words  which  is  to  indicate 
our  thoughts  in  an  abridged  form.  If  I  wish  to  speak  to  any 
one  of  a  species  of  birds  three  or  four  feet  in  height,  whose 
skin  is  covered  with  something  between  feathers  and  hair,  of  a 
dark  brown  color,  without  wings,  but  in  their  place  two  or 


cii.  VI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  357 

three  small  branches,  like  those  of  the  broom,  which  descend 
to  the  lower  part  of  the  body,  with  long  and  large  legs,  the 
feet  armed  only  with  three  claws  and  witliout  a  tail ;  I  am 
compelled  to  make  this  description  whereby  I  can  make  myself 
understood  by  others.  But  when  I  am  told  that  the  name  of 
this  animal  is  Cassowary,  I  can  then  use  this  name  to  designate 
in  discourse  this  entire  complex  idea. 

Th.  Perhaps  a  very  exact  idea  of  the  covering  of  the  skin 
or  of  some  other  part  would  suffice  by  itself  alone  to  distin- 
guish this  animal  from  every  other  known,  as  Hercules  was 
known  by  his  gait,  and  as  the  lion  was  recognized  by  his  claw 
according  to  the  Latin  proverb.  But  the  more  circumstances 
you  heap  up,  the  less  provisional  is  your  definition. 

§  35.  Ph.  We  may  curtail  the  idea  in  this  case  without 
prejudice  to  the  thing;  but  when  nature  curtails  it,  it  is  a 
question  whether  the  species  remains.  For  example :  if  a 
body  existed  having  all  the  qualities  of  gold  except  mallea- 
bility, would  it  be  gold  ?  it  depends  upon  men  to  decide. 
They  are  then  the  ones  who  determine  the  species  of  things. 

Til.  Not  at  all ;  they  would  determine  only  the  name.  But 
this  experience  would  teach  us  that  malleability  has  no  neces- 
sary connection  with  the  other  cpialities  of  gold  taken  together. 
It  would  teach  us  then  a  new  possibility  and  consecpiently  a 
new  species.  As  for  gold  which  is  eager  ^  or  brittle,  this  comes 
only  from  additions,  and  is  not  consistent  with  the  other  tests 
of  gold;  for  the  cupel  and  antimony  remove  this  eagerness 
from  it. 

§  36.  Ph.  A  portion  of  our  doctrine  follows  that  will  appear 
very  strange.  Each  abstract  idea  having  a  certain  name  forms 
a  distinct  species.  But  what  of  that,  if  nature  so  wills  it  ?  I 
should  be  glad  to  know  why  a  lap-dog  and  a  greyhound  are  not 
as  distinct  species  as  a  spaniel  and  an  elephant. 

Th.  I  have  distinguished  above  the  different  senses  of  the 
word  species.  Taking  it  logically,  or  mathematically  rather, 
the  least  dissimilitude  may  suffice.  Thus  each  different  idea 
will  give  another  species,  and  it  makes  no  difference  whether 
it  has  a  name  or  not.  But,  physically  speaking,  we  do  not  at- 
tend to  all  the  varieties,  and  we  speak  either  distinctly  when  the 
question  concerns  only  appearances,  or  conjecturally  when  the 
1  Cf.  Locke,  riiilos.  Works,  Vol.  2,  p.  05  (Bolin's  ed.).  — Tr. 


358  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk.  hi 

question  concerns  the  inner  truth  of  things,  presuming  therein 
some  essential  and  immutable  nature,  like  reason  in  man. 
We  presume  then,  that  whatever  differs  only  by  accidental 
changes,  like  water  and  ice,  quicksilver  in  the  liquid  form  and 
as  sublimate,  is  of  the  same  species :  and  in  organic  bodies  the 
provisional  mark  of  the  same  species  is  usually  placed  in  the 
generation  or  race,  as  in  those  most  alike  it  is  placed  in  repro- 
duction. It  is  true  we  cannot  judge  with  precision,  for  lack 
of  knowledge  of  the  inner  nature  of  things ;  but,  as  I  have 
said  more  than  once,  we  judge  provisionally  and  often  con- 
jecturally.  But  when  we  wish  to  speak  only  from  the  external, 
for  fear  of  saying  nothing  certain,  there  is  some  latitude  ;  and 
to  dispute  then  whether  a  difference  is  specific  or  not  is  to 
dispute  about  the  name ;  and  in  this  sense  there  is  so  great  a 
difference  between  dogs,  that  we  may  very  well  say  that  the 
house-dogs  of  England  and  the  dogs  of  Boulogne  belong  to 
different  species.  It  is  not  impossible,  however,  that  they 
belong  to  a  remote  identical  or  similar  race,  which  we  should 
find  if  we  could  go  back  very  far,  and  that  their  ancestors 
were  alike  or  identical,  but  that  after  great  changes,  some  of 
the  posterity  have  become  very  large  and  others  very  small. 
We  may  indeed  believe  also  without  offending  reason  that 
they  have  in  common  an  inner  nature,  constant,  specific,  which 
is  no  longer  subdivided  thus,  or  which  is  not  found  here  in 
several  other  such  natures,  and  consequently  is  no  longer 
varied  save  by  accidents;  although  there  is  also  nothing  to  make 
us  judge  that  this  must  necessarily  be  so  in  all  that  which  we 
call  the  lowest  species  (species  infima).  But  there  is  no  likeli- 
hood that  a  spaniel  and  an  elephant  are  of  the  same  race,  and 
that  they  have  such  a  specific  common  nature.  Thus  in  the 
different  sorts  of  dogs,  speaking  of  appearances,  we  may  dis- 
tinguish species,  and  speaking  of  the  inner  essence  we  may  be  in 
suspense  :  but  comparing  the  dog  and  the  elephant  there  is  no 
reason  for  attributing  to  them  externally  or  internally  that 
which  would  make  us  think  them  of  one  and  the  same  species. 
So  there  is  in  this  case  no  occasion  for  suspense  in  the  face  of 
the  presumption.  In  man  we  can  also  distinguish  species 
logically  speaking,  and  if  we  stopped  with  the  external  we 
should  find  also,  speaking  physically,  differences  which  could 
pass  as  specific.     Thus  a  traveller  was  found  who  thought 


CI!.  VI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  359 

that  the  Negroes,  Chinese,  and  finally  the  Americans  were  not 
(tf  one  and  the  same  race  among  tliemselves  nor  with  the 
[it'oples  resembling  us.  But  as  we  know  the  essential  inner 
luiture  of  man,  i.e.  the  reason,  which  dwells  in  the  man  him- 
self and  is  found  in  all  men,  and  as  we  notice  nothing  fixed 
and  internal  among  us  wlricli  forms  a  subdivision,  we  have  no 
reason  to  judge  that  there  is  in  men,  according  to  the  truth  of 
the  inner  nature,  an  essential  specific  difference,  while  such 
difference  is  found  between  man  and  beast,  supposing  that  the 
beasts  are  only  empirical,  according  as  I  have  explained  above, 
as  in  fact  experience  gives  us  no  reason  for  forming  any  other 
judgment. 

§  3d.  Ph.  Let  us  take  the  example  of  an  artificial  thing 
whose  internal  structure  is  known  to  us.  A  time-piece  that 
only  indicates  the  hours,  and  one  that  strikes,  are  of  one 
species  oiily  for  those  who  have  only  one  name  by  which  to 
designate  them ;  but  for  him  who  designates  the  first  by  the 
name  watch,  and  second  clock,  they  are  in  relation  to  liim  dif- 
ferent species.  It  is  the  name  and  not  the  inner  disposition 
which  makes  a  new  species,  otherwise  there  would  be  too 
many  species.  There  are  watches  with  four  wheels,  and 
others  with  five ;  some  have  strings  and  fusees,^  and  some  not ; 
some  have  a  free  balance,  and  others  are  regulated  by  a  spiral 
spring  and  others  by  hog's  bristles.  Does  any  one  of  these 
things  suffice  to  make  a  specific  difference  ?  I  say  no,  so 
long  as  these  time-pieces  agree  in  name. 

Th.  And  I  for  my  part  say  yes,  for  without  stopping  at 
names,  I  should  consider  the  varieties  of  contrivance  and 
especially  the  differences  of  the  balance ;  for  since  a  spring 
has  been  applied  which  governs  the  vibrations  according  to 
its  own  and  consequently  renders  them  more  equal,  pocket- 
watches  have  changed  their  character,  and  have  become  in- 
comparably more  accurate.  I  have  indeed  mentioned  before 
another  principle  of  equality  which  might  be  applied  to 
watches. 

Ph.  If  any  one  wishes  to  make  divisions  based  upon  the 
differences  which. he  knows  in  the  internal  configuration  he 
may  do  so ;  but  they  -would  not  be  distinct  species  with  rela- 
tion to  the  people  who  are  ignorant  of  this  construction. 

1  Locke  has  "physics,"  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2,  p.  07  (Bohn's  eel.).  — Tk. 


3G0  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk.  hi 

Th.  I  do  uot  know  why  those  with  you  always  wish  to 
make  virtues,  truths,  and  species  depend  upon  our  opinion  or 
knowledge.  They  exist  in  nature,  whether  we  know  it  and 
approve  or  not.  To  speak  otherwise  is  to  change  the  names 
of  things  and  received  language  without  any  reason.  Men  up 
to  the  present  time  have  believed  that  there  are  many  kinds 
of  clocks  or  watches,  without  informing  themselves  in  what 
they  consist  or  how  they  may  name  them. 

Ph.  You  have  however  recognized  not  long  since  that  when 
men  wish  to  distinguish  physical  species  by  appearances,  they 
limit  them  in  an  arbitrary  way,  where  they  find  it  to  the  pur- 
pose, i.e.  according  as  they  find  the  difference  more  or  less 
considerable  and  according  to  the  end  they  have.  And  you 
yourself  have  made  use  of  the  comparison  of  weights  and 
measures,  which  are  regulated  and  given  their  names  accord- 
ing to  the  good  pleasure  of  man. 

Th.  It  is  since  then  that  I  have  begun  to  understand  you. 
Between  specific  differences  purely  logical,  for  w^iich  the  least 
variation  of  assignable  definition  suffices,  however  accidental 
it  be,  and  between  s])ecific  differences  purely  ^ihysiccd,  based 
upon  the  essential  or  immutable,  we  may  place  a  mean,  which 
cannot  be  precisely  determined ;  it  is  regulated  by  the  most 
important  appearances,  which  are  not  altogether  immutable, 
but  which  do  not  change  easily,  the  one  approaching  the 
essential  more  than  the  other.  And  as  a  connoisseur  too  may 
go  farther  than  another,  the  thing  appears  arbitrary  and  has 
some  relation  to  men,  and  it  appears  convenient  to  regulate 
names  also  according  to  these  principal  differences.  We  can 
then  speak  thus,  that  there  are  specific  civil  differences  and 
nominal  species  which  must  not  be  confounded  with  what  I 
have  called  above  nominal  definitions,  and  which  have  place 
in  differences  specifically  logical  as  well  as  physical.  For  the 
rest,  besides  common  usage,  the  laws  themselves  may  give 
autliority  to  the  significations  of  words,  and  then  the  species 
would  become  legal,  as  in  the  contracts  which  are  called 
nominati,  i.e.,  designated  by  a  particular  name.  For  example 
as  the  Roman  Law  made  the  age  of  puberty  commence  at  the 
end  of  the  fourteenth  year.  This  entire  consideration  is  not 
to  be  despised,  but  I  do  not  see  that  it  is  of  very  much  use 
here,  for  besides  the  fact  that  you  have  appeared  to  me  to 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  361 

apply  it  sometimes  where  it  did.  not  apply,  we  shall  accom- 
plish nearly  the  same  result  if  we  consider  that  it  rests  with 
men  to  proceed  in  subdivisions  as  far  as  they  find  them  to 
the  purpose,  and  to  abstract  ulterior  differences  without  the 
necessity  of  denying  them ;  and  that  it  also  rests  with  them 
to  choose  the  certain,  notwithstanding  the  vincertain,  in  order 
to  fix  some  notions  and  measures  by  giving  them  names. 

Ph.  I  am  much  pleased  that  we  are  here  no  longer  so  far 
apart  as  we  appeared.  §  41.  You  agree  then,  sir,  I  see,  that 
artificial  as  well  as  natural  things  are  species  contrary  to  the 
view  of  some  philosophers.  §  42.  But  before  leaving  the 
names  of  substances,  I  would  add  that  of  all  the  diverse  ideas 
we  have,  they  alone  are  ideas  of  substances  which  have  proper 
or  individual  names ;  for  it  rarely  happens  that  men  need  to 
make  frequent  mention  of  any  individual  quality  or  other 
individual  accident.  Besides  individual  acts  perish  at  once 
and  the  combination  of  circumstances  which  thereby  comes 
about  only  subsists  as  in  the  substances. 

Th.  There  are,  however,  cases  where  it  has  been  necessary 
to  remember  an  individual  accident  and  to  give  it  a  name  ; 
thus  your  rule  is  ordinarily  good,  but  there  are  exceptions  to 
it.  Religion  furnishes  us  with  them ;  for  example  we  cele- 
brate each  year  the  memory  of  the  birth  of  Jesus  Christ.  The 
Greeks  call  this  event  Theogeny,  and  that  of  the  adoration  of 
the  Magi,  Epiphany.  And  the  HebreAvs  call  the  Passah  par 
excellence  the  passage  of  the  angel  who  caused  the  death  of 
the  eldest  sons  of  the  Egyptians  without  touching  those  of  the 
Hebrews ;  and  this  is  why  they  were  to  celebrate  its  memory 
every  year.  As  for  the  species  of  artificial  things,  the  scholastic 
philosophers  found  difficulty  in  admitting  them  into  their  p?-e- 
dicameyits ;  but  there  was  little  necessity  for  their  hesitation 
since  these  predicamental  tables  were  destined  for  use  in  mak- 
ing a  general  review  of  our  ideas.  It  is  well  however  to  rec- 
ognize the  difference  existing  between  perfect  substances  and 
between  the  assemblages  of  substances  {aggregata)  which  are 
substantial  entities  composed  either  by  nature  or  by  the  art  of 
man.  For  nature  has  also  such  aggregates,  as  the  bodies  whose 
mixture  is  imperfect  (imperfecte  mixta)  to  use  the  language  of 
our  philosophers,  which  constitvite  no  unum  per  se  and  do  not 
possess  in  themselves  a  perfect  unity.     I  believe  however  that 


302  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.   hi 

the  four  bodies  which  they  call  elements,  and  think  simple,  and 
the  salts,  metals,  and  other  bodies  which  they  think  are  per- 
fectly mixed,  and  to  wliich  they  attribute  their  temperaments,^ 
are  not  unitm  j)er  se  either;  so  much  the  more  as  we  must 
judge  that  they  are  uniform  and  homogeneous  only  in  appear- 
ance, and  even  a  homogeneous  body  would  not  cease  to  be  a 
mass.  In  a  word,  the  perfect  unity  must  be  reserved  to  bodies 
animated,  or  endowed  with  primitive  entelechies;  for  these 
entelechies  are  analogous  to  souls  and  are  as  individual  and 
imperishable  as  they  ;  and  I  have  elsewhere  affirmed  that  their 
organic  bodies  are  practically  machines,  but  which  surpass  the 
artificial  machines  of  our  invention  as  much  as  the  inventor  of 
the  natural  machines  surpasses  us.  For  these  natural  machines 
are  as  imperishable  as  the  souls  themselves,  and  the  animal 
with  the  soul  subsists  always  :  it  is  (the  better  to  explain  my- 
self by  something  pleasing,  wholl}^  laughable  as  it  is,)  as  if  a 
harlequin  wished  to  strip  himself  in  the  theatre,  but  could  not 
succeed  because  he  had  an  indefinite  number  of  garments  one 
upon  another ;  although  these  infinite  replications  of  organic 
bodies,  which  exist  in  an  animal,  are  not  so  similar  nor  so 
applied  the  one  to  the  other,  as  the  garments,  nature's  art 
being  of  a  wholl}'  different  subtility.  All  this  shows  that  the 
philosophers  have  not  been  wholly  in  the  wrong  in  putting  so 
great  distance  between  artificial  things  and  between  natural 
bodies  endowed  with  a  real  unity.  But  it  belonged  only  to 
our  time  to  develop  this  mystery  and  make  understood  its 
importance  and  consequences  in  order  thoroughly  to  establish 
natural  theology  and  what  is  called  Pneumatics,-  in  a  manner 

1  Leibnitz  here  alludes  to  the  four  elements  of  Empedocles,  c.  492-c.  432, 
B.  c,  viz.,  fire,  air,  earth,  water,  adopted  by  Plato  and  Aristotle  and  called  by 
the  Perijmtetics  warmth,  cold,  drj'ness,  humidity,  a  mixture  of  which  in  vary- 
ing proi^ortions  constituted  all  bodies.  Cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griec,  I.  2  [Vol. 
2],  758  f;q.,  5th  ed.,  1892,  II.  1  [Vol.  .3],  796"  s^.,  4th  ed.,  1889,  U,  2  [^^ol.  4].  431, 
sq.,  832  sq.,  .3d  ed.,  1879.  The  state  of  a  body  resulting  from  the  proportional 
disposition  of  these  primary  constituent  elements  or  qualities  was  called  its 
temperament,  the  character  of  the  temperament  varying  according  to  the  pre- 
dominance of  one  or  more  of  the  elements.  The  scholastics  discussed  the 
question  whether  the  temperament  comprised  these  four  primary  qualities,  or 
whether  it  did  not  consist  in  a  fifth  simple  quality,  the  outcome  of  the  recipro- 
cal action  of  the  four  primary  qualities,  wliich  resulted  in  their  entire  destruc- 
tion.    Cf.  also  Gevhardt, Leibniz.  philo-H.  Schrift.,  4,  207. — Tr. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  .50,  note  2.  Schaarschmidt  states  that  Pneumatics  —  Pneumatik 
—  with  the  meaning  —  Doctrine  of  the  Spirit,  Ze/j re  vom  Geiste  —  Psychology 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  363 

truly  natural  and  in  agreement  with  our  experiments  and 
understanding,  and  requiring  the  loss  of  none  of  the  important 
considerations  they  are  destined  to  furnish,  or  rather  enhanc- 
ing their  value,  as  does  the  system  of  pre-established  harmony.^ 
And  I  believe  that  we  can  best  conclude  this  long  discussion 
of  the  names  of  substances  only  by  that  means. 

—  occurs  in  Alsted's  Encyclopsedie,  Herbornias,  1630,  cf.  ante,  p.  311,  note  2,  and 
that  Stephen  Chauvin  in  his  Lexicon  philosophicum,  Leovardiae,  1713,  adopted 
it  and  explained  it  by  Pneumatology  and  Piieumatosophy.  The  term  is  now 
confined  to  pliysical  science,  and  denotes  tliat  department  of  hydrodynamics 
whicli  treats  of  the  properties  of  gases  as  distinguislied  from  liquids.  Cf. 
Krauth-Flemmiug,  Vocah.  of  the  Pliilos.  Sciences,  p.  388,  New  York,  Sheldon 
&Co.,  1883.  — Tk. 

1  Of.  Meiv  Essinjs,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  10,  §§  7  and  9,  hifra,  pp.505,  507 ;  Systeme 
noureau,  §§  14-10,  Gerbardt,  4,  484-8(5,  Erdmann,  127,  a-128,  Jacques,  1,  475-77, 
trans.  Duncan,  Philos.  Wks.  of  Leibnitz,  77-79 ;  Considerations  sur  les  principes 
de  vie,  etc.,  G.  6,  541,  E.  430,  trans.  D.  165;  Principes  de  la  nature  et  de  la 
grace,  §§  7-13,  G.  6,  602-(J04,  E.  716,  trans.  D.  212-215;  Animadversiones  in 
partem  yeneralem  Principiorum  Cartesianorum,  Pt.  I.  ad  Art.  14,  G.  4,  358, 
trans.  D.  50;  Leibniz  gegen  Descartes  und  den  Cartesianisrmis,  G.  4,  292-294, 
401-403,  405-406,  E.  176,  trans.  D.  132-138,  and  his  note  49,  p.  382 ;  Med.  de  Cog. 
Ver.  et  Ideis,  G.  4,  424,  E.  80,  a,  trans.  D.  30.  According  to  Leibnitz,  his 
doctrine  of  monads  requires  as  its  necessary  complement  the  existence  of  God, 
since  the  single  monads,  expressing  in  their  own  experience  all  that  is  beyond 
them,  yet  without  inliuence  on  other  monads,  cannot  furnish  a  suiiicient 
ground  or  reason  for  the  liarmony  and  connection  of  tilings  in  a  universal 
world-order.  This  harmonious  world-order  existing,  its  sutiicient  ground  or 
reason  must  be  found  in  the  absolute  being,  God,  who  has  given  to  each 
monad  the  nature  which  makes  it  capable  of  develojiing  itself  in  its  extreme 
individuality  in  accord  and  correspondence  with  every  other.  The  pre-estab- 
lished harmony  is  thus  an  actual  proof,  in  accord  with  experience,  of  the 
existence  of  God,  and  the  suggestion  of  reason  in  the  ontological  argument  as 
improved  by  Leibnitz,  is  confirmed  by  the  comparative  and  comprehensive 
study  of  the  phenomena  of  nature.  For  expositions  and  criticisms  of  Leibnitz's 
doctrine,  cf.  Dewey,  Leibniz's  Neio  Essays,  chaps.  11,  12;  E.  Zeller,  Gesch.  d. 
deutschen  Philos.  seit  Leibniz,  2d  ed.,  Miinchen,  1875,  pp.  83-98, 124-127;  F.  A. 
Lange,  Gesch.  d.  Mater ialismus,  3d  ed.,  Leipzig  u.  Gerlohn,  1875  sq.,  Bk.  I., 
Sect.  IV.,  chap.  4,  Eng.  trans,  by  E.  C.  Thomas,  3  vols.,  Boston,  Vol.  2,  pp. 
124  sq. ;  Kuno  Fischer,  Gesch.  d.  n.  Philos.,  Bd.  II.,  Leibniz,  3d  ed.,  Heidelberg, 
1889,  pp.  455  sq.,  539  .s^.  —  Tr. 


804  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bic. 


CHAPTER  VII 

OF    PARTICLES 

§  1.  Ph.  Besides  the  words  which  are  used  to  name  ideas,  we 
need  those  which  signify  the  connection  of  ideas  or  proposi- 
tions. This  is,  this  is  not,  are  general  signs  of  affirmation  or 
negation.  But  besides  the  parts  of  propositions  the  mind  also 
binds  together  sentences  and  entire  propositions,  §  2.  availing 
itself  of  words  expressing  this  union  of  different  affirmations 
and  negations  and  which  are  called  jmrticles ;  in  whose  proper 
use  the  art  of  speaking  well  principally  consists.  It  is  in 
order  that  reasoning  be  consecutive  and  methodical  that  terms 
showing  the  connection,  restriction,  distinction,  opposition,  em- 
phasis, etc.,  are  needed.  And  when  they  are  despised  the 
hearer  is  embarrassed. 

Th.  I  admit  that  particles  are  very  useful ;  but  I  am  not 
aware  that  the  art  of  speaking  well  consists  principally  in 
their  proper  use.  If  any  one  presents  only  aphorisms  or 
detached  theses,  as  they  often  do  in  the  universities,  or  as  in 
the  case  of  that  which  they  call  among  the  jurisconsults  an 
articulate  libel,  or  as  in  the  articles  which  are  offered  to  the 
witnesses,  then  provided  we  arrange  these  propositions  well 
we  shall  accomplish  very  nearly  the  same  result  in  making 
them  understood  as  if  we  had  put  in  the  connective  and  the 
particles ;  for  the  reader  supplies  them.  But  I  admit  there 
would  be  trouble  if  you  put  in  the  particles  badly,  and  much 
more  than  if  you  omitted  them.  Particles  seem  to  me  also 
to  unite  not  only  the  parts  of  discourse  composed  of  proposi- 
tions and  the  parts  of  the  proposition  composed  of  ideas,  but 
also  the  parts  of  the  idea,  composed  in  mau}^  ways  by  the 
combination  of  other  ideas.  And  it  is  this  last  connection 
which  is  indicated  by  the  prepositions,  while  the  adverbs 
modify  the  affirmation  or  negation  in  the  verb ;  and  the  con- 
junctions modify  the  connection  of  different  affirmations  or 
negations.  But  I  doubt  not  that  you  have  noticed  all  this 
yourself,  although  your  words  seem  to  state  otherwise. 

§  3.  Ph.    The  part  of  grammar  which  treats  of  particles  has 


CH.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  8G5 

been  cultivated,  less  than  tliat  which  represents  in  order  the 
cases,  genders,  modes,  tenses,  gerundives,  and  supines.  It  is  true 
that  in  some  languages  they  have  also  arranged  the  particles 
under  some  titles  by  distinct  subdivisions  with  great  appear- 
ance of  exactness.  But  it  is  not  sufficient  to  run  through 
these  catalogues.  One  must  reflect  upon  his  own  thoughts  in 
order  to  observe  the  forms  which  the  miud  takes  in  discours- 
ing, for  the  particles  are  so  many  indications  of  the  action  of 
the  mind. 

Th.  It  is  very  true  that  the  doctrine  of  the  particles  is 
important,  and  I  wish  we  might  enter  into  much  greater 
detail  thereupon.  For  nothing  would  be  more  suited  to  make 
known  the  different  forms  of  the  understanding.  Genders  are 
of  no  account  in  philosophical  grammar,  but  the  cases  corre- 
spond to  the  jirejiositions,  and  often  the  preposition  is  enveloped 
in  the  noun  and  as  it  were  absorbed,  and  other  particles  are 
concealed  in  the  inflections  of  the  verbs. 

§  4.  Ph.  In  order  properly  to  explain  particles  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  render  them  (as  is  usual  in  a  dictionary)  by  the 
words  of  another  language  which  approach  most  nearly  their 
meaning,  because  it  is  as  difficult  to  comprehend  their  precise 
meaning  in  one  language  as  in  another ;  besides  the  significa- 
tions of  related  words  in  two  languages  are  not  always  exactly 
the  same  and  indeed  they  vary  in  one  and  the  same  language. 
I  remember  that  in  the  Hebrew  language  there  is  one  particle 
of  a  single  letter^  of  which  there  are  reckoned  up  more  than 
fifty  significations. 

Th.  Scholars  have  attempted  to  make  special  treatises  upon 
the  particles  of  the  Latin,  Greek,  and  Hebrew ;  and  Strauchius,^ 
a  celebrated  jurisconsult,  has  published  a  book  upon  the  use 
of  particles  in  jurisprudence,  where  their  signification  is  of  no 
small  consequence.  We  ordinarily  find,  however,  that  it  is 
rather  by  means  of  examples  and  synonymes  that  they  attempt 
to  explain  them,  than  by  distinct  notions.     Further  we  can 

1  I.e.  the  adverb  h-  —  Tr. 

2  Johann  Strauch,  lf512-1680,  the  maternal  iiiiclo  of  Leibnitz,  a  distinguished 
jurisconsult,  Professor  at  Leipzii^,  .lena,  and  Giessen,  and  Syndicus  in  Braun- 
si'liweig;  cf.  Gulirauer,  G.  W.  Fraiherr  v.  Leibnitz,  \'t.  1.,  Bk.  I.,  pp.  0,  35  sq., 
and  Annierkimf/en  z.  erst.  BucJie,  pp.  (>,  7.  The  book  here  referred  to  by 
Jjoilniitz  is  entitled :  Lexicon  particulururn  juris  s.  de  usu  et  efficacia  quor- 
nndam  si/ncater/oreinatian  ct  partieularuin  inderUnabiliurn.  —  Tr. 


30(5  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [i;k.   hi 

not  always  find  a  general  or  formal  signification  for  them,  as 
the  late  Bohlius  '  called  it,  which  can  satisfy  all  the  examples; 
but  notwithstanding  this  we  can  always  reduce  all  the  uses  of 
a  Avord  to  a  definite  number  of  significations.  And  this  is 
Avhat  should  be  done. 

§  5.  Ph.  In  fact  the  number  of  significations  greatly  exceeds 
that  of  the  particles.  In  English  the  particle  hut  has  very  differ- 
ent significations:  (1)  when  I  say:  hut  to  say  no  more,  {mats 
pour  ne  rieu  dire  de  plus)  as  if  this  particle  indicated  that  the 
mind  stops  in  its  course  before  it  has  reached  the  end.  But 
saying :  (2)  I  saw  hut  two  planets  (je  vis  seulement  deux  planetes), 
the  mind  restricts  the  sense  of  what  it  means  to  that  which 
has  been  expressed  by  the  exclusion  of  everything  else.  And 
when  I  say  (3)  :  you  pray,  but  it  is  not  that  God  icould  hring  you 
to  the  true  religion,  hut  that  he  tvould  confirm  you  in  your  oivn 
(vous  priez  Dieu  mais  ce  n'est  pas  qu'il  veuille  vous  amener  a 
la  connaissance  de  la  vraye  Religion,  mais  qu'il  vous  confirme 
dans  la  vostre),  the  first  hut  (or  mais)  designates  a  supposition 
in  the  mind  which  is  otherwise  than  it  should  be,  and  the 
second  shows  that  the  mind  puts  a  direct  opposition  between 
what  j)recedes  and  what  follows.  (4)  All  animals  have  sense, 
hut  a  dog  is  an  animal  (tous  les  animaux  ont  du  sentiment, 
mais  le  chien  est  un  animal).  Here  the  particle  signifies  the 
connection  of  the  second  proposition  with  the  first. 

Th.  The  French  mais  (but)  may  be  substituted  in  all  these 
instances  except  the  second ;  but  the  German  ullein,  taken  as 
a  particle,  which  signifies  a  kind  of  mixture  of  mais  (but)  and 
seulement  (only),  may  doubtless  be  substituted  instead  of  hut 
in  all  these  examples  except  the  last,  where  its  use  may  be  a 
little  doubtful.  Mais  (but)  is  also  rendered  in  German  some- 
times by  aber,  sometimes  by  sondern,  which  indicates  a  sepa- 
ration or  segregation  and  approaches  the  particle  allein.  For 
a  proper  explanation  of  the  particles,  it  is  not  sufficient  to 
make  an  abstract  explication  as  we  have  just  made  here  ;  biit 
we  must  proceed  to  a  paraphrase  which  may  be  substituted  in 

1  Samuel  Bohl,  1011-1689,  Professor  at  Rostock,  who  devoted  himself  to  the 
furtherance  of  the  study  of  Hebrew  in  Germany,  and  whom  Leibnitz  mentions 
because  of  his  works  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Hebrew  Vowel-  and  Accent-Signs ; 
cf.  Duteus,  Leibniz,  op.  om.,  5,  190.  He  published  a  large  number  of  works, 
among  which  were  Scrutin.  S.  s.  ex  accentibus,  1G36,  and  Dissertat.  pro  for- 
niali  Si'jnif.  S.  S.  eruenda,  Rostock,  1637.  —  Tk. 


cn.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  367 

its  place,  as  the  definition  may  be  put  in  the  phxce  of  the  thing 
defined.  When  we  have  striven  to  seek  and  to  determine 
these  suitable  paraphrases,  in  all  the  particles  so  far  as  they 
are  susceptible  of  them,  we  shall  have  regulated  their  sig- 
nifications. Let  us  try  to  attain  this  result  in  our  four  ex- 
amples. In  the  first  we  mean:  Thus  far  only  speak  we  of 
this,  and  no  farther  {iion  piu) ;  in  the  second :  I  see  only  two 
}ilanets,  and  no  more ;  in  the  third :  You  pray  God,  and  for 
this  only,  viz.  to  be  confirmed  in  your  religion,  and  no  more, 
etc. ;  in  the  fourth,  it  is  as  if  we  said  :  all  animals  have  sense  ; 
it  is  sufficient  to  consider  that  only,  and  no  more  is  needed. 
'I'he  dog  is  an  animal,  he  then  has  sense.  Thus  all  these 
examples  indicate  limits,  and  a  non  plus  ultra,  whether  in 
things,  or  in  discourse.  Thus  hut  is  an  end,  a  limit  of  the 
course,  as  if  we  said  :  stop,  we  are  there,  we  have  reached  our 
But.  But,  Bute,  is  an  old  Teutonic  word,  signifying  some- 
thing fixed,  an  abode.  Beuten  (an  obsolete  word  found  still  in 
some  church  songs)  is  to  abide.  Mais  originates  from  magis, 
as  if  any  one  wished  to  say  :  as  for  the  surplus  we  mxist  leave  it, 
which  is  the  same  as  saying :  No  more  is  needed,  it  is  enough, 
let  us  come  to  something  else,  or  this  is  something  else.  But 
as  the  use  of  languages  varies  in  a  strange  manner,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  enter  much  farther  into  the  detail  of  examples  in 
order  sufficiently  to  regulate  the  significations  of  particles.  In 
French  we  avoid  the  double  mais  by  a  cependant  (however),  and 
we  should  say:  Vous  priez,  cependant  ce  n'est  pas  pour  obtenir 
la  verity,  mais  pour  estre  confirme  dans  vostre  opinion  (You 
pray,  not  however  {cependant)  to  obtain  the  truth  but  (mais) 
to  be  confirmed  in  your  opinion).  The  sed  of  the  Latins  was 
often  expressed  formerly  by  ains,  which  is  the  anzi  of  the 
Italians,  and  the  French  in  modifying  it  have  deprived  their 
language  of  an  advantageous  expression.  For  example :  There 
was  no  certainty  about  it,  yet  {cep)endanl)  we  were  persuaded 
of  what  I  have  informed  you,  because  we  like  to  believe 
Avhat  we  wish ;  but  it  has  been  found  that  it  was  not  so ;  but 
{ains)  rather,  etc.  (II  n'y  avoit  rien  de  seur,  cependant  on  estoit 
persuade  de  ce  que  je  vous  ay  mand^,  parce  qu'on  aime  a  croire 
ce  qu'on  souhaite ;  mais  il  s'est  trouv6  que  ce  n'estoit  pas 
cela;  ains  plustost,  etc.). 

§  6.  Ph.    My  purpose  has  been  to  touch   this  matter  only 


3fi8  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

very  slightly.  I  would  add  that  particles  often  include  either 
constantly  or  in  certain  constructions  the  sense  of  an  entire 
proposition. 

Th.  But  when  it  is  a  comjjlete  sentiment,  I  think  that  it  is 
only  by  means  of  a  kind  of  ellipsis ;  otherwise  it  is  the  inter- 
jections alone  which  in  my  opinion  can  subsist  by  themselves 
and  say  all  in  a  word,  as  ah!  (Jiol  me!).  For  when  we  say 
mats,  adding  nothing  more,  it  is  an  ellipsis  for  :  hut  let  us  tvait 
for  the  confirmation  of  intelligence  and  not  flatter  ourselves 
unduly.  There  is  something  approximating  to  this  in  the  nisi 
of  the  Latins  :  si  nisi  non  esset,  if  there  were  not  but  (mais). 
For  the  rest  I  should  not  be  displeased,  sir,  had  you  entered  a 
little  farther  into  the  detail  of  the  turns  of  the  mind  which 
appear  marvellous  in  the  use  of  the  particles.  But  since  we 
have  reason  for  hastening  to  conclude  this  investigation  of 
words  and  to  return  to  things,  I  do  not  wish  to  delay  you 
longer,  although  I  truly  think  that  languages  are  the  best 
mirrors  of  the  human  mind,  and  that  an  exact  analysis  of  the 
signification  of  words  would  show  us  better  than  anything  else 
the  workings  of  the  understanding:. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

OF  ABSTRACT  AND  CONCRETE  TERMS 

§  1.  Ph.  It  is  further  to  be  remarked  that  terms  are 
abstract  or  concrete.  Each  abstract  idea  is  distinct,  so  that  of 
two  the  one  can  never  be  the  other.  The  mind  must  perceive 
by  its  intuitive  knowledge  the  difference  between  them,  and 
consequently  two  of  these  ideas  can  never  be  affirmed  one  of 
another.  Every  one  sees  at  once  the  falsehood  of  these  propo- 
sitions :  humanity  is  animality  or  rationality :  this  is  as  evident 
as  any  of  the  generally  received  maxims. 

Th.  There  is  still  something  to  be  said  thereupon.  We 
admit  that  justice  is  a  virtue,  a  habit  (habitus),  a  quality,  an 
accident,  etc.  Thus  two  abstract  terras  may  be  stated  one  of 
another.  I  am  furthermore  wont  to  distinguish  two  kinds  of 
abstracts.  There  are  abstract  logical  terms,  and  there  are 
also  abstract  real  terms.     The  abstract  real  terms,  or  conceived 


I 


CH.  IX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  369 

at  least  as  real,  are  eitlier  essences  or  parts  of  the  essence,  or 
accidents,  i.e.  beings  added  to  substance.  The  abstract  logical 
terms  are  the  predications  reduced  to  terms,  as  if  I  said:  to  be 
a  man,  to  be  an  animal;  and  in  this  sense  the  one  can  be 
stated  of  the  other,  by  saying :  to  be  a  man  is  to  be  an  animal. 
But  in  the  realities  this  has  no  place.  For  we  cannot  say  that 
humanity  or  man-ness  ^  {Vhommcite)  —  (if  you  please),  which  is 
the  essence  of  the  whole  man,  is  animality,  which  is  only  a 
part  of  this  essence ;  yet  these  abstract  and  incomplete  beings 
signified  by  the  abstract  real  terms  have  also  their  genera  and 
species  which  are  not  less  expressed  by  the  abstract  real  terms  : 
thus  there  is  predication  between  them,  as  I  have  shown  by 
the  example  of  justice  and  virtue. 

§  2.  Ph.  One  may  always  say  that  substances  have  only 
few  abstract  names ;  they  have  scarcely  spoken  in  the  schools 
of  humanity,  animality,  corporality  ;  and  they  have  never  been 
authorized  in  the  world. 

Til.  The  reason  is  that  but  few  of  these  terms  were  necessary 
to  serve  as  examples  and  to  throw  light  upon  the  general  no- 
tion, which  was  the  reason  why  they  were  not  wholly  neglected. 
If  the  ancients  did  not  use  the  word  Immcmity  in  the  sense  of 
the  schools,  they  said  human  nature,  which  is  the  same  thing. 
It  is  certain  also  that  they  said  divinity,  or  rather  divine 
nature ;  and  theologians  having  found  it  needful  to  speak  of 
these  two  natures  and  of  real  accidents,  they  were  attached  to 
these  abstract  entities  in  the  schools  of  philosophy  and  the- 
ology, and  perhaps  to  a  greater  extent  than  was  proper. 


CHAPTER   IX 

OF    THE    IMPERFECTIONS    OF    WORDS 

§  1.  Ph.  We  have  already  spoken  of  the  dotible  use  of  ivords. 
The  one  is  to  register  our  own  thoughts  in  order  to  aid  our 
memory  which  makes  us  talk  to  ourselves ;  the  other  is  to 
communicate    our   thoughts    to  others   by   means   of   speech. 

1  I  have  taken  the  liberty  to  coin  the  word  as  an  equivalent  of  the  French, 
which  I  think  is  also  coined  by  Leibnitz  to  express   the  abstraction  of  the 
scholastics.  —  Tr. 
2b 


870  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.   hi 

These  two  uses  show  the  perfection  or  imperfection  of  words. 
§  2.  When  we  speak  only  to  ourselves,  it  is  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference what  words  Ave  employ,  provided  we  remember  their 
meaning  and  do  not  change  it.  But  §  3.  the  use  of  communication 
is  also  of  two  kinds,  civil  and  philosophic.  The  civil  consists 
in  the  conversation  and  use  of  the  civil  life.  The  pTdlosophic 
use  is  that  made  of  words  for  the  purpose  of  giving  precise 
notions  and  to  express  in  general  propositions  certain  truths. 

Th.  Very  good:  words  are  not  less  marks  (notce)  for  us 
(as  the  characters  of  arithmetic  or  algebra  may  be)  than  signs 
for  others  ;  and  the  use  of  words  as  of  signs  is  as  much  in 
place  when  the  question  concerns  the  application  of  general- 
precepts  to  the  usage  of  life,  as  when  it  concerns  the  discovery 
or  verification  of  these  precepts.  The  first  use  of  signs  is  civil, 
and  the  second  philosophic. 

§  5.  Ph.  Xow  it  is  difficult,  chiefly  in  the  following  cases, 
to  learn  and  retain  the  idea  which  each  word  signifies,  (1) 
when  these  ideas  are  very  complex;  (2)  when  the  ideas  com- 
posing a  new  one  have  no  natural  bond  between  them,  so  that 
there  is  in  nature  no  fixed  measure  nor  any  model  to  rectify  and 
regulate  them ;  (3)  when  the  model  is  not  easy  to  be  known ; 
(4)  when  the  meaning  of  the  word  and  the  real  essence  are 
not  exactly  the  same.  The  names  of  the  modes  are  most  lia- 
ble to  be  doubtful  and  imperfect  for  the  two  first  reasons,  and 
those  of  substances  for  the  two  second.  §  6.  When  the  idea 
of  the  modes  is  very  complex,  as  that  of  the  majority  of  the 
terms  of  ethics,  they  rarely  have  precisely  the  same  significa- 
tion in  the  minds  of  tAvo  different  persons.  §  7.  The  defect 
also  of  the  models  renders  these  words  equivocal.  He  who 
first  invented  the  word  hrusquer  (to  be  abrupt  with)  understood 
thereby  what  he  found  to  the  purpose,  Avithout  informing  those 
Avho  have  used  it  as  he  of  his  precise  meaning,  and  Avithout 
having  shoAvn  them  any  constant  model.  §  8.  Common  use 
regulates  sufficiently  the  sense  of  Avords  for  ordinary  couA^ersa- 
tion,  but  it  has  no  precision ;  and  the  signification  most  con- 
formed to  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  language  is  every  day 
disputed.  Many  speak  of  glory,  but  few  have  the  same  under- 
standing of  it.  §  9.  They  are  only  simple  sounds  in  the 
mouths  of  many,  or  at  least  their  meanings  are  very  indefinite. 
And  in  a  discourse  or  conversation  in  which  mention  is  made 


cii.  IX]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  371 

i)f  honor,  faith,  grace,  religion,  the  chicrch,  and  above  all  in  dis- 
cussion, you  will  notice  at  once  tliat  men  have  different  notions 
which  they  apply  to  the  same  terms.  And  if  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  the  terms  of  the  people  of  our 
time,  it  is  much  more  difficult  to  understand  ancient  books. 
Fortunate  is  it  that  we  may  pass  them  by  save  when  they 
contain  what  we  should  believe  and  do. 

Th.  These  remarks  are  good :  but  in  regard  to  ancient  books, 
as  we  need  to  understand  Holy  Scripture  above  all,  and  as 
lloman  laws  are  still  of  great  use  in  a  good  part  of  Europe,  we 
are  indeed  compelled  to  consult  a  great  many  other  ancient 
hooks;  the  Rabbis,  the  Church  Fathers,  even  the  profane  his- 
torians. Besides  the  ancient  physicians  also  deserve  to  be 
understood.  The  practice  of  medicine  by  the  Greeks  came 
through  the  Arabs  to  us  ;  the  water  from  the  fountain  has  been 
made  turbid  in  the  streams  of  the  Arabs,  and  purified  in  many 
respects  since  we  have  begun  to  have  recourse  to  the  original 
Greeks.  But  these  Arabs  do  not  cease  to  be  of  use  and  we  are  as- 
sured that  Ebenbitar,^  for  example,  who  in  his  books  on  Simples 
has  copied  Dioscorides,  often  serves  to  throw  light  upon  him.  I 
find  also  that,  next  to  religion  and  history,  it  is  chiefly  in  medi- 
cine, as  far  as  it  is  empirical,  that  the  tradition  of  the  ancients 
preserved  in  writing,  and  in  general  the  observations  of  another 

1  Ibn-al-Baitar,  c.  1197-1248,  a  distinguislied  Arabian  botanist,  —  according 
to  Pouchet  the  most  learned  that  the  Arabian  School  has  produced,  —  who 
wrote  a  general  history  of  simples,  or  of  plants  alphabetically  arranged,  a 
materia  medica,  based  upon  and  said  to  contain  for  the  most  part  the  woi'k  of 
tlie  Greek  physician  Dioscorides,  c.  100  a.d.,  Uepl 'yatj?  "laTpiK^^,  as  well  as  a 
variety  of  facts  from  other  sources,  including  descriptions  of  plants  not  men- 
tioned by  either  Dioscorides  or  Pliny  the  Elder,  23-79.  Most  of  15aitar's 
works  still  remain  in  MSS.  in  the  libraries  of  Paris  and  the  Escurial.  Fr.  R. 
l>if!tz;  published  a  small  fragment  of  the  work  on  Simples  in  his  Analecta  me- 
(Hca  ex  librls  Mti.S.,  Lipsiae,  ISoS,  8vo.  There  are  also  Grosse  Zusammenstel- 
liing  a.  d.  Krdfte  d.  bekannt.  einfachen  Heil-und-Nahrxmrismittel  v.  .  .  .  Ebn 
Jlaithar.  Aus  d.  Arahisdien  ilhersp.tzt  v.  Dr.  Joseph  v.  Sontheimer,  2  vols., 
Stuttgart,  lcS40-i2,  and  Traite  dea  simplen,  trans,  by  L.  Leclero,  in  lust,  de 
Prance,  Noti(;es  et  extraits  des  MSS.  de  la  Bibl.  Nationale,  vol.  23,  Pt.  I.,  Paris, 
1.S77,  Ito.  For  some  account  of  Baitar,  ef.  Leclerc  in  Gazette,  hehdom.  de  medi- 
cine et  de  chirurgie,xxn.,97, 129,  Paris,  1875;  F.  A.  Pouchet,  Ilistoire  des  sciences 
n.atureUes  au  moyen  due,  Paris,  185,3,  8vo.  Schaarschmidt  says  that  Jjoibnitz 
)nay  have  been  led  to  the  remark  which  he  here  makes  u))ou  liaitar  by  the 
Ex.eridttitiones  de  hornoni/inis  Jii/les  iatr/rm,  appemleil  to  Claud.  Salniasius, 
158S-1()53,  Pllnianx  exereitaliones,  P.  104.  a.  V>.  110.  a.  A.,  Trajecti-ad-Iiheuum, 
1689,  2  vols.,  fol.,  where  different  accounts  of  Dioscorides  are  amended  from 
Ebnl)itar.  —  Tr. 


372  LEIBNITZ'S   ClUrKiUF.   OF   LOCKP:  [isk.  hi 

may  be  of  service.  I  have  therefore  always  held  in  high 
esteem  physicians  much  versed  in  the  knowledge  of  antiquity  ; 
and  I  was  very  sorry  that  Keiuesius/  excellent  in  both  depart- 
ments (of  knowledge),  had  turned  aside  to  explain  the  rites 
and  history  of  the  ancients,  rather  than  to  recover  a  part  of 
the  knowledge  they  had  of  nature,  in  which  it  has  been  shown 
that  he  would  have  been  able  furthermore  marvellously  to  suc- 
ceed. When  the  Latins,  Greeks,  Hebrews  and  Arabs  shall 
some  day  be  exhausted,  the  Chinese,  supplied  also  with  ancient 
books,  will  enter  the  lists  and  furnish  matter  for  the  curiosity 
of  our  critics.  IS"ot  to  speak  of  some  old  books  of  the  Persians, 
Armenians,  Copts  and  Brahmins,  which  will  be  unearthed  in 
time  so  as  not  to  neglect  any  light  antiquity  may  give  on  doc- 
trines by  tradition  and  on  facts  by  history.  And  if  there  were 
no  longer  an  ancient  book  to  examine,  languages  would  take 
the  place  of  books  and  they  are  the  most  ancient  monuments 
of  mankind.  In  time  all  the  languages  of  the  world  will  be 
recorded  and  placed  in  the  dictionaries  and  grammars,  and 
compared  together ;  this  Avill  be  of  very  great  use  both  for  the 
knowledge  of  things,  since  names  often  correspond  to  their 
properties  (as  is  seen  by  the  names  of  plants  among  different 
peojDles),  and  for  the  knowledge  of  our  mind  and  the  wonder- 
ful variety  of  its  operations.  Kot  to  speak  of  the  origin  of 
nations,  which  is  known  by  means  of  solid  etymologies  which 
the  comparison  of  languages  will  best  furnish.  But  of  this  I 
have  already  spoken.  And  all  this  shows  the  use  and  extent 
of  criticism,  little  considered  by  some  otherwise  very  clever 
philosophers  who  take  the  liberty  to  speak  with  contempt  of 
Rabhinage-  and  in  general  of  ^^liilology.  We  see  also  that 
critics  will  find  for  a  long  time  yet  matter  for  fruitful  exercise, 

1  Thomas  Reinesius,  1587-1667,  a  physician  who  wrote  on  natural  history 
and  medicine,  and  afterwards  devoted  himself  to  philological  and  antiquarian 
studies.  ■  Among  his  works  were,  Schola  jureconsultorum  medica  relationum 
lihriH  aliquot  comprehensa,  qidhus  principia  medicinsR  in  jus  transmiita  ex 
professo  examinantiir, Lipsife,  1679, 12mo;  Syntazma  inscriptionem  antiqiiantm 
cum  primis  Romie  veteris,  quarum.  omiasa  est  recensio  in  Grvteii  opere,  cum 
comment,  Lipsife,  1682,  fol.  Cf.  B.  Schuchardt,  Lebensbeschreibun(/e7i  be- 
riihmter  y£rzte  und  Naturforscher,  welche  aus  Thiiringen  stammen.  Corre- 
spondenz-BI litter  des  allgemeinen  drztlichen  Vereinsvon  Thiirinc/en,  Weimar, 
1888,  xvii.,  556,  601.— Tr. 

2  A  term  of  disparagement,  meaning  the  study  made  of  the  hooks  of  the 
rabhis.  —  Tr. 


cii.  IX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  373 

and  tliey  will  do  well  not  to  amuse  themselves  too  much  with 
niinutite,  since  they  have  so  many  objects  more  pleasijig  for 
treatment ;  though  I  well  know  that  minutiee  also  are  often  very 
necessary  with  the  critics  for  the  discovery  of  more  important 
knowledge.  And  as  criticism  turns  in  large  measure  upon  the 
meaning  of  words  and  the  interpretation  of  authors,  especially 
the  ancients,  this  discussion  about  words  joined  with  the  men- 
tion you  made  of  the  ancients,  makes  me  touch  upon  this 
important  point.  But  to  return  to  your  four  defects  of  nomi- 
nation, I  tell  you,  sir,  that  we  can  remedy  them  all,  especially 
since  writing  has  been  invented  and  they  subsist  only  through 
our  negligence.  For  it  depends  upon  us  to  fix  their  meanings, 
at  least  in  any  scholarly  language,  and  to  agree  to  destroy  this 
tower  of  Babel.  But  there  are  two  defects  where  the  remedy 
is  more  difficult,  consisting  the  one  in  the  doubt  which  exists 
whether  the  ideas  are  compatible,  when  experience  does  not 
furnish  them  all  combined  in  one  and  the  same  subject ;  the 
other  in  the  necessity  for  making  provisional  definitions  of 
sensible  things,  when  our  experience  with  them  is  insufficient 
for  more  complete  definitions  :  but  I  have  spoken  more  than 
once  of  both  these  defects.^ 

Ph.  [I  am  going  to  tell  you  some  things  which  will  serve 
further  to  clear  up  to  some  extent  the  defects  you  have  just 
remarked,  and  the  third  of  those  which  I  have  indicated 
makes  it  seem  that  these  definitions  are  provisional ;  viz. :  — 
when  we  have  no  sufficient  knowledge  of  our  sensible  models, 
i.e.  the  substantial  beings  of  corporeal  nature.  This  defect 
also  makes  us  ignorant  as  to  whether  we  may  combine  the 
sensible  qualities  which  nature  has  not  combined,  because  at 
l)ottom  we  do  not  understand  them.]  Now  if  the  signification 
of  the  words  which  serve  for  the  mixed  modes  is  uncertain, 
for  lack  of  models  which  show  the  same  composition,  that  of 
the  names  of  the  substantial  beings  is  uncertain  for  a  wholly 
contrary  reason,  because  they  must  signify  what  is  supposed  to 
be  conformed  to  the  reality  of  things,  and  to  be  related  to  the 
models  formed  by  nature. 

Th.  I  have  already  more  than  once  remarked  in  our  pre- 
vious conversations  that  this  is  not  essential  to  the  ideas  of 

1  Cf.  New  E.ssin/K,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  (i.  —  Te. 


374  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

substances ;  but  I  admit  that  ideas  made  after  nature  are  the 
surest  and  most  useful. 

§  12.  Ph.  When  then  we  follow  the  models  wholly  made 
by  nature,  unless  the  imagination  finds  it  necessary  to  retain 
their  representations,  the  names  of  substances  have  in  ordi- 
nary use  a  double  relation,  as  I  have  already  shown.  The 
Jirst  is  that  they  signify  the  internal  and  real  constitution  of 
things,  but  this  model  cannot  be  known  and  consequently  can- 
not serve  to  regulate  the  significations. 

Th.  That  is  not  the  question  here,  since  we  are  speaking  of 
ideas  of  which  we  have  models  ;  the  internal  essence  is  in  the 
thing,  biit  we  agree  that  it  cannot  serve  as  a  pattern. 

§  13.  Ph.  The  second  relation  is  then  that  which  the  names 
of  substances  immediately  have  to  the  simple  ideas,  which 
exist  at  the  same  time  in  the  substance.  But  as  the  number 
of  these  ideas  united  in  one  and  the  same  subject  is  great,  men 
speak  of  this  same  subject,  forming  very  different  ideas  of  it, 
both  by  the  different  combination  of  the  simple  ideas  they 
make  and  because  the  greater  part  of  the  qualities  of  bodies 
are  the  powers  which  they  have  of  producing  changes  in 
other  bodies  and  receiving  them  ;  witness  the  changes  one  of 
the  basest  metals  is  capable  of  undergoing  through  the  opera- 
tion of  fire,  and  it  receives  many  more  yet  at  the  hands  of  a 
chemist,  through  the  application  of  other  bodies.  Further,  one 
is  contented  with  weight  and  color  as  criteria  for  a  knowledge 
of  gold ;  another  includes  ductility,  fixedness ;  and  the  third 
desires  to  make  us  take  into  consideration  its  solubility  in 
aqua  regia.  §  14.  As  things  likewise  often  resemble  each 
other,  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  designate  their  precise 
differences. 

Th.  As  bodies  are  really  liable  to  be  altered,  disguised, 
falsified,  counterfeited,  it  is  a  great  point  to  be  able  to  dis- 
tinguish and  recognize  them.  Gold  is  disguised  in  solution, 
but  it  may  be  drawn  off,  either  by  precipitating  it  or  dis- 
tilling the  water ;  and  counterfeit  or  adulterated  gold  is 
recognized  or  purified  by  the  art  of  the  assayers,  which  not 
being  known  to  everybody,  it  is  not  strange  that  men  do  not 
all  have  the  same  idea  of  gold.  And  ordinarily  it  is  only 
the  experts  who  have  sufficiently  just  ideas  of  these  mat- 
ters. 


CH.  IX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDErxSTANDING  375 

§  15.  Ph.  This  variety  does  not,  however,  cause  so  mi;ch 
confusion  in  civil  intercourse  as  in  philosophic  researches. 

Th.  It  would  be  more  tolerable  if  it  had  no  influence  in  prac- 
tical life  where  it  is  often  important  not  to  receive  a  Qui  pro 
quo,  and  consequently  to  know  the  characteristics  of  things  or 
to  have  at  hand  the  class  who  know  them.  And  it  is  especially 
important  as  regards  drugs  and  materials  which  are  costly,  and 
of  which  you  may  have  need  on  important  occasions.  The 
philosophical  confusion  will  manifest  itself  rather  in  the  use 
of  more  general  terms. 

§  18.  Ph.  The  names  of  simple  ideas  are  less  liable  to  equivo- 
cation, and  we  are  rarely  mistaken  as  regards  the  terms  white, 
bitter,  etc. 

Th.  It  is,  however,  true  that  these  terms  are  not  wholly 
exempt  from  uncertainty ;  and  I  have  already  noticed  the 
example  of  neighboring  colors  which  are  within  the  confines  of 
two  species  and  whose  species  is  doubtful. 

§  19.  Ph.  After  the  names  of  simple  ideas,  those  of  the  simple 
modes  are  least  doubtful,  as  for  example,  those  of  figures  and 
numbers.  But,  §  20.  the  mixed  modes  and  substances  cause  all 
the  trouble.  §  21.  Men  will  say  that  instead  of  imputing 
these  imperfections  to  the  words,  we  should  rather  put  them 
to  the  account  of  our  understanding ;  but  I  reply  that  w^ords 
interpose  themselves  to  such  an  extent  between  our  mind  and 
the  truth  of  things,  that  we  may  compare  them  with  the 
medium,  across  which  pass  the  rays  from  visible  objects,  and 
which  often  spreads  a  mist  before  our  eyes ;  and  I  have  tried 
to  think  that,  if  the  imperfections  of  language  were  more 
thoroughly  examined,  the  majority  of  the  disputes  would  cease 
of  themselves,  and  the  way  to  knowledge  and  perhaps  to  peace 
would  be  more  open  to  men. 

Th.  I  think  we  could  succeed  from  this  time  in  written  dis- 
cussions, if  men  would  agree  upon  certain  rules  and  execute 
them  with  care.  But  in  order  to  proceed  exactly  viva  voce  and 
at  once,  some  change  in  the  language  would  be  necessary.  I 
have  elsewhere '  entered  upon  this  enquiry. 

1  In  his  writiniis  in  fnrthfiranee  of  his  plan  for  the  estahlisliment  of  a  General 
Cliaracteristic  or  Philosojihical  I^angna.^e,  Sp^ciease  f/eii^ralc,  a  project  wiiieh 
Leibnitz  had  very  mneli  at  heart,  as  appears  from  his  frequent  alhision  to  the 
subject,  and  upon  wliich  throughout  his  entire  life  he  spent  mucli  labor,  chiefly 


37(5  LETRMTZ'S   ClIITTQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

§  22.  Ph.  While  waiting  for  tins  reform  which  will  not  be 
ready  very  soon,  this  uncertainty  regarding  words  should  teach 
us  to  be  moderate,  especially  when  it  is  a  question  of  imposing 
upon  others  the  sense  attributed  by  us  to  the  ancient  authors, 
since  in  the  Greek  authors  it  is  found  that  nearly  every  one 
speaks  a  different  language, 

Th.  I  have  been  rather  surprised  to  see  that  Greek  authors 
so  distant  from  one  another  in  time  and  place,  as  Homer, 
Herodotus,  Strabo,  Plutarch,  Lucian,  Eusebius,  Procopius, 
Photius,  approach  so  closely,  while  the  Latins  have  changed 
so  much,  and  the  Germans,  English,  and  French  much  more. 
But  the  fact  is,  the  Greeks  since  Homer's  time,  and  still 
more  when  Athens  was  in  a  flourishing  condition,  had  good 
authors  which  posterity  has  taken  as  models,  at  least  in  writ- 
ing. For  no  doubt  the  common  language  of  the  Greeks  must 
have  been  much  changed  already  under  the  rule  of  the  Eomans. 
And  this  same  reason  accounts  for  the  fact  that  the  Italian 
has  not  suffered  so  great  a  change  as  the  French,  because  the 
Italians,  having  had  earlier  writers  of  durable  reputation,  imi- 
tated and  moreover  esteemed  Dante,  Petrarch,  Boccaccio,  and 
other  authors  at  a  time  when  those  of  the  French  were  no 
longer  appreciated. 

CHAPTEPv  X 

OF    THE    ABUSE    OF    WORDS 

§  1.  Ph.  Besides  the  natural  imperfections  of  language, 
there  are  some  that  are  voluntary  and  arise  from  negligence,  and 
it  is  an  abuse  of  words  to  use  them  so  badly.  The  first  and  most 
i:)alpable  abuse  is,  §  2.  that  we  attach  no  clear  idea  to  them.  Of 
these  words  there  are  two  classes :  the  first  have  never  had 
any  definite  idea,  either  in  their  origin  or  ordinary  use.  For 
the  most  part  philosophical  and  religious  sects  have  introduced 

preparatory,  and  with  little  positive  results  in  accomplishing  his  plan.  Cf. 
N<m  Essays,  Bk.  IV.  chap.  G,  §  2,  Th.,  chap.  17,  §  1:5,  Th.;  Gerhardt,  Leibniz, 
philos.  Schrift.,  3,  216;  4,  27  sq.,  Erdmann,  6  sq.;  G.  7,  3  sq.,  E.  82  sq.,  669  sq.; 
Trendelenburg,  Ueber  Leibniz.  Entivurf  einer  allgemeinen  Characteristik,  in 
his  Histor.  Beitrdge  z.  Philos.,  vol.  3,  pp.  1  sq.,  Berlin,  1867;  L.  Neff,  G.  W. 
Leibniz  als  Sprachf or  seller  und  Etymologe,  Pt.  II.,  pp.  13  sq.,  Heidelberg, 
1870-1.—  Tr. 


cii.   X]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  377 

them  in  order  to  support  some  strange  opinion,  or  to  conceal 
some  weak  place  in  their  system.  They  are,  however,  distin- 
guishing characters  in  the  moutli  of  members  of  the  party. 
§  3.  There  are  other  words,  which  in  their  first  and  common 
use  have  some  clear  idea,  but  which  have  since  been  appro- 
priated to  very  important  matters  without  attaching  to  them 
any  certain  idea.  In  this  way  the  words  wisdom,  glory,  grace, 
are  often  in  the  mouths  of  men. 

Th.  I  believe  that  insignificant  words  are  less  in  number 
than  you  think,  and  that  with  a  little  care  and  good  will  you 
can  fill  up  their  void  or  fix  their  indefiniteness.  Wisdom 
appears  to  be  nothing  else  than  the  science  of  happiness. 
Grace  is  a  favor  done  to  those  who  do  not  deserve  it  aird  who 
find  themselves  in  a  state  where  they  need  it.  And  glory  is 
the  fame  of  the  excellence  of  some  one. 

§  4.  Ph.  I  do  not  wish  now  to  examine  whether  there  is 
anything  to  be  said  in  regard  to  these  definitions,  but  rather  to 
notice  the  causes  of  the  abuse  of  words.  In  the  first  place,  we 
learn  the  words  before  we  learn  the  ideas  belonging  to  them,  and 
children  accustomed  thereto  from  the  cradle  use  them  in  like 
manner  during  their  whole  life :  the  more  as  they  do  not  cease 
to  make  themselves  understood  in  conversation,  without  ever 
having  fixed  their  idea,  by  using  different  expressions  in  order 
to  make  others  understand  their  meaning.  This,  however,  often 
fills  their  discourses  with  a  quantity  of  vain  sounds,  especially 
in  matters  concerning  morals.  Men  take  the  words  they  find 
in  use  among  their  •  neighbors,  and  in  order  not  to  appear 
ignorant  of  their  meaning  employ  them  confidently  without 
giving  them  a  certain  sense :  and,  as  in  this  kind  of  discourse 
they  are  rarely  in  the  right,  they  are  also  rarely  convinced 
that  they  are  wrong;  and  to  wish  to  draw  them  from  their 
error  is  to  wish  to  dispossess  a  vagabond. 

Th.  Men  in  fact  take  so  rarely  the  necessary  trouble  to 
understand  terms  or  words  that  I  have  more  than  once  been 
astonished  that  children  can  learn  languages  so  soon,  and  that 
men  furthermore  speak  them  so  accurately ;  a  view  to  which 
we  attach  so  little  in  instructing  children  in  their  mother 
tongue  and  which  others  think  of  so  little  in  acquiring  clear 
definitions;  the  more  so  as  those  we  learn  in  the  schools  do 
not  ordinarily  concern  the  words  in  public  use.     For  the  rest,  I 


378  LEinXlTZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [p.k.  in 

admit  that  men  frequently  happen  to  be  wrong  when  indeed 
they  discuss  seriously  and  speak  in  accord  with  their  feeling ; 
but  I  have  also  remarked  often  enough  that  in  their  speculative 
discussions  upon  matters  within  the  province  of  their  mind, 
they  have  every  reason  for  two  sides,  except  in  the  oppositions 
they  make  to  each  other  where  they  misconstrue  another's 
view.  This  arises  from  the  bad  use  of  terms  and  sometimes 
also  from  a  spirit  of  contradiction  and  affectation  of  superi- 
ority. 

§  5.  Ph.  In  the  second  place  the  use  of  words  is  sometimes 
inconstant,  a  practice  only  too  general  among  scholars.  It  is 
nevertheless  a  plain  cheat,  and  if  voluntary,  is  folly  or  malice. 
If  any  one  so  conducted  himself  in  his  accounts  (as  to  take  an 
X  for  a  V),  who,  I  pray,  would  have  anything  to  do  with 
him  ? 

Th.  This  abuse  being  so  common  not  only  among  scholars 
but  also  in  the  Avorld  at  large,  I  believe  that  it  is  due  rather  to 
bad  custom  and  inadvertence  than  to  malice.  Usually  the 
different  significations  of  the  same  word  have  some  affinity ; 
this  makes  one  pass  for  another  and  does  not  give  time  to  con- 
sider what  is  said  with  all  the  precision  that  is  desirable.  We 
are  accustomed  to  tropes  and  figures,  and  some  elegance  or 
brilliant  falsehood  easily  imposes  upon  us.  For  we  oftener 
seek  pleasvire,  amusement,  and  appearance,  than  truth ;  besides, 
vanity  mixes  itself  therein. 

§  6.  PJi.  TJie  third  abuse  is  an  affected  obscurity,  either  by 
giving  terms  in  use  unusual  meanings,  or  by  introducing  neiv 
terms  without  explaining  them.  The  ancient  Sophists,  whom 
Lucian  ridicules  so  properly,  pretending  to  speak  of  every- 
thing, covered  their  ignorance  under  the  veil  of  the  obscurity 
of  words.  Among  the  sects  of  philosophers  the  Peripatetic 
has  shown  itself  remarkable  by  this  defect;  but  the  other 
sects,  even  among  the  moderns,  are  not  wholly  exempt  from  it. 
For  example,  the  people  who  abuse  the  term  extension,  and 
find  it  necessary  to  confuse  it  with  that  of  body.  §  7.  Logic 
or  the  art  of  discussion,  which  is  held  in  such  high  esteem, 
has  helped  to  maintain  this  obscurity.  §  8.  Those  who 
have  given  themselves  uj)  to  it  have  been  useless  or  rather 
detrimental  to  the  state ;  §  9.  while  mechanics,  though  de- 
spised by  the  learned,  have  been  serviceable  to  human  life. 


CH.  x]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  379 

But  these  obscure  doctors  have  been  admired  by  the  ignorant ; 
and  they  have  been  thought  invincible  because  provided  with 
briers  and  thorns,  into  which  it  was  no  pleasure  to  thrust  one's 
self,  their  obscurity  alone  serving  as  a  defence  of  their  absurd- 
ity. §  12.  The  evil  is  that  this  art  of  obscuring  words  has 
confused  the  great  rules  of  men's  action,  religion  and  justice. 

Th.  Your  complaint  is  largely  just :  it  is  nevertheless  true 
that  there  are,  though  rarely,  pardonable  and  even  praiseworthy 
obscurities,  as  when  we  profess  to  be  enigmatical,  and  the 
enigma  is  timely.  Pythagoras '  so  used  it,  and  it  is  frequently 
the  manner  of  the  Orientals.  The  alchemists,  who  are  called 
adepts,  declare  that  they  wish  to  be  understood  only  by  the 
sons  of  the  art.  And  that  would  be  well,  if  these  pretended 
sons  of  the  art  had  the  key  to  the  cipher.  A  certain  obscurity 
may  be  allowed;  but  something  must  be  concealed  which  is 
worth  divining,  and  the  enigma  must  be  decipherable.  But 
religion  and  justice  demand  clear  ideas.  It  seems  that  the 
little  order  brought  into  their  teaching  has  made  the  confusion 
in  their  doctrine ;  and  the  indeterminateness  of  the  terms  is 
perhaps  more  harmful  than  their  obscurity.  Now  as  logic  is 
the  art  which  teaches  the  order  and  connection  of  thoughts,  I 
do  not  see  any  reason  for  blaming  it.  On  the  contrary  it  is  for 
want  of  logic  that  men  deceive  themselves.^ 

§  14.  Ph.  The  fourth  abuse  is  when  we  take  words  for  things, 
i.e.  believe  that  the  terms  correspond  to  the  real  essence  of  the 


1  Pythagoras,  c.  580-570-c.  500  b.c.  The  reference  is  to  his  so-called  Symbols, 
or  sayings  preserved  in  a  symbolic  form,  in  order  that  their  meaning  might  be 
concealed  from  the  uninitiated,  and  the  characteristic  of  which  is  the  union  of 
an  ethical  prescript  with  an  external  action  relatively  indifferent.  Cf.  Dioge- 
nes Laertius,  Be  vitis,  dor/matibus,  et  apophthegmatis  clarontmphilosoi/horum, 
VIII,  17  sq.,  who  gives  some  of  these  symbols  with  interpretations  of  a  part  of 
them  ;  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griec,  5th  ed.,  1892,  Vol.  1,  p.  .324,  note  2,  4(j2.  MiiUach, 
Frcujmt.  Pliilot^.  Grsec,  Vol.  1,  p.  504  sq.,  gives  a  collection  of  these  sayings. 
Examples  are:  "Carry  not  the  image  of  God  in  the  finger-ring,"  "Stir  not 
t'le  fire  with  the  sword,"  "  Sacrifice  and  pray  with  bare  feet."  Gottling, 
Gcsammlt.  AbhatulL,  Vol.  1,  p.  278  sq.,  2,  280  sq.,  has  given  them  a  "  pene- 
trating investigation,"  on  wliich  see  the  note  of  Zeller  above  cited.  Leibnitz 
on  Pythagoras,  (/.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schri/t.,  7,  147.  —  Tr. 

2  Leibnitz,  while  rejecting  the  over-refinements  of  the  scholastic  logic,  never- 
theless rightly  values  formal  logic  as  an  aid  to  clear  thinking  and  correct 
reasoning.  Cf.  the  letter  to  Gabriel  Wagner,  1696,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos. 
Schri/t.,  7,  512  sq.,  Erdmann,  418  sq.,  Guhrauer,  Leibniz,  deutsche  Schri/t.,  1, 
374  sq.,  Berlin,  1838.  —  Tr. 


SSO  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  in 

substances.  Who  is  there  brought  up  in  the  Peripatetic  phi- 
losophy Avho  does  not  think  that  the  ten  names  which  represent 
the  jiredkainents  are  exactly  conformed  to  the  nature  of  things; 
that  tho  substanddl  forms,  vegetative  soids,abhorrenceofa  vacuum, 
intentional  species,  etc.,  are  something  real  ?  The  Platonists 
have  their  soul  of  the  world,  and  the  Epicureans  the  tendency  of 
their  atoms  towards  movement  at  the  time  when  they  are  at 
rest.  If  the  aericd  or  ethereal  vehicles  ^  of  Dr.  More  had  pre- 
vailed in  any  corner  of  the  world  they  would  have  been  thought 
no  less  real. 

Th.  Properly  speaking  this  is  not  to  take  words  for  things, 
but  to  believe  that  true  which  is  not  so,  an  error  too  common 
with  all  men,  depending  not  alone  upon  the  abuse  of  words, 
but  consisting  in  something  entirely  different.  The  design 
of  the  pre('7i''coHie»^s  is  a  very  useful  one,  and  we  ought  to 
think  of  rectifying  rather  than  of  rejecting  them.  Substances, 
quantities,  qualities,  actions  or  passions,  and  relations,  i.e.  five 
general  names  of  things  may,  together  with  those  formed  by 
their  composition,  suffice,  and  have  not  you  yourself,  in  mar- 
shalling ideas,  been  willing  to  grant  them  as  the  predicaments  ? 
I  have  spoken  above  of  substantial  forms.^  And  I  know  not 
whether  we  have  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting  the  vegetative 
souls,'^  since  persons  of  much  experience  and  judgment  recog- 

1  The  aerial  or  ethereal  vehicles  are  the  aerial  or  celestial  bodies  of  the 
spirits,  which,  according  to  More,  the  souls  of  men  after  sufiieient  purification 
attain,  either  at  death,  in  the  case  of  a  very  few  of  the  noblest  and  most 
heroic,  or  at  some  period  after  death.  Cf.  H.  More,  Opera  omnia,  Loudini, 
l()7!t,  2  vols.,  fol. ;  Tract,  de  irnmortaliiate  animie,  Bk.  III.  chap.  1,  Axioma,  27, 
§§  3,  28  sq..  Vol.  2,  p.  396  sq.,  chap.  11,  §  2,  p.  427;  Antidotus  adversus  Atheis- 
mum,  Bk.  III.  chap.  3,  §  9,  Vol.  2,  p.  99.  — Tk. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  349  and  note.  — Tr. 

3  The  scholastic  philosophy  recognized  three  forms  or  kinds  of  souls,  corre- 
sponding to  the  three  orders  of  life,  plants,  animals,  and  men,  viz.:  the  rege- 
tative,  sensitive,  and  intellective  (anima  vegetahilis  or  nutritiva,  sensibilis  or 
sen.ntiva,  intellectiva  or  rutionalis).  Of  these  the  vegetative  is  the  lowest, 
the  sensitive  the  next  higher,  the  intellective  the  highest ;  and  the  higher 
form  includes  potentially  in  itself  the  lower  and  subordinate  form  and  its 
functions.  The  functions  of  the  vegetative  soul  are  nutrition,  growth,  repro- 
duction; of  the  sensitive  soul,  sensation,  feeling,  perceptional,  appetitive  and 
emotional  activity;  of  the  intellective,  those  of  the  reason  and  the  \\ill.  In 
man,  these  several  functions  are  all  united  in  the  intellective  or  rational  soul, 
which  he  alone  possesses,  and  which  comjirises  witliin  itself  the  sensitive  and 
vegetative  souls.  Cf.  Stiickl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  11.  2  [Vol.  31. 
592  sq.,  CIS  sq.,  633  sq.  —  Tr. 


cii.  x]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  381 

nize  a  great  analogy  between  plants  and  animals,  and  you,  sir, 
have  appeared  to  admit  animal  sonls.  Abhorrence  of  a  vacuum 
may  be  soundly  understood;  i.e.  supposing  nature  has  once 
filled  space,  and  that  bodies  are  impenetrable  and  non-condens- 
able, she  could  not  admit  any  vacuum ;  and  I  consider  these 
three  suppositions  well  grounded.  But  the  intentional  species,^ 
which  are  to  make  the  connection  between  the  soul  and  the 
body,  are  not  so,  though  we  may  excuse  the  sensible  species,^ 

1  Cf.  5th  letter  of  Leibnitz  to  Clarke,  §  84,  Gerliardt,  7,  410,  Ei-dmaim,  773, 
b,  Jacques,  2,  4(;5,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I,  IGl,  trans.  Duncan,  275. 

The  doctrine  of  the  intentional  species  {species  intentionales)  to  which 
were  ojiposed  tlie  real  species  {species  reales)  or  the  actual  forms  of  things, 
arose  in  the  attempts  of  the  Mediseval  Sclioolmen  to  explain  the  process  and 
philosophy  of  sense-perception  and  cognition.  Two  views  have  in  general  been 
held  concerning  their  nature:  1.  That  they  were  the  forms,  similitudes,  or 
images  {fornix,  similitudines,  simulacra)  of  external  objects,  different  both 
from  the  mind  and  from  these  objects,  the  intermediate  and  vicarious  repre- 
sentatives of  these  objects  in  perception  and  thought,  the  media  through 
which  the  mind  infei-s  and  comes  to  know  these  external  objects  —  a  form  of 
the  doctrine  of  mediate  perception.  2.  That  they  were  modifications  of  the 
mind  itself,  occasioned  by  the  action  upon  the  mind  of  the  external  object  and 
the  mind's  responsive  reaction  thereto,  by  which  the  mind  is  likened  or  con- 
formed to  the  given  object  and  so  detei-mined  immediately  to  cognize  it. 
The  latter  view  is  maintained  by  the  Roman  Catholic  psychologists,  as  being 
the  doctrine  of  the  greatest  of  the  schoolmen,  such  as  All)ertus  Magnus, 
Thomas  Aquinas,  Duns  Scotus,  and  as  giving  the  real  meaning  of  the  terms 
they  use.     It  is  the  more  correct  interpretation. 

The  intentional  species,  according  as  they  affected  or  were  modifications  of 
the  sense  or  the  intellect,  were  divided  into  sensible  species  {species  sensihiles) 
and  intelliylble  or  intellectual  species  {.species  intelligihiles  vel  intellectuales) . 
Both  the  sensible  and  the  intelligible  species  were  further  distinguished  as 
impressed  species  {species  ijnpressa)  and  expressed  species  {species  expressa). 
According  to  the  representative  theory  of  the  intentional  species,  the  species 
impressa  was  the  vicarious  existence  emitted  by  the  object,  impressed  on  the 
particular  faculty,  and  concurring  with  it  in  its  operation ;  while  the  species 
expressa  was  the  actual  operation  elicited  by  the  faculty  and  the  impressed 
species  conjointly,  i.e.  the  sensations  and  intellections.  The  direct  or  imme- 
diate theory  regarded  the  genesis  of  species,  whether  as  sensible  or  intelligible, 
as  exhibiting  two  stages :  1.  In  sensuous  cognition,  (a)  the  species  sensibilis 
impressa,  or  "the  modification  of  the  sensuous  faculty  viewed  as  au  impres- 
sion wrought  in  the  mind  by  the  action  of  the  object,"  and  (h)  the  sf)ccies 
sensibilis  expressa,  or  "the  reaction  of  the  mind  as  an  act  of  cognitive  con- 
sciousness." 2.  In  intellectual  cognition,  (a)  the  species  intelligibilis  im- 
pressa, or  the  "modification  effected  in  the  recipient  capacity"  of  the 
iiitellectus  pattens  vel  possibilis  (the  ^^assine  intellect  —  Aristotle's  vov^  rraerjn- 
Ko?),  and  (b)  the  species  intelligibilis  expressa,  or  the  "mental  modification 
reflecting  the  essence  of  the  object,  and  by  means  of  wliich  the  object  is  ap- 
prehended," a  modification  due  to  the  act  of  the  intellectus  agens  (the  active 
intellect  —  Aristotle's  roO?  ttoujtikos). 


382  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  hi 

which  proceed  from  the  object  to  the  distant  organ,  meaning 
thereby  the  propagation  of  motion.  I  admit  that  there  is  no 
Phitonic  soul  of  the  7vorld,  for  God  is  beyond  the  worhl,  extixi- 
mundana  intelligentia,  or  rather  supramundana}  I  know  not 
whether  by  the  tendency  to  movement  of  the  Epicurean  atoms 
you  understand  the  weight  attributed  to  them,  no  doubt  with 
reason,  since  they  maintain  that  bodies  all  move  of  them- 
selves in  one  and  the  same  direction.  The  late  Henry  More,  a 
theologian  of  the  English  Church,  Avholly  clever  as  he  was, 
showed  himself  a  little  too  ready  to  invent  hypotheses  which 
were  neither  intelligible  nor  apparent ;  witness  his  HyJarchic 
principle  ^  of  matter,  a  cause  of  weight,  elasticity,  and  other 
wonders  which  are  met  with.  I  have  nothing  to  say  of  these 
ethereal  vehicles,  having  never  examined  their  nature. 

§  15.  Ph.    An  example  touching  the  word  matter  will  assist 
you  the  better  to  enter  into  my  thought.     Matter  is  taken  as 


The  doctrine  of  the  intentional  s^jecies  was  held  hy  the  Realists,  Aquinas, 
Duns  Seotus,  and  others.  The  Nominalists,  especially  Duraudus,  Biel,  and 
Occam,  rejected  it,  and  the  doctrine  was  exploded  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
largely  hy  the  ar£;uments  of  Gassendi,  Hobbes,  and  Descartes.  On  the  whole 
subject,  cf.  Hamilton's  Eeid,  8th  ed.,  Edinburgh,  1880,  Vol.  1,  p.  267  sq.,  and 
Note  M.,  Vol.  2,  p.  951  sq.;  Lects.  on  Metnphys.,  Boston,  1875,  p.  291  sq.,  and 
notes;  Stockl,  Gcsch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  II.  1  [Vol.  2]  46.3  «$.,  II.  2 
[Vol.  .3]  808,  c)65,  978,  991  sq.,  III.  [Vol.  4]  634  sq.;  Haureau,  Histoire  de  la 
philos.  sc-olastique,  II.  1  [Vol.  2]  417  .^q.,  II.  2  [Vol.  3]  ^47  sq.,  ,378  sq. ;  Prantl, 
Gesch.  d.  Logik  im  Ahendlande,  Vol.  3,  pp.  113,  210  sq.,  294,  335  sq. ;  Maher, 
S.  J.,  PsycJiolo()y  (Manuals  of  Catholic  Philosophy  —  Stonyhurst  Series),  pp. 
49-53,  290-297,  London:  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1890;  Zigliara,  Siimma 
Philoso2)hica,  3d  ed.,  Lugduni,  1880,  Vol.  2,  pp.  243-4,  260  sq. ;  Suarez,  De 
Anima,  Lib.  III.  cc.  2,  3;  Kleutgen,  Philos.  d.  Vorzeit,  §§  18-52;  Sanseverino, 
DynamHofiia,  Neapoli,  1802-66,  Vol.  1,  pp.  373-403  (of  which  pp.  .390-400 
contain  "  an  effective  refutation  of  the  charge  of  representationism  against 
St.  Thomas  and  the  leading  scholastics,  based  on  the  doctrine  of  species"). 
Vol.  2,  pp.  5msq.  —  T-R. 

1  Cf.  Theodicee,  Pt.  II.  §  217,  Gerhardt,  0,  248,  Erdmann,  571,  a,  Jacques,  2, 
205.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  339 ;  letter  to  Placcius,  Sept.  8, 
1690,  Diitens,  Lelbnit.  op.  om.,  6,  48;  to  T.  Burnett,  Aug.  24  (v.s.)  1697,  G.  3, 
217,  D.  (;,  26.3.  More  rejected  the  mechanical  explanation  of  physical  nature', 
and  adopted  the  principium  hylarchicum,  or  spiritas  naturse  as  he  designates 
it,  the  immaterial  force  in  all  nature,  the  principle  of  the  movement  and 
sympathy  of  beings,  similar  to  the  anima  muyidi  of  the  Platonists  and  tlie 
archasus  {cf.  ante,  p.  67,  note  3)  of  the  Alchemists.  Cf.  H.  More,  Opera  omnia, 
Londini,  1679,  Enchiridion  metaphys.,  especially  in  the  Scholia,  to  chap.  13^ 
§  4,  Vol.  1,  p.  222  sq. ;  also  Tract,  de  immortcditate  animse,  Bk.  III.  chap.  12, 
Vol.  2,  p.  430.— Tk. 


CH.  x]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  383 


an  entity  really  existing  in  nature,  distinct  from  the  body; 
which  indeed  is  thoroughly  self-evident ;  otherwise  these  two 
ideas  might  be  put  indifferently  the  one  in  the  place  of  the 
other.  For  we  may  say  that  one  single  matter  composes  all 
bodies,  but  not  that  a  single  body  composes  all  matter. 
Neither  will  we  say,  I  think,  that  one  matter  is  greater  than 
another.  Matter  expresses  the  substance  and  solidity  of 
body ;  thus  we  no  more  conceive  different  matters  than  differ- 
ent solidities.  But  since  matter  has  been  taken  as  a  name  of 
something  existing  under  this  determination,  this  thought  has 
produced  unintelligible  discourse  and  confused  discussion  upon 
materia  prima. 

Th.  This  example  appears  to  me  to  serve  rather  to  excuse 
than  to  blame  the  Peripatetic  philosophy.  If  all  silver  were 
figured,  or  rather  because  all  silver  is  figured  by  nature  or  art, 
is  it  less  allowable  to  say  that  silver  is  an  entity  really  existing 
in  nature,  distinct  (taking  it  in  its  precision)  from  the  plate  or 
the  money  ?  You  will  not  on  that  account  say  that  silver  is 
nothing  else  than  certain  qualities  of  money.  Thus  it  is  not 
so  useless  as  you  suppose  to  reason  in  general  physics  about 
materia  pirima  and  to  determine  its  nature  in  order  to  know 
whether  it  is  always  uniform,  whether  it  has  some  other 
property  besides  impenetrability  (as  I  in  fact  have  shown  ^ 
after  Kepler  that  it  also  has  what  may  be  called  inertia),  etc., 
although  it  is  never  found  wholly  pure  ;  as  it  would  be  allow- 
able to  reason  about  pure  silver^  although  we  had  none  with  us 
nor  the  means  of  purifying  it.  I  do  not  at  all  disapprove 
what  Aristotle  has  said  about  materia  prima ;  ^  but  one  cannot 

1  Cf.  De  ipsa  natura,  icm,  §  11,  Gerliardt,  Leibniz.  pMlos.  Schrift.,  4,  510, 
Erdmann,  157,  a,  Jacques,  1,  4(i2  (in  French),  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  II.,  54,  trans. 
Dnncan,  119;  Theodicee,  Pt.  I.,  §  30,  G.  0,  119,  E.  512,  a,  J.  2,  89,  Dutens,  1, 
141  (in  Latin) ;  Specimen  dynamicum,  1(!95,  Pt.  I.,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math. 
Schrift.,  (i,  234  nq.,  Dutens,  3,  315  sq.,  trans.  Appendix,  670  sq.  ;  G.  Leibniz, 
philo's.  Schrift.,  4,  4(14-7,  Dutens.  2,  Pt.  I.,  2:^4-7,  two  letters  to  the  editor  of  the 
"Journal  des  Savans,"  in  the  numbers  for  June  18th,  1(!91,  January,  KHi,  the 
first  originally  a  fragment  from  a  letter  to  Antonio  Alberti,  G.  7,  447-9;  5th 
letter  to  Clarke,  §  102,  G.  7, 414,  E.  775,  h,  J.  2,  470,  Dutens,  2, 165,  trans. Duncan, 
280.  In  tlie  letter  to  Jac.  Thomasius,  April  20-30,  1669  (cf.  G.  1,  17,  18,  24), 
Leibnitz  affirmed  that  matter  consisted  of  extension  and  inpenctrability  only. 
—  Tr. 

2  Of.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  3d  ed.,  1879,  II.  2  [Vol.  4] ,  p.  320,  note  2 ;  and 
Bonitz,  Ltd.  Ariat.  sub  voe.  v^rj,  in  vol.  5  of  Berlin  Academy,  cd.  of  Aristotle. 
Cf.  also  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  259.  — Tr. 


384  LKllLMTZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.   in 

lii'lj)  l)l;imins:r  tlioso  who  liave  stop})ed  too  soon  and  have  con- 
jured \\\)  cliinu'iMs  out  of  the  ill-understood  words  of  this 
jihilosopher,  who  i)oi'lia})s  also  has  given  too  much  occasion 
souu'tinu's  for  this  misconception  and  nonsense.  But  we 
should  not  exaggerate  so  much  the  defects  of  this  celebrated 
author,  because  we  know  that  many  of  his  works  were  not 
completed  or  published  by  himself. 

§  17.  Fh.  The  Jjfih  abnse  is  the  putting  of  words  in  the  place 
of  things  which  they  do  not  and  cannot  in  any  way  signify. 
It  occurs  when  by  the  names  of  substances  we  mean  to  say 
something  more  than  this :  what  I  call  gold  is  malleable 
(although  at  bottom  then  gold  signifies  nothing  else  than  what 
is  malleable),  intending  to  have  it  understood  that  mallea- 
bility depends  upon  the  real  essence  of  gold.  Thus  we  say 
that  it  is  right  to  define  man  with  Aristotle  as  a  reasonable 
animal ;  and  that  it  is  not  right  to  define  him  with  Plato 
as  a  two-legged  animal  without  feathers  and  with  broad  nails. 
§  18.  There  is  scarcely  any  one  who  does  not  suppose  that 
these  words  signify  a  thing  having  a  real  essence  upon  which 
these  properties  depend;  but  it  is  a  plain  abuse  when  the 
complex  idea  signified  by  this  word  does  not  include  this  thing. 

T7i.  For  myself  I  should  rather  think  that  we  are  plainly 
wrong  in  censuring  this  common  usage,  since  it  is  very  true 
that  in  the  complex  idea  of  gold  is  included  the  thought  that 
it  is  a  thing  having  a  real  essence,  whose  constitution  is  un- 
known to  us  in  detail  otherwise  than  that  upon  it  depend  such 
qualities  as  malleability.  But  in  order  to  express  its  mallea- 
bility without  identity  and  without  the  defect  of  coccysm  or 
repetition  (see  chap.  8,  §  18),^  we  must  recognize  this  thing  by 
other  qualities,  as  color  and  weight.  And  it  is  as  if  we  said 
that  a  certain  fusible  body,  yellow  and  very  heavy,  called  gold, 
has  a  natvire  which  gives  it  besides  the  quality  of  being  very 
soft  to  the  hammer  and  capable  of  being  made  very  thin.  As 
for  the  dejinition  of  man  attributed  to  Plato,  which  he  appears 
to  have  made  only  for  practice,  and  which  you  would  not,  I 
think,  compare  seriously  with  that  which  is  received,  it  is 
manifestly  a  little  too  external  and  provisional;  for  if  this 
Cassoivary,  of  which  you  recently  spoke   (chap.  6,  §  34),  had 

1  The  reference  is  incorrect.  Perbaiis  chap.  (3,  §  18,  is  meant,  or  chap.  10, 
§18.  — Tr. 


cii.  X]  ON   HUMAN  UNDEllSTANDING  385 

been  found,  to  have  wide  nails,  it  would  be  man ;  for  it  would 
not  have  been  necessary  to  strip  it  of  its  feathers,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  cock  which  Diogenes,  as  they  say,  wished  to  make 
a  Platonic  nian.^ 

§  10.  Ph.  In  the  mixed  modes,  as  soon  as  an  idea  entering 
therein  is  changed,  you  at  once  recognize  it  as  another  thing, 
as  plainly  appears  in  the  words,  mtirder,  which  signifies  in 
English  (as  Mordt  in  German),  homicide  premeditated  with 
design ;  manslaughter  (a  word  corresponding  in  origin  to  homi- 
cide), a  voluntary  but  not  premeditated  homicide;  chance- 
medley  (a  chance  melee,  according  to  the  force  of  the  word), 
homicide  committed  without  design ;  for  what  is  expressed  by 
the  names  and  what  I  think  to  be  in  the  thing  (which  I  called 
before  nomincd  essence  and  real  essence)  is  the  same.  But  it  is 
not  so  in  the  names  of  substances ;  for  if  one  puts  into  the  idea 
of  gold  what  another  leaves  out,  for  example  fixedness  and 
solubility  in  aqua  regia,  men  do  not  think  for  that  reason  that 
its  species  has  been  changed,  but  only  that  the  one  has  a  more 
perfect  idea  than  the  other  of  what  constitutes  the  real  con- 
cealed essence  to  which  the  name  of  gold  is  given,  although  this 
secret  relation  is  useless  and  serves  only  to  involve  us  in  diffi- 
culties. 

Th.  I  think  I  have  already  made  this  statement ;  but  I  am 
going  also  to  show  you  clearly  here,  that  what  you,  sir,  have 
just  said,  is  found  in  the  modes,  as  in  the  substances,  and  that 
we  have  no  ground  for  censuring  the  internal  essence  for  this 
relation.  Here  is  an  example:  we  may  define  a  parabola,  in 
the  sense  of  the  geometers,  as  a  figure  in  which  all  the  lines 
parallel  to  a  certain  straight  line  are  united  by  thought  in  a 
certain  point  or  focus.  But  it  is  rather  the  exterior  and  the 
effect  which  is  expressed  by  this  idea  or  definition,  than  the 
internal  essence  of  this  figure  or  what  can  at  once  make  known 
its  origin.  We  may  at  the  beginning  even  doubt  if  such  a 
figure  as  we  wish  and  which  ought  to  produce  this  effect  is  a 
possible  thing;  and  it  is  this  which  with  me  shows  whether  a 

1  Of.  Diogenes  Laertius,  c.  230-250,  Be  viAiK,  dixjtnutihu.'i  el  (ipop/il.hcumatis 
clurtirum  philoHOphoruni  lib.  dccnn,  VI.  40:  UAaTiovo?  opto-a/iei-ov, 'Ai/OpwTros  eo-rl 

fojoi'  Sivovi',  amepov,  Kal  eiSoKi/xoOi'To?,  TiAas  [AtoyeVTjt  6  /cuiof]  a^eKTpvova  ei(7))>'eyKfi'  ei? 
Tr)!/  rrxo^rtu  auToO,  KaC  (|)r)(TU',   OuTo?  irrriu  !>   UAaTioi'Oir  drflpajTros.   '69ev  T<p  opo)  7rpo<rtTi;0»j 

To  TT\aTvuivvxoi'.    The  ilcjiniiions  ascril)ed  to  Plato,  and  found  in  some  editions 
of  his  works,  are  boyoiid  donl)t  si)uri()iis.  — Tr. 
2  (' 


;lS(i  LEIBNITZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.  in 

ilelinition  is  ouly  nominal  and  taken  from  the  properties,  or 
whether  it  is  also  real.  But  he  who  mentions  the  parabola 
anil  knows  it  only  by  the  definition  I  have  just  spoken  of, 
ceases  not,  when  speaking  of  it,  to  understand  a  figure  which 
has  a  certain  construction  and  constitution  unknown  to  him, 
but  wliich  he  wishes  to  learn  in  order  to  be  able  to  draw  it. 
Another  who  has  examined  it  more  thoroughly  will  add  some 
other  i)roperty,  and  will  discover,  for  example,  that  in  the 
figure  asked  for,  the  portion  of  the  axis  intercepted  between 
the  ordinate  and  the  perpendicular  drawn  to  the  same  point 
of  the  curve  is  always  constant,  and  equal  to  the  distance 
from  the  vertex  to  the  focus.  He  will  thus  have  a  more  per- 
fect idea  than  the  former,  and  will  come  more  easily  to  the 
drawing  of  the  figure,  although  he  is  not  yet  there.  And, 
moreover,  Ave  shall  agree  that  it  is  the  same  figure,  the  consti- 
tution of  which  is  still  concealed.  You  see  then,  sir,  that  all 
that  3'ou  have  found  and  partly  censured  in  the  use  of  words 
signifying  substances  is  also  found  and  found  plainly  justified 
in  the  words  signifying  the  mixed  modes.  But  what  has  made 
you  think  that  there  was  some  difference  between  the  sub- 
stances and  the  modes,^  is  merely  the  fact  that  you  have  not 
consulted  here  the  intellectual  modes  difficult  of  discussion, 
which  are  found  to  resemble  in  all  this  bodies  which  are  still 
more  difficult  to  know. 

§  20.  Ph.  Thus  I  fear  I  must  suppress  Avhat  I  washed 
to  say  to  you,  sir,  of  the  cause  of  what  I  have  thought  an 
abuse,  as  if  it  were  because  we  falsely  think  that  nature 
always  acts  wdth  regularity  and  fixes  limits  to  each  species  by 
this  specific  essence  or  internal  constitution  which  we  there 
understand  and  wdiich  alw^ays  follows  the  same  specific  name. 

Til.  You  see  clearly  then,  sir,  by  the  example  of  the  geo- 
metrical modes,  that  w-e  are  not  wrong  in  referring  them  to 
internal  and  specific  essences,  although  there  is  great  differ- 
ence between  sensible  things,  whether  substances,  or  modes, 
of  which  we  have  only  nominal  provisional  definitions,  and 
of  which  we  do  not  readily  hope  for  real  ones,  and  between 
the  intellectual  modes,  difficult  of  discussion  since  we  can  at 
last  reach  the  internal  constitution  of  the  geometrical  figures. 

1  Jacques  reads :  "  c'est  que  vous  n'avez  point  consulte',"  etc.  Gerhardt  and 
Erdinanu  read:  "u'est  que  vous,"  etc. — Tr. 


til.  x]  ON  HUMAN   UNDEESTANDING  387 

§  21.  Ph.  [I  see  at  last  that  I  should  have  been  wrong  in 
laying  the  blame  of  this  relation  upon  the  essences  and  internal 
constitutions,  under  the  pretext,  that  this  would  render  our 
words  signs  of  nothing  or  of  an  unknown  something.  For 
what  is  unknown  in  certain  respects  may  make  itself  known 
in  another  way,  and  the  inner  nature  may  partly  reveal  itself 
by  the  phenomena  which  spring  from  it.  And  as  for  the 
question:  whether  a  monstrous  foetus  is  a  man  or  not?  I  see 
that,  if  it  cannot  be  decided  at  once,  this  fact  does  not  prevent 
the  species  from  being  well  fixed  in  itself,  our  ignorance 
nowise  changing  anything  in  the  nature  of  things.] 

Th.  In  fact,  some  very  clever  geometers  have  chanced  to 
possess  insufficient  knowledge  as  to  what  the  figures  were, 
many  qualities  of  which  seemingly  exhaustive  of  the  subject 
tliey  knew.  For  example,  there  were  some  lines  called  2'x'ctrls,^ 
of  which  there  were  given  indeed  the  quadratures  and  the 
measure  of  their  surfaces  and  of  the  solids  made  by  their 
revolution,  before  it  was  known  that  they  were  only  a  com- 
position of  certaiii  cubic  paraboloids.  Thus  in  considering 
beforehand  tliese  pearls  as  a  particular  species,  they  had  only 
provisional  knowledge  of  them.  If  this  may  happen  in  geom- 
etry, do  you  wonder  that  it  is  difficult  to  determine  the  species 
of  corporeal  nature  which  are  incomparably  more  complex  ? 

§  22.  Ph.  Let  us  pass  to  the  sixth  abuse  in  order  to  con- 
tiuue  the  enumeration  begun,  althougli  I  see  clearly  that  some 
of  the  points  must  be  struck  from  the  list.  This  general  but 
little  noticed  abuse  is  this  :  men  having  by  long  use  attached 
certain  ideas  to  certain  words,  imagine  that  this  connection  is 
manifest  and  that  everybody  agrees  to  it.  Whence  it  comes 
that  they  feel  very  strange,  when  asked  the  meaning  of  the 
words  they  employ,  when  indeed  the  question  is  an  absolutely 
necessary  one.     There  are  few  people  who  do  not  take  it  as  an 

1  Cf.  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  7,  §  4,  Tli.  infra,  p.  465.  Reud  Fraufois 
Walter  de  Sluse,  1622-1G85,  a  Flemish  geometer,  canon  of  Liege  cathedral,  and 
author  of  the  method  for  the  construction  of  the  roots  of  equations  of  the  3d 
and  4th  degree,  "  which  consists  in  reducing  the  resolution  of  the  proposed 
equation  to  that  of  the  system  of  two  equations  representing  two  conies,  by 
introducing  an  unknown  auxiliary  whose  elimination  reproduces  tlie  primitive 
equation."  He  developed  this  method  in  his  Mcsolahium  ct  prublemata  solida, 
etc.,  4to,  Leodii  Eburonum,  KifiS.  Leibnitz  mentions  tliis  work  in  a  letter  to 
Hobbes,  l.'i-22  Jvily,  1G70,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philus.  tidirift.,  7,  573. — Tr. 


.188  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [isk.  hi 

affront  if  asked  what  they  mean  Avhen  speaking  of  life.  But 
the  vague  idea  they  may  have  of  it  is  insufficient  when  the 
question  arises  as  to  the  knowledge  wliether  a  plant,  already 
formed  in  the  seed,  or  a  pullet  in  the  e^^^  not  yet  in  process 
of  incubation,  or  a  man  in  a  swoon  without  sense  or  motion, 
has  life.  And  although  men  do  not  wish  to  appear  so  little 
intelligent  or  so  obtrusive  as  to  find  it  necessary  to  ask  for  an 
explanation  of  the  terms  used,  nor  critics  so  disagreeable  as  to 
censure  others  unceasingly  for  the  use  they  make  of  words, 
nevertheless  when  it  is  a  question  of  exact  research,  such 
explication  is  necessary.  Often  scholars  of  different  parties 
in  the  reasonings  they  display  the  one  against  the  other 
merely  speak  different  languages  and  think  the  same  thing, 
although  perhaps  their  interests  are  different. 

Th.  I  think  I  have  explained  sufficiently  my  views  upon 
the  notion  of  life,  which  must  always  be  accompanied  by  per- 
cejition  in  the  soul ;  otherwise  it  would  be  only  an  appearance, 
as  the  life  which  the  American  savages  attributed  to  watches 
or  clocks,  or  which  those  magistrates  attributed  to  the  mario- 
nettes, who  believed  them  animated  by  demons,  when  they 
desired  to  punish  as  a  sorcerer  the  one  who  had  first  pre- 
sented this  spectacle  in  their  city. 

§  23.  Ph.  In  conclusion,  words  serve  (1)  to  make  our 
thoughts  understood,  (2)  to  do  this  easily,  and  (3)  to  furnish 
entrance  into  the  knowledge  of  things.  Words  fail  at  the 
first  point,  when  they  have  no  definite  and  constant  idea 
either  received  or  understood  by  others.  §  23.  They  fail  in 
facility,  when  they  have  very  complex  ideas,  without  distinct 
names ;  this  is  often  the  fault  of  the  languages  themselves 
which  have  no  names  ;  often  also  of  the  man  who  is  ignorant 
of  them ;  in  that  case  extensive  paraphrases  are  necessary. 
§  24.  But  when  the  ideas  signified  by  the  words  do  not  agree 
with  what  is  real,  they  fail  in  the  third  point.  §  26.  (1)  He 
who  has  terms  without  ideas  is  like  a  man  who  has  onlj'  a 
catalogue  of  books.  §  27.  (2)  He  who  has  very  complex  ideas 
is  like  a  man  who  has  a  quantity  of  books  in  loose  sheets 
without  titles,  and  who  could  not  give  the  book  save  by  giving 
the  sheets  in  succession.  §  28.  (3)  He  who  is  not  constant 
in  the  use  of  signs  is  like  a  merchant  who  sells  different  goods 
under  the  same  name.     §  29.    (4)  He  who  attaches  particular 


I 


CH.  x]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  389 


ideas  to  received  words  cannot  enlighten  others  by  the  light  he 
may  have.  §  30.  (5)  He  who  has  in  his  head  ideas  of  sub- 
stances which  never  had  existence,  cannot  advance  in  real 
knowledge.  §  33.  The  first  will  speak  in  vain  of  the  taran- 
tula or  of  charity.  The  second  will  see  new  animals  without 
being  able  easily  to  show  them  to  others.  The  third  will 
take  body  sometimes  as  a  solid,  sometimes  as  a  mere  exten- 
sion ;  and  by  frugality  he  will  designate  sometimes  the  virtue, 
sometimes  the  kindred  vice.  The  fourth  will  call  a  mule 
by  the  name  horse,  and  what  everybody  calls  prodigal  will  be 
to  him  generous ;  and  the  fifth  will  seek  in  Tartary  on  the 
authority  of  Herodotus  ^  a  nation  composed  of  men  having  only 
one  eye.  I  remark  that  the  first  four  defects  are  common  to 
the  names  of  substances  and  modes,  but  that  the  last  is  pecu- 
liar to  substances. 

Th.  Your  remarks  are  very  instructive.  I  will  only  add 
tliat  you  seem  to  have  something  chimerical  still  in  your  ideas 
of  the  accidents  or  forms  of  being ;  and  so  the  fifth  defect  is 
also  common  to  substances  and  to  accidents.  The  extravagant 
shepherd  was  not  so,  only  because  he  believed  there  were 
nymphs  concealed  in  the  trees,  but  also  because  he  always 
expected  romantic  adventures. 

§  34.  Ph.  I  had  thought  to  conclude,  but  I  remember  the 
seventh  and  last  abuse,  which  is  that  of  figurative  terms  or 
allusions.  But  there  will  be  difliculty  in  thinking  it  an  abuse, 
because  what  is  called  wit  and  imagination  is  better  received 
than  truth  wholly  dry.  It  goes  well  in  discourse  where  you 
only  seek  to  please;  but  at  bottom,  order  and  clearness  ex- 
cepted, all  the  art  of  rhetoric,  all  these  artificial  and  figura- 
tive applications  of  words,  serve  only  to  insinuate  false  ideas, 
to  excite  the  passions  and  seduce  the  judgment,  so  that  they 
are  nothing  but  pure  frauds.  Nevertheless  this  fallacious  art 
is  given  the  first  rank  and  rewards.  It  is  evident  that  men 
care  but  little  for  truth  and  much  prefer  to  deceive  and  to  be 
deceived.  This  is  so  true  that  I  doubt  not  that  what  I  have 
just  said  against  this  art  is  regarded  as  the  result  of  an  extreme 
audacity.  For  eloquence,  like  the  fair  sex,  has  charms  too 
powerful  to  alloAv  itself  to  be  opposed. 

1  Bonk  III.,  clmp.  llfi;  IV  .  <'liai)S.  i:!,  27  :  rf.  nlsn  .Escliylus,  rronicllivua,  823 
(SOI,  Diudorl),  lid  ed.,  F.  A.  Palcy,  Loiidoii,  1870;  Paiisiuiius,  1,  24,  0.  — Tb. 


S90  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.  in 

Th.  Very  far  from  censuring  your  zeal  for  the  truth,  I 
linil  it  just.  And  would  that  it  might  be  effective.  I  do 
not  wholly  despair  of  it,  because  you  seem  to  me,  sir,  to  combat 
eloquence  with  its  own  weapons,  and  to  have  an  eloquence  of 
anotlier  species  superior  to  this  deceptive  kind,  as  there  was  a 
Venus  Urania,  mother  of  divine  love,  before  whom  this  other 
bastard  Venus,  mother  of  a  blind  love,  dared  not  appear  with 
her  child  with  eyes  blinded.^  But  that  indeed  proves  that 
your  thesis  needs  some  moderation,  and  that  certain  adorn- 
ments of  eloquence  are  like  the  Egyptian  vases  which  you 
could  use  in  the  worship  of  the  true  God.  It  is  as  in  painting 
and  music,  which  are  abused,  one  of  which  often  represents 
grotesque  and  even  hurtful  imaginations,  and  the  other  softens 
the  heart,  and  the  two  amuse  in  vain ;  but  they  can  be  usefully 
employed,  the  one  to  render  the  truth  clear,  the  other  to  make 
it  effective,  and  this  last  result  must  be  also  that  of  poetry 
which  contains  rhetoric  and  music. 


CHAPTER  XI 

OF    THE    REMEDIES    WHICH     MAY    BE     APPLIED     TO     THE     IMPER- 
FECTIONS   AND    ABUSES    JUST    SPOKEN    OF 

§  1.  Ph.  This  is  not  the  place  to  plunge  into  this  discussion 
upon  the  use  of  a  true  eloquence,  and  still  less  to  reply  to  your 
obliging  compliment,  since  we  ought  to  think  of  bringing  this 
matter  of  ivords  to  an  end,  by  seeking  the  remedies  for  the 
imperfections  we  have  noticed  therein.  §  2.  It  would  be  ridic- 
ulous to  attempt  to  reform  the  languages,  and  to  desire  to  com- 
pel men  to  speak  only  according  to  the  measure  of  their  knowl- 
edge. §  3.  But  it  is  not  too  much  to  desire  that  philosophers 
speak  exactly,  when  the  question  concerns  a  serious  search  for 
the  truth :  without  this  all  will  be  full  of  error,  opiniativeness, 
and  vain  disputes.     §  8.  The  Jirst  remechi  is  to  use   no  word 

1  For  the  myth  here  referred  to  liy  Leibnitz,  ef.  Plato,  Symposium,  180.  D, 
Jowctt's  trans".  Vol.  2,  p.  32,  2(1  ed.,  1875,  Vol.  1,  p.  .550,  .Sd  ed.,  1802;  Pausa- 
nias,  9,  1(!,  .";  also  Harrison- Verrall,  Mytholoc/y  cmd  Monuvients  of  Ancipvt 
Atliiiis,  212  sq.,  London,  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1890;  VtaWev,  Griech. Mythol.,2d 
ed.,  18G0,  Vol.  1,  p.  265.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  391 

without  attaching  thereto  an  idea,  instead  of  frequently  em- 
ploying words  like  instinct,  sympathy,  antipathy,  without 
attaching  any  sense  to  them. 

Th.  The  rule  is  good  ;  but  I  know  not  whether  the  examples 
are  pertinent.  Everybody  seems  to  understand  by  instinct  an 
inclination  of  an  animal  to  what  is  proper  for  it,  without  on 
that  account  apprehending  its  reason ;  and  men  indeed  ought 
less  to  neglect  these  instincts,  which  they  discover  moreover 
in  themselves,  although  their  artificial  method  of  living  has 
for  the  most  part  nearly  effaced  them ;  the  physician  of  his 
own  accord,  indeed,  has  carefully  observed  it.  SymjMthy  or 
antipathy  signifies  that  which  in  bodies  destitute  of  feeling 
corresponds  to  the  instinct  for  luiion  or  separation  found  in 
animals.  And  although  we  have  no  such  knowledge  of  the 
cause  of  these  inclinations  or  tendencies,  as  is  to  be  desired, 
we  nevertheless  have  a  notion  of  them  suflicient  to  discourse  of 
them  intelligibly. 

§  9.  Ph.  The  second  remedy  is  that  the  ideas  of  the  names 
of  the  modes  at  least  be  determined  and,  §  10.  that  the  ideas 
of  the  names  of  substances  be  more  conformed  to  what  exists. 
If  any  one  says  that  justice  is  conduct  conformed  to  the  law 
relating  to  the  good  of  another,  this  idea  is  not  sufficiently 
determined,  so  long  as  we  have  no  distinct  idea  of  that  which 
is  called  laiv. 

Th.  We  might  say  here  that  the  laio  is  a  precept  of  wisdom 
or  of  the  science  of  happiness. 

§  11.  Ph.  The  third  remedy  is  to  employ  terms  so  far  as 
possible  in  conformity  with  received  usage.  §  12.  The  fourth 
is  to  declare  in  what  sense  we  take  the  words,  whether  we 
coin  new  ones  or  employ  the  old  in  a  new  sense,  (or) 
whether  we  find  that  use  has  not  sufficiently  fixed  their  mean- 
ing. §  13.  But  there  is  some  difference.  §  14.  The  words  for 
simple  ideas  which  cannot  be  defined,  are  explained  by  synony- 
mous words,  when  they  are  better  known,  or  by  showing  the 
thing.  It  is  by  these  means  that  we  can  make  a  peasant  un- 
derstand what  the  color  feuille  morte  is,  by  telling  him  that  it  is 
that  of  dry  leaves  which  fall  in  the  autumn.  §  15.  The  names 
of  the  mixed  modes  should  be  exi)laine(l  by  definition,  for  that  is 
possible.  §  16.  It  is  upon  this  ground  that  ethics  is  suscepti- 
ble of  demonstration.     We  shall   take   man   as   a   corporeal 


S<I2 


LHlliNirZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [nic.  in 


rational  being  without  troubling  ourselves  about  his  external 
fif^urc,  §  17.  for  it  is  by  means  of  definitions  that  the  matters 
of  morality  may  be  clearly  treated.  AVe  shall  rather  define 
justice  according  to  the  idea  we  have  in  our  mind  than 
seek  a  model  therefor  outside  of  us,  as  Aristides,  and  form 
it  thereupon.  §  18.  And  as  the  majority  of  the  mixed 
modes  nowhere  exist  together,  we  can  fix  them  in  defining 
them  only  by  the  enumeration  of  that  which  is  scattered. 
§  19.  In  substances  there  are  ordinarily  some  directing  or 
characteristic  qualities  which  we  consider  as  the  most  distinc- 
tive idea  of  the  species,  to  which  we  suppose  the  other  ideas 
forming  the  complex  idea  of  the  species  are  attached.  It  is 
form  in  vegetables  and  animals,  and  color  in  animate  bodies, 
and  in  some  color  and  form  together.  This  is  why,  §  20.  the 
definition  of  man  given  by  Plato  is  more  characteristic  than 
that  of  Aristotle ;  or  why  we  should  not  cause  the  death  of 
monstrous  productions,  §  21.  and  often  sight  avails  as  much 
as  any  other  test ;  for  persons  accustomed  to  test  gold  often 
distinguish  by  sight  the  true  from  the  false,  the  pure  from 
that  which  has  been  adulterated. 

Th.  Everything  doubtless  returns  to  the  definitions  which 
may  extend  even  to  primitive  ideas.  One  and  the  same  sub- 
ject may  have  several  definitions,  but  the  knowledge  that  they 
agree  with  themselves,  must  be  learned  by  reason,  by  demon- 
strating one  definition  by  another,  or  by  experience,  by  jDroving 
that  they  constantly  go  together.  As  for  morality,  one  part  is 
wholly  grounded  in  reason ;  but  there  is  another  depending 
upon  experience  and  related  to  the  disposition.  For  a  knowl- 
edge of  substances,  form  and  color,  i.e.  the  visible,  gives  us 
the  first  ideas,  because  it  is  by  these  that  we  know  things 
at  a  distance ;  but  they  are  ordinarily  too  provisional,  and  in 
things  of  importance  to  us  we  try  to  know  substance  more 
closely.  I  am  astonished,  moreover,  that  you  return  again  to 
the  definition  of  man,  attributed  to  Plato,  since  j^ou  have  just 
yourself  stated,  §  16.  that  in  morals  man  must  be  taken  as  a 
corporeal  rational  being  without  troubling  ourselves  about  the 
external  form.  For  the  rest  it  is  true  that  a  large  practice  does 
much  for  discerning  at  sight  what  another  may  scarcely  know 
through  arduous  experiments.  And  ph^^sicians  of  large  experi- 
ence, with  very  good  sight  and  memory,  often  know  at  the  first 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  393 

appearance  the  disease  wliich  another  will  draw  out  for  himself 
with  difficulty  by  force  of  questioning  and  trying  the  pulse. 
But  it  is  well  to  unite  all  the  indications  we  may  have. 

§  22.  Ph.  I  admit  that  he  to  whom  a  good  assayer  makes 
known  all  the  qualities  of  gold,  will  have  a  better  knowledge 
of  them  than  sight  could  give.  But  if  we  could  learn  its  in- 
ternal constitution,  the  meaning  of  the  word  gold  would  be  as 
easily  determined  as  that  of  the  triangle. 

Til.  It  would  be  wholly  as  determined,  and  it  would  have  in 
it  no  2^^'ovisional  element ;  but  it  would  not  be  so  easily  deter- 
mined. For  I  think  a  distinction  a  little  prolix  would  be 
necessary  in  order  to  explain  the  contexture  of  gold,  as  is  the 
case  indeed  in  geometry  with  figures  whose  definition  is  long. 

§  23.  Ph.  Spirits  separated  from  bodies  have  doubtless 
knowledge  more  perfect  than  ours,  although  we  have  no  notion 
of  the  manner  in  which  they  may  acquire  it.  But  they  may 
have  as  clear  ideas  of  the  radical  constitution  of  bodies,  as  we 
have  of  a  triangle. 

Th.  I  have  already  remarked,  sir,  that  I  have  reasons  for 
thinking  that  no  created  spirits  exist  entirely  separate  from 
bodies ;  but  there  are  no  doubt  some  whose  organs  and  under- 
standing are  incomparably  more  perfect  than  ours,  and  which 
surpass  us  in  every  kind  of  conception,  as  much  and  more  than 
Mr.  Frenicle,^  or  that  Swedish  boy  of  whom  I  have  spoken  to 
you,  surpassed  the  common  run  of  men  in  tlie  calculation  of 
numbers,  made  by  imagination. 

§  24.  Ph.  We  have  already  noticed  that  the  definitions  of 
substances  which  may  serve  in  explaining  names  are  imperfect 
in  relation  to  the  knowledge  of  things.     For  usually  we  put 

1  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  j)hilos.  Schrift.,  4,  319.  Bernard  Frenicle  de  Bessy, 
c.  1G05-1G75,  brother  of  the  poet  Nicolas  Frenicle,  1600-1661,  "conseiller  a  la 
cour  des  monnaies,"  member  of  the  Paris  Academy  of  Sciences,  who  acquired 
the  reputation  of  being  the  first  arithmetician  of  his  age  by  the  rapidity  with 
which  he  solved  the  most  complicated  numerical  problems,  and  by  his  ingen- 
ious researches  upon  the  solution  in  whole  numbers  of  indeterminate  equations. 
His  metliod,  known  as  tlie  method  of  exclusions,  apjiears  to  have  been  an  inge- 
nious groping,  l)ut  based  on  some  general  propcisitions  which  greatly  restricted 
this  groping,  and  which  have  since  been  rigorously  demonstrated  by  Leonard 
Euler,  1707-178?.  and  Jos.  Louis  Lagrange,  1736-1813.  Pierre  dc  Fermat,  KiOl- 
16(>.'),  and  Descartes.  1.596-1650,  greatly  admired  his  work,  astonished  tliat  lie 
could  go  so  far  witliout  the  aid  of  algebra  and  tliat  his  arithmetic  could  con- 
duct him  where  analysis  finds  so  much  difficulty  in  going.  His  principal  work 
was,  Traite  des  tricmr/les,  reeianyleH  ea  noinhre,  Paris,  1676.  —  Tu. 


;?94  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQl'l':    OF    LOCKE  [hk.   hi 

the  name  in  the  place  of  the  thing ;  then  the  name  says  more  " 
than  the  definitions ;  thus  to  give  a  good  definition  of  sub- 
stances, we  must  study  natural  history. 

Th.  You  see  then,  sir,  that  the  name  gold,  for  example, 
signifies  not  only  that  which  he  who  pronounces  it  knows  of 
it^  —  for  example,  something  yellow,  very  heavy,  —  but  also 
what  he  does  not  know,  and  which  another  ma}^  know,  i.e.  a 
body  endowed  with  an  internal  constitution  from  which  pro- 
ceed color  and  weight,  and  from  which  spring  still  other  prop- 
erties admitted  to  be  better  known  by  experts. 

§  25.  Ph.  It  were  now  to  be  wished  that  those  practised  in 
physical  researches  would  set  down  the  simple  ideas  in  which 
they  observe  that  the  individuals  of  each  species  constantly 
agree.  But  the  composition  of  a  dictionary  of  this  kind 
which  would  contain,  so  to  speak,  a  natural  history,  would  re- 
quire too  many  persons,  too  much  time,  trouble,  and  sagacity 
for  such  a  work  ever  to  be  hoped  for.  It  would  be  well,  how- 
ever, to  accompany  words  with  small  copper-plate  engravings 
of  things  knoAvn  by  their  external  form.  Such  a  dictionary 
would  be  of  much  service  to  posterity  and  would  spare  future 
critics  much  trouble.  Small  figures  as  of  the  celery-plant 
(apium),  of  a  Bouquetin  {ibex,  a  kind  of  wild  goat),  would  be 
more  valuable  than  long  descrii^tions  of  this  plant  or  of  this 
animal.  And  in  order  to  know  what  the  Latins  called  sfrigiles 
and  sistriivi,  tunica  and  paZZl^<7>^,  figures  in  the  margin  would  be 
incomparably  more  vah^able  than  the  pretended  synonymes, 
currycomb,  cymbal,  dress,  cloak,  mantle,  which  show  but  little 
of  them.  For  the  rest  I  shall  not  stop  upon  the  seventh  remedy 
of  the  abuse  of  words  which  is  to  employ  constantly  the  same 
term  in  the  same  sense,  or  to  give  notice  when  you  change  it.  i 
For  we  have  spoken  sufficiently  of  this  subject.  I 

TJi.   Rev.  Father  Grimaldi,^  President  of  the  ^Mathematical 

1  Claudius  Philiji  Grimaldi,  with  whom  Leihuitz  hecame  acquainted  durinir 
his  stay  in  Rome  in  1689,  and  with  whom  he  corresponded,  receiving  from  him 
after  his  return  to  Pelvin  much  interesting  information.  Cf.  Guhrauer,  G.  W. 
Freiherr  v.  Leibniz,  2,  95  sq. ;  Kuno  Fischer,  Gesch.  d.  ??.  Philos.,  Vol.  2,  p.  201, 
.3d  ed.,  Heidelberg,  1889;  Dutens,  Leibniz,  op.  o?».,  4,  Pt.  L  81,  88  S(?.,  88;  6, 
106,  128,  227,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  phiIo.<i.  Schrifi.  3,  166,  174.  Schaarschmidt 
states  that  such  dictionaries  as  Leibnitz  here  mentions  on  the  authority  of 
Grimaldi  exist  in  fact  among  the  Chinese,  and  have  been  brought  to  Europe, 
that  the  Bonn  University  library  possesses  a  couple  of  parts  of  one  such 
dictionary,  and  that  it  must  be  regarded  as  an  alphabetically  arranged  orbis 
pictus.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  395 

Society  at  Pekiii,  tells  me  that  the  Chinese  have  illustrated 
dictionaries.  There  is  a  small  nomenclator  printed  at  Nurem- 
berg in  which  there  are  such  figures  for  each  word  which  are 
good  enough.  Such  an  illustrated  universal  dictionary  were  to 
be  desired,  and  would  not  be  very  difficult  to  make.  As  for  the 
descrijytion  of  sjjecies,  it  is  properly  natural  history,  and  we 
are  working  at  it  by  degrees.  Were  it  not  for  the  wars 
(which  have  troubled  Europe  since  the  first  foundation  of  the 
Societies  or  Royal  Academies)  it  would  be  farther  advanced, 
and  already  in  a  condition  to  profit  from  our  labors  ;  but  the 
great  for  the  most  part  do  -not  recognize  its  importance,  nor 
what  good  they  deprive  themselves  of  by  neglecting  the  ad- 
vancement of  solid  knowledge  ;  and  besides  they  are  ordinarily 
too  much  indisposed  by  the  pleasures  of  peace  or  by  the  cares 
of  war  to  weigh  things  which  do  not  strike  them  at  once. 


I 


ESSAY   ON   UNDERSTANDING 

Book  IV.  —  Of  Knowledge 
CHAPTER  I 

OF    KNOWLEDGE    IN    GENERAL 

§  1.  Ph.  Hitherto  we  have  spoken  of  ideas  and  of  tcords 
which  represent  them ;  let  us  come  now  to  the  knoivledge, 
which  the  ideas  furnish,  for  it  rests  only  upon  our  ideas. 
§  2.  Knowledge  is  simply  the  perception  of  the  connection 
and  agreement,  or  of  the  opposition  and  disagreement,  which 
we  find  between  two  of  our  ideas.  Whether  we  imagine,  con- 
jecture, or  believe,  it  is  always  that.  We  perceive,  for  exam- 
ple, by  this  means,  that  white  is  not  black,  and  that  the 
angles  of  a  triangle  and  their  equality  to  two  right  angles 
have  a  necessary  connection. 

Th.  Knowledge  has  a  still  more  general  signification,  so 
that  we  find  it  also  in  ideas  or  terms,  before  we  reach  proposi- 
tions or  truths.  And  it  may  be  said  that  he  who  has  atten- 
tively looked  at  more  pictures  of  plants  and  animals,  more 
diagrams  of  machines,  more  descriptions  or  representations  of 
houses  or  fortresses,  who  has  read  more  ingenious  romances, 
heard  more  curious  narratives,  this  one,  I  say,  will  have  more 
knowledge  than  another,  even  though  there  should  not  be  a 
word  of  truth  in  all  that  which  was  ])ortrayed  or  related  to 
him ;  for  the  custom  he  has  of  representing  in  his  mind  many 
express  and  actual  conceptions  or  ideas,  renders  him  more  fit 
to  conceive  what  is  placed  before  him  ;  and  it  is  certain  that 
he  will  be  better  instructed  and  more  capable  than  anotlier 
who  has  neither  seen  nor  read  nor  heard  anything,  ])rovided 

397 


308  LHUiMTZ'S   CiaiUilH   OF   LOCKE  [i.ic 


that  in  these  stones  and  representations  he  takes  nothing  as 
true  which  is  not  so  and  that  these  impressions  do  not  prevent 
him  elsewhere  from  distinguishing  the  real  from  the  imagi- 
nary, or  the  existent  from  the  possible.  This  is  why  certain 
logicians  of  the  period  of  the  Reformation  who  Avere  in  some 
measure  of  the  party  of  the  Eamists/  were  not  wrong  in  say- 
ing that  the  tojncs  or  orders  of  invention  (argumenta,  as  they 
call  them)  serve  as  much  for  the  explication  or  very  detailed 
description  of  an  incomplex  theme,  i.e.  of  a  thing  or  idea,  as 
for  the  proof  of  a  complex  theme,  i.e.  of  a  thesis,  proposition,  or 
truth.  And  indeed  a  thesis  may  be  explained,  in  order  that 
its  sense  and  force  may  be  well  known,  without  raising  the 
question  of  its  truth  or  proof,  as  is  seen  in  sermons  and  homi- 
lies explaining  certain  passages  of  Holy  Scripture,  or  in 
instruction  or  lectures  upon  certain  texts  of  civil  or  canon  law 
whose  truth  is  presupposed.  We  can  even  say  that  there  are 
some  themes  which  are  means  between  an  idea  and  a  proposi- 
tion. These  are  the  questions,  some  of  which  demand  only  yes 
or  no ;  and  they  are  the  nearest  to  propositions.  But  there 
are  some  also  which  demand  the  how,  the  circumstances,  etc., 
where  there  is  more  to  be  supplied  in  order  to  make  proposi- 
tions. It  is  true,  it  may  be  said,  that  in  descriptions'  (even  of 
things  purely  ideal)  there  is  a  tacit  affirmation  of  possibility. 
But  it  is  also  true  that,  as  we  may  undertake  the  explanation 
and  proof  of  a  falsehood,  a  method  which  sometimes  serves  as 
its  best  refutation,  the  art  of  description  may  fall  upon  the 
impossible  also.  Something  like  this  is  found  in  the  novelle 
of  the  Count  of  Scandiauo  followed  by  Ariosto,'  and   in   the 

1  The  Ramists  were  disciples  of  Peter  Eamns  (o/.  infra  p.  408,  note  1). 
Schaarsfhmidt  states  that  Leibnitz  probably  has  in  mind  chiefly  J.  H.  Alsted, 
whom  he  has  previously  (cf.  ante.  pp.  .311,  note  2,  .3(52)  cited,  and  whom  he 
jireatly  prized  and  studied,  in  whose  Syatema  lof/icm  harmonicum,  Her- 
borniae,  1614,  p.  69,  the  arrpimentum  is  divided  into  arc/umentum  simple/ 
fwhich  Leibnitz  calls  theme  inromplere)  and  into  arc/umentum  complexnm. 
The  former,  according  to  Alsted,  is  a  "terminus  extra  omnem  dispositionem 
dirigens  materiam"  (Leibnitz  says:  "uue  chose  ou  idee"),  the  Mtter  is  a 
"  definitio  et  distributio  "  (Leibnitz  says :  "  una  these,  proposition  ou  verite  ") . 
Cf.  Alsted,  p.  261.— Tr. 

2  I.e.  in  the  sense  of  nominal  definitions,  which  allow  the  really  impossible. 
Cf.  ante,  p.  317,  note  3.  —  Tr. 

3  Leibnitz  here  refers  to  Matteo  Maria  Boiardo,  c.  1434-1494,  Count  of 
Scandiano,  and  the  author  of  Orlando  Innamorato.  which  a  recent  writer 
calls  "the  most  chivalrous  poem  of  the  Renaissance,"  and  "a  masterpiece  of 


CH.  I]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  399 


"Amadis  of  Ganl"^  or  other  old  romances,  in  the  fairy-stories 
which  were  again  in  fashion  some  years  since,  in  the  "True 
History"^  of  Lucian  and  in  the  "Voyages"  of  Cyrano  de 
Bergerac ; '^  to  say  nothing,  of  the  grotesque  figures  of  the 
painters.  So  we  know  stories  with  the  rhetoricians  belong  in 
the  number  of  progymnasmata  or  preliminary  exercises.  But 
taking  knowledge  in  a  narrower   sense,  i.e.  as    knowledo-e   of 

inventive  genius,"  and  wiiieli  furnished  Ludovico  Ariosto,  1474-15:53,  with  the 
theme  of  his  Orlando  Furioso.     For  an  account  of  the  two  writers  anil  their 
i  works,  cf.  J.  A.  Symonds,  lieiialsnance  in  Italy,  Pt.  IV.,  Italian  Literature, 
I  Vol.  1,  pp.  45(j  sq.,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1  sq.    New  York,  H.  Holt  &  Co.,  1885. 

Through  a  misunderstanding  of  Leibnitz's  reference  to  the  Count  of  Scan- 
\<  diano,  Schaarschmidt,  in  his  note  to  the  passage,  has  wrongly  identified  him 
j  with  Tito  Giovanni  Ganzarini,  1518-1582,  Professor  of  Literature  at  Modena, 
.  called  il  Scandianese,  from  his  birthplace,  Scandiano.  Ariosto  published  his 
Orlando  Furioso  in  151(),  two  years  before  Ganzarini  was  born,  and  could 
|;  scarcely  be  said  to  have  "followed  "  an  author  who  was  only  fifteen  years 
|;i  old  when  the  poet  himself  died.  —  Tr. 

I        1  The  Arnadis  de  Gaiila,  the  best  of  all  the  old  romances  of  chivalry,  was 

j.  originally  written,  it  is  supposed,  about  13<)0,  by  Vasco  de  Lobeira,  a  Portu- 

\  guese  knight  attached  to  the  court  of  John  I.  of  Portugal,  and  who  died  in  1403. 

I  The  oldest  text  now  extant  is  in  Spanish  prose,  a  version  from  the  Portuguese 

'  original,  now  lost,  made  by  Garcia  Ordonez  de  Montalvo,  between  1492  and 

]  1504.     Editions  of  the  Spanish  version  are  numerous,  the  earliest  accessible 

I  being  that  of  1519;  and  there  are  translations  in  English,  French,  German, 

'  Italian,  and  other  languages.     The   best  and  at  present  the   only  readable 

I  edition  in  English  is   the   abridged   translation    (with   a   Preface  giving  an 

:  account,  not,  however,  without  error,  of  the  work),  made  from  the  Spanish, 

by  Robert  Southey,  London,  1803,  4  vols.,  12mo,  new  ed.,  London,  1872,  3  vols., 

IGmo.     Cf.  also,  V.  de  Lobeira,  Amadis  de  Gaula,  Barcelona,  1847-8,  4  vols., 

Wmo;   George   Tieknor,  Hist,  of  Simnish  Lit.,  3d   ed.,  Boston,  18()3,  Vol.  1, 

pp.  198-207;   L.  Braunfels,  Kritischer  Versuch  iiber  Amadis,  Leipzig,   1876. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  writer  of  the  article,  "Amadis  of  Gaul,"  in  the 

Eneyclop.  Brit.,  9th  ed.,  argues  for  the  Anglo-Norman  origin  of  the  romance, 

on  the  ground  that  all  its  ideas  and  materials,  its  design  and  machinery, 

belong  to  the  Anglo-Norman    romance-cycle    in  vogue   before  Lobeira  was 

born. — Tr. 

2  Tlie  'AATjeoCg  i<TTopia.<;  Aoyos  ( Verm  Historix)  of  Lucian  is  one  of  the  witty 
satirist's  cleverest  works,  written  in  easy  and  elegant  Greek,  and  exhibiting 
great  fertility  of  invention.  It  was  purposely  composed,  says  Lucian,  as  a 
satire  on  the  poets  and  logographers  who  have  written  so  many  marvellous 
tales,  and  contains  things  which  neither  he  nor  any  one  else  has  ever  seen, 
wliicli  not  only  do  not,  but  cannot,  exist,  and  descriptions  of  experiences  and 
adventures  which  are  absurd  and  impossible,  chief  among  which  is  a  voyage 
to  the  moon.  Lucian  himself  says  that  the  only  true  statement  in  his  History 
is  that  it  contains  notliing  but  lies  from  beginning  to  end.  It  has  without  doulit 
su))pli(!d  hints  to,  or  served  as  a  model  for,  writers  like  Rabelais,  Swiit,  and 
Cyrano  de  Bergerac.  — Tr. 

^  Cf.  ante,  p.  228,  note  2.  Amid  many  imaginative  extravagances,  these 
Voyuf/es  contain  a  pretty  exact  knowledge  of  the  philosophy  of  Descartes.  —  Tu. 


•100  l.i:ii5MTZ'S    ('KiriQUE    OF    LOCKE  [hk.   iv 

truth,  as  you,  sir,  do  licre,  I  say  it  is  quite  true  that  truth  is 
always  grounded  in  the  agreement  oi-  disagreement  of  ideas, 
but  it  is  not  true  in  general  that  our  knowledge  of  truth  is  a 
lH'ree[)tion  of  this  agreement  or  disagreement.  For  when  we 
kiu)W  truth  only  I'luiiirically,  from  having  experienced  it, 
without  knowing  the  connection  of  things  and  the  reason 
there  is  in  wliat  we  have  experienced,  we  have  no  perception 
of  this  agreement  or  disagreement,  unless  we  mean  that  we 
feel  it  in  a  confused  way  without  being  conscious  of  it.  But 
your  examples,  it  seems,  show  that  you  always  demand  a  knowl- 
edge in  which  one  is  conscious  of  connection  or  opposition, 
and  this  is  what  cannot  be  granted  you.  Fiirther,  we  can 
treat  a  complex  theme  not  alone  by  seeking  the  proofs  of  its 
truth,  but  also  in  explicating  and  otherwise  illustrating  it, 
according  to  the  topical  order,  as  I  have  already  observed. 
Finally,  I  have  a  further  remark  to  make  upon  our  definition  : 
viz.  that  it  appears  only  suited  to  categorical  truths,  in  which 
there  are  tivo  ideas,  the  subject  and  the  predicate ;  but  there 
is  besides  a  knowledge  of  hypothetical  truths  or  what  may  be 
reduced  thereto  (as  disjunctives  and  others)  in  which  there  is 
connection  between  the  antecedent  and  the  consequent  propo- 
sition ;  thus  more  than  two  ideas  may  enter  therein. 

§  3.  Ph.  [Let  us  limit  ourselves  here  to  the  knowledge  of 
truth  and  then  apply  what  will  be  said  of  the  connection  of 
ideas  to  the  connection  of  propositions,  in  order  to  include  in 
one  whole  the  categorical  and  hypothetical  truths.]  Now  I 
believe  that  this  agreement  or  disagreement  may  be  reduced 
to  four  kinds  :  (1)  Identity  or  diversity,  (2)  Relation,  (3)  Co- 
existence or  necessary  connection,  (4)  Real  existence.  §  4. 
For  the  mind  perceives  immediately  that  one  idea  is  not  an- 
other, that  white  is  not  black  ;  §  5.  then  it  perceives  their 
relation  by  comparing  them  with  each  other;  for  example, 
tliat  two  triangles  whose  bases  are  equal  and  Avhich  are  found 
between  two  parallels  are  equal.  §  6.  Next  there  is  coexist- 
ence (or  rather  connection),  as  fixedness  always  accompanies 
the  other  ideas  of  gold.  §  7.  Finally  there  is  real  exist- 
ence beyond  the  mind,  as  wlien  it  is  said :  God  is. 

Th.  I  believe  it  may  be  said  that  the  connection  is  nothing 
else  than  the  arfreement  or  the  relation  taken  generally.  And  I 
have  remarked  above  that"  every  relation  is  either   of   com- 


CH.  i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  401 


parison  or  concurre-nce.  Tliat  of  comparison  gives  diversity 
and  identity,  either  complete  or  partial ;  whereby  are  consti- 
tuted the  concepts  of  the  same  or  the  diverse,  the  like  or  unlike. 
Concurrence  contains  what  you  call  coexistence,  i.e.  connection 
of  existence.  But  when  we  say  that  a  thing  exists  or  that  it 
has  real  existence,  this  existence  itself  is  the  predicate,  i.e. 
it  has  a  notion  joined  with  the  idea  in  question,  and  there  is 
connection  between  these  two  notions.  The  existence  of  the 
object  of  an  idea  may  also  be  conceived,  as  the  concurrence  of 
this  object  with  the  Ego.  Thus  I  believe  it  may  be  said  that 
there  is  only  comparison  or  concurrence ;  but  that  the  com- 
parison which  marks  identity  or  diversity,  and  the  concurrence 
of  the  thing  with  the  Ego,  are  the  relations  which  deserve  to 
be  distinguished  among  others.^  More  exact  and  more  pro- 
found researches  might  perhaps  be  made  ;  but  1  content  myself 
here  with  making  remarks. 

§  8.  Ph.  There  is  actual  knoivledge,  which  is  the  present 
perception  of  the  relation  of  ideas ;  and  there  is  habitual 
hnoidedge,  when  the  mind  has  so  evidently  perceived  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  and  so  placed  it  in  its 
memory,  that  every  time  it  comes  to  reflect  upon  the  proposi- 
tion, it  is  at  once  certain  of  the  truth  it  contains  without  the 
least  doubt.  For  being  capable  of  thinking  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly of  but  one  thing  at  once,  men  would  all  be  very  igno- 
rant if  they  knew  only  the  actual  object  of  their  thoughts ; 
and  he  who  knew  most  would  know  but  one  truth. 

Th.  It  is  true  that  our  science,  the  most  demonstrative  in- 
deed, being  very  often  obliged  to  acquire  its  existence  by  a 
long  chain  of  inferences,  must  involve  the  memory  of  a  jmst 
demonstration  which  is  no  longer  distinctly  in  view,  when  the 
conclusion  is  made ;  otherwise  it  would  always  be  repeating 
this  demonstration.  And  even  while  it  lasts  it  cannot  be 
understood  as  a  complete  whole  at  once;  for  all  its  parts  can- 
not be  present  in  the  mind  at  the  same  time ;  thus  always  re- 
calling the  preceding  part  to  mind,  we  should  never  advance  to 
the  last  which  achieves  the  concilusion.    This  is  the  reason  also 

1  Lciliiiitz  rndn(!ns  Lookt^'s  four  kiiuls  of  nurceiiiniit  or  (lisaKrcoinniit  to  (,\vo, 
and  tlius  gfiioralizcs  the  relation  and  considers  t.lie  existfiiico  as  IIk;  concur- 
rence of  i\u\  object  witli  tlio  Ej^o.    This  concurreuce  Leibnitz  explains  by  liis 
doctrine  of  pre-esta])lisliod  liarniony.  —  Tu. 
2  D 


402  LEIBNITZ'S   CKHIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk. 


tlint  without  writing  it  would  be  difficult  properly  to  establish 
the  si'ienee.s,  the  memory  not  being  sufficiently  reliable.  But 
having  put  in  Avriting  a  long  demonstration,  like,  for  example, 
those  of  Apollonius,'  and  having  gone  over  again  all  its  parts, 
as  if  they  were  examining  a  chain,  link  by  link,  men  can 
assure  themselves  regarding  their  reasonings ;  for  -which  pur- 
pose proofs  are  also  of  use,  and  the  result  at  last  justifies  the 
whole.  But  we  see  by  this  that  as  all  belief  consists  in  the 
memory  of  past  life,  of  proofs  or  reasons,  it  is  not  within  our 
power  or  choice  to  believe  or  disbelieve,  since  memory  is  not 
a  thing  depending  on  our  will. 

§  9.'  Ph.  It  is  true  that  our  habitual  knowledge  is  of  two 
sorts  or  degrees.  Sometiujes,  truths  laid  up  as  it  Avere  in  the 
memory  no  sooner  present  themselves  to  the  mind,  than  it  sees 
the  relation  between  the  ideas  entering  therein ;  but,  some- 
times, the  mind  contents  itself  with  the  memory  of  the  convic- 
tion, without  retaining  the  proofs,  and  often,  indeed,  without 
the  power  to  recall  them  if  it  wished.  It  may  be  thought  that 
this  is  rather  to  believe  one's  memory  than  really  to  know  the 
truth  in  question,  and  this  formerly  appeared  to  me  to  be  a 
mean  between  opinion  and  knowledge,  a  kind  of  assurance 
superior  to  simple  belief  based  upon  the  testimony  of  another. 
But  upon  due  reflection  I  find  that  this  knowledge  contains 
perfect  certainty.  I  remember,  i.e.  I  know  (memory  being 
only  the  reviving  of  something  past),  that  I  w^as  once  certain 
of  the  truth  of  this  proposition,  that  the  three  angles  of  a  tri- 
angle are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  Now,  the  immutability 
of  the  same  relations  between  the  same  immutable  things 
is  at  present  the  mediate  idea  which  shows  me  that,  if  they 
were  once  equal,  the}^  will  be  so  still.  It  is  upon  this  ground 
that  in  mathematics  j^ci'i'tictdar  demonstrations  furnish  general 
knowledge ;  otherwise  a  geometer's  knowledge  would  not  ex- 
tend beyond  this  particular  figure  which  he  had  drawn  while 
demonstrating  it. 

Th.  Tlie  mediate  idea  of  which  you,  sir,  speak,  presupposes 
the  fidelity  of  our  memory  ;  but  it  sometimes  happens  that  our 
memory  deceives  us,  and  that  we  have  not  made  every  neces- 
sary effort,  although  w^e  now  believe  we  have.  This  is  clearly 
seen  in  the  examination  of  accounts.     Sometimes  there    are 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  108,  note  1.  — Te. 


.11.  i]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  403 

examiners  officially  appointed,  as  at  our  mines  in  the  Harz, 
and  to  make  the  receivers  of  the  particular  mines  more  atten- 
tive, they  have  imposed  a  money  penalty  upon  every  error  in 
calculation ;  nevertheless  they  find  them  in  spite  of  this  pen- 
alty. But  the  more  care  we  employ,  the  more  reliance  we  can 
place  upon  past  reasonings.  I  have  devised  a  method  of  keep- 
ing accounts,  by  which  he  who  collects  the  sums  of  the  col- 
umns leaves  upon  the  paper  traces  of  the  progress  of  his 
reasoning,  so  that  he  does  not  reason  in  vain.  He  can  always 
revise  and  correct  the  last  errors  without  affecting  the  first : 
the  examination,  also,  which  another  desires  to  make  costs,  in 
this  way,  almost  no  trouble,  because  he  can  examine  the  very 
same  traces  at  a  glance.  There  are,  besides,  means  of  verifying 
the  accounts  of  each  o.rticle,  by  a  very  convenient  kind  of  proof, 
without  increasing  to  any  considerable  extent  the  labor  of  the 
computation.  And  all  this  easily  shows  that  men  may  have 
rigorous  demonstrations  on  paper,  and  have  an  infinite  number 
of  them.  But  unless  we  remember  that  we  have  been  abso- 
lutely accurate,  we  cannot  have  this  certainty  in  the  mind. 
And  this  accuracy  consists  in  an  orderly  procedure,  the  observ- 
ance of  which  in  each  part  is  an  assurance  as  regards  the 
whole ;  as  in  the  examination  of  a  chain  by  links,  in  which 
inspecting  each  to  see  if  it  is  strong,  and  measuring  with  the 
liand  so  as  not  to  skip  any,  assurance  is  obtained  of  the  good 
quality  of  the  chain.  And  by  this  means  we  have  all  the 
C(u-titude  of  which  human  things  are  capable.  But  I  do  not 
agree  that  in  mathematics  particular  demonstrations  upon  the 
figure  which  is  drawn  furnish  this  general  certitude,  as  you 
seem  to  take  it.  For  you  must  know  that  it  is  not  the  figures 
which  furnish  the  proof  with  geometers,  although  the  style  of 
the  exposition  may  make  you  think  so.  The  force  of  the  dem- 
onstration is  independent  of  the  figure  drawn,  which  is  drawn 
only  to  facilitate  the  knowledge  of  our  meaning,  and  to  fix  the 
attention;  it  is  the  universal  propositions,  i.e.  the  definitions, 
axioms,  and  theorems  already  demonstrated,  which  make  the 
reasoning,  and  which  would  sustain  it  though  the  figure  were 
not  there.  Hence  it  is  that  a  learned  geometer,  like  Scheube- 
lius,'  has  given  Euclid's  figures  without  the  letters  which  might 

1  .Toliiinn  Sclieybl  —  Latin,  Schenbolius —  141)4-1570,  \v;is,  iiccordiiiij  to  Jonlier, 
AlUjemeines   Gelehrtcn-Lcxicun,  Lcipziti',  1750-51,   Vol.  4,  p.  257,  a  professor 


404  LEIBNITZ'S   CUITIQUE    OF   LUCKE  [i;k.  iv 


bind  them  to  the  demonstration  he  has  put  with  them ;  and 
another,  like  Herlinus/  has  reduced  the  same  demonstrations 
to  syllogisms  and  prosyllogisms. 


CHAPTER  II 

OF    THE    DEGREES    OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE 

§  1.  Pit.  Knowledge  is  then  intuitive  when  the  mind  per- 
ceives the  agreement  of  two  ideas  immediately  by  themselves 
without  the  intervention  of  any  other.  In  this  case,  the  mind 
takes  no  pains  to  prove  or  examine  the  truth.  As  the  eye 
sees  the  light,  the  mind  sees  that  white  is  not  black,  that  a 
circle  is  not  a  triangle,  that  three  is  two  and  one.  This  knowl-^ 
edge  is  the  clearest  and  most  certain  of  which  human  weak- 
ness is  capable ;  it  acts  in  an  irresistible  manner  without^ 
allowing  the  mind  to  hesitate.  It  is  knowledge  that  the  idea 
is  in  the  mind  as  perceived.  Whoever  asks  for  greater  certi- 
tude, knows  not  what  he  asks. 

Th.  Primitive  truths,  which  are  known  by  intuition,  are  of 
two  kinds,  like  the  derivative.  They  are  truths  of  reason  or 
truths  of  fact.  Truths  of  reason  are  necessary,  and  those 
of  fact  are  contingent.  The  primitive  truths  of  reason  are 
those  which  I  call  by  the  general  name  of  identical,  because 
they  seem  only  to  repeat  the  same  thing  without  giving  us  any 
information.  They  are  affirmative  or  negative.  The  affirma- 
tive are  such  as  the  following  :  Each  tiling  is  tuhat  it  is,  and  in 

of  mathematics  in  the  University  at  Tiihingen.  His  Euclidis  sex  libri  primi 
de  geometricis  principiis  gr.  et  hit.  cum  commentario  appeared  at  Basle,  1590. 
—  Tr. 

1  Christian  Herlinvis,  whom  Leibnitz  also  mentions  toward  the  end  of  his 
Meditationes  de  Cog.,  Verit.,  et  Ideix,  as  co-editor  witli  Conrad  Dasypodius 
(15."32-ir)00,  professor  of  mathematics  in  Strassburc;  University,  and  Canon 
of  St.  Thomas'  Church)  of  Euclid,  appears  to  be  otherwise  unknown.  Their 
joint  work,  of  which  Herlinus  did  the  first  and  fifth  books,  and  Dasypodius 
the  other  four,  appeared  under  tlie  title  Anabjais  geomctrise  sex  Uhrorwin 
Euclidis,  etc.,  Strassburg,  1566,  fol.  It  is,  says  Michaud,  Blog.  Universelle, 
Vol.  10,  p.  560,  a  pedantic  work  in  which  the  demonstrations  of  the  Greek 
geometer  are  reduced  to  syllogistic  form,  so  that  a  proposition  of  fifteen  or 
twenty  lines  is  spun  out  into  several  pages,  and  is  often  more  involved  or 
at  least  more  difficult  to  follow.  —  Tii. 


I 


CH.  ii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  405 

as  many  examples  as  you  please,  A  is  A,  B  is  B.  I  shall 
be  what  I  shall  be.  I  have  written  what  I  have  written.  Ai\cl 
nothing  in  verse  as  in  prose,  is  to  be  notldnfi  or  a  trifle.  The 
equilateral  rectangle  is  a  rectangle}  The  rational  animal  is  al- 
ways an  animal.  And  in  the  hypothetical :  If  the  regular  figure 
of  four  sides  is  an  equilateral  rectangle,  this  figure  is  a  rectangle. 
Copulatives,  disjunctives,  and  other  propositions  are  also  sus- 
ceptible of  this  identicism,  and  I  reckon  indeed  among  the 
affirmatives  :  uon-A  is  non-A.  And  this  hypothetical :  if  A  is 
non-B,  it  follows  that  A  is  non-B.  Again,  if  non-A  is  BC,  it 
follows  that  non-A  is  BC.  If  a  figure  having  no  obtuse  angle 
may  be  a  regular  triangle,  a  figure  having  no  obtuse  angle  may  be 
regular.  I  come  now  to  the  identical  negatives  which  belong 
either  to  the  principle  of  contradiction  or  to  the  disjKirates. 
The  principle  of  contradiction  is  in  general :  a  proposition  is 
either  true  orfcdse:  this  contains  two  true  statements,  one  that 
the  true  and  the  false  are  not  compatible  in  one  and  the  same 
proposition,  or  that  a  proposition  cannot  be  true  and  false  at 
once;  the  other  that  the  opposition  or  the  negation  of  the  true 
and  the  false  are  not  compatible,  or  that  there  is  no  mean  be- 
tween the  true  and  the  false,  or  rather  :  it  is  impossible  for  a 
2)7'oposition  to  be  neither  true  nor  false.  Now  all  this  is  also 
true  in  all  imaginable  propositions  in  particular,  as  what  is  A 
cannot  be  non-A.  Again,^  AB  cannot  be  non-A.  An  equilat- 
eral rectangle  cannot  be  non-rectangle.  Again,  it  is  trxie  that 
every  man  is  an  animal,  then  it  is  false  that  any  man  is  found 
who  is  not  an  animal.  We  may  vary  these  statements  in  many 
ways,  and  apply  them  to  copulatives,  disjunctives,  and  others. 
As  for  the  disparates,  they  are  the  propositions  which  state 
that  the  object  of  one  idea  is  not  the  object  of  another  idea ; 
as,  that  heat  is  not  the  same  thing  as  color ;  again,  man  and 
animal  are  not  the  same,  although  every  man  is  an  animal. 
All  this  may  be  asserted  independently  of  all  proof  or  of  re- 
duction to  opposition,   or  to  the  principle   of   contradiction, 

1  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "Est  nn  rectangle.  L'aninial  raisonnable 
e.st  toujours  nn  animal.  Et  dans  les  liypotlietiqnes :  Si  la  fiynro  rt^nnliero  de 
quati'o  costcs  est  un  rectangle  equilateral." — Tr. 

2  Erdmann  and  Jacques  omit:  "Item  AB  lie  saiiroit  estro  non-A.  Un 
rectangle  equilateral  iie  sauroit  estre  non-rectangle.  Item  il  est  vray  que  tout 
liomme  est  nil  animal,  done  il  est  faux,"  and  instead  of  the  last  four  words, 
read:  "Item  il  est  vray,"  etc.  —  Tk. 


40U  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCIvE  [bk.  iv 

wliou  these  ideas  are  sufficiently  understood  not  to  require 
here  analysis  ;  otherwise  they  are  liable  to  be  misunderstood  : 
for  in  saying,  the  triangle  and  the  trilateral  are  not  the  same,  we 
should  be  mistaken,  since  upon  proper  consideration  we  find 
that  three  sides  and  three  angles  always  go  together.  In  say- 
ing, the  quadrilateral  rectangle  and  the  rectangle  are  not  the  same, 
we  should  also  be  mistaken.  For  it  is  found  that  the  four- 
sided  iigure  alone  can  have  all  the  angles  right  angles.  But 
we  may  also  say  in  the  abstract  that  the  triangle  is  not  the  tri- 
lateral, or  that  the  formal  causes  of  the  triangle  and  of  the  tri- 
lateral are  not  the  same,  as  the  philosophers  express  it.  They 
are  different  relations  of  one  and  the  same  thing. 

Some  one  after  having  heard  with  patience  what  we  have 
just  said  up  to  this  point,  will  lose  it  after  all  and  will  say 
that  we  are  amusing  ourselves  with  frivolous  statements,  and 
that  all  identical  truths  are  useless.  But  he  will  make  this 
judgment  for  want  of  having  thought  sufficiently  upon  these 
matters.  The  deductions  of  logic,  for  example,  are  demon- 
strated by  identical  principles ;  and  geometers  require  the 
principle  of  contradiction  in  their  demonstrations  which  re- 
duce to  the  imjDOSsible.^  Let  us  be  content  here  to  show  the 
use  of  identicals  in  the  demonstrations  of  rational  deduction. 
I  say,  then,  that  the  principle  of  contradiction  alone  suffices  to 
demonstrate  the  second  and  the  third  figures  of  the  syllogism 
by  means  of  the  first.  For  example,  we  may  conclude  in  the 
first  figure,  in  Barbara  : 

All  B  is  C, 

All  A  i.s  B, 
Then  All  A  is  C. 

Suppose  that  the  conclusion  is  false  (or  that  it  is  true  that 
some  A  is  not  C),  then  one  or  the  other  of  the  premises  will 
be  false  also.  Suppose  that  the  second  is  true,  the  first  must 
then  1)6  false,  which  maintains  that  all  B  is  C.  Then  its  con- 
tradictory will  be  true,  i.e.  some  B  will  not  be  C.  And  this 
will  be  the  conclusion  of  a  new  argument,  'drawn  from    the 

1  I.e.  the  so-called  indirect  proof,  which  provisionally  assumes  the  truth  of 
the  contradictory  opposite  of  the  proposition  to  be  proved,  and  then,  having 
discovered  the  impossibility  of  this  assumption,  concludes,  by  the  aid  of  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  that  the  original  proposition  is  correct.  — Tr. 


cii.  n]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  407 

falsity  of  the  conclusion  and  the  truth  of  one  of  the  i)remises 
of  the  preceding  argument.     Here  is  this  new  argument : 

Some  A  is  not  C. 
This  is  opposed  to  the  preceding  conclusion  supposed  false. 

All  A  is  B. 
This  is  the  preceding  premise  supposed  true. 

Then  some  B  is  not  C. 

This  is  the  present  true  conclusion,  opposed  to  the  preced- 
ing false  premise. 

This  argument  is  in  the  mode  Disamis  of  the  third  figure, 
which  is  thus  plainly  demonstrated  and  at  once  from  the 
mode  Barbara  of  the  first  figure  by  employing  simply  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction.  And  I  noticed  in  my  youth,  when  I 
examined  minutely  these  things,  that  all  the  modes  of  the 
second  and  third  figure  may  be  drawn  from  the  first  by  this 
method  alone,  by  supposing  that  the  mode  of  the  first  is  valid, 
and  consequently  that  the  conclusion  being  false,  or  its  contra- 
dictory being  taken  as  true,  and  one  of  the  premises  being 
taken  as  true  also,  the  contradictory  of  the  other  premise  is 
true.  It  is  true  that  in  the  schools  of  logic  they  prefer  to 
make  use  of  conversions  to  draw  the  less  principal  figures  from 
the  first  which  is  the  principal,  because  this  method  appears 
better  suited  to  the  scholars.  But  for  those  who  seek  demon- 
strative reasons,  in  which  the  least  possible  suppositions  must 
be  employed,  we  shall  not  demonstrate  by  the  supposition  of 
conversion  what  may  be  demonstrated  by  the  primitive  princi- 
ple alone,  which  is  that  of  contradiction  and  which  assumes 
nothing.  I  have  also  made  this  apparently  remarkable  obser- 
vation, that  only  the  less  principal  figures  which  are  called 
direct,  viz.  the  second  and  the  third,  can  be  demonstrated  by 
the  principle  of  contradiction  by  itself :  but  the  less  original 
indirect  figure,  the  fourth,  whose  invention  the  Arabs  attribute 
to  Galen,^  although  we  found  nothing   concerning   it   in   the 

1  Claudius  Galenns,  c.  1.30-c.  201,  a  very  celebratod  pliysieian  aiul  niedical 
writer,  who  also  wrote  a  large  number  of  pliilosopliical  and  los;;ieal  works,  the 
greater  part  of  which  are  now  lost.  His  medical  and  scientific  treatises  contain 
considerable  philosophical  and  logical  discussion,  and  liis  I)e  asu  ])artium 


lUS  LElBMrZ'S   CRITIQUE   UF   LUCKE  [bk.  iv 

works  of  his  remaining  to  us,  nor  in  the  other  Greek  authors, 
the  fourth,  I  say,  has  this  disadvantage,  that  it  cannot  be 
derived  from  the  first  or  principal  figure  by  this  method 
ah)ne,  and  it  is  necessary  besides  to  employ  another  supposi- 
tion, viz.  conversions,  so  that  it  is  farther  removed  by  one 
degree  than  the  second  and  the  third,  which  are  on  a  level 
and  equally  removed  from  the  first ;  while  the  fourth  needs 
also  the  second  and  the  third  for  its  demonstration.  For  it  is 
found  very  opportunely  that  the  conversions  required  are 
demonstrated  by  the  second  or  third  figure,  demonstrable 
independently  of  the  conversions,  as  I  have  just  shown.  It  is 
Peter  Kamus  ^  who  already  made  this  remark  concerning  the 
demonstrability  of  conversion  by  these  figures  ;  and  (if  I  am 
not  mistaken)  he  reproached  the  logicians,  who  make  use  of 
conversion  to  demonstrate  these  figures,  with  arguing  in  a 
circle,  although  it  was  not  so  much  the  circle  that  he  found  it 
necessary  to  reproach  them  \vith  (for  they  did  not  use  these 

Corp.  hum.  is,  says  Janet,  "  an  apology  for  and  a  continual  application  of  the 
principle  of  final  causes."  The  most  complete  ed.  of  his  works  containing 
the  Greek  text  and  a  Latin  version  is  the  O'pera  Omnia,  cur.  C.  G.  Kiihn, 
Leipzig,  1821-33,  20  vols.,  8vo.  For  his  philosophical  views,  cf.  K.  Sprengel, 
Beitr.  z.  Gesch.  d.  Medicin,  1,  117-195,  Halle,  1794-6 ;  on  his  logic,  cf.  Prantl, 
Gesch.  d.  Logik,  1,  559-577.  A  brief  account  of  his  ijhilosophy  is  given  by 
Zeller,  Fhilos.  d.  Griech.,  III.,  1  [Vol.  5],  823  sq.,  3d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1880. 

The  invention  of  the  fourth  syllogistic  figure  was  ascribed  to  Galen  by 
Averroes,  1105-1198,  but  without  adequate  foundation.  Galen  was  led  through 
the  additions  to  the  first  figure  already  made  by  Theophrastus,  c.  373-c.  288 
B.C.,  to  transpose  the  premises  in  the  same,  and  only  by  this  means  indirectly 
to  tlie  fourth  arrangement  of  the  middle  term.  Cf.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Loyik 
im  Abendlande,  1, 570-574 ;  also  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Lects.  on  Logic,  Boston,  1873, 
Lect.  XX.,  Tl  LXXIIL,  pp.  285-0;  Lect.  XXL,  fi  LXXIV.,  p.  302-3,  and  notes. 
—  Tr. 

1  Petrus  Ramus  —  Pierre  de  la  Ramee  — 1515-1572,  murdered  during  St. 
Bartholomew's  Night,  was  a  determined  opponent  of  Aristotelian  scholasticism, 
and  especially  of  its  logic  or  dialectic,  in  the  place  of  which  he  attempted  to 
set  up  a  new,  simpler,  and  better  gi-ounded  dialectic.  For  this  purpose  he 
wrote  and  published  his  two  works,  AnimadversioneR  Ari.^totelicse,  Paris, 
15.34,  etc.,  and  Institutiones  dialecticie,  Paris,  1543.  Following  Cicero  and 
Quintilian,  his  scheme  was  a  blending  of  logic  and  rhetoric.  For  a  long  time 
after  him,  logicians  were  divided  into  Ramists  and  Anti-Ramists,  while  the 
Semi-Raraists,  among  whom  were  Alsted  and  Goclen  {cf.  ante,  p.  311,  note  2), 
sought  to  mediate  between  the  Aristotelic  dialectic,  as  set  forth  by  Melanch- 
thon,  and  that  of  Ramus.  The  remarks  to  which  Leibnitz  here  refers  are 
found,  according  to  Schaarschmidt,  in  Animad.  Aristotel.,  Lutetiae,  1548, 
pp.  388  .s<7.  For  a  good  account  of  Ramus,  cf.  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d. 
Mittelalters,  111.  [Vol.  4],  pp.  29(j  sq.;  also  Ueberweg-Heinze,  Gesch.  d.  Philos., 
7thed.,  3,  24,  20.— Tr. 


CH.  II]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  409 

figures  in  their  turn  to  justify  the  conversions)  as  the  hysteron 
proteron  or  the  reversal  {le  rebonrs);  because  conversions  need 
rather  to  be  demonstrated  by  these  figures,  than  these  figures 
by  the  conversions.  But  as  this  demonstration  of  conversions 
shows  also  the  use  of  the  identical  affirmatives,  which  many 
take  as  altogether  frivolous,  it  will  be  so  much  more  to  the 
purpose  to  introduce  them  here.  I  wish  to  speak  only  of  con- 
versions without  contraposition,  which  suffice  me  here,  and 
which  are  simple  or  |ver  accidens,  as  they  are  called.  Simple 
conversions  are  of  two  kinds  :  that  of  the  universal  negative, 
as  :  no  square  is  obtuse-angled,  then  no  obtuse-angled  Jig ure  is  a 
square;  and  that  of  the  particular  affirmative,  as  :  some  tri- 
angles are  obtuse-angled,  then  some  obtuse-angled  figures  are 
triangles.  But  conversion  per  accidens,  as  it  is  called,  concerns 
the  universal  affirmative,  as  :  every  square  is  a  rectangle,  then 
some  rectangles  are  squares.  A  rectangle  is  here  always  under- 
stood to  be  a  figure  all  of  whose  angles  are  right  angles,  and 
by  the  squctre  is  understood  a  regular  quadrilateral.  Now  the 
question  is  to  demonstrate  these  three  kinds  of  conversion, 
which  are  : 

(1)  No  A  is  B,  then  no  B  is  A. 

(2)  Some  A  is  B,  then  some  B  is  A. 

(3)  All  A  is  B,  then  some  B  is  A. 

Demonstration    of    the  first   conversion   in    Cesare,    which 
belongs  to  the  second  figure. 

No  A  is  B. 

All  B  is  B. 
Then  no  B  is  A. 

Demonstration  of  the  second  conversion  in  Datisi,  which  be- 
longs to  the  third  figure. 

All  A  is  A. 

Some  A  is  B. 

Then  some  B  is  A. 

Demonstration  of  the  third    conversion  in  Darapti,  which 
belongs  to  the  third  figure. 

All  A  is  A. 

All  A  is  B. 

Then  some  B  is  A. 


.110  LKIBNITZ'S    ClUTlQrE    OF    LOCKE  [p.k.    iv 


This  shows  that  the  purest  and  apparently  most  useless 
iilontical  proi)Ositious  are  of  considerable  use  in  the  abstract 
and  general;  and  that  may  teach  us  that  we  should  not 
desi)ise  any  truth.  As  for  this  i)roposition,  that  three  is  as 
much  as  two  and  one,  which  you,  sir,  still  adduce  as  an  example 
of  intuitive  knowledge,  I  have  to  say  that  it  is  only  the  defini- 
tion of  the  term  three,  for  the  sim])lest  definitions  of  numbers 
are  formed  in  this  way :  Two  is  one  plus  one,  three  is  two  plus 
one,  fotir  is  three  plus  one,  etc.  It  is  true  that  there  is  therein 
a  concealed  statement,  which  I  have  already  spoken  of,  viz. 
that  these  ideas  are  possible :  and  this  is  here  known  intuitively, 
so  that  it  may  be  said,  that  an  intuitive  knowledge  is  comprised 
in  definitions  when  their  possibility  appears  at  once.  And  in 
this  way  all  adequate  definitions  contain  primitive  truths  of 
reason  and  consequently  intuitive  knowledge.  In  short,  you 
can  say  in  general  that  all  primitive  truths  of  reason  are  imme- 
diate with  respect  to  an  immediateness  of  ideas. 

As  for  the  ji^'imitive  truths  of  fact,  they  are  the  immediate  in- 
ternal experiences  of  an  immediateness  of  feeling.  And  here  it 
is  that  the  first  truth  of  the  Cartesians  or  of  St.  Augustine :  I 
think,  therefore  I  am,  i.e.  /  ayn  a  thing  which  thinks,  holds  good.^ 
But  we  must  know,  that  as  the  identicals  are  general  or  par- 
ticidar,  and  as  one  is  as  clear  as  the  other  (since  the  statement 
that  A  is  A  is  as  clear  as  the  statement  that  a  thing  is  ichat  it 
is),  so  is  it  also  with  the  first  truths  of  fact.  For  not  only  is 
it  immediately  clear  to  me  that  /  think,  but  it  is  wholly  as 
clear  to  me  that  I  have  different  thoughts,  that  sometimes  /  think 
of  A,  and  sometimes  of  B,  etc.  Thus  the  Cartesian  principle 
is  valid,  but  it  is  not  the  only  one  of  its  kind.  You  see  by 
this  that  all  inimitive  truths  of  reason  or  of  fact  have  this 
in  common,  that  they  cannot  be  proved  by  anything  more  cer- 
tain. 

§  2.  Ph.    1  am  very  glad,  sir,  that  you  have  carried  forward 

1  Cf.  Augustine,  SoUl.  II.,  1:  "  Tu  qi;i  .scis  te  nosse,  scis  te  esse?  Scio! 
Unde.scis?  Nescio!  Simplicem  te  sentis  an  multipliceiu?  Nescio!  Cogitare 
te  scis?  Scio!"  in  Opera,  Vol.  1,  p.  369,  Benedictine  ed.,  Paris,  Franciscus 
Muguet,  1679;  Vol.  1,  p.  885,  ed.  Migne,  Paris,  1841.  Augustine,  351-130,  thus 
anticipated  the  principle  of  Descartes,  15!;x>-16.50,  "  Cogito  ergo  sum,"  a  fact 
unknown  however  to  Descartes,  who  was  not  one  of  the  class  of  reading 
philosophers,  until  hrought  to  his  knowledge  hy  Arnauld,  1612-1691,  and 
Mersenne,  1588-1G48,  in  their  criticism  of  his  philosophy. —Tr. 


cii.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  411 

farther  than  I  had  done  that  which  rehites  to  intuitive  knowl- 
edge. Now  demonstrative  knowledge  is  only  a  concatenation  of 
intuitive  knowledge  in  all  the  connections  of  mediate  ideas. 
For  often  the  mind  cannot  unite,  compare,  or  apply  immedi- 
ately the  ideas  one  to  the  other,  and  this  compels  it  to  make 
use  of  other  ideas  (one  or  more)  as  means  to  the  discovery  of 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  it  seeks,  and  this  is  what  we 
call  reasoning.  As  in  demonstrating  the  three  angles  of  a  tri- 
angle to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles,  it  finds  some  other 
angles  which  are  seen  to  be  equal  both  to  the  three  angles  of 
the  triangle  and  to  two  right  angles.  §  3.  These  intervening 
ideas  are  called  proofs,  and  the  disposition  of  the  mind  to  dis- 
cover them  is  called  sagacity.  §  4.  And  even  when  found, 
this  knowledge  cannot  be  acquired  without  pains  and  atten- 
tion and  by  more  than  a  single  passing  view  ;  for  the  ndnd 
must  enter  upon  a  progression  of  ideas,  made  gradually  and 
by  degrees,  §  5.  and  there  is  doubt  before  the  demonstra- 
tion. §  6.  It  is  not  so  clear  as  the  intuitive  knowledge,  as 
the  image  reflected  by  several  mirrors  from  one  to  another 
grows  more  and  more  faint  with  each  reflection,  and  is  no 
longer  at  once  so  recognizable  especially  by  weak  eyes.  It  is 
the  same  with  knowledge  produced  by  a  long  train  of  proof. 
§  7.  And  although  each  step  taken  by  reason  in  the  demon- 
stration is  intuitive  knowledge  or  simple  sight,  nevertheless 
as  in  this  long  train  of  proofs  the  memory  does  not  so  exactly 
preserve  this  connection  of  ideas,  men  often  take  fallacies  for 
demonstrations. 

Th.  Besides  natural  sagacity  or  that  acquired  by  exercise, 
there  is  an  art  of  finding  mediate  ideas  (the  medium'),  and  this 
art  is  analysis.  Now  it  is  well  to  consider  here,  that  the  ques- 
tion is  sometimes  to  find  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  a  given 
proposition,  which  is  nothing  else  than  an  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion Anf  i.e.  whether  it  is  or  is  not.  Sometimes  it  concerns 
an  answer  to  a  more  difficult  {cmteris  paribus)  question,  where 
it  is  asked  for  example  by  tvhom  and  how  ?  and  Avhere  there  is 
more  to  be  supplied.  And  it  is  these  questions  alone,  which 
leave  a  part  of  the  proposition  blank,  which  the  mathemati- 
cians call  problems.  As,  when  we  are  asked  to  find  a  mirror 
which  collects  all  the  rays  of  the  sun  in  one  point,  we  are 
asked  for  its  form,  or  how  it  is  made.     As  for  the  first  ques- 


-112  LKIU.MTZ'S   Ciailt^LE   UF   LOCKE  [bk. 


tions  in  which  the  point  at  stake  is  only  truth  and  falsehood 
antl  where  there  is  nothiuLj  to  Ije  supplied  in  the  subject  or 
]»r»'dieat»',  there  is  less  invention,  yet  there  is  some,  and  the 
judgment  alone  is  not  sufficient.  It  is  true  that  a  man  of  judg- 
ment, i.e.  one  who  is  capable  of  attention  and  reserve,  and 
who  has  the  leisure,  the  patience,  and  the  necessary  freedom 
of  mind,  may  understand  the  most  difficult  demonstration  if 
projierly  set  before  him.  But  the  most  judicious  man  in  the 
world,  without  other  aid,  will  not  always  be  capable  of  discov- 
ering this  demonstration.  Thus  there  is  still  some  invention 
therein ;  and  with  geometers  there  was  more  of  it  formerly 
than  now.  For  when  analysis  was  less  cultivated,  more  sagac- 
ity was  necessary  to  attain  it,  and  it  is  on  this  account  that 
some  geometers  still  of  the  old  school,^  or  others  who  have  not 
yet  sufficient  aptness  in  the  new  methods,  think  they  have 
done  something  wonderful  when  they  discover  the  demonstra- 
tion of  some  theorem  that  others  have  invented.  But  those 
Avho  are  versed  in  the  art  of  invention  know  when  this  is  esti- 
mable or  not ;  for  example,  if  some  one  sets  forth  the  quadra^ 
ture  of  a  space  comprised  within  a  curved  and  a  straight  line, 
which  is  successful  in  all  its  segments  and  which  I  call  general, 
it  is  always  within  our  power  according  to  our  methods  to  dis- 
cover its  demonstration,  provided  we  are  willing  to  take  the 
trouble.  But  there  are  some  particular  quadratures  of  certain 
portions,  where  the  thing  may  be  so  involved,  that  it  will  not 
always  be  possible  {in  j)otestate)  thus  far  to  develop  it.  It 
happens  also  that  induction  presents  us  with  truths  in  num- 
bers and  in  figures  whose  general  reason  is  not  yet  discovered. 
For  much  is  needed  in  order  to  attain  perfection  of  analysis  in 
geometry  and  in  numbers,  as  many  are  becoming  conceited 
upon  the  basis  of  the  boasts  of  some  men  otherwise  excellent, 
but  a  little  too  hasty  or  too  ambitious. 

But  it  is  much  more  difficult  to  discover  important  truths, 
and  still  more  to  discover  means  of  producing  what  is  sought, 
when  it  is  justly  sought,  than  to  discover  the  demonstration 
of  truths  which  another  has  discovered.  Beautiful  truths  are 
often  attained  by  synthesis,  by  passing  from  the  simple  to  the 
complex ;  but  when  it  is  a  question  of  discovering  exactly  the 
means  of  producing  what  is  proposed,  synthesis  is  ordinarily 

1  Gerhardt  reads :  "roclie";  Erdmann  and  Jacques:  "race." — Tr, 


CH.  II]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  413 

not  sufficient,  and  often  to  be  willing  to  make  all  the  requisite 
combinations  would  be  an  endless  task,  although  one  might 
often  be  aided  therein  by  the  metJiocl  of  exclusion,^  which  cuts 
off  a  good  portion  of  useless  combinations,  and  often  nature 
does  not  admit  any  other  method.  But  the  means  are  not  al- 
ways at  hand  for  the  proper  pursuit  of  this  method.  Analysis 
then  must  give  us  a  thread  in  this  labyrinth,  when  it  is  possi- 
ble, for  there  are  cases  where  the  nature  itself  of  the  question 
demands  that  we  grope  about,  short  cuts  not  being  always 
possible. 

§  8.  P7i.  Now  as  in  demonstration  intuitive  knowledge  is 
always  supposed,  it  has,  I  think,  given  occasion  for  this  maxim  : 
that  all  reasoning  springs  from  things  already  Imoion  and  agreed 
to  (ex prmcognitis  et  prceconcessis)  r'  But  we  shall  have  occasion 
to  speak  of  the  falsity  of  this  axiom  when  we  speak  of  the 
maxims  which  are  improperly  taken  as  the  foundation  of  our 
reasoning. 

Th.  I  am  curious  to  learn  what  falsehood  you  can  find  in  an 
axiom  apparently  so  reasonable.  If  it  were  always  necessary 
to  reduce  everything  to  intuitive  knowledge,  demonstration 
would  often  be  insufferably  prolix.  This  is  why  mathema- 
ticians have  had  the  cleverness  to  divide  the  difficulties  and  to 
demonstrate  separately  the  intervening  propositions.  And 
there  is  art  also  in  this;  for  as  the  mediate  truths  (which  are 
called  lemmas,  since  they  appear  to  be  a  digression)  may  be 
assigned  in  many  ways,  it  is  well,  in  order  to  aid  the  under- 
standing and  the  memory,  to  choose  those  of  them  which 
greatly  shorten  the  process,  and  appear  memorable  and  worthy 
in  themselves  of  bein";  demonstrated.     But   there  is  another 


1  The  "  metliod  of  exclusion  "  or  cliiuination,  says  Soliaarsclimidt,  proceeds 
from  a  disjunctive  judgment,  the  predicate  of  which  emhraces  in  the  sum  of 
its  divisional  members  all  possible  determinations  of  the  subject.  After  it  has 
been  shown  that  individual  divisional  members  cannot  be  united  witli  the 
subject  in  a  catejijorical  judgment,  that  one  alone  of  the  divisional  members 
whicli  cannot  bo  separated  from  the  sul)ject  remains  as  the  actual  predicate 
for  llie  \alid  determination  of  the  subject.  For  example:  A  is  1!,  or  C,  or  D, 
or  E.  In  this  formula,  B,  C,  D,  E  must  include  all  thinkable  predicate- 
determinations  of  A.  In  the  question :  Is  A,  B,  or  C,  or  D,  or  E,  it  is  then 
proved  that  A  is  not  C,  D,  E,;n  which  case  A  must  be  B;  or  that  A  is  not 
B,  D,  E,  in  which  case  A  must  be  C,  and  so  on.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Aristotle,  Analyt.  Post.,  I.,  1,  p.  71',  1:  -rraua  &i.Saa-Ka\Ca  koI  n-oo-a /xaSi/tn? 
SiavoriTLKr)  et  TrpouTrap^ouo-rj?  ytVtTai  yvJiatiui.  — Til. 


414  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [inc.  iv 

obstacle,  viz. :  that  it  is  not  easy  to  demonstrate  all  the  axioms, 
and  to  reduce  demonstration  Avholly  to  intuitive  knowledge. 
And  if  we  had  chosen  to  wait  for  that,  perhaps  we  should  not 
yet  have  the  science  of  geometry.  But  we  have  already  spoken 
of  this  iu  our  former  conversations,  and  we  shall  have  occasion 
to  speak  of  it  again. 

§  9.  Ph.  We  shall  come  to  that  presently ;  now  I  shall  re- 
mark again  what  I  have  already  touched  upon  more  than  once, 
that  it  is  a  common  opinion  that  only  the  mathematical 
sciences  are  capable  of  a  demonstrative  certainty ;  but  as  the 
agreement  and  disagreement  w'hich  may  be  known  intuitively 
is  not  a  privilege  belonging  only  to  the  ideas  of  numbers  and 
figures,  it  is  perhaps  for  want  of  application  on  our  part  that 
mathematics  alone  have  attained  to  demonstrations.  §  10. 
Many  reasons  conspired  to  tliis  end.  The  mathematical 
sciences  are  very  generally  useful ;  the  least  difference  therein 
is  very  easily  recognized.  §  11.^  These  other  simple  ideas, 
w^hich  are  appearances  or  situations  produced  in  us,  have  no 
exact  measure  of  their  different  degrees.  §  12.^  But  when  the 
difference  of  these  visible  qualities,  for  example,  is  sufficiently 
great  to  excite  in  the  mind  clearly  distinct  ideas,  as  those  of 
blue  or  red,  they  are  as  capable  of  demonstration  as  those  of 
number  and  extension. 

TJi.  There  are  notable  examples  enough  of  demonstration 
outside  of  mathematics,  and  it  may  be  said  that  Aristotle  has 
already  given  some  in  his  "  Prior  Anah'tics."  In  fact  logic  is 
as  susceptible  of  demonstrations  as  geometry,  and  it  may  be 
said  that  the  logic  of  the  geometers,  or  the  methods  of  argu- 
mentation explained  and  established  b}'^  Euclid  in  reasoning 
upon  propositions,  are  a  particular  extension  or  promotion  of 
general  logic.  Archimedes  ^  is  the  first,  whose  works  we  have, 
who  has  practised  the  art  of  demonstration  upon  an  occasion 
where  he  is  treating  of  physics,  as  he  has  done  in  his  book  on 

1  §  11,  as  also  §  12,  is  §  17  in  the  texts  of  Errlniann  and  Jaeques.  — Tr. 

2  §  12  is  §  13  in  Locke,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2,  p.  140  (Bohu's  ed.).  — Te. 

3  Archimedes,  287-212  B.C.,  the  greatest  mathematician  among  the  Greeks, 
distinguished  also  for  his  discoveries  in  hydrostatics  and  hydraulics,  and  for 
his  ingenious  inventions.  He  first  placed  the  science  of  engineering  upon  a 
sound  mathematical  ba.sis.  The  most  complete  and  magnificent  edition  of  his 
extant  works  is  that  edited  by  Torelli  and  published  at  Oxford,  at  the  Claren- 
don Press,  1792,  fol.  —  Tr. 


cii.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  415 

Equilibrium.  Furthermore,  jurists  may  be  said  to  have  many 
good  demonstrations;  especially  the  ancient  Roman  jurists, 
whose  fragments  have  been  preserved  to  ns  in  the  Pandects. 
I  am  wholly  of  the  opinion  of  Laurentius  Valla,^  who  cannot 
enough  admire  these  authors  among  others,  because  they  all 
speak  in  a  manner  so  just  and  so  clear  and  in  fact  reason  in 
a  way  closely  approaching  the  demonstrative,  and  often  it  is 
wholly  demonstrative.^  Indeed,  I  do  not  know  any  science 
outside  that  of  law  and  that  of  arms,  in  which  the  Romans 
have  made  any  considerable  addition  to  what  they  received 
from  the  Greeks. 

Tu  regere  imperio  populos  Romane  memento  : 
Heb  tibi  erunt  artes  paciqae  impoiiere  luorem, 
Parcere  subjectis,  et  debellare  superbos.* 

This  precise  manner  of  expressing  themselves  is  the  reason 
that  all  the  jurists  of  the  Pandects,  though  sometimes  quite 

1  Laurentius  Valla  —  Lorenzo  della  Valle  —  c.  1407-1457,  a  humanist  and 
philologian  of  the  earlier  Italian  Renaissance,  was  an  earnest  opponent  of  the 
scholastic  dialectic,  a  determined  foe  of  tradition  and  authority,  and  the  initi- 
ator and  champion  of  a  bold  and  unbiassed  criticism  which  he  applied  to 
language,  historical  documents,  and  ethical  opinions.  He  was  eminent  as  a 
Latinist,  and  his  treatise  Elegantise  latinse  lingusn,  c.  1431,  in  six  books, — 
the  Preface  to  the  third  book  of  which  Schaarschmidt  thinks  Leibnitz  probably- 
had  in  mind  in  referring  to  Valla's  admiration  for  the  style  of  the  Roman 
jurists,  therein  very  higlily  praised,  —  subjected  the  forms  of  Latin  grammar 
and  rhetoric  to  critical  investigation  and  analysis,  and  established  upon  a 
scientific  foundation  the  princiiiles  of  Latin  style.  His  Be  /also  credita  et 
ementita  Constantini  Donatione,  1440,  destroyed  tlie  claims  of  the  Papacy  to 
temporal  power  based  upon  this  alleged  "Donation,"  by  proving  its  docu- 
mentary foundations  to  be  forgeries.  His  principal  philosophical  writings  are : 
De  voluptaie  et  vero  bono,  1431,  iu  which  he  boldly  defended  the  Epicurean 
doctrine  of  pleasure  as  the  true  and  only  good;  De  libero  arbiti-io;  and  the 
DinlecticsB  disputationes  contra  Ariatote'licnsi,  1409,  of  which  Prantl,  Gesch. 
'/.  Lof/ik  im  Abcndlandc,  4,  IGl-lW,  gives  some  account  witli  citations. 
N'alla's  Opera  Omnia,  Basiliai,  1465  and  1540-154:5.  Leibnitz  refers  to  him 
and  his  Be  lib.  arbit.  and  De  voluptate  in  the  Theodicde,  Pt.  HI.,  §§  405  ,S(7. 
For  accounts  of  his  life  and  works,  of.  G.  Tiraboschi,  Storia  della  Leiteratura 
Jtaliana,  Vol.6,  Pt.  II.,  pp.  3.39-.346,  Rome,  1784;  Symonds,  Renaissance  in 
Italy,  Pt.  II.,  The  Revival  of  Learninr/,  p.  258  sq.,  New  York,  H.  Holt  &  Co., 
1881.  For  liis  philosopliy,  cf.  Stcicki,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  HI. 
[Vol.  4] ,  279-283.  Mancini  publisliod  at  Florence,  1891 ,  a  brilliant  and  exliaus- 
tive  monograph  investigating  and  settling  disputed  points  in  Valla's  life.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Kestnor,  No.  15,  in  Cli.  Kortholt,  Leihnit.  epist. 
ad  diversos,  Lipsiae,  17.34-1742,  Vol.  ,3,  p.  2.56,  Dutons,  Lcibnit.  opera  omnia. 
Vol.  4,  Pt.  HI.,  p.  267,  where  he  expresses  himself  similarly  as  here.  Also, 
Cnhrauer,  Leibniz,  cine  lUor/raphie,  Pt.  I.,  pp.  36,  37. — Tb. 

3  Verg.  ^TJn.  6,  851-853.  — Tr. 


416  LHUiMTZVS   CIUTIQUE   OF   LOClvE  [bk.   iv 

distant  from  one  another  in  time,  seem  to  be  a  single  anther, 
and  there  woukl  be  mnch  difficulty  in  distinguishing  them,  if 
the  names  of  the  writers  were  not  at  the  beginning  of  the  ex- 
tracts ;  as  it  would  be  difficult  to  distinguish  Euclid,^  Archi- 
medes and  Apollonius  ^  in  reading  their  demonstrations  upon 
matters  which  the  one  as  well  as  the  other  has  touched  upon. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  the  Greeks  have  reasoned  with  all 
possible  accuracy  in  mathematics,  and  that  they  have  left  the 
human  race  models  in  the  art  of  demonstration:  for  if  the 
Babylonians  and  the  Egyptians  had  anything  more  than  an 
empirical  geometry,  nothing  of  it  at  least  remains ;  but  it  is 
astonishing  that  these  same  Greeks  lost  it  to  such  an  extent  ^ 
at  once  as  soon  as  they  turned  aside  ever  so  little  from  num- 
bers and  figures  in  order  to  proceed  to  philosophy.  For  it  is 
strange  that  we  do  not  see  a  shadow  of  demonstration  in  Plato 
and  in  Aristotle  (his  "Prior  Analytics"  excepted)  and  in  all 
the  other  ancient  philosophers.  Proclus*  was  an  excellent 
geometer,  but  he  seems  another  man  when  he  speaks  on  phi- 
losophy. What  has  made  it  easier  to  reason  demonstrably  in 
mathematics  is  largely  the  fact  that  experience  can  there  guar- 
antee the  reasoning  at  every  moment,  as  is  also  the  case  in  the 
syllogistic  figures.  But  in  metaphysics  and  ethics  this  par- 
allelism of  reason  and  experience  is  no  longer  found ;  and  in 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  93,  note  1.  —  Tr.  2  q/-.  ante,  p.  108,  note  1.  —  Tr. 

3  A  strange  remark  for  Leibnitz  to  make,  who  had  so  thorouglily  studied 
Aristotle  in  liis  youth,  and  in  later  years  Plato,  whose  works  contain  demon- 
strations inferior  in  no  respect  certainly  to  the  precision  of  the  Pandects.  The 
only  explanations  that  seem  to  touch  the  ease  are  that  Leibnitz  had  in  mind  the 
stringency  and  completeness  of  mathematical  demonstration,  which  in  form, 
and  sometimes  in  content  also,  is  apparently,  and  sometimes  really,  superior, 
though  not  necessarily  so  merely  because  mathematical,  to  the  demonstrations 
of  philosophy ;  or,  as  he  seems  to  suggest  in  the  immediately  following  con- 
text, that  metaphysics  being  a  matter  of  pure  thought  and  ethics  largely  an 
ideal  not  as  yet  realized  in  the  actual,  their  demonstrations  cannot,  like  those 
of  mathematics,  be  experimentally  verified,  and  must  thus  he  regarded  as,  in 
a  sen.se,  lacking  in  completeness  as  demonstrations.  —  Tr. 

^  Cf.  ante,  p.  108,  note  2.  Leibnitz's  remark  concerning  Proclus  has  its 
justification  in  the  fact  that  his  philosophical  system,  while  embracing  the 
entire  philosophy  and  theology  of  his  predecessors  methodically  elaborated 
with  great  dialectic  art  and  skill,  is  yet  purely  formal  in  its  completeness,  its 
thought  exliibiting  little  freedom  or  creative  power,  and  wholly  lacking  in  any 
real  scientific  basis  and  character.  Though  presenting  here  and  there  evidence 
of  deep  speculative  ability  on  the  part  of  its  author,  his  philosophy  is  never- 
theless wholly  wanting  in  such  demonstration  as  is  found  in  his  mathematical 
work.  — Tr. 


en.  II]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  417 

physics  experiments  cleinand  labor  and  expense.  Now  men 
at  once  relaxed  their  attention,  and  as  a  consequence  were 
led  astray  when  they  were  destitute  of  this  faithful  guide, 
experience,  who  aided  and  sustained  them  in  their  walk,  as 
that  little  revolving  machine  does,  which  prevents  children 
from  falling  when  walking.  There  was  a  succedaneum,^  but  it 
is  something  that  has  not  been  and  is  not  yet  sufficiently  con- 
sidered. And  I  shall  speak  of  it  in  its  place.  For  the  rest, 
blue  and  red  are  scarcely  capable  of  furnishing  matter  for 
demonstration  by  means  of  the  ideas  we  have  of  them,  because 
these  ideas  are  confused.  And  these  colors  do  not  supply 
matter  for  reasoning  so  long  as  in  experience  they  are  found 
accompanied  by  some  distinct  ideas,  but  in  which  the  con- 
nection with  their  own  ideas  does  not  appear.] 

§  14.  Ph.  Besides  intuition  and  demonstration,  which  are 
the  two  degrees  of  our  knowledge,  all  the  rest  is  faith  or 
opinion,  and  not  knowledge,  at  least  as  regards  all  general 
truths.  But  the  mind  has  also  another  perception,  regarding 
the  particular  existence  of  finite  beings  outside  of  us,  and  this 
is  sensitive  lanowledge.^ 

Th.  \_Opinion,  based  on  probability,  deserves  perhaps  the 
name  knowledge  also  ;  otherwise  nearly  all  historic  knowledge 
and  many  other  kinds  will  fall.  But  without  disputing  about 
terms,  I  hold  that  the  investigation  of  the  degrees  of  probability 
is  very  important,  that  we  are  still  lacking  in  it,  and  that  this 
lack  is  a  great  defect  of  our  logics.^  For  if  the  question  can- 
not always  be  decided  absolutely,  the  degree  of  resemblance 
ex  datis  can  always  be  determined,  and  consequently  one  can 
reasonably  judge  what  view  is  the  most  likely.     And  when 

1  I.e.,  a  substitute.  The  expression  was  much  used  by  the  later  Roman 
jurists.  — Tr. 

2  Locke's  word  is  "  sensitive,"  Philos.  Wks.  (Bohn's  ed.),  Vol.  2,  p.  141,  udfin. 
His  three  degrees  of  knowledge  are  intuitive,  demonstrative,  and  sensitive,  cf. 
infra,  \).  42D.  —  Tr. 

3  Cf.  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Kestner,  No.  11,  Jan.  30, 1711,  §  ?>  (Dutens,  Leihnit. 
op.  om.  4,  Pt.  HL,  2G4,  and  Kortholt,  Leibnit.  epist.  ad  diversos,  3,  251) :  "Ea 
vero  pars  Logicae,  qua  sc.  gradus  verisimilitudinum  et  argumcntorum  pondera 
constituerentur,  nuspiara  hactenus  reperitur  traditur.  Ego  juvenis  aliquaiido 
aggressus  sum,  sed  per  varia  dissipatus,  fere  intra  voluntatem  steti.  Topica 
Aristotelis  scopo  meo  nou  respoudet.  Congei'it  regulas,  qusc  occasioiiem 
aliquam  prrebere  possunt  de  argumentis  cogitandi,  sed  quiu  nnn  possunt 
docere,  quantum  cuique  argunicuto  aut  judicio  ponderis  insit." — Tii. 

O  1. 


418  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [rk.  iv 


our  moralists  (I  mean  the  wisest  of  them,  such  as  the  present 
(vioderne)  General  of  the  Jesuits)^  unite  the  safest  and  the  most 
probable,  and  prefer  even  the  safe  to  the  probable,^  they  are 
not  far  in  fact  from  the  most  probable ;  for  the  question  of 
safety  is  here  that  of  the  little  probability  of  an  evil  to  be 
feared.  The  fault  of  the  moralists  lax  upon  this  article  ^  has 
largely  been,  that  they  have  had  a  too  limited  and  too  inade- 
quate notion  of  the  probable,  which  they  have  confounded  with 
the  Endoxon^  ov  the  probable  {opinable)  of  Aristotle;  for  Aris- 
totle in  his  "  Topics  "  did  not  mean  to  accommodate  himself  to 
the  opinion  of  others,  as  did  the  orators  and  sophists.  Endoxon 
is  with  him  what  has  been  received  from  the  greatest  number 
or  the  most  authoritative:  he  is  wrong  in  having  restricted 
his  "  Topics  "  to  this,  and  this  view  caused  him  to  adhere  only 
to  received  maxims,  for  the  most  part  vague,  as  if  he  wished 

1  Leibnitz  probably  refers  to  Tirso  Gonzalez,  General  of  the  Jesuits  from 
1GS7-1705,  and  author  of  a  work  ou  probabilisiu,  opposing  the  doctrine  and 
maintaining  that  the  Jesuits  did  not  originate  it,  entitled  Fundamentum 
theologise  moralis,  id  est  tractatus  theoloc/icus  de  recto  usu  opinionum proha- 
bilium,  4to,  Dillingen,  ltt89,  Naples,  1694.  An  abridgment  with  the  title  Synop- 
sis tract,  theol.  de  recto  usu  opinionum  jirohahilium,  concinnata  a  theologo 
qiiodam  Soc.Jesu:  cui  accessit  logistica  prohabilitatum,  3d  ed.,  appeared  at 
Venice,  1696,  8vo.  Cf.  Michaud,  Biog.  Univ.  18, 111-112,  Du  Pin,  Biblioth.  des 
aut.  eccles.  du  XVII.  siecle,  and,  for  the  De  recto  usu  opin.  proh.,  Migne,  Theol. 
cur.  compl.  Vol.  11,  p.  1397.  — Tr. 

2  The  theory  of  moral  j)robabilism  is,  perhaps  the  most  celebrated  question 
discussed  in  Moral  Theology,  and  formed  one  of  the  chief  subjects  of  contro- 
ver.sy  between  the  Janseuists  and  tlie  Jesuits  of  the  seventeenth  century. 
The  aim  of  moral  probabilisra  is  to  find  some  rule  by  which  action  may  be 
determined  in  that  portion  of  the  moral  realm  in  which  certainty  is  impossible, 
and  probability  only  can  be  attained.  The  pyrobo.hle  opinion  being  that  M'hich 
has  a  certain  number  of  argumcTits  in  its  favor,  either  intrinsic,  i.e.,  grounded 
in  reason,  judgment  in  regard  to  wliich  was  restricted  to  men  of  considerable 
education  and  especially  to  those  versed  in  moral  theology,  or  eictrinsic,  i.e., 
resting  on  some  external  authority,  such  as  that  of  some  theologian  of  repute  ; 
and  the  safe  opinion,  that  which  conforms  to  the  moral  law,  casuists  distinguish 
the  following  doctrines:  1.  Probabilism,  which  permits  action  in  accord  with 
the  opinion  which  is  least  pi-obable  and  least  safe  :  2.  Probabilorism,  or  the 
preference  of  the  most  probable  opinion,  regardless  of  its  relative  safety  ; 
3.  Tutiorism,  or  the  choice  of  the  safest  opinion,  without  regard  to  its  rela- 
tive probability.  On  the  whole  subject,  rf.  the  dissertation  of  Pierre  Nicole 
annexed  to  his  Latin  trans,  of  Pascal's  Lettres  prorinciales,  and  Janet,  La 
Morale,  Bk.  III.,  Chap.  3,  Paris,  1874,  Eng.  trans..  The  Tlieory  of  Morals,  pp. 
292-308,  New  York,  Chas.  Scribner's  Sons,' 1883.— Tr. 

3  According  to  Janet,  the  casuists  refuted  by  Pascal.  —  Tr. 

C/.  lopnCS,  I.,  1,  100"  21 :  erSofa  6c  TO.  SoKOvvTa  TTa<TLV  rj  to:?  irAettrTOt?  >7  TOi?  croi^oty, 
KoX  TOUTOis  fi  Tracriv  7)  TOts  irXdaTOK;  rj  Tois  ixaXiUTa  yrupiVotS  Ka.\  eiSd|oi?.  —  Tr. 


cii.  II]  ON   HUMAN   UNDEKSTANDING  419 

to  reason  only  by  means  of  quodlibets  ^  or  proverbs.  But  tlie 
probable  or  the  likely  is  more  extended :  it  must  be  drawn 
from  the  nature  of  things ;  and  the  opinion  of  persons  whose 
authority  has  weight  is  one  of  the  things  which  may  contribute 
to  render  an  opinion  probable,  but  not  what  completes  the  en- 
tire verisimilitude.  At  the  time  when  Copernicus-  was  almost 
alone  in  his  opinion,  it  was  still  incomparably  more  prohahle 
than  that  of  all  the  rest  of  the  human  race.  Now  T  do  not  know 
but  that  the  establishment  of  the  art  of  estimating  jirohahilities  ^ 
would  be  more  useful  than  a  majority  of  our  demonstrative 
sciences,  and  I  have  thought  of  this  more  than  once.] 

Ph.  Sensitive  knowledge,  or  that  which  establishes  the  exist- 
ence of  particular  beings  without  us,  goes  beyond  bare  proba- 
bility ;  but  it  has  not  all  the  certainty  of  the  two  degrees  of 
knowledge  of  which  we  have  just  spoken.  Nothing  is  more 
certain  than  that  the  idea  we  receive  of  an  external  object  is 
in  our  mind,  and  this  is  intuitive  knowledge :  but  the  knowl- 
edge whether  from  this  we  can  certainly  infer  the  existence 
of  anything  without  us  corresponding  to  this  idea,  this  it  is 
which  certain  persons  think  may  be  questioned,  because  men 
may  have  such  ideas  in  their  minds,  when  no  such  thing  actu- 
ally exists.  For  myself  I  believe,  however,  that  there  is  a 
degree  of  evidence  which  elevates  us  beyond  doubt.  One  is 
unalterably  convinced  that  there  is  a  great  difference  between 
the  perceptions  which  he  has  when  by  day  he  looks  at  the  sun, 
and  when  by  night  he  thinks  about  it ;  and  the  idea  which  is 

1  The  Medifeval  Latin  "  quodlibetum "  was  a  very  elal)orate  and  subtle 
scholastic  argumentation  upon  a  question  clioseu  at  pleasure — "  quod  libet  " 
—  but  almost  always  of  a  theological  or  philosophical  character.  Such  ques- 
tions were  called  "  quodlibetarise  qua^stiones  " ;  they  were  proposed  chiefly 
for  the  exercise  of  students,  and  their  discussion  was  carried  on  to  satisfy 
curiosity  or  for  entertainment,  and,  for  the  most  part,  served  rather  to  exhibit 
the  skill  and  dexterity  of  the  dialectician  tlian  to  establish  truth.  The  French 
word  "  quolibet,"  starting  from  the  scholastic  use  of  the  term  in  the  sense  of 
an  argumentative  subtlety,  came  by  a  debasing  extension  of  this  meaning  to 
signify  a  witty,  but  not  always  appropriate  commonplace,  a  bad  joke,  a  pun, 
an  epigram ;  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  Leibnitz,  coupling  the  word  with 
"  proverbs,"  uses  the  term.  — Tr. 

~  Nicolas  Copernicus,  1473-1543,  published  his  theory  of  the  planetary  system 
in  his  De  orhium  c<f.lestmm.  revolutionibiif!  lit.  VI.,  Nuremberg,  1543,  2d  ed., 
Basle,  1560,  both  fol.  3d  ed.,  with  notes  by  Nicolas  Muler  in  his  Astronomia 
Instaurata,  Amsterdam,  1G17  and  1640,  4to.  —  Tr. 

3(7/".  ante,  p.  213,  note  2,  p.  214,  note  1;  also  Erdmann,  Leibnit.  opera 
philos.,  84. —  Tr. 


420  Li:iBNlTZ\s   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [p,k.  n 

renewed  by  recourse  to  the  memory  is  very  different  from  that 
which  actually  comes  to  us  by  means  of  the  senses.  Some  one 
will  say  that  a  dream  may  produce  the  same  effect.  I  reply 
in  the  first  place  that  it  matters  little  that  I  remove  this  doubt, 
because  if  all  is  but  a  dream,  reasoning  is  useless,  truth  and 
knowledge  nothing  at  all.  In  the  second  place,  he  will  ac- 
knowledge, in  my  opinion,  the  difference  between  dreaming  of 
being  in  a  fire,  and  being  actually  in  it.  And  if  he  persists  in 
appearing  sceptical,  I  shall  tell  him  that  it  is  enough  that  we 
certainly  find  pleasure  or  pain  following  the  application  to 
ourselves  of  certain  objects,  true  or  dreamt  of,  and  that  this 
certitude  is  as  great  as  our  happiness  or  misery ;  two  things 
beyond  which  we  have  no  interest.  Thus  I  think  we  may  count 
three  sorts  of  knowledge :  intuitive,  demonstrative  and  sensitive. 
Th.  [I  think  yon  are  right,  sir,  and  I  also  think  that  to 
these  species  of  certitude  or  certain  knowledge  you  can  add  the 
knoidedge  of  the  probable;  thus  there  will  be  two  sorts  of 
knowledge,  as  there  are  two  sorts  of  proofs,  the  first  of  which 
produce  certitude,  and  the  second  end  only  in  probability.  But 
let  us  come  to  this  dispute  of  the  Sceptics  and  the  Dogmatists 
upon  the  existence  of  things  without  us.  We  have  already 
touched  upon  it,  but  we  must  return  to  it  here.  I  formerly 
discussed  the  subject  a  great  deal  viva  voce  and  in  writing 
with  the  late  Abbe  Foucher,^  Canon  of  Dijon,  a  learned  and 

1  Simon  Foucher,  1644-169G,  a  devoted  student  of  the  Platonic  philosophy, 
in  consequence  of  which  he  was  called  "  the  restorer  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
Academy."  His  Critique  de  la  Recherche  de  la  Verite,  here  mentioned  by 
Leibnitz,  appeared  at  Paris,  1675.  It  was  based  upon  the  sceptical  principles 
of  the  Middle  Academy,  and  was  subjected  to  a  very  shari>  criticism  by  Male- 
branche  in  the  Preface  to  the  next  edition  of  the  Recherche  de  la  Verite'. 
Foucher  also  wrote  Dissertation  sur  la  recherche  de  la  verite  ou  sur  la  philo- 
sophic des  academiciens,  Paris,  1673,  said  to  be  his  best  work,  and  Be  la 
Sagesse  des  anciens,  Paris,  1683.  For  Foucher's  "  objections  "  (published  in 
the  "Journal  des  Savaus  "  of  Sept.  12,  1695)  to  Leibnitz's  doctrine  of  pre- 
established  harmony  as  set  forth  in  the  Sy.^teme  nouveau  ("  Jour,  des  Savans," 
June  27,  1695),  cf.  Gerhardt,  1,424,  and  4,  487,  Erdmann,  129,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I., 
102,  trans.  Duncan,  81 ;  and  for  Leibnitz's  reply  ("  Jour,  des  Savans,"  April  2 
and  9,  1696),  cf.  G.  4,  493,  E.  131,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  L,  67,  trans.  Duncan,  85.  The 
correspondence  of  Foucher  with  Leibnitz  was  first  published  by  Foucher  de 
Careil  in  his  Lettres  et  opuscules  inedits  de  Leibniz, Taris,  1854,  pp.  27-131  (cf. 
Introd.  pp.  22-41,  where  the  controversy  over  Malebranche  is  thoroughly  con- 
sidered) ,  and  more  recently,  1875,  after  a  new  comparison  with  the  originals 
in  the  Royal  Library  at  Hannover,  by  Gerhardt,  Leibnix.  philos.  Schri/t.,  1, 
363  sq.  —  Tr. 


CH.  ii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  421 

subtile  man,  but  a  little  too  prepossessed  in  favor  of  las  Acad- 
emicians, which  sect  he  was  very  desirous  of  reviving,  as  Gas- 
sendi^  had  brought  upon  the  stage  that  of  Epicurus.^  His 
critique  upon  "  The  Search  after  Truth,"  ^  and  the  other  minor 
treatises  which  he  afterwards  published,  have  made  their 
author  quite  well  known.  He  published  also  in  the  "  Journal 
des  Savaus  "  some  objections  to  my  System  of  Pre-established 
Harmony,  when  I  gave  it  to  the  public  after  having  digested 
it  for  many  years ;  but  death  prevented  him  from  replj'ing  to 
my  answer.  He  always  preached  the  necessity  of  guatding 
against  prejudice  and  of  using  great  accuracy,  but  besides  the 
fact  that  he  himself  did  not  make  it  his  duty  to  carry  out  his 
counsel  to  others,  in  which  he  was  perhaps  excusable,  it  seems 
to  me  that  he  was  not  careful  whether  another  did  it,  antici- 
pating doubtless  that  no  one  would  ever  do  it.  Now  I  showed 
him  that  the  truth  of  sensible  things  consisted  only  in  the 
connection  of  phenomena,  which  must  have  its  reason  and  is 
that  which    distinguishes  them   from   dreams ;    but  that   the 

1  Cf.  ante,  pp.  64,  note  2,  65,  n.  3.  Gassendi  published  ou  the  life  and  phi- 
losophy of  Epicurus:  De  vita,  nioribus  et  doctrlna  Epicuri,  Lugd.  Bat.,  1647; 
Aniinadversiones  in  lib):  X.  Diog.  Laert.  de  Epicuro,  Lugd.  Bat.  1649;  Syn- 
tagma philos.  Epicuri,  The  Hague,  1655.  For  his  philosophy,  cf.  his  Syntagma 
philosophicum.  Vols.  1  and  2  of  his  Opera  omnia;  also  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Phi- 
los. d.  Mittelalters,  HI.  [Vol.  4],  316-327;  Lange,  Gesch.  d.  Materialismus, 
Vol.  1,  Eng.  trans.  Vol.  1,  pp.  253-269;  R.  Adamson,  article  "Gassendi,"  in 
Encyclop.  Brit.,  9th  ed.  —  Tr. 

2  Of.  ante,  p.  126,  note  1.  On  his  life  and  i^hilosophy,  cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d. 
Griech.,  HI.,  1  [Vol.  5],  363  s(?.,  3d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1880;  Lange,  Gesch.  d.  Materi- 
alismus, Vol.  1,  Eng.  trans.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  98  sq. ;  Benn,  The  Greek  Philosophers, 
Vol.  2,  pp.  53  sq. ;  Win.  Wallace,  Epicureanism,  in  the  series  of  "  Cliief 
Ancient  Philosophies,"  pub.  by  the  Society  for  promoting  Christian  Knowl- 
edge, London,  1880.  — Tr. 

^  The  De  la  Recherche  de  la  Verity,  the  principal  work  of  Malebranche, 
1638-1715,  appeared  in  1674-1679.  The  most  recent  edition  is  that  of  F.  Bouil- 
lier,  with  an  introduction  and  notes,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1880.  Ou  Malehrauche's 
philosophy,  cf.  Bouillier,  Hislolre  de  la  Philos.  Cartesienne,  Paris,  1854 ;  Olle- 
Laprune,  La  Philos.  de  Mcdebranche,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1870-1872;  Kuuo  Fischer, 
Gesch.  d.  n.  Philos.,  3d  ed.,  I.,  1,  Eng.  trans,  by  J.  P.  Gordy,  New  York,  Scrib- 
ners,  1887;  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  1,  p.  159  sq.  For 
a  critical  account  of  Maleljranche's  place  in  the  history  of  pliilosophy,  cf. 
Edward  Caird,  article  "  Cartesianism,"  in  Encyclop.  Brit.,  9th  ed.  For  Lcil)- 
nitz's  correspondence  with  Malebranche,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Sch)-ifl., 
1,  315-361 ;  for  his  discussion  of  Malehrauche's  jjhilosophy,  cf.  Gerhai'dt,  3, 
656-660,  Erdmann,  735-737,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  213,  trans.  Duncan,  233-237;  G. 
6,  579-594  (cf.  also  481-483),  E.  690-697,  D.  2,  Pt.  I.,  201 ;  G.  (i,  574-578  [cf.  also 
480-483;  Locke's  examination  of  Malel)ranche  is  in  his  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2, 
413-458,  Bohn's  ed.),  E.  450-452,  trans.  Duncan,  185-189.  —Tr. 


422  LEIBNITZ'S   CIUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

truth  of  oiir  existence  and  the  cause  of  phenomena  is  of  a 
different  nature,  because  it  establishes  substances,  and  that 
the  Sceptics  spoiled  what  they  rightly  say  by  carrying  it  too 
far,  and  by  Avishing  indeed  to  extend  their  doubts  even  to 
immediate  experience,  and  to  the  geometrical  truths,  a  thing 
which  Foucher  did  not  do  however,  and  to  the  other  truths 
of  reason,  which  he  did  a  little  too  much.  But  to  return  to 
you,  sir,  yon  are  right  in  saying  that  there  is  ordinarily  some 
difference  between  feelings  and  imaginations  ;  but  the  Sceptics 
will  say  that  the  more  or  less  does  not  alter  the  species.  Be- 
sides, although  feelings  are  wont  to  be  more  vivid  than  im- 
aginations, it  is  nevertheless  a  fact  that  there  are  cases  where 
imagiuative  persons  are  impressed  as  much  or  perhaps  more 
by  their  imaginations  than  another  is  by  the  truth  of  things  ; 
so  that  I  think  the  true  criterion  concerning  the  objects  of  the 
senses  is  the  connection  of  the  phenomena,  i.e.  the  connection 
of  that  which  takes  place  in  different  places  and  times,  and 
in  the  experience  of  different  men  who  are  themselves,  each  to 
the  others,  very  important  phenomena  in  this  respect.  And 
the  connection  of  the  phenomena  which  guarantees  the  truths  of 
fact  in  respect  to  sensible  things  outside  of  ns,  is  verified  by 
means  of  the  truths  of  reason;  as  the  phenomena  of  optics  are 
explained  by  geometry.  It  must,  however,  be  admitted  that 
none  of  this  certitude  is  of  the  highest  degree,  as  you  have 
well  recognized.  For  it  is  not  impossible,  metaphysically 
speaking,  that  there  may  be  a  dream  continuous  and  lasting 
like  the  life  of  a  man  ;  but  it  is  a  thing  as  contrary  to  reason 
as  would  be  the  fiction  of  a  book  which  should  be  formed  by 
chance  by  throwing  together  the  type  pell-mell.  For  the  rest, 
it  is  also  true  that,  provided  the  phenomena  are  connected,  it 
does  not  matter  whether  they  are  called  dreams  or  not,  since 
experience  shows  that  we  are  not  deceived  in  the  measures  we 
take  concerning  phenomena  when  they  are  understood  accord- 
ing to  the  truths  of  reason.'] 

1  C'/.  JS^cw  Essays,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  4,  §  2,  Th.,  ante,  pp.  318,  319,  notes  1  and 
2,  and  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  11,  §  10,  Th.,  infra,  p.  512.  The  principle  of  the  "con- 
nection of  the  phenomena,"  their  constant  occurrence  in  the  same  order  and 
relations,  giving  them  a  certain  measure  of  ohjectivity  in  our  consciousness 
and  enabling  us  to  predict  the  appearance  of  other  members  of  the  series  when 
one  member  presents  itself,  is  for  Leibnitz  the  guarantee  of  the  truth  of  our 
sense-knowledge  and  the  ground  of  our  greatest  possible  certainty  therein; 


CH.   Ill]  ON    HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  423 

§  15.  Ph.  For  the  rest,  knowledge  is  not  always  clear,  though 
ideas  may  be.  A  man  who  has  as  clear  ideas  as  any  mathe- 
matician in  the  world  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  and  of  equality 
to  two  right  angles,  may  yet  have  a  very  obscure  perception  of 
their  agreement. 

TJi.  [Ordinarily  when  ideas  are  thoroughly  understood  their 
agreements  and  disagreements  appear.  I  admit,  however,  that 
at  times  some  of  them  are  so  complex,  that  much  care  is  needed 
to  develop  what  they  conceal ;  and  in  this  respect  certain 
agreements  or  disagreements  may  still  remain  obscure.  As 
to  your  example,  I  remark  that  if  we  have  in  the  imag- 
ination the  angles  of  a  triangle  Ave  do  not  on  that  account 
have  clear  ideas  of  them.  The  imagination  cannot  furnish  us 
an  image  common  to  acute-angled  and  obtuse-angled  triangles, 
and  yet  the  idea  of  triangle  is  common  to  them  :  thus  this 
idea  does  not  consist  in  images  and  it  is  not  as  easy  as  you 
may  think  thoroughly  to  understand  the  angles  of  a  triangle.] 


CHAPTER  III 

OF    THE    EXTENT    OF    HUMAN    KNOWLEDGE 

§  1.  Ph.  Our  knowledge  does  not  extend  beyond  our  ideas, 
§  2.  nor  beyond  the  perception  of  their  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement. §  3.  It  cannot  always  be  intuitive,  because  we 
cannot  always  compare  things  immediately,  for  example,  the 
size  of  two  triangles  upon  one  and  the  same  base,  equal,  but 
very  different.  §  4.  Our  knowledge,  also,  cannot  always  be 
demonstrative,  for  we  cannot  always  find  mediate  ideas.  §  5. 
Finally,  our  sensitive  knowledge  regards  only  the  existence  of 
things  which  actually  strike  our  senses.  §  6.  Thus  not  only 
our  ideas  are  limited,  but  also  our  knowledge  is  more  limited 
than  our  ideas.  I  do  not  doubt  however  that  human  knowl- 
edge can  be  carried   much  farther  if  men  will  devote  them- 

but  he  holds  that  this  gnarantee  is  "verified,"  and  tlie  consecutions  of  experi- 
ence supplemented,  "by  means  of  the  truths  of  reason,"  and  particularly  by 
the  use  of  the  princijiles  of  logic.  The  position  here  taken  is  also  tliat  of  the 
modern  scientist,  who  keeps  strictly  within  the  scientific  realm  and  does  not 
pass  on  to  consider  the  ultimate  metaphysical  nature  and  ground  of  the 
phenomena  he  investigates.  —  Tr. 


424.  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [iik.  iv 

selves  sincerely  to  discovering  the  means  of  perfecting  truth, 
with  entire  freedom  of  mind  and  with  all  the  application  and 
industry  they  emplo}'  in  coloring  or  maintaining  falsehood,  in 
defending  a  system  in  favor  of  which  they  have  declared 
themselves,  or  else  a  certain  party  and  certain  interests,  with 
which  they  find  themselves  united.  But  after  all  our  knowledge 
can  never  embrace  all  we  may  wish  to  know  concerning  the 
ideas  Ave  have.  For  example,  we  shall  never  perhaps  be  able 
to  find  a  circle  equal  to  a  square,  and  know  certainly  that  it  is  so. 
Th.  [There  are  confused  ideas  in  which  we  cannot  promise 
ourselves  a  complete  knowledge,  like  those  of  certain  sensible 
qualities.  But  when  they  are  distinct,  there  is  room  to  hope 
for  all.  As  for  the  square  equal  to  the  circle,  Archimedes  has 
already  shown  that  there  is  one.  For  it  is  the  one  whose  side 
is  the  mean  proportional  between  the  semi-diameter  and  the 
semi-circumference.  He  has  also  determined  a  straight  line 
equal  to  the  circumference  of  the  circle  by  means  of  a  straight 
line  tangent  to  the  spiral,  as  others  by  the  tangent  to  the 
quadratrix ;  a  method  of  quadrature  with  which  Clavius  ^  was 
wholly  content ;  not  to  speak  of  a  thread  applied  to  the  cir- 
cumference and  then  stretched  out,  or  of  the  circumference 
which  revolves  to  describe  the  cycloid  and  is  changed  to  a 
straight  line.  Some  demand  that  the  construction  be  made 
by  emplo^dng  only  the  ruler  and  the  compasses ;  but  the 
majority  of  geometrical  problems  cannot  be  constructed  by 
this  means.  The  question  then  is  rather  that  of  finding  the 
proportion  between  the  square  and  the  circle.  But  this  pro- 
portion not  being  capable  of  expression  in  finite  rational  num- 
bers, it  has  been  necessar}^,  in  order  to  employ  only  rational 
numbers,  to  express  this  same  proportion  in  an  infinite  series  ^ 

1  Christopher  Clavius,  1537-1G12,  a  Jesuit  and  distinguished  mathematician, 
Professor  of  Mathematics  at  Rome,  and  called  "the  Euclid  of  the  sixteenth 
centnry,"  was  employed  by  Pope  Gregory  XIII.  in  the  reformation  of  the 
calendar,  for  which  he  made  the  principal  calculations.  Among  his  works 
are:  Eudidis  elementorum,  Rome,  loTI;  Sinus  liness  tangentes,  etc.,  Rome, 
1586,  4to;  Romani  Calendarii  a  Gre'jorio  XIII.  P.M.  restituti  ExpUcatio, 
Rome,  lfiO.3.  His  Opera  mathematica,  containing  these  and  several  other 
works,  appeared  at  Mayence,  1()12,  5  vols.,  fol.  —  Tk. 

2  Leibnitz's  infinite  series,  which,  according  to  Schaarschmidt,  he  had  dis- 
covered before  he  became  acquainted  with  Huygens,  and  also  before  his 

discoveryof  the  infinitesimal  calculus,  is     =1 ! i ! ,  and 

'4  3      5      7      9      11      13 


Gil.  iiij  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  425 

of  these  numbers,  which  I  have  assigned  in  a  manner  quite 
simple.  Now  we  should  like  to  know  whether  there  is  not 
some  finite  quantity,  although  it  be  irrational  only,  or  more 
than  irrational,  which  can  express  this  infinite  series,  that  is 
to  say,  whether  we  can  find  exactly  an  abbreviated  expression 
for  this  series.  But  finite,  especially  irrational,  expressions,  if 
we  proceed  to  the  most  irrational  of  all,  may  vary  in  too  many 
ways  for  us  to  be  able  to  make  an  enumeration  of  them  or  to 
determine  easily  all  that  they  are  capable  of.  There  might  be 
perhaps  a  means  of  doing  it  if  this  irrationality  should  be  ex- 
plained by  an  ordinary,  or  even  more,  an  extraordinary  equa- 

as  related  to  unity  it  expresses  the  proijortion  obtaining  between  the  circle 
and  the  circumscribed  square.  Cf.  Be  vera  proportione  circuli  ad  quadratum 
circumscriptum  in  numeris  rationaltbus,  "Acta  Erud.  Lips.,"  February,  1682, 
p.  41  sq.,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  II.,  1  [Vol.  5],  118,  Dutens,  Leih- 
nit.  op.  om.,  3,  140  sq.\  Quadratura  arithmetica,  "Acta  Ernd.  Lip.,"  April, 
1691,  p.  180,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  II.,  1  [Vol.  5],  130,  Dutens, 
3,  242;  also  letter  to  Gonring,  Jan.  3, 1678,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  lyhilos.  Schrift., 
1,  187. 

The  problem  of  which  Leibnitz  liere  speaks  is  the  modern  form  of  the  prob- 
lems of  the  rectification  and  quadrature  of  the  circle  or  the  calculation  and 
construction  of  w  and  of  a  square  mathematically  exactly  equal  in  area  to  a 
given  circle.  In  referring  to  it  he  distinguishes  between  an  "ordinary,"  or 
algebraic,  and  an  "  extraordinary,"  or,  as  it  is  now  termed,  transcendental 
equation.  The  problem  is  to  prove  that  tt  cannot  be  the  root  of  any  equation 
having  whole  numbers  for  coefficients,  or  that  tt  is  not  algebraical.  The  quad- 
rature of  the  circle  has  long  been  known  to  be  an  unsolvable  problem,  —  Leib- 
nitz l<:new  this,  —  but  the  impossibility  of  its  solution  has  only  recently  been 
demonstrated.  Not  until  mathematicians  possessed  the  methods  furnished  by 
the  theory  of  definite  integrals  and  the  departments  of  higher  algebra  devel- 
oped in  the  last  few  decades  was  this  demonstration  possible.  With  the  aid 
of  these  methods  Prof.  Lindemann  of  Kunigsberg  succeeded,  in  June,  1882,  in 
demonstrating  with  exactness  the  non-algebraic  character  of  tt,  and  thus 
proved  for  the  first  time  that  the  rectification  and  the  squaring  of  tlie  circle 
witli  ruler  and  compasses  is  impossible.  For  liis  proof,  cf.  Uber  die  Ludolph'  nche 
Za/ii,  in  the  "  Sitzungsberichte  d.  kungl.  Pr.  Akad.  d.  Wiss.,  zu  Berlin,"  June 
22,  1882,  pp.  679-682;  the  "  Comptes  Fv.endus  "  of  the  French  Academy,  Vol. 
11.5,  pp.  72-74,  "  Math.  Annalen,"  Vol.  20,  pp.  213-225. 

For  an  historical  sketch  of  the  problem  of  circle-quadrature,  cf.  Holtzen- 
dorff  and  Virchow,  Sammluiig  gemeinverstUvdlicher  ioissennrhafllicher  Vor- 
trlif/e,  Heft  67  ;  an  article  from  this  by  H.  Schubert,  in  "  The  Monist,"  January, 
1891,  Vol.  1,  No.  2,  pp.  197-228,  reprinted  in  Smitlisonian  Report,  1890,  pp.  i)7- 
120;  and  tbe  article  "  Squaring  of  the  Circle,"  in  the  Encrjclop.  Brit.,  9tli  ed.. 
Vol.  22,  pp.  450-454  (American  Reprint).  On  Leibnitz's  relation  to  the  prob- 
lem, cf.  Knmmer,  Festrede  am  Leibniztage,  in  the  "  Monatsbericlite  d.  Pr. 
Akad.  d.  Wiss.,"  July,  1867,  p.  387  sq.,  an  article  which,  wliile  not  directly 
taking  into  consideration  the  present  interesting  passage  for  tlie  history  of 
mathematics,  is  admirable  in  its  understanding  of  the  peculiarities  of  Leib- 
nitz's metliod  of  thought. — -Tr. 


426  LKin.NirZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [ijk.  iv 

tion,  which  would  introduce  the  irrational  or  even  the  unknown 
quantity  into  the  exponent,^  for  which,  however,  an  extended 
calculation  would  be  required,  and  in  which  the  difficulty  will 
not  easily  be  solved  unless  we  some  day  find  a  short  method  for 
its  solution.  But  to  exclude  all  the  finite  expressions  is  impos- 
sible, as  I  myself  know,  and  to  determine  exactly  the  best  is 
an  immense  task.  And  all  this  shows  us  that  the  human 
mind  proposes  questions  so  strange,  especially  when  the  infinite 
enters  therein,  that  we  must  not  be  astonished  if  there  is  some 
difficulty  in  making  them  out,  so  much  the  more  as  all  depends 
often  on  a  short  method  in  these  geometrical  matters,  which 
cannot  always  be  determined  on,  just  as  fractions  cannot 
always  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  terms  or  the  divisors  of  a 
number  be  found.  It  is  true  that  we  may  always  have  these 
divisors  if  they  are  possible,  because  their  number  is  finite  ; 
but  when  what  we  have  to  examine  is  infinitel}^  variable  and 
ascends  by  degrees,  we  are  not  its  master  though  we  wish  to 
be,  and  it  is  too  laborious  to  do  all  that  is  necessary  in  order 
to  attempt  methodically  to  reach  the  short  method  or  the  rule 
of  progression  exempting  us  from  going  farther.  And  as  its 
usefulness  does  not  correspond  to  the  labor,  its  success  is  left 
to  posterity,  which  will  be  able  to  enjoy  it  when  this  labor  or 
prolixity  is  diminished  by  the  new  preparations  and  means 
which  time  may  furnish.  Unless  the  persons  who  devote 
themselves  from  time  to  time  to  these  studies  determine  to  do 
properly  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  further  progress,  we 
camiot  hope  to  advance  much  in  a  short  time.  And  we  must 
not  think  that  all  is  done,  since  indeed  in  ordinarj^  geometrj^, 
we  still  have  no  method  for  determining  the  best  constructions 
when  the  problems  are  a  little  complex.  A  certain  progres- 
sion of  synthesis  should  be  mixed  with  our  analysis  in  order 
the  better  to  succeed.  And  I  remember  to  have  heard  it  said 
that  the  Pensionary  De  Witt  -  had  some  thoughts  on  this 
subject.] 

1  Cf.  Letter  to  Arnaukl,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  2,  61, 62,  Jauet, 
CEuvres  philos.  de  Leibniz,  1,  622. — Tr. 

2  Jolin  De  Witt,  1625-1(;72,  an  illustrious  Dutch  statesman,  was  a  steadfast 
opponent  of  the  House  of  Orange,  whose  re-elevation  to  power  in  the  United 
Pro^inees  he  labored  earnestly  and  for  many  years  successfully  to  prevent. 
His  plans  for  his  country  were  finally  defeated  by  the  diplomacy  of  Louis 
XIV.,  the  opposition  of  the  Calvinist  clergy,  and  the  change  in  the  popular 


CH.   Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  427 

Ph.  There  is,  indeed,  another  diificulty,  to  know  lohetlier  a 
purely  material  being  thinks  or  not,^  and  perhaps  we  shall  never 
be  capable  of  knowing  this,  although  we  have  ideas  of  matter 
and  of  thought,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
discover  by  contemplation  of  our  own  ideas  without  revelation, 
whether  God  has  not  given  to  some  masses  of  matter,  fitly  dis- 
posed, the  power  to  perceive  and  to  think,  or  whether  he  has 
not  united  and  joined  to  matter  so  disposed  an  immaterial 
substance  that  thinks.  For  as  regards  our  notions,  it  is  no 
more  difficult  for  us  to  conceive  that  God,  if  he  pleases,  can 
add  to  our  idea  of  matter  the  faculty  of  thinking,  than  to  under- 
stand that  he  joins  to  it  another  substance  with  the  faculty  of 
thinking,  since  we  know  not  luJierein  thinking  consists,  nor  to 
what  kind  of  substance  this  all  powerful  Being  has  been 
pleased  to  give  that  power,  which  cannot  exist  in  any  created 
being  save  by  virtue  of  the  good  pleasure  and  the  bounty  of 
the  Creator. 

Th.  [This  question  is  without  doubt  incomparably  more 
important  than  the  preceding ;  but  I  venture  to  say  to  you, 
sir,  that  I  wish  it  were  as  easy  to  touch  souls  in  order  to 
influence  them  for  their  good,  and  to  heal  bodies  of  their 
diseases,  as  I  think  it  is  in  our  power  to  determine  this  ques- 
tion. I  hope  you  will  admit  at  least  that  I  can  advance  loith- 
out  offending  against  modesty  and  without  speaking  as  a  master 
in  default  of  good  reasons  ;  for  besides  speaking  oidy  accord- 
ing to  received  and  common  opinion,  I  think  I  have  brought 
thereto  an  attention  not  common.  In  the  first  place,  I  grant 
you,  sir,  that  when  we  have  only  confused  ideas  of  thought  and 
of  matter,  as  is  ordinarily  the  case,  we  must  not  be  astonished 
if  we  do  not  see  the  means  of  solving  such  questions.  As  I 
remarked  a  little  before,  one  who  has  only  the  ideas  of  the 
angles  of  a  triangle  commonly  held  will  never  think  of  finding 

feeling  towards  the  Prince  of  Orange,  occasioned  by  the  recollection  of  their 
country's  obligations  to  his  ancestors.  He  was  massacred,  witli  his  brother 
Cornelius,  in  the  revolution  wliich  put  the  Prince  William  (afterwards  William 
in.  of  England)  at  the  liead  of  the  United  Provinces.  He  published  Elementa 
linearum  curvariim,  Ley<len,  IGoO;  The  Hague,  1709.  —  Tu. 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  56  sq.,  where  Leibnitz  shows  that  Locke  afterwards  gave  up 
the  opinion  which  he  once  advanced  as  possible  tliat  matter  (^an  think.  For  Leil)- 
nitz,  who  regards  matter  as  a  mere  phenomenon  and  not  a  reality,  the  question 
does  not  exist.  —  Tr. 


428  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

them  always  equal  to  two  right  angles.  We  must  consider 
tliat  matter  taken  as  a  coiivplete  being  {i.e.  secondary  matter  in 
distinction  from  i\\Q primary,  which  is  something  purely  passive 
and  consequently  incomplete)  is  only  a  mass,  or  that  which 
results  therefrom,  and  that  every  real  mass  supposes  simple 
substances  or  real  unities,  and  when  we  further  consider  what 
belongs  to  the  nature  of  these  real  unities,  i.e.  perception  and 
its  consequences,  we  are  transferred  so  to  speak  into  another 
world,  that  is  to  say  into  the  intelligible  tvorld  of  substances 
Avhile  before  we  have  been  only  among  the  phenomena  of  the 
senses.  And  this  knowledge  of  the  interior  of  matter  shows 
us  sufficiently  its  natural  capability,  and  that  whenever  God 
shall  give  it  organs  suitable  for  rational  expression,  the  imma- 
terial substance  which  reasons  will  not  fail  to  be  given  it  also, 
in  virtue  of  that  harmony  which  is  also  a  natural  consequence 
of  substances.  IMatter  cannot  subsist  without  immaterial 
substances,  i.e.  without  the  unities ;  after  which  the  question 
should  no  longer  be  asked  whether  God  is  free  to  give  them  to 
it  or  not ;  and  if  these  substances  had  not  in  themselves  this 
correspondence  or  harmony  of  which  I  have  just  spoken,  God 
would  not  act  in  accordance  with  the  natural  order.  To  speak 
in  an  entirely  simple  manner  of  giving  or  according  powers  is 
to  return  to  the  naked  faculties  of  the  schoolmen  and  to  im- 
agine minute  self-subsisting  entities,  which  may  go  in  and  out 
like  pigeons  from  a  pigeon-house.  It  is  making  substances  of 
them  without  being  aware  of  it.  The  primitive  poicers  con- 
stitute substances  themselves,  and  the  derivative  powers,  or,  if 
you  prefer,  the  faculties,  are  only  modes  of  being,  which  must 
be  derived  from  substances,  and  are  not  derived  from  matter 
so  long  as  it  is  only  a  machine,  i.e.  so  long  as  it  is  abstractly 
considered  only  as  the  incomplete  essence  of  primary  matter,  or 
passivity  pure  and  simple.  As  to  which  I  think  you  will 
agree,  sir,  that  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  mere  mechanism 
to  produce  perception,  sensation,  reason.  They  must  then 
spring  from  some  other  substantial  thing.  To  desire  God  to 
act  otherwise  and  to  give  to  things  accidents  which  are  not 
modes  of  being  or  modifications  derived  from  substances,  is  to 
have  recourse  to  miracles  and  to  what  the  schoolmen  called  the 
obediential  power,  by  a  kind  of  supernatural  exaltation,  as  when 
certain  theologians  claim  that  the  fire  of  hell  burns  up  sepa 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDEKSTANDING  429 

rated  souls.  In  which  case  it  may  indeed  be  doubted  whether 
it  was  the  fire  that  acted  or  whether  God  did  not  himself 
produce  the  effect,  acting  in  place  of  the  fire.] 

Ph.  You  surprise  me  somewhat  by  your  elucidations,  and 
you  anticipate  me  in  many  of  the  things  I  was  going  to  say 
to  you  upon  the  limits  of  our  knowledge.  I  should  have  said 
to  you  that  we  are  not  in  a  state  of  vision,  as  the  theologians 
call  it,  that  faith  and  probability  must  suffice  us  as  regards 
many  -things,  and  particularly  as  regards  the  immateriality  of 
the  soul;  that  all  the  great  ends  of  morality  and  religion  are 
established  upon  sufficiently  good  foundations  without  the  aid 
of  the  proofs  of  this  immateriality  drawn  from  philosophy ; 
and  that  it  is  evident  that  he  who  has  begun  to  make  us  sub- 
sist here  as  sensible  and  intelligent  beings,  and  who  has  pre- 
served us  many  years  in  this  state,  can  and  will  make  us  enjoy 
also  a  similar  state  of  sensibility  in  the  other  life,  and  make 
us  capable  of  receiving  there  the  retribution  he  has  designed 
for  men  according  as  they  shall  have  conducted  themselves  in 
this  life ;  in  fine  that  we  may  judge  by  this  that  the  necessity 
to  determine  for  or  against  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  is  not 
so  great  as  some  people  too  zealous  for  their  own  views  have 
wished  to  persuade  us.  [I  was  going  to  say  all  this  to  you, 
and  more  besides  to  the  same  effect,  but  I  see  now  how  differ- 
ent is  the  statement  that  we  are  sensible,  thinking,  immortal 
beings  by  nature  and  the  statement  that  we  are  so  only  by  mir- 
acle. It  is  a  miracle,  in  fact,  which  I  know  I  must  admit  if  the 
soul  is  not  immaterial ;  but  this  view  of  miracle,  besides  being 
without  foundation,  will  not  produce  a  sufficiently  good  effect  in 
the  minds  of  most  people.  I  see  clearly  also  from  the  way  you 
understand  the  matter,  that  we  can  decide  rationally  as  regards 
the  present  question,  without  finding  it  needful  to  depart  to 
the  enjoyment  of  the  state  of  vision  and  to  find  ourselves  in  the 
company  of  those  su.perior  spirits  who  penetrate  very  deeply 
into  the  internal  constitution  of  things  and  whose  living  and 
penetrating  sight  and  vast  field  of  knowledge  may  make  us 
imagine  by  conjecture  what  happiness  they  must  enjoy.]  I 
had  supposed  it  entirely  beyond  our  knowledge  to  combine  sen- 
sation tvith  extended  matter,  and  existence  toith  a  thing  tohich  has 
absolutely  no  extension.  I  had  therefore  become  convinced  that 
those  who  took  sides  here  followed  the  unreasonable  method 


430  LEIB.MTZ'S   ClUTIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

of  certain  persons,  who,  seeing  that  things  considered  from  a 
certain  side  are  incomprehensible,  throw  themselves  headlong 
upon  the  opposite  side,  although  it  is  no  less  unintelligible  ;  a 
procedure  which  arose  in  my  opinion  from  the  fact  that  some 
having  their  mind  too  deeply  buried  so  to  speak  in  matter, 
could  not  accord  any  existence  to  that  which  is  not  material ; 
and  others  not  finding  that  thought  is  included  in  the  natural 
faculties  of  matter,  concluded  that  God  himself  could  not  give 
life  and  perception  to  a  solid  substance  without  putting  therein 
an  immaterial  substance ;  while  I  now  see  that  if  He  had  done 
so  it  would  be  by  a  miracle,  and  that  this  incomprehensibility 
of  the  union  of  the  soul  and  the  body  or  of  the  imion  of  sensa- 
tion icith  matter  seems  to  cease  through  your  hypothesis  of  pre- 
established  harmony  between  different  substances.] 

Th.  [In  fact  there  is  nothing  unintelligible  in  this  new 
hypothesis,  since  it  attributes  to  the  soul  and  to  bodies  only 
the  modifications  which  we  experience  in  ourselves  and  in 
them ;  and  only  makes  them  appear  more  regular  and  more 
connected  than  has  been  thought  hitherto.  The  difficulty 
which  remains  exists  only  as  regards  those  who  wish  to  imagine 
what  is  only  intelligible,^  as  if  they  wished  to  see  sounds  or  hear 
colors,  and  these  are  they  who  refuse  existence  to  everything 
which  is  net  extended,  a  view  which  will  compel  them  to  refuse 
it  to  God  himself,  i.e.  to  renounce  the  causes  and  reasons  of 
changes  and  of  such  changes  :  these  reasons  being  incapable  of 
arising  from  extension  and  from  natures  purely  passive, 
and  not  indeed  wholly  from  particular  and  inferior  active 
natures  without  the  pure  and  universal  act  of  the  supreme 
substance.] 

Ph.  One  objection  remains  for  me  with  reference  to  things 
whose  matter  is  naturally  susceptible  of  feeling.  The  body 
so  far  as  we  can  conceive  it,  is  capable  only  of  striking  and 
effecting  a  body,  and  motion  can  produce  nothing  but  motion  : 
so  that  when  we  agree  that  the  body  produces  pleasure  or 
pain  or  the  idea  of  a  color  or  sound,  we  seem  compelled  to 
abandon  our  reason,  to  go  beyond  our  own  ideas,  and  to  at- 
tribute this  production  solely  to  the  good  ptleasure  of  our 
Creator.  What  reason  have  we  then  to  conclude  that  it  is 
not  the  same  with  perception  in  matter  ?     I  almost  see  what 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  274,  note  2.  —  Tr. 


CH.  in]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  431 

reply  you  can  make,  and  although  you  have  already  said  some- 
thing regarding  it  more  than  once,  I  understand  you  better 
now,  sir,  than  1  have  done.  But  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  hear 
further  what  reply  you  will  make  regarding  it  ixpon  this 
important  occasion. 

Th.  [You  rightly  judge,  sir,  that  I  shall  say  that  matter 
cannot  produce  pleasure,  pain,  or  thought  in  us.  It  is  the  soul 
itself  which  produces  them  in  conformity  to  what  takes  place 
in  matter.  And  some  clever  people  among  the  moderns  begin 
to  declare  that  they  understand  occasional  causes  only  as  I. 
Now  this  being  posited,  there  occurs  nothing  unintelligible, 
except  that  we  cannot  distinguish  all  that  enters  into  our  con- 
fused perceptions,  which  contain  even  the  intinite,  and  which 
are  the  detailed  expression  of  what  occurs  in  bodies.  f-A-S  for 
the  good  lileasiire  of  the  Creator,  it  must  be  said  that  he  is 
ruled  by  the  natures  of  things,  so  that  he  produces  and  con- 
serves therein  only  what  suits  them  and  can  be  explained,  at 
least  in  general,  by  their  natures ;  for  the  detail  often  sur- 
passes us  as  much  as  the  care  and  power  of  arranging  the 
grains  of  a  mountain  of  sand  according  to  the  order  of  the 
figures,  although  there  is  here  notliing  difficult  to  understand 
but  the  multitude.  Otherwise  if  this  knowledge  were  in 
itself  beyond  us,  and  if  we  could  not  indeed  conceive  the  rea- 
son of  the  relations  of  the  soul  and  body  in  general,  in  fine, 
if  God  gave  to  things  accidental  jjoivers  detached  from  their 
natures,  and  consequently  removed  from  reason  in  general, 
there  would  be  a  back  door  for  calling  back  the  too  occult  quali- 
ties which  no  mind  can  understand,  and  these  little  goblins  of 
faculties  incapable  of  reason, 

Et  quidquid  Scliola  finxit  otiosa : 

helpful  goblins  who  proceed  to  appear  like  the  gods  of  the 
theatre,  or  like  the  fairies  of  the  Amadis,  and  who  will  do  at  need 
all  that  a  philosopher  wishes,  without  ceremony  and  without 
tools.  But  to  attribute  the  origin  of  these  powers  to  the  good 
pleasure  of  God  appears  to  me  a  thing  not  quite  congruous  with 
him  who  is  the  supreme  reason,  with  whom  everything  is 
regular,  everything  consistent.  This  good  pleasure  would  not 
indeed  be  good,  nor  pleasure,  if  there  were  not  a  perpetual 
parallelism  between  the  power  and  the  wisdom  of  God.] 


•132  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

§  8.  Ph.  Our  knowledge  of  identity  and  diversity  goes  as  far 
as  our  ideas,  but  that  of  the  connection  of  our  ideas,  §§9,  10. 
as  regards  their  coexistence  in  one  and  the  same  subject  is 
very  imperfect  and  almost  nothing  §  11.  especially  as  regards 
secondary  qualities  as  colors,  sounds,  and  tastes  §  12.  because 
we  do  not  know  their  connection  with  the  primary  qualities, 
i.e.  §  13.  how  they  depend  upon  size,  figure,  or  motion.  §  15. 
We  know  a  little  more  of  the  incompatibility  of  the  secondary 
qualities ;  for  a  subject  cannot  have,  for  example,  two  colors 
at  the  same  time,  and  when  they  seem  to  be  seen  in  an  opal  or 
in  an  infusion  of  lignum  nepJiriticum,  it  is  in  different  parts  of 
the  object.  §  16.  It  is  the  same  with  the  active  and  passive 
powers  of  bodies.  Our  researches  in  this  direction  must  depend 
on  experience. 

Th.  [The  ideas  of  sensible  qualities  are  confused,  and  the 
powers  which  should  produce  them  furnish  in  consequence  only 
ideas  into  which  some  confusion  enters :  thus  the  connections 
of  these  ideas  can  be  known  otherwise  than  by  experience 
only  as  they  are  reduced  to  the  distinct  ideas  which  accom- 
pany them,  as  has  been  done  (for  example)  in  regard  to  the 
colors  of  the  rainbow  and  of  prisms.  And  this  method  pre- 
sents a  beginning  in  analysis  which  is  of  great  use  in  physics  ; 
and  by  following  it  I  doubt  not  that  medicine  in  time  will 
find  itself  considerably  more  advanced,  especially  if  the  public 
is  a  little  better  interested  than  hitherto.] 

§  18.  Ph.  As  for  the  knowledge  of  relations  it  is  the  largest 
field  of  our  knowledge  and  it  is  difficult  to  determine  how  far 
it  may  extend.  Progress  depends  on  our  sagacity  in  finding 
intermediate  ideas.  Those  who  are  ignorant  of  algebra  cannot 
imagine  the  wonderful  things  that  may  be  done  in  this  field 
by  means  of  this  science.  And  I  do  not  see  that  it  is  easy  to 
determine  what  new  means  of  perfecting  other  parts  of  OTir 
knowledge  may  yet  be  found  out  by  a  penetrating  mind.  At 
least  the  ideas  regarding  quantity  are  not  the  only  ones  capable 
of  demonstration  ;  there  are  others,  perhaps  the  most  imjjortant 
part  of  our  contemplation,  from  which  Ave  might  deduce  certain 
knowledge,  if  vices,  passions,  and  domineering  did  not  directly 
oppose  the  execution  of  such  enterprise. 

Th.  [Nothing  is  truer  than  what  you,. sir,  here  say.  What 
is  there  more  important,  supposing  it  is  true,  than  what  I  be- 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  433 

lieve  we  have  determined  upon  the  nature  of  substance,  upon 
unity  and  multiplicity,  upon  identity  and  diversity,  upon  the 
constitution  of  individuals,  upon  the  impossibilities  of  void 
and  atoms,  upon  the  origin  of  cohesion,  upon  the  law  of  con- 
tinuity, and  the  other  laws  of  nature ;  but  chiefly  upon  the 
harmony  of  things,  the  immateriality  of  souls,  tlie  union  of 
the  soul  and  the  body,  the  conservation  of  souls,  and  even  of 
the  animal  after  death.  And  there  is  nothing  in  all  this  which 
I  do  not  think  demonstrated  or  demonstrable.] 

Ph.  [It  is  true  that  your  hypothesis  appears  extremely  con- 
sistent and  of  great  simplicity :  a  clever  man  in  France  who 
desired  to  refute  it,  admits  publicly  that  he  was  impressed  by 
it.  And  it  is  a  simplicity  very  different  from  that  which  I  see. 
It  will  be  well  to  show  this  doctrine  more  and  more  in  its  true 
light.  But  in  speaking  of  things  which  are  of  most  importance 
to  us,  I  thought  of  morality  to  which  I  admit  your  metaphysic 
gives  wonderful  foundations  :  but  without  digging  so  deep,  it 
has  sufficiently  firm  foundations,  although  perhaps  they  do  not 
extend  as  far  (as  I  remember  that  you  remarked)  when  a  nat- 
ural theology  like  yours  is  not  their  base.  Yet  the  considera- 
tion of  the  goods  of  this  life  alone  already  serves  to  establish 
important  consequences  for  regulating  human  society.  We 
can  estimate  justice  and  injustice  as  incontestably  as  in  math- 
ematics ;  for  example  this  proposition  :  There  cannot  he  injustice 
where  there  is  no  prop)erty,  is  as  certain  as  any  demonstration 
which  is  in  Euclid  ;  property  being  the  right  to  a  certain  thing, 
and  injustice  the  violation  of  a  right.  It  is  the  same  with  this 
proposition :  No  government  alloios  absolute  liberty.  For  gov- 
ernment is  the  establishment  of  certain  laws,  whose  execution 
it  demands,  and  absolute  liberty  is  the  power  each  one  has  of 
doing  whatever  he  pleases. 

Th.  [You  use  the  word  property  a  little  differently  from  its 
ordinary  use,  for  you  mean  by  it  the  right  of  one  person  to  a 
thing  to  the  exclusion  of  the  right  of  another.  Thus  if  there 
were  no  property,  as  if  all  were  common,  there  nevertheless 
might  be  injustice.  By  thing  in  the  definition  of  pr(jp(u-ty  you 
must  also  further  understand  action ;  for  otherwise,  if  there 
were  therein  no  right  to  things,  it  would  be  always  an  injustice 
to  prevent  men  from  acting  where  they  find  it  needful.  But 
according  to  this  explanation  it  is  impossible  that  there  be  no 
2f 


434  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iy 

2n'opel•t3^  As  for  the  proposition  concerning  the  incompati- 
bility of  government  with  absolute  liberty,  it  belongs  to  the 
number  of  the  corollaries,  i.e.  the  propositions,  which  it  is 
sufficient  to  point  out.  There  are  some  in  jurisprudence  which 
are  more  complex,  as  for  example,  those  concerning  what  is 
called  jus  accrescendi,^  concerning  the  conditions  and  many 
other  matters ;  and  I  indicated  them  when  I  published  in 
my  youth  some  theses  upon  the  conditions,  in  which  I  demon- 
strated some  of  them.  And  if  I  had  leisure,  I  would  retouch 
them.-] 

P7i.  [That  would  afford  pleasure  to  the  curious,  and  serve 
to  anticipate  any  one  who  might  reprint  them  without  re- 
vision.] 

Th.  [That  is  what  happened  to  my  "  Ars  Combinatoria,"  ^  as 
I  have  already  complained.  It  was  a  fruit  of  my  early  youth, 
and  yet  it  was  reprinted  a  long  time  after  -without  consulting 
me  and  without  indicating  even  that  it  was  a  second  edition, 
and  this  made  some  think  to  my  prejudice  that  I  was  capable 

1  Cf.  Poste,  Gaius,  dements  of  Roman  Law,  Bk.  II.,  199  (p.  262,  3d  ed., 
Oxford,  1890) :  "  Illud  constat  si  duobus  pluribusve  per  vindicationem  eadem 
res  legata  sit,  sive  conjunctim,  sive  disjunctim,  si  omnes  veuiant  ad  legatum, 
partes  ad  singulos  pertiuere,  et  deficientis  portionem  collegatario  adcrescere." 
Also  Sandars,  Inst,  of  Justinian,  Lib.  II.,  Tit.  XX.,  8  (p.  226,  Stli  ed.,  London, 
1888):  "Si  eadem  res  duobus  legata  sit,  sive  conjunctim  sive  disjunctim:  si 
ambo  perveniant  ad  legatum,  scinditur  inter  eos  legatum ;  si  alter  deficiat, 
quia  aut  spreverit  legatum,  aut  vivo  testatore  decesserit,  vel  alio  qiiolibet 
modo  defecerit,  totum  ad  collegatarium  pertiuet." 

In  reference  to  the  jus  uccresceudi  —  the  law  of  increase — Sandars  says, 
p.  198:  "  If  any  one  instituted  beir  died  before  tbe  testator,  or  refused  to  take 
his  share  of  the  inheritance,  his  share  was,  in  fact,  undisposed  of.  But  as  the 
testator  was  always  supposed  to  have  disposed  of  his  whole  estate,  if  he  dis- 
posed of  any  part,  this  sbare  was  di^aded  among  all  tbose  who  entered  on  tbe 
inheritance  in  proportions  corresponding  to  the  share  given  them  by  the  will. 
Their  claim  was  called  tbe  'jus  accrescendi.'  "  — Tr. 

2  Leibnitz  here  refers  to  bis  thesis  De  conditionihus,  which  he  defended 
under  the  presidency  of  Prof.  Leonhard  Schwendendorfer,  at  Leipzig,  in  166.5. 
Gubrauer  states  (cf.  Leihniz,  eine  Biof/rapJiie,  Pt.  I.,  pp.  36-37)  that  we  do 
not  know  the  treatise  in  its  original  form,  but  in  tbe  revision  and  rearrange- 
ment of  its  material  made  by  Leibnitz  in  1672,  in  a  collection  of  his  juristic 
treatises  under  the  title  Specimina  juris,  and  which  is  found  in  Dutens,  Leib- 
nit.  op.  om.,  4,  Pt.  III.,  92  .sg.  — Tk. 

3  The  Dissertutio  de  Arte  Combinatoria,  cf.  Gerhardt,  4,  27  .^q.,  Erdmann. 
6  sq.,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  341  sq.,  appeared  at  Leipzig  in  16(56.  Tbe  pirated  edi- 
tion here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz  was  published  at  Frankfort,  1690,  and  re- 
viewed by  him  in  tbe  "  Acta  Erud.,"  February,  1691.  Cf.  Gubrauer,  Leibniz, 
eine  Biog.,  Pt.  I.,  pp.  37-38,  and  Anvierkungen  z.  erst.  Buche,  pp.  7,  8; 
Dutens,  6,  295.— Tr. 


CH.  in]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  435 

of  publishing  such  a  piece  in  my  mature  years  ;  for  although 
it  contains  thoughts  of  some  consequence,  which  I  still  ap- 
prove, it  also  contains  some  which  could  become  only  a  young 
student.] 

§  19.  Ph.  I  find  that  diagrams  are  a  great  remedy  for  the 
uncertainty  of  words,  but  they  cannot  have  place  in  moral 
ideas.  Most  moral  ideas  are  more  complex  than  the  diagrams 
ordinarily  considered  in  mathematics  ;  thus  the  mind  finds  it 
diificult  to  retain  the  precise  combinations  of  what  enters  into 
moral  ideas,  in  a  manner  as  perfect  as  is  necessary  in  long  de- 
ductions. And  if  in  arithmetic  the  different  stages  are  not 
designated  by  marks  whose  precise  meaning  is  known,  and 
which  last  and  remain  in  sight,  it  is  well-nigh  impossible  to 
make  extended  computations.  §  20.  Definitions  furnish  some 
remedy  provided  they  are  constantly  employed  in  ethics.  And 
for  the  rest,  it  is  not  easy  to  foresee  what  methods  may  be 
suggested  by  algebra  or  by  some  other  means  of  this  nature  to 
remove  other  difficulties. 

Th.  [The  late  Erhard  Weigel,^  a  mathematician  of  Jena  in 
Thuringia,  ingeniously  invented  diagrams  to  represent  moral 
things  ;  and  when  the  late  Samuel  Puffendorf,-  his  disciple,  pub- 

1  Erhard  Weigel,  1625-1699,  a  dlstiuguished  German  mathematician  and 
astronomer,  was  professor  of  mathematics  in  Jena  from  1633  on,  where  he  was 
Leibnitz's  first  teacher  in  the  subject,  wlien  he  studied  tliere  in  1G()3,  cf. 
Guhrauer  Leibniz,  eine  Biographie,  Pt.  I.,  pp.  26,  32.  Tlie  Diet  of  Ratisbon 
appointed  him  to  organize  a  commission  for  tlie  correction  of  tlie  calendar. 
Hc!  also  la})ored  earnestly  for  the  reform  of  the  school  system  in  Germany, 
travelling  through  the  country  in  1696  for  this  purpose,  cf.  Guhrauer,  op.  cit., 
Pt.  II.,  pp.  211-214,  and  the  correspondence  of  Leibnitz  and  Placcius,  from 
Fel).  12,  1696  on,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  (!,  61  sq. 

Weigel,  who  was  a  philosopher,  moralist,  and  an  original  investigator  of 
the  law  of  nature  {Natarrecht)  as  well  as  a  mathematician,  published  many 
works,  among  them  the  Expose  arithm^tique  de  la  morale,  or,  as  the  German 
title  runs,  Arithmetische  Beschreibunc;  der  Moralwelsheit  von  Permnen  und 
Sachen,  woraus  das  gemeine  Wesen  besteht,  nach  der  pythagorischcn  Kreutz- 
zahl  in  lauter  tetraktische  Glieder  eingetheilt,  Jena,  1674,  4to,  in  which  he 
attempted  a  mathematical  exposition  of  moral  philosophy,  based  upon  the 
Pythagorean  principle  that  the  essence  of  things  consists  in  numl)ers.  Leibnitz 
thus  speaks  of  this  book  in  the  Miscellanea,  No.  CLIIL,  Dutens,  6,  325:  "  M. 
Weigelius  a  fait  un  excellent  livre  en  Allemand  siu-  la  morale  cclairee  par 
les  nombres,  et  je  ne  crois  pas  que  les  Pythagoriciens  ayent  ricii  (lit  de  plus 
beau  sur  ce  chapitre."  For  further  remarks  of  Leibnitz  mi  Weigel,  cf. 
Guhrauer,  Leibnitz's  deutsche  Schriften,  2,  473  sq.  —  Tr. 

-  Samuel  Pufendorf,  1().'52-1()94,  was  one  of  the  greatest  (Jermaii  pul)licists 
and  historians,  and  one  of  the  founders  of  the  science  of  pulilic  law.  He 
studied  at  Jena  under  Weigi^l,  witli  whom  he  formed  an  intimal(!  frieiidsbip, 


430  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

lislied  his  "  Elements  of  universal  Jui'is}>ruclence  "  sufficiently 
conformed  to  the  thoughts  of  Weigel,  there  was  added  thereto 
in  the  Jena  edition  the  "  Moral  Sj'here  "of  this  mathematician. 
But  these  diagrams  are  a  kind  of  allegory  nearly  like  the  table 
of  Cebes,^  but  less  popular  and  serving  the  memory  in  the  re- 
tention and  arrangement  of  its  ideas  rather  than  the  judgment 
in  the  acquisition  of  demonstrative  knowledge.  They  do  not 
cease  to  have  their  use  in  arousing  the  mind.  Geometrical 
diagrams  appear  simpler  than  moral  things ;  but  they  are  not 
so,  because  continuity  includes  the  infinite  from  which  it  must 
be  chosen.  For  example,  to  cut  a  triangle  into  four  equal 
parts  by  two  straight  lines  perpendicular  to  each  other  is  a 
question  apparently  simple  but  really  quite  difficult.  It  is  not 
the  same  in  questions  of  morality  since  they  are  determinable 

and  to  whose  teaching  and  influence  he  largely  owes  the  orderly  method  and 
mathematical  precision  and  dryness  which  characterize  his  style,  and  that 
independence  of  character  which  never  yielded  to  the  "  ipsedixitism  "  of  other 
writers,  however  high  their  position  and  authority.  Among  his  works  are: 
Elementa  jurisprudents  as  universalis,  cum  appendice  de  Sphasra  morali  (of 
Weigel),  Hag.  Com.,  1G60,  12mo  —  also  Jena,  1(J60,  "  bei  Meyer  "  ;  the  ed.  here 
meant  by  Leibnitz,  according  to  Schaarschmidt,  who  states  that  in  the  2d 
Jena  ed.,  1G69,  the  Sphssra  moralis  occurs,  p.  313  sq.,  — the  book  which  obtained 
for  him  from  the  elector  Charles  Louis,  to  whom  it  was  dedicated,  the  newly 
created  chair  of  the  law  of  nature  and  of  nations  at  Heidelberg;  De  statu 
imperii  (jermanici,  Geneva,  1667,  — the  book  which  first  called  forth  Leibnitz's 
aversion  and  criticism,  — small  in  bulk,  but  great  in  significance,  in  which  he 
criticised  the  political  organization  of  the  empire,  suggested  a  remedy  for  the 
evils  therein,  and  revealed  himself  as  a  consummate  statesman,  subsequent 
events  proving  the  justness  of  his  conclusions;  and  the  work  on  which  his 
fame  chiefly  rests,  De  jure  naturse  et  gentium,  1672,  trans,  into  French,  with 
notes,  by  Barbeyrac,  Amsterdam,  1712,  and  into  English  by  Basil  Kennett, 
London,  1729,  and  resume  of  the  same,  De  officio  hominis  et  civis,  1675. 

For  Leibnitz's  criticism  of  Pufendorf  and  his  work,  —  the  severest,  perhaps, 
Tie  ever  made  on  any  one,  and  through  which  he  is,  to  a  considerable  extent, 
responsible  for  the  failure  of  posterity  justly  to  estimate  and  acknowledge 
its  debt  to  him,  —  c/.  letter  to  Kestner,  No.  7,  §  2,  Dutens,  4,  Pt.  HI.,  261; 
Moniia  qumdam  ad  S.  Puffendorfii  principia,  ibid.,  275-283;  letter  to  S.  Kor- 
tholt.  No.  3,  Dutens,  5,  305;  letters  to  Bierling,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos. 
Schri/t.,  7,  487,  488,  490,  499,  506,  511,  Dutens,  5,  355,  358,  361,  371,  386.  390  — 
Dutens  gives  Bierling's  letters  to  Leibnitz  also;  letter  to  Bourguet,  G.  3,  590, 
Erdmann,  734,  b.,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  3;34.  For  a  comparison  of  the  views  of 
Leibnitz  and  Pufendorf  on  the  ultimate  foundations  of  natural  and  public  law, 
c/.  Monita  qusedam.  above  cited,  and  Guhrauer,  Leibniz,  eine  Biog.,  Pt.  L,  223 

Sq.—TR. 

1  Cebes  of  Thebes,  a  disciple  of  Socrates,  distinguished  for  his  virtue  and 
love  of  truth;  cf.  Plato,  Phsedo,  59  C,  60  C  sq.,  63  A.  His  Hu-af,  Tabula, 
or  '  picture,'  is,  according  to  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  II.,  1  [Vol.  3],  242,  4th 
ed.,  1889,  "  certainly  spurious." — Tk. 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  437 

by  reason  alone.  For  the  rest  it  is  not  the  phace  here  to  speak 
de  proferendis  scientiae  demonstrandi  pomoeriis,  and  to  propose 
true  means  of  extending  the  art  of  demonstration  beyond  its 
ancient  boundaries  which  have  been  nearly  the  same  up  to  the 
present  time  as  those  of  mathematics.  If  God  gives  me  the 
time  necessary  for  it,  I  hope  some  day  to  publish  an  essay 
upon  this  subject,  putting  these  means  into  effective  use  with- 
out limiting  myself  to  precepts.]  ^ 

Ph.  [If  you  carry  out  this  plan,  sir,  and  as  it  should  be, 
you  will  infinitely  oblige  the  Philalethes  like  myself,  i.e.  the  class 
who  sincerely  desire  to  know  the  truth.]  For  truth  is  naturally 
agreeable  to  the  mind,  and  there  is  nothing  so  deformed  and 
so  incompatible  with  the  understanding  as  a  lie.  But  men 
must  not  be  expected  to  apply  themselves  much  to  these 
discoveries,  so  long  as  the  desire  and  the  esteem  of  riches  or 
of  power  shall  lead  them  to  espouse  opinions  authorized  by 
fashion,  and  to  seek  in  consequence  arguments  either  to  make 
them  pass  as  good  or  to  varnish  over  and  cover  their  deform- 
ity. And  while  the  different  parties  make  all  men  whom  they 
can  get  into  their  power  receive  their  opinions  without  exam- 
ining whether  they  are  true  or  false,  what  new  light  can  be 
hoped  for  in  the  sciences  belonging  to  morals  ?  This  part  of 
the  human  race  which  is  under  the  yoke,  ought  to  expect  in 
most  places  in  the  world  instead  of  that  light,  darkness  as 
thick  as  that  of  Egypt,  were  not  the  candle  of  the  Lord  itself 
found  present  in  the  mind  of  men,-  a  sacred  light  which  all 
human  power  cannot  wholly  extinguish. 

Th.  [I  do  not  despair  that  at  some  time  and  in  a  more  tran- 
quil country  men  will  betake  themselves  more  to  reason  than 
they  have  done.     For  in  fact  we  must  despair  of  nothing ;  and 

1  Leibnitz's  plan  to  extend  and  perfect  the  science  of  demonstration,  or  that 
part  of  logic  which  is  concerned  witli  the  methods  of  proof,  and  which  in  bis 
view  was  conceived  up  to  his  own  time  too  narrowly  as  virtually  identical 
with  the  method  of  mathematics,  is  closely  connected,  l)nt  not  identical,  with 
his  Universal  Characteristic;  cf.  ante,  pp.  292,  note  1,  ."75,  note  1.  Leibnitz, 
however,  never  carried  his  plan  into  execution,  b\it  left  some  preliminary 
essays  or  sketches  which  serve  to  indicate  what  he  tliought  desirable  in  this 
direction,  and  what  he  purposed  himself  some  day  to  provide.  Cf.  Pr^ceptes 
pour  avancer  les  sciences,  Erdmann,  Leibidt.  op.  philos.  1().')-171,  published  in 
a  more  complete  form  in  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schri/t.,  1,  157  sq. ;  and 
the  fragment  without  title  treating  of  the  means  of  philosophical  demonstra- 
tion ,  O . ,  7,  'J'.ID-liOl .  —  Tr.  2  Qf_  Proverbs  20  :  27.  —  Tr. 


438.  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

T  believe  that  great  changes  for  evil  and  for  good  are  reserved 
for  the  human  race,  but  in  the  end  more  for  good  than  for 
evil.  Suppose  we  see  some  day  a  great  prince,  who,  like  the 
ancient  kings  of  Assyria  or  of  Egypt  or  like  another  Solomon, 
reigns  a  long  time  in  a  profound  peace,  and  that  this  prince, 
loving  virtue  and  truth  and  endowed  with  a  great  and  solid 
mind,  takes  it  into  his  head  to  make  men  happier  and  more 
accommodating  among  themselves  and  more  powerful  over 
nature  ;  what  wonders  will  he  not  do  in  a  few  years  ?  For  it 
is  certain  that  in  this  case  more  would  be  done  in  ten  years 
than  in  a  hundred  or  perhaps  a  thousand  while  letting  things 
follow  their  ordinary  course.  Moreover,  if  the  path  were 
opened  once  for  all,  many  people  would  enter  therein  as 
the  geometers  do,  though  this  would  be  only  for  their  pleas- 
ure and  to  acquire  fame.  The  public  better  civilized  will 
some  day  turn  more  than  it  has  hitherto  done  to  the  advance- 
ment of  medicine  ;  natural  histories  of  all  countries  will  be 
I)ublished  like  almanacs  or  like  the  Mercures  galans;^  no  val- 
uable observation  will  be  left  without  being  registered ;  those 
who  will  apply  themselves  thereto  will  be  aided ;  the  art  of 
making  such  observations  will  be  perfected,  and  further  that 
of  employing  them  to  establish  aphorisms.  The  time  will 
come  when  the  number  of  good  physicians  ha^dng  become 
greater  and  the  number  of  people  of  certain  professions  of 
which  there  will  then  be  less  need  having  become  proportion- 
ally less,  the  public  will  be  in  a  condition  to  give  more 
encouragement  to  natural  research,  and  above  all  to  the  ad- 
vance of  medicine,  and  then  this  important  science  will  be 
carried  far  beyond  its  present  condition  and  will  grow  apace. 
I  believe  indeed  that  this  business  of  the  police  should  be 
the  object  of  the  greatest  care  of  those  who  govern,  after  that 
of  virtue,  and  that  one  of  the  greatest  fruits  of  good  morals 
or  politics  will  be  to  produce  a  better  (science  of)  medicine, 

1  "  Mercure  galant,"  the  title  of  different  periodicals  treating  of  politics, 
literature,  and  containing  announcements,  and  news  of  various  kinds ;  in  par- 
ticular, the  title  of  a  journal  founded  by  De  Vise'  in  1672,  and  continued,  with 
several  short  periods  of  suspension,  under  various  names  and  editors,  till  1853. 
Leibnitz,  in  a  letter  to  Sebastian  Kortliolt,  Jan.  9,  1711,  inquires  whether  a 
complete  set  can  be  obtained,  and  at  what  price:  "  Discere  etiam  velim,  an 
totus  Mercurius  Gallant,  ut  sic  dicam,  vulgo  Mercure  Galant  a  Dcvisivo  nuper 
extincto  a  multis  annis  conipositus,  tolerabili  pretio  haberi  possit,  et  quanti?  " 
(c/.  Dutens,  Lelhnit.  op.  om.  5,  315). — Tr. 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  439 

wlien  men  shall  begin  to  be  wiser  than  they  are  and  the  no- 
bility shall  learn  the  better  to  employ  their  wealth  and  their 
power  for  their  own  welfare.] 

§  21.  Ph.  As  for  the  knowledge  of  real  existence  (which  is 
the  fourth  kind  of  knoivledge)  it  must  be  said  that  we  have  an 
intuitive  knowledge  of  orir  existence,  a  demonstrative  knowledge 
of  that  of  God,  and  a  sensitive  knowledge  of  other  things.  We 
shall  speak  of  these  fully  in  what  follows. 

Th.    [You  could  say  nothing  more  justly.] 

§  22.  Ph.  Having  now  spoken  of  knoioledge,  it  appears  ap- 
propriate the  better  to  discover  the  present  condition  of  our 
mind  that  we  should  consider  a  little  the  dark  side  and  take 
knowledge  of  our  ignorance :  for  it  is  infinitely  greater  than 
our  knowledge.  The  causes  of  this  ignorance  are  as  follows  : 
(1)  Want  of  ideas ;  (2)  Inability  to  discover  the  connection 
between  the  ideas  we  have ;  (3)  Neglect  to  trace  and  examine 
them  with  exactness.  §  23.  As  for  the  toant  of  ideas,  we  have 
as  simple  ideas  only  those  coming  to  us  from  the  senses  [in- 
ternal or  external].  Thus  as  regards  an  infinite  number  of 
the  creatures  of  the  universe  and  their  qualities  we  are  like 
the  blind  as  regards  colors  not  indeed  possessing  the  faculties 
necessary  in  order  to  their  knowledge;  and  according  to  all 
appearances  man  holds  the  lowest  rank  among  intellectual 
beings. 

Th.  [I  do  not  know  but  that  there  are  also  some  below  us. 
Why  should  we  degrade  ourselves  unnecessarily?  Perhaps  we 
hold  a  sufficiently  honorable  rank  among  rational  animals ; 
for  superior  genii  may  have  bodies  of  another  kind  so  that 
the  name  animal  cannot  agree  with  them.  We  cannot  say 
whether  our  sun  among  the  great  number  of  other  suns  has 
more  above  than  below  it,  and  we  are  well  placed  in  his  sys- 
tem: for  the  earth  occupies  the  middle  course  between  tlie 
planets,  and  its  distance  api)ears  well  chosen  for  a  contem- 
plative animal  who  should  inhabit  it.  Besides  we  have  in- 
comparably more  reason  to  praise  than  to  complain  of  our  lot, 
the  majority  of  our  evils  rightly  being  imputed  to  our  faidt. 
Above  all  we  should  be  very  wrong  to  complain  of  the  defects 
of  our  knowledge,  since  we  avail  ourselves  so  little  of  that 
which  charitable  nature  presents  to  us.] 

§  24.  Ph.   It  is,  however,  true  that  the  extreme  distance  of 


440  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  it 

nearly  all  parts  of  the  Avorlcl  wliicli  are  exposed  to  our  sight 
couceals  them  from  our  knowledge,  and  apparently  the  visible 
world  is  only  a  small  part  of  this  immense  universe.  We  are 
confined  in  a  small  corner  of  space,  i.e.  in  the  system  of  our 
sun,  and  yet  we  do  not  know  even  what  takes  place  in  the 
other  planets  which  as  well  as  our  ball  revolve  about  it. 
§  25.  This  knowledge  escapes  us  by  reason  of  size  and  dis- 
tance ;  but  other  bodies  are  concealed  from  us  because  of  their 
minuteness ;  and  these  are  the  ones  which  it  would  most  con- 
cern us  to  know ;  for  from  their  contexture  we  could  infer  the 
use  and  operation  of  those  which  are  visible,  and  know  why 
rhubarb  purges,  hemlock  kills,  and  opium  produces  sleep. 
Thus  §  26.  whatever  distance  human  industry  may  advance 
experimental  philosophy  upon  physical  things,  I  am  compelled 
to  believe  that  we  can  attain  upon  these  mtd;ters  a  scientific 
knoivledge. 

Til.  [I  fully  believe  that  we  shall  never  advance  so  far  as 
will  be  desirable  ;  but  it  seems  to  me  that  some  considerable 
progress  will  be  made  in  time  in  the  explication  of  certain 
phenomena,  because  the  large  number  of  experiments  which 
we  are  led  to  make  may  furnish  us  data  more  than  sufficient, 
so  that  only  the  art  of  employing  them  will  be  lacking,  (an 
art)  the  small  beginnings  of  which  I  do  not  despair  of  seeing 
pushed  forward,  since  the  infinitesimal  analysis^  has  given  us 
the  means  of  uniting  geometry  with  physics,  and  dynamics  has 
furnished  us  with  the  general  laws  of  nature.] 

§  27.  Ph.  Spirits  are  still  further  removed  from  our  knowl- 
edge ;  we  cannot  form  any  idea  of  their  different  orders,  and 
yet  the  intellectual  ivorld  is  certainly  grander  and  more  beau- 
tiful than  the  material  world. 

Th.  [These  worlds  are  always  perfectly  parallel  as  regards 
efficient  causes,  but  not  as  regards  final.  For  in  proportion  as 
spirits  rule  in  matter  they  produce  therein  wonderful  arrange- 
ments. This  appears  in  the  changes  men  have  made,  in  order 
to  embellish  the  earth,  as  little  gods  imitating  the  great  archi- 
tect of  the  universe,  though  only  by  employing  bodies  and 

1  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  1G42-1727,  in  his  Principia,  was  the  first  to  apply  in  a 
systematic  way  tlie  infinitesimal  calculus  to  physics,  after  that  Galileo,  15(34- 
1642,  had  paved  the  way  for  a  theory  of  universal  gravitation  by  his  deter- 
mination of  the  law  of  acceleration  in  fallins;;  bodies. — Tr. 


CH.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  441 

their  laws.  What  may  not  be  conjectured  concerning  tliis 
immense  multitude  of  spirits  which  surpass  us?  And  as 
spirits  form  all  together  a  kind  of  state  under  God,  whose  gov- 
ernment is  perfect,  we  are  far  removed  from  comprehending 
the  system  of  this  intelligible  world  and  from  conceiving  the 
punishments  and  rewards  prepared  for  those  who  deserve 
them  according  to  the  most  exact  standard,  and  from  imagin- 
ing what  eye  has  not  seen,  nor  ear  heard,  nor  has  ever  entered 
into  the  heart  of  man.  But  all  this  shows  that  we  have  all 
the  distinct  ideas  necessary  for  knowing  bodies  and  spirits, 
but  not  sufficient  detail  of  facts,  nor  senses  penetrating  enough 
to  distinguish  confused  ideas  or  sufficiently  extended  to  per- 
ceive them  all.] 

§  28.  Ph.  As  for  the  connection,  the  knowledge  of  which 
is  wanting  to  us  in  the  ideas  which  we  have,  1  was  going  to 
say  to  you  that  the  mechanical  affections  of  bodies  have  no 
connection  with  the  ideas  of  colors,  sounds,  smells,  tastes, 
pleasure,  and  pain;  and  that  their  connection  depends  only 
upon  the  good  pleasure  and  the  arbitrary  Avill  of  God.  But  I 
remember  that  you  think  there  is  a  perfect  correspondence, 
although  this  is  not  always  an  entire  resemblance.  But  you 
recognize  that  the  too  great  detail  of  small  things  entering 
therein  hinders  us  from  discerning  that  which  is  concealed, 
though  you  hope  still  that  we  shall  make  much  advance  there- 
in ;  and  that  thus  you  do  not  wish  to  say  with  my  illustrious 
author  (§  29),  that  it  is  labor  lost  to  engage  in  such  a  search,  from 
fear  that  this  belief  would  injure  the  growth  of  science.  I 
should  have  spoken  also  of  the  difficulty  which  has  hitherto 
been  found  in  explaining  the  connection  between  the  soul  and 
the  body,  since  a  thought  cannot  be  conceived  as  producing  a 
motion  in  the  body,  nor  a  motion  as  producing  a  thought  in 
the  mind.  [lUit  since  T  comprehend  your  hypothesis  of  pre- 
established  harmony,  this  difficulty  of  Avhich  they  despaired 
appears  to  me  removed  at  once,  and  as  it  were,  by  magic] 
§  .30.  There  remains  then  the  third  cause  of  our  ignorance, 
viz.  that  we  do  not  follow  the  ideas  we  have  or  may  have, 
and,  do  not  apply  ourselves  to  finding  intermediate  ideas. 
Thus  it  is  that  we  are  ignorant  of  mathematical  truths,  al- 
though there  is  no  imperfection  in  our  faculties,  nor  any 
incertitude  in  the  things  themselves.     The  bad  use  of  words 


442  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

has  contributed  the  most  to  prevent  us  from  finding  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  ideas ;  and  the  mathematicians  who 
form  their  thouglits  independently  of  names  and  accustom 
themselves  to  present  to  their  minds  the  ideas  themselves  in- 
stead of  their  sounds,  have  thereby  escaped  a  great  deal  of 
embarrassment.  If  men  had  acted  in  their  discoveries  in  the 
material  world  as  they  have  been  wont  to  do  in  regard  to 
those  having  reference  to  the  intellectual  world,  and  if  they 
had  been  wholly  lost  in  a  chaos  of  terms  of  an  uncertain  mean- 
ing, they  would  have  disputed  endlessly  about  the  zones,  the 
tides,  the  building  of  vessels,  and  the  routes;  they  would 
never  have  gone  beyond  the  line,  and  the  antipodes  would 
still  be  as  unknown  as  they  were  when  to  maintain  them  was 
declared  a  heresy. 

TJi.  [This  third  cause  of  our  ignorance  is  the  only  blamable 
one;  and  you  see,  sir,  that  the  despair  of  further  advance  is 
therein  contained.  This  discouragement  does  much  injury; 
and  persons  of  ability  and  importance  have  hindered  the 
progress  of  medicine  by  the  false  persuasion  that  it  is  labor 
lost  to  work  therein.  When  you  see  the  Aristotelian  philoso- 
phers of  past  time  speak  of  meteors,  as  the  rainbow,  for 
example,  you  will  find  that  they  believed  they  should  not 
think  alone  of  explaining  distinctly  this  phenomenon ;  and  the 
attempts  of  Mauroly cus,  ^  and  afterwards  of  Marc  Antony  de 
Dominis  ^  appeared  to  them  like  the  flight  of  Icarus.     But  the 

1  Francesco  Maurolico,  1494-1575,  a  celebrated  Italian  mathematician, 
whose  father,  a  Greek,  came  originally  from  Constantinople,  taught  mathe- 
matics at  Palermo,  Naples,  Rome,  and  Messina.  In  his  Treatise  on  Conies  he 
sought  for  the  first  time  to  deduce  the  properties  of  these  curves  from  the 
corresponding  curves  in  the  circle  of  which  they  are  the  perspective.  He  first 
introduced  secants  into  trigonometrical  calculations,  constructing  and  publish- 
ing a  table  of  them  in  his  Theodosii  sphmricorum,  Messina,  1558,  fol.  He  also 
investigated  the  structure  of  the  eye,  seeking  therein  the  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  of  vision.  He  described  exactly  the  course  of  the  rays  of  light 
across  the  cornea  and  the  crystalline  lens,  but  stopped  in  utter  astonishment 
when  he  discovered  that  his  theory  led  him  to  admit  that  the  images  of  objects 
upon  the  retina  are  found  inverted.  The  work  of  Maurolico,  here  referred  to  by 
Leibnitz,  is  his  Prohlemuta  ad  perspectivam  et  iridem  pertinentia,  appended 
toliis  Photisrai  [or  Theoreinata]  delumine  et  umbra  ad  perspectivam  radiorum 
incidentiinn,  Venice,  1575, 4to,  new  ed.,  with  notes  of  Clavius,  Lyons,  1(513. — Tr. 

2  M.  Ant.  de  Dominis,  15(56-1624,  a  native  of  Dalmatia,  was  professor  of 
eloquence,  philosophy,  and  natural  sciences  at  the  University  of  Padua. 
Though  archbishop  of  Sjialatro,  he  was  republican  in  his  ^news  of  the  consti- 
tution and  administration  of  the  church  and  strongly  opposed  to  the  doctrine 


en.  Ill]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  443 


sequel  has  disabused  the  world  of  this.  It  is  true  that  the 
bad  use  of  terms  has  caused  a  good  part  of  the  confusion 
found  in  our  knowledge,  not  only  in  ethics  and  metaphysics, 
or  in  what  is  called  the  intellectual  world,  but  also  in  medi- 
cine where  this  abuse  of  terms  increases  more  and  more.  We 
cannot  always  aid  ourselves  with  figures  as  in  geometry :  but 
algebra  shows  us  that  great  discoveries  may  be  made  without 
recurring  always  to  the  ideas  themselves  of  things.  In  ref- 
erence to  the  pretended  heresy  about  the  antipodes  I  will  say 
in  passing  that  it  is  true  that  Boniface,^  Archbishop  of  May- 
ence,  accused  Virgil  of  Salzburg,^  in  a  letter,  which  he  wrote 

of  papal  supremacy.  While  in  England  he  published  his  views  in  his  De 
republica  ecclesiastica,  London,  1(517-1020,  rej^rinted  Frankfort,  l(i58,  both  eds., 
3  vols.,  fol.  For  some  specimen  quotations  from  this  book,  rf.  Larousse, 
Grande  Diet.  Univ.  de  XIX"  Steele,  Vol.  (i,  p.  1008,  a.  Returning  to  Italy,  he 
and  his  book  were  condemned  as  heretical,  in  spite  of  his  retraction  of  his 
errors,  and  he  was  imprisoned,  and  probably  i^oisoned,  in  the  Castle  of  St. 
Angelo,  and  his  body  exhumed  and  burned  with  great  ceremony  in  the  Camjio 
de'  Fiori  in  Rome  in  January,  1625. 

In  his  De  radiis  visits  et  lucis  in  vitris  perspectivis  et  iride,  Venice,  IGU, 
4to,  cited  with  high  praise  by  Newton  in  his  Optics,  he  presented  to  the  world 
the  first  attempt  at  a  theory  of  the  rainbow.  He  successfully  reflected  rays 
of  light  through  the  interior  of  raindrops  before  making  them  come  out  again, 
but  could  not  account  for  the  angle  at  which  the  observer  sees  the  ray  of  the 
l)ow.  On  his  theory,  cf.  Venturi,  Commentarii  sopra  la  storia  e  le  teorie  dtlV 
ottica,  Bologna,  1814,  Vol.  1,  p.  149.  Of  the  De  radiis  visas  et  lucis,  chap.  9 
and  chap.  13,  ^^Vera  iridis  tota  generatio  eocplicatur,"  are  printed  in  Libri, 
Histoire  des  Sciences  math,  en  Italie  depuis  la  Renaissance  jusqu'a  la  fin  du 
XVII"  siecle,  1838-1841,  4  vols.,  8vo,  Vol.  4,  p.  43(3  sq.  Leibnitz  thus  speaks 
of  him  in  the  Miscellanea  Leihnitiana,  ed.  Feller,  No.  CXV.,  p.  198  ((/.  also 
Dutens,  Leihnit.  op.  om.,  6,  319):  "  Elegantissime  materiam  tractavit  de- 
monstrationiljusque  mathematicis  confirmavit.  Iridis  etiam  et  nonnullorum 
aliorum  ejusmodi  meteorum  causam  ab  Aristotele  assignatam  recte  ex- 
pend it." —  Tk. 

1  Boniface  (Wiufrid,  the  Anglo-Saxon  Benedictine  monk,  named  Bonifa- 
cius  by  Pope  Gregory  II.),  680-755,  the  apostle  to  the  Germans,  became  arch- 
bishop of  Mayeuce  (Mainz)  in  748.  On  his  life  and  labors,  cf.  Neander,  Hist. 
of  the  Christ.  Eelig.  and  Church,  3,  46  sq.;  Smith  and  Wace,  Dirt,  of  Christ. 
Biorj.,  Vol.  1,  p.  324.  His  Opera  qvse  extant  omnia,  ed.  J.  A.  Giles,  Londini, 
1844,  2  vols.,  8vo;  also  in  Migne,  Patrol,  s.  Lat.,  Vol.  89,  Paris,  18()3.  His 
letters  were  edited,  with  notes,  by  the  Jesuit  Nic.  Serarius,  1555-1()09,  Mayeuce, 
1(505  and  1629,  4to;  and  l)y  Wiirdtwein,  Moguntiw,  1789,  fol.— Tr. 

'■^  St.  Fergil,  best  known  by  tlie  Latinized  form  of  his  name,  — Virgilius,  — 
was  an  Irish  priest  from  Aghavoe,  Queen's  Co.,  who  came  to  Bavaria,  became 
at  first  abbot  of  St.  Peter's  monastery  in  Sal/.liurg,  and  finally,  on  the  martyr- 
dom of  Boniface,  7.55,  and  the  death  of  John,  bishop  of  Salzburg,  was  appointed 
and  consecrated  bishop,  June  13,  7(5()  or  767.  One  of  his  last  acts  as  bishop  was 
to  visit  his  entire  diocese  and  to  pay  a  long  deferred  visit  to  Cariuthia.  He 
died  Nov.  27,  789. 


444  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

to  tlie  Pope  against  liim  on  this  subject,  and  that  the  Pope 
replied  thereto  in  a  way  Avhich  showed  that  he  employed  the 
term  quite  in  the  sense  of  Boniface;  but  it  does  not  appear 
that  this  accusation  has  had  any  results.  Virgil  has  always 
held  his  own.  The  two  antagonists  pass  for  saints,  and  the 
savants  of  Bavaria  who  regard  Virgil  as  an  apostle  of  Carin- 
thia  and  the  neighboring  countries,  have  justified  their  mem- 
ory of  him.] 

CHAPTER   IV 

OF    THE    REALITY    OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE 

§  1.  Ph.  Some  one  who  has  not  understood  the  importance 
of  having  good  ideas,  and  of  understanding  their  agreement 
or  disagreement,  will  think  that  in  reasoning  upon  them  so 
carefully  Ave  have  been  building  castles  in  the  air,  and  that  there 
will  be  in  our  entire  system  only  the  ideal  and  imaginary.  An 
extravagant  man,  whose  imagination  is  heated,  will  have  the 
advantage  of  possessing  ideas  more  vivid  and  in  greater  num- 
ber, thus  he  would  also  have  more  knowledge.  There  will  be 
as  much  certitude  in  the  visions  of  an  enthusiast  as  in  the 

Virgil  was  involved  in  two  controversies  with  Boniface.  First,  in  regard  to 
the  validity  of  an  informally  administered  haptism  in  which  the  officiating 
and  ignorant  priest  had  mutilated  the  Latin  formula.  Boniface  said  the  hap- 
tism was  invalid,  and  must  be  repeated ;  Virgil  maintained  its  validity,  and 
on  his  appeal  to  Pope  Zach-ary  (741-752),  was  sustained.  Second,  in  regard  to 
the  "  antipodes  "  here  mentioned.  Virgil  publislied  a  philosophical  treatise 
maintaining  the  rotundity  of  the  earth  and  the  antipodes,  which  Boniface 
regarded  as  heretical  because  the  view  advanced  was  thought  to  imply  the 
existence  of  two  races  of  men,  one  of  which  did  not  spring  from  Adam,  was 
therefore  free  from  original  sin,  and  had  no  need  for  or  share  in  the  work  of 
the  Redeemer.  Pope  Zachary,  in  the  letter  to  Boniface  here  referred  to  (c/. 
letters  of  Boniface,  No.  140,  in  Bihl.  Max.  Vet.  Patr.,  27  vols.,  fol.  Lugd.,  1677, 
Vol.  13,  p.  1.31-133),  characterized  as  perverse  and  heretical  the  doctrine  of 
another  world  and  other  men  under  the  earth,  —  "  De  perversa  doctrina,  quam 
contra  Dominum  et  animam  suam  locutus  est  (quod  scilicet  alius  mundus, 
et  alii  homines  sub  terra  sint  aliusque  sol  et  luna),"  etc.;  but  Virgil  showed 
that  his  speculations  were  purely  scientific  and  did  not  touch  the  theological 
doctrines  of  original  sin  or  the  unity  of  the  human  race.  He  was  accordingly 
acquitted  of  the  charge  of  heresy,  and  canonized  by  Gregory  IX.  in  1233.  Cf. 
Smith  and  Wace,  Diet,  of  Christian  Biog.,  Vol.  4,  pp.  1160,  1211,  London, 
1887;  Neander,  Hist,  of  the  Christ.  Relic/,  and  Church,  3,  63;  also  Bayle,  Diet, 
histor.  et  crit.,  2d  ed.,  1702  (which  was,  perhaps,  Leibnitz's  source  of  infor- 
mation on  the  subject),  Eng.  Trans.,  London,  1738,  Vol.  5,  p.  493;  and  for  a 
justification  of  Virgil,  cf.  "  Me'moires  de  Trevoux,"  Jan.  1708.  — Tr, 


CH.  IV]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  445 

reasonings  of  a  sober  man,  provided  this  entluisiast  speaks 
consistently;  and  it  will  be  as  triie  to  say  that  a  harpy  is  not 
a  centaur  as  to  say  a  square  is  not  a  circle.  §  2.  I  reply  that 
our  ideas  agree  with  things.  §  3.  But  the  criterion  will  be 
demanded.  §  4.  I  reply  further  in  the  first  2^lcic6  that  this 
agreement  is  manifest  as  regards  the  simple  ideas  of  our  mind, 
for  being  unable  to  form  them  itself,  it  must  be  that  they  are 
produced  by  things  acting  upon  the  mind;  and  m  the  second 
'place,  §  5.  all  our  complex  ideas  (those  of  substances  excepted) 
being  archetypes  which  the  mind  itself  has  made,  not  intended 
to  be  copies  of  anything  nor  referred  to  the  existence  of  finy- 
thing  as  to  their  originals,  they  cannot  fail  to  be  completely 
conformed  to  the  things  necessary  to  real  knowledge. 

Th.  Our  certitude  would  be  small,  or  rather  nothing,  if  it 
had  no  other  basis  of  simple  ideas  than  that  which  comes  from 
the  senses.  Have  you  forgotten,  sir,  how  I  have  shown  that 
ideas  are  originally  in  our  mind,  and  that  indeed  our  thoughts 
come  to  us  from  the  depths  of  our  own  nature,  other  creatures 
being  unable  to  have  an  immediate  influence  upon  the  soul. 
Besides  the  ground  of  our  certitude  in  regard  to  universal 
and  eternal  truths  is  in  the  ideas  themselves,  independently 
of  the  senses,  just  as  ideas  pure  and  intelligible  do  not  depend 
on  the  senses,  for  example,  that  of  being,  unity,  identity,  etc. 
But  the  ideas  of  sensible  qualities,  as  color,  savor,  etc.  (which 
in  reality  are  only  phantoms),^  come  to  us  from  the  senses, 
i.e.  from  our  confused  perceptions.  And  the  basis  of  the  truth 
of  contingent  and  singular  things  is  in  the  succession  which 
causes  these  phenomena  of  the  senses  to  be  rightly  united  as 
the  intelligible  truths  demand.^     That  is  the  difference  which 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  317  (where  the  term  "phantasies,"  in  line  12,  rendered  hy  the 
word  "notions,"  would  have  I)een  better  rendered,  perhaps,  by  "phantasms" 
or  "phantoms"),  notes  1  and  2,  and  infra,  p.  459.  Schaarschmidt  translates: 
" Phantasie-Erscheinungen."  The  term  "phantom,"  or,  as  it  might  perhaps 
have  been  translated,  "phantasm," — the  Greek  <^avTa<TiJ.a,  and  the  Scholastic 
"phantasma,"  —  signifies  here  a  mental  modification  given  or  produced 
through  the  agency  of  the  senses,  but  having  no  corresponding  external 
object,  i.e.  an  entirely  subjective  phenomenon,  real  as  such,  but  which,  since 
it  corresponds  to  no  objective  external  reality,  has,  to  a  certain  extent,  the 
character  of  a  mere  appearance.  —  Tr. 

2  CY.  Nciv  K^says,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  2,  §  14,  TIi.  (2),  ante,  p.  422,  note  1. 
Leibnitz  felt,  says  Schaarschmidt,  that  we  could  not  bo  satisfied  from  a  philo- 
sophical point  of  view  with  the  old  definition  of  truth  as  consisting  iu  the 
agreement  of  thought  witli  reality.  — Tu, 


440  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

should  be  made,  while  that  which  you  here  make  between 
simple  and  complex  ideas,  and  ideas  complex  belonging  to  sub- 
stances and  to  accidents,  does  not  appear  to  me  well  founded, 
since  all  intelligible  ideas  have  their  archetypes  in  the  eternal 
possibility  of  things.] 

§  5.  Ph.  It  is  true  that  our  complex  ideas  need  archetypes 
outside  the  mind  only  when  the  question  concerns  an  existing 
substance  which  must  effectively  unite  outside  us  these  com- 
plex ideas,  and  the  simple  ideas  of  Avhich  they  are  composed. 
The  knowledge  of  mathematical  truths  is  real,  although  it  re- 
volves only  upon  our  ideas,  and  finds  nowhere  exact  circles. 
But  we  are  assured  that  existing  things  will  agree  with  our 
archetypes  according  as  what  we  suppose  therein  is  found 
existing.  §  7.  This  serves  to  justify  the  reality  of  moral 
things.  §  8.  Nor  are  Cicero's  "  Offices "  less  conformed  to 
truth,  because  no  one  in  the  world  rules  his  life  exactly 
according  to  the  pattern  of  a  virtuous  man  such  as  Cicero  has 
painted  for  us.  §  9.  But  (it  will  be  said)  if  moral  ideas  be  of 
our  invention,  what  a  strange  notion  shall  we  have  of  justice 
and  temperance? 

§  10.  I  reply  that  the  uncertainty  will  be  only  in  the  lan- 
guage, because  what  is  said  is  not  always  understood,  or 
always  understood  in  the  same  way. 

Th.  [You  might  reply  also,  sir,  and  much  better  in  my 
opinion,-  that  the  ideas  of  justice  and  temperance  are  not  of 
our  invention,  any  more  than  those  of  the  circle  or  the 
square.     I  think  I  have  sufficiently  shown  this.] 

§  11.  Ph.  As  for  the  ideas  of  substances  existing  outside 
us,  our  knowledge  is  real  so  long  as  it  is  conformed  to  these 
archetypes;  and  in  this  respect  the  mind  must  not  combine 
ideas  arbitrarily,  so  much  tlie  more  as  there  are  very  few  sim- 
ple ideas  of  which  we  can  be  certain  that  they  can  or  cannot 
exist  together  in  nature  beyond  Avhat  appears  by  sensible 
observations. 

Til.  It  is,  as  I  have  more  than  once  said,  because  these 
ideas,  when  reason  cannot  judge  of  their  compatibility  or  con- 
nection, are  confused,  like  those  of  the  particular  qualities 
of  the  senses. 

§  13.  Ph.  It  is  well  also  as  regards  existing  substances  not 
to  limit  ourselves  to  names  or  to  species  supposed  to  be  estab- 


cu.  IV]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  447 

lished  by  names.  This  makes  me  return  to  discussions  we 
have  often  enough  had  regarding  the  definition  of  man.  For 
speaking  of  an  innocent''-  who  lias  lived  forty  j^ears  without  giv- 
ing the  least  sign  of  reason,  could  we  not  say  that  he  holds 
the  middle  place  between  man  and  beast?  It  would  possibly 
be  thought  a  very  bold  paradox,  or  even  a  falsehood  with  very 
dangerous  consequences.  But  it  seemed  to  me  formerly  and 
it  seems  still  to  some  of  my  friends  whom  I  cannot  disabuse 
as  yet  (of  the  idea)  that  it  is  only  in  virtue  of  a  prejudice 
based  upon  this  false  supposition  that  these  two  names  man 
and  beast  signify  distinct  species,  so  well  marked  by  real 
essences  in  nature  that  no  other  species  can  intervene  between 
them,  as  if  all  things  were  thrown  into  the  mould  according 
to  the  precise  number  of  these  essences.  §  14.  When  these 
friends  are  asked  what  species  of  animals  these  innocents  are, 
if  they  are  neither  men  nor  beasts,  they  repl}'  they  are  innocents, 
and  that  is  sufficient.  If  asked  further  what  they  will  become 
in  the  next  world,  our  friends  reply  they  are  not  concerned  to 
know  or  inquire.  Let  them  fall  or  stand  to  their  own  master 
(Rom.  14 : 4),  who  is  good  and  faithful  and  disposes  of  his 
creatures  not  according  to  the  narrow  limits  of  our  particular 
thoughts  or  opinions,  nor  does  he  distinguish  them  conformably 
to  the  names  and  species  it  has  pleased  us  to  invent;  let  it  suffice 
us  that  those  who  are  capable  of  instruction  will  be  called  to 
render  an  account  of  their  conduct  and  will  receive  their  re- 
ward according  to  the  deeds  done  in  their  bodies  (2  Cor.  5:10). 
S  15.  I  shall  exhibit  to  you  the  rest  of  their  reasonings.  The 
ipiestion  (say  they)  luhether  imbeciles  must  be  deprived  of  a  future 
state  rests  upon  two  equally  false  suppositions :  first  that  every 
being  having  the  form  and  external  appearance  of  man  is 
ilestined  to  an  immortal  state  after  this  life;  and  second  that 
everything  iiaving  a  human  birth  must  enjoy  this  privilege, 
licuiove  these  imaginative  ideas,  and  you  will  see  that  such 
questions  are  ridiculous  and  groundless.  In  fact  I  think  we 
shall  disallow  the  first  supposition  and  shall  not  have  the  mind 
so  buried  in  matter  as  to  believe  that  eternal  life  is  due  to  any 
form  of  material  mass,  so  that  the  mass  must  have  feeling 
eternally  because  moulded  upon  such  a  figure.     §  16.  But  the 

1  Locke's  word  is  "changeling,"  Philos.  Works  (Bolm's  ed.),  Vol.  2,  p.  170 
sq.,  aud  note.  —  Tr. 


448  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 


second  su2:>position  comes  to  the  rescue.  We  shall  say  that  this 
innocent  conies  from  rational  parents  and  that  consequently  it 
must  have  a  rational  soul.  I  know  not  by  what  rule  of  logic 
we  can  establish  such  a  consequence,  nor  how  after  that  we 
should  dare  to  destroy  these  ill-formed  and  disfigured  produc- 
tions. Oh,  they  are  monsters,  it  will  be  said.  Very  well,  so  be 
it.  But  what  will  this  always  intractable  innocent  be?  Shall 
a  defect  in  the  body  make  a  monster,  and  not  a  defect  in  the 
mind?  This  is  to  return  to  the  first  supposition,  already 
refuted,  that  the  external  suffices.  A  well-formed  innocent 
is  a  man,  as  we  believe ;  he  has  a  rational  soul,  although  it 
does  not  appear ;  but  make  the  ears  a  little  longer  and  more 
pointed,  and  the  nose  a  little  flatter  than  usual,  then  you  begin 
to  hesitate.  Make  the  face  narrower,  flatter,  and  longer; 
there  you  are  all  at  once  decided.  And  if  the  head  is  per- 
fectly that  of  any  animal,  it  is  no  doubt  a  monster;  and  this 
is  for  you  a  demonstration  that  it  has  no  rational  soul  and 
that  it  should  be  destroyed.  I  ask  you  now  where  to  find  the 
just  measure  and  the  final  limits  bearing  with  them  a  rational 
soul.  There  are  human  foetuses,  half  beast,  half  man,  others 
three  parts  of  which  belong  to  the  one,  and  one  part  to  the 
other.  How  determine  precisely  the  lineaments  which  indicate 
reason?  Further,  will  not  this  monster  be  a  species  midway 
between  man  and  beast?  And  such  is  the  innocent  in  question. 
Th.  [I  am  astonished  that  you  return  to  this  question  suffi- 
ciently examined  by  us,  and  that  more  than  once,  and  that 
you  have  not  better  catechized  your  friends.  If  we  distin- 
guish the  man  from  the  beast  by  the  faculty  of  reason,  there 
is  no  middle  ground,  the  animal  in  question  must  have  it  or 
not  have  it;  but  as  this  faculty  sometimes  does  not  appear, 
we  judge  of  it  by  indices  which  are  not  demonstrative  of  the 
truth  till  this  reason  manifests  itself:  for  we  know  by  the 
experience  of  those  who  have  lost  it  and  who  at  last  have  re- 
covered its  exercise,  that  its  function  may  be  suspended.  Birth 
and  form  furnish  presumptions  of  that  which  is  concealed. 
But  the  presumption  of  birth  is  effaced  {eliditur)  by  a  figure 
very  different  from  the  human,  such  as  that  of  the  animal  was, 
born  of  a  woman  of  Zealand  according  to  Levinus  Lemnius  ^ 

1  Liviii  Lemmens  —  Latin,  Levinus  Lemnius  —  L505-156S,  a  Dutch  physician, 
who  was  very  successful  in  practice,  and  had  iu  his  time  a  very  great  repnta- 


cii.  v]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  449 

(Book  I.,  Chap.  8),  which  had  a  hooked  beak,  a  long  and 
round  neck,  flashing  eyes,  a  pointed  tail,  and  great  agility 
at  first  in  running  about  the  room.  But  you  will  say  that 
there  are  some  monsters  or  brothers  of  the  Lombards  (as  the 
physicians  formerly  called  them  because  it  was  said  that  the 
women  of  Lombardy  were  subject  to  this  kind  of  childbirth) 
who  approach  more  and  more  the  human  figure.  Very  well; 
so  be  it.  How  then  (say  you)  can  the  proper  limits  of  the 
figure  which  is  to  pass  as  human  be  determined?  I  rej)ly 
that  in  a  conjectural  matter  there  is  no  precision.  And  there 
the  affair  ends.  You  object  that  the  innocent  does  not  exliibit 
reason,  and  yet  passes  as  a  man,  but  if  it  had  a  monstrous 
figure,  it  would  not  be  man,  and  thus  you  have  more  regard 
for  figure  than  for  reason.  But,  does  this  monster  exhibit 
reason?  Certainly  not.  You  see,  then,  that  it  lacks  more 
than  the  innocent.  The  defect  of  the  exercise  of  reason  is 
often  temporal,  but  it  does  not  cease  in  those  in  whom  it  is 
accompanied  by  a  dog's  head.  For  the  rest,  if  this  animal 
with  a  human  figure  is  not  a  man,  there  is  no  great  harm  in 
guarding  it  during  the  uncertainty  as  to  its  fate.  And  whether 
it  has  a  rational  soul  or  not,  God  will  not  have  made  it  for 
nothing,  and  Ave  may  say  of  the  souls  of  men  who  live  in  a 
state  always  similar  to  that  of  early  infancy  that  their  fate 
may  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  souls  of  those  infants  who  die 
in  the  cradle. 


CHAPTER  V 

OF    TRUTH    IN    GENERAL 

§  1.  Ph.  For  many  centuries  the  question  has  been  asked. 
What  is  truth?  §  2.  Our  friends  think  it  is  the  joining  or 
separating  of  signs  according  as  the-  things  themselves  agree 
or  disagree  among  themselves.  By  the  joining  or  separating 
of  signs  must  be  understood  what  is  otherwise  called  a  j)ropo- 
sition. 

tion.  Lemnius  relates  this  marvellous  occurrence,  which  he  states  was  reported 
to  liim  l^y  the  woman  herself,  as  soon  as  slie  had  barely  rec^overed,  but  in  which 
there  must  liave  liecn  some  deception,  in  Iiis  JJc  miracuiis  occultis  naiursi',,  Bk. 
I.,  chap.  8,  p.  37,  Francofurti,  1628,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  24,  London,  1658.  —Tii. 

2g 


450  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk.  iv 

Th.  But  an  epithet  does  not  make  a  proposition;  for  example, 
the  ivise  man.  But  there  is  a  union  of  two  terms.  ^STegation 
also  is  different  from  separation;  for  saying  vian,  and  after  an 
interval  saying  tvise,  is  not  a  denial.  Agreement  also,  or  dis- 
agreement is  not  properly  speaking  what  is  expressed  by  the 
proposition.  Two  eggs  have  agreement  and  two  enemies  have 
disagreement.  The  question  here  concerns  an  entirely  par- 
ticular mode  of  agreement  or  disagreement.  Thus  I  think 
this  definition  fails  wholly  to  explain  the  point  in  question. 
But  what  I  find  least  to  my  taste  in  your  definition  of  truth 
is  that  you  seek  truth  in  words.  Thus  the  same  sense  ex- 
l^ressed  in  Latin,  German,  English,  Prench,  will  not  be  the 
same  truth,  and  it  will  be  necessary  to  say  with  Hobbes,^  that 

1  Cf.  Leibnitz,  Be  stilo  philos.  Nizolii,  §  28,  ad  fin.,  Gerhardt,  4,  158,  Erd- 
mauu,  69  b,  Dutens,  4,  Pt.  I.,  60,  where,  after  expressing  his  belief  that  "  Occam 
himself  was  not  more  of  a  Xomiualist  than  Thomas  Hobbes  now  is,  who,  in 
truth,  seems  to  me  more  tlian  a  Nominalist,"  Leibnitz  continues:  "  Non  con- 
tentus  enim  cum  Xominaiibus  universalia  ad  nomina  reducere,  ipsam  rerum 
veritatem  ait  in  nominalibus  cousistere,  ac,  quod  majus  est,  pendere  ab  arbitrio 
humano,  quia  Veritas  pendeat  a  detinitionibus  terminorum,  definitiones  autem 
terminorum  ab  arbitrio  humano.''  Hoblies  in  his  Leviathan  (Morley's  Uni- 
versal Library,  No.  21),  3d  ed.,  London:  Geo.  Routledge  &  Sous,  1887,  Pt.  1., 
chap.  4,  p.  24,  after  speaking  of  "  the  imposing  of  '  names,'  and  the  'connec- 
tion of  them,'"  says:  "  When  two  names  are  joined  together  into  a  conse- 
quence, or  affirmation,  as  thus,  'a  man  is  a  living  creature'  ...  if  the  latter 
name  'living  creature,'  signify  all  that  the  former  name  'man'  signiHeth, 
then  the  affirmation,  or  consequence,  is  '  true ' ;  otherwise  '  false.'  For  '  true  ' 
and  'false'  are  attributes  of  speech,  and  not  of  things.  .  .  ."  And  in  the  next 
pai'agraph:  "  Seeing  then  that  truth  consisteth  in  the  right  ordering  of  names 
in  our  affirmations,  a  man  that  seeketh  precise  truth  bad  need  to  remember 
what  every  name  he  uses  stands  for,  and  to  place  it  accordingly."  Leibnitz, 
probably,  had  this  or  some  similar  passage  in  mind,  in  his  i-eferences  to  Hobbes' 
doctrine,  and  his  statement  is  a  possible  and  seemingly  fair  interpretation  of 
many  passages  in  Hobbes'  writings,  which  passages,  however,  might  be  offset 
by  others  of  a  different  character.  Hobbes,  nevertheless,  seems  never  to  have 
gone  beyond  bis  nominalistic  position,  never,  at  least,  so  far  as  consciously  to 
connect  his  doctrine  of  truth  with  the  facts  of  experience  and  the  reality  of 
things ;  while  Leibnitz's  doctrine  of  truth  has  to  a  certain  extent  at  least  an 
objective  reference  in  affirming  an  actual  or  at  least  possible  existence  of  the 
objects  of  ideas,  cf.  ante,  pp.  422,  note  1,  445,  note  2,  infra,  p.  452,  note  1. 

For  further  exposition  of  Holibes'  doctrine,  cf.  G.  Croom  Robertson,  Hobbe.'!, 
pp.  83-90,  espec.  p. 87  (Philos.  Classics),  Edinburgh:  Wm.  Blackwood  &  Sons, 
1886.  On  the  relation  of  Leibnitz  to  Hobbes,  cf.  F.  Tunnies,  Leibniz  und 
Hobbes,  in  the  "  Philos.  Monatshefte,"  vol.  23, 1887,  5.57-573 ;  see  also,  "  Mind," 
No.  .50,  April,  1888,  pp.  312-314.  For  two  letters  of  Leilinitz  to  Hobbes,  cf. 
Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  1,  82-87,  also,  7,  572-574,  where  the  first 
letter  isgiveu  with  an  amended  text.  Leibnitz  appended  to  his  Theodic^e  a 
short  piece  entitled    Reflexions  siir  Vouvrage  que  M.  Hobbes  a  public  en 


cii.  v]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  451 

trutli  depends  on  the  good  pleasure  of  men ;  whicli  is  to  speak 
in  a  very  strange  manner.  You  attribute,  indeed,  truth  to  God, 
who,  you  will  agree  with  me  (I  think),  has  no  need  of  signs. 
Finally,  I  have  been  astonished  already  more  than  once  at  the 
disposition  of  your  friends  who  are  pleased  to  make  essences, 
species,  and  trutlis  nominal. 

Ph.  Do  not  advance  too  fast.  Under  signs  they  include 
ideas.  Thus,  truths  will  be  either  mental  or  nominal,  accord- 
ing to  the  species  of  signs. 

Th.  [We  shall  then  have  also  literal  truths,  which  may  be 
•  distinguished  as  truths  upon  paper  or  parchment,  of  ordinary 
black  ink  or  of  printer's  ink,  if  truths  must  be  distinguished 
by  signs.  It  were  then  better  to  place  truths  in  the  relation 
between  the  objects  of  ideas  which  causes  the  one  to  be  or  not 
to  be  included  in  the  other.  That  does  not  depend  upon 
languages,  and  is  common  to  us  with  God  and  the  angels; 
and  when  God  manifests  a  truth  to  us  we  shall  acquire  that 
which  is  in  his  understanding,  for  although  there  is  an  infi- 
nite difference  between  Ids  ideas  and  ours,  as  regards  perfec- 
tion and  extent,  it  is  always  true  that  they  agree  in  the  same 
relation.  It  is,  then,  in  this  relation  that  truth  must  be  placed, 
and  we  can  distinguish  between  the  trutlis  which  are  inde- 
pendent of  our  good  pleasure,  and  between  the  expressioyis 
which  we  invent  as  seems  good  to  us.] 

§  3.  Ph.  It  is  only  too  true  that  men,  even  in  their  minds, 
put  words  in  the  place  of  things,  especially  when  the  ideas 
are  complex  and  indeterminate.  But  it  is  also  true  as  you 
have  observed,  that  then  the  mind  contents  itself  with  the 
indication  only  of  the  truth,  without  for  the  present  under- 
standing it,  in  the  persuasion  that  it  depends  upon  itself  to 
understand  it  wlien  it  will.  For  the  rest,  the  act  which  takes 
place  in  affirming  or  denying  is  more  easily  conceived  by  re- 
flecting upon  what  goes  on  in  us,  than  explained  in  words. 
Therefore,  you  do  not  take  it  ill  that  in  default  of  some- 
thing better  we  have  spoken  of  joining  together  or  of  sepa- 
rating. §  8.  You  will  also  agree  that  propositions  at  least 
may  be  called  verbal,  and  that,  when  tlic^y  are  true,  they  arc 

Anr/lols,  de  la  liherte,  de  la  7iecessit6  et  du  hasard,  cf.  Gorlianlt,  (»,  388-399, 
Erdmann,  629-634,  Janet,  (Euvres  philos.  de  Leibniz,  2,  424-437,  Duteiis,  1, 
415-429  (in  Latin).  — Tk. 


452  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 


both  verbal  and  also  real,  for,  §  9.  falsehood  consists  in  joining- 
names  otherwise  than  as  their  ideas  agree  or  disagree.  §  10. 
Words  are  at  least  great  vehicles  of  truth.  §  11.  There  is  also 
a  moral  truth,  which  consists  in  speaking  of  things  according 
to  the  persuasion  of  our  mind;  there  is  finally  metaphysical 
truth  which  is  the  real  existence  of  things  in  conformity  to 
the  ideas  we  have  of  them. 

Th.  [Moral  truth  is  by  some  called  veracity,  and  metaphysi- 
cal truth  is  commonly  taken  by  the  metaphysicians  as  an 
attribute  of  being,  but  it  is  an  attribute  very  useless  and 
almost  void  of  meaning.  Let  us  content  ourselves  with  seek- 
ing truth  in  the  correspondence  of  the  propositions  in  the 
mind  with  the  things  in  question.  It  is  true  that  I  have  also 
attributed  truth  to  ideas  in  saying  that  ideas  are  true  or  false ; 
but  then  I  mean,  in  reality,  the  truth  of  propositions  ailirming 
the  possibility  of  the  object  of  the  idea.  In  the  same  sense 
we  can  say  also  that  a  being  is  true,  that  is  to  say,  the  propo- 
sition affirming  its  actual,  or  at  least,  possible  existence.]  ^ 


CHAPTER  VI 

OF    UNIVERSAL    PROPOSITIONS,    THEIR    TRUTH    AND    CERTITUDE. 

§  2.  Ph.  All  our  knowledge  is  of  general  or  particular 
truths.  We  can  never  make  the  former,  which  are  the  most 
important,  well  understood,  and  can  ourselves,  indeed,  very 
rarely  comprehend  them  save  as  they  are  conceived  and  ex- 
pressed by  words. 

Th.  [I  think  that  other  marks  also  can  produce  this  effect; 
we  see  it  in  the  characters  of  the  Chinese.     A  iiniversal  char- 

1  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  32,  ante,  p.  281,  and  notes;  also  Bk.  HI., 
chap.  3,  ante,  p.  317,  note  3;  and  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  1,  ante,  pp.  .397-8.  Locke  in  the 
first  of  these  passages  agrees  with  the  view  of  Aristotle,  De  Interpret.,  1,  16", 
12,  that  truth  or  falsity  is  predicable  not  of  single  ideas,  bnt  only  of  their  union 
in  judgments  or  propositions;  and  Leibnitz  in  the  present  passage  maintains 
essentially  the  same  doctrine  in  saying  that  by  the  truth  he  attributes  to  ideas 
he  means  the  truth  of  the  ijropositions  affirming  the  possibility  of  the  objects 
of  the  ideas.  Such  "  true  "  or  "  false  "  ideas  must,  then,  be  regarded  simply 
as  abbreviated  ijropositions,  or  as  tacitly  involving  propositions.  The  idea  of 
the  decaliedron  {rf.  ante,  p.  315,  and  note  1)  is  false,  although  we  have  its 
nominal  defiuition,  because  the  figure  is  impossible.  —  Tr. 


CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  453 

acteristic  ^  very  popular  and  better  than  theirs  might  be  intro- 
duced, if  small  figures  were  employed  in  the  place  of  words, 
which  would  repre,sent  visible  things  by  their  lines,  and  the 
invisible  by  the  visible  which  accompany  them,  adding  thereto 
certain  additional  marks  suitable  to  make  understood  the  flex- 
ions and  the  particles.  This  would  be  of  service  at  first  for 
easy  communication  with  distant  nations;  but  if  introduced 
also  among  us  without,  however,  renouncing  ordinary  writing, 
the  employment  of  this  mode  of  writing  would  be  very  useful 
in  enriching  the  imagination,  and  in  giving  thoiights  less  surd 
and  verbal  than  we  now  have.  It  is  true  that  the  art  of  draw- 
ing not  being  known  by  all,  it  follows  that,  excepting  the 
books  printed  in  this  way  (which  everybody  would  soon  learn 
to  read),  everybody  could  not  avail  themselves  of  it  otherwise 
than  by  a  method  of  printing,  i.e.  having  the  figures  all  en- 
graved ready  for  printing  upon  paper,  and  adding  thereto 
afterwards  with  the  pen  the  marks  of  the  flexions  or  particles. 
But  in  time  everybody  would  learn  the  plan  in  youth,  so  as 
not  to  be  deprived  of  the  convenience  of  this  figured  character, 
which  ivould  speaTc  in  truth  to  the  eyes,  and  would  be  very 
agreeable  to  the  people,  just  as  in  fact  the  peasants  already 
have  certain  almanacs,  telling  them  without  words  much  that 
they  ask;  and  I  remember  to  have  seen  some  satirical  impres- 
sions in  copper-plate  which  possessed  a  somewhat  enigmatical 
character  in  which  there  were  figures  significant  of  themselves, 
mingled  with  words, ^  while  our  letters  and  the  Chinese  char- 
acters are  significant  only  by  the  will  of  men  (eic  instituto). 

§  3.  Ph.  [I  think  your  thoughts  will  some  day  be  carried 
out,  so  agreeable  and  natural  appears  to  me  this  writing,  and 
it  seems  to  be  of  no  little  consequence  for  increasing  the  per- 
fection of  our  mind,  and  rendering  our  conceptions  more  real.] 
But  to  return  to  general  knowledge  and  its  certainty,  it  will 
be  proper  to  remark  that  there  is  a  certainty  of  truth  and  also 
a  certainty  of  knowledge.  (^When  words  are  so  joined  in  propo- 
sitions that  they  express  exactly  the  agreement  or  disagree- 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  375,  notel. 

2  Probably  sonietbing  similar  to  what  is  now  known  by  the  term  "Rebus." 
For  a  brief  statement  of  the  flevelopment  of  writing  from  the  picture  stage, 
its  earliest  form,  to  the  alphabetic  as  we  now  have  it,  cf.  E.  Benj.  Andrews, 
Institutes  of  Gen.  Hist.,  chap.  2,  §  1.'3,  p.  41),  2d  ed.  Boston:  Silver,  Burdett  & 
Co.,  1888.  — Tk. 


454  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

inent  as  it  really  is,  it  is  a  certainty  of  truth;  and  tlie  cer- 
tainty of  knowledge  consists  in  perceiving  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  ideas  so  far  as  it  is  expressed  in  propositions^ 
Tliis  is  what  we  ordinarily  call  being  certain  of  a  proposition.  ^ 

Th.  [In  fact  this  last  kind  of  certainty  will  also  suffice  with- 
out the  use  of  words,  and  is  nothing  else  than  a  perfect  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth ;  while  the  lirst  kind  of  certainty  appears  to 
be  nothing  else  than  the  truth  itself.] 

§  4.  Ph.  jSToav  as  we  cannot  be  assured  of  the  truth  of  any 
general  proposition,  unless  we  know  the  precise  limits  of  the 
signilication  of  the  terms  of  which  it  is  composed,  it  will  be 
necessary  for  us  to  know  the  essence  of  each  species,  which  is 
not  difficult  as  regards  the  simple  ideas  and  the  modes.  But  in 
substances  wherein  a  real  essence  distinct  from  the  nominal 
is  supposed  to  determine  the  species,  the  extent  of  the  gene- 
ral term  is  very  uncertain,  because  we  do  not  know  this  real 
essence;  and  consequently  in  this  sense  we  cannot  be  assured 
of  any  general  jyojyositiori  made  upon  the  basis  of  these  sub- 
stances. But  when  we  suppose  the  species  of  substances  to 
be  nothing  else  than  the  reduction  of  substantial  individuals 
into  certain  sorts,  arranged  under  different  general  names 
according  as  they  agree  with  the  different  abstract  ideas  which 
we  designate  by  these  names,  we  cannot  doubt  whether  a  prop- 
osition, well  known  as  it  should  be,  is  true  or  not. 

TJi.  [I  do  not  know  why  you,  sir,  return  again  to  a  point 
sufficiently  discussed  by  us,  and  which  I  believe  an  empty  one. 
But,  after  all,  I  am  very  glad  of  it,  because  you  give  me  an  op- 
portunity very  suitable  (it  seems  to  me)  to  disabuse  you  anew. 
I  say  then  to  you  that  we  can  be  assured,  for  example,  of  a 
thousand  truths  regarding  gold,  or  that  body  whose  internal 
essence  makes  itself  known  by  the  greatest  weight  known  here 
below,  or  by  the  greatest  ductility,  or  by  other  marks.  For 
we  say  that  the  body  of  the  greatest  known  ductility  is  also 
the  heaviest  of  all  known  bodies.  It  is  true  that  it  is  not 
impossible  that  all  which  has  hitherto  been  noticed  in  gold 
will  some  day  be  found  in  two  bodies  distinguishable  by  other 
new  qualities,  and  that  thus  gold  would  no  longer  be  the  low- 
est species,  as  it  has  hitherto  been  regarded  provisionally. 
We  might  also,  if  the  one  kind  remained  rare,  and  the  other 
became   common,    think    it   proper   to   reserve   the   name   of 


DH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  455 


true  gold  to  the  single  rare  species,  in  order  to  retain  it  in 
use  as  money  by  means  of  new  assays  which  would  be  suited 
bo  it.  After  which  we  shall  not  doubt,  also,  that  the  internal 
essence  of  these  two  species  is  different;  and  if  indeed  the 
definition  of  an  actually  existing  substance  should  not  be 
fully  determined  in  all  respects  (as  in  fact,  that  of  men  is  not 
as  regards  the  external  figure),  we  should  not  cease  to  have 
an  infinite  number  of  general  propositions  upon  its  subject, 
which  would  follow  from  reason  and  the  other  qualities  which 
we  recognize  in  it.  All  that  we  can  say  regarding  these  gen- 
,eral  propositions  is,  that  in  case  man  is  taken  as  the  lowest 
species  and  restricted  to  the  race  of  Adam,  we  shall  have  no 
properties  of  man  such  as  are  named  in  qiiarto  modo,^  ov  may 

1  The  term  i?i  quarto  modo,  here  used  by  Leibnitz,  refers  to  a  classification 
oi propria  —  iSia,  properties  —  existent  in  the  time  of  Porpliyry,  233-304,  thougli 
not  accepted  by  him,  —  cf.  Eio-aywyTJ,  chap.  4,  4«,  14  (in  Aristotle,  ed.  Berl. 

lAcad.,  Vol.  4,  p.  4)  :  to  £e  I&lov  SiaipoOat  riTpa\ui<;  .  .  .  (18.)  TirapTov  Se  e</)'  ov  avv- 
SeSpdfxrjKe  to  /udi'o)  Kal  TauTi  Kal  ad,  U)S  Toi  avOpuinto  to  yeAotrTixoi'  .  .  .   (22.)  TauTa  6e  Koi 

Kvpioi<;  ISlo.  </)7)(Tti',  oTi  Kal  avTL(TTpi<j>ei.  —  and  due,  j)erhaps,  to  some  one  of  the  old 
Peripatetics,  and  prevalent  in  different  forms  in  the  Middle  Age,  according  to 
which  classification  as  given  by  Porphyry  there  were  four  classes :  1.  Propria 
belonging  to  one  species  only,  but  not  to  every  individual  thereof,  as  gram- 
matical to  man;  2.  Propria  belonging  to  every  individual  of  the  species,  but 
not  to  this  species  alone,  as  biped  to  man  ;  3.  Propria  belonging  to  one  species 
only  and  to  every  individual  thereof,  but  not  always,  as  hoary  to  man ;  4.  Pro- 
pria belonging  to  one  species  only,  to  every  individual  thereof,  always,  as 
risihilitfi  or  risible  to  man. 

The  propria  of  this  fourth  class — quartus  modus  —  are,  each,  of  equal 
breadth  with  its  subject,  and,  though  no  part  of  the  essence  of  the  species  of 
which  they  are  predicated,  —  man,  for  example,  without  the  proprium  risible, 
still  being  man,  —  as  a  matter  of  fact  belong  to  every  individual  of  the  species 
on  all  occasions,  and  to  no  individual  of  any  other  species.  Propositions  predi- 
cating such  propria  are  judgments  in  A,  according  to  Archbisliop  Tliomson's 
terminology,  of  the  type  "Common  Salt  is  Chloride  of  Sodium,"  and  are  of 
course  convertible. 

Propria  of  this  fourth  class  alone,  i.e.  pi'opria  each  of  which  would  be  coinci- 
dent with  its  subject  so  as  to  be  enouncible  in  a  j  udgment  in  A  —  reciprocal  —  con- 
stitute the  fourth  predicable,  and  answer  to  the  l&iov  of  Aristotle  and  Porpliyry, 
and  the  proprium  of  Appuleius,  Marcianus  Capella  and  Boethius.  These 
writers,  with  the  exception  of  Aristotle,  to  whom  probably  the  four-fold  divis- 
ion of  propria,  was  unknown,  regard  the  other  tliree  classes,  wliiuh  were  pro- 
pria according  to  the  Middle  Age  sclioolmen,  as  accidents,  —  accidentia,  aviJ.^e- 
^rjKOTa,  —  a  fact  which  explains  the  somewliat  peculiar  language  of  Leibnitz: 
"We  shall  have  no  properties  of  man  such  as  {of  the  sort  that)  are  nameil  in 
quarto  modo,"  etc.  Leibnitz's  thought  is  this :  "  In  the  case  of '  man '  "  taken 
as  the  lowest  species  —  species  infimxc  —  and  "limited  to  Adam's  race,  there  is, 
except  provisionally,  no  such  propriiim.  '  Solo-rational-animal '  would  l)e, 
provisionally,  such  a  propriian,  because  up  till  now  \vi^  know  no  m(>n  wlioiii  it 


456  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  i\ 

be  enounced  concerning  liim  by  a  reciprocal  or  simply  conver- 
tible proposition,  unless  provisionally,  as  in  saying:  vian  ii 
the  only  rational  animal.  Taking  man  as  those  of  our  race, 
the  provisional  consists  in  the  assumption  that  he  is  the  onlj 
rational  animal  of  those  known  to  us;  for  we  might  som( 
day  find  other  animals  who  would  have  in  common  with  th( 
posterity  of  men  of  the  present  time  all  that  which  we  hav( 
hitherto  observed  in  them,  but  who  Avould  have  another  origin 
It  is  as  if  the  so-called  Australians  should  overrun  our  coun 
tries :  in  all  likelihood  we  should  then  discover  some  means  o: 
distinguishing  them  from  ourselves.  But  in  case  this  shoulc 
not  happen,  and  supposing  that  God  had  forbidden  this  mixt 
ure  of  these  races,  and  that  Jesus  Christ  had  redeemed  our; 
only,  it  would  be  necessary  to  try  to  make  some  artificial  mark 
in  order  to  distinguish  between  them.  There  would  doubtles 
be  an  internal  difference,  but  as  it  would  not  make  itself  recog 
nizable,  we  should  be  reduced  to  the  extrinsic  denomination  o 
birth  alone  which  we  should  try  to  accompany  with  a  durabl 
artificial  mark  that  would  give  an  intrinsic  denomination,  an( 
a  constant  means  of  distinguishing  our  race  from  the  others 
These  are  all  fictions,  for  we  have  no  need  to  recur  to  thes 
distinctions,  being  the  only  rational  animals  of  this  globe 
Yet  these  fictions  are  useful  in  knowing  the  natures  of  ideas 
substances,  and  truths  general  in  their  character.  But  if  ma: 
were  not  taken  as  the  loioest  species  nor  as  that  of  the  rationa 
animals  of  the  race  of  Adam,  and  if,  instead  of  that,  he  signifiei 
a  genus  common  to  several  species,  which  belonged  now  to 
single  known  race,  but  which  might  belong  also  to  other 
distinguishable  either  by  birth  or  even  by  their  natural  marks 
as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  the  supposed  Australians 
then,  I  say,  this  genus  would  have  recipirocal  propositions,  ani 
the  present  definition  of  man  would  not  be  provisional.     It  i 

would  not  fit,  and  know  of  no  other  si^ecies  any  of  whose  individuals  it  woul 
fit.  Only  provisionally,  however,  for  future  discoveries  may  show,  in  eithe 
of  these  respects,  that '  sole-rational-animal,'  and  '  man '  are  not  exactly  coinc 
dent  concepts."  On  the  whole  subject,  cf.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Lor/ik,  Vol.  ; 
pp.  M3,  .S95,  425,  581,  58i,  630,  G74,  G76,"  C,'J6,  Vol.  2,  pp.  342-343,  Vol.  ; 
p.  102,  Vol.  4,  p.  241,  note  .383;  Aldrich,  Artis  Logicss  Rudimenta,  ed.  Manse 
Oxford,  1856,  pp.  32-34. 

I  would  add  that  for  much  of  the  material  as  well  as  of  the  language  of  th 
above  note,  I  am  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  Pres.  E.  B.  Andrews  of  Brow 
University.  —  Tr. 


3H.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  457 


the  same  with  gold;  for  suppose  that  some  day  there  were  two 
kinds  of  it  distinguishable,  the  one  rare  and  hitherto  unknown, 
the  other  common  and  perhaps  artificial,  discovered  in  the 
course  of  time;  then  suj^pose  that  the  name  gold  should 
continue  for  the  present  species,  i.e.  for  the  natural  and  rare 
gold,  in  order  to  preserve  by  its  means  the  commodity  of  gold 
money,  based  upon  the  rarity  of  this  substance,  its  definition 
known  hitherto  by  intrinsic  denominations  would  have  been 
provisional  only,  and  should  be  augmented  by  new  marks 
which  will  be  discovered,  to  distinguish  the  rare  gold  or  the 
ancient  species  from  the  new  artificial  gold.  But  if  the  name 
gold  should  then  remain  common  to  the  two  species,  i.e.  if 
by  gold  you  mean  a  genus  of  which  up  to  the  present  time  we 
know  no  subdivision,  and  which  we  now  take  as  the  lowest 
species  (but  only  provisionally  until  the  subdivision  is  known) 
I  and  if  some  day  a  new  species  were  found,  i.e.  an  artificial 
gold,  easy  to  make,  and  which  might  become  common;  I  say 
that  in  this  sense  the  definition  of  this  genus  should  not  be 
judged  provisional,  but  perpetual.  And  indeed,  without 
troubling  ourselves  with  the  names  man  or  gold,  whatever 
name  is  given  to  the  genus  or  to  the  lowest  known  species, 
and  even  if  none  should  be  given  them,  what  has  just  been 
said  would  be  always  true  of  ideas,  genera  or  species,  and 
species  will  be  defined  provisionally  only  by  the  definitions  of 
genera.  But  it  will  always  be  allowable  and  reasonable  to 
assume,  by  means  of  a  reciprocal  proposition,  that  there  is  a 
real  internal  essence  belonging  either  to  the  genus  or  the 
species,  which  makes  itself  known  ordinarily  by  external  marks. 
I  have  assumed  hitherto  that  the  race  does  not  degenerate  or 
change;  but  if  the  same  race  passed  into  another  species,  we 
should  be  so  much  the  more  obliged  to  recur  to  other  marks 
and  denominations  intrinsic  or  extrinsic,  without  confining 
ourselves  to  the  race. 

§  7.  Ph.  Complex  ideas,  which  the  names  we  give  to  the 
species  of  substances  justify,  are  collections  of  ideas  of  certain 
qualities  which  we  have  observed  coexisting  in  an  unknown  sub- 
stratum  which  we  call  substance.  But  we  cannot  know  cer- 
tainly what  other  qualities  coexist  necessarily  with  such  com- 
binations, unless  we  can  discover  their  dependence  as  regards 
their  primary  qualities. 


458  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 


Th.  I  liave  already  remarked  before  that  the  same  (diffi- 
culty) is  found  in  the  ideas  of  accidents,  whose  nature  is  a 
little  abstruse,  as,  for  example,  are  the  figures  in  geometry; 
for  wlien  the  question  concerns,  for  example,  the  figure  of  ;i 
mirror  wliicli  collects  all  the  parallel  rays  into  one  point  as  a 
focus,  many  properties  of  this  mirror  may  be  found  before  its 
construction  is  known,  but  we  shall  be  uncertain  about  many 
other  relations  it  may  have,  until  we  find  in  it  that  which 
corresponds  to  the  internal  constitution  of  substances,  i.e.  the 
construction  of  this  figure  of  the  mirror,  which  will  constitute 
as  it  were  the  key  to  ulterior  knowledge.] 

Ph.  But  if  we  had  known  the  internal  constitution  of  this 
body,  we  should  have  found  therein  only  the  dependence 
which  the  primary,  or  what  you  call  manifest,  qualities  may 
have,  i.e.  you  would  know  what  size,  figure,  and  moving  force 
depend  thereupon;  but  we  should  never  know  the  connection 
which  they  may  have  with  the  secondary  or  confused  qucdities, 
i.e.  with  the  sensible  qualities,  as  colors,  tastes,  etc. 

Th.  The  fact  is,  you  still  assume  that  these  sensible  quali- 
ties, or  rather  the  ideas  we  have  of  them,  do  not  depend  upon 
figure  and  movement  in  a  natural  way,  but  only  upon  the 
good  pleasure  of  God,  who  gives  us  these  ideas.  You  appear 
to  have  forgotten,  sir,  the  remonstrance  I  have  more  than  once 
made  to  you  against  this  opinion,  in  order  to  make  you  think 
rather  that  these  sensitive  ideas  depend  in  detail  upon  the  fig- 
ures and  movements,  and  express  them  exactly,  although  we 
cannot  distinguish  therein  this  detail  in  the  confusion  of 
too  great  a  multitude  and  minuteness  of  mechanical  actions 
which  strike  our  senses.  But  if  we  had  reached  the  internal 
constitution  of  some  bodies,  Ave  should  see  also  how  they  must 
have  these  qualities,  which  would  themselves  be  reduced  to 
their  intelligible  reasons ;  although  it  would  never  be  in  oiir 
power  to  recognize  them  sensibl}^  in  these  sensitive  ideas 
which  are  a  confused  resultant  of  the  actions  of  bodies  upon 
us,  as,  now  that  we  have  the  perfect  analysis  of  green  into  blue 
and  yellow,  ^  and  have  scarcely  anj^thing  more  to  ask  in  regard 
to  it  save  as  related  to  these  ingredients,  we  are,  however, 
incaj^able  of  analyzing  the  ideas  of   blue  and  yellow  in  our 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  320,  note  1 ;  also  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Th.  Burnett,  without  date, 
but  written,  according  to  Gerhardt,  in  1699,  G.,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3, 
250.  —  Tr. 


,  CH.  VI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  459 

sensitive  idea  of  green,  for  tlie  very  reason  that  it  is  a  con- 
, fused  idea.  It  is  uiucli  the  same  as  we  cannot  analyze  the 
idea  of  the  teeth  of  the  wheel,  i.e.  of  the  cause,  in  tlie  percep- 
tion of  an  artificial  transparency,  which  I  have  noticed  among 
the  clock-makers,  made  by  the  rapid  rotation  of  a  cog-wheel, 
whicli  makes  the  teeth  disappear,  and  an  imaginary  continu- 
ous transparency  appear  in  their  place,  composed  of  the  suc- 
cessive appearances  of  the  teeth  and  their  intervals,  but  in 
which  the  succession  is  so  rapid  that  our  phantasy  cannot  dis- 
tinguish it.  We  find  then,  indeed,  these  teeth  in  the  distinct 
notion  of  this  transparency,  but  not  in  this  confused  sensitive 
perception,  whose  nature  is  to  be  and  to  remain  confused; 
otherwise  if  the  confusion  ceased  (as  if  the  motion  were  so 
slow  that  we  could  observe  its  parts  and  their  succession) 
this  notion,  i.e.  this  phantasm^  of  a  transparency  would  no 
longer  exist.  And  as  there  is  no  need  of  imagining  that 
God  for  his  good  pleasure  gives  us  this  phantasm,  and  that 
it  is  independent  of  the  movement  of  the  teeth  of  the  wheel 
and  their  intervals,  and  as,  on  the  contrary,  we  conceive  it 
to  be  only  a  confused  expression  of  what  takes  place  in  this 
movement,  an  expression,  I  say,  that  consists  in  the  fact  that 
these  successive  things  are  confounded  in  an  apparent  simul- 
taneity: it  is  thus  easy  to  think  that  it  will  be  the  same  as 
regards  other  sensitive  ]}liantasms,  of  which  we  have  not  as  yet 
so  perfect  an  analysis,  as  of  colors,  tastes,  etc.  For,  to  speak 
the  trutli,  they  deserve  this  name  phantasms  rather  than  that 
of  qualities  or  even  of  ideas.  And  it  would  suifice  us  in  all 
respects  to  understand  them  as  well  as  this  artificial  trans- 
parency, without  its  being  reasonable  or  possible  to  claim 
a  further  knowledge  of  them;  for  to  desire  these  confused 
phantasms  to  abide,  and  yet  to  distinguish  therein  their  in- 
gredients by  the  phantasy  itself,  is  a  contradiction,  is  a  desire 
to  have  the  pleasure  of  being  deceived  by  an  agreeable  per- 
spective, and  to  desire  that  at  the  same  time  the  eye  see  the  de- 
ception, wliich  would  destroy  it.     It  is  a  case,  in  short,  Avhere  — 

niliilo  phis  agas 
Quaiii  si  des  operam,  ut  cum  rationc  insanias.^ 

1(7/".  ante,  p.  445,  note  1.  Schaarschmidt  here  translates:  "Phantasie- 
Erscheinung  "  ;  in  line  17  of  this  page,  "  Pliantasievorstellung  "  ;  in  lines  24,  20, 
31,  "Erschoiimngcn."  —  Tii. 

2  Terence,  Eun.,  1.  1.  17,  18.  — Tr. 


■ir.O  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [rk.  iv 

lUit  it  often  happens  that  men  seek  nodum  in  scirpo  ^  and  make 
difficulties  where  there  are  none,  by  demanding  the  impossible, 
and  after^Yards  complaining  of  their  impotence  and  of  the 
limits  of  their  light. 

§  8.  Ph.  All  gold  isjixed  is  a  proposition,  the  truth  of  which 
we  cannot  certainly  know.  For  if  gold  signifies  a  species  of 
things,  distinguished  by  a  real  essence,  which  nature  has 
given  it,  we  are  ignorant  what  particular  substances  are  of 
this  species.  Thus,  although  this  maybe  gold,  we  cannot  affirm 
it  with  certainty.  If  we  take  gold  as  a  body  endowed  with  a  cer- 
tain yelloAV  color,  malleable,  fusible,  heavier  than  any  known 
body,  it  is  not  difficult  to  know  what  is  or  is  not  gold;  but 
with  all  that,  no  other  quality  can  be  affirmed  or  denied  with 
certainty  of  gold,  than  that  which  has  a  connection  with  this 
idea,  according  to  a  connection  or  incompatibility  which  may 
be  discovered.^  Now  fixity  having  no  known  connection  with 
color,  weight,  and  the  other  simple  ideas  which  I  have  sup- 
posed to  constitute  the  complex  idea  we  have  of  gold,  it  is 
impossible  that  we  can  know  with  certainty  the  truth  of  this 
proposition,  that  all  gold  is  fixed. 

Th.  We  know  almost  as  certainly  that  the  heaviest  of  all 
bodies  known  here  below  is  fixed,  as  we  know  certainly  that 
it  will  be  light  to-morrow.  This  is  because  we  have  tried  it  a 
hundred  thousand  times ;  it  is  an  experimental  certainty,  and 
of  fact,  although  we  do  not  know  the  bond  which  unites  the 
fixity  with  the  other  qualities  of  this  body.  Moreover,  it  is 
unnecessary  to  oppose  two  things  which  agree  and  amount  to 
the  same  thing.  When  I  think  of  a  body,  which  is  at  the 
same  time  yellow,  fusible,  and  which  resists  the  cupel,  I  think 
of  a  body  whose  specific  essence,  although  unknown  in  its 
interior,  makes  these  qualities  emanate  from  its  depths,  and 
makes  itself  known  confusedly  at  least  by  means  of  them.  I 
see  nothing  wrong  in  that,  nor  anything  which  requires  you  to 
return  so  often  to  the  charge  in  order  to  attack  it. 

§  10.  Ph.  It  is  enough  for  me  now  that  this  knowledge  of 
the  fixity  of  the  heaviest  of  bodies  is  not  known  to  us  by  the 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  226,  note  1.  — Tr. 

2  According  to  the  texts  of  Gerhardt  and  Erdmanu.  Jacques  and  Janet 
read :  "  Que  ce  qui  a  avec  cette  idee  une  connexion  ou  une  incompatibilite 
qu'on  pent  decouvrir  " ;  i.e.  tlian  that  which  has  a  discoTerable  connection 
or  incompatibility  with  this  idea,  —  Tr. 


cii.  VI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  461 

agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas.  And  I  for  myself  tlunk 
that  among  tlie  secondary  qualities  of  bodies  and  the  powers 
relating  to  them  there  cannot  any  two  be  named  whose  neces- 
sary coexistence  or  incompatibility  can  be  known  with  cer- 
tainty, except  the  qualities  which,  belong  to  the  same  sense 
and  necessarily  exclude  one  another,  as  when  you  can  say  that 
what  is  white  is  not  black. 

Th.  I  believe,  however,  that  you  might  perhaps  find  them; 
for  example,  every  palpable  body  (or  that  Avhich  may  be  felt 
by  touch)  is  visible.  Every  hard  body  makes  a  noise  when 
struck  in  the  air.  The  tones  of  strings  or  wires  are  serai-pro- 
portional to  the  weights  which  cause  their  tension.  It  is  true 
that  what  you  ask  succeeds  only  as  far  as  you  conceive  distinct 
ideas  united  with  confused  sensitive  ideas. 

§  11.  Ph.  It  is  not  always  necessary  to  think  that  bodies 
have  their  qualities  by  themselves  independently  of  anything 
else.  A  piece  of  gold,  separated  from  the  impression  and 
influence  of  every  other  body,  would  immediately  lose  its 
yellow  color  and  weight;  perhaps,  also,  it  would  become 
friable  and  lose  its  malleability.  You  know  how  vegetables 
and  animals  depend  upon  the  earth,  air,  and  sun;  how  do  you 
know  whether  the  very  distant  fixed  stars  have  not  also  an 
influence  upon  us? 

Th.  This  is  a  very  excellent  remark;  and  if  the  contexture 
of  certain  bodies  were  known  to  us,  we  could  not  judge  wliolly 
of  tlieir  effects  without  knowing  the  interior  of  those  which 
touch  and  traverse  them. 

§  13.  Ph.  Our  judgment,  however,  may  go  further  than 
our  knowledge.  For  people  sedulous  in  making  observations 
I '.an  penetrate  farther,  and  by  means  of  certain  probabilities 
lesulting  from  an  exact  observation  and  by  certain  hints  pur- 
posely put  together,  often  make  just  conjectures  regarding 
that  which  experience  has  not  yet  discovered  to  them;  but  it 
is  always  only  conjecture. 

Th.  But  if  experience  justifies  these  consequences  in  a  con- 
stant manner,  do  you  not  find  that  you  can  acquire  certain 
l»ropositions  by  this  means?  Certain,  I  say,  at  least  as  those 
which  assert,  for  example,  that  the  lieaviest  of  our  Ijodies  is 
fixed  and  that  the  one  which  is  after  it  the  heaviest  is  volatile, 
for  it  seems  to  me  that  the  certainty  (understanding  it  as  moral 


462  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OE   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

or  physical),  but  not  the  necessity  (or  metaphysical  certainty)  of 
these  propositions  which  are  learned  by  experience  alone  and 
not  by  analysis  and  the  bond  of  ideas,  is  established  among 
us  and  with  reason.^ 


CHAPTER  VII 

OF    PROPOSITIONS    CALLED    MAXIMS    OR    AXIOMS 

§  1.  Ph.  There  is  one  species  of  propositions  which  under 
the  name  of  maxims  or  axioms  pass  as  p^^'inciples  of  science, 
and  because  they  are  self-evident,  we  have  been  contented  to 
call  them  innate,  although  no  one  that  I  knoiv  of  has  ever  tried 
to  show  the  reason  and  ground  of  their  extreme  clearness, 
which  forces  us,  so  to  speak,  to  give  them  our  consent.  It  is 
not,  however,  useless  to  enter  into  this  investigation  and  to 
see  whether  this  great  evidence  is  peculiar  to  these  proposi- 
tions alone,  as  also  to  examine  how  far  they  contribute  to 
our  knowledge. 

Th.  This  investigation  is  very  useful  and  very  important. 
But  you  must  not  suppose,  sir,  that  it  has  been  entirely 
neglected.  You  will  find  in  a  hundred  places  that  the  Scho- 
I'lastics  have  said  that  these  propositions  are  evident  ex  ter- 
'  minis,  as  soon  as  the  terms  are  understood,  so  that  they 
were  persuaded  that  the  force  of  conviction  was  grounded  in 
the  knowledge  of  the  terms,  i.e.  in  the  connection  of  their 
ideas.     But  geometers  have  done  very  much  more:  that  is 

1  Metaphysical  and  moi-al  or  physical  certainty  differ  as  the  certainty  of  the 
truths  of  reason  and  the  truths  of  fact.  The  truths  of  reason  ground  them- 
selves in  the  necessities  of  thought,  and  their  certainty  is  accordingly  ahsolute. 
The  truths  of  fact,  in  Leihnitz's  view,  rest  upon  the  divine  choice  of  the  best, 
and  have  an  evidence  merely  relative  and  established  with  the  aid  of  experi- 
ence; their  necessity  is  accordingly  only  hyiiothetical.  Cf.  Neiv  Essays,  Bk. 
II.,  chap.  21,  §  8,  Th.,  ante,  pp.  17'J-180,  and  §  18,  Th.,  ante,  p.  183.  The  prin- 
ciple upon  which  the  whole  matter  depends  is  the  famous  distinction  of  the 
media3val  scholastics  between  the  understanding  and  the  will  of  God,  a  prin- 
ciple to  which  Leibnitz  very  often  recurs,  especially  in  order  to  maintain  the 
contingency  of  the  world,  and  to  escape  from  the  universal  fatalism  of 
Spinoza.  According  to  this  principle,  the  understanding  of  God  is  the  source 
of  the  necessary  truths,  and  the  will  of  God  the  source  of  the  contingent  truths. 
The  distinction,  however,  does  not  solve  the  problem  either  of  the  contingency 
of  the  physical  universe  or  of  the  moral  freedom  of  man.  —  Tk. 


CH.  vn]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  463 

they  have  undertaken  very  often  to  demonstrate  them.^  Pro- 
clus  already  attributes  to  Thales  of  Miletus,  one  of  the 
oldest  known  geometers,  the  wish  to  demonstrate  the  proposi- 
tions which  Euclid  has  since  assumed  as  evident.^  It  is  said 
that  Apollonius  has  demonstrated  other  axioms,  and  Proclus 
has  also  done  so.  The  late  Mr.  Roberval,  already  eighty 
years  old  or  thereabouts,  intended  to  publish  the  new  ele- 
ments of  geometry  of  which  I  think  I  have  already  spoken  to 
you.^  Perhaps  the  "New  Elements"  of  Arnauld,  which  at 
that  time  made  some  stir,  had  contributed  thereto.*  He 
exhibited  specimens  of  them  in  the  Royal  Academy  of  Sciences, 
and  some  found  fault  that  assuming  this  axiom,  if  equal  mag- 

1  Leibnitz  frequently  refers,  both  in  the  Netv  Essays  and  elsewhere,  to 
the  demonstrability  of  the  axioms,  and  the  thouglit  was  evidently  a  favorite 
one  with  him.  It  is  a  weiglity  thought,  too;  for  all  real  advance  in  specula- 
tive and  truly  and  lastingly  constructive  thinking  rests  upon  just  this  "  work- 
ing-over of  the  notions,"  as  Herbart  expresses  it,  this  deeper  jienetration  into 
their  real  meaning  and  content,  and  its  exposition  in  the  simplest  possible 
intelligible  forms.  — Tr. 

2  Proclus  cites  Thales  of  Miletus  in  prop.  XV.,  theor.  VIII.,  of  his  In 
primum  Euclidis  Elementorum  lib.  Commentarii,  ex  recog.  G.  Friedleiu, 
p.  299.  Thales,  c.  624-c.  550  B.C. ,  was  the  foun<ler  of  the  Greek  geometry,  astron- 
omy, and  philosophy.  For  his  geometry,  cf.  G.  J.  Allman,  Greek  Geometry 
from  Thales  to  Euclid,  Dublin,  1889;  for  his  philosophy,  cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d. 
Griech.,  I.,  1  [Vol.  1],  180-19G,  5th  ed.,  Leipzig,  1892.  — Tit". 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  107,  note  1.  — Tr. 

■*  The  work  of  Antoine  Arnauld,  1612-1694,  here  referred  to  is  the  Nouveaux 
Elemens  de  Geometric,  Paris,  1G()1,  mentioned  among  the  most  prominent 
books  of  that  time  by  Ch.  Wolf  in  his  Kurzer  Unterricht  v.  d.  vornehmsten 
math.  Schrift.,  Wien,  176o.  Arnauld  was  an  excellent  mathematician,  an  able 
philosopher  and  theologian,  a  celebrated  controversialist,  and  the  indefatigable 
champion  and  mouthpiece  of  the  Jansenists  against  the  Jesuits.  A  zealous 
Catholic,  he  repeatedly  tried  to  convert  Leibnitz  to  that  faith.  Leibnitz's 
correspondence  with  him  contains  important  matter  regarding  his  own  philos- 
ophy. It  was  originally  edited  and  published  by  C.  L.  Grotefend,  Briefwechsel 
z.  Leibniz,  Arnauld  u.  d.  Landgrafen  Ernst  v.  Ilessen-Rheinfels  aus  d.  Hand- 
schriften  der  Konif/l.  Bibliothek  z.  Hannover,  Hanover,  1846,  and  was  re- 
printed conformal)ly  to  Grotefend's  text  by  Janet,  (Euvres  philos.  de  Leibniz, 
Vol.  1,  pp.  577-691,  and,  with  a  new  comparison  of  the  original  Mss.,  by  Ger- 
hardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  Vol.  2,  pp.  ll-i;{8;  cf.  also  his  Einleitung,  ib. 
p.  5  sq.,  and  Vol.  1,  p.  65,  and  for  Leibnitz's  first  letter,  unanswered,  to  Ar- 
nauld, ib.  68-82  (Grotefend,  op.  cit.  137  sq.). 

Arnauld's  (Euvres  completes,  with  a  life  by  Larriere,  appeared  at  Paris  and 
Lausanne,  1775-178."?,  45  vols..  Vols.  158-40  containing  the  philosopliical  works. 
Of  these  the  most  important  are :  I)es  vraies  et  des  fausses  idees,  1(!8.'5,  directed 
against  Malebranche,  in  which  Arnauld  develops  his  doctrine  of  [xa-ception  and 
attacks  the  theory  of  representative  ideas,  07i  wliich  cf.  Hamilton's  Reid, 
8th  ed.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  295-298,  Vol.  2,  pp.  82.'5  b,  96;!;  Reflexions  philos.  et  thdoloc/. 
sur  le  nouveau  systeme  de  la  nature  et  de  la  grace  du  P.  Malebranche,  1685- 


464  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

7iihi(les  are  added  to  equals,  equals  arise  therefrom,  lie  demon- 
strated this  other  which  is  considered  equally  evident:  if 
equals  are  taken  from  equal  magnitudes,  equals  remain.  It  was 
said  he  should  have  assumed  both  or  demonstrated  both.  But 
I  was  not  of  that  opinion,  and  I  believed  that  it  was  always 
so  much  gained  to  have  diminished  the  number  of  the  axioms. 
Addition  is  no  doubt  anterior  to  subtraction  and  more  simple, 
because  the  two  terms  are  employed  in  addition  in  the  same 
way,  which  is  not  the  case  in  subtraction.  Arnauld  did 
the  opposite  of  Eoberval.  He  assumed  still  more  than 
Euclid.  As  for  the  maxims,  they  are  sometimes  taken  as 
established  propositions  whether  evident  or  not.  That  may 
be  well  for  beginners  whom  scrupulousness  holds  back;  but 
when  the  establishment  of  science  is  the  question,  it  is  a  dif- 
ferent matter.  Thus  it  is  that  they  are  often  taken  in  ethics 
and  even  among  the  logicians  in  their  topics,  in  some  of  which 
there  is  a  good  supply,  but  a  part  of  which  contain  enough  of 
them  vague  and  obscure.  For  the  rest,  I  said  a  long  time 
since  publicly  and  privately  that  it  is  important  to  demon- 
strate all  our  secondary  axioms,  which  we  ordinarily  use, 
by  reducing  them  to  the  primitive  or  immediate  and  indemon- 
strable axioms,  which  I  recently  and  elsewhere  called  the 
identicals. 

§  2.  Ph.  Knowledge  is  self-evident  when  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  ideas  is  immediately  perceived.  §  3.  But 
there  are  truths,  not  recognized  as  axioms,  which  are  none 
the  less  self-evident.  Let  us  see  if  the  four  species  of  agree- 
ment of  which  we  spoke  not  long  since  (chap.  1,  §  3,  and 
chap.  3,  §  7),  viz. :  identity,  connection,  relation,  and  real  ex- 
istence, furnish  us  with  them.  §  4.  As  for  identity  or  diver- 
sity, we  have  as  many  evident  propositions,  as  we  have  dis- 
tinct ideas,  for  we  can  deny  both,  as  in  saying  Tnan  is  not  a 
horse,  red  is  not  blue.  Further  the  statement  tvhat  is,  is,  is  as 
evident  as  the  statement  a  man  is  a  man. 

Th.  It  is  true,  and  I  have  already  remarked  that  it  is  as 
evident  to  say  ecthetically  in  particular  A  is  A,  as  to  say  in 

1686 ;  Objections  contre  Descartes ;  and  La  Logique  ou  I' Art  de  Penser,  or  the 
celebrated  Port  Royal  Logic,  1662,  written  in  conjunction  with  Nicole  (c/. 
infra,  p.  530,  note  1),  the  best  specimen  of  the  logic  of  the  Cartesian  school. 
It  has  been  translated  into  English  most  admirably  by  Prof.  Thos.  Spencer 
Baynes. — Tk. 


CH.  vii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  465 

general :  it  is  what  it  is.  But  to  deny  the  subjects  of  diif erent 
ideas  one  of  another  is  not  always  certain,  as  I  have  already 
remarked;  as  if  any  one  wished  to  say,  the  trilateral  (or  that 
which  has  three  sides)  is  not  a  triangle,  because,  in  fact,  tri- 
laterality  is  not  triangularity ;  again,  if  any  one  had  said :  the 
pearls  of  Slusius  -^  (of  whicli  I  spoke  to  you  not  long  since) 
are  not  the  lines  of  the  cubic  parabola,  he  would  have  been  mis- 
taken, and  yet  that  would  have  appeared  evident  to  many 
people.  The  late  Mr.  Hardy,  ^  Conseiller  au  Chatelet  de  Paris, 
an  excellent  geometer  and  orientalist  and  well  versed  in 
the  ancient  geometers,  who  has  published  the  commentary 
of  Marinus  on  the  Data  of  Euclid,  was  so  prepossessed  Avith 
the  fact  that  the  oblifj^ue  section  of  the  cone  called  an  ellipse 
is  different  from  the  oblique  section  of  the  cylinder,  that  the 
demonstration  of  Serenus  ^  appeared  to  him  paralogistic,  and  I 
could  gain  nothing  against  him  by  my  remonstrances :  as  he 
was  nearly  as  old  as  Roberval,  when  I  saw  him,  and  I  was  a 
very  young  man,  a  difference  which  could  give  me  very  little 
persuasive  power  as  regards  him,  although  in  other  respects  I 
was  on  very  good  terms  with  him.  This  example  may  show 
in  passing  what  prepossession  may  do  even  in  the  case  of  clever 
people,  for  he  was  truly  prepossessed,  and  Hardy  is  spoken  of 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  387,  note  1.  — Tr. 

■-  Claude  Hardy,  born  near  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century,  died  in  1G78, 
was  a  barrister  by  profession,  and  became  in  162()  "  Conseiller  au  Chatelet  de 
Paris."  He  was  acquainted  with  not  less  than  thirty-six  ancient  and  modern 
languages,  and  made  a  profound  study  of  mathematics.  Descartes  chose  him 
as  one  of  his  judges  in  his  controversy  with  Fermat,  in  KiOB,  over  Fermat's 
De  maximis  et  minimis.  Hardy  published  the  Data  Euclidis,  Greek  text,  with 
Latin  trans.,  together  with  the  commentary  of  Marinus,  tlie  Neo-Platonist 
{(■f.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  HI.,  2  [Vol.  G] ,  833,  3d  ed.,  1881),  who  lived  in 
the  fifth  century,  and  was  a  disciple  and  the  successor  of  Proclus  ((/.  ante, 
p.  108,  note  2),  at  Paris,  1025,  4to.  Leibnitz  speaks  of  Hardy  as  an  "homme 
de  merite,  grand  geometre,  et  grand  orientaliste,"  cf.  Dutens,  5,  (ilO.  —  Tu. 

3  Serenus  of  Antissa,  in  the  island  of  Lesbos,  a  Greek  geometer,  who  lived 
in  the  fourth  century,  was  the  author  of  two  treatises,  De  Sectione  Cylindri 
et  Coni,  lihH  duo,  which,  according  to  Brunet,  appeared,  together  with  the 
Conies  of  Apollonius  of  Perga,  th(i  Lemmas  of  Pappus  of  Alexandria,  and  the 
commentari<;s  of  Eutocius  of  Ascalonita,  at  ISuiin,  ir)(i(),  fol.,  reprinted  at  I'is- 
toja,  lliiM;,  fol.,  and  afterwards  edited  and  pul)lished  by  llallcy,  Oxford,  1710, 
fol.  Hardy  could  not  have  seen  either  of  the  last  two  editions,  since  he  died 
in  1(;78,  but  possil)ly  he  may  have  been  acquainted  with  that  of  l.'jfiG;  and,  if 
not,  then,  as  Schaarschmidt  says,  he  must  refer  to  Mcwsennci's  Synopsis, 
Paris,  1G44,  which  contains,  pp.  27G-312,  an  abridgment  of  Apollonius  and 
Serenus.  —  Tk. 

2h 


40G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

with  esteem  in  the  letters  of  Descartes.^  But  I  brought  him 
forward  only  to  show  how  Ave  mjiy  be  mistaken  in  denying  one 
idea  of  another,  if  we  have  not  thoroughly  enough  examined 
them  wliere  it  is  necessary. 

§  5.  Ph.  As  regards  connection  or  coexistence,  we  have  very 
few  self-evident  propositions;  there  are,  however,  some,  and 
it  appears  to  me  that  this  is  a  self-evident  proposition :  two 
bodies  cannot  he  in  the  same  place. 

Th.  Many  Christians  contest  the  point  with  you,  as  I  have 
already  remarked,  and  even  Aristotle  and  those  who  after  him 
admit  real  and  exact  condensations,  reducing  one  and  the  same 
entire  body  into  a  smaller  place  than  it  before  filled,  and  those 
who,  as  the  late  Mr.  Comenius  ^  has  done  in  a  little  book  writ- 
ten expressly  for  the  purpose,  claim  to  overthrow^  modern 
natural  philosophy  by  the  experiment  of  the  air-gun,  cannot 
be  expected  to  agree  therewith.  If  you  take  the  body  as  the 
impenetrable  mass,  your  statement  will  be  true,  because  it 
will  be  identical  or  nearly  so;  but  that  the  real  body  is  such 
will  be  denied  you.     At  least  it  will  be  said  that  God  could 

1  Schaarsclimidt  thiuks  that  Leibnitz  here  confounded  Hardy  with  Eoherval, 
whom  he  had  mentioned  just  before.  Descartes  frequently  mentions  Hardy 
in  his  letters,  e/.,  for  example,  Pt.  I.,  epist.  Ill,  Pt.  II.,  epist.  61,  98,  101,  108, 
Pt.  III.,  epist.  34,  GO,  63,  etc. ;  he  also  corresponded  with  him,  and  doubtless 
valued  him  highly,  as  witness  his  choice  of  him  as  arbiter  in  his  controversy 
with  Fermat,  but  he  nowhere  in  his  letters  appears  expressly  to  praise  him ; 
while  he  speaks  thus  of  Roberval  in  Lib.  III.,  epist.  56,  ad  Fermatium:  "  qui 
procul  dubio  inter  primarios  seculi  nostri  geometras  censeri  debet."  —  Tr. 

2  John  Amos  Comenius,  15!»2-lfi71,  the  last  bishoi)  of  the  old  Mora-sian  and 
Bohemian  Brethren,  devoted  himself  chiefly  to  the  reform  and  regulation  of 
public  education  and  instruction,  and  wrote  many  works  on  pedagogy,  which 
he  collected  and  published  under  the  title  Opera  didactica  omnia,  Amsterdam, 
1657,  4  vols.,  fol.  He  also  did  some  work  in  i^hysical  science,  publishing  his 
Disquisitio  de  caloris  et  frii/oris  natura,  Amsterdam,  1659,  12nio,  which  the 
writer  in  Michand,  Biog.  Univ.,  9,  345,  says  is  the  only  one  of  his  physical 
works  deserving  to  be  in  demand,  and  his  Physicsnad  lumen  divinum  refor- 
matas  synopsis,  Leipsig,  1633,  and  Amsterdam,  1643,  Eng.  trans.,  London,  1651, 
which  is,  perhaps,  the  book  to  which  Leibnitz  here  refers.  For  Leibnitz's  esti- 
mate of  a  portion  of  the  writings  of  Comenius,  cf.  Dutens,  5,  181.  For  an 
account  of  his  life  and  work,  <■/.  S.  S.  Laurie,  Comenius.  His  Life  and  Educa- 
tional Works,  4th  ed.  (Pitt  Press  Series),  Cambridge,  Univ.  Press,  1893;  also  a 
reprint  of  the  same,  with  five  portraits,  a  somewhat  extended  and  annotated 
bibliography,  and  photographic  reproductions  of  pages  from  early  editions  of 
Comenius'  works,  published  by  C.  W.  Bardeen,  Syracuse,  N.  Y.,  1893. —Tr. 

3  Gerhardt  reads  "  reserver,"  probably  a  Ms.  or  typographical  error;  Erd- 
mann,  Jacques,  and  Janet  read  "  renverser,"  which,  as  the  context  requires, 
the  translation  follows. — Tr. 


CH.  vii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  467 

make  it  otherwise,  so  that  this  impenetrability  will  be  ad- 
mitted, only  as  conformed  to  the  natural  order  of  things  which 
God  has  established  and  of  which  experiment  assures  us, 
although  elsewhere  it  would  be  necessary  to  admit  that  it  is 
also  very  conformable  to  reason. 

§  6.  Ph.  As  for  the  relations  of  the  modes,  mathematicians 
have  formed  many  axioms  upon  the  one  relation  of  equality, 
like  that  of  which  you  have  just  spoken,  that  if  equals  Ibe 
taken  from  equals  the  remainders  are  equal.  But  it  is  not  less 
evident,  I  think,  that  oyie  and  one  are  equal  to  two,  and  that  if 
from  the  five  fingers  of  one  hand  you  take  away  two  and  then 
two  others  from  the  five  fingers  of  the  other  hand,  the  number 
of  the  fingers  remaining  will  be  equal. 

Th.  That  one  and  one  make  two,  is  not  properly  a  truth, 
but  it  is  the  definition  of  tivo ;  although  it  is  true  and  evident 
that  it  is  the  definition  of  a  possible  thing.  As  for  the  axiom 
of  Euclid  applied  to  the  fingers  of  the  hand,  I  willingly  admit 
that  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive  what  you  say  of  the  fingers  as 
to  see  it  in  the  case  of  A  and  B ;  but  in  order  not  to  do  often 
the  same  thing,  you  observe  it  generally,  and  afterwards  it  is 
sufficient  to  make  subsumptions.  Otherwise,  it  is  as  if  you 
preferred  calculation  by  particular  numbers  to  universal  rules, 
which  would  be  obtaining  less  than  is  possible.  For  it  is  of 
more  account  to  solve  the  general  problem :  to  find  two  num- 
bers whose  Slim  makes  a  given  number,  and  whose  difference 
also  makes  a  given  number,  than  merely  to  seek  two  numbers 
whose  sum  makes  ten,  and  whose  difference  makes  six.  For 
if  I  proceed  in  this  second  problem  according  to  the  method 
of  numerical  algebra,  mixed  witli  the  literal  {specieuse),  the 
calculation  will  be  as  follows:  a -f- 6  =  10,  and  a  —  h=^Q; 
of  which  by  adding  together  the  right  side  to  the  right,  and 
the  left  side  to  the  left,  I  produce  the  result,  a  +  6+a  —  6  = 
10  +  6,  i.e.  (since  +6  and  —  &  cancel  each  other)  2a  =  16 
or  a  =  8.  Subtracting  the  right  side  from  the  right,  and  the 
left  from  the  left  (since  to  take  away  a  —  &  is  to  add  —  a  +  &) 
I  produce  the  result  a  +  6  —  a  +  6  =  10  —  6,  i.e.  2^  =  4  or 
h  =  2.  Thus,  I  shall  in  truth  have  the  a  and  h  1  ask  for, 
which  are  8  and  2,  which  satisfy  tlie  problem,  i.e.  whose  sum 
is  10  and  whose  difference  is  6;  but  I  have  not  tlier('l)y  the 
general  method  for  any  other  numbers,  which  we  miglit  wish 


408  LEIBNITZ'S   CUITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

or  be  able  to  put  in  tlie  place  of  10  or  6,  a  metliod  wliicli  I 
could,  however,  fiud  with  the  same  facility  as  these  two  num- 
bers 8  and  2,  by  putting  x  and  v  in  the  place  of  the  numbers 
10  and  6.  For  proceeding  the  same  as  before  we  shall  have 
a  -^  b  +  a  —  b  =  X  -\-  V,  i.e.  2  a  =  X  +  V  ov  a  =  ^ X  -{-  V,  and  we 
shall  also  have  a  -\-  b  —  a  +  b  =  x  —  v,  i.e.  2b  =  x  —  v  or  b  = 
^  X—  V.  This  calculation  gives  this  theorem  or  general  canon, 
that  when  two  numbers  are  required  whose  sum  and  differ- 
ence are  given,  you  have  only  to  take  as  the  greater  of  the 
required  numbers,  half  of  the  sum  made  from  the  given  sum 
and  difference ;  and  for  the  less  of  the  required  numbers,  half 
of  the  difference  between  the  given  sum  and  difference.  You 
see  also  that  I  might  have  dispensed  with  the  letters,  if  I 
had  treated  the  numbers  as  letters,  i.e.  if  instead  of  putting 
2  a  =  16  and  2  6  =  4,  I  had  Avritten  2  a  =  10  +  6  and  2  6  =  10  -  6, 
which  would  have  given  me  a  =  ^  (10  +  6)  and  b  =  ^  (10  —  6). 
Thus,  in  the  particular  calculation  itself  1  should  have  had  the 
general  calculation,  taking  these  symbols  10  and  6  as  general 
numbers,  as  if  they  were  the  letters  x  and  v;  in  order  to  have 
a  truth  or  method  more  general,  and  taking  these  same  charac- 
ters 10  and  6  also  for  the  numbers  they  ordinarily  signify,  I 
shall  have  a  sensible  example  which  may  serve,  indeed,  as  a 
proof.  And  as  Vieta  ^  has  substituted  letters  for  numbers  for 
the  sake  of  greater  generality,  I  have  desired  to  reintroduce 
the  numerical  characters,  since  they  are  more  serviceable 
in  algebra  (specieuse)  even  than  the  letters.  I  have  found  this 
of  much  use  in  large  calculations  for  avoiding  errors  and  even 

1  Fran9ois  Viete,  15iO-lG03,  lietter  known  by  the  Latin  form  of  his  name, 
Vieta,  was  a  distinguished  French  matliematician,  who  is  often  regarded  as 
the  founder  of  modern  algebra,  because  of  his  introduction  of  the  general  use 
of  letters  as  symbols  of  imdetermined,  and  therefore  general,  quantities,  thus 
oijening  up  the  way  for  the  higher  mathematical  analysis,  afterwards  carried 
on  by  Descartes  and  others.  To  him  is  also  due  the  invention  of  the  different 
simple  transformations  now  used  in  the  solution  of  equations,  such  as  adding 
to  or  subtracting  from  the  members  of  an  equation  the  same  quantity,  or  mul- 
tiiilying  or  dividing  them  by  the  same  quantity.  He  first  enounced  the  princi- 
ple of  homogeneity  or  the  principle  that  all  the  quantities  in  an  equation  should 
be  of  one  kind, — lines,  surfaces,  solids,  or  supersolids,  —  a  principle  which,  after 
three  centuries  of  controversy,  has  now  been  adopted  generally  by  mathemati- 
cians. His  various  mathematical  writings,  which,  being  a  man  of  wealth,  he 
j)rinted  at  his  own  expense  and  distributed  among  the  scholars  of  Europe, 
were  collected  and  edited  by  F.  van  Schooten,  Professor  of  ^Mathematics  at 
Leyden,  aided  by  J.  Golius  and  Mersenne,  and  published  under  the  title  of 
Opera  mathematica,  Leyden,  16i(},  1  vol.,  fol.  — Tr. 


CH.  vii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  469 

in  the  application  of  proofs,  sucli  as  the  casting  away  of  tlie 
nines  in  the  midst  of  the  computation  without  waiting  for  the 
result,  when  there  are  only  numbers  instead  of  letters;  wiiich 
may  often  be  when  you  employ  skill  in  the  positions,  so  that 
the  suppositions  are  found  true  in  the  particular  case,  besides 
the  use  there  is  of  seeing  the  connections  and  orders  which 
the  letters  alone  cannot  always  make  the  mind  discern  so  well, 
as  I  have  elsewhere  shown,  after  I  found  that  the  good  char- 
acteristic is  one  of  the  greatest  aids  of  the  human  mind. 

§  7.  Ph.  As  for  real  existence  which  I  had  counted  as  the 
fourth  species  of  existence  which  may  be  noticed  in  ideas,  it 
can  furnish  us  no  axiom,  for  we  have  not  indeed  a  demonstra- 
tive knowledge  of  beings  outside  us,  God  alone  excepted. 

Th.  We  can  always  say  that  this  proposition  /  exist,  is 
of  the  highest  evidence,  being  a  proposition  which  cannot  be 
proved  by  any  other,  or  rather  an  immediate  truth.  And  to 
say  /  think,  therefore  I  am,  is  not  properly  to  prove  existence 
by  thought,  since  to  think  and  to  be  thinking  is  the  same  thing; 
and  to  say,  I  am  thinking,  is  already  to  say,  /  am.  You  can, 
however,  exclude  this  proposition  from  the  number  of  the  axi- 
oms with  some  reason,  for  it  is  a  proposition  of  fact,  based 
upon  an  immediate  experience,  and  it  is  not  a  necessary  prop- 
osition, whose  necessity  is  seen  in  the  immediate  agreement  of 
ideas.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  only  God  who  sees  how  these 
two  terms,  /and  existence  are  united,  i.e.  why  I  exist.  But  if 
the  axiom  is  taken  more  generally  as  an  immediate  or  non- 
provahle  truth,  we  may  say  that  this  proposition,  I  am,  is  an 
axiom,  and  in  every  case  we  may  be  assured  that  it  is  Sij^rivii- 
tive  truth,  or  ratlier  unum  ex  primis  cognitis  inter  termiiios  com- 
plexos,  i.e.  that  it  is  one  of  the  first  known  statements  wliich 
is  understood  in  the  natural  order  of  our  knowledge,  for  it 
may  be  that  a  man  has  never  thought  expressly  of  forming 
tliis  proposition,  which,  however,  is  innate  to  him. 

§  8.  Ph.  [I  have  always  believed  that  the  axioms  have  little 
influence  upon  tlie  other  parts  of  our  knowledges  ]>ut  you 
have  disabused  me,  since  you  have  indeed  shown  an  important 
use  of  identical  propositions.  Suffer  me,  however,  sir,  to  set 
before  you  still  what  I  have  in  mind  upon  tliis  article,  for 
your  explanations  may  also  serve  to  make  others  return  from 
their  error.]     §  8.   It  is  a  (udebrated  rule  in  the  sc.liools  that 


470  LEIBNITZ'S   CllITlQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

all  reasoning  comes  from  things  already  known  and  admitted, 
ex  praecognitis  et  praeconcessis.  This  rule  seems  to  cause  these 
maxims  to  be  regarded  as  truths  known  to  the  mind  before 
the  others,  and  the  other  parts  of  our  knowledge  as  truths 
dependent  upon  the  axioms.  §  9.  [I  think  I  have  shown 
(IJook  I.,  chap.  1)  that  these  axioms  are  not  the  first  known, 
the  child  knowing  much  sooner  that  the  rod  which  I  show  him 
is  not  the  sugar  he  has  tasted,  than  all  the  axioms  you  please. 
But  you  have  distinguished  between  particular  knowledge  or 
experiences  of  facts  and  the  principles  of  a  universal  and 
necessary  knowledge  (and  herein  I  admit  that  it  is  necessary 
to  recur  to  axioms)  as  also  between  the  natural  and  accidental 
order]. 

Th.  I  have  also  added  that  in  the  natural  order  the  state- 
ment, that  a  thing  is  what  it  is,  is  prior  to  the  statement  that 
it  is  not  another;  for  the  question  here  does  not  concern  the 
history  of  our  discoveries,  which  is  different  in  different  men, 
but  the  connection  and  natural  order  of  truths,  which  is 
always  the  same.^  But  your  remark,  viz. :  that  what  the  child 
sees  is  only  a  fact,  deserves  still  more  reflection ;  for  the  expe- 
riences of  the  senses  do  not  give  truths  absolutely  certain  (as 
you  have  often  yourself,  sir,  observed  not  long  since),  nor  are 
they  exempt  from  all  danger  of  illusion.  For  if  it  is  allow- 
able to  make  fictions  metaphysically  possible,  sugar  might 
imperceptibly  be  changed  into  a  rod,  in  order  to  punish  the 
child  who  has  been  naughty,  as  water  is  changed  into  wine 
with  us  on  Christmas  eve,  if  it  has  been  well  prepared  (mori- 
gene).'^  But  in  all  cases  the  pain  (you  will  say)  that  the  rod 
inflicts  will  never  be  the  pleasure  the  sugar  gives.  I  reply  that 
the  child  will  take  it  into  his  head  as  late  to  make  an  express 
proposition  about  this,  as  to  notice  this  axiom,  that  you  can- 

1  Leibnitz  liere  calls  attention  to  a  very  important  distinction,  viz. :  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  historical  and  the  natural  or  logical  order  of  our  knowl- 
edge. The  genesis  of  our  knowledge,  its  gradual  rise  in  the  course  of  our  lives, 
is  always  a  matter  of  individual  experience,  the  experience  of  no  two  indi-i 
viduals  being  precisely  alike ;  while  the  natural  or  logical  order  and  connec- 
tion of  truths,  being  grounded  in  reason,  is  always  the  same  for  all.  Leibnitz's 
remark  further  suggests  that  the  origiu  of  a  principle  or  truth  is  not  its 
justification,  a  common  fallacy  in  much  of  the  investigation  of  the  present 
day,  and  that  the  ultimate  criteria  of  truth  are  philosophical,  not  historical. 
Cf.  Bowne,  Metaphysicii,  pp.  13  sq.,  New  York  :  Harper  and  Bros.,  1882.  — Ti;. 

2  Duncan,  Philos.  Wks.  of  Leibnitz,  p.  .'ial,  translates:  "rectified."  —  Te. 


CH.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  471 

not  truly  say  that  what  is  is  not  at  the  same  time,  altliough 
,he  can  very  well  perceive  the  difference  of  the  pleasure  and 
the  pain,  as  well  as  the  difference  between  perceiving  and  not 
perceiving. 

§  10.  Ph.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of  other  truths  as 
self-evident  as  these  maxims.  For  example,  that  one  and  two 
are  equal  to  three,  is  as  evident  a  proposition  as  that  axiom 
which  states :  that  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  its  parts. 

Th.  You  appear  to  have  forgotten,  sir,  that  I  have  shown 
you  more  than  once  that  the  statement  one  and  two  is  three  is 
only  the  definition  of  the  term  three,  so  that  to  say  that  one 
and  two  is  equal  to  three,  is  to  say  that  a  thing  is  equal  to 
itself.  As  for  this  axiom,  that  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of 
all  its  parts,  Euclid  makes  no  express  use  of  it.  This  axiom 
I  also  needs  limitation,  for  it  must  be  added  that  these  parts 
must  not  themselves  have  a  common  part,  for  seven  and  eight 
are  parts  of  twelve,  but  they  make  more  than  twelve.  The 
bust  and  the  trunk  taken  together  are  more  than  the  man,  in 
that  the  thorax  is  common  to  them  both.  But  Euclid  says, 
that  the  lohole  is  greater  than  its  part,  a  statement  which  is 
wholly  trustworthy.  And  the  statement  that  the  body  is 
greater  than  the  trunk,  differs  from  the  axiom  of  Euclid  only 
in  this,  that  this  axiom  is  limited  to  what  is  exactly  necessary : 
but  in  exemplifying  it  and  clothing  the  body  you  make  the 
intelligible  become  also  sensible,  for  the  statement  that  a  given 
whole  is  larger  than  a  given  part,  is  in  fact  the  proposition 
that  a  wliole  is  larger  than  its  part,  but  the  features  of  which 
are  embellished  witli  some  coloring  or  addition :  it  is  as  if  he 
who  says  A  B  says  A.  Thus  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  oppose 
the  axiom  and  the  example  as  different  truths  in  this  regard, 
but  to  consider  tlie  axiom  as  embodied  in  the  example  and 
rendering  it  true.  It  is  a  different  matter,  if  the  evidence  is  \ 
not  observed  in  the  example  itself,  and  when  the  affirmation 
of  the  example  is  a  consequence,  and  not  merely  a  subsump- 
tion  of  the  universal  proposition,  as  may  occur  indeed  in  tlie 
3ase  of  the  axioms. 

Ph.  Our  clever  author  says  here :  I  should  like  to  ask  those 
gentlemen  who  maintain  that  all  other  knowledge  (not  of  fact) 
iepends  upon  general  principles  innate  and  self-evident,  what 
principle  they  need  to  })rove  that  tioo  and  tnjo  are  four?  for 


472  LELBMITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

we  know  (according-  to  liini)  tlie  truth  of  this  kind  of  proposi- 
tions without  recourse  to  any  proof.  What  do  you  say  about 
it,  sir? 

Th.  I  say  that  I  was  awaiting  you  there  well  prepared. 
That  two  and  two  are  four  is  not  a  truth  at  once  immediate, 
supposing  that  /owr  signifies  three  and  one.  We  can  then 
demonstrate  it,  and  in  this  av' ay :  — ■ 

Definitions. —  (1)  T'^oo  is  one  and  one. 

(2)  Three  is  two  and  one. 

(3)  Four  is  three  and  one. 

Axiom.  — Putting  equal  things  in  tlieir  place,  the  equality  remains. 
Demonstration.  — 2  and  2  is  2  and  1  and  1  (by  def.  1) 2  +  2 

2  and  1  and  1  is  3  and  1  (by  def.  2) 2  +  1  +  1 

3  and  1  is  4  (by  def.  3) 3  +  1 

4 

Then  (by  the  axiom)  2  and  2  is  4.     Which  was  to  be  demonstrated. 

I  might,  instead  of  saying  that  2  and  2  is  2  and  1  and  1,  say 
that  2  and  2  is  equal  to  2  and  1  and  1,  and  thus  with  the 
others.  But  it  may  be  understood  throughout  in  order  to 
shorten  the  process;  and  that,  in  virtue  of  another  axiom 
which  states  that  a  thing  is  equal  to  itself,  or  that  what  is 
the  same,  is  equal. 

Ph.  [This  demonstration,  as  little  necessary  as  it  is  in  rela- 
tion to  its  too  Avell  known  conclusion,  serves  to  show  how 
truths  depend  on  definitions  and  axioms.  Thus  I  foresee  what 
reply  3^ou  will  make  to  many  objections  that  are  made  against 
the  use  of  axioms.  You  object  that  there  Avill  be  an  innu- 
merable multitude  of  principles ;  but  this  is  when  you  reckon 
among  the  principles  the  corollaries  which  follow  from  the 
definitions  by  the  aid  of  some  axiom.  And  since  the  defini- 
tions or  ideas  are  innumerable,  so  also  Avill  the  principles  be 
in  this  sense,  supposing  also  with  you  that  the  undemonstra- 
ble  i^rinciples  are  the  identical  axioms.  They  become  innu- 
merable also  by  exemplification,  but  at  bottom  you  can  reckon 
A  is  A  and  B  is  B  as  one  and  the  same  principle  differently 
clothed. 

Th.  Further,  this  difference  of  degrees  in  the  evidence 
makes  me  disagree  with  your  distinguished  author  that  all 


CH.  vii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  473 

these  truths  Ccalled  x>rinciples  and  which  pass  as  self-evident, 
because  they  are  so  near  the  indemonstrable  primitive  ax- 
ioms, are  entirely  independent  and  incapable  of  receiving  the 
one  from  the  other  any  light  or  proof.  For  they  may  always 
be  reduced  either  to  axioms,  themselves,  or  to  other  truths 
nearer  the  axioms,  as  this  truth,  that  two  and  two  make  four, 
has  shown  you.  And  I  just  told  you  how  Roberval  diminished 
the  number  of  Euclid's  axioms,  by  sometimes  reducing  one  to 
another. 

§  11.  Ph.  This  judicious  writer,  who  has  furnished  an  occa- 
sion for  our  conferences,  agrees  that  maxims  have  their  use, 
but  he  believes  that  it  is  rather  that  of  closing  the  mouth  of 
the  obstinate,  than  of  establishing  the  sciences.  I  should  be 
very  glad,  said  he,  if  you  would  show  me  some  one  of  these 
sciences  built  upon  these  general  axioms  which  cannot  be 
shoAvn  to  be  sustained  as  well  without  axioms. 

Th.  Geometry  is,  without  doubt,  one  of  these  sciences. 
Euclid  expressly  employs  axioms  in  demonstration,  and  this 
axiom :  tliat  two  homogeneous  magnitudes  are  equal  ivhen  one  is 
neither  larger  nor  smaller  than  the  other,  is  the  basis  of  the 
demonstrations  of  Euclid  and  Archimedes  respecting  the  size 
of  curvilinears.  Archimedes  employed  axioms  of  which  Euclid 
had  no  need ;  for  example,  of  two  lines,  each  of  which  is  con- 
cave always  on  the  same  side,  that  which  encloses  the  other  is 
the  greater.  We  cannot  also  dispense  with  the  identical  ax- 
ioms in  geometry,'  as,  for  example,  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, or  the  demonstrations  which  lead  to  the  impossible. 
And  as  for  the  other  axioms,  which  are  demonstrable,  we  may 
dispense  with  them,  absolutely  speaking,  and  draw  conclu- 
sions immediately  from  the  identicals  and  from  the  defini- 
tions; but  the  prolixity  of  the  demonstrations,  and  the  end- 
less repetitions  into  which  you  would  then  fall,  would  cause 
a  horrible  confusion,  if  it  were  always  necessary  to  begin  ah 
ovo ;  while  by  assuming  the  mean  propositions,  already 
proved,  we  easily  pass  much  farther.  This  assumption  of 
truths  already  known  is  useful,  especially  as  r(;gards  the  ax- 
ioms, for  they  recur  so  often  that  geometers  are  compelled  to 
make  use  of  them  constantly  without  citing  them;  so  that  we 
should  be  mistaken  in  thinking  that  they  are  not  there,  because 
we  do  not  perhaps  always  see  them  quoted  in  tlu;  margin. 


474  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

Ph.  Bnt  he  objects  to  the  example  from  theology.  For  the 
knowledge  of  this  holy  religion  came  to  us  from  revelation 
(says  our  author),  and  without  this  aid  the  maxims  would 
never  have  been  able  to  make  us  know  it.  The  light  comes  to 
us  then  from  the  things  themselves,  or  immediately  from  the 
infallible  veracity  of  God. 

Th.  It  is  as  if  I  said,  medicine  is  based  upon  experience, 
reason  then  is  of  no  use  therein.  Cliristian  theology,  which 
is  the  true  medicine  for  souls,  is  based  upon  revelation  w^hich 
corresponds  to  experience ;  but  to  make  of  it  a  perfect  body, 
we  must  unite  therewith  natural  theology,  which  is  drawn 
from  the  axioms  of  eternal  reason.  Is  not  this  principle 
indeed  that  veracity  is  an  attribute  of  God,  upon  which  you 
acknowledge  that  the  certainty  of  revelation  is  based,  a  maxim 
taken  from  natural  theology?^ 

Ph.  Our  author  wishes  to  distinguish  between  the  means  of 
acquiring  knowledge  and  of  teaching  it,  or  rather  between 
teaching  and  communicating.  After  schools  had  been  erected 
and  professors  established  to  teach  the  sciences  that  others  had 
found  out,  these  professors  availed  themselves  of  these  max- 
ims in  order  to  impress  the  sciences  upon  the  minds  of  their 
scholars,  and  to  convince  them  by  means  of  the  axioms  of  cer- 
tain particular  truths;  while  the  particular  truths  have  served 
the  first  discoverers  in  finding  the  truth  without  the  general 
maxims. 

Th.  I  wish  that  this  pretended  procedure  had  been  justified 
for  us  by  examples  of  some  particular  truths.  But  rightly 
considering  things,  we  shall  not  find  it  practised  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  sciences.  And  if  the  discoverer  finds  only  a 
particular  truth,  he  is  only  half  a  discoverer.     If  Pythagoras  ^ 

1  Locke,  without  discussing  its  possibility  or  its  method,  assumes  a  special 
source  of  religion  in  an  immediate  revelation  of  God  to  the  soul  of  man,  and 
rests  the  truth  of  this  revelation  upon  the  "unerring  veracity"  of  God.  Cf. 
Philos.  Wks.,  Vol.  2,  p.  209,  Bohn's  ed.  Leibnitz,  who  elsewhere  discusses  to 
a  certain  extent  both  the  possibility  and  the  method  of  revelation,  and  admits 
its  possibility,  and  also  its  actuality,  especially  as  regards  those  things  which 
are  beyond  the  limits  of  our  finite  experience,  emphasizes  the  rational  element 
in  theology  by  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  revelation  presupposes  a  nat- 
ural idea  of  God,  philosophically  derived  and  including  the  attribute  of  verac- 
ity, to  which  it  may  appeal  and  by  which  its  character  and  claims  to  authority 
must  be  judged.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  379,  note  1.  On  his  life  and  philosophy,  cf.  Zeller,  PIulos.  d. 
Griech.,  5th  ed.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  296  sq.     For  his  mathematical  work,  cf.  G.  J. 


CH.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  475 

had  only  observed  that  the  triangle  whose  sides  are  3,  4,  5,  has 
■the  property  of  the  equality  of  the  square  on  the  hypothenuse 
with  those  on  the  sides  (i.e.  that  9  +  16  =  25),  would  he  on 
that  account  have  been  the  discoverer  of  this  great  truth  which 
includes  all  right-angled  triangles,  and  which  has  passed  into 
a  maxim  with  the  geometers?  It  is  true  that  often  an  exam- 
ple, seen  by  chance,  serves  as  the  occasion  which  suggests  to  a 
clever  man  the  search  for  general  truth,  but  it  is  still  very 
often  no  easy  matter  to  find  it;  besides,  this  path  of  discovery 
is  not  the  best  nor  the  most  employed  by  those  who  proceed  in 
an  orderly  and  methodical  way,  and  they  make  use  of  it  only 
upon  the  occasions  Avhen  better  methods  fall  short.  In  the 
same  way,  some  have  thought  that  Archimedes  found  the 
quadrature  of  the  parabola  by  weighing  a  piece  of  wood  cut 
parabolically,  and  that  this  particular  experiment  caused  him 
to  discover  the  general  truth;  but  those  who  know  the  pene- 
tration of  this  great  man  see  clearly  that  he  had  no  need  of 
such  an  aid.  Moreover,  if  this  empirical  way  of  particular 
truths  had  been  the  occasion  of  all  the  discoveries,  it  would 
not  have  been  sufficient  to  give  them;  and  the  discoverers 
themselves  have  been  delighted  with  observing  the  maxims 
and  the  general  truths  if  they  have  been  able  to  attain  them, 
otherwise  their  discoveries  would  have  been  very  imperfect. 
All  that  may  then  be  attributed  to  the  schools  and  to  the  pro- 
fessors, is  that  they  have  collected  and  arranged  the  maxims 
and  other  general  truths:  and  would  God  they  had  done  so 
still  more  and  with  more  care  and  choice,  the  sciences  would 
not  be  found  so  scattered  and  so  confused.  For  the  rest  I 
admit,  that  there  is  often  some  difference  betM^een  the  method 
we  use  in  teaching  the  sciences  and  that  which  has  produced 
their  discovery :  but  this  is  not  the  point  in  question.  Some- 
times, as  I  have  already  observed,  chance  has  given  occasion 
for  discovery.  If  we  had  noticed  these  occasions,  and  had 
preserved  the  memory  of  tliem  for  posterity  (which  woidd 
have  been  very  useful),  this  detail  Avould  have  been  a  very  con- 
siderable part  of  the  history  of  tlie  arts,  but  it  would  not  have 

Alhiiiui,  GreeJc  Geometry  from  TIinlcK  to  Euclid,  Dublin,  ISS!),  iuid,  by  tbe 
sanio  author,  Pythagorean  Geometry,  being  the  niatlieniaticiU  part  of  the 
article  "  PythaRoras"  in  the  Encydop.  Brit.,  9th  ed.,  Vol.  20,  pp.  14G-149 
{Amcr.  ed.).  —  Tk. 


476  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

been  proper  to  make  systems  of  them.  Sometimes  also  dis- 
coverers have  proceeded  rationally  to  the  truth,  but  by  ex- 
tended circuits.  I  find  that  in  matters  of  importance  authors 
would  have  rendered  service  to  the  public,  if  they  had  been 
willing  sincerely  to  indicate  in  their  writings  the  traces  of 
their  experiments ;  but  if  the  system  of  science  should  be  built 
upon  that  foundation,  it  would  be  as  if  in  a  finished  house  you 
wished  to  preserve  all  the  apparatus  which  ^  the  architect  re- 
quired in  building  it.  Good  methods  of  teaching  are  all  such 
that  by  their  means  science  could  certainly  have  been  discov- 
ered; and  then  if  they  are  not  empirical,  i.e.  if  the  truths  are 
taught  by  reasons  or  by  proofs  drawn  from  ideas,  it  will  always 
be  by  axioms,  theorems,  canons,  and  such  other  general  propo- 
sitions. The  case  is  different  when  the  truths  are  aphorisms 
like  those  of  Hippocrates,'^  i.e.  truths  of  fact  either  general,  or 

1  Gerhardt  reads  "  done,"  manifestly  a  manuscript  or  a  typographical  error. 
Erdmann,  Jacques,  and  Janet  read  "dont,"  which  the  translation  follows. — 
Tr. 

2  Hippocrates  of  Cos,  460-375  B.C.,  the  "  Father  of  Medicine,"  was  the  first 
to  base  the  practice  of  medicine  on  the  observation  of  nature  and  the  principles 
of  an  inductive  philosophy.  Though  descended  from  a  family  of  priest-physi- 
cians, he  put  aside  all  its  traditions  and  jirejudices,  gave  himself  up  to  the 
study  of  the  natural  history  of  disease  in  the  living  subject,  and  treated  it 
always  as  subject  to  natural  laws.  He  placed  especial  emphasis  on  sympto- 
mology  and  dieteties.  The  two  chief  modern  critical  editions  of  his  writings,  or 
those  ascribed  to  him,  are  E.  Littre,  (Euvres  completes  d'Hippocrate,  10  vols., 
Paris,  1839-61,  and  F.  Z.  Ermerins,  Hippocratis  et  aliorum  medicorum  veterum 
reliquise,  3  vols.,  Utrecht,  lS59-(34.  The  \\<f,opi<7ixoi  —  Aphorisms  —  are  accepted 
as  absolutely  genuine  by  Littre,  but  rejected  as  spirrious  by  Ermerins.  The 
Greek  text  with  French  trans,  is  found  in  Littre,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  4,  pp.  396  sq. ; 
with  Latin  trans.,  in  Ermerins,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  i^p.  397  sq.  For  an  English 
translation,  cf.  F.  Adams,  Genuine  Wks.  of  Hippocrates  (Sydenham  Soc),  2 
vols.,  London,  1849,  Vol.  2,  p.  685. 

In  this  connection  I  may  add  that  Professor  Schaarschmidt  of  Bonn  Uni- 
versity has  kindly  informed  me  that  the  phrase  o-v/xTr^oia  Travra  cited  by  Leibnitz 
from  Hippocrates,  cf.  ante,  p.  48  {ad  fin.)  is  to  be  found  in  the  iiepl  Tpo<f)^s,  §  23, 
Littre,  (Euvres  cVHippocratc,Yo\.  9,  p.  106,  where  it  runs  thus:  Huppota /una, 
^vy-TTvoLa  ij-ia,  ^vfj-Tvaeia.  iravTa-  k.t.x.  Professor  Schaarsclimidt  thinks  that  Leib- 
nitz probably  read:  ^vy.-,Tvoi.a  tio-vto.,  —  conspirantia  omnia,  —  omitting /ma  and 
^vixTTaeda,  and  took  fv^wrota  for  an  adjective,  while  it  is  in  the  text  a  substan- 
tive meaning  concordance,  —  consjnratio,  —  a  usage  which  sometimes  occurs, 
cf.  Stephanus,  Thesau.  Ling.  Grsec,  Vol.  3,  p.  416,  C;  or  that  he  quoted 
from  memory,  as  he  often  does.  Su^ltj-vous  —  conspirans —  as  an  epithet  of  the 
universe  occurs  in  Plutarch,  De  fato,  2,  574,  E :  to  .J>u(Tei  SioiKela-BaL  rdi-ie  rbf 
KocT/jiOf,  a-viMTTvovv,  Koi  o-vfjiTTaeri,  avTov  avT<2  ovTa,  I.e.  "that  the  world  is  govemed 
by  Xature,  and  that  it  conspires,  consents,  and  is  compatible  with  itself." 
Plutarch's  Morals,  Eng.  trans.,  by  several  hands,  corrected  and  revised  liy 
W.  AV.  Goodwin,  Ph.D.,  Vol.  5,  p.  308,  Boston  :  Little,  Brown  &  Co.,  1870.  —  Ti:. 


CH.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  477 

at  least  true  most  frequently,  learned  by  observation  or  based 
on  experience,  and  for  which  there  are  no  reasons  immedi- 
ately convincing.  But  the  question  here  is  not  about  this, 
for  these  truths  are  not  known  by  the  connection  of  ideas. 

Ph.  Here  is  the  manner  in  which  our  ingenious  author  con- 
ceives that  the  need  of  maxims  has  been  introduced.  The 
schools  having  established  disputation  as  the  touchstone  of  the 
ability  of  people,  they  adjudged  the  victory  to  the  one  who 
holds  the  field  of  battle  and  speaks  the  last  word.  But  in 
order  to  furnish  means  of  convincing  the  obstinate,  it  was 
necessary  to  establish  maxims. 

Til.  The  schools  of  philosophy  had  done  better,  no  doubt, 
to  unite  practice  with  theory,  as  do  the  schools  of  medicine, 
chemistry,  and  mathematics ;  and  to  give  the  prize  to  the  one 
who  had  done  the  best,  especially  in  ethics,  rather  than  to  the 
one  who  had  spoken  the  best.  Yet  as  there  are  matters  in 
which  discourse  itself  is  an  effect  and  sometimes  the  sole 
effect  and  masterpiece  which  can  make  known  the  ability  of 
a  man,  as  in  metaphysical  matters,  we  have  had  reason  on 
some  occasions  to  judge  of  the  ability  of  people  by  their  suc- 
cess in  the  conferences.  We  know,  indeed,  that  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Reformation  the  Protestants  challenged  their 
adversaries  to  come  to  colloquies  and  discussions,  and  some- 
times upon  the  success  of  these  discussions  the  public  con- 
cluded for  the  reform.  We  know,  also,  how  much  the  art  of 
speaking  and  of  giving  birth  and  force  to  reasons,  aiid,  if  it 
may  be  so  called,  the  art  of  discussion,  can  accomplish  in  a 
council  of  state  and  of  war,  a  court  of  justice,  a  medical  con- 
sultation, and  even  in  a  conversation.  And  we  are  obliged  to 
recur  to  this  means  and  to  content  ourselves  with  words 
instead  of  acts  on  those  occasions,  for  this  very  reason  that 
the  question  then  concerns  an  event  or  future  fact  where  it 
would  be  too  late  to  learn  the  truth  by  the  effect.  Thus  the 
art  of  discussion  or  of  contending  by  reasons  (whereby  I  here 
understand  the  quotation  of  authorities  and  examples)  is  very 
great  and  very  important;  but  unfortunately  it  is  very  badly 
managed,  and  for  this  reason  also  often  reaches  no  conclusion 
or  a  bad  one.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have  more  than 
once  intended  to  remark  upon  the  colloquies  of  theologians, 
accounts  of  whom  we  have,  in  order  to  show  the  defects  wliich 


478  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  ir 

may  be  noticed  in  them  and  the  remedies  that  might  be  em- 
ployed therefor.  In  consultations  upon  business,  if  those  who 
have  the  most  power  have  not  a  very  solid  mind,  authority  or 
eloquence  prevail  ordinarily,  although  they  are  banded  against 
the  truth.  In  a  word,  the  art  of  conferring  and  discussing 
would  need  to  be  entirely  remodelled.  As  for  the  advantage 
of  the  one  who  has  the  last  word,  it  is  almost  Avholly  in  free 
conversations ;  for  in  councils  suffrages  or  votes  go  by  order, 
whether  they  begin  or  finish  with  the  last  in  rank.  It  is  true 
that  it  ordinarily  belongs  to  the  president  to  begin  and  end, 
i.e.  to  propose  and  decide;  but  he  decides  according  to  the 
plurality  of  the  votes.  In  academic  discussions  it  is  the 
respondent  or  maintainant  (of  the  thesis)  who  speaks  last,  and 
the  field  of  battle  abides  with  him,  almost  always  by  an 
established  custom.  It  is  a  question  of  testing  him,  not  of 
confounding  him;  otherwise  it  would  be  treating  him  as  an, 
enemy.  In  reality,  there  is  almost  no  question  of  truth  on 
these  occasions:  indeed,  opposite  theses  are  maintained  at 
different  times  in  the  same  chair.  The  hall  of  the  Sorbonne 
was  shown  to  Casaubon,^  and  they  said  to  him:  this  is  the 
place  where  they  have  disputed  for  so  many  centuries;  he 
replied,  to  what  conclusion  have  they  come? 

Ph.  The  wish  was,  however,  to  prevent  the  dispute  from 
going  on  to  infinity,  and  to  furnish  means  of  deciding  between 
two  equally  expert  combatants,  in  order  that  the  dispute 
enter  not  upon  an  infinite  series  of  syllogisms.  This  means 
was  the  introduction  of  certain  general  propositions,  the 
larger  part  self-evident,  and  which  being  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  be  received  by  all  men  with  entire  consent,  were  to  be 
regarded  as  general  measures  of  truth,  and  to  hold  the  place  of 
princi2)les  (when  the  disputants  had  posited  no  others),  beyond 
which  none  could  go,  and  to  which  both  sides  were  obliged  to 
hold.  Thus  these  maxims  having  received  the  name  of  prin- 
ciples which  could  be  denied  in  the  dispute,  and  which  ended 
the  question,  they  were  taken  erroneously  (according  to  my 
author)  as  the  sources  of  knowledge  and  the  foundations  of 
the  sciences. 

1  Isaac  Casaubon,  1559-1614,  a  great  classical  scholar  and  editor,  who  had 
the  reputation  of  being;,  next  to  Scaliger,  the  most  learned  man  of  liis  age. 
Leibnitz  also  relates  this  anecdote  in  his  letter  to  Thomas  Burnett,  Feb.  1-11, 
l(i<)7,  Gerhardt,  3,  192,  Dutens,  6,  245.— Tr. 


en.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  479 

Th.  Would  to  God  we  had  made  use  of  them  in  this  way 
in  the  discussions,  there  would  be  nothing  to  say  in  reply,  for 
we  should  decide  something.  And  what  better  thing  could 
Ave  do  than  to  reduce  controversy,  i.e.  contested  truths  to 
truths  evident  and  incontestable?  would  not  that  be  to  estab- 
lish them  in  a  demonstrative  fashion?  And  who  can  doubt 
that  these  principles,  which  would  end  disputes  by  establish- 
ing truth,  would  not  be  at  the  same  time  sources  of  knowledge? 
For,  provided  the  reasoning  is  good,  it  matters  not  whether 
it  is  carried  on  silently  in  one's  study,  or  exposed  for  sale 
publicly  in  a  professor's  chair.  And  even  if  these  principles 
were  assumptions  rather  than  axioms,  taking  the  assumptions 
not  as  Euclid,  but  as  Aristotle,  i.e.  as  suppositions  which 
must  be  admitted  while  waiting  opportunity  to  prove  them, 
these  principles  would  always  have  this  use,  that  by  means 
of  them  all  the  other  questions  would  be  reduced  to  a  small 
number  of  propositions.  Thus  I  am  the  most  surprised  of 
anybody  to  see  a  praiseworthy  thing  blamed  by  I  know  not 
what  prepossession,  to  which  we  clearly  see  by  the  example 
of  your  author  the  most  clever  men  are  susceptible  through 
want  of  attention.  Unfortunately  they  do  an  entirely  differ- 
ent thing  in  academic  disputes.  Instead  of  establishing  gen- 
eral axioms,  they  do  all  they  can  to  weaken  them  by  vain  and 
little  understood  distinctions,  and  it  pleases  them  to  employ 
certain  philosophical  rules,  of  which  there  are  large  books 
completely  full,  but  which  are  little  certain  and  little  deter- 
mined and  which  they  have  the  pleasure  of  eluding  while  dis- 
tinguishing them.  This  is  not  the  way  to  end  the  disputes, 
but  to  render  them  infinite,  and  finally  to  wear  out  the 
adversary.  It  is  as  if  we  ])\\t  him  in  a  dark  place,  where  we 
strike  at  random  and  no  one  can  judge  the  blows.  This 
invention  is  admirable  for  the  maintainants  {Respondentea) 
who  are  engaged  in  maintaining  certain  theses.  It  is  a  buck- 
ler of  Vulcan  which  renders  them  invulnerable;  it  is  Orci 
galea,  Pluto's  helmet,  which  renders  them  invisible.  They 
must  be  very  unskilful  or  very  unfortunate  if  they  can  be 
caught  with  that.  It  is  true  there  are  some  rules  which  have 
exceptions,  especially  in  questions  into  wlaich  many  circum- 
stances enter,  as  in  juris])rudence.  ]}ut  to  render  their  use 
sure   these  exceptions    must   be    determined  in  number  and 


480  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

sense  so  far  as  possible;  and  then  it  may  be  that  the  excej)- 
tion  itself  has  its  sub-exceptions,  i.e.  its  replications,  and  that 
the  replication  has  its  duplications,  etc.,  but  at  the  end  of  the 
reckoning,  all  these  exceptions  and  sub-exceptions,  clearly  de- 
termined, and  joined  with  the  rule,  must  achieve  universality. 
Of  this  jurisprudence  furnishes  very  remarkable  examples. 
But  if  these  kinds  of  rules,  loaded  with  exceptions  and  sub- 
exceptions,  should  enter  into  academic  disputes,  it  would 
always  be  necessary  to  dispute  pen  in  hand,  holding  as  a 
pn-otocol  what  is  said  by  both  sides.  And  this  would  be  more 
necessary  elsewhere,  in  disputing  constantly  pro  forma  by 
means  of  many  sj'llogisms,  mixed  from  time  to  time  with  dis- 
tinctions, which  the  best  memory  in  the  world  must  confound. 
But  we  are  not  kept  from  giving  ourselves  this  trouble,  from 
pushing  sufficiently  the  formal  syllogisms  and  from  registering 
them,  in  order  to  discover  the  truth  when  it  is  without  recom- 
pense, and  we  should  not  indeed  succeed  therein,  if  we  wished, 
unless  the  distinctions  are  excluded  or  better  regulated. 

Ph.  It  is,  however,  true,  as  our  author  observes,  that  the 
scholastic  method  having  been  introduced  also  into  conversa- 
tions outside  the  schools,  in  order  to  shut  the  mouths  of 
cavillers,  has  produced  a  bad  effect.  For,  provided  we  have 
mediate  ideas,  we  may  have  the  connection  without  the  aid  of 
the  maxims  and  before  they  have  been  produced,  and  that 
would  be  sufficient  for  sincere  and  tractable  people.  But  the 
method  of  the  schools  having  authorized  and  encouraged  men 
in  opposing  and  resisting  evident  truths  until  they  are  reduced 
to  contradict  themselves  or  to  fight  established  principles,  it 
is  no  wonder  that  in  ordinary  conversation  they  are  not 
ashamed  to  do  what  in  the  schools  is  a  subject  of  glory  and 
counted  a  virtue.  The  author  adds  that  reasonable  people, 
among  the  rest  of  the  world,  who  are  not  yet  corrupted  by 
education,  will  find  it  very  difficult  to  believe  that  such  a 
method  has  ever  been  followed  by  persons  who  make  a  pro- 
fession of  loving  truth,  and  who  pass  their  lives  in  studying 
religion  or  nature.  I  shall  not  inquire  here  (says  he)  how 
this  method  of  instructing  is  fitted  to  turn  away  the  minds  of 
young  people  from  the  love  of  and  sincere  search  for  the 
truth,  or  rather  to  make  them  doubt  if  there  really  is  any 
truth    in   the  world,   or   at   least   any  wliich   deserves   their 


cH.  vii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  481 

adherence.  But  what  I  strongly  think  (he  adds)  is  this,  that 
excepting  those  places  which  have '  admitted  the  Peripatetic 
|ihilosophy  into  their  schools,  where  it  has  reigned  many  cen- 
turies without  teaching  the  world  anything  but  the  art  of  dis- 
})utation,  these  maxims  are  nowhere  regarded  as  the  foundations 
of  the  sciences  nor  as  important  aids  to  advancement  in  the 
knowledge  of  things. 

Th.  Your  clever  author  will  have  it  that  the  schools  alone 
have  been  led  to  form  maxims;  bvit  it  is  the  general  and  very 
lational  instinct  of  the  human  race.  You  can  infer  this  from 
t  lie  proverbs  which  are  in  use  among  all  nations,  and  which 
are  usually  only  maxims  wliich  the  public  acknowledge.  But 
when  persons  of  judgment  make  a  statement  which  appears  to 
ns  contrary  to  the  truth,  we  must  do  them  the  justice  to  sus- 
pect that  there  is  a  greater  defect  in  their  expressions  than 
ill  their  sentiments:  a  procedure  confirmed  here  in  our  author, 
<>r  whose  motive  animating  him  against  the  maxims,  I  begin 
to  catch  a  glimpse.  Cavilling,  as  well  as  the  desire  to  be  con- 
vinced in  order  to  yield,  exists  as  really  inordinary  discourse, 
wdiere  there  is  no  question  of  exercise,  as  in  the  schools ;  else- 
wliere  most  frequently  they  have  the  better  grace  to  sujipress 
1  he  majors  which  are  understood,  and  to  be  contented  with 
cuthymemes,  and  indeed  without  forming  premises  it  is  suffi- 
cient often  to  use  the  simple  mecUits  terminus  or  mediate  idea, 
t  he  mind  understanding  sufiiciently  its  connection  without  ex- 
|iressing  it.^  And  this  is  satisfactory  when  this  bond  is  incon- 
it 'Stable;  but  you,  sir,  will  also  agree  with  me  that  often  we 
;j,()  too  fast  in  assumption,  and  that  paralogisms  arise  so  that 
it  would  very  often  be  better  to  have  regard  for  certainty, 
in  expressing  ourselves,  tlian  to  prefer  thereto  brevity 'and 
I'lcgance.     But  the  prejudice  of  your  author  against  maxims 

^  Ordinarily  in  argumentation  we  omit  one  of  the  premises,  usually  the 
major,  as  easily  understood  and  too  clearly  manifest  to  require  statement. 
Sunietimes,  but  less  commonly,  we  omit  the  minor  premise,  and  oci^asioiially 
I  111'  conclusion,  as  in  epigrams  and  other  forms  of  wit,  the  whole  point  of 
\\  hich  very  often  consists  171  making  apparent  the  unexpressed  truth.  Leib- 
nitz emphasizes  the  sufiftcieiicy  of  the  middle  term  — inedi, as  icnnuius  — or 
iiie<liate  idea,  because  through  it,  the  common  term  in  the  premises  exiiressing 
the  particular  reason  in  the  given  case,  the  conclusion  is  readied,  whence  tlio 
middle  term  is  sometimes  called  the  argument.  The  mind  having  grasped  the 
I i  I it.icular  reason  expressed  in  this  term,  can  easily  supply  the  rest  of  the  argu- 

lit,  and,  if  necessary,  state  it  in  due  syllogistic  form.  —  Tr. 

2  I 


482  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OE  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

made  him  reject  altogether  their  utility  for  the  establishment 
of  the  truth,  and  goes  as  far  as  to  make  them  accomplices  with 
disorders  in  conversation.  It  is  true  that  young  people 
accustomed  to  academic  exercises  in  "which  they  are  occupied 
a  little  too  much  with  exercise  and  not  enough  in  drawing 
from  the  exercise  the  greatest  fruit  it  should  have,  viz. : 
knowledge,  have  some  difficulty  in  emancipating  themselves 
therefrom  in  the  world.  And  one  of  their  cavillings  is  not  to 
wish  to  yield  themselves  to  tlie  truth  save  when  it  has  been 
rendered  entirely  palpable  to  them,  though  sincerity  and 
indeed  civility  should  compel  them  not  to  wait  for  these  ex- 
tremes, which  make  them  disagreeable  and  give  a  bad  opinion  of 
them.  It  must  also  be  admitted  that  it  is  a  vice  with  which 
men  of  letters  are  often  found  infected.  But  the  fault  is  not 
in  wishing  to  reduce  truths  to  maxims,  but  in  wishing  to  do 
it  unseasonably  and  needlessly,  for  the  human  mind  sees  much 
at  a  glance,  and  it  is  to  restrain  it  that  we  wish  to  compel  it 
to  stop  at  every  step  it  takes  and  to  express  all  that  it  thinks. 
It  is  precisely  as  if  when  making  his  account  with  a  merchant 
or  host  one  should  compel  him  to  reckon  the  whole  with  the 
fingers  in  order  to  be  more  certain  of  it.  And  to  make  that 
demand  he  must  be  either  stupid  or  capricious.  In  fact, 
sometimes  we  find  that  Petronius  had  reason  for  saying 
adolescentes  in  scholis  stultissimos  fieri,^  that  young  people 
sometimes  become  stupid  and  even  harebrained  in  places, 
which  ought  to  be  schools  of  wisdom;  corrujitio  optimi Xiessima.' 
But  still  oftener  they  become  vain,  blundering,  and  confused, 
whimsical,  troublesome,  and  that  often  depends  on  the  dis- 
position of  their  masters.  For  the  rest,  I  find  that  there  are 
far  greater  faults  in  conversation  than  that  of  demanding  too 
much  clearness.  For  usually  we  fall  into  the  opposite  vice 
and  neither  give  nor  ask  for  enough  of  it.  If  the  one  is 
troublesome,  the  other  is  hurtful  and  dangerous. 

1  Petronius,  Satyricon,  chap.  1 :  "  Et  ideo  ego  adolescentulos  existimo  in 
scholis  stixltissimos  fieri,  quia  nihil  ex  iis,  quae  in  usu  habemus,  aut  audiunt, 
aut  vident,"  etc.  —  Tr. 

2  The  phrase  is  not  found  in  any  classical  author.    It  was  perhaps  suggested 

hy  Aristotle,  Politics,  A,  2,  1289",  39:    aidyKr,  yap  r^v  ^e„  rij?  irp^rv^  Kal  eetoTdTTii 

[-oAiTec'a?]  TrapcKBaa-iv  elvat  xfip'VTrjr,  thus  translated  by  .Jowett,  The  Politics 
of  Aristotle,  Vol.  1,  p.  109,  Oxford  :  Clarendon  Press,  1885 :  "  That  which  is  the 
perversion  of  the  first  and  most  divine  [government]  is  necessarily  the  worst." 


cii.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  483 

§  12.  Ph.  The  use  of  maxims  is  sometimes  also,  when 
attached  to  false  notions,  vague  and  uncertain;  for  then  the 
ir.axims  serve  to  confirm  us  in  our  errors,  and  even  to  prove 
contradictions.  For  example,  he  who  with  Descartes^  forms 
;iii  idea  of  what  he  calls  body,  as  of  a  thing  which  is  nothing 
hut  extension,  may  demonstrate  easily  by  this  maxim  lohat  is, 
is,  that  there  is  no  vacuum,  i.e.  space  without  body.  For  he 
knows  his  own  idea,  he  knows  that  it  is  what  it  is  and  not 
another  idea;  thus  extension,  body,  and  space  being  with  him 
three  words  signifying  one  and  the  same  thing,  it  is  also  as 
true  for  him  to  say,  that  space  is  body,  as  to  say  that  body  is 
hody.  §  13.  But  another  for  whom  body  signifies  a  solid 
extension,  will  conclude  in  the  same  way  that  to  say:  that 
space  is  not  a  body  is  as  certain  as  any  pro])osition  we  can 
prove  by  this  maxim:  it  is  impossible  for  a  thing  to  be  and  not 
f'j  be  at  the  same  time. 

Th.  The  bad  use  of  maxims  should  not  cause  their  general 
use  to  be  censured;  all  truths  are  liable  to  this  disadvantage, 
that,  by  uniting  them  with  falsehoods,  false  or  even  contradic- 
tory conclusions  may  be  drawn.  And  in  this  example  there 
is  but  little  need  of  these  identical  axioms  to  which  is  im- 
1  luted  the  cause  of  the  error  and  contradiction.  This  would 
hi"  seen  if  the  argument  of  those  who  concluded  from  their 
(h'finitions,  that  space  is  body,  or  that  space  is  not  body, 
were  reduced  to  form.  There  is,  indeed,  something  exces- 
sive in  this  inference :  body  is  extended  and  solid,  then  exten- 
sion, i.e.  the  extended  is  not  body,  and  extension  is  not  a 
corporeal  thing;  for  I  have  already  remarked  that  there  are 
superfluous  expressions  of  ideas,  or  those  which  do  not  mul- 
tiply things,  as  if  some  one  said,  by  triquetrum  I  mean  a 
trilateral  triangle,  and  concluded  therefrom  that  every  trilat- 
eral is  not  a  triangle.  Thus  a  Cartesian  might  say  that  the 
idea  of  a  solid  extension  is  of  this  same  natvire,  i.e.  that  it  is 
superfluous;  as  in  reality,  taking  extension  as  something  sub- 
stantial, every  extension  will  be  solid,  or  rather  every  exten- 
sion will  be  corporeal.  As  for  the  vacuum,  a  Cartesian  will  be 
right  in  concluding  from  his  idea  or  form  of  idea  that  there  is 
none,  supposing  his  idea  to  be  valid;  but  another  will  not  be 

1  Cf.  Princip.  Philn>:.,  II,,  §§  1,  4,  11,  Veitch's  traus.,  pp.  232,  2:57,  8th  ed., 
Edinburgh,  1881 .  ~  Tii. 


484  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [uk.  iv 

right  ill  concluding  at  once  from  his  form  that  there  may  be  a 
vacviuui,  as  in  reality,  although  I  am  not  for  the  Cartesian 
view,  I  nevertheless  think  there  is  no  vacuum,^  and  I  find 
that  in  this  example  a  worse  use  is  made  of  ideas  than  of 
maxims. 

§  15.  Ph.  It  seems  at  least  that  from  such  use  as  you  would 
make  of  maxims  in  verbal  propositions  they  cannot  give  us 
the  least  knowledge  of  substances  existing  outside  us. 

Th.  I  am  altogether  of  another  opinion.  For  example,  this 
maxim  that  nature  proceeds  by  the  shortest  paths,  or  at  least 
by  the  most  definite,  sufiices  alone  to  give  a  reason  for  nearly 
the  whole  of  optics,  catoptric  and  dioptric,  i.e.  of  what  takes 
place  outside  us  in  the  action  of  light,  as  I  have  formerlj" 
shown  ^  and  Molyueux  has  strongly  approved  in  his  Dioptric, 
which  is  a  very  excellent  book.^ 

Ph.  It  is  maintained,  however,  that  when  use  is  made  of 
identical  principles  to  prove  propositions  in  which  there  are 
words  signifying  complex  ideas  as  onan  or  virtue,  their  use  is 
extremely  dangerous,  and  invites  men  to  regard  or  receive 
falsehood  as  manifest  truth.  And  this  is  because  men  think 
that  when  the  same  terms  are  retained  the  propositions  re- 
volve about  the  same  things,  although  the  ideas  which  these 
terms  signify  are  different;  so  that  men  taking  the  words  for 
the  things,  as  they  usually  do,  these  maxims  commonly  serve 
to  prove  contradictory  propositions. 

Th.  How  unjust  to  blame  the  poor  maxims  for  that  which 
should  be  imputed  to  the  bad  use  of  terms  and  to  their  equiv- 
ocations. By  the  same  reasoning  you  will  blame  the  syllo- 
gisms because  they  conclude  badly  when  the  terms  are  equiv- 
ocal. But  the  S3dlogisin  is  innocent,  because  in  reality  there 
are  then  four  terms  contrary  to  the  rules  of  the  syllogism. 
By  the  same  reasoning  you  would  also  blame  the  calculations 
of  arithmeticians,  or  of  algebraists,  because  by  putting  Xfor  V 
or  by  taking  a  for  b  by  inadvertence,  they  draw  therefrom 
false  and  contradictory  conclusions. 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  16,  and  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  4,  ante,  pp.  125-127;  also 
Descartes,  Princip.  Philos.,  II.,  §§  16  sq.,  Veiteh's  trans.,  pp.  241  sq. — Tr. 

2  Leibnitz  probably  refers  to  his  article  Unicum  opttcse  catoptn'cx  et  di- 
optricm  principium,  published  in  the  "Acta  Erud.  Lips.,"  June,  1682,  pp.  185- 
190,  and  found  in  Dutens,  .3,  145-150.— Tr. 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  138,  note  1.  Molyneux's  Dioptrica  nova  was  for  a  long  time 
the  chief  work  on  Optics.  —  Tr. 


CH.  VII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  485 

§  19.  Ph.  I  should  think  at  least  that  maxims  are  of  little 
use  when  we  have  clear  and  distinct  ideas;  and  others  will 
have  it  indeed  that  then  they  are  absolutely  of  no  use,  and 
maintain  that  any  one  who  in  these  instances  cannot  discern 
truth  and  falsehood  without  these  kinds  of  maxims,  will  not 
be  able  to  do  so  by  their  agency;  and  our  author  (§§  16,  17) 
shows  indeed  that  they  are  of  no  use  in  deciding  whether  such 
a  one  is  a  man  or  not. 

Th.  If  the  truths  are  very  simple  and  evident,  and  closely 
approaching  the  identicals  and  the  definitions,  there  is  but 
little  need  of  expressly  employing  maxims  to  draw  from 
them  these  truths,  for  the  mind  virtually  employs  them  and 
makes  its  conclusion  all  at  once  without  intermediate  ideas. 
But  Avithout  axioms  and  theorems  already  known,  mathema- 
ticians would  have  much  trouble  in  advancing;  for  in  long 
processes  of  reasoning  {consequences),  it  is  well  to  stop  from 
time  to  time,  and  to  set  up,  as  it  were,  military  columns  in 
the  midst  of  the  road,  which  will  serve  furthermore  to  indi- 
cate it  to  others.  Otherwise  these  long  roads  will  be  too 
inconvenient,  and  will  appear  even  confused  and  obscure, 
while  we  are  unable  to  discern  anything,  or  to  point  out  what 
place  we  are  in.  It  is  like  going  to  sea  without  a  compass  in 
a  dark  night,  seeing  neither  bottom,  shore,  nor  stars;  it  is  like 
travelling  in  vast  moors  in  which  there  are  neither  trees  nor 
hills  nor  streams ;  it  is  like  a  linked  chain  destined  for  the 
measurement  of  lengths,  in  which  there  are  some  hundreds  of 
links,  perfectly  alike,  without  a  distinction  of  a  bead,  or  of 
coarser  grains  or  of  larger  links  or  other  divisions  Avhicli 
might  indicate  the  feet,  fathoms,  perches,  etc.  The  mind 
which  loves  unity  in  multiplicity  then  joins  together  sonif^  of 
tlie  consequences  to  form  from  them  mediate  conclusions,  and 
this  is  the  use  of  maxims  and  theorems.  By  this  means  there 
is  more  pleasure,  more  light,  more  memory,  more  application 
and  less  repetition.  If  some  analyst  in  calculating  should 
choose  not  to  assume  these  two  geomcitrical  maxims,  that  the 
Sfpiare  on  the  hypothenuse  is  equal  to  the  two  squares  of  the 
sides  about  the  riglit  angle,  and  that  the  corresponding  sides 
of  simihir  triangles  are  proportional,  thinking  tliat,  because 
we  have  the  demonstration  of  these  two  theorems  by  the  con- 
nection of  the  ideas  they  contain,  he  can  pass  them  l)y  easily 


486  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

by  putting  the  ideas  themselves  in  their  place,  he  will  find 
himself  far  removed  from  his  reckoning.  But  that  you  may 
not  think,  sir,  that  the  proper  use  of  these  maxims  is  confined 
to  the  limits  of  the  mathematical  sciences  alone,  you  will  find 
that  its  use  is  not  less  in  jurisprudence,  and  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal means  of  rendering  it  easier,  and  of  looking  at  its  vast 
ocean  as  upon  a  geographical  map,  is  to  reduce  a  multitude  of 
particular  decisions  to  more  general  principles.  For  exam- 
ple, you  will  find  that  a  multitude  of  laws,  of  Digests,  of 
actions  or  exceptions,  of  those  which  are  called  in  factum,  ^ 
depend  on  this  maxim,  ne  quis  aUerius  damno  fiat  locupletior,'^ 
let  no  one  profit  by  the  injury  which  might  happen  to  an- 
other, a  principle  which  should,  however,  be  exj)ressed  with  a 
little  more  precision.  It  is  true  that  there  is  a  great  distinc- 
tion to  be  made  between  the  rules  of  law.  I  speak  of  good 
ones,  and  not  of  certain  brocards  (hrocardicaY  introduced  by 
the  doctors  which  are  vague  and  obscure;  although  these  rules 
also  might  often  become  good  and  useful,  if  reformed,  while 
with  their  infinite  distinctions  {cum  suis  faUentiis)  they  serve 
only  to  confuse.  Xow  good  rules  are  either  aphorisms  or 
maxims,  and  under  maxims  I  include  both  axioms  and  theo- 
rems. If  these  are  apliorisms  which  are  formed  by  induction 
and  observation,  and  not  by  reason  a  priori  and  which  clever 
people  have  made  after  a  review  of  established  law,  this  text 
of  the  jurisconsult  Paulus  in  the  title  of  the  Digests,  which 
speaks  of  the  rules  of  law,  has  place:  non  ex  regula  jus  sumi, 

1  Cf.  Digest.,  Lib.  XLIV.,  Tit.  VII.,  25,  Ulpianus,  lib.  singul.  Regularum: 
"§  1.  —  In  factum  actio  dicitur,  qualis  est  (exempli  gratia)  actio  quae  datur 
patrono  adversus  libertum,  a  quo  contra  edictum  praetoris  in  jus  vocatus 
est."  — Tr. 

■-  For  a  similar  expression,  cf.  Digest.,  Lib.  L.,  Tit.  X'STT.,  206,  Pomponius, 
lib.  9,  ex  variis  Lectionibus  :  "  Jure  naturae  aequum  est,  nerainem  cum  alterius 
detrimento  et  injuria  fieri  locupletiorem  "  ;  Digest.,  Lib.  XXL,  Tit.  YI.,  14; 
also  Lib.  XXIII.,  Tit.  III.,  (i,  Pomponius,  lib.  14  ad  Sabinum,  §  2:  ".  .  .  quia 
bono  et  aequo  non  conreniat,  aut  lucrari  aliquem  cum  damno  alterius,  aut 
damnum  sentire  per  alterius  lucrum  "  ;  Lib.  XIV.,  Tit.  III.,  17,  §  4,  ad  fin.  —  Tk. 

3  Cf.  Letter  11,  to  Kestner,  Jan.  30,  1711,  §  2  (Dutens,  4,  Pt.  III.,  2l>4,  als.. 
Kortholt,  Leihnit.  epist.  ad  diversos,  Lips.  17:>4-1742,  3,  251)  :  "  Brocardica 
quae  Tocant,  vel  sunt  ijjsa  solida  juris  principia,  vel  regular,  quaedam  topics  : 
priora  necessaria  sunt :  posteriores  utiles  forent,  si  satis  examinatae,  explica- 
taeque  haberentur :  pertinent  enim  fere  ad  facti  quaestionem.  artemque  conji- 
ciendi,  ad  quam  refero  etiam  interpretandi  artificium."  Cf.  also  Leibnitz'^ 
Norn  methodiis  discendse  docendseque  jurisprudentise,  Pt.  II.,  §  25,  Dutens,  4. 
Pt.  III.,  188-18'J.— Tr. 


CH.  VII]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  487 

sed  ex  jure  quod  est  regidam  Jieri,^  i.e.  we  draw  rules  from  a 
law  already  known,  in  order  the  better  to  remember  them,  but 
we  do  not  establish  the  law  upon  these  rules.  But  there  are 
fundamental  maxims  constituting  the  law  itself  and  forming 
actions,  exceptions,  replications,  etc.,  which,  when  they  are 
taught  by  pure  reason,  and  do  not  arise  from  the  arbitrary 
power  of  the  state,  constitute  natural  law;  and  such  is  the 
rule  of  which  I  have  just  spoken,  which  forbids  tortious 
profit.  There  are  also  rules  whose  exceptions  are  rare,  and 
which  consequently  pass  as  universal.  Such  is  the  rule  of  the 
Institutes  of  tlie  Emperor  Justinian  in  §  2  of  the  title  Actions, 
which  declares  that  when  the  question  concerns  corporeal 
tilings,  the  actor  does  not  possess,  except  in  a  single  case 
which  the  emperor  states  is  indicated  in  the  Digests;  but 
he  leaves  us  to  search  for  it.  It  is  true  that  some  read 
instead  of  sane  uno  casu,  sane  yion  uno ;  ^  and  from  one  case 
you  can  sometimes  make  many.  Among  the  physicians  the 
late  Mr.  Earner,^  who,  in  giving  us  his  Prodromus,  made  us 
hope  for  a  new  Sennertus,"*  or  system  of  medicine  accommodated 

1  Cf.  Digest.,  Lib.  L.,  Tit.  XVII.,  1.  Paulus  [lib.  IG  ad  Plautium]  :  "  Rei;ula 
est,  quae  rem,  qusB  est,  breviter  enarrat.  Nou  ut  ex  regula  jus  sumatur,  sed 
ex  jure,  quod  est,  regula  fiat."  Gerhardt's  text  omits  the  name  Paulus,  aiid 
his  footnote  states  that  there  is  a  gap  in  the  Ms.  —  Tr. 

2  Cy.  Sandars,  Inst,  of  Justinian,  Lib.  IV.,  Tit.  VI.,  De  actionibvs,  §  2,  ad 
fin.  (p.  431,  8th  ed.,  London,  1888):  "Quod  genus  actionis  in  controversiis 
reruiu  corjioralium  proditum  non  est,  nam  in  his  is  agit  qui  uon  possidet :  ei 
vero  qui  possidet,  non  est  actio  prodita  per  quam  neget  rem  actoris  esse.  Sane 
uno  easu,  qui  possidet,  nihilominus  actoris  partes  obtinet,  sicut  in  latioribus 
Digestorum  libris  opportunius  apparebit."  The  reading  "sane  uno  casu"  is 
adopted  and  followed  by  the  modern  editors.  The  references  to  the  Digests 
are,  according  to  Sandars,  Li)).  VIII.,  5,  2,  Lib.  XXXIX.,  1,  15,  ed.  Mommsen, 
Berlin:  Weidmann,  1870,  pp.  207,  378.  — Tr. 

3  Jacob  Barner,  1(;41-1686,  a  German  physician,  was  professor  of  chemistry 
at  Padua,  and  of  philosophy  and  medicine  at  Leipzig,  and  the  author  or  com- 
piler of  a  large  number  of  works  which  give  a  sufficiently  faithful  account  of 
the  medicine  and  especially  the  chemistry  of  his  time,  wholly  occupied  as  it 
was  in  the  chimerical  search  for  the  philosopher's  stone.  His  Prodromus  Sen- 
nerti  novi,  AugnstfB  Vindelicorum,  1674,  4to,  was  published  as  the  prospectus 
of  a  proposed,  but  never  completed,  work,  which,  like  that  of  Sennert,  should 
cover  the  history  of  medicine  from  the  earliest  times  to  his  own  day.  —  Tr. 

*  Daniel  Sennert,  l.^i72-l(J37,  a  cclelirated  (Jerman  physician,  was  pi-ofcssor 
of  medicine  in  tlu^  University  of  Wittemherg  from  1()02-1()37,  and  introduced 
into  its  curriculum  the  teaching  of  chemistry,  in  spite  of  strong  and  continued 
opposition  from  those  who  thought  it  useless.  He  disputed  the  doctrine  of  the 
soul  held  by  the  Schoolmen,  and  by  maintaining  the  immateriality  of  the  souls 
of  animals  raised  against  himself  many  adversaries,  among  whom  was  Ilonora- 


488  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

to  the  new  discoveries  or  views,  advances  the  opinion  that  the 
method  which  pliysicians  ordinarily  observe  in  their,  systems 
of  practice  is  to  explain  the  art  of  healing  by  treating  of  one 
disease  after  another  following  the  order  of  the  parts  of  the 
body  human  or  other,  without  having  given  universal  precepts 
of  practice  common  to  many  diseases  and  symptoms,  and  that 
this  involves  them  in  an  infinite  number  of  repetitions;  so 
that  we  might  suppress,  in  his  view,  three-quarters  of  Senner- 
tus,  and  abridge  the  science  infinitely  by  universal  jDropositions, 
and  especially  by  those  with  which  agrees  the  KaOoXov  Trpdrov 
of  Aristotle,^  i.e.  which  are  reciprocal,  or  approach  thereto. 
I  think  there  is  reason  in  advising  this  method,  especially  as 
regards  the  precepts  wherein  medicine  is  ratiocinative ;  but  in 
proportion  as  it  is  empirical,  it  is  not  so  easy  nor  so  certain 
to  form  universal  propositions.  Further,  there  are  usually 
complications  in  particular  diseases,  which  form,  as  it  were, 
an  imitation  of  substances,  so  that  a  disease  is  like  a  plant  or 
an  animal,  which  demands  a  history  by  itself,  i.e.  they  are 
modes  or  forms  of  being  with  which  agrees  what  we  have  said 
of  bodies  or  substantial  things,  a  quartan  ^  fever  being  as  diifi- 
cult  to  examine  thoroughly  as  gold  or  quicksilver.  Thus  it  is 
well,  without  detriment  to  the  universal  precepts,  to  seek  in  the 

tus  Fabri,  who  accused  him  of  blasphemy  and  impiety,  because  he  had  not 
seen  the  bearing  of  his  reasonings.  Sennert  protested  that  he  had  never  main- 
tained the  immortality  of  the  souls  of  animals,  but  it  was  a  strict  consequence 
of  his  principle. 

In  his  Institutiones  medicse  et  de  oririine  animarwn  in  brutis,  Witteraberg, 
1611,  4to,  Sennert  endeavored  to  unite  for  the  first  time  the  principles  of  Galen 
{cf.  ante,  p.  407,  note  1)  with  those  of  Paracelsus,  1493-1541.  His  Opera  omnia, 
ed.  uovissima,  Lugduni,  IGK!,  6  vols.,  fol.  Sprengel  says  he  was  "the  most 
celebrated  of  all  the  conciliators  of  the  seventeenth  century,"  "a  man  who 
united  to  immense  erudition  and  to  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  ancients  great 
credulity,  a  taste  little  refined,  and  a  weak  judgment."  —  Tr. 

1  Aristotle  limited  scientific  consideration  to  that  which  is  universally  or 
for  the  most  part  valid.  His  Ka.e6\ov  npCiTov  is  the  universal  in  its  original  and 
proper  sense,  as  the  essential  attribute  of  individual  things  in  which  alone  it 
has  any  realization,  and  whose  essence  consists  in  just  this  realization  of  the 
universal  in  them.  This  universal  is  conceived  of  as  the  cause,  and  as  such 
becomes  the  middle  term  in  the  syllogism,  and  constitutes  the  absolutely  essen- 
tial element  in  logical  demonstration,  in  the  absence  of  which  the  reasoning 
has  no  validity.  Cf.  Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  3d  ed.,  §§  23, 
32-34,  pp.  47,  (>4 ;  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.  II.  2  [Vol.  4] ,  304  sq.,  3d  ed. ;  Prantl, 
Gesch.  d.  Lor/ik,  1,  104  sq.,  119  sq. ;  Windelband,  A  Ili.^t.  of  Philos.,  trans,  by 
J.  H.  Tufts,  Ph.D.,  13.'i-143.    New  York :  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1893.  — Tr. 

2  I.e.  a  fever  running  in  periods  of  four  days.  —  Tr. 


CH.  vii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  489 

different  kinds  of  diseases  methods  of  healing,  and  remedies 
which  satisfy  many  symptoms  and  complications  of  causes, 
and  especially  to  gather  together  those  which  experience  has 
approved.  This  Sennertus  has  not  sufficiently  done,  for  com- 
petent judges  have  remarked  that  the  compositions  of  the 
receipts  he  proposes  are  often  made  more  ex  ingenio  by 
estimate  than  authorized  by  experience,  as  would  be  neces- 
sary if  one  wovild  be  more  certain  of  his  case.  I  think  then 
that  the  better  course  would  be  to  unite  these  two  ways,  and 
not  to  complain  of  repetitions  in  a  matter  so  delicate  and  so 
important  as  is  medicine,  wherein  I  find  that  we  lack  what 
we  have  in  too  large  measure  in  my  view  in  jurisprudence,  i.e. 
books  of  particular  cases,  and  repertories  of  observations 
already  made.  For  I  think  that  a  thousandth  part  of  the 
books  of  the  jurisconsults  would  suifice  us,  but  that  we  would 
have  none  too  many  in  the  matter  of  medicine,  if  we  had  thou- 
sands more  of  well-detailed  observations.  The  fact  is,  juris- 
prudence is  wholly  based  upon  reasons  in  regard  to  which 
nothing  is  expressly  indicated  by  laws  or  by  customs.  For  Ave 
can  always  derive  it  either  from  law  or,  in  default  of  this, 
from  natural  right  by  means  of  the  reason.  The  laws  of 
each  country  are  finished  and  determined,  or  may  become  so; 
while  in  medicine,  the  principles  of  experience,  i.e.  the  ob- 
servations, cannot  be  too  greatly  multiplied  in  order  to  give 
more  opportunity  to  the  reason  to  decipher  what  nature  only 
half  alloAvs  us  to  know.  For  the  rest,  I  do  not  know  any  one 
who  employs  the  axioms  in  the  way  that  the  clever  author  of 
whom  you  speak  does  (§§  16,  17),  as  if  any  one,  in  order  to 
demonstrate  to  a  child  that  a  negro  is  a  man,  availed  himself 
of  the  principle  what  is,  is,  by  saying :  a  negro  has  a  rational 
soul;  now  the  rational  soul  and  man  is  the  same  thing,  and 
consequently  if  having  a  rational  soul  he  were  not  a  man,  it 
would  be  false  that  what  is,  is,  or  rather  one  and  the  same 
thing  would  be  or  would  not  be  at  the  same  time.  For  with- 
out employing  these  maxims,  which  are  not  in  season  here, 
and  do  not  enter  directly  into  the  reasoning,  as  they  also  do 
not  advance  it  in  any  respect,  everybody  will  be  content  to 
reason  thus:  a  negro  has  a  rational  soul,  whoever  has  a 
rational  soul  is  a  man,  tlierefore  the  negro  is  a  man.  And  if 
any  one  assuming  that  there  is  no  rational  soul  if  it  does  not 


490  LEIBNITZ'S   CIUTIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

appear  to  vis,  concluded  that  infants  just  born  and  imbeciles 
do  not  belong  to  the  human  s|)ecies  (as,  in  fact,  the  author 
states  that  he  has  conversed  with  very  reasonable  persons  who 
made  this  denial),  I  do  not  think  that  the  bad  use  of  the 
maxim,  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be, 
would  delude  them,  nor  that  they  think  of  it  even  in  drawing 
this  conclusion.  The  source  of  their  error  would  be  an  exten- 
sion of  the  principle  of  our  author,  which,  denies  that  there  is 
anything  in  the  soul  of  which  it  is  not  conscious,  while  these 
gentlemen  would  proceed  as  far  as  to  deny  the  soul  itself, 
when  others  did  not  perceive  it. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

OF    TRIFLING    PROPOSITIONS 

Ph.  I  believe,  indeed,  that  reasonable  persons  have  not 
been  disinclined  to  employ  identical  axioms  in  the  way  of 
which  we  have  just  spoken,  §  2.  It  also  seems  that  these 
purely  identical  maxims  are  only  trifling  xiropositions  or  niigato- 
rice,  as  the  schools  indeed  call  them.  I  should  not  be  content 
to  say  that  they  seem  thus,  did  not  your  surprising  example 
of  the  demonstration  of  conversion  by  the  agency  of  the  identi- 
cals-^ make  me  proceed,  bridle  in  hand,  thenceforth,  wdien 
contempt  for  anything  is  the  question.  But  I  shall  tell  you 
that  what  j^ou  allege  in  their  favor  proclaims  them  wdiolly 
trifling;  viz. :  (§  3)  you  recognize  at  first  sight  that  they  con- 
tain no  instruction  unless  to  show  a  man  sometimes  the  ab- 
surdity in  which  he  is  involved. 

TJi.  Do  you  count  that  as  nothing,  sir,  and  do  you  not  recog- 
nize that  to  reduce  a  proposition  to  absurdity  is  to  demonstrate 
its  contradictory?  I  indeed  believe  that  you  w-ill  instruct  no 
man  by  telling  him  that  he  must  not  deny  and  affirm  the  same 
thing  at  the  same  time,  but  you  instruct  him  b}^  showing  him 
by  the  force  of  the  consequence,  that  he  does  this  without 
thinking  of  it.     It  is  difiicult,  in  my  opinion,  always  to  pass 

1  Cf.  Ncio  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  2,  ante,  p.  409.  — Tr. 


cii.  viii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  491 

from  these  apagogical  demonstrations, i.e.  demonstrations  which 
reduce  to  absurdity,  and  to  prove  everything  by  the  ostensives,^ 
as  they  are  called;  and  geometers,  who  are  very  curious  on 
this  point,  have  tried  it  sufficiently.  Proclus  speaks  of  it 
from  time  to  time,  when  he  sees  that  certain  ancient  geome- 
ters, coming  after  Euclid,  have  found  a  demonstration  more 
direct  (as  they  think)  than  his.  But  the  silence  of  this  an- 
cient commentator  sufficiently  shows  that  they  did  not  always 
accomplish  it. 

§  3.  Ph.  You  will  at  least  admit,  sir,  that  a  million  proposi- 
tions may  be  formed  at  little  expense,  but  also  of  very  little 
use;  for  is  it  not  trifling  to  remark,  for  example,  that  the 
oyster  is  the  oyster,  and  that  it  is  false  to  deny  it,  or  to  say 
that  the  oyster  is  not  the  oyster?  As  to  which  our  author 
agreeably  says  that  a  man  who  would  make  this  oyster  some- 
times the  subject,  sometimes  the  attribute,  or  the  predicatum, 
would  justly  be  like  a  monkey  who  should  amuse  himself  by 
throwing  one  oyster  from  one  hand  to  the  other,  which  pro- 
•ceeding  could  altogether  as  well  satisfy  the  hunger  of  the 
monkey  as  these  propositions  are  capable  of  satisfying  the 
understanding  of  man. 

Th.  1  find  that  this  author,  as  full  of  intelligence  as  gifted 
with  judgment,  has  every  reason  in  the  Avorld  for  speaking 
against  those  who  would  so  use  them.  But  you  certainly  see 
how  the  identicals  must  be  employed  to  render  them  useful; 
viz. :  by  showing  by  force  of  consequences  and  definitions  that 
other  truths  which  you  wish  to  establish  reduce  to  them. 

§  4.  Ph.  I  know  it  and  I  see  clearly  that  they  may  be 
applied  with  much  stronger  reason  to  propositions  which 
appear  trifling  and  on  many  occasions  are  so,  wherein  a  part 
of  the  complex  idea  is  affirmed  of  the  object  of  this  idea,  as 
in  the  statement :  lead  is  a  metal.  In  the  mind  of  a  man  who 
is  acquainted  with  the  meaning  of  these  terms  and  who  knows 
that  lead  signifies  a  very  heavy  fusible  and  malleable  body, 
there  is  this  use  alone,  that  in  saying  metal,  you  indicate  to 
him  at  once  many  simple  ideas  instead  of  enumerating  them 
one  by  one.      §  5.  The  same  is  true  when  part  of  the  defini- 

'  I.e.  direct  demniistrations,  a  term  used  as  tho  opposite  of  the  indirect  or 
apn(/(>f/irul.  denioiistiMtions,  wliich  show  the  truth  of  a  thing  hy  proving  the 
absurdity  of  denying  it.  —  Tii. 


492  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [int.   iv 

tion  is  aflfirmed  of  the  thing  defined;  as  in  the  statement: 
all  gold  is  fusible,  supposing  you  have  defined  gold  as  a  yellow, 
heavy,  fusible,  and  malleable  body.  Again,  to  say  that  the 
triangle  has  three  sides,  that  man  is  an  animal,  that  a  palfrey 
{palefroy,  an  old  French  word)  is  an  animal  which  neighs, 
serves  to  define  the  words,  but  not  to  teach  anything  besides 
the  definition.  But  we  learn  something  from  the  statement 
that  man  has  a  notion  of  God  and  that  opium  plunges  him 
into  sleep. 

Th.  Besides  what  I  have  said  of  the  identicals  which  are 
wholly  so,  we  shall  find  that  these  semi-identicals  have  also  a 
particular  use.  For  example,  a  icise  man  is  always  a  man; 
that  gives  us  the  knowledge  that  he  is  not  infallible,  that  he 
is  mortal,  etc.  Some  one  in  danger  needs  a  pistol-ball,  and 
lacks  the  lead  to  found  it  in  the  form  he  has ;  a  friend  says 
to  him :  remember  that  the  silver  yon  have  in  your  purse  is 
fusible;  this  friend  will  not  teach  him  a  quality  of  the  silver, 
but  will  make  him  think  of  a  use  he  may  make  of  it,  in  order 
to  have  pistol-balls  in  this  pressing  need.  A  large  part  of 
moral  truths  and  of  the  most  beautiful  sentences  of  authors  is 
of  this  nature:  they  very  often  teach  us  nothing,  but  they 
make  us  think  at  the  right  time  of  what  we  know.  That 
iambic  senarius  of  the  Latin  tragedy, — 

Cuivis  potest  accidere,  quod  cuiquam  potest,  i 

which  might  be  expressed  thus,  although  less  prettily:  that 
which  may  happen  to  one,  may  happen  to  everybody,  only 
makes  us  remember  the  human  condition,  quod  nihil  humani  a 
nobis  alienum  putare  debemusJ^  This  rule  of  the  jurisconsults : 
qui  jure  suo  utitur,  nemini  facit  injuriam  ^  (he  who  uses  his 

1  Publilius  Syrus,  in  Seneca,  De  Tranquillitate ,  chap.  11.  —  Tr. 

"  Cf.  Terence,  Heauton.  1.  1.  23-25:  "  Homo  sum;  humani  nihil  a  me  alie- 
num puto."  —  Tr. 

3  Schaarschmidt  states  that  this  rule  of  the  jurisconsults  comes  from  the 
"Ref/ulsR  et  prxcepta  juris,"  which  were  customarily  appended  to  the  older 
editions  of  the  Institutiones.  The  exact  phrase  does  not  occur  in  the  Corpus 
Juris  Civilis;  but  cf.  Digest,  Lib.  XXXIX.,  Tit.  II.,  24,  ad  fin.,  where  Trebatius 
says:  "  non  teneri  me  damni  infecti:  neque  enim  existimari,  operis  mei  vitio 
damnum  tibi  dari  in  ea  re,  in  qua  jure  meo  usus  sum  "  ;  ih.  2(5:  "  Proculus  ait, 
cum  quis  jure  quid  in  suo  faceret,"  etc.;  Digest,  Lib.  L.,  Tit.  XVII.,  55,  where 
Gains  says:  "  Nullus  videtur  dolo  facere,  qui  suo  jure  utitur"  ;  ih.  129,  where 
Paulus  says:  "Nihil  dolo  creditor  facit,  qui  suum  recipit."  —  Tr. 


CH.  viii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  493 

own  riglit,  injures  no  one)  appears  trifling.  But  it  is  very 
useful  on  certain  occasions  and  makes  one  justly  think  of 
what  is  necessary.  If,  for  instance,  any  one  raised  his  house 
as  far  as  he  is  allowed  by  the  statutes  and  usages,  and  by  so 
doing  deprived  his  neighbor  of  some  view,  he  would  pay  this 
neighbor  at  once,  according  to  this  rule  of  law,  if  he  ventured 
to  complain.  Por  the  rest,  propositions  of  fact,  or  experiences, 
like  that  which  states  that  opium  is  a  narcotic,  carry  us  farther 
than  the  truths  of  pure  reason,  which  can  never  make  as  go 
beyond  that  which  is  in  our  distinct  ideas. ^  As  for  this  propo- 
sition, that  every  man  has  a  notion  of  God,  it  is  from  the 
reason,  since  notion  signifies  idea.  For  the  idea  of  God,  ac- 
cording to  my  view,  is  innate  in  all  men:  but  if  this  notion 
signifies  an  idea  in  which  you  actually  think  it,  it  is  a  propo- 
sition of  fact  which  depends  on  the  history  of  the  human  race. 
§  7.  Finally,  to  say  that  a  triangle  has  three  sides  is  not  so 
identical  as  it  seems,,  for  a  little  attention  is  required  to  see 
that  a  polygon  must  have  as  many  angles  as  sides;  it  would 
also  have  an  additional  side,  if  the  polygon  were  not  supposed 
to  be  closed. 

§  9.  Ph.  It  seems  that  the  general  propositions  concerning 
substances  are  for  the  most  part  trifling,  if  they  are  certain. 
He  who  knows  the  meanings  of  tlie  words :  substance,  man, 
animal,  form,  soul,  vegetative,  sensitive,  rational,  will  form 
from  them  many  indubitable  but  useless  propositions,  partic- 
ularly about  the  soul,  of  which  we  often  speak  without  know- 
ing what  it  really  is.  Every  one  may  see  an  infinite  number 
of  propositions,  reasonings,  and  conclusions  of  this  nature  in 
the  books  of  metaphysics,  scholastic  theology,  and  a  certain 
kind  of  physics,  the  reading  of  which  will  teach  him  nothing 
more  of  God,  spirits,  and  bodies  than  he  knew  before  having 
run  tlirough  these  books. 

Th.  It  is  true,  that  abstracts  of  metaphysics  and  such  other 
books  of  this  character  as  are  commonly  seen,  teach  only 
words.  To  say,  for  example,  that  metaphysics  is  the  science 
of  being  in  general,  which  explains  the  principles  and  affec- 
tions emanating   from    it;  that   the   ])rinciples    of  being  are 

1  Truths  or  fact  furnish  occasion  for  inductive  conchisions  which  enhirge 
our  knowledj;;e ;  while  truths  of  reason  can  only  be  explicated,  or  made  clearer 
as  to  their  already  existing  content.  — Tr. 


494  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

essence  and  existence;  that  the  affections  are  either  primi- 
tive, viz. :  unity,  truth,  the  good,  or  derivative,  viz. :  iden- 
tity, diversity,  sini])licity,  complexity,  etc.,  and,  in  speakiny 
of  each  of  these  terms,  to  give  only  vague  notions  and  verbal 
distinctions  is  indeed  to  abuse  the  name  of  science.  But  we 
must  render  this  justice  to  the  more  profound  Scholastics, 
like  Suarez  ^  (whom  Grotius  valued  so  highly)  and  admit  that 
there  is  sometimes  in  them  discussions  of  value,  as  upon  the 
continuum,  the  infinite,  the  contingent,  the  reality  of  abstracts, 
the  principles  of  individuation,  the  origo  et  vacuum  formarum, 
the  soul  and  its  faculties,  the  concurrence  of  God  with  his 
creatures,  etc.,  and  even  in  ethics,  upon  the  nature  of  the 
will  and  the  principles  of  justice ;  in  a  word,  we  must  admit 
that  there  is  still  some  gold  in  these  scorise,  but  it  is  only 
enlightened  persons  who  can  profit  from  it;  and  to  load  the 
youth  with  the  rubbish  of  inutilities,  because  there  is  some- 
thing of  value  here  and  there,  would  be  badly  to  dispose  of 
the  most  precious  of  all  things,  time.  For  the  rest,  we  are 
not  wholly  destitute  of  general  propositions  regarding  sub- 
stances which  are  certain,  and  deserve  to  be  known;  there  are 
grand  and  beautiful  truths  concerning  God  and  the  soul  which 

1  Francisco  Suarez,  1548-1G17,  a  famous  Jesuit  and  a  distinguished  pliiloso- 
plier,  theologian,  and  philosophical  jurist,  nvas  "the  last  great  Scholastic." 
In  philosophy  he  was  a  moderate  Thomist.  As  a  theologian,  he  advocated  the 
system  known  as  "  congruisni."  In  his  Tractatus  de  leglbus  ac  Deo  legislatorc. 
reprinted,  London,  1679,  wherein  he  was  to  a  certain  extent  the  forerunner  of 
Grotius  and  Pufendorf,  he  maintained  the  theory  of  conditional  obedience  to 
authority.  For  an  account  of  his  views  on  natural  law  and  sovereignty,  cf. 
Larousse,  Grande  Diet.  Univ.  de  XIX^  Steele,  \o\.  14,  pp.  1164rC-ll(35a;  for 
his  "congruism,"  ihid.,  Vol.4,  p. 934a.  His  Opera  omnia,  23  vols.,  fol.,  ap- 
peared at  Mainz  and  Lyons,  1630  sq.,  Venice,  1640,  new  revised  ed.,  26  vols.. 
8vo,  Besancon  and  Paris,  1856-62.  The  most  important  of  his  works  are,  per- 
haps, the  Disputationes  metaphysics^,  1605,  and  the  Tract,  de  lee/.,  cited  above. 
For  an  account  of  his  philosoi>hy,  cf.  Stockl,  Gesch.  de  Philos.  d.  Mittelalterf, 
III.  \yo\.  4],  6.34  fq.,  and  K.  Werner,  Suarez  w.  d.  Scholastik  d.  letzten  Jahr- 
hunderte,  Regensburg,  1861. 

Huig  van  Groot  —  Latin,  Hugo  Grotius  —  cf.  ante,  p.  285,  note  1,  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  philosophy  of  law,  in  his  theological  writings  occasionally  cites 
Suarez  as  an  authority ;  cf.,  for  example.  Opera  omnia  theologica,  Amsterdam. 
1679,  Vol.  4,  pp.  206,  a,  50,  621,  a,  54;  and  in  his  Epistolse.  ad  Gallos,  epist.  1.-4 
ad  Joa.  Gordesium,  p.  3.35,  ed.  Leipzig,  1674,  and  new  ed.  1684,  also  Epistolir 
quotquot  reperiri  potuerunt,  epist.  329,  p.  118,  Amsterdam,  1687,  praises  him 
thus:  "  Quorsum  tantus  .Suarezii  coutemtus?  hominis,  si  quid  recte  judico. 
in  philosophia  cui  hoc  tempore  connexa  est  scholastica,  tautae  subtilitatis,  ut 
vix  quemquam  habeat  parem?  "  — Tr. 


CH.  VIII]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  495 

our  clever  author  has  taught  either  iu  his  own  right  or  in 
part  after  others.  We  have  perhaps  added  something  also 
thereto.  And  as  for  general  knowledge  concerning  bodies, 
considerable  additions  are  being  made  to  what  Aristotle  left, 
and  it  should  be  said  that  physics,  even  general  phj^sics,  has 
become  much  more  real  than  it  was  heretofore.  As  for  real 
metaphysics,  we  are  beginning,  as  it  were,  to  establish  it,  and 
we  find  important  truths  grounded  in  reason  and  confirmed  by 
experience,  which  belong  to  substances  in  general.  I  hope, 
also,  that  I  have  advanced  a  little  the  general  knowledge  of 
the  soul  and  of  spirits.  Such  a  metaphysic  Avas  the  demand 
of  Aristotle,  it  is  the  science  which  he  called  Z-qTov^ivr],  the 
desired  (la  desiree)  or  that  which  he  sought,  which  must  be  as 
regards  the  other  theoretic  sciences  what  the  science  of  happi- 
ness is  to  the  arts  which  it  needs,  and  what  the  architect  is  to 
the  workmen.  This  is  why  Aristotle  said  that  the  other 
sciences  depend  upon  metaphysics  as  the  most  general  science 
and  must  derive  from  it  their  principles,  demonstrated  by  it.-^ 
You  must  know  also  that  true  ethics  is  to  metaphysics  what 
practice  is  to  theory,  because  upon  the  doctrine  of  substances 
in  common  depends  the  knowledge  of  spirits  and  particularly 
of  God  and  the  soul  which  gives  a  proper  meaning  to  justice 
and  virtue.  For  as  I  have  elsewhere "  remarked,  if  tliere  were 
neither  providence  nor  a  future  life,  tlie  wise  man  would  be 
more  limited  in  the  practice  of  virtue,  for  he  would  refer 
everything  merely  to  his  present  satisfaction,  and  even  this 
satisfaction,  which  appears  already  in  Socrates,  in  the  em- 
peror  Marcus   Aurelius,    in   Epictetus    and   other   ancients,*^ 

1  Cf.  Aristotle,  Metaphys.,  A,  2,  982'>-983a,  the  object  of  which  is  to  prove 
the  depeudence  of  the  other  sciences  upon  metaphysics,  and  in  which  the  term 
ir]Tilv  frequently  occurs  in  this  specific  sense;  cf.  especially  982 'J,  7,  8:  t'f  airav- 

Tiov  ovv  Tujf   e'ipr}fxei^tjiju  eTrt   ttji'  avTiqv  ^iriO'Trjfxiqi'   TTtTTTet  to   ^YjTov^ei'of  ui'OjU.rt.      For   tlie 

comparison  to  the  architect,  c/.  1,  981  a,  ,'50.  — Tit. 

2  Leibnitz  refers  perhaps  to  what  he  said  in  Neio  Jissays,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  2, 
§  2,  Th.  (2),  ante,  pp.  86-87;  or  in  the  Preface  to  his  Codex  juris  (lentiinn 
diplomatieus,  §  13  (Dutens,  4,  Pt.  III.,  290)  :  "  Ut  voro  univorsali  denionstra- 
tiono  conficiatur,  omne  honestum  esse  utile,  ct  oinn(!  turpe  daninosum,  assu- 
menda  est  immortalitas  animal,  et  rector  luiivcrsi  Dnns,"  etc.  — Tk. 

3  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus,  121-lsO,  tlic  noblest  of  thi^  Koinan  Emperors, 
whose  Meditations  or  Thoughts  exhibit  tlio  Stoic  philosojihy  at  its  best  on  tin- 
moral  and  religious  side,  and  present  a  morality  nearer  to  that  of  Die  New 
Testament  than  tliat  of  any  otlier  pagan  writer.  Eds.  of  the  Greek  Text 
Ta  eis  ai-Toi' by  J.  M.  Scliultz,  Tjcipzig,  1802,  reprinted  liy  Tauchnitz,  1821,  and 


496  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

would  not  be  so  well  grounded  always  without  these  beautiful 
and  grand  views  which  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  universe 
open  for  us  even  in  a  future  without  limits;  otherwise  the 
tranquillity  of  the  soul  would  be  only  what  is  called  a  forced 
patience,  so  that  we  may  say  that  natural  theology,  comprising 
two  parts,  theoretical  and  practical,  contains  altogether  real 
metaphj'sics  and  the  most  perfect  ethics.^ 

§  12.  Ph.  There  is  doubtless   knowledge  which    is  far  re- 

by  J.  Stich,  Leipzig,  1882.  Eng.  traus.,  The  Thoughts  of  the  Emperor  M. 
Aurelius  Antoninus,  by  Geo.  Long,  revised  ed.  in  Bolin's  Class.  Library;  also 
Boston:  Tieknor  and  Fields,  18()4.  On  bis  life  and  philosopby,  c/.  Zeller, 
Philos.  d.  Griech.,  III.,  1  [Vol.  5],  754-763,  .3d  ed.,  1880;  Capes,  Stoicism  (in 
series  of  "  Cbief  Anct.  Pliilosopbies,"  pub.  by  tbe  Soc.  for  promoting  Chris- 
tian Knowledge),  chap.  13,  pp.  200-239,  London,  1880;  F.  W.  Farrar,  Heekers 
after  God,  pp.  257-317,  Loudon,  Maemillan  &  Co.,  1877. 

Epictetus,  tbe  date  of  whose  birth  and  death  is  unknown,  lived  in  Rome 
under  Nero,  .54-68,  and  his  successors,  and,  when  Domitian  in  iMr  banished  all 
philosophers  from  the  Imperial  City,  went  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  and  there 
taught  till  his  death,  which  appears  to  have  occurred  iu  the  reign  of  Trajan, 
!t8-117,  or  shortly  after.  At  first  a  slave,  but  afterwards  a  freedman,  he  repre- 
sented Stoicism  in  the  cottage,  while  in  Aurelius  we  see  it  on  the  throne.  He 
left  no  writings,  but  his  discourses,  Aiarpipai,  were  carefully  taken  down  as 
far  as  possible  in  his  own  words  as  he  uttered  them,  by  his  pupil  and  admirer 
Arrian.  The  best  ed.  is  that  by  Schweighiiuser,  6  vols.,  8vo,  Leipzig,  179&- 
1800.  Eng.  trans.,  The  Discourses  of  Epictetus,  with  the  Encheiridion  and 
Fragments,  by  Geo.  Long,  in  Bohn's  Class.  Library ;  also  by  T.  W.  Higginson, 
Boston:  Little,  Brown  &  Co.,  1865.  On  his  life  and  philosophy,  cf.  Zeller, 
Philos.  d.  Griech.,  III.,  1  [Vol.  5],  738-754,  3ded.,  1880;  Capes,  Stoicism,  chap. 
12,  pp.  180-199;  Farrar,  Seekers  after  God,  pp.  18G-256,  London,  1877.  — Tr. 

1  The  old  scholasticism  made  natural  theology  a  part  of  metaphysics,  which 
included  besides  natural  theology,  ontology,  cosmology,  and  psychology.  Cf. 
Thos.  Aquinas,  Summa  TheoL,  Pt.  I.,  Quest.  1,  Art.  1,  ad  Jin.:  "  Unde  theo- 
logia,  quse  ad  sacram  doctrinam  pertinet,  differt  secundum  genus  ab  ilia  theo- 
logia  quae  pars  philosophise  ponitur."  Leibnitz,  in  a  writing  without  place  or 
date,  which  Gerhardt  {Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  4,  268,  note  **)  thinks  was 
undoubtedly  addressed  to  the  Duchess  Sophie,  says  (G.  op.  cit.,  4,  292,  and 
Foucber  de  Careil,  Nouvelles  lettres  et  opuscules  de  Leibniz  inedits,  Paris, 
1857,  p.  25) :  "En  eifect  la  metaphysique  est  la  theologie  naturelle,  et  le  mcme 
Dieu  qui  est  la  source  de  tous  les  biens,  est  aussi  le  principe  de  toutes  les  con- 
noissances."     Cf.  also  Discours  de  metaphys.,  §  28,  G.  4,  453. 

Leibnitz  finds  the  source  of  ethical  truths  in  natural  theology,  because  God, 
the  idea  of  whom  is  the  subject  of  natural  theology,  is  also  the  object  of  man's 
highest  moral  aspiration  and  effort,  so  far  as  he  seeks  lovingly  to  comprehend 
him,  a  i^oint  of  view  from  which  Leibnitz  sought  to  develop  the  ethical  con- 
ceptions published  under  the  title  of  Defliritiones  ethicse,  G.  7,  73  sq.,  Erdmann, 
670,  trans.  Duncan,  Philos.  Wks.  of  Leibnitz,  130,  and  which  controls  the 
thought-development  in  the  Preface  to  the  Codex  juris  gentium  diplomaticus, 
cf.  §l3,  Dutens,  4,  Pt.  III.,  296,  in  the  Theodicee,  Preface,  G.  6,  26-28,  E.469, 
jacqiies,  2,  3-4,  Janet,  2,  .3-4,  and  in  the  Discours  de  metaphys.,  §§  2-4,  35-37, 
G.  4,  427-430,  460-463.  —  Tr. 


CH.  IX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  497 

moved  from  being  trifliug  or  purely  verbal.  But  tliis  last 
seems  to  be  that  in  which  two  abstracts  are  affirmed  the  one 
of  the  other;  for  example,  that  parsimony  is  frugality,  that 
gratitude  is  justice;  and  however  specious  these  and  other 
propositions  sometimes  appear  at  first  sight,  yet  when  we 
press  their  force,  we  find  that  it  all  amounts  to  nothing  else 
than  the  signification  of  the  terms. 

Th.  But  the  significations  of  terms,  i.e.  definitions  united 
with  identical  axioms,  express  the  principles  of  all  demonstra- 
tions :  and  as  these  definitions  can  make  known  at  the  s^vae 
time  the  ideas  and  their  possibility,  it  is  plain  that  what 
depends  on  them  is  not  always  purely  verbal.  As  for  the 
example  that  gratitude  is  justice,  or  rather  a  part  of  justice,  it 
is  not  to  be  despised,  for  it  shows  that  what  is  called  actio 
ingrati,^  or  the  complaint  which  can  be  made  against  the 
ungrateful,  should  be  less  neglected  in  the  tribunals.  The 
Komans  received  this  action  against  the  Liberti,^  or  freedmen, 
and  still  to-day  it  should  have  place  as  regards  the  revocation 
of  gifts.  For  the  rest,  I  have  already  said  elsewhere  ^  that 
abstract  ideas  also  may  be  attributed  to  one  another,  the  genus 
to  the  species,  as  in  the  statements :  duration  is  a  continuity, 
virtue  is  a  habit;  but  universal  justice  is  not  only  a  virtue, 
but  it  is  indeed  the  complete  ethical  virtue. 


CHAPTER   IX 

OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE    OF    OUR    EXISTENCE* 

§  1.  Ph.  We  have  hitherto  considered  only  the  essences  of 
things,  and  as  our  mind  knows  them  only  by  abstraction,  by 
detaching  them  from  every  particular  existence,  other  than 
that  which  is  in  our  understanding,  they  give  us  absolutely 
no  knowledge  of  any  real  existence.     And  the  universal  prop- 

1  CJf.  Cod.  Jnstin.,  8,  5(),  1,  8,  and  10.  — Tr. 

2  Gerliardt,  Erduiann,  and  Janet  read  "les  lil)ertes  "  ;  Jacques  reads  "  les 
libcres."  —  Tr. 

3  Cf.  Bk.  III.,  chap,  '.i,  §  10,  Th.,  ante,  p.  .313.  — Tr. 

*  Locke's  title  is,  "  Of  our  knowledge  of  existence,"  PhiloK.  WorkK,  Vol.  '2, 
p.  228,  Bohn'sed.  — Tr. 
2  K 


41t8  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

ositious  of  wliicli  we  may  have  a  certain  knowledge,  do  not 
relate  to  existence.  Fiirtlier,  every  time  we  attribute  anything 
to  an  individual  of  a  genus  or  a  species  by  a  proposition,  which 
would  not  be  certain  if  the  same  were  attributed  to  the  genus 
or  species  in  general,  the  proposition  belongs  only  to  the  exist- 
ence and  makes  known  only  an  accidental  union  in  the  things 
existing  in  particular,  as  when  we  say,  such  a  man  is  learned. 

Th.  Very  well,  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the  philosophers 
also,  distinguishing  so  often  between  what  is  essence  and  what 
existence,  refer  to  existence  everything  which  is  accidental  or 
contingent.  Very  often  we  do  not  even- know  whether  the  uni- 
versal propositions,  which  we  know  only  by  experience,  are 
not  perhaps  accidental  also,  because  our  experience  is  limited; 
as  in  the  countries  where  water  is  not  frozen,  this  proposition 
which  will  be  formed  about  it,  that  water  is  always  in  a  fluid 
state,  is  not  essential,  and  we  know  it  by  coming  into  colder 
countries.  But  we  may  take  the  accidental  in  a  more  limited 
sense,  so  that  there  will  be,  as  it  were,  a  mean  between  it  and 
the  essenticd;  and  this  mean  is  the  natural  (le  naturel),  i.e.  that 
Avhich  does  not  belong  to  the  thing  necessarily,  but  which, 
nevertheless,  agrees  with  it  of  itself  if  nothing  prevents. 
Thus,  some  one  might  maintain  that  it  is  not  indeed  essen- 
tial, but  that  it  is  at  least  natural,  for  water  to  remain  fluid. 
We  might  maintain  this,  I  say,  but  it  is  not,  however,  a 
demonstrated  fact,  and  perhaps  the  inhabitants  of  the  moon, 
if  there  are  any,  would  have  reason  to  believe  the  statement 
no  less  grounded  that  it  is  natural  for  water  to  be  frozen. 
There  are  other  cases,  however,  where  the  natural  is  less 
doubtful ;  for  example,  a  ray  of  light  always  continues  straight 
in  the  same  medium  unless  it  accidentally  meets  some  surface 
which  reflects  it.  For  the  rest,  Aristotle  was  accustomed  to 
refer  to  matter  the  source  of  accidental  things ;  -^  but  then  we 
must  understand  thereby  secondary  matter,  i.e.  the  hea})  or 
mass  of  bodies. 

§  2.  Ph.  I  have  already  -  remarked,  following  the  excellent 
English  author  who  wrote  the  Essay  concerning  Understand- 
ing, that  we  know  oiir  existence  by  intuition,  that  of  God  by 

Of.  lifefciphys.,  E,  2,  1027*,  14:    wo-re  rj  vK-q  icrrai  airia  tj   ev5e;^ofiei'))  vapa  to  lus 
eiTi  TO  TToAv   dAAw?  tou  <7v fx^e ^iqKoTo'; .  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  3,  §  21,  ante,  p.  439.  — Tr. 


CH.  x]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  499 


demonstration,  and  that  of  other  things  by  sensation.  §  3. 
Now  this  intuition  which  makes  known  our  existence  to  our- 
selves, makes  it  known  to  us  with  an  evidence  complete, 
incapable  of  being  proved  and  having  no  need  of  proof;  so 
'  that  even  when  I  attempt  to  doubt  all  things,  this  doubt  itself 
does  not  allow  me  to  doubt  my  own  existence.  In  fine,  we 
have  on  this  point  the  highest  degree  of  certainty  that  can  be 
imagined. 

Th.  I  am  entirely  agreed  as  to  all  this.  And  I  add  that 
the  immediate  apperception  of  our  existence  and  of  our 
thoughts  furnishes  us  the  first  truths  a  posteriori,  or  of  fact, 
i.e.  the  first  experieyices,  as  the  identical  propositions  contain 
the  first  truths  a  lyriori,  or  of  reason,  i.e.  the  first  lights  (les 
premih-es  lumih-es).'^  Both  are  incapable  of  proof,  and  may  be 
called  immediate;  the  former,  because  they  are  immediate 
between  the  understanding  and  its  object;  the  latter,  because 
they  are  intermediate  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate. 


CHAPTER  X 

OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE    OF    THE    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD 

§  1.  Ph.  God  having  given  to  our  soul  the  faculties  with 
which  it  is  adorned,  lias  not  left  himself  without  a  Avitness ; 
for  the  senses,  perception,  and  the  reason  furnish  us  manifest 
proofs  of  his  existence. 

Th.  God  has  not  only  given  the  soul  faculties  suitable  for 
knowing  him,  but  he  has  also  impressed  upon  it  characters 
which  indicate  him,  although  the  soul  needs  faculties  to  per- 
ceive these  characters.  But  I  do  not  wish  to  repeat  tlie  discus- 
sions we  have  already  had  upon  ideas  and  innate  truths, 
among  which  I  reckon  the  idea  of  God  and  the  truth  of  his 
existence.     Let  us  come  rather  to  the  fact. 

Ph.  Now,  although  the  existence  of  God  is  the  truth  most 
easily  proved  by  the  reason,  and  its  evidence  equals,  if  I  am 
not  mistaken,  that  of  mathematical  demonstrations,  it  yet 
demands   attention.     It   needs  at   once   only  n'flection    upon 

1  Schaarsclimidt  tniiislates:  "dio  crstcn  ErluuL'litnnj,Miii  ans  il.'iii  Iiiiiorn," 
i.e.  the  first  illumiiialioiis  li-om  within.  —  Tk. 


500  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

oiu'selvos  and  ouv  own  indubitable  existence.  §  2.  Tims  I  sup- 
pose that  every  one  knows  that  something  actually  exists,  and  tliat 
thus  there  is  a  real  being.  If  tliere  is  any  one  who  can  doubt 
his  own  existence,  I  declare  that  I  do  not  speak  to  him.  §  3. 
We  know  also  by  an  intuitive  knowledge  that  bare  nothing  can- 
not prochice  a  real  being.  Whence  it  follows,  with  matliemat- 
ical  evidence,  that  something  has  existed  from  all  eternity,  since 
everytliing  which  has  a  beginning  must  have  been  produced 
by  something  else.  §  4.  Now  every  being  which  draws  its 
existence  from  another,  draws  also  from  it  all  it  has,  and 
all  its  faculties.  The  eternal  source  -of  all  beings  is  then 
also  the  principle  of  all  their  powers,  so  that  this  eternal  being 
must  he  also  all-jjoirerfiil.  §  5.  Further,  man  finds  in  himself 
knowledge.  Tliere  is,  then,  an  intelligent  being.  Now  it  is  im- 
possible for  a  thiug  absolutely  destitute  of  knowledge  and  per- 
ception to  produce  an  intelligent  being,  and  it  is  contrary  to 
the  idea  of  matter,  deprived  of  thought,  to  produce  it  of  itself. 
The  source  of  things  is  then  intelligent,  and  there  Jias  been  an 
intelligent  being  from  all  eternity.  §  6.  An  eternal,  very  power- 
ful, and  very  intelligent  being  is  what  we  call  God.  If,  how- 
ever, any  one  were  found  so  unreasonable  as  to  supjDose  that 
man  is  the  only  being  having  knowledge  and  wisdom,  but  that, 
nevertheless,  he  has  been  formed  by  pure  chance,  and  that  it 
is  this  same  principle,  blind  and  without  knowledge,  which 
carries  on  all  the  rest  of  the  universe,  I  shall  advise  him  to 
examine  at  his  leisure  the  wholly  solid  and  emphatic  censure 
of  Cicero  ("De  Legibus,"  lib.  2).  Certainly,  he  says,  no  one 
could  be  so  foolishly  arrogant  as  to  think  that  he  has  within 
himself  an  understanding  and  reason,  and  yet  that  there  is  no 
intelligence  governing  the  heavens  and  all  this  vast  universe.^ 
From  what  I  have  just  said  it  clearly  follows  that  we  have  a 
more  certain  knowledge  of  God  than  of  anything  else  outside  us. 
Th.  I  assure  you,  sir,  with  perfect  sincerity,  that  I  am  ex- 
tremely sorry  to  be  obliged  to  say  something  against  this 
demonstration ;  but  I  do  it  solely  in  order  to  give  you  an  op- 
portunity to  fill  up  the  void.     It  is  principally  in  the  part 

1  Cicero,  Be  Lef/.,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  7:  "Quid  est  enim  verius,  qnam  neminem 
esse  oportere  tarn  stulte  arro.^autem,  ut  in  se  rationem  et  mentem  piitet  iiiesse, 
in  coelo  mundoque  non  putet?  Aut  ut  ea  quje  vix  summa  ingenii  ratioue  com- 
prehendat,  nulla  ratione  moveri  putet?  "  —  Tr. 


en.  x]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  501 

wliere  you  couclude  (§  3)  that  something  has  existed  from  all 
eternity.  I  find  therein  some  ambiguity,  if  that  means  that 
there  never  has  been  any  time  in  which  nothing  existed.  I  admit 
it,  and  it  follows  truly  from  the  preceding  propositions  by 
an  inference  wholly  mathematical.  For  if  there  had  always 
been  nothing,  there  would  always  have  been  nothing,  nothing 
being  unable  to  produce  a  being;  then  we  ourselves  should  not 
be,  which  is  contrary  to  the  first  truth  of  experience.  But  the 
consequence  appears  at  once,  that  by  the  statement  that  some- 
thing has  existed  from  all  eternity,  you  mean  an  eternal 
thing.  But  it  does  not  at  all  follow  in  virtue  of  what  you 
have  hitherto  advanced,  that  if  there  has  ahvays  been  some- 
thing, there  has  always  been  a  certain  thing,  i.e.  an  eternal 
being.  For  certain  opponents  will  say  that  I  have  been  pro- 
duced by  other  things,  and  these  things  by  others.  Further, 
if  some  admit  eternal  beings  (as  the  Epicureans  their  atoms) 
they  Av^ill  not  think  themselves  compelled  for  that  reason  to 
admit  an  eternal  being  who  is  the  only  source  of  all  the 
others.  For  if  they  should  admit  that  this  which  gives  exist- 
ence, gives  also  the  other  qualities  and  powers  of  the  thing, 
they  will  deny  that  a  single  thing  gives  existence  to  the 
others,  and  they  will  say  also  that  in  each  thing  many  others 
must  concur.  Thus  we  shall  not  reach  by  this  alone  a  source 
of  all  the  powers.  Yet  it  is  veVy  reasonable  to  judge  that 
there  is  one,  and  also  that  the  universe  is  governed  with  wis- 
dom. But  when  we  believe  matter  susceptible  of  thought,  we 
may  be  disposed  to  believe  that  it  is  not  impossible  that  it 
may  produce  something.  At  least  it  will  be  difficult  to  bring 
forward  a  proof  which  does  not  show  at  the  same  time  that  it 
is  wholly  incapable  of  it;  and,  assuming  that  our  thought 
comes  from  a  thinking  being,  may  we  take  it  as  admitted, 
witliout  prejudice  to  the  demonstration,  that  tliis  must  be 
God? 

§  7.  Ph.  I  do  not  doul)t  tliat  the  excellent  man  from  whom 
I  have  borrowed  this  demonstration  is  capable  of  perfecting 
it;  and  I  shall  try  to  influence  him  to  do  so,  since  he  could 
scarcely  render  a  greater  service  to  the  public.  You  also  de- 
sire it.  This  makes  me  think  that  you  do  not  consider  it 
necessary,  in  order  to  shut  the  mouths  of  atlieists,  to  uiakf 
everything  revolve  upon  tlie  existence  of  the  idea  of  CJod   in 


502  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OP  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

lis,  as  some  do,  who  attach  themselves  too  strongly  to  this 
favorite  discovery  even  to  rejecting  all  other  demonstrations 
of  the  existence  of  God,^  or  at  least  attempting  to  weaken 
them  and  forbidding  to  employ  them  as  if  they  were  weak  or 
false ;  although  at  bottom  they  are  proofs  which  show  us  so 
clearly  and  in  a  manner  so  convincing  the  existence  of  this 
sovereign  being  by  the  consideration  of  our  own  existence, 
and  of  the  sensible  parts  of  the  universe,  that  I  think  no  wise 
man  ought  to  resist  them. 

Th.  Although  I  am  for  innate  ideas,  and  in  particular  for 
that  of  God,  I  do  not  think  that  the-  demonstrations  of  the 
Cartesians  drawn  from  the  idea  of  God  are  perfect.  I  have 
shown  fully  elsewhere  ^  (in  the  "Actes  de  Leipsic,"  and  in 
the  "Memoires  de  Trevoux")  that  what  Descartes  has  bor- 
rowed from  Anselm,^  Archbishop  of  Canterbuiy,  is  very  beau- 

1  Descartes  relied  mainly,  and  Spinoza  exclusively,  on  the  ontological  or  a 
priori  arscument  for  the  proof  of  God's  existence.  Spinoza's  system,  in  fact, 
did  not  admit  the  possibility  of  any  other  argument,  since  God  is  the  only  sub- 
stance and  all  other  things  are  merely  modes,  accidents,  or  expressions  of  that 
substance.  Cf.  Descartes,  Meditations,  III.  and  V.,  Veitch's  trans.,  pp.  115  sq., 
143  sq.,  Princip.  Philos.,  Pt.  I.,  §§  13  sg.,  Veitch,  pp.  198  sq.,  Discours  de  la 
Methode,  Pt.  IV.,  Veitch,  pp.  34  sq.;  Spinoza,  Ethica,  Pt.  I.,  ed.  Van  Vloten  and 
Land,  Vol.  1,  pp.  .39  sq.,  trans.  Elwes,  Vol.  2,  pp.  45  sq.;  letter  to  De  Vries, 
V.  V.  &  L.,  2,  34,  trans.  E.  2, 315.  Also  on  Descartes,  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Philos., 
trans,  by  Tufts,  392-3,  405  ;  on  Spinoza,  ibid.,  401,  407-10.  Leibnitz,  while  seek- 
ing to  correct  and  complete  the  ontological  argument,  makes  the  teleological 
form  of  the  a  posteriori  argument,  in  his  doctrine  of  monads  and  their  pre- 
established  harmony,  one  of  the  constituent  principles  of  his  system.  Cf.  Con- 
fessio  natursR  contra  atheistas,  1668,  Gerhardt,  4,  105-109,  Erdmann,  45-47, 
Dutens,  1,  5-8;  Principes  de  la  nature  et  de  la  grace,  §§  11  sq.,  G.  6,  603,  E. 
716,  trans.  Duncan,  214,  Monadologie,  §§  38  sq.,  G.  6,  613,  E.  70S,  trans.  D.,  223. 
Leibnitz's  doctrine  of  monads  demands  the  existence  of  God  as  its  necessary 
ground  and  complement.  Cf.  ante,  p.  363,  note  1.  He  regarded  all  the  argu- 
ments for  God's  existence  as  valuable  and  urged  men  to  perfect  them.  Cf. 
infra,  p.  505,  note  2.     On  his  doctrine,  cf.  Windelband,  op.  cit.,  420-425.  —  Tr. 

■-Leibnitz  means  the  3Ied.  de  Coy.,  Ver.  et  Id.,  published  in  the  "Acta 
Erud.  Lips.,"  Nov.,  1684,  and  found  in  Gerhardt,  4,  422,  Erdmann,  79,  Dutens, 
2,  Pt.  I.,  14,  Janet,  2,  514  (in  French) ,  trans.  Duncan,  27 ;  and  the  De  la  demon- 
stration Cartesienne,  etc.,  publi.shed  in  the  "  Memoires  de  Trevoux,"  1701,  G. 
4,  405,  E.  177,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  254,  -Lanet,  2,  568,  trans.  Duncan,  136.— Tr. 

3  Anselm,  10.3.3-1109,  archbishop  of  Canterbury  from  1093  till  his  death,  and 
the  real  founder  of  the  Christian  Scholasticism  of  the  Middle  Age,  was  a  dis- 
tinguished philosopher  and  theologian,  whose  fame  rests  chiefly  upon  his  onto- 
logical or  a  priori  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  liis  theory  of  the 
incarnation  and  atonement.  His  Opera  are  found  in  Migne,  Patrol.  Ctir. 
Compl.,  Vol.  155.  The  most  important  for  ijhilosophy  are  the  Cur  Deus 
Homo  ?,  the  Monolofjium,  and  the  Proskxjium.    The  two  latter,  with  Gauuilo's 


I 


CH.  X]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  503 

tiful  and  really  very  ingenious,  but  that  there  is  still  a  gap 
therein  to  be  filled.  This  celebrated  archbishop,  who  was 
without  doubt  one  of  the  most  able  men  of  his  time,  congratu- 
lates himself,  not  without  reason,  for  having  discovered  a 
means  of  proving  the  existence  of  God  a  priori,  by  means  of 
its  own  notion,  without  recurring  to  its  effects.  And  this  is 
very  nearly  the  force  of  his  argument:  God  is  the  greatest, 
or  (as  Descartes  says)  the  most  perfect  of  beings,  or  rather  a 
being  of  supreme  grandeur  and  perfection,  including  all  de- 
grees thereof.  That  is  the  notion  of  God.  See  now  how 
existence  follows  from  this  notion.  To  exist  is  something 
more  than  not  to  exist,  or  rather,  existence  adds  a  degree  to 
grandeur  and  perfection,  and  as  Descartes  states  it,  existence 
is  itself  a  perfection.  Therefore  this  degree  of  grandeur  and 
perfection,  or  rather  this  perfection  which  consists  in  exist- 
ence, is  in  this  supreme  all-great,  all-perfect  being :  for  otherwise 
some  degree  would  be  wanting  to  it,  contrary  to  its  definition. 
Consequently  this  supreme  being  exists.  The  Scholastics, 
not  excepting  even  their  Doctor  Angelicus,^  have  misunder- 

refutation  of  the  Proslogium,  entitled  Liber  pro  insipiente,  and  Anselra's 
reply,  Liber  apologetictis,  were  edited  by  C.  Haas,  Tiibingen,  1863.  There  is 
a  French  trans.,  with  notes,  of  the  Monolof/ium  and  Proslogium  by  Bouchitte, 
Le  Rationalisme  Chretien,  Paris,  1842;  and  an  English  trans,  of  the  Pros- 
logium and  Lib.  apologet.  in  the  "Bibliotheca  Sacra,"  Vol.  8  [1851],  pp.  529 
sq.,  704  sq.,  and  of  the  Cur  Deus  Homo?,  ibid.,  Vol.  11  [1854],  pp.  729  sq.,  12 
[1855] ,  52  sq.  His  ontological  argument  is  found  in  the  Proslogium  and  the 
Liber  apologeticus.  An  excellent  account  of  it  is  given  in  Ueberweg-Heinze, 
Gcsch.  d.  Philos.,  7th  ed.,  Berlin,  1888,  Vol.  2,  p.  152  sq.,  Eng.  trans,  from  4th 
German  ed.,  New  York,  1871,  Vol.  1,  pp.  38.3-86.  Cf.  also  Windelband,  Hist. 
o/P/h7o,<;.,  trans,  by  Tufts,  pp.  291-294;  Mulford,  The  Repuhlir  of  God,  pp.  i, 
5,  4th  ed.,  Boston,  1882.  For  further  ac(H)unt  of  Ansclni's  life  anil  |i]ii]osoi)hy, 
cf.Jiiisse,  Anselm  von  Canterburi/,  2  vols.,  Leipzig,  1843,  1852  (ontolog.  argt. 
in  Vol.  2,  pp.  233-286)  ;  Stuckl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  M ittelaller.'i,  1,  \5l-20S; 
Haureau,  Histoire  de  la  Philos.  Scholastique,  Paris,  1872-80,  1,  2().5-87. 

For  expositions  and  criticisms  of  the  ontological  argument,  cf.  Kant,  ICrit. 
d.  r.  Vernuiift.,  ed.  Rosenkranz  and  Schubert,  2,  4()2-470,  ed.  llartcnstoin, 
1838,  2,  45()-464,  1867,  3,  405-411,  ed.  Kirchman,  Leipzig,  1877,  1,  47(i-48:!,  trans. 
Miiller,  1  vol.  ed.,  509-518;  E.  Caird,  The  Philos.  of  Kunt,  (ilasgow,  1877, 
630,  642,  The  Crit.  Philos.  of  Kant,  New  York,  1889,  2,  110,  120;  Hegel, 
Vorlesungen  u.  d.  Beweise  vom  Dasein  Gottes,  in  his  I'hilos.  d.  Kelig., 
Anhang,  2,  .357  .5g.,  2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1840;  Dorner,  Christ.  Glaahenslehre,  1,  201 
sq.,  Eng.  trans.,  1,  214  sq.;  Pfleiderer,  Philos.  d.  Relig.,  2,  271  sq.,  2d  ed., 
Berlin,  1884,  Eng:  trans.,  3,  271  sq. —Tii. 

1  I.e.  Thomas  Aquinas,  1225  or  1227-1274.  For  his  (•riti(iu(^  of  the  ontologi- 
cal argument,  cf.  Hmmna  theoloqix,  Pt.  L,  Quest.  2,  Ai-ticle  1  ;  (Unitru  gen- 
tiles, Bk.  I.,  chap.  11;  and  StHcki,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Miitehtltrrs,  II.,  1  [Vol. 


50-1  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

stood  this  argument,  and  have  taken  it  as  a  paralogism;  in 
^vliieh  respect  they  were  altogether  wrong,  and  Descartes, 
who  stiulied  quite  a  long  time  the  scholastic  philosophy  at  the 
Jesuit  College  of  La  Fleche,  had  great  reason  for  re-establish- 
ing it.  It  is  not  a  paralogism,  but  it  is  an  imperfect  -^  demon- 
stration, which  assumes  something  that  must  still  be  proved 
in  order  to  render  it  mathematically  evident;  that  is,  it  is 
tacitl}^  assumed  that  this  idea  of  the  all-great  or  all-perfect 
being  is  possible,  and  implies  no  contradiction.  And  it  is 
already  something  that  by  this  remark  it  is  proved  that, 
assuming  that  God  is  possible,  lie  exists,  -which  is  the  privilege 
of  divinity  alone.  We  have  the  right  to  presume  the  possi- 
bility of  every  being,  and  especially  that  of  God,  until  some  one 
proves  the  contrary.  So  that  this  metaphysical  argument 
already  gives  a  morally  demonstrative  conclusion,  which  de- 
clares that  according  to  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  we 
must  judge  that  God  exists,  and  act  in  conformity  thereto. 
But  it  is  to  be  desired,  nevertheless,  that  clever  men  achieve 
the  demonstration  with  the  strictness  of  a  mathematical  proof, 
and  I  think  I  have  elsewhere  -  said  something  that  may  serve 
this  end.  The  other  argument  of  Descartes,  which  under- 
takes to  prove  the  existence  of  God  because  the  idea  of  him  is 
in  our  soul,  and  must  have  come  from  the  original,  is  still  less 
conclusive.  For  in  the  first  place  this  argument  has  this  de- 
fect, in  common  with  the  preceding,  that  it  assumes  that  there 
is  in  us  such  an  idea,  i.e.  that  God  is  possible.  For  what 
Descartes  alleges,  that  in  speaking  of  God  we  know  what  we 

2],  498.  Spinoza  also  censures  Aquinas  for  his  rejection  of  the  outological 
argument;  cf.  Korte  Verhandelbui  van  God,  in  Spinoza,  Opera,  ed.  Van  Vlo- 
ten  and  Land,  Vol.  2,  p.  2()5,  and  Schaarschmidt's  German  trans,  of  tbe  same 
(Vol.  18  of  J.  H.  V.  Kirchmanu's  Fhilos.  Bihliothek),  p.  (5,  2d  ed.,  Berlin, 
1874.— Tr. 

1  Gerhardt  reads  "  parf.aite  "  ;  Erdmann,  Jacques,  and  Janet  "  imparfaite." 
The  reading  of  G.  is  evidently  a  IMs.  or  typographical  error,  as  the  sense 
requires  that  of  E.,  J.,  and  J.  —  Tr. 

2  Leibnitz  here  probably  refers  to  the  De  la  demonstration  Cartesieniie, 
etc.,  1701,  Gerhardt,  4,  405,  Erdmann,  177,  Dutens,  2.  Pt.  I.,  254,  trans.  Dun- 
can, 136.  But  cf.  also  G.  4,  292-2!t4,  401-403,  trans.  Duncan,  132-130 ;  Animad- 
versiones  in  partem  generalem  Prmcipioruni  Cartesianorum,  1(502,  Pt.  I.,  ad 
art.  14,  18,  20,  G.  4,  358-60,  trans.  Duncan,  50-51,  and  Letters  to  Jacquelot, 
Nov.,  1702,  G.  3,  442  .sg..  Letter  to  Conring,  Jan.  3,  1678,  G.  1,  188,  E.  78;  cor- 
respondence with  Eckhard,  G.  1,  212  nq. ;  and  Stein,  Leibniz  v.  Spinoza,  Bei- 
lage  VIL,  p.  306:  Probatio  eiisientitB  Del  ex  ejus  essentia.  — Ti;. 


CH.  x]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  505 

are  saying,  and  that  consequently  we  have  an  idea,  is  a  decep- 
tive indication,  since  in  speaking  of  perpetual  mechanical 
movement,  for  example,  we  know  Avhat  we  are  saying,  and 
yet  this  movement  is  an  impossible  thing,  of  Avhich,  conse- 
quently, we  can  have  only  an  apparent  idea.  Secondly,  this 
same  argument  does  not  sufficiently  prove  that  the  idea  of 
God,  if  we  have  it,  must  come  from  the  original.  But  I  do 
not  wish  to  delay  here  at  present.  You  will  say,  sir,  to  me, 
that  recognizing  in  us  the  innate  idea  of  God,  I  ought  not  to 
say  that  we  may  question  whether  there  is  one.  But  I  per- 
mit this  doubt  only  in  relation  to  a  strict  demonstration  based 
upon  the  idea  alone.  For  we  are  otherwise  sufficiently  assured 
of  the  idea  and  of  the  existence  of  God.  And  you  will  re- 
member that  I  have  shown  how  ideas  are  in  us,  not  always  in 
such  wise  that  we  are  conscious  of  them,  Imt  always  in  such 
wise  that  we  may  draw  them  from  our  own  depths  and  make 
them  perceivable.  And  this  is  also  my  belief  concerning  the 
idea  of  God,  the  possibility  and  existence  of  which  I  hold  to 
be  demonstrated  in  more  than  one  way.  And  the  pre-estab- 
lished harmony  itself  furnishes  a  new  and  incontestable  means 
of  so  doing.  ^  I  believe  also  that  nearly  all  the  means  which 
have  been  employed  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  are  good 
and  might  be  of  service,  if  we  would  perfect  them,  and  I  am 
not  at  all  of  the  opinion  that  we  should  neglect  that  drawn 
from  the  order  of  things.^ 

§  9.  Ph.  It  will  perhaps  be  proper  to  insist  a  little  upon  this 
question,  whether  a  thinking  being  can  come  from  a  non- 
thinking being  deprived  of  all  sensation  and  knowledge  such 
as  matter  may  be.  §  10.  It  is  indeed  quite  evident  that  a 
part  of  matter  is  incapable  of  producing  anything  of  itself, 
and  of  giving  itself  motion;  its  motion  must  then  either  be 
eternal  or  be  impressed  upon  it  by  a  more  powerful  being.  If 
this  motion  were  eternal,  it  Avould  always  be  incapable  of  pro- 
ducing knowledge.  Divide  matter  into  as  many  little  parts  as 
you  please,  in  order,  as  it  were,  to  spiritualize  it,  give  it  all 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  363,  note  1.— Tr. 

2  Leibnitz's  idea  is  that  all  risht  tliouslit,  if  thorougli-goiiiK  and  deep  ennngh, 
must  at  last  lead  back  to  God,  its  original  source.  None  of  tlic  ]iroofs  of  (iod's 
existence  are  therefore  to  he  cast  aside,  hut  tlie  essential  signilicance  of  ea<'h 
is  to  he  sought  out  and  ascc^rtained  and  its  form  perfected,  and  all  are  to  ho 
united  into  one  orgaruc  whole.  —  Tit. 


606  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

figures  and  motions  yon  wisli,  make  it  a  globe,  a  cube,  a  prism, 
a  cylinder,  etc.,  whose  diameters  are  only  the  one-millionth 
part  of  a  gry,  which  is  one-tenth  of  a  line,  which  is  one-tenth 
of  an  inch,  which  is  one-tenth  of  a  philosophical  foot,  which 
is  one-third  of  a  pendulum,  each  vibration  of  which  in  the 
latitude  of  forty-five  degrees  is  equal  to  one  second  of  time. 
This  particle  of  matter,  small  as  it  is,  will  act  upon  other 
bodies  of  a  size  proportional  to  itself  no  differently  than 
bodies  of  an  inch  or  a  foot  in  diameter  act  among  them- 
selves. And  we  may  hope  as  rationally  to  produce  feeling, 
thought,  and  knowledge,  by  putting  together  gross  parts  of 
matter  in  a  certain  figure  and  motion,  as  by  means  of  the 
smallest  parts  of  matter  in  the  world.  These  last  knock, 
push,  and  resist  each  other  just  as  the  great  ones  do,  and  this 
is  all  they  can  do.  But  if  matter  could  draw  from  its  bosom 
feeling,  perception,  and  knowledge,  immediately  and  with- 
out machinery,  or  without  the  aid  of  figures  and  motions, 
then  their  possession  must  be  an  inseparable  property  of 
matter  and  of  all  its  parts.  To  which  one  could  add  that, 
though  the  general  and  specific  idea  we  have  of  matter 
leads  us  to  speak  of  it  as  if  it  were  a  thing  single  in  num- 
ber, yet  all  matter  is  not  properly  one  individual  thing,  which 
exists  in  a  material  being  or  a  single  body  that  we  know  or 
can  conceive.  So  that  if  matter  were  the  first  eternal  think- 
ing being,  there  would  not  be  one  eternal  infinite  and  think- 
ing being,  but  an  infinite  number  of  eternal  infinite  ^  thinking 
beings,  independent  of  one  another,  whose  forces  would  be 
limited  and  thoughts  distinct,  and  who  consequently  could 
never  produce  this  order,  harmony,  and  beauty  which  is  seen 
in  nature.  Whence  it  necessarily  follows  that  the  eternal 
first  being  cannot  be  matter.  I  hope  that  you,  sir,  will  be 
more  content  with  this  reasoning  taken  from  the  celebrated 
author  of  the  preceding  demonstration  than  you  have  appeared 
to  be  with  his  demonstration. 

Th.  I  find  the  present  reasoning  the  most  solid  in  the 
world,  and  not  only  exact,  but  further  profound  and  worthy  of 
its  aiTthor.  I  am  perfectly  of  his  opinion  that  no  combination 
and  modification  of  the  parts  of  matter,  however  small  they 

1  Locke  has  "finite  "  here,  Philos.  Works,  Vol.  2,  p.  2.37,  Bolm's  ed.  Ger- 
hardt,  Erdmann,  Jacques,  and  Janet  all  read  "infinis."  —  Tr. 


cii.  x]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  507 


may  be,  cau  produce  perception;  forasnmcli  as  the  gross  par- 
ticles could  not  give  it  (as  is  maiiifestly  admitted)  and  as 
all  is  proportional  in  the  small  parts  to  what  may  take  place 
in  the  great.  It  is  furthermore  an  important  remark  regard- 
ing matter  which  the  author  makes  here,  that  it  must  not  be 
taken  as  a  thing  single  in  number,  or  (as  I  have  been  wont 
to  state  it)  as  a  true  and  perfect  monad  or  unity,  since  it  is 
only  a  mass  of  an  infinite  number  of  beings.  Here  this  excel- 
lent author  needed  but  a  step  to  arrive  at  my  system.  For  in 
fact  I  give  perception  to  all  these  infinite  beings,  each  one  of 
which  is  like  an  animal  endowed  with  a  soul  (or  some  active 
analogous  principle  which  makes  its  true  unity),  together 
with  what  is  necessary  to  this  being  in  order  to  be  passive 
and  endowed  with  an  organic  body.  Now  these  beings  have 
received  their  nature,  active  as  well  as  passive  {i.e.  what  they 
have  of  immaterial  and  material),  from  a  general  and  supreme 
cause,  because  otherwise,  as.  the  author  very  well  says,  being 
independent  of  one  another,  they  could  never  produce  this 
order,  harmony,  and  beauty  which  is  seen  in  nature.  But 
this  argument,  which  appears  to  possess  only  a  moral  certainty, 
is  pushed  to  a  necessity  wholly  metaphysical  by  the  liew  kind 
of  harmony  I  have  introduced,  which  is  the  pre-established  har- 
mony. Por  each  one  of  these  souls  expressing  in  its  way  what 
takes  place  outside  it  and  being  unable  to  have  any  influence 
on  other  particular  beings,  or  rather,  being  obliged  to  draw 
this  expression  from  the  de})ths  of  its  own  nature,  each  one 
must  necessarily  have  received  this  nature  (or  this  internal 
reason  of  the  expression  of  that  which  is  outside)  from  a 
universal  cause  upon  which  all  these  beings  depend  and  which 
makes  one  perfectly  in  accord  and  correspondent  with  another; 
a  thing  impossible  without  an  infinite  knowledge  and  power 
and  with  an  artifice  great  as  regards  especially  the  spontane- 
ous agreement  of  the  mechanism  with  the  acts  of  the  rational 
soul.     The  illustrious  author  ^  wlio  made  objections  against  it 

1  Leilmitz  here  refers  to  Pierre  Bayle,  1(i47-170(),  a  celebrated  critic,  pliiloso- 
pher,  and  controversialist,  who  published  in  his  Dictionmim;  historUiuc  cl 
critique,  Rotterdain,  l()'.)5-97,  2  vols.,  2d  ed.,  revised  and  enlarijcd,  1702,  articdc 
"Rorarius,"  a  criticism  of  Leibnitz's  Systems  noureau  de  la  nutiirc,  etc.,  jml)- 
lished  in  the  "  Jonr.  des  Savants,"  .June,  ICitS,  pp.  449  xq.  Leil)nit/,  son-ht  lo 
repel  his  criticisms  in  a  \vritin,<,s  July,  lOilS,  addressed  to  Hasnaj;!'  de  llrauval, 
editor  of  the  "  Histoire  des  ouvrages  des  .S(;avans,"  and  publislied   therein, 


508  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 


in  his  wonderful  Dictionary  doubted,  as  it  were,  whether  this 
condition  of  things  did  not  surpass  all  possible  wisdom,  saying 
that  the  wisdom  of  God  did  not  appear  to  him  too  great  for 
such  an  effect,  and  recognized  at  least  that  never  had  the 
feeble  conceptions  we  may  have  of  the  divine  perfection  been 
so  set  in  relief. 

§  12.  Ph.  How  delighted  I  am  at  this  agreement  of  your 
thoughts  with  those  of  my  author!  I  hope  you  will  not  be  dis- 
pleased, sir,  if  I  give  you  an  account  also  of  the  rest  of  his 
reasoning  upon  this  article.  First  he  examines  whether  the 
thinking  being,  upon  whom  all  the  other  intelligent  beings - 
depend  (and  with  much  stronger  reason  all  other  beings)  is 
material  or  not.  §  13.  It  is  objected  that  a  thinking  being 
might  be  material.  But  he  replies  that  if  that  were  so,  it  is 
enough  that  this  be  an  eternal  being  which  has  an  infinite 
knowledge  and  power.  Further,  if  thought  and  matter  can  be 
separated,  the  eternal  existence  of  matter  Avill  not  follow 
from  the  eternal  existence  of  a  thinking  being.  §  14.  It  will 
further  be  asked  of  those  who  make  God  material  whether 
they  imagine  that  every  part  of  matter  thinks.  In  that  case 
it  will  follow  that  there  would  be  as  many  Gods  as  particles 
of  matter.  But  if  each  part  of  matter  does  not  think,  then 
there  is  a  thinking  being  composed  of  non-thinking  parts, 
which  has  already  been  disproved.  §  15.  To  say  that  any 
single   atom    of    matter   thinks,    and   that   the   other   parts, 

July,  1698,  p.  329 s^.,  c/.Gerhardt,  Leibniz. philos.  Schrift.,  4,  517-24,  Erdmann, 
15(M54,  Jacques,  1,  481-87,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  74-80.  In  the  2d  ed.  of  his  Diction- 
nairc,  p.  2599  sq.,  Eng.  trans,  from  2d  ed.,  carefully  collated  with  the  several 
eds.  of  the  original,  5  vols.,  London,  1738,  4,  900-916,  Bayle  again  discussed 
Leibnitz's  views,  and  to  this  discussion  Leibnitz  made  a  thorough  and  search- 
ing reply,  first  published  by  Gerhardt,  4,  524-54,  with  the  title:  Extract  clu 
Dictionnaire  de  31.  Bayle,  article  Rorarius,  p.  2599  sqq.  de  V Edition  de  Van 
1702  avec  nies  remarques.  Leibnitz  pub.  a  revision  of  this  detailed  refutation, 
in  1712,  in  the  "  Histoire  critique  de  la  Republique  des  Lettres,"  Vol.  2,  p.  78 
sq.  Gerhardt  has  published  it,  4,  544-71,  with  many  additions  by  Leibnitz. 
Of.  also  Erdmann,  183-191,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  L,  80-93,  Janet,  2,  579-94.  Leibnitz 
elsewhere  frequently  refers  to  Bayle,  especially  in  the  Theodicee,  in  the  pre- 
liminary essay  entitled,  Discours  preliminaire  sur  conformite  de  lafoi  avec  la 
raison,  in  which  Bayle's  objections  are  cai'efully  examined,  and  in  Pts.  II.  and 
IIL,  where  he  is  cited  on  nearly  every  page,  and  which  presents  a  continuous 
polemic  against  him.  The  composition  of  the  Theodicee  was  occasioned  by  the 
discussions  held  by  Leibnitz  with  Queen  Sophie  Charlotte  of  Prussia  on  philo- 
sophical and  theological  topics  suggested  by  the  reading  of  Baj'le's  Dictionary. 
For  the  correspondence  of  Leibnitz  and  Bayle,  cf.  Gerhardt,  3,  21  sq.  —  Tr. 


CH.  x]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  509 

though  equally  eternal,  do  not  think,  is  to  make  the  gratuitous 
statement  that  one  part  of  matter  is  infinitely  above  anotliev 
and  produces  thinking  beings  not  eternal.^  §  16.  If  we  will 
have  it  that  the  thinking  eternal  and  material  being  is  a  cer- 
tain particular  mass  of  matter  whose  parts  are  non-thinking, 
we  fall  back  upon  the  view  which  has  been  disproved;  for  the 
parts  of  matter  are  united  in  vain,  they  can  acquire  only  a 
new  local  relation,  which  cannot  give  them  knowledge.  §  17. 
It  matters  not  whether  this  mass  is  at  rest  or  in  motion.  If 
at  rest,  it  is  only  an  inactive  mass  which  has  no  privilege 
above  one  atom ;  if  in  motion,  since  this  motion,  which  distin- 
guishes it  from  other  parts,  is  destined  to  produce  thought, 
all  these  thoughts  will  be  accidental  and  limited,  each  part  by 
itself  being  without  thought,  and  having  nothing  which  regu- 
lates its  movements.  Thus  there  will  be  neither  freedom,  nor 
choice,  nor  wisdom,  any  more  than  in  simple  brute  matter. 
§  18.  Some  believe  that  matter  is  at  least  coeternal  Avith  God. 
But  they  do  not  say  why :  the  production  of  a  thinking  being, 
which  they  admit,  is  much  more  difficult  than  that  of  matter 
which  is  less  perfect.  And  perhaps  (says  the  author)  if  we 
would  withdraw  ourselves  a  little  from  common  ideas,  give 
wings  to  our  mind,  and  engage  in  the  profoundest  examina- 
tion we  could  make  of  the  nature  of  things,  we  might  be  able  to 
attain  <t  conception,  though  in  an  imperfect  manner,  hoiv  matter 
may  at  first  have  been  made,  and  how  it  commenced  to  exist  by 
the  power  of  this  eternal  first  being.  But  we  should  see  at  the 
same  time  that  to  give  being  to  a  spirit  is  an  effect  of  this 
eternal  and  infinite  power  much  more  difficult  to  comprehend. 
But  because  this  would  perhaps  lead  me  too  far  (he  adds) 
from  the  notions  upion  tuhich  the  p}hilosophy  noio  in  the  world  is 
based,  it  would  not  be  excusable  in  me  to  deviate  so  far  from 
them  or  to  inquire,  so  far  as  grammar  would  permit,  whether 
at  bottom  the  commonly  established  opinion  is  contrary  to 
this  particular  view;  it  would  be  wrong,  I  say,  for  me  to 
engage  in  this  discussion,  especially  in  this  corner  oftheivorld, 
where  the  received  docti'ine  is  good  enough  for  my  purpose, 
since  it  posits  as  an  indulntable  tiling  that  if  the  creation  or 
beginning  of  any  substance   whatever  from   nothing  be  once 

1  Lcilmitz  iinticipiites  this  argument  of  Locke  by  liis  law  of  continuity.— 
Tu. 


510  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

admitted,  the  creation  of  every  otlier  substance,  excej)t  the 
Creator  himself,  may  with  tlie  same  facility  be  assumed. 

Th.  You  have  given  me  genuine  pleasure,  sir,  by  giving  me 
some  account  of  a  profound  thought  of  your  clever  author, 
which  his  too  scrupulous  prudence  has  prevented  him  from 
producing  in  its  entirety.  It  would  be  a  great  wrong,  if  he 
shoidd  suppress  it  and  leave  us  there,  after  having  made  our 
mouths  water.  I  assure  you,  sir,  that  I  believe  there  is  some- 
thing beautiful  and  important  concealed  behind  this  enigmati- 
cal manner.^  The  substance  in  large  letters  might  make  one 
suspicious  that  he  conceives  the  production  of  matter  in  the 
same  Avay  as  that  of  the  accidents,  which  we  find  no  difficulty 
in  drawing  from  nothing:  and  in  distinguishing  liis  particular 
thought //'om  the  pliilosopliy  noio  prevalent  in  the  world  or  in  that 
corner  of  the  earth,  I  do  not  know  but  that  he  had  in  mind  the 
Platonists,  who  take  matter  as  something  fleeting  and  transi- 
tory, after  the  manner  of  the  accidents,  and  had  an  altogether 
different  idea  of  spirits  and  souls. 

§  19.  Ph.  Finall}^,  if  some  deny  creation,  by  which  things 
are  made  from  nothing,  because  they  cannot  conceive  it,  our 
author,  writing  before  he  knew  your  discovery  on  the  reason 
of  the  union  of  the  soul  and  the  body,  holds  against  them, 
that  they  do  not  understand  how  voluntary  movements  are  pro- 
duced in  bodies  by  the  will  of  the  soul,  and  they  cease  not  to 
believe  the  fact,  being  convinced  by  experience;  and  he  re- 
plies with  reason  to  those  who  answer  that  the  soul  being  una- 
ble to  produce  a  new  motion,  produces  only  a  ncAV  determina- 
tion of  the  animal  spirits,  he  replies  to  them,  I  say,  that  the 
one  is  as  inconceivable  as  the  other.  And  nothing  can  be 
better  said  than  what  he  adds  on  this  occasion,  that  to  wish 
to  limit  what  God  can  do  to  what  we  can  comprehend,  is  to 
give  an  infinite  extent  to  our  comprehension,  or  to  make  God 
himself  finite. 

Th.  Although  now  the  difficulty  regarding  the  union  of  the 
soiU  and  the  body  has  in  my  view  been  removed,  there  remain 
difficulties  elsewhere.     I  have  shown  a  posteriori  by  the  pre- 

1  With  regard  to  tliis  riddle  or  euigma,  Professor  Scliaarsclimidt  informs  me 
tliat  Raspe,  in  his  ed.  of  the  Noiivcaux  Essnis,  17().5,  says,  p.  409:  "  Mr.  Coste 
I'a  explique  d'apres  le  Chevalier  Newton  dans  la  remarqne  (2)  an  §  18,  de  ce 
chapitre.     Edition  de  Locke  d'Amsterdam,  de  1755,  p.  5l.'3."  —  Tr. 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  511 

established  harmony,  that  all  the  monads  have  received  their 
origin  from  God  and  depend  upon  him.  But  we  cannot  com- 
prehend the  hoAV  in  detail;  and  at  bottom  their  conservation 
is  nothing  else  than  a  continual  creation/  as  the  Scholastics 
have  very  clearly  recognized. 


CHAPTEE  XI 

OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE    OF    THE    EXISTENCE    OF     OTHER    THINGS 

§  1.  Ph.  As,  then,  the  existence  of  God  only  has  a  necessary 
connection  with  ours,  the  ideas  we  may  have  of  anything  no 
more  prove  the  existence  of  this  thing  than  the  portrait  of  a 
man  proves  his  existence  in  the  world.  §  2.  The  certainty, 
however,  I  have  of  black  and  white  upon  this  paper  by  means 
of  sensation,  is  as  great  as  that  of  the  motion  of  my  hand, 
which  is  second  only  to  the  knowledge  of  our  own  existence, 
and  of  that  of  God.  §  3.  This  certainly  deserves  the  name  of 
knowledge.  For  I  do  not  believe  that  any  one  can  seriously  be 
so  sceptical  as  to  be  uncertain  of  the  existence  of  things  which 
he  sees  and  feels.  At  least,  he  who  can  carry  his  doubts  so 
far  will  never  have  any  controversy  with  me,  since  he  can 
never  be  certain  that  I  say  anything  contrary  to  his  opinion. 
The  perceptions  of  sensible  things  §  4.  are  produced  by  exter- 
nal causes  which  affect  our  senses,  for  we  do  not  acquire  these 
perceptions  without  the  organs,  and  if  the  organs  sufficed, 
they  would  always  produce  them.  §  5.  Further,  I  sometimes 
experience  the  fact  that  I  cannot  prevent  these  ideas  from 
being  formed  in  my  mind,  as,  for  example,  the  light,  when  I 
have  my  eyes  open  in  a  place  into  which  the  light  may  enter : 
while  I  can  lay  aside  the  ideas  which  are  in  my  memory. 
There  must  be,  then,  some  external  cause  of  this  living  im- 
pression whose  efficacy  I  cannot  overcome.     §  G.   Sonu;  of  these 

1  Cf.  Observatio  ad  Recensionem  libri  de  Fidci,  et  Rationis  consensu  a  Do- 
mino Jiiqiieloto  editi,  mense  Octobri  proxime  prxcedenti  factam,  pul).  in  tlic 
"  Acta  Enul.  Lips.,"  Dec.  1705,  p.  553,  ud  fin.,  Gerhardt,  (!,  S.'JC-S,  Erdmaiiii, 
43:^-4,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  2.50-8;  Theodicdc,  Pt.  III.,  §§  3S2,  .•'.85,  .301-3,  (}.  (J, 
342,  E.  G14,  Jacques,  2,  2!I0,  Janet,  2,  388,  Dutens,  1,  387 ;  Picliler,  Die  The- 
ologie  des  Leibniz,  1,  2.52,  Miinchen,  ]8(i!);  Afoiuuloloi/ie,  §  47,  G.  (>,  (iU,  E.  708, 
Jacques,  2,  397,  Janet,  2,  (iOl,  trans.  Duncan,  225;  Noleu,  Leibniz,  La  Mona- 
dologic,  3d  ed.,  Paris,  181)3,  pp.  148,  211.  —Tr. 


r>l2  LEIBNITZ'S   CiariQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

ini]n"essions  are  produced  in  iis  with  pain,  althoiigh  afterwards 
wo  remember  it  without  feeling  the  least  inconvenience.  And 
althongh  mathematical  demonstrations  do  not  depend  on  the 
senses,  yet  the  examination  made  of  them  by  means  of  dia- 
grams is  of  much  use  in  proving  the  evidence  of  our  sight,  and 
seems  to  give  to  it  a  certainty  approaching  that  of  demonstra- 
tion itself.  §  7.  Our  senses  also  in  many  cases  bear  witness 
to  each  other.  He  who  sees  the  fire  may  feel  it  if  in  doubt  of 
it.  And  in  writing  this,  I  see  that  I  can  change  the  appear- 
ance of  the  paper,  and  say  beforehand  wdaat  new  idea  it  is 
going  to  present  to  the  mind;  but,  when  these  characters  are 
traced,  I  can  no  longer  avoid  seeing  them  as  they  are,  in 
addition  to  the  fact  that  the  sight  of  these  characters  will 
make  another  man  utter  the  same  sounds.  §  8.  If  any  one 
thinks  that  all  this  is  but  a  long  dream,  he  may  dream,  if  he 
pleases,  that  I  make  this  response  to  him,  that  our  certainty 
based  upon  the  testimony  of  our  senses  is  as  perfect  as  our 
nature  allows,  and  our  condition  demands.  He  who  sees  a 
candle  burning,  and  tries  the  heat  of  the  flame,  which  hurts 
him  if  he  does  not  withdraw  his  finger,  will  not  ask  for  a 
greater  certainty  in  order  to  govern  his  actions,  and  if  this 
di-eamer  did  not  so  do  {i.e.  withdraw  his  finger)  he  would  find 
himself  awakened.  Such  an  assurance  then  suffices  us,  which 
is  also  as  certain  as  pleasure  or  pain,  two  things  beyond  which 
we  have  no  interest  in  knowledge  or  the  existence  of  things. 
§  9.  But  beyond  our  actual  sensation,  there  is  no  knowledge, 
and  it  is  only  prohahility,  as  when  I  believe  that  there  are  men 
in  the  world;  of  which  fact  there  is  a  high  degree  of  probabil- 
ity, although  at  present,  alone  in  my  chamber,  I  see  none  of 
them.  §  10.  It  is  also  folly  to  expect  a  demonstration  of  every- 
thing and  to  act  not  in  accord  with  clear  and  evident  truths 
though  they  are  not  demonstrable.  A  man  who  should  so 
use  them  could  be  assured  of  nothing  but  of  dying  in  a  very 
short  time. 

Th.  I  have  already  remarked  in  our  preceding  conferences 
that  the  truth  of  sensible  things  is  justified  by  their  connec- 
tion,^ which  depends  upon  the  intellectual  truths  grounded  in 
reason  and  upon  constant  observations  in  the  sensible  things 

1  Cf.  New  EsmyK,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  2,  §  14,  Th.  {2),  ante,  p.  422,  note  1.  From 
the  idealistic  jjoiiit  of  view,  tlie  only  possible  criterion  of  the  truth  of  the  phe- 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  513 


themselves  even  when  the  reasons  do  not  appear.  And  as 
these  reasons  and  observations  give  us  the  means  of  judging 
the  future  as  rehi.ted  to  our  interest,  and  as  success  corresponds 
with  our  rational  judgment,  we  could  not  demand,  nor  have 
indeed,  a  greater  certainty  regarding  these  objects.  We  can 
also  give  a  reason  for  dreams  themselves,  and  for  their  slight 
connection  with  other  phenomena.  Nevertheless,  I  believe 
that  we  might  extend  the  appellation  of  knowledge  and  of 
certainty  beyond  actual  sensations,  since  clearness  and  mani- 
festness  go  beyond,  which  I  consider  as  a  species  of  certainty; 
and  it  Avould  undoubtedly  be  folly  seriously  to  doubt  whether 
there  are  men  in  the  world  when  we  do  not  see  any.  To  doubt 
seriously  is  to  doubt  in  relation  to  the  practical,  and  we  might 
take  certainty  as  a  knowledge  of  truth  Avhich  we  cannot  doubt 
in  relation  to  the  practical  without  madness ;  and  sometimes 
we  take  it  still  more  generally,  and  apply  it  to  qases  where 
we  could  not  doubt  without  deserving  to  be  severely  blamed. 
But  evidence  would  be  a  luminous  certainty,  i.e.  where  we  do 
not  doubt  because  of  the  connection  we  see  between  ideas. 
According  to  this  definition  of  certainty,  we  are  certain  that 
Constantinople  is  in  the  world,  that  Constantine,  Alexander 
the  Great,  and  Julius  Csesar  lived.  It  is  true  that  some  i)eas- 
ant  of  Ardennes  might  justly  doubt  about  these,  for  lack  of 
information;  but  a  man  of  letters  and  of  the  world  could  not 
do  so  without  great  derangement  of  mind. 

§  11.  Ph.  We  are  assured  in  truth  by  our  nuMuory  of  many 
things  which  are  past,  but  we  shall  not  be  able  to  judge  easily 
whether  they  exist  still.  I  saw  yesterday  water,  and  a  certain 
number  of  beautiful  colors  upon-  bubbles  formed  upon  this 
water.  Now  I  am  certain  that  those  bubbles  as  well  as  that 
water  existed,  but  I  do  not  know  with  any  more  certainty  the 
present  existence  of  the  water  than  that  of  the  bubbles, 
although  the  former  is  infinitely  more  probable  because  the 
water  has  been  observed  to  be  lasting  and  the  bubbles  to  dis- 
appear. §  12.  Finally,  outside  of  ourselves  and  God  we  know 
other  spirits  only  by  revelation,  and  we  have  concerning  them 
only  the  certainty  of  faith. 

Tioinoiin,  of  tlie  senses  is  llie  constancy  .and  resnlarity  in  llicir  connection  or 
consecution.     Of.  also  I)r  uiodo  ilia/iiu/ufndi.  phxiininciut  rcalic  nh  imcujiivt- 
rils,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  phllos.  Schrift.,  7,  Jil'J  .s^. ;  Erdmann,  44:5-445.  —  Til. 
2   L 


514  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

Th.  It  has  already  been  remarked  that  our  memory  some- 
times deceives  us.  And  we  put  confidence  in  it  or  not,  accord- 
ing as  it  is  more  or  less  vivid,  and  more  or  less  connected  with 
the  things  we  know.  And  even  when  we  are  assured  of  the 
principal  fact  we  may  often  question  the  circumstances.  I 
remember  to  have  known  a  certain  man,  for  I  feel  that  his 
image  as  well  as  his  voice  is  not  new  to  me ;  and  this  double 
indication  is  a  better  guarantee  to  me  than  one  of  the  two,  but 
1  cannot  remember  where  I  have  seen  him.  It  happens,  how- 
ever, though  rarely,  that  a  person  is  seen  in  a  dream  before  he 
is  seen  in  flesh  and  blood.  And  I  am  assured  that  a  lady  of  a 
well-known  court  saw  in  a  dream  and  described  to  her  friends 
the  person  she  afterAvards  married,  and  the  hall  in  which  the 
betrothal  was  celebrated,  and  she  did  this  before  she  had  seen 
or  known  either  the  man  or  the  place.  They  attributed  the 
circumstance  to  some  indefinite  secret  presentiment;  but 
chance  may  produce  this  effect,  since  it  is  quite  rare  that  it 
happens,  besides,  dream-images  being  somewhat  obscure,  there 
is  more  liberty  in  connecting  them  afterwards  with  certain 
others. 

§  13.  Ph.  Let  us  conclude  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  prop- 
ositions, the  one  particular  and  concerning  existence,  as,  for 
example,  that  an  elephant  exists;  the  other  general,  concern- 
ing the  dependence  of  ideas,  as,  for  example,  that  men  should 
obey  God.  §  14.  The  majority  of  these  general  and  certain 
propositions  bear  the  name  of  eternal  truths,  and,  in  fact,  they 
all  are  such.  This  is  not  because  these  are  propositions  act- 
ually formed  someAvhere  from  all  eternity,  or  because  they 
are  graven  upon  the  mind  after  some  model,  which  always 
existed,  but  because  we  are  assured  that  when  a  creature  en- 
riched with  faculties  and  means  therefor,  applies  his  thoughts 
to  the  consideration  of  his  ideas,  he  will  discover  the  truth 
of  these  propositions. 

TJi.  Your  division  appears  to  return  to  mine  of  x)ropositions 
of  fact  and  jprojpositions  of  reason.  Propositions  of  fact  also 
may  become  general  in  a  way,  but  it  is  by  induction  or  obser- 
vation, so  that  it  is  only  a  multitude  of  similar  facts,  as  when 
it  is  observed  that  all  quicksilver  is  evaporated  by  the  force 
of  fire;  and  this  is  not  a  perfect  generality,  because  we  do 
not   see   its  necessity.     General  propositions    of   reason   are 


CH.  XI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  515 


necessary,  calthough  the  reason  also  furnishes  some  which  are 
not  absolutely  general,  and  are  only  probable,  as,  for  example, 
when  we  presume  an  idea  to  be  possible  until  its  contrary  is 
discovered  by  a  more  exact  research.  There  are  finally  mixed 
propositions,  drawn  from  premises,  some  of  which  come  from 
facts  and  observations,  and  others  are  necessary  propositions ; 
and  such  are  a  number  of  geographical  and  astronomical  con- 
clusions regarding  the  globe  of  the  earth  and  the  course  of  the 
stars,  which  spring  from  the  combination  of  the  observations 
of  travellers  and  astronomers  with  the  theorems  of  geometry 
and  arithmetic.  But  as,  according  to  the  usage  of  logicians, 
the  conclusion  follows  the  weakest  of  the  premises  -^  and  cannot 
have  more  certainty  than  they,  these  mixed  propositions  have 
only  the  certainty  and  generality  which  belong  to  the  obser- 
vations. As  for  the  eternal  truths,  it  must  be  observed  that  at 
bottom  they  are  all  conditional  and  say  in  effect :  such  a  thing 
posited,  such  another  thing  is.  For  example,  in  saying:  every 
figure  ivhich  has  three  sides  will  also  have  three  angles,  I  say 
nothing  else  than  that,  supposing  there  is  a  figure  Avith  three 
sides,  this  same  figure  will  have  three  angles.  1  say  this 
same,  and  it  is  in  this  respect  that  the  categorical  proposi- 
tions which  may  be  stated  unconditionally,  although  at  bot- 
tom conditional,  differ  from  those  called  hypothetical,  as  this 
proposition  would  be:  if  a  figure  has  three  sides,  its  angles  are 
equal  to  two  right  angles,  in  which  we  see  that  the  antecedent 
proposition  (viz. :  the  figure  of  three  sides)  and  the  consequent 
(viz. :  the  angles  of  the  figure  of  three  sides  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles)  have  not  the  same  subject  as  they  have  in  the 
preceding  case,  in  which  the  antecedent  was:  this  figure  has 

1  The  variously  phrased  formula:  condusio  sequitur  partem  deblUoreni  ov 
deteriorem ;  sectetur  partem  condusio  deteriorem ;  pejorem  sequitur  semper 
condusio  partem,  is  the  Scholastic  expression  of  the  fundamental  ijrinciple  of 
the  categorical  syllogism,  according  to  which  the  conclusion  (lannot  contain 
more  than  is  contained  in  the  premises,  or,  as  givcm  by  Hamilton  (Lects.  on 
Logic,  p.  21!),  Boston,  1873),  in  his  third  rule  of  the  syllo.uisin,  "The  conclu- 
sion must  correspond  in  quantity  with  the  subsumption  [minor  premise],  and 
in  quality  with  the  sumption  [major  premise]."  Logicians  regarded  negative 
and  particular  propositions  as  weaker  or  worse  as  related  to  universal  and 
afHrmative  propositions,  the  negative  being  weaker  in  (piality  and  the  par- 
ticular in  quantity,  so  that  in  the  syllogism  if  one  of  the  prciuiises  is  particular 
the  conclusion  will  be  particular,  and  if  one  of  the  premises  is  negative  the 
conclusion  will  be  negative.  For  the  history  of  the  subject,  cf.  Praiitl,  Gesch. 
d.  Lofjik,  1,  371,  587;  1.',  275;  3,  4S.  — Tk. 


510  I.KIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.   iv 

three  sides,  and  tlic  consequent:  tJie  said  figure  has  three  angles. 
Although,  again,  the  hypothetical  may  often  be  transformed 
into  the  categorical,  merely  by  changing  a  little  the  terms, 
as  if  instead  of  the  preceding  hypothetical,  I  said :  the  angles 
of  every  figure  with  three  sides  are  equal  to  two  right  angles. 
The  Scholastics  have  hotly  disputed  de  constantia  subjecti,  as 
they  called  it,  i.e.  how  the  proposition  made  upon  a  subject 
can  have  a  real  truth,  if  this  subject  does  not  exist.  The  fact 
is  that  the  truth  is  only  conditional,  and  says,  that  in  case  the 
subject  ever  exists,  it  will  be  found  such.  But  it  will  be 
further  demanded,  in  what  is  this  connection  founded,  since 
there  is  in  it  some  reality  which  does  not  deceive.  The  reply 
will  be,  that  it  is  in  the  connection  of  ideas.  But  it  will  be 
asked  in  reply,  where  would  these  ideas  be  if  no  mind  existed, 
and  Avhat  then  would  become  of  the  real  ground  of  this  cer- 
tainty of  the  eternal  truths?  This  leads  us  finally  to  the  ulti- 
mate ground  of  truths,  viz. :  to  that  Supreme  and  Universal 
Mind,  which  cannot  fail  to  exist,  whose  understanding,  to 
speak  truly,  is  the  region  of  eternal  truths,  as  St.  Augustine 
has  recognized  and  expresses  in  a  sufficiently  vivid  way.-^  And 
in  order  not  to  think  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  recur  to  this, 
we  must  consider  that  these  necessary  truths  contain  the  de- 
termining reason  and  the  regulating  principle  of  existences 
themselves,  and,  in  a  word,  the  laws  of  the  universe.  Thus 
these  necessary  truths  being  anterior  to  the  existence  of 
contingent  beings,  must  be  grounded  in  the  existence  of  a 

1  Aiireliiis  Augustinus,  .354-430,  grounded  his  philosophy  in  the  principle  of 
the  absolute  and  immediate  certainty  of  consciousness  or  inner  experience. 
Cf.  Be  Beata  Vita,  chsfi).  7  ;  Solil.  II.,  1  {ante,  p.  410,  note  1) ;  Be  Vera  Relig.,  3'.), 
72  sq. ;  Be  Trin:,  X.,  14,  XIV.,  7.  In  this  certainty  of  the  individual  conscious- 
ness, i.e.  in  thought  itself,  is  immediately  involved  the  idea  of  God  in  whom 
exist  the  universal  truths  as  the  ideas  or  norms  of  all  reality.  Cf.  Be  Ideis,  2 : 
"  Suut  namque  ideae  principales  formse  qufedam,  vel  rationes  rerum  stabiles  et 
incommutabiles,  qua?  ipsa;  forraatai  non  sunt  atque  per  hoc  seterufe  ac  semper 
eodem  modo  se  habentes,  quse  in  divina  intelligentia  continentur,  et  quum 
ipsa;  neqiie  oriantur  ueque  intereant,  secundum  eas  tamen  formari  dicitur 
omne,  quod  interire  potest  et  omne,  quod  oritur  et  interit." 

For  a  good  account  of  Augustine's  philosophy,  cf.  Ueberweg-Heinze,  7th 
ed.,  Berlin,  1888,  2,  97-11.5,  especially  10(>-7,  Eng.  trans,  from  4th  Germ,  ed., 
New  York,  1871,  1,  .333  sq.,  especially  339-40;  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Philos., 
trans,  by  Tufts,  276  sq.  Augustine's  works  form  Vols.  32-47  of  the  Latin 
Fathers  in  Mgne,  Patrol,  cur.  compl.,  Paris,  1835  sq.;  Eng.  trans,  by  Dods, 
15  vols.,  Edinburgh,  1871-77,  and  in  Schafi's  lib.  Xicene  and  Post-Xicene 
Fathers,  Vols.  1-8,  Buffalo,  I88fj-8S.  — Tr. 


CH.  xii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  517 

necessary  substance.  Here  it  is  that  I  find  tlie  original  of  the 
ideas  and  truths  which  are  graven  in  our  souls,  not  in  the 
form  of  propositions,  but  as  the  sources  out  of  which  applica- 
tion and  occasion  will  cause  actual  judgments  to  arise.-' 


CHAPTER  Xn 

OF    THE    IMPROVEMENT    OF    OUR    KNOWLEDGE 

§  1.  Ph.  We  have  spoken  of  the  kinds  of  knowledge  we 
have.  Now  let  us  come  to  the  means  of  improving  the  knowl- 
edge or  of  finding  the  truth.  It  is  the  received  opinion  among 
scholars,  that  the  maxims  are  the  bases  of  all  knowledge,  and 
that  each  particular  science  is  based  upon  certain  things 
already  known  {])rcecognita).  §  2.  I  admit  that  mathematics 
seem  to  favor  this  method  by  their  good  success,  and  you  have 
given  considerable  support  to  this  view.  But  it  is  still  doubtful 
Avhether  it  is  not  rather  the  ideas  which  were  of  service  therein 
through  their  connection  than  two  or  three  general  maxims 
which  were  posited  at  the  beginning.  A  young  lad  knows 
that  his  body  is  greater  than  his  little  finger,  but  not  by  vir- 
tue of  this  axiom,  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part. 
Knowledge  commenced  by  particular  propositions;  but  after- 
wards it  was  desired  to  relieve  the  memory  by  means  of  gen- 
eral notions  from  a  cumbersome  load  of  pcf'Tticular  ideas.  If 
language  were  so  imperfect  that  there  were  no  relative  terms, 
whole  and  jmH,  could  he  not  know  that  his  body  is  larger  than 
his  little  finger?  I  at  least  give  you  the  reasons  of  my  author, 
although  I  think  I  foresee  what  you  will  say  thereto  in  con- 
formity with  what  you  have  already  said. 

Th.  I  know  not  why  you  bear  the  maxims  such  ill  will  as 
to  attack  them  yet  again  •,  if  they  serve  to  relieve  the  memory 
of  a  midtitude  of  particular  ideas,  as  you  admit,  they  must  be 
very  useful,  although  they  had  no  other  use.     But  I  add  tliat 

1  For  Leibnitz  God  is  the  sonvce  of  all  truths  as  well  as  of  all  lioiutrs.  The 
idea  of  God  contains  in  itself  i)otentially  all  truth,  and  is  tlie  re.ijulativo  (hut 
not  in  the  Kantian  sense  of  the  term),  or  ])etter,  the  (ronslitutive,  jjrinciple 
of  all  thought,  just  as  his  actuality  contains  potentially  within  itself  all  exist- 
ences, and  is  the  regulative,  i.e.,  constitutive,  principle  of  all  heing.  < 'f.  also, 
cuite,  p.  4!Hj,  note  1.  —  Tr. 


518  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

they  do  not  spring  from  particular  ideas,  for  tliey  are  not 
found  by  induction  from  examples.  He  who  knows  that  ten 
is  more  than  nine,  that  the  body  is  larger  than  the  finger,  and 
that  the  house  is  too  large  to  be  able  to  run  away  with  the 
door,  knows  each  one  of  these  particular  propositions,  by  one 
and  the  same  general  reason  which  is,  as  it  were,  incorpo- 
rated therein  and  illuminated,  just  as  we  see  designs  adorned 
with  colors  in  which  the  proportion  and  configuration  con- 
sists properly  in  the  outlines,  whatever  the  color  may  be. 
Xow  this  common  reason  is  the  axiom  itself  which  is  known, 
so  to  speak,  implicitly,  although  it  does  not  exist  at  first  in  an 
abstract  and  separate  manner.  The  examples  derive  their 
truth  from  the  incorporated  axiom,  and  the  axiom  has  not  its 
ground  in  the  examples.  And  as  this  common  reason  of  these 
particular  truths  exists  in  the  minds  of  all  men,  you  see  clearly 
that  it  is  not  necessar}'  that  the  words  tchole  and  pari  be  found 
in  the  language  of  him  who  is  imbued  therewith. 

§  4.  Ph.  But  is  it  not  dangerous  to  authorize  assumptions 
under  the  pretext  of  axioms?  One  will  assume,  with  some  of 
the  ancients,  that  all  is  matter;  another,  with  Polemo,^  that 
the  Avorld  is  God;  a  third  will  assert  that  the  sun  is  the  prin- 
cipal divinity.  Judge  what  a  religion  we  should  have,  if  that 
were  allowed.  So  trvie  is  it  that  it  is  dangerous  to  receive 
principles  without  questioning  them,  especially  if  they  con- 
cern morality.  For  some  one  will  expect  another  life,  like 
that  of  Aristippus,^  who  placed  happiness  in  the  pleasures  of 
the  body,  rather  than  like  that  of  Antisthenes,^  who  main- 

1  Polemo,  the  successor  of  Xenocrates,  396-314  B.C.,  as  scholarch,  or  head, 
.314-270  B.C.,  of  the  school  of  the  Old  Academy,  and  the  third  iu  that  otHce 
from  Plato  (Speiisippus  holding  it  from  Plato's  death  iu  347  to  3:i!t,  and  Xeno- 
crates from  339-314) ,  devoted  himself  chiefly  to  ethics.  The  statement  that  he 
declared  the  universe  to  be  God  —  Uo\efjLov  tov  Koa/j-ov  eehv  i.ne<t>v>">^To  —  rests  on 
the  authority  of  Stobaeus,  Edogm  jjhys.,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  2,  5,  §  (52,  p.  15,  ed.  A. 
Meineke,  Leipzi.s:,  1855-<j4.  For  his  philosophy,  cf.  ZeUer,  Philos.d.  Griech., 
XL,  1  [Vol.  .3],  993-4,  1045-<i,  4th  ed.,  Leipzig,  1889.— Tr. 

2  Aristippus,  c.  435-c.  3(;(;  B.C.,  the  founder  of  the  Cyrenaic  school,  made 
pleasure,  which,  according  to  Diog.  Laertius,  II.,  85,  8ti,  he  defined  as  the 

feeling  of    a  gentle   motion  —  teAos  S'  iTreV^ati-e  ■riji' Afiai-KiVjjo-ti'eis  alo-erjo-iciraSiSo- 

ixevriv  .  .  .  rriv  ixkv  \eiav  KivrjfTiv  Tr]v  r\&ovT}v  —  the  cud  of  life,  the  wisc  man  aiming 
to  enjoy  pleasure  without  being  controlled  by  it.  For  his  writings,  ef.  Mul- 
lach,  Frar/t.  philos.  Gr.,  II.,  397  sq.  On  his  life  and  philosophy," cA  Zeller, 
Phllos.  d.  Griech.,  II.,  1  [Vol.  .3],  33(j  .s^.,  ethical  doctrine,  352  sq.  —  Tn. 

^  Antisthenes,  c.  440-c.  ;!()9  B.C.,  a  pupil  of  Gorgias  and  Socrates,  was  the 
founder  of  the  CjTiic  school,  and  taught,  according  to  Diog.  Laertius,  VI.,  11, 


CH.  XII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  519 


tained  tliat  virtue  suffices  to  produce  happiness.  And  Arclie- 
laus,^  who  will  lay  it  down  as  a  principle  that  justice  and 
injustice,  honesty  and  dishonesty,  are  defined  only  by  the  laws 
and  not  by  nature,  will  no  doubt  have  other  measures  of  moral 
good  and  evil  than  those  who  admit  obligations  anterior  to 
human  constitutions.  §  5.  It  must  be,  then,  that  principles  are 
certain.  §  6.  But  this  certainty  comes  only  from  the  com- 
parison of  ideas :  thus  we  have  no  need  of  other  principles, 
and  according  to  this  rule  alone  we  shall  advance  much  farther 
than  by  putting  our  minds  at  the  disposal  of  another. 

Th.  I  am  astonished,  sir,  that  you  turn  against  maxims,  i.e. 
against  evident  principles,  that  which  can  and  must  be  said 
against  principles  assumed  gratis.  When  one  demands  p?-ce- 
cognita  in  the  sciences,  or  anterior  knowledge,  which  serves 
to  ground  science,  he  demands  knoivn  principles  and  not  arbi- 
trary positions,  whose  truth  is  not  known;  and  even  Aristotle 
understands  that  the  inferior  and  subaltern  borrow  their  prin- 
ciples from  other  superior  sciences  in  which  they  have  been 
demonstrated,  except  the  first  of  the  sciences,  which  we  call 
metaphysics,  which,  according  to  him,  asks  nothing  from  tlie 
others,  and  furnishes  them  the  principles  they  need;  and 
Avhen  he  says:  hd  ma-Teveiv  Tov  [xuvddvovTa,'^  the  apprentice  must 
that  virtue  only  is  a  good,  and  that  it  is  sufficient  for  happiness  —  aurapicT)  yap 

Tr;;/  ipeTTji/   eh'ai   Trpb?   evSaifxoi'iav.      For   hiS   Writings,    (/.    Mulhlcll,   FrUf/t.  plliloS. 

dr.,  II.,  21)1  sq.  On  his  life  and  iihilosophy,  cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Grlech.,  II.,  1 
[Vol.  3],  281  sq.,  ethical  doctrine,  303  sq.  —  Tr. 

1  Archelaus,  the  dates  of  whose  hirth  and  death  are  unknown,  was  a  physi- 
cist, and  the  disciple  of  Anaxagoras,  c.  .500-128  B.C.,  whose  physical  doctrine 
he  seems  to  have  modified  in  the  direction  of  the  Ionic  school  as  represented 
hy  Anaximines,  c.  .588-c.  524  B.C.,  and  Diogenes  of  ApoUonia.  Zeller  says  that 
the  statement,  as  given  by  Diog.  Laertius,  II.,  !(!,  that  he  derived  the  distin(v 
tion  of  good  and  had  from  custom  rather  than  nature  —  to  SiKaiov  fXt'm  khI  to 
ai(TXPov  oil  (^Ocrei  aWa  I'd^w  —  appears  to  he  due  to  a  mistake  in  interpreting  his 
language,  aud  that  he  merely  said  that  men  at  the  beginning  were  without 
custom  and  law,  and  first  attained  thereto  in  the  course  of  time.  On  his 
philosophy,  cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  I.,  2  [Vol.  2],  10;!1-10;58,  5th  ed., 
Leipzig,  18<)2.  — Tr. 

'^  Cf.  Aristotle,  Sophi.st.  Elench.,  chap.  2,  IGl,  b,  1-3:    6i5a<rKaAtKol   iJ.iv  ol  U 

Twi'  oiKiiuiV  apx<j)V  eKo-CTTov  /aafijfiaTO!  Kai  ouk  ck  tmv  toO  aTTOKpi.vofiivov  Ho^Cov  (ruAAoyi^o- 

ixevoL  (Sel  yap  nL(TTev(iu  Tot'  piat'Oavoi'Ta),  i.e.  (liacnfishms  for  thc  purposo  of  teach- 
ing proceed  from  the  special  principles  of  each  science,  and  do  not  draw  tiicir 
conclusions  from  the  opinifms  of  the  participating  pupil;  Aristotle's  thought 
being  that  the  pupil  will  receive  a  confirmation  of  tlKs  mere  faith  in  th(^  i)rin- 
ciples  demanded  of  him  at  the  outset,  in  the  cour.se  of  the  explanation  and 
(IfMHonstration  of  these  principles  in  his  presence,  an<l  in  the  agn^cnicnt  of  llie 
scientific  results  with  the  facts  and  his  further   knowledge.      Leibnitz  lieic 


620  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

believe  liis  master,  his  tliouglit  is  that  he  must  do  it  only  while 
Avaiting,  Avhile  he  is  not  yet  instructed  in  the  higher  sciences, 
so  that  it  is  only  provisionally.  Thus  we  are  very  far  from 
receiving  gratuitous  principles.  To  this  it  must  be  added  that 
even  principles  whose  certainty  is  not  complete  may  have 
their  use  if  we  build  upon  them  only  by  demonstration;  for 
although  all  the  conclusions  in  this  case  are  conditional  only, 
and  are  valid  only  upon  the  supposition  that  this  principle  is 
tnie,  nevertheless  this  connection  itself  and  these  conditional 
enunciations  would  at  least  be  demonstrated;  so  that  it  were 
much  to  be  desired  that  we  had  many  books  written  in  this 
way,  where  there  would  be  no  danger  of  error,  the  reader  or 
disciple  being  warned  of  the  condition.  ,  And  practice  will  be 
regulated  by  these  conclusions  only  as  the  supposition  shall 
be  found  verified  elsewhere.  This  method  also  serves  very 
often  itself  to  verify  suppositions  or  hypotheses,  when  many 
conclusions  arise  from  them,  the  truth  of  which  is  otherwise 
known,  and  sometimes  this  gives  a  perfect  proof  {retour) 
sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis.  Mr. 
Conring,^  a  physician  by  profession,  but  a  clever  man  in  every 
kind  of  learning,  except  perhaps  mathematics,  wrote  a  letter 
to  a  friend  engaged  in  reprinting  at  Helmstadt  the  book  of 
Viottus,^  an   esteemed  Peripatetic   philosopher  who  tried  to 

exj)resses  a  similar  thought,  in  premising  the  provisional  charactei-  of  that 
faith  which  the  heginuer  should  have  in  his  teacher.  —  Tr. 

1  Hermann  Conring,  1606-1'iSl,  one  of  the  most  learned  men  of  his  age, 
possessed  of  vast  erudition,  and  thoroughly  informed  on  medicine,  law,  the- 
ology, history,  physics,  philology,  etc.,  taught  at  Helmstjidt,  and  wrote  an 
immense  number  of  works,  which  have  beeu  united  in  part  and  jiublished 
under  the  title  of  Opera  omnia,  Brunswick,  1730,  7  vols.,  fol.  For  an  account 
of  him,  cf.  Michaud,  Blog.  Univ.,  Vol.  il,  pp.  447-452.  For  his  correspondence 
with  Leibnitz,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrlft.,  1,  15:5-2()(i.  —  Tr. 

2  Bartolommeo  Viotto,  or  Viotti,  surnamed  a  Clivolo,  son  of  a  distin- 
guished surgeon,  Tommaso  Viotto,  who  was  the  first  in  the  tfniversity  of 
Turin  to  receive  the  laurel  crown  in  surgery  from  the  Decurious  of  Trino, 
was  a  philosopher  and  physician  of  Turin,  and,  in  tlie  five  years  preceding 
1552,  public  professor  of  logic  in  that  city.  He  died  in  15(i8.  He  was  author 
of  Be  halneorum  naturaliiun  vlribiis  lib.  IV.,  Lugduui,  1552,  reprinted  in  Be 
balneis  omnia  qux  extant  apud  Grsecos,  Latinos,  et  Arabas,  fol.  Venetiis,  1553, 
pp.  247-71 ;  and  of  the  work  here  and  elseAvhere  referred  to  by  Leibnitz, 
Bemonstrationum  in  methodum,  medendi  lib.  V.,  8vo,  Parisiis,  1500,  and  under 
the  editorship  of  A.  P'rolingius,  Helmstadt,  1G61,  Braunschweig,  1084.  Cf. 
Correspondence  of  Leibnitz  and  Conring,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift., 
1,  1S4,  187;  of  Leibnitz  and  Placcius,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  6,  45. 

Conring,  Bitrod.  in  univ.  art.  med.,  Hala?  et   Lipsise,  1720,  p.  23,  saj"s  of 


xii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  521 


explain  the  demonstration  and  "Posterior  Analytics"  of 
Aristotle.  This  letter  was  appended  to  the  book,  and  in 
it  Conring  criticised  Pappns  when  he  said  that  analysis 
prop'oses  to  discover  the  unknown  by  assuming  it,  and  by 
reaching  therefrom,  by  inference,  known  truths;^  a  method 
which  is  contrary  to  logic  (he  said)  which  teaches  that  from 
falsehbod  we  cannot  infer  truths.  But  I  made  known  to  him 
afterwards  that  analysis  makes  use  of  dehnitions  and  other 
reciprocal  propositions  which  furnish  means  of  making  the 
proof  (retoui-),  and  of  discovering  synthetic  demonstrations.^ 
And  even  when  this  proof  is  not  demonstrative,  as  in  physics, 
it  is  nevertheless  sometimes  highly  probable,  when  the  hy- 
pothesis explains  easily  many  phenomena,  difficult  without 
it  and  very  independent  of  one  another.  I  hold  to  tlie 
truth,  sir,  that  the  principle  of  principles  is  in  a  way  the 
good  use  of  ideas  and  of  experience;  but  by  examining  it 
thoroughly  we  shall  find  that,  as  regards  ideas,  it  is  nothing 
else  than  the  union  of  definitions  by  means  of  identical  axi- 
oms. Nevertheless,  it  is  not  always  an  easy  thing  to  come  to 
this  ultimate  analysis,  and  whatever  desire  the  geometers,  at 
least  the  ancient  geometers,  liave  shown  to  succeed  tlierein, 
they  have  not  yet  been  able  to  do  so.     The  celebrated  autlior 

him :  "  Certe  qui  necessitatem  ejus  in  medicina  simul  et  ipsam  artem  deniou- 
strandi  post  Galeuum  osteiiderit,  liacteuus  nemo  inventus  est,  si  exeii)ias 
unum  Bartliolomfeum  Viottum  hominem  loiige  doctissimum ;  cujus  de  d(>nion- 
stratione  prajclarum  opus  ante  centum  aunos  prodiit."  (Jf.,  also,  (i.  Pasch, 
J)e  novls  invetitis,  2d  ed.,  4to,  Lipsire,  1700,  p.  2(i;  J.  A.  van  der  Ijinden,  De 
scriptis  medicis,  8vo,  Amstelredami,  1637,  p.  82,  Linden,  renovat.,  4to,  Norim- 
bergiB,  lfi86,  jjp.  114, 119;  Kestner,  Medicinisches-Gelehrten-Lexiconj  4to,  Jena, 
1740,  p.  897 ;  G.  G.  Bonino,  Biografia  medica  piemontese,  8v(),  Torino,  1824, 
Vol.  1,  pp.  199-201.  — Tr. 

1  Pappus  of  Alexandria  was  a  Greek  geometer  "  of  a  very  liigh  order,"  wlio 
flourished,  aceordiug  to  tlie  best  recent  opinion,  in  llie  reign  of  Diotdctian, 
284-30"),  and  whose  'S.wayioyr,,  or  Collection,  is  of  very  great  valne  in  tlie  lus- 
tory  of  mathematics.  From  Bk.  VII.  of  tliis  work  is  (Un-ived  a  large  part  of 
our  knowledge  of  Greek  geometry.  Tlie  best  cd.  of  the  whole  work  is  F. 
Hultsch,  Pappi  Alexandrini  Collectumis  qux  Hupersunt,  3  vols.,  Berlin,  I87()-78. 

Pappus'  explanation  of  the  nature  of  analysis  and  synthesis,  which  ('on- 
ring  erroneously  criticised,  is  found  in  the  preface  of  Blv.  VII.  of  this  'liwa.yioyri, 
cf.  Hultsch,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  2,  pp.  ^>.ii-^i;  C.  1.  Gerhardt,  Der  Saininkmr/  des 
Pappus  von  Alexandrien,  siehentes  u.  aehtes  Buck,  Halle,  1871,  pp.  2-4.  .Ac- 
cording to  Schaarschmidt,  this  explanation  is  perhaps  the  clearest  and  l)est 
concise  statement  that  has  been  made  of  the  nature  o(  the  analytic  and  syn- 
thetic method.  —  Tr. 

^  Cy.  Con-espondence  of  I.eiliiiit/,  and  Conring,  LettiM-  of  .l.in.  'M.  1i'p7S, 
Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  phllos.  Schrl/t.,  1,  187-8;  also,  ibid.,  18."),  19U,  19:;  .s-/.  —  Tu. 


622  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

of  " The  Essay  on  Human  Understanding,"  would  give  tliem 
much  jdeasure  if  he  would  eomi)lete  this  investigation,  a  little 
more  difficult  than  Ave  think. .  Euclid,  for  examjjle,  has  put 
among  the  axioms  one  which  amounts  to  saying:  that  two 
straight  lines  can  meet  only  once.  The  image  derived  from 
the  experience  of  the  senses,  does  not  permit  us  to  picture  to 
ourselves  more  than  one  meeting  of  the  two  lines;  but  it  is 
not  upon  this  that  science  must  be  founded.  And  if  any  one 
believes  that  this  image  gives  the  connection  of  distinct  ideas, 
he  is  not  sufficiently  instru.cted  concerning  the  source  of  truths, 
and  a  multitude  of  propositions,  demonstrable  by  others  ante- 
rior, would  pass  with  him  as  immediate.  Many  of  those  who 
have  criticised  Euclid,  have  not  sufficie^itly  considered  this : 
these  kinds  of  images  are  only  confused  ideas,  and  he  who 
knows  the  straight  lines  only  by  this  means  will  not  be  capable 
of  demonstrating  anything.  Euclid,  therefore,  for  want  of  a 
distinctly  expressed  idea,  i.e.  a  definition  of  a  straight  line  (for 
that  which  he  gives  meanwhile  is  obscure  and  of  no  use  to  him 
in  his  demonstrations),  was  obliged  to  return  to  two  axioms 
which  for  him  took  the  place  of  definitions  and  which  he  em- 
ployed in  his  demonstrations :  the  one  that  two  straight  lines 
have  no  common  part,  the  other  that  they  enclose  no  space. 
Archimedes  has  given  a  kind  of  definition  of  the  straight  line, 
in  saying  that  it  is  the  shortest  line  between  two  points.  But 
he  tacitly  assumes  (by  employing  in  his  demonstrations  ele- 
ments like  those  of  Euclid,  based  upon  the  two  axioms  I  have 
just  mentioned)  that  the  properties  (affections)  of  which  these 
axioms  speak,  accord  with  the  line  which  he  defines.^  Thus  if 
you  believe,  with  your  friends,  under  the  pretext  of  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  ideas,  that  what  these  images  tell  us 
Avas  allowed  and  is  still  to  be  received  in  geometry,  without 
seeking  that  strictness  of  demonstration  by  means  of  defini- 
tions and  axioms  which  the  ancients  demanded  in  this  science 
(as  I  believe  many  people  will  believe  for  lack  of  information), 
I  will  admit,  sir,  that  a^ou  may  be  contented  as  regards  those 
who  trouble  themseh^es  only  about  practical  geometr}^  sueh 
as  it  is,  but  not  as  regards  those  Avho  desire  to  have  the  science 
which  serves  indeed  to  perfect  the  practical.  And  if  the 
ancients  had  been  of  this  opinion  and  had  relaxed  their  efforts 
1  Gerhardt  and  Erdmaun  read  "  defiuit "  ;  Jacques  "  decrit."  —  Tr. 


CH.  xii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  523 


on  tliis  point,  I  think  they  wonhl  have  made  hut  little  advance, 
and  would  have  left  ns  only  an  empirical  geometry  such  as 
that  of  the  Egyptians  apparently  was,  and  such  as  that  of  the 
Chinese  seems  still  to  be;  this  would  have  deprived  us  of  the 
most  worthful  physical  and  mechanical  knowledge  which 
geometry  has  caused  us  to  discover,  and  which  is  indcnown 
wherever  our  geometry  is  iinknown.  It  is  also  apparent 
that  in  following  the  senses  and  their  images  we  should  fall 
into  errors;  much  the  same  as  we  see  that  all  those  who  are 
not  instructed  in  exact  geometry  receive  as  an  indubitable  truth 
upon  trust  in  their  imagination,  that  two  lines  continually 
approaching  each  other,  must  finally  meet;  while  geometers 
give  contrary  instances  in  the  case  of  certain  lines  called 
asymptotes.  But*  besides  this  we  should  be  deprived  of  what 
I  value  most  highly  in  geometry  as  related  to  reflection,  viz. : 
permitting  us  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  true  source  of  eternal 
truths  and  of  the  means  of  making  us  comprehend  their  neces- 
sity, a  matter  which  the  confused  ideas  of  the  setJse-images 
could  not  show  us  distinctly.  You  will  say  to  me  that  Euclid 
Avas  obliged,  however,  to  confine  himself  to  certain  axioms 
whose  evidence  is  seen  only  confusedly  by  means  of  the 
images.  I  agree  with  you  that  he  has  limited  himself  to  these 
axioms,  but  it  was  better  for  him  to  limit  himself  to  a  small 
number  of  truths  of  this  nature  which  appeared  to  liim  the 
simplest  and  to  deduce  from  them  the  others  whicli  another 
less  exact  would  also  have  taken  as  certain  without  demonstra- 
tion, than  to  leave  many  of  them  undemonstrated,  and  what  is 
Avorse,  to  alloAV  people  the  liberty  of  extending  their  laxity 
according  to  their  fancy.  You  see  then,  sir,  that  what  you 
and  your  friends  have  said  regarding  the  connection  of  ideas 
as  the  true  source  of  truths  needs  ox})lication.  If  you  are 
willing  to  content  yourself  with  the  confused  sight  of  this 
connection,  you  weaken  the  exactness  of  (hnnonstrations,  and 
Euclid  has  clone  incomparably  better  in  reducing  all  to  defini- 
tions and  to  a  small  number  of  axioms.  Yet  if  joi\  wish  tljis 
connection  of  ideas  to  be  distinctly  seen  and  express(!d,  you 
will  be  obliged  to  recur  to  definitions  and  identical  axioms, 
as  I  claim;  and  sometimes  you  will  be  obliged  to  content 
yourself  with  some  axioms  less  ])riniitiv(!,  as  J']u(di(l  and 
Archimedes  have  done,  when  you  find  difiiculty  in  attaining  a 


524  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

l)erfect  analysis,  and  you  will  do  better  in  that  way  than  to 
negk'ct  or  defer  some  fortunate  discoveries  which  j^ou  can 
already  make  by  tlieir  means :  as  in  fact  I  have  already  said 
to  you  at  another  time,  sir,  that  I  believe  we  should  not  have 
a  geometry  (I  mean  a  demonstrative  science),  if  the  ancients 
had  not  been  willing  to  advance  until  they  had  demonstrated 
the  axioms  they  were  obliged  to  employ. 

§  7.  Ph.  I  begin  to  understand  what  a  distinctly  known  con- 
nection of  ideas  is,  and  I  see  clearly  that  in  this  sense  axioms 
are  necessary.  I  see  clearly  also  how  necessary  it  is  that  the 
method  we  follow  in  our  researches,  when  the  question  is  that 
of  the  examination  of  ideas,  be  regulated  by  the  example  of 
the  mathematicians  who  from  certain  very  clear  and  easy 
beginnings  (which  are  nothing  else  than  the  axioms  and  defi- 
nitions) proceed  by  small  degrees  and  a  continual  chain  of 
reasoning  to  the  discovery  and  demonstration  of  truths  that 
appear  at  first  beyond  human  capacity.  The  art  of  finding 
proofs,  and  these  admirable  methods  they  have  invented  for 
separating  and  putting  in  order  mediate  ideas  is  what  has 
produced  such  wonderful  and  unexpected  discoveries.  But 
whether  with  time  a  similar  method  may  not  be  found  out 
useful,  in  respect  to  other  ideas  as  well  as  those  belonging  to 
magnitude  is  a  question  I  will  not  determine.  At  least,  if 
otheT  ideas  were  examined  according  to  the  ordinary  method 
of  the  mathematicians,  they  would  lead  our  thoughts  farther 
than  we  are  perhaps  led  to  imagine.  §  8.  And  this  might  be 
done  particularly  in  the  case  of  morality,  as  I  have  more  than 
once  said. 

Th.  I  believe  you  are  right,  sir,  and  I  have  been  disposed 
for  a  long  time  to  make  it  my  business  to  accomplish  your 
predictions. 

§  9.  Ph.  In  regard  to  the  knowledge  of  bodies  we  are  com- 
pelled to  take  a  directly  contrary  path;  for  having  no  ideas 
of  their  real  essences,  we  are  obliged  to  recur  to  experience. 
§  ^10.  But  I  do  not  deny  that  a  man  accustomed  to  making 
rational  and  regular  experiments  is  capable  of  forming  juster 
conjectures  regarding  their  still  unknown  properties  than 
another  not  so  accustomed,  but  it  is  judgment  and  opinion,  not 
knowledge  and  certainty.  This  makes  me  think  that  physics 
is  incapable  of  becoming  a  science  in  our  hands.     But  experi- 


cii.  XII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  525 


ments  and   historical    observations   may  be  of  use  to  us  as 
regards  the  health  of  our  bodies  and  the  conveniences  of  life. 

Th.  I  admit  that  physics  as  a  whole  will  never  be  a  per- 
fect science  among  us,  but  we  shall  not  cease  to  be  able  to 
have  some  physical  science,  and  indeed  we  have  already  some 
specimens  of  it.  For  example,  magnetology  may  pass  for 
such  a  science,  for,  making  a  few  suppositious  based  upon 
experience,  we  can  demonstrate  from  them  by  a  certain  infer- 
ence a  number  of  phenomena  which  really  occur  as  we  see  that 
reason  declares.  We  ought  not  to  hope  to  give  a  reason  for 
all  experiments,  as  indeed  the  geometers  have  not  yet  proved 
all  their  axioms;  but  just  as  they  are  satisfied  to  deduce  a 
large  number  of  theorems  from  a  small  number  of  principles 
of  the  reason,  so  is  it  sufficient  that  the  physicists  by  means 
of  certain  principles  of  experience  give  a  reason  for  a  multi- 
tude of  phenomena  and  can  indeed  prove  them  in  practice. 

§  11.  Ph.  Since  then  our  faculties  are  not  fitted  to  make  us 
discern  the  internal  fabric  of  bodies,  we  must  consider  that  it 
is  enough  that  they  discover  to  us  the  existence  of  God,  and  a 
sufficiently  extended  knowledge  of  ourselves  to  instruct  us  in 
our  duties  and  in  our  greatest  interests,  particularly  as  related 
to  eternity.  And  I  think  I  am  right  in  inferring  therefrom< 
that  morality  is  the  proper  science  and  the  important  business  of 
mankind  in  general,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  different  arts  ivhich 
are  conversant  about  different  p)arts  of  nature  are  the  lot  of  par- 
ticular men.  It  may  be  said,  for  example,  that  ignorance  of 
the  use  of  iron  is  a  reason  in  the  countries  of  America,  where 
nature  has  spread  abroad  abundantly  all  kinds  of  goods,  for  tlie 
lack  of  the  greatest  part  of  the  conveniences  of  life.  Thus 
very  far  from  despising  the  science  of  nature,  §  12.  I  hold, 
that  if  this  study  is  directed,  as  it  ought  to  be,  it  may  be  of 
greater  use  to  the  human  race  than  all  that  has  been  done  up 
to  this  time;  and  he  who  invented  printing,  who  discovered 
the  use  of  the  compass,  and  who  made  known  the  virtue  of 
quinquina,  has  contributed  more  to  the  propagation  of  knowl- 
edge and  to  the  advancement  of  the  useful  conveniences  of 
life,  and  has  saved  more  people  from  the  grave,  than  the 
founders  of  colleges  and  hospitals  and  other  monuments  of 
the  most  exemplary  charity,  which  have  l^een  Ijuilt  at  great 
expense. 


526  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 


Th.  You  could  say  notliing,  sir,  more  to  my  liking.  True 
morality  or  piet}^,  very  far  from  favoring  the  inactivity  of  cer- 
tain idle  quietists,  must  impel  us  to  cultivate  the  arts.  And 
as  I  said  not  long  since,  a  better  police  would  be  able  to  bring 
us  some  day  a  much  better  medical  science  than  that  we  have 
at  present.  We  cannot  preach  this  doctrine  enough,  next  to 
the  care  for  virtue. 

§  13.  Ph.  Although  I  recommend  experiments,  I  do  not 
despise  probable  hypotheses.  They  may  lead  us  to  new  dis- 
coveries, and  are,  at  least,  a  great  aid  to  the  memory.  But 
our  mind  has  a  great  tendency  to  go  too  fast  and  to  be  satis- 
fied with  certain  superficial  appearances,  for  lack  of  taking 
the  necessary  time  and  trouble  to  apply  them  to  a  multitude 
of  phenomena. 

Th.  The  art  of  discovering  the  causes  of  phenomena,  or 
true  hypotheses,  is  like  the  art  of  deciphering,  in  which  an 
ingenious  conjecture  often  greatly  shortens  the  road.  Lord 
Bacon  began  to  put  the  art  of  experimenting  into  precepts, 
and  Chevalier  Boyle  ^  had  a  great  talent  for  practising  it. 
But  if  the  art  of  employing  experiments  and  of  drawing  con- 
sequences therefrom  is  not  joined  with  it,  we  shall  never 
with  the  utmost  cost  attain  to  what  a  man  of  great  penetration 
might  discover  at  first  sight.  Descartes,  assuredly  such  a  man, 
has  made  a  similar  remark  in  one  of  his  letters  ^  regarding  the 
method  of  the  Chancellor  of  England;  and  Sj^inoza  (whom  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  quote  when  he  says  a  good  thing)  in  one  of 
his  letters  ^  to  the  late  Mr,  Oldenburg,  Secretary  of  the  Eoyal 
Society  of  England,  printed  among  the  posthumous  works  of 
this  subtle  Jew,  makes  a  similar  reflection  upon  a  work  of 
Boyle,  who,  to  speak  the  truth,  stops  a  little  too  much  to 
draw  from  a  great  number  of  fine  experiments  no  other  con- 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  324,  note  2.  —  Tr. 

2  The  remark  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz  as  occurring  in  one  of  Descartes' 
letters  has  not  as  yet  been  found  in  any  of  those  now  extant ;  and,  as  mention 
is  made  of  Bacon  in  Spinoza's  remark  cited  immediately  after,  it  is  possible 
that  Leibnitz  confounded  the  two  authors,  a  thing  which  might  readily  happen, 
especially  as  Leibnitz  was  often  out  of  the  reach  of  books  when  composing 
his  works,  as  ijrobably  in  this  case,  cf.  ante,  p.  8,  note  1.  —  Tr. 

3  67'.  Spinoza,  0/)<')Y/,ed.  Van  \noten  and  Land,  2,  19:  "  Sed  interim  nescio, 
cur  clarissimus"  ^ir  hoc"  (i.e.  universal  mechanism)  "  adeo  sollicite  conetur 
colligere  ex  hoc  suo  exi^erimento ;  cum  jam  hoc  a  Verulamio,  et  postea  a 
Cartesio  satis  superque  demonstratum  sit."  —  Tr. 


CH.  XII]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  527 

chision  than  this  which  he  might  take  as  a  principle,  viz. :  that 
everything  in  nature  takes  phice  mechanically,  a  principle 
which  can  be  rendered  certain  by  reason  alone,  and  never  by 
experiments,  whatever  their  number. 

§  14.  Ph.  After  having  established  clear  and  distinct  ideas 
with  fixed  names,  the  great  means  of  extending  our  knowl- 
edge is  the  art  of  finding  mediate  ideas  which  can  show  us  the 
connection  or  incompatibility  of  the  extreme  ideas.  The  max- 
ims at  least  are  of  no  avail  in  furnishing  them.  Suppose  a 
man  has  not  an  exact  idea  of  a  right  angle,  he  Avill  vainly  tor- 
ment himself  in  demonstrating  something  about  the  right- 
angled  triangle :  and  whatever  maxims  he  employs,  he  will  have 
difficulty  in  attaining  by  their  aid  the  proof  that  the  first 
squares  of  the  sides  enclosing  the  riglit  angle  are  equal  to  the 
square  on  the  hypothenuse.  A  man  might  ruminate  upon 
these  axioms  a  long  time  without  ever  seeing  more  clearly 
into  mathematics. 

Th.  It  is  of  no  avail  to  ruminate  upon  the  axioms  without 
having  something  to  which  to  apply  them.  Axioms  often 
serve  to  connect  ideas,  as,  for  example,  this  maxim,  that  similar 
extensions  of  the  second  and  third  dimensions  are  in  reason 
double  and  triple  the  corresponding  extensions  of  the  first 
dimension,  is  of  very  great  use;  and  the  quadrature,  for  ex- 
ample, of  the  lune  of  Hippocrates  ^  springs  from  it  at  once  in 
the  case  of  the  circles  by  uniting  therewith  the  application  of 
these  two  figures  the  one  to  the  other,  when  their  given  posi- 
tion furnishes  the  opportunity  for  so  doing,  as  their  known 
comparison  promises  light  thereupon. 

1  Hippocrates  of  Chios,  c.  440  b.c,  a  contemporary  of  Hippocrates  of  Cos, 
the  physician  (c/'.  ante,  p.  47(),  note  2),  was  a  celebrated  Greek  geometer,  whose 
most  noted  achievement  was  the  discovery  of  the  quadrature  of  tlie  hme,  or 
the  crescent-shaped  plane  figure  produced  hy  drawing  two  perpendicular  railii 
in  a  circle  and  describing  upon  the  line  joining  their  extreniitie?:  a  st^niicirch'. 
This  lune  is  famous  as  the  first  curvilinear  space  whose  area  was  exactly  de- 
termined, and  its  area  is  exactly  equal  to  that  of  the  triangle  formed  by  the  two 
radii  and  the  line  joining  their  extremities.  For  the  demonstration  of  this, 
cf.  Larousse,  Grande  Diet.  Univ.  de  XIX<'  Siecle,  Vol.  10,  p.  791,  a,  b.  On 
Hippocrates  and  bis  services  to  mathematics,  cf.  Allman,  Greek  Geom. 
from  Thales  to  Euclid,  ()4  sq.;  Gow,  A  Short  Hist,  of  Greek  Math.,  Kil  sq.: 
H.  Suter,  Gesch.  d.  math.  Wissenschaften,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  '.V.i-'.H\,  /iiri(  li, 
1873.  — Tr. 


528  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

CHAPTER   XIII 

OTHER    CONSIDERATIONS    CONCERNING    OUR     KNOWLEDGE 

^  1.  Ph.  It  will  be  perhaps  further  appropriate  to  add,  that 
our  knowledge  has  a  close  relation  to  our  sight  in  this,  as  well 
as  in  other  things,  that  it  is  neither  wholly  necessary  nor  wholly 
voluntary.  We  cannot  fail  to  see  when  our  eyes  are  open  to 
the  light,  but  we  can  turn  them  towards  certain  objects,  §  2. 
and  consider  them  with  more  or  less  application.  Thus  when 
the  faculty  is  once  applied,  it  does  not  depend  upon  the  will 
to  determine  the  knowledge ;  no  more  than  a  man  can  prevent 
himself  from  seeing  what  he  sees.  But  he  must  employ  his 
faculties,  as  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  inform  himself. 

TJi.  We  have  spoken  before  of  this  point,  and  established 
the  fact  that  it  does  not  depend  upon  man  to  have  this  or  that 
opinion  in  the  present  state,  but  it  depends  upon  him  to  pre- 
pare himself  to  have  it  or  not  to  have  it  eventually,  and  that 
thus  opinions  are  voluntary  only  in  an  indirect  manner. 

CHAPTER   XIV 

OF    .JUDGMENT 

§  1 .  Ph.  Man  would  be  found  without  direction  in  the 
greater  part  of  the  arts  of  his  life,  if  he  had  nothing  to  con- 
duct him  from  the  point  where  certain  knowledge  fails  him. 
§  2.  He  must  often  be  contented  with  a  simple  tmlight  ofprob- 
ahility.  §  3.  The  faculty  of  using  this  is  judgment.  One  is 
contented  with  it  often  of  necessity,  but  often  through  want 
of  diligence,  patience,  and  skill.  §  4.  It  is  called  assent  or 
dissent,  and  is  employed  when  anything  is  presumed,  i.e.  when 
it  is  taken  as  true  before  it  is  proved.  When  this  is  done  con- 
formably to  the  reality  of  things,  it  is  a  right  judgment. 

Til.  Others  call  judgm,ent  the  act  which  is  performed  every 
time  a  statement  is  made  after  some  knowledge  of  a  cause; 
and  there  will  be  some  also  who  will  distinguish  judgment 


CHS.  xiii-xv]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  529 


from  opinion,  as  not  of  necessity  being  so  uncertain.  But  I 
do  not  wish  to  criticise  any  one  regarding  tlie  use  of  words, 
and  it  is  allowed  you,  sir,  to  take  judgment  as  a  probable 
opinion.  As  for  presumption,  wliich  is  a  term  of  the  juris- 
consults, good  use  with  them  distinguishes  it  from  conjecture. 
It  is  something  more,  something  which  must  pass  for  truth 
})rovisionally  until  there  is  proof  of  the  contrary,  while  a 
sigyi,  a  co7ijecture,  must  often  be  weighed  against  another  con- 
jecture. Thus  it  is  that  he  who  admits  having  borrowed 
money  from  another,  is  presumed  to  pay  the  debt,  unless  he 
shows  that  he  had  done  so  already,  or  that  the  debt  ceases  b}' 
some  other  principle.  Presumption  is  not  then  in  this  sense 
taking  before  proof,  which  is  not  allowed,  but  taking  in  advance 
but  with  foundation,  while  awaiting  a  contrary  proof. 


CHAPTER  XV 

OF    PROBABILITY 

§  1.  Ph.  If  demonstration  shows  the  connection  of  ideas, 
probability  is  nothing  else  than  the  appearance  of  this  connec- 
tion based  upon  proofs  in  which  immutable  connection  is  not 
seen.  §  2.  There  are  several  degrees  of  assent  from  assurance 
down  to  conjecture,  doubt,  distrust.  §  3.  When  there  is  cer- 
tainty, there  is  intuition  in  all  parts  of  the  reasoning  which 
show  its  connection;  but  what  makes  me  believe  is  some- 
thing extraneous.  §  4.  Now  probability  is  grounded  in  its 
conformity  with  what  we  know,  or  in  the  testimony  of  tliose 
who  know. 

Th.  I  prefer  to  maintain  that  it  is  always  grounded  in  like- 
lihood (yraisemblance)  or  in  conformity  witli  the  trutli;  and 
the  testimony  of  another  is  also  a  thing  which  the  trutli  has 
been  wont  to  have  for  itself  as  regards  tlie  facts  that  art; 
within  reach.  It  may  be  said  then  that  the  similarity  of  the 
]ivobable  and  the  truth  is  taken  either  from  the  thing  itself, 
or  from  some  extraneous  thing.  The  rhetoricians  employ  two 
kinds  of  arguments:  the  artificial,  drawn  from  things  by  rea- 
soning, and  the  non- artificial,  based  only  upon  tlie  express 
testimony  either  of  man  or  perhaps  also  of  the  thing  itself. 

2  M 


530  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.   iv 

But  there  are  mixed  arguments  also,  for  testimony  may  itself 
furnish  a  fact  which  serves  to  form  an  artificial  argument. 

§  5.  Ph.  It  is  for  lack  of  similarity  to  truth  that  we  do  not 
readily  believe  that  which  has  nothing  like  that  which  we 
know.  Thus  when  an  ambassador  told  the  king  of  Siam  that 
with  ns  the  water  was  so  hardened  in  winter  that  an  elephant 
might  walk  thereon  without  breaking  through,  the  king  said 
to  him :  Hitherto  I  have  believed  you  as  a  man  of  good  faith ; 
now  I  see  that  you  lie.  §  6.  But  if  the  testimony  of  others  can 
render  a  fact  probable,  the  ojnnion  of  others  should  not  pass 
of  itself  as  a  true  ground  of  probability.  For  there  is  more 
error  than  knowledge  among  men,  and  if  the  belief  of  those 
whom  we  know  and  esteem  is  a  legitimate  ground  of  assent, 
men  have  reason  to  be  Heathen  in  Japan,  Mahometans  in 
Turkey,  Papists  in  Spain,  Calvinists  in  Holland,  and  Luther- 
ans in  Sweden. 

T7i.  The  testimony  of  men  is  no  doubt  of  more  weight  than 
their  opinion,  and  in  reason  it  is  also  the  result  of  more 
reflection.  But  you  know  that  the  judge  sometimes  makes 
them  take  the  oath  de  crediditate,  as  it  is  called ;  that  in  the 
examinations,  we  often  ask  witnesses  not  only  what  they  have 
seen  but  also  what  they  think,  demanding  of  them  at  the 
same  time  the  reasons  of  their  judgment,  and  whether  they 
have  reflected  thereupon  to  such  an  extent  as  behooves  them. 
Judges  also  defer  much  to  the  views  and  opinions  of  ex- 
perts in  each  profession;  private  individuals,  in  proportion 
as  it  is  inconvenient  for  them  to  present  themselves  at  the 
appropriate  examination,  are  not  less  compelled  to  do  this. 
Thus  a  child,  or  other  human  being  whose  condition  is  but 
little  better  in  this  respect,  is  obliged,  whenever  he  finds  him- 
self in  a  certain  situation,  to  follow  the  religion  of  the  coun- 
try, so  long  as  he  sees  nothing  bad  therein,  and  so  long  as  he 
is  not  in  a  condition  to  find  out  Avhether  there  is  a  better.  A 
tutor  of  pages,  whatever  his  sect,  will  compel  them  each  to 
go  to  the  church  where  those  who  profess  the  same  belief  as 
this  young  man  go.  The  discussions  between  Nicole  ^  and 
others  on  the  argument  from  the  great  number  in  a  matter  of 

1  Pierre  Nicole,  1625-169."),  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the  Port-Royal- 
ists, and,  with  the  exception  of  Arnauld  (<;/".  ante,  p.  4(i3,  note  4)  and  Pascal,  the 
most  accomplished  memher  of  the  school,  was  author  with  Arnauld  of  the  fa- 


cii.  XV]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  531 


faith  may  be  consulted,  in  which  sometimes  one  defers  to  it 
too  much  and  another  does  not  consider  it  enough.  There  are 
other  similar  prejudgments  by  which  men  would  very  easily 
exempt  themselves  from  discussion.  These  are  what  Tertul- 
lian,  in  a  special  treatise,  calls  Prescri);itowes,^  availing  him- 
self of  a  term  which  the  ancient  jurisconsults  (whose  lan- 
guage was  not  unknown  to  him)  intended  for  many  kinds  of 
exceptions  or  foreign  and  predisposing  allegations,  but  wliich 
now  means  merely  the  temporal  prescription  when  it  is  in- 
tended to  repel  the  demand  of  another  because  not  made  with- 
in the  time  fixed  by  law.  Thus  there  was  reason  for  mak- 
ing known  the  legitimate  prejudgments  both  on  the  side  of  the 
Roman  Church  and  on  that  of  the  Protestants.  It  has  been 
found  that  there  are  means  of  opposing  novelty,  for  example, 
on  the  part  of  both  in  certain  respects ;  as,  for  example,  when 
the  Protestants  for  the  most  part  abandoned  the  ancient  form 
of  ordination  of  clergymen,  and  the  Eomanists  changed  the 
ancient  canon  of  the  Old  Testament  books  of  Holy  Scripture, 
as  I  have  clearly  enough  shown  in  a  discussion  I  had  in 
writing,  and  from  time  to  time,  with  the  bishop  of  Meaux, 
whom  we  have  just  lost,  according  to  the  news  which  came 
some  days  since. ^  Thus  these  censures  being  mutual,  the 
novelty,  although  it  presents  a  suspicion  of  error  in  these 
jnatters,  is  not  a  certain  proof  thereof. 

mons  L'Art  de  Penser  or  the  Port  Royal  Logic.  His  most  important  work  is 
his  Esmis  de  Morale,  Paris,  l(i71-74.  It  was  about  his  De  I'uniti;  de  rdf/Iise  ou 
refntdtion  du  vouveau  si/steme  de  Jurlen,  Paris,  ](i87,  that  the  theoh)gical 
controversies  here  alluded  to  by  Leibnitz  centred,  and  "  in  which  the  question 
was  considered,  whether  Roman  Catholicism  allows  itself  to  engage  in  the  — 
undoubtedly  questionable  —  argument  of  the  'majority  of  professors.'  "  An 
account  of  Nicole's  De  Vunite  de  Veglise  will  be  found  in  Bayle's  Diet.,  Eng. 
transL,  Vol.  4,  p.  ;u;.1,  London,  1737."— Tr. 

1  Tertullian,  150-100  —  220-240,  sought  in  his  De  Prsescriptione  IIxretic07'um 
to  produce  a  formal  general  argument  against  all  heresies  —  "  advcrsus  ha-rc- 
ses  omnes  "  —  his  object  being  to  prevent  heretics,  in  accordance  with  certain 
just  and  necessary  rules  (prxsaHptiones),  from  appealing  to  Scrii)ture  in  sup- 
port of  their  views.  For  an  account  of  the  work,  <■/'.  Sniitli  and  Wace,  Dili, 
of  Christ.  Biog.,  Vol.  4,  p.  837  a,  sq.—Tii. 

2  I^eibnitz  here  refers  to  his  correspondence  with  Jacques  Be'nigne  P.ossuet, 
1<)27-1704,  Bishop  of  Meaux  from  KiSI  till  liis  death.  'J'his  correspondence  was 
ironic  in  character,  and  extench^d,  willi  some  interrupt  ions,  over  a  period  of 
about  2~)  years,  but  was  without  result,  because  Leil)ni1z  would  not  suffer  the 
freedom  of  seientilic  inquiry  to  be  taken  away,  wliile  JJossuel  desired  sub- 
jection to  the  infallible  autliority  of  the  cimrch.  The  entire  correspondence 
has  been  published  by  Foucher  de  Careil,  (Euvres  de  Leibniz,  Vols.  1,  2, 


532  LKIBNJTZ'S    CRITIQUE    OF   LUCKE  [bk. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

OF    THE    DEGKEES    OF    ASSENT 

§  1.  Ph.  As  for  the  degrees  of  assent,  we  must  take  care 
that  the  grounds  of  probability  we  have  do  not  operate  beyond 
the  degree  of  likelihood  found  therein  or  which  has  been  found 
therein  when  they  are  examined.  For  we  must  admit  that 
assent  cannot  always  be  based  upon  an  actual  view  of  the  rea- 
sons which  have  prevailed  with  the  mind,  and  it  would  be 
very  difficult  even  for  those  ^  who  have  an  admirable  memory 

Paris,  1859-60.  A  portion  of  the  same  is  found  in  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  07n.,  1, 
507  sg.  The  letters  especially  referred  to  are  (1)  of  Leibnitz:  Dec.  11,  1(J99, 
(Foucher  de  Careil,  (JEnvres  de  Leibniz,  2,  274-277 ;  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  1, 
59i-596) ,  May  14  and  24, 1700  (F.  2,  314-369 ;  D.  1,  612-642) ;  (2)  of  Bossuet :  Jan. 
9  and  30,  1700  (F.  2,  278-306;  D.  1,  596-611),  Aug.  17,  1701  (F.  2,  396-426;  D.  1, 
657-(i73).  For  an  account  of  the  controversy,  cf.  Pichler,  Die  Theologie  des 
Leibniz,  Vol.  2,  pp.  206-215. 

The  present  passage  is  important,  as  it  enables  us  to  determine  the  date  of 
the  composition  of  the  New  Essays,  or  at  least  of  this  portion  of  them.  Bos- 
suet died  April  12,  1704.  This  passage  must  then  have  been  written  in  the 
second  half  of  April,  1704;  and  from  other  data  (for  which  cf.  Guhrauer, 
Leibniz.  Eine  Biographic,  Bk.  II.,  j).  282  and  Anmerkungen  z.  zweiten  Buche, 
pp.  38-39;  and  Gerhardt's  Introduction  to  the  New  Essays,  ante,  pp.  8,  9,  and 
notes)  it  is  evident  that  the  entire  work  was  substantially  completed  in  1704, 
though  the  revision  of  the  French  style,  and  possibly  some  minor  additions  or 
alterations,  occupied  Leibnitz  to  a  certain  extent  after  this  date. 

In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  date  given,  ante,  p.  9,  line  15, 
1709,  sliould  be  1704  (cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  jMlos.  Schrift.,  3,  297,  note  *),  and 
that  Gerhardt's  remark,  ante,  p.  9:  "On  the  other  hand,  he  remarks,  well- 
nigh  it  seems  in  the  opposite  sense,"  etc.,  as  well  as  that  by  the  Translator, 
ante,  p.  101,  note  l,prope.fn.:  "  As  Leibnitz  was  occupied  .  .  .  with  the  com- 
position and  revision  of  his  New  Essays,  from  1700  ...  to  1709  and  perhaps 
later  .  .  .  possibly  even  as  late  as  1714  or  1716,"  should  be  modified  accord- 
ingly.—  Tr. 

1  Gerhardt's  text  reads:  "  Sur  une  veue  actuelle  des  raisons,  qui  ont  prevalu 
sur  Vesprit,  et  il  seroit  tres  difficile,  meme  a  ceux,  qui  out  une  memoire  ad- 
mirable," etc.  The  words  italicised  above  are  not  found  in  the  texts  of  Easpe, 
Erdmann,  .Jacques  and  Janet;  and  Janet  restores  the  sense  of  "  this  incorrect 
phrase  "thus:  "...  Sur  une  vue  actuelle  des  vstXsons,  conime  il  aitive  chez 
ceux  qui  ont  une  memoire  admirable,  capable  de  toujours  retenir.  ..." 
Gerhardt's  reading  agrees  with  Locke's  text,  cf.  Philos.  Wks.,  Vol.  2,  p.  271, 
Bohn's  ed.,  and  is  therefore  to  l)e  preferred.  — Te. 


CH.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  533 


always  to  retain  all  the  proofs  Aviiicli  have  compelled  them  to 
a  certain  assent,  and  which  sometimes  might  fill  a  volume  on  a 
single  question.  It  suffices  that  they  have  once  examined  the 
matter  minutely  with  sincerity  and  with  care,  and  that  they 
have,  so  to  speak,  cast  up  the  account.  §  2.  Without  this  men 
must  be  very  sceptical,  or  change  their  view  at  every  moment, 
in  order  to  yield  themselves  to  every  man  who,  having  exam- 
ined the  question  of  late,  offers  them  arguments  which  they 
cannot  at  once  wholly  answer,  for  lack  of  memory  or  of  api)li- 
cation  at  leisure.  §  3.  It  must  be  admitted  that  this  often 
makes  men  obstinate  in  error :  but  the  fault  is,  not  that  they 
rely  upon  their  memory,  but  that  they  have  badly  judged  be- 
fore. For  often  the  remark  that  they  have  never  thought 
otherwise  takes  the  place  of  an  examination  and  of  reason 
with  men.  But  ordinarily  those  who  have  least  examined 
their  opinions  hold  them  most  tenaciously.  Holding  to  Avhat 
one  has  seen  is  praiseworthy,  but  not  always  to  what  one  has 
believed,  because  some  consideration  may  have  been  left  behind 
capable  of  overturning  all.  There  is  perhaps  no  one  in  the 
world  who  has  the  leisure,  patience,  and  means  of  assembling 
all  the  proofs  on  both  sides  of  the  question  upon  which  he 
has  his  opinions  in  order  to  comj^are  these  proofs  and  safely 
to  conclude  that  nothing  more  remains  for  him  to  know  for  his 
more  ample  instruction.  But  the  care  of  our  life  and  of  our 
more  important  interests  cannot  bear  the  delay,  and  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  that  our  judgment  be  determined  upon  the 
points  when  we  are  incapable  of  attaining  to  a  certain  knowl- 
edge. 

Th.  There  is  nothing  but  what  is  good  and  solid  in  wliat 
you,  sir,  have  just  said.  It  would  be  desirable,  however,  for 
men  to  have  at  certain  junctures  ivritlen  abstracts  (in  form  of 
memoranda)  of  the  reasons  which  have  led  them  to  an  imjior- 
tant  opinion,  which  they  are  obliged  often  to  justify  after- 
wards to  themselves  or  others.  Besides,  although  in  a  matter 
of  justice  it  is  not  usually  allowable  to  retract  the  judgments 
which  have  been  passed,  and  to  revise  the  verdicts  agreed 
uj)ou  (otherwise  there  would  necessarily  be  perpetual  unrest, 
which  would  be  so  inuch  the  more  intolerable  as  the  accounts 
of  things  past  cannot  always  be  preserved),  yet  one  is  some- 
times allowed  upon  new  light  to  sue  for  justice,  ami  also  to 


534  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

obtain  what  is  called  restitutio  in  integrum'^  contrary  to  the 
decision  that  has  been  given.  And  likewise  in  our  own 
ail:"airs,  especially  in  matters  very  important,  where  it  is  still 
allowable  to  embark  or  to  put  back,  and  where  it  is  not  preju- 
dicial to  suspend  their  execution  and  to  proceed  bridle  in 
hand,  the  decisions  of  our  minds  based  upon  probabilities 
should  never  so  pass  in  rem  judicatam,- eiS  the  jurisconsults  call 
it,  i.e.  to  a  settlement,  that  we  may  not  be  disposed  to  the 
revision  of  the  reasoning  when  new  counter  reasons  of  Aveight 
present  themselves.  But  when  there  is  no  more  time  for  delib- 
eration, we  must  follow  the  judgment  we  made  with  as  much 
firmness  as  if  it  were  infallible,  but  not  always  with  so  much 
strictness.^ 

§  4.  Ph.  Since,  then,  men  cannot  avoid  exposing  themselves 
to  error  in  judgment  and  having  different  opinions,  since  they 
cannot  look  at  things  from  the  same  points  of  view,  they  must 
maintain  peace  between  themselves  and  the  duties  of  humanity 
amid  this  diversity  of  opinions  without  claiming  that  another 
should  promptly  change  a  rooted  opinion  upon  our  objec- 
tions, especially  if  there  is  room  for  supposing  that  his 
adversary  acts  from  interest  or  ambition  or  from  some  other 
private  motive.  Most  frequently  those  who  would  impose 
upon  others  the  necessity  of  yielding  to  their  opinions  have 
examined  tilings  with  but  little  thoroughness.  For  those  who 
have  entered  beforehand  sufficiently  into  the  discussion  to 
extricate  themselves  from  doubt  are  so  few  in  number,  and 
find  so  little  reason  to  condemn  others,  that  nothing  violent 
is  to  be  expected  on  their  part. 

Th.  Really  that  which  one  has  the  most  right  to  censure  in 
men  is  not  their  opinion,  but  their  rash  judgment  in  censuring 

1  Cf.  Fsinlns,  Sententiarum,  Lib.  I.,  Tit.  VII.  1.:  "Integri  restitutio  est  re- 
diuteicrandse  rei  vel  causse  .actio.  2.  lutegri  restitutionem  prastor  tribuit  ex 
his  causis,  quae  per  metum,  doluin  et  status  permutatioiiem,  et  justum  errorera, 
et  absentiam  necessariam,  et  infirmitateni  aetatis  gesta  esse  dicuntur ;  "  also 
Llgest,  Lib.  XLII.,  Tit.  I.  33. 

^  Cf.  Digest,  Lib.  XLII.,  Tit.  I.  1:  "  Res  judicata  dicitur,  qute  fineni  con- 
troversiam  pronunciatioue  judicis  accipit :  quod  vel  condemnatione  vel  abso- 
lutione  contingit."  —  Tr. 

3  Janet  cites  as  a  parallel  passage  Descartes,  Discovrs  de  la  Methode,  Pt. 
in. :  "  Ma  seconde  maxime  etait  d'etre  le  plus  ferme  et  le  plus  resolu  eu  raes 
actions  que  je  pourrais,  et  de  ne  suivre  pas  moins  c-onstamment  les  opinions 
les  plus  douteuses  lorsque  je  m'y  serais  une  fois  determine  que  si  elles  eussent 
ete  tres-assurees."  — Tr. 


CH.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  535 

that  of  otliers,  as  if  it  were  necessary  to  be  stupid  or  wicked 
to  judge  differently  from  tliemselves;  a  condition  of  things 
wliicli,  in  the  authors  of  these  passions  and  hatreds  who  spread 
them  among  the  public,  is  the  effect  of  a  mind  haughty  and 
unfair,  Avhich  loves  to  rule  and  cannot  suffer  contradiction. 
Xot  that  there  is  not,  in  truth,  reason  very  often  for  censuring 
the  opinions  of  others,  but  it  must  be  done  in  a  spirit  of  fair- 
ness, and  sympathy  with  human  weakness.  It  is  true  that 
we  are  right  in  taking  precautions  against  bad  doctrines, 
Avhich  are  influential  upon  manners  and  upon  practical  piety : 
but  we  must  not  attribute  them  to  people  to  their  prejudice 
without  having  good  proofs  of  the  same.  If  fairness  wishes 
to  spare  j^ersons,  piety  demands  the  representation,  Avhere  it  is 
fitting,  of  the  bad  effects  of  their  dogmas  when  they  are  in- 
jurious, as  those  are  which  are  contrary  to  the  providence  of  a 
perfectly  wise,  good,  and  just  God,  and  contrary  to  that 
immortality  of  souls  which  renders  them  susceptible  of  the 
effects  of  his  justice,  not  to  speak  of  other  opinions  dangerous 
as  regards  morality  and  the  police.  I  know  that  excellent  and 
well-meaning  men  maintain  that  these  theoretic  opinions 
have  less  influence  upon  practice  than  is  thought,  and  I  also 
know  that  there  are  persons  of  an  excellent  disposition  whom 
these  opinions  will  never  make  do  anything  unworthy  of 
themselves :  as  also  those  who  have  reached  these  errors  by 
speculation,  are  by  nature  wont  to  be  farther  removed  from 
the  vices  to  which  men  in  general  are  susceptible,  besides  the 
fact  that  they  are  careful  of  the  dignity  of  the  sect  in  which 
they  are,  as  it  were,  chiefs;  and  it  may  be  said  that  Epicurus 
and  Spinoza,  for  example,  have  led  a  life  wholly  exemplary. 
But  these  reasons  cease  most  frequently  in  their  disciples  or 
imitators,  who,  believing  themselves  released  from  the  trouble- 
some fear  of  an  overseeing  Providence  and  of  a  menacing 
future,  give  loose  reins  to  'their  brutish  passions,  and  turn 
their  mind  to  the  seduction  and  corruption  of  others;  and  if 
they  are  ambitious  and  of  a  disposition  somewhat  harsh,  they 
will  be  capable,  for  their  pleasure  or  advancement,  of  setting 
on  fire  the  four  corners  of  the  earth,  as  I  have  known  from  the 
character  of  some  whom  death  has  swept  away.  I  find  also 
that  similar  opinions  insinuating  themselves  little  by  little 
into  the  minds  of  men  of  high  life  who  rule  others  and  upon 


53G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OE   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

whom  affairs  depend,  and  slipping  into  the  books  in  fashion, 
dispose  all  things  to  the  general  revolution  with  wliich 
Europe  is  threatened,  and  accomplish  the  destruction  of  what 
still  remains  in  the  world  of  the  generous  sentiments  of  the 
ancient  Greeks  and  Romans,  who  preferred  love  of  country 
and  of  the  public  good,  and  regard  for  posterity  to  fortune, 
and  even  to  life.  These  puhUc  spirits,  as  the  English  call 
them,  are  fast  diminishing,  and  are  no  longer  in  fashion;  and 
they  will  diminish  still  faster  when  they  are  no  longer  sus- 
tained by  the  good  morality  and  true  religion  which  even 
natural  reason  teaches  us.  The  best  of  the  opposite  character 
who  are  beginning  to  rule  have  no  other  principle  than  that  they 
call  Jionor.  But  the  mark  of  the  honest  man  and  of  the  man  of 
honor  with  them  is  only  to  do  no  baseness  as  they  understand 
it.  And  if  for  the  sake  of  power  or  through  caprice  anyone 
poured  forth  a  deluge  of  blood,  if  he  turned  every  sense  upside 
down,  that  would  be  counted  as  nothing,  and  a  Herostratus  ^  of 
the  ancients  or  a  Don  Juan  in  the  "  Festin  de  Pierre  "  "^  would 
pass  for  a  hero.  Boldly  they  scoff  at  the  love  of  country,  they 
ridicule  those  who  care  for  the  public,  and  when  any  well-mean- 
ing man  speaks  of  what  will  become  of  posterity,  they  reply: 
we  shall  see  when  the  time  comes.  But  these  persons  will  pos- 
sibly experience  themselves  the  evils  they  think  reserved  for 
others.  If,  however,  this  disease  of  an  epidemic  mind  whose  bad 
effects  begin  to  be  visible  is  corrected,  these  evils  will  perhaps 
be  prevented;  but  if  it  goes  on  increasing.  Providence  will 
correct  men  by  the  revolution  itself  which  must  spring  there- 
from: for  whatever  may  happen,  everything  will  always  turn 
out  for  the  better  in  general  at  the  end  of  the  account,  although 
that  ought  not  and  cannot  happen  without  the  punishment  of 
those  who  have  contributed  even  to  the  good  by  their  bad  acts. 
But  I  return  from  a  digression  into  which  the  consideration  of 
truthful  opinions  and  of  the  right  of  censuring  them  has  led  me. 

1  Herostratus,  an  Ephesian,  who,  for  the  sake  of  making  his  name  famous, 
as  he  himself  confessed  on  being  put  to  torture,  set  fire  to  the  temple  of  Ar- 
temis at  Ephesus,  on  the  night  in  which  Alexander  the  Great  was  born, 
356  B.C.  — Tr. 

2  The  Don  Juan  ou  le  Festin  de  Pierre,  1665,  a  comedy  of  Moliere,  1622- 
1673,  the  principal  character  of  which  is  Don  .Juan.  Tlie  play,  written  in 
prose,  was  versified  in  1677,  at  the  request  of  Moliere's  widow,  by  Thomas 
Corneille,  1625-1709. —Tr. 


CH.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  537 


Now  as  in  theology  censures  go  very  nuicli  farther  than  else- 
where, and  as  those  who  lay  great  stress  upon  their  orthodoxy, 
often  condemn  their  adversaries,  to  whom  those  in  the  same 
party  who  are  called  syncretists  by  their  adversaries  are 
opposed,  this  opinion  has  caused  civil  wars  to  spring  up 
between  the  rigid  and  condescending  in  one  and  the  same 
party.  But,  as  to  refuse  eternal  salvation  to  those  who  are  of 
another  opinion  is  to  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  God,  the 
wisest  of  those  who  condemn,  only  indicate  the  peril  in  which 
they  think  they  see  erring  souls,  and  leave  to  the  peculiar 
merc}^  of  God  those  whose  wickedness  does  not  render  them 
incapable  of  profiting  therefrom,  and  on  their  part  believe 
themselves  obliged  to  make  all  imaginable  efforts  to  withdraw 
them  from  a  condition  so  dangerous.  If  these  persons  who 
thus  judge  of  the  perils  of  others  have  come  to  this  opinion 
after  a  suitable  examination  and  there  are  no  means  of  dis- 
abusing them  of  it,  their  conduct  cannot  be  censured  so  long 
as  they  use  only  fair  means.  But  as  soon  as  they  go  farther, 
they  violate  the  laws  of  equity.  For  they  should  consider 
that  others  persuaded  like  themselves  have  an  equal  right  to 
maintain  their  views,  and  even  to  spread  them  if  they  think 
them  important.  Opinions  must  be  excepted  Avhich  teach 
crimes  that  should  not  be  allowed,  and  which  it  is  right  to 
suppress  by  stringent  means,  if  it  should  be  true,  indeed,  that 
he  who  maintains  them  cannot  be  rid  of  them;  ^  as  it  is  right 
to  destroy  even  a  poisonous  animal,  wholly  innocent  as  it  is. 
But  I  speak  of  suppressing  the  sect  and  not  men,  since  we 
can  prevent  them  from  doing  harm  and  dogmatising. 

§  5.  Ph.  To  return  to  the  ground  and  degrees  of  assent,  it 
is  proper  to  remark  that  propositions  are  of  two  kinds.  Some 
are  of  fact,  and,  depending  upon  observation,  may  be  based  upon 
human  testimony;  otliers  are  speculative,  and,  regarding  things 
which  our  senses  could  not  discover,  are  incapable  of  similar 
testimony.  §  6.  When  a  particular  fact  is  in  conformity  with 
our  constant  observations,  and  with  the  uniform  report  of 
others,  we  rest  upon  it  as  firmly  as  if  it  were  certain  kuowl- 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "no  pent  point  s'on  defaire."  Enlniaiin,  Jacques  and 
Janet  read:  "ne  pent  point  s'en  faire,"  and  Janet  in  liis  note  says:  "siii)i)ly 
'  d'autres.'  "  With  this  reading  the  meaning  is:  "  cannot  procure  for  himself 
otliers."  — Tr. 


538  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

edge,  and  where  it  is  in  conformity  witli  the  testimony  of  all 
men,  in  all  ages,  so  far  as  can  be  known,  it  is  the  first  and 
liighest  degree  of  probability;  for  example,  that  fire  warms, 
that  iron  sinks  to  the  bottom  of  the  water.  Our  belief  built 
upon,  such  foundations  rises  to  assurance.  §  7.  In  the  second 
place,  all  historians  relate  that  such  an  one  has  preferred  his 
individual  interest  to  that  of  the  public,  and  as  it  has  always 
been  observed  that  this  is  the  custom  of  the  majority  of  men, 
the  assent  I  give  to  these  histories  is  confidence.  §  8.  Thirdly, 
when  there  is  nothing  either  for  or  against  it  in  the  nature  of 
things,  a  fact,  vouched  for  by  the  testimony  of  unsuspected 
people,  for  example,  that  Julius  Caesar  lived,  is  received  with 
a  firm  belief.  §  9.  But  when  the  testimony  is  found  contrary 
to  the  ordinary  course  of  nature  or  the  witnesses  vary  among 
themselves,  the  degrees  of  probability  may  vary  infinitely, 
whence  arise  these  degrees  which  AV'e  call  belief,  conjecture, 
doubt,  uyicertainty,  distrust;  and  there  it  is  that  exactness  is 
necessary  to  form  a  right  judgment  and  to  proportion  our 
assent  to  the  degrees  of  probability. 

T/i.  Jurisconsults  in  treating  of  proofs,  presumptions,  con- 
jectures, and  indices,  have  said  a  number  of  good  things  on 
this  subject,  and  have  gone  into  some  considerable  detail. 
They  begin  with  notoriety,  in  which  there  is  no  need  of  proof. 
Afterwards  they  come  to  comjdete  proofs,  or  those  which  pass 
as  such,  upon  which  they  pronounce  sentence,  at  least,  in  a 
civil  process,  but  upon  Avhich  in  some  places  they  are  more 
reserved  in  a  criminal  process;  and  they  are  not  wrong  in 
demanding  in  such  case  proofs  more  than  complete,  and  espe- 
cially as  regards  what  is  called  corpus  delicti,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  act.  There  are  then  proofs  more  than  complete, 
and  there  are  also  ordinary  complete  piroofs.  Then  there  are 
presumptions,  which  pass  provisionally  as  complete  proofs, 
i.e.  so  long  as  the  contrary  is  not  proved.  There  are  proofs 
more  than  half  complete  (to  speak  precisely),  in  which  the  one 
who  relies  upon  them  is  allowed  to  swear  to  make  them  good 
{t\\Q  jur amentum  suppletorium)  ;  there  are  others  less  than  half 
complete,  where  wholly  to  the  contrary  the  oath  is  adminis- 
tered to  him  who  denies  the  act,  to  purge  himself  (the  _/i<ra- 
mentum  purgationis) .  Beyond  this  there  are  many  degrees 
of  conjectures  and  indices.    Particularly  in  a  criminal  process 


cii.  xvi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  539 

there  are  indices  (ad  torturam)  to  proceed  to  the  torture,  which 
itself  has  its  degrees  indicated  by  the  formuhis  of  arrest- 
there  are  indices  (ad  terrendum)  sufficient  to  show  the  instru- 
ments of  torture  and  to  prepare  things  as  if  they  intended  to 
come  to  it.  There  are  some  (ad  capturam)  to  make  sure  of 
a  suspected  man;  and  (ad  inqidrendum)  to  make  inquiries 
secretly  and  without  noise.  And  these  differences  may  be  of 
use  also  on  other  similar  occasions.  The  entire  form  of  judi- 
cial procedure  is  notliing  else  in  fact  than  a  species  of  logic 
applied  to  questions  of  law.  Physicians  also  have  a  number 
of  degrees  and  differences  in  their  signs  and  indications  which 
may  be  seen  among  them.  The  mathematicians  of  our  times 
have  begun  to  calculate  chances  upon  the  occasion  of  games. 
Chevalier  de  Mere,^  whose  "Agremens"  and  other  works  have 
l)een  printed,  a  man  of  penetrating  mind  who  was  both  a 
player  and  a  philosopher,  gave  them  an  opportunity  by  form- 
ing questions  regarding  the  profits  in  order  to  know  how  much 
the  game  would  be  worth,  if  interrupted  at  such  or  such  a 
stage.  In  this  way  he  induced  Pascal,  his  friend,  to  examine 
these  things  a  little.  The  question  made  a  stir  and  gave 
Huygens  the  opportunity  to  produce  his  treatise  "de  Alea."^ 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  213,  note  2;  also  Response  (Replique)  aux  reflexions  contenues 
dans  la  seconde  Edition  du  Dictionnaire  Critique  de  M.  Bayle,  Gerhardt,  4, 
570,  Erdmaiin,  190,  Janet,  2,  593,  Duteus,  2,  Ft.  I.,  92.  Antoine  Gonilianlt, 
chevalier  de  Mere,  c.  ItilO-lGSl,  was  erroneously  confounded  with  a  (xcorges 
Brossin,  chevalier  de  Mere,  belonging  to  another  family,  by  all  biographers 
since  Moreri,  until  the  special  reseai'ches  of  M.  de  Bremont  d'Ars  proved  the 
error  and  assigned  him  his  right  name.  He  had  an  Inordinately  exalted  idea 
of  his  own  importance  and  attainments,  especially  in  mathematics.  His 
Af/i'ements,  discours  de  M.  le  chevalier  de  Me'rd  a  M'""  **,  appeared  in  l(i77, 
12mo,  and  in  the  collected  edition  of  all  his  works,  entitled  (Etrrres  du  chevalier 
de  Mere,  Amsterdam,  1692,  2  vols.,  12mo.  A  A'olume  of  (Euvres  posthuntes, 
12mo,  appeared  at  Paris,  1700,  and  again  at  The  Hague,  1701.  For  furtlier 
account  of  him,  cf.  Larousse,  Grande  Diet.  Univ.  de  XIX^^  Siecle,  Vol.  11,  p. 
72.— Tr. 

2  Cf.  anfp,  p.  150,  note  3.  Huygens'  De  ratioeiniis  in  alex,  ludo,  dated  The 
Hague,  1()57,  is  found  in  F.  van  iSchooten,  Exercilat.  math.  lib.V.,  pp.  51-l-5:i9, 
Lugd.  Bat.  l()r>7,  4to.  It  was  written  by  Huygens  in  Hiitcli  and  translated  into 
Latin  by  Schooten.  There  are  two  English  translations,  one  attril)nled  to 
Motte,  but  probably  by  Arbuthnot ;  tlie  other  by  W.  Brown.  Cf.  1.  Todliuntcr, 
Hist,  of  the  Math.  Theory  of  I'rohabilit!/,  pp.  22-2:i,  Cambridge  and  London, 
Macmillan  &  Co.,  1865.  Leibnitz,  Miscellan.  Leihnit.,  No.  CXIII.,  cf.  Dutens, 
(i,  Pt.  I.,  318,  says  of  it:  "Christian!  Hugenii  ratiocinia  de  lusu  aha-.,  Franc. 
Schotenii  scriptis  matheraaticis  adjecta,  sunt  elegans  specimen  ratiocinationis 
de  gradibus  i)robabilitatis." 

Spinoza  also  discussed  tlie  calculation  of  probabilities  in  games  of  chance, 


540  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [nic.  iv 

Other  learned  men  entered  into  the  subject.  Some  principles 
were  established  of  which  the  Pensioner  De  Witt  also  availed 
himself  in  a  brief  discourse  printed  in  Dutch  on  annuities.^ 
The  foundation  on  which  they  have  built  goes  back  to  the 
prosthaj)hfpresis,^  i.e.  the  taking  of  an  aritlimetical  mean  be- 
tween several  equally  receivable  suppositions.  Our  peasants 
also  have  made  use  of  it  for  a  long  time  according  to  their 
natural  mathematics.  For  example,  when  some  inheritance  or 
land  is  to  be  sold,  the}'  form  three  bodies  of  appraisers ;  these 
bodies  are  called  Scliurzen  in  Low  Saxon,  and  each  body  makes 
an  estimate  of  the  property  in  question-.  Suppose,  then,  that 
the  first  estimates  its  value  to  be  1000  crowns,  the  second 
1400,  the  third  1500;  the  sum  of  these  three  estimates  is 
taken,  viz.  3900,  and  because  there  were  three  bodies,  the 
third,  i.e.  1300,  is  taken  as  the  mean  value  asked  for;  or 
rather,  they  take  the  sum  of  the  third  part  of  each  estimate 
which  is  the  same  thing.  This  is  the  axiom:  CBquaUbus 
cequalia,  equal  suppositious  must  have  equal  consideration. 
But  when  the  suppositions  are  unequal  they  compare  them 
with  each  other.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  with  two 
dice,  the  one  ought  to  win  if  it  makes  7  points,  tlie 
other  if  it  makes  9,  the  question  is  asked  what, proportion 
obtains  between  their  probabilities  of  winning?  I  reply  that 
the  probability  of  the  last  is  worth   only  two-thirds  of  the 

in  a  letter  to  Jan  van  der  Meer.  Cf.  Epistola  Xo.  .38  (formerly  43) ,  Spinoza, 
Opera,  ed.  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  2,  145-149  (in  Latin  and  Dutch)  ;  Spinoza's 
Briefwechsel,  in  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann's  Phllos.  Bibliothek,  Vol.  46,  pp.  145- 
147.  — Tr. 

^  Cf.  ante,  p.  426,  note  2.  John  De  Witt  appears  to  have  been  "  the  first  to 
apply  scientific  principles  to  the  calculations  connected  with  annuities,  which 
are  analogous  to  those  connected  with  assurances."  His  report  on  this  sub- 
ject was  presented  to  the  States  General,  July  30,  1671.  It  was  entitled  De 
vardye  van  de  lif-renten  )ia  proportie  van  de  los-renten,  and  appeared  at  La 
Haye,  1671.  An  abstract  of  it,  showing  exactly  how  De  Witt  reasoned  on  the 
subject,  will  be  found  in  M.  Nicolas  Struyck,  Inleiding  tot  het  akjenieine  geo- 
graphy, etc.,  p.  .345,  Amsterdam,  1740,  4to,  and  an  English  translation  of  the 
tract  is  printed  in  Contributions  to  the  Hist,  of  Insurance  by  Frederick 
Hendriks  in  the  "Assurance  Magazine,"  Vol.  2  (1852),  p.  231.  For  some 
remarks  on  De  Witt's  hypothesis  as  to  the  rate  of  mortality,  cf.  the  same  vol., 
p.  .393.  — Tr. 

2  Prosthaphseresis  —  7rpoo-ea(iatpecrt? —  =  a  previous  subtraction.  The  term 
here  signifies  "  the  fundamental  principle  for  the  ascertainment  of  the  degree 
of  probability  wliich  requires  us  to  take  the  arithmetical  mean  of  the  existing 
suppositions  estimated  according  to  their  relative  value." — Tr. 


CH.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  541 

probability  of  the  first,  for  the  first  can  make  7  in  three  ways 
with  two  dice,  viz. :  by  1  and  6,  or  2  and  5,  or  3  and  4;  and 
the  other  can  make  9  in  two  ways  only,  by  throwing  3  and  G, 
or  4  and  5;  and  all  these  methods  are  equally  possible. 
Then  the  probabilities,  which  are  as  the  numbers  of  equal 
possibilities,  will  be  as  3  to  2,  or  as  1  to  |.  I  have  more  than 
once  said  that  a  7iew  kind  of  logic  would  be  required  which 
would  treat  of  the  degrees  of  probability,  since  Aristotle  in 
his  "  Topics  "  has  done  nothing  less  than  this,  and  has  con- 
tented himself  with  putting  in  a  certain  order  certain  popular 
rules  distributed  according  to  the  common  topics,  which  may 
be  of  use  on  some  occasion  where  the  question  concerns  the 
amplification  of  the  discourse  and  the  giving  to'  it  probability 
without  putting  it  to  the  trouble  of  furnishing  us  a  necessary 
balance  for  weighing  pro1>abilities  and  forming  thereupon  a 
solid  judgment.-'  It  would  be  well  for  him  who  should  treat 
of  this  matter  to  pursue  the  examination  of  games  of  chance; 
and  in  general  I  wish  that  some  skilful  mathematician  would 
produce  an  ample  work  with  full  details  and  thoroughly 
reasoned  upon  all  sorts  of  games,  which  Avould  be  very  useful 
in  perfecting  the  art  of  invention,  the  human  mind  appearing 
to  better  advantage  in  games  than  in  the  most  serious  matters. 

§  10.  Ph.  The  law  of  England  observes  this  rule,  that  the 
copy  of  an  act  received  as  authentic  by  witnesses  is  a  good 
proof,  but  the  copy  of  a  copy,  however  attested,  and  by  wit- 
nesses the  most  credible,  is  never  admitted  as  a  proof  in  a 
trial.  I  have  never  yet  heard  any  one  censure  this  wise  pre- 
caution. This  observation  at  least  may  be  drawn  from  it, 
that  testimony  has  less  force  in  proportion  as  it  is  farther 
removed  from  the  original  truth  which  is  in  the  thing  itself  5 
while  among  certain  peoples  use  is  made  of  it  in  a  directly 
contrary  manner,  opinions  acquiring  force  as  they  grow  older, 
and  what  would  not  at  all  have  appeared  probable  a  thousand 
years  ago  to  a  reasonable  man  a  contemporary  of  the  one  who 
first  certified  it,  passes  at  present  as  certain  because  many 
have  related  it  upon  his  testimony. 

Th.  Historical  critics  have  great  regard  for  contemporary 
witnesses  of  things:  but  a  contemporary  even  merits  belief 
chiefly  as  regards  public  events  only ;  but  when  he  speaks  of 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  417,  note  3.  —  Tk. 


542  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [dk.  iv 

motives,  secrets,  hidden  forces,  and  things  which  may  be  dis- 
puted, as,  for  example,  poisonings,  assassinations,  we  acquaint 
ourselves  with  what  many  have  believed.  Procopius  is  very 
credible  when  he  speaks  of  the  war  of  Belisarius  against  the 
Vandals  and  the  Goths,  but  when  he  retails  horrible  scandals 
against  the  Empress  Theodora  in  his  "Anecdotes,"  he  may 
believe  them  who  will.^  Generally,  Ave  should  be  very  re- 
served in  believing  satires  ;  we  see  some  published  in  our  times 
which,  although  wholly  improbable,  have  nevertheless  been 
greedily  swallowed  by  the  ignorant.  And  some  day  perhaps 
it  will  be  said  :  Is  it  possible  that  one.  would  have  dared  to 
publish  these  things  at  that  time,  if  there  had  been  any  appar- 
ent foundation  for  them  ?  But  if  this  statement  is  some  day 
made,  the  judgment  will  be  a  very  erroneous  one.  The  world, 
however,  is  inclined  to  indulge  in  satire ;  and,  to  quote  but 
one  example,  the  late  Mr.  Maurier,  the  son,'  having  published, 
from  some  caprice,  in  his  memoirs  printed  some  years  since, 
certain  things  wholly  without  foundation  against  the  incom- 
parable Hugo  Grotius,  ambassador  from  Sweden  to  France, 
stirred  apparently  by  some  unknown  circumstance  against  the 
memory  of  this  illustrious  friend  of  his  father,  I  have  noticed 
that  many  authors  have  repeated  them  from  envy,  although 
the  negotiations  and  letters  of  this  great  man  sufficiently 
make  known  the  contrary.  We  have  emancipated  ourselves 
indeed  from  writing  romances  in  history,  and  he  who  produced 
the  last  life  of  Cromwell  thought  that  in  order  to  enliven  the 
subject  he  was  allowed,  in  speaking  of  the  life,  still  private, 
of  this  clever  usurper,  to  make  him  travel  in  France,  where 
he  follows  him  into  the  public  houses  of  Paris  as  if  he  had 

1  For  critical  discussion  of  the  authorship  of  the  Ta  'AvexSora  —  Anecdota 
or  Historia  Arcana  —  of  Procopius,  and  of  the  credibility  of  its  contents,  cf. 
J.  H.  Reinkens,  Anecdota  sintne  scnpta  a  Procopio  Cmsariensi  inquiritur, 
Breslau,  1S58,  who  denies,  and  F.  Dahn,  ProJcoplus  von  Cilsarea,  Berlin,  18(35, 
who  affirms,  that  Procoi^ius  is  the  author.  Prof.  James  Bryce  gives  a  brief 
acfount  and  estimate  of  the  work  in  his  article  on  "Procopius,"  in  the 
Encyclop.  Brit.  9th  ed.  Cf.  also  M.  Dehidour,  Thesis,  1877,  who  tries  to  make 
out  the  best  case  he  can  for  Theodora,  and  Prof.  Bryce  in  the  "  Contemporary 
Review,"  Feb.  188.5.  — Tr. 

-  Louis  Aubery  du  Maurier,  the  historian,  died  1687,  was  the  son  of 
Benjamin  Aubery,  an  ambassador  from  France  to  Holland,  and  published 
Memoires  pour  servir  a  VHi.'itoire  de  Hollande,  IHSO,  Menioires  de  Hamburg, 
de  Lubeck,  de  Holstein,  etc.  Leibnitz  refers  to  him  in  his  letter  to  Bierling, 
Oct.  24,  1709,  Gerhardt,  7,  487.  —Tr. 


cri.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  543 


been  his  master.*  But  it  appears  by  the  history  of  Cromwell 
Avritten  by  Carrington,  a  well-informed  man,  and  dedicated 
to  bis  son  Kichard  when  he  acted  the  part  of  the  Pro- 
tector, that  Cromwell  never  went  out  of  the  British  Isles. 
Detail  especially  is  uncertain.  There  are  almost  no  good 
accounts  of  battles;  the  majority  of  those  of  Titus  Livius 
appear  to  be  imaginary,  as  well  as  those  of  Quintus  Curtius. 
It  would  be  necessary  to  have  on  both  sides  the  accounts  of 
exact  and  capable  men,  who  indeed  would  draw  up  plans  of 
them  like  those  which  the  Count  of  Dahlberg,  who  had  already 
served  with  distinction  under  the  King  of  Sweden,  Charles 
Gustavus,  and  Avho,  being  Governor-General  of  Livonia,  re- 
cently defended  Riga,  has  had  engraved  touching  the  actions 
and  battles  of  this  prince.  We  must  not,  however,  at  once 
decry  a  good  historian  at  a  word  from  some  prince  or  minister 
who  has  exclaimed  against  him  on  some  occasion,  or  in  regard 
to  some  subject  not  to  his  taste  or  wherein  there  really  is  i)er- 
haps  some  fault.  The  story  is  told  that  Charles  the  Pifth, 
wishing  to  have  something  of  Sleidan^  read,  said:  "Bring  me 
my  story-teller  (meiiteur),"  and  that  Carlowitz,  a  Saxon  gentle- 
man, of  good  repute  at  that  time,  said  that  the  history  of  Slei- 
dau  destroyed  in  his  mind  all  the  good  opinion  he  had  had  of 
the  ancient  histories.  That  statement,  I  say,  will  have  no  force 
in  the  minds  of  well-informed  persons  in  overthrowing  the 
authority  of  the  history  of  Sleidan,  the  best  part  of  which  is 
a  series  of  the  public  acts  of  the  Diets  and  Assemblies,  and 
of  the  writings  authorized  by  the  princes.  And  if  there  re- 
mained the  least  scruple  regarding  it,  it  has  just  been  removed 
by  the  excellent  history  of  my  distinguished  friend,  the  late 
Mr.  Von  Seckendorf^   (in  which  I  cannot,   however,  refrain 

1  Leibnitz  here  refers,  according  to  Schaarsclimidt,  to  Jas.  Heath's  Flar/el- 
Iniii;  ov  the  Life  and  Death,  Birth  and  Burial  of  Oliver,  the  late  Usurj)er, 
London,  1663,  8vo.  Li  this  book  tlie  Protector  is  generously  slandered  and 
abused.  S.  Carrington's  The  Hist,  of  the  Life  and  Death  of  Oliver  Cronnvell, 
London,  165'.t,  8vo,  is  a  panegyric,  in  which  Cromwell  is  compared,  among 
others,  with  Alexander  the  (4reat.  An  ahi'idginent  of  Heath's  book  may  lie 
found  in  the  "  Harleian  Miscellany,"  1,279,  ed.  Park.  It  may  be  added  that 
"  the  earliest  lives  of  Cromwell  were  cither  brief  chronicles  of  the  chief  events 
of  his  life  or  were  panegyrics."  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  114,  note  1.  —  Tu. 

3  Veit  Ludwig  von  Seckendorf,  1626-1692,  a  distinguished  German  sciiolar 
and  statesman,  whose  C'oinmentarius  historieus  et  apolof/eticus  de  Luth<raiv- 


544  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

from  disapproving  the  term  "  Lutlieranism  "  on  the  title-page, 
wliicli  a  bad  custom  has  authorized  in  Saxony),  wherein  the 
majority  of  the  statements  are  justified  by  extracts  from  an 
immense  number  of  pieces,  drawn  from  the  Saxon  archives 
which  he  had  at  his  disposal,  although  the  Bishop  of  Meaux, 
who  contested  their  validity,  and  to  whom  I  sent  it,  merely 
replied  to  me  that  this  book  is  horribly  prolix;  but  I  could 
wish  that  it  were  twice  as  large  on  the  same  scale.  The  more 
ample  it  is,  the  more  hold  it  must  give,  since  one  has  only  to 
choose  his  passages ;  besides,  there  are  some  esteemed  histori- 
cal works  which  are  much  greater.  For  the  rest,  we  do  not 
always  despise  authors  posterior  to  times  of  which  they 
speak  when  what  they  relate  is  apparently  otherwise.  Some- 
times, also,  it  happens  that  they  preserve  some  most  ancient 
pieces.  For  example,  there  has  been  doubt  as  to  what  family 
Suibert,  Bishop  of  Bamberg,  since  Pope  under  the  name  of 
Clement  II.,  belonged.  An  anonymous  author  of  the  history 
of  Brunswick,  who  lived  in  the  fourteenth  century,  named  his 
family,  and  some  persons  learned  in  our  history  desired  to  pay 
no  regard  whatever  to  it ;  but  I  have  had  a  chronicle  much 
more  ancient,  not  yet  printed,  in  which  the  same  statement  is 
made  with  more  details,  from  which  it  appears  that  he  be- 
longed to  the  family  of  the  ancient  allodial  seigniors  of  Horn- 
bourg  (not  far  from  Wolfenbuttel),  the  territory  of  which  was 
given  by  the  last  owner  to  the  cathedral  church  of  Halber- 
stadt. 

§  11.  Ph.  I  do  not  wish  you  to  think  that  I  desired  to  lessen 
the  authority  and  use  of  history  by  my  remark.  It  is  from 
this  source  that  we  receive  with  a  convincing  evidence  a  large 

ismo  sive  de  Reformatione,  Leipzig,  1692,  3  vols.,  fol.,  occasioned  by  and 
directed  against  the  L'Histoire  du  Lutheranisme,  Paris,  KiSO,  of  the  Jesuit 
.Maimbourg,  is  his  most  important  work,  and  a  rich  storehouse  of  authentic 
materials  for  the  history  of  the  reformation  from  l.")17-1547,  drawn  from 
documents  contained  in  the  Saxon  archives,  the  writings  of  the  reformers  and 
tlieir  contemporaries,  accompanied  by  a  polemical  and  historical  commentary. 
It  is  the  work  of  an  able,  philosophic  mind,  with  scarcely  a  trace  of  the  secta- 
rian spirit.  Leibnitz  gives  a  brief  account  and  estimate  of  the  book  in  his 
letters  to  Bossuet,  Jan.  <S-18,  and  April  8-18,  1692  {cf.  Foucher  de  Careil, 
(Uuvrps  de  Leibniz,  1,  228,  27.5,  Dutens,  LeibnU.  op.  om.,  1.  .52.S-4:,  530-5:!l).  It 
is  also  referred  to  in  Bossuet's  letters  to  Leibnitz,  Jan.  10,  1692  (F.  1, 22i>,  D.  1, 
522),  March  26  or  May  26,  1692  (F.  1,  25.".),  and  Leibnitz  to  Bossuet,  Avithout 
dates  (F.  1,  223,  254-255).  For  further  remarks  of  Leibnitz  concerning  it,  </. 
Dutens,  5,  90,  93,  566.  —  Tr. 


cii.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  545 


part  of  our  useful  truths.  I  see  nothing  more  valuable  than 
the  records  of  antiquity  remaining  to  us,  and  I  wish  we  had 
more  of  them,  and  less  corrupted.  But  it  is  always  true  that 
no  copy  raises  itself  higher  than  the  certainty  of  its  first 
original. 

Th.  It  is  certain,  that  when  we  have  a  single  ancient  author 
as  the  authority  for  a  fact,  all  those  who  have  copied  him  add 
no  weight  thereto,  or  rather  should  be  reckoned  as  nothing.  It 
should  be  wholly  as  if  what  they  said  belonged  to  the  number, 
Twv  uTTu^  Aeyo/xe'i/wv,  of  things  which  have  been  said  only  once, 
a  collection  of  which  Menage^  wished  to  make.  Moreover,  to- 
day, if  a  hundred  thousand  petty  writers  should  repeat  the 
slanders  of  Bolsec  ^  (for  example),  a  man  of  judgment  would 
value  it  no  more  than  the  noise  of  goslings.  Jurisconsults 
have  written  de  fide  historica;  but  the  subject  merits  a  more 
exact  research,  and  some  of  these  gentlemen  have  been  too 
indulgent.  As  for  that  which  is  of  great  antiquity,  some  of 
the  most  noted  facts  are  doubtful.  Clever  people  have  doubted, 
with  reason,  whether  Eoiliulus  was  the  first  founder  of  the 
city  of  Rome.  There  is  dispute  about  the  death  of  Cyrus,  and 
besides,  the  discrepancy  between  Herodotus  and  Ctesias  has 
spread  doubt  upon  the  history  of  the  Assyrians,  Babylonians, 
anil  Persians.  That  of  Nebuchadnezzar,  of  Judith,  and  even 
of  the  Ahasuerus  of  Esther  suffer  from  great  difficulties.  The 
Bomans,  when  speaking  of  the  gold  of  Toulouse,  contradict 
the  story  of  the  defeat  of  the  Gauls  by  Camillus.  Above  all, 
the  particular  and  private  history  of  peoples  is  without  credit, 
unless  it  is  taken  from  very  ancient  originals,  and  is  suf- 
ficiently in  conformity  with  public  history.     This  is  why  the 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  .'550,  note  1. — Tu. 

-  Jerome  Henues  Bolsec,  born  at  Paris,  died  1685,  at  Lyons,  was  a  Carmel- 
ite of  Paris,  wlio  foi-sook  his  order,  became  a  Protestant,  fled  to  Italy  and 
tlience  to  Geneva,  where  he  set  up  as  a  physician,  bnt  not  meeting  with  the 
success  he  desired,  gave  himself  up  to  theology,  discoursed  publicly  on  the 
doctrine  of  Predestination,  advocating  the  views  of  Pelagius,  and  thus  incur- 
ring the  censure  of  Calvin,  was  imprisoned  and  tlion  banislicd  by  the  Senate  of 
Geneva,  Dec.  29,  1551.  He  went  thence  to  Bern,  whillier  Calvin  pursued  him. 
These  persecutions  developed  in  him  a  violent  hatred  towards  Calvin,  wliich, 
after  his  return  to  the  Catholic  faith,  he  vented  in  his  L'Hixtuirc  de  la  vie, 
mceurs,  actes,  doctrhie  et  mort  de  Jean  Calvin,  Paris,  1577,  8vo.  He  also  pub- 
lished a  similar  work,  L'lHstairc  de  la  vie,  mwars,  dociriiip  et  dep(>r/")nr)itx  de 
Theodore  de  Beze,  Paris,  1580,  8vo.  Both  works  arc  merely  pamphlets,  with 
no  historical  authority.  —  Tr. 
2  N 


546  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [inc    iv 

stories  told  lis  of  the  ancient  German,  Gcallic,  British,  Scotch, 
Polish,  and  other  kings  pass  with  reason  as  fabulous  and 
made  iip.  Trebeta,  son  of  Ninus,  founder  of  Treves,  Bru- 
tus, ancestor  of  the  Britons,  or  Britains,  are  as  real  as  the 
Aniadis.  The  tales  taken  from  certain  story-tellers,  which 
Trithemius,^  Aventin,^  and  even  Albinus^  and  Sifrid  Petri  ■* 
have  taken  the  liberty  to  tell  of  the  ancient  princes  of  the 
Franks,  Boii,  Saxons,  Frisians ;  and  what  Saxo  Gramaticus 
and  the  Edda  tell  us  of  the  remote  antiquities  of  the  north, 
cannot  have  more  authority  than  what  Kadlubko,^  the  first 
Polish  historian,  says  of  one  of  their  kings,  a  son-in-law  of 
Julius  Caesar.  But  when  the  histories  of  different  jDCoples 
agree  in  instances  where  there  is  no  appearance  that  one  has 
copied  another,  it  is  a  great  sign  of  their  truth.     Such  is  the 

1  Johann  Trithemins,  1402-1516,  abbot  of  Si^auheim,  whose  Compendium, 
siv  hreviarium 2»'inii  voluminis  annalium ,  sive  historUirum ,  de  origine  rerum 
et  r/entifi  Fraiicorum  appeared  at  Mainz,  1515,  reprinted,  Paris,  1539.  Leib- 
nitz speaks  of  him  in  his  Introd.  in  c-ollectionem  Sc.riptoruin  Hi><tor.  Bruns- 
vicensi  inservientium,  Dntens,  4,  Pt.  II.,  4,  5.  For  an  accouut  of  him,  cf. 
Michaud,  Biofj.  Univ.  Vol.  46,  pp.  551-559. — Tk. 

2  .Tohann  Thurmayr  Aventinns,  HG6-15o4,  author  of  Annales  Boiorum. 
His  history,  the  materials  of  which  were  drawn  from  authentic  sources,  was 
finished  in  1528,  and  published  "  with  some  important  omissicuis  "  of  passages 
adverse  to  the  Roman  Catholics  by  Zeigler  in  1554.  The  omitted  passages  were 
afterwards  restored  by  Nicolas  Cisner  in  the  Basle  ed. ,  15S0.  Leibnitz  mentions 
him  \nh\s, Introd.  in  col.  Scnpt.  Hititor.  Brunsvic,  Dutens,  4,  Pt.  II.,4.  — Te. 

3  Alcuiii,  —  Latin,  Alcuinus  or  Albinus  Flaccus,  —  c.  735-804,  the  instructor 
of  Charlemagne,  whose  collected  works,  containing  among  other  things  some 
historical  treatises,  were  first  published  by  And.  Duchesne,  Paris,  1617,  1  vol., 
fol.,  and  afterwards  by  Froben,  Alcvini  opera,  post  editioneni  ab  And.Querce- 
tano  curutani,  de  novo  collata,  emendata,  aucta  et  illustratu,  2  vols.,  fol., 
Ratisbon,  1777.    Migne,  Patrol.,  Vols.  100,  101,  is  a  reprint  of  this  ed.  — Tr. 

4  Sifrid  or  Suffrid  Petri,  1527-1597,  a  Dutch  philologist  of  great  learning, 
but  deficient  in  critical  ability  and  taste,  was  Professor  of  Latin  and  Greek  in 
the  University  of  Erfurt,  1557,  of  Law  at  Cologne,  1577,  and  of  Canon  Law  at 
Louvain  and  Cologne, 1585.  He  was  the  historiographer  of  the  States  of  Fries- 
land,  and  published  De  Fri.iiorum  antiquitate  et  origine  lib.  III.,  Cologne, 
1590;  De  Scriptoribiis  Frisiss  decades  XVI.  et  semis,  Cologne,  1593.  His 
Historia  veterum  episcoponmi  Ultrajectinse  sedis  et  comitum  Ilollandix, 
appeared  at  Francker,  1612.  — Tr. 

^  Vincent  Kadlubek  or  Kodlubko,  1161-1223,  bishop  of  Cracow,  a  Latin 
chronicler  of  the  early  history  of  Poland,  whose  Histonn  Polonica,  Do- 
bromiel,  1612,  12mo,  written  with  spirit,  but  in  a  barbarous  style,  throws 
much  liglit  on  the  events  of  his  own  time,  but  must  be  received  with  caution, 
as  regards  the  early  period,  since  he  treated  the  early  legendary  stories,  many 
of  whicli  closely  resemble  the  Scandinavian  sagas,  as  genuine  history.  The 
work  is  in  four  books  and  extends  to  the  year  1202,  and  is  true  and  faithful 
in  relating  events  in  Poland  in  the  11th  and  12th  centuries.  —  Tr. 


cri.  XVI]  ON    HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  547 

accord  of  Herodotus  with  the  history  of  the  Old  Testament  in 
many  things,  for  example,  when  he  speaks  ^  of  the  battle  of 
Megiddo  between  the  king  of  Egypt,  and  the  Syrians  of  Pales- 
tine, i.e.  the  Jews,  in  which,  according  to  the  testimony  of 
the  sacred  history  we  have  of  the  Hebrews,  King  Josias  was 
mortally  wounded.  The  consent  of  the  Arabic,  Persian,  and 
Turkish  historians  with  the  Greeks,  Romans,  and  other  occi- 
dentals gives  pleasure  to  those  who  seek  for  facts  ;  as  also 
the  testimony  wliich  the  medals  and  superscriptions,  remain- 
ing from  antiquity,  render  to  the  books  which  have  come  down 
from  the  aiicients  to  us  and  Avliich  are,  in  reality,  copies  of 
copies.  We  must  wait  for  what  Ave  shall  yet  learn  of  the 
history  of  China,  until  we  are  in  a  better  condition  to  judge 
of  it.  and  until  it  shall  bear  its  credibility  with  itself.  The 
use  of  history  consists  principally  in  the  pleasure  there  is  in 
knowing  origins,  in  the  justice  rendered  to  the  men  who  have 
deserved  well  of  other  men,  in  the  establishment  of  historical 
criticism,  and  especially  of  sacred  history,  which  supports  the 
foundations  of  revelation,  and  (putting  also  aside  the  geneal- 
ogies and  laws  of  princes  and  powers)  in  the  useful  teachings 
whicli  the  examples  furnish  us.  I  do  not  despise  the  thorough 
examination  of  antiquities,  even  to  the  smallest  trifles ;  for 
sometimes  the  knowledge  which  the  critics  draw  from  them 
nuxy  be  of  use  in  more  important  matters.  I  consent,  for  ex- 
ample, to  the  writing  even  of  the  entire  history  of  clothing 
and  of  the  tailor's  art,  from  the  garments  of  the  Hebrew  priests, 
or,  if  you  please,  from  the  peltries  which  God  gave  to  the  first 
bride  and  bridegroom  at  their  departure  from  Paradise,  to  the 
top-knots  and  furbelows  of  our  time,  and  to  the  union  there- 
with of  all  that  can  be  drawn  from  ancient  sculptures  and 
from  paintings  also  made  some  centuries  after.  I  will  furnish 
indeed,  if  any  one  desires  it,  the  memoirs  of  a  man  of  Augs- 
burg of  the  past  century,  who  is  described  with  all  the  clothes 
which  he  wore  from  his  infancy  up  to  the  age  of  63  years.  I 
do  not  know  who  told  me  that  the  lato  Duke  of  Aumont,"  a 

1  Cf.  Herodotus  II.  159,  and  notes  of  Bilhr  :iiid  Kawlinson  on  the  passage. 
—  Tr. 

2  Loiiis-Marie-Victor  d'Anmont,  1(1.32-1704,  a  French  .sehohir,  ininiismutisi, 
and  "  brigadier  du  roi  "  under  Louis  XIV.  in  the  Low  Countries,  contrihutcd 
niucli  to  the  progress  of  the  knowledj^e  of  medals,  and  was  a  member  of  Ihe 
"  Academie  des  inscriptions  et  Belles-Lettres."  — Tii. 


5i8  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

great  connoisseur  of  fine  antiquities,  had  a  similar  curiosity. 
This  may  perhaps  be  of  use  in  distinguishing  the  legitimate 
monuments  from  those  which  are  not  so,  not  to  speak  of  other 
uses.  And  since  men  are  allowed  to  play,  they  ^\^ll  still 
further  be  allowed  to  divert  themselves  with  these  kinds  of 
work,  if  their  essential  duties  do  not  suffer  thereby. /T3ut  I 
wish  there  might  be  some  persons  who  would  devote  them- 
selves preferably  to  drawing  from  history  that  which  is  more 
useful,  as  the  extraordinary  examples  of  virtue,  remarks  upon 
the  conveniences  of  life,  stratagems  of  politics  and  of  war. 
And  I  wish  that  a  kind  of  universal,  history  were  written 
which  should  indicate  only  such  things,  and  some  few  others 
of  more  consequence;  for  sometimes  one  reads  an  extensive 
historical  work,  learned,  well-written,  suited  also  to  the  end 
of  the  author,  and  excellent  of  its  kind,  but  which  contains 
little  useful  instruction,  by  which  I  do  not  mean  here  simple 
morality,  with  which  the  "  Theatrum  vitae  humanae  "  ^  and  other 
such  florileges  are  filled,  but  skill  and  knowledge  of  which 
everybody  would  not  think  in  case  of  neecL/  I  wish  also  that 
an  infinite  number  of  things  of  this  nature,  by  which  we  might 
profit,  might  be  drawn  from  books  of  tra\'el,  and  be  arranged 
according  to  the  order  of  the  subjects.  But  it  is  astonishmg 
that  while  so  many  useful  things  remain  to  be  done,  men 
amuse  themselves  almost  always  with  what  is  already  done, 
or  with  purely  useless  things,  or  at  least  with  what  is  the 
least  important,  and  I  see  little  remedy  therefor  until  the 
public  is  more  concerned  about  them  in  more  tranquil  times. 

§  12.  Ph.  Yonr  digressions  give  pleasure  and  profit.  But 
from  the  probabilities  of  facts,  let  us  come  to  those  of  opinions 
concerning  things  which  do  not  fall  under  the  senses.  Such 
things  are  incapable  of  any  testimony,  for  example,  the  exist- 
ence and  ^  nature  of  spirits,  angels,  demons,  etc.,  the  material 
substances  which  are  in  the  planets  and  other  mansions  ■'^  of 

1  Theodore  Zwinger,  15.>V1588,  a  celebrated  Swiss  physician,  whose  Thea- 
t?-u>n  vitse  humanse,  "  a  vast  compilation  of  historical  facts  and  anecdotes,  and 
of  curious  and  piquant  observations,"  in  preparing  which  he  availed  himself 
of  the  materials  which  his  father-in-law,  Lycosthenes  [Conrad  Wolffhart], 
1518-15()1,  had  collected  and  asked  him  to  set  in  order,  appeared  at  Basle, 
1565-lGOl,  5  vols.,  fol.  —  Tr. 

■-  Gerhardt  reads:  "  de,"  a  Ms.  or  typograi^hical  error;  Erdmann,  Jacques, 
and  Janet  have  "  et."  —  Tr. 

3  Locke's  word,  Philos.  TFor^-s,  Vol.  2,  p.  279  (Bohn's  ed.).  — Tr. 


CH.  XYi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  549 


this  vast  universe ;  finally,  upon  the  mode  of  operation  of  the 
majority  of  the  works  of  nature,  and  of  all  these  things  we 
can  have  merely  conjectures,  wherein  analogy^  is  the  great 
rule  of  probability.  For  being  incapable  of  attestation,  they 
can  appear  j)robable  only  so  far  as  they  agree  more  or  less 
with  established  truths.  As  violent  friction  of  two  bodies 
produces  heat  and  even  tire,  as  the  refractions  of  transparent 
bodies  produce  the  appearance  of  colors,  we  think  that  fire 
consists  in  a  violent  agitation  of  the  imperceptible  parts,  and 
that  colors  also,  whose  origin  we  do  not  see,  come  from  a  simi- 
lar refraction ;  and  finding  that  there  is  a  gradual  connection 
in  all  the  parts  of  the  creation  that  may  be  subject  to  human 
observation,  without  any  considerable  gap  between  any  two, 
we  have  every  reason  to  think  that  things  rise  also  towards 
perfection  gradually  and  by  insensible  degrees.-  It  is  difiieult 
to  say  where  the  sensible  and  the  rational  begin,  and  what  is 
the  lowest  degree  of  living  things ;  it  is  like  the  increase  or 
diminution  of  quantity  in  a  regular  cone.  The  difference  is 
exceeding^  great  between  certain  men  and  certain  animals ; 
Uiit  if  we  wish  to  compare  the  understanding  and  capacity  of 
certairi  liTeh  and  certain  brutes,  we  shall  find  so  little  differ- 
ence, that'll  will  be  very  diificult  to  assert  that  the  under- 
standing of  these  men  is  clearer  or  more  extended  than  that, 
of  these  brutes.  When,  therefore,  we  observe  such  an  insensi- 
ble gradation  between  the  parts  of  creation  from  man  to  the 
lowest  parts  beneath  him,  the  rule  of  analogy  makes  us  regard 
it  as  probable  that  there  is  a  parallel  gradation  in  the  things 
above  us  and  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  observation,  anil  this  kind 
of  probability  is  the  broad  foundation  of  rational  hypotheses.'' 

1  In  the  case  of  natural  phenomena  beyond  the  reach  of  the  senses,  anah)gy 
is  the  great  rule  of  probability,  the  reasoning  in  general  being  hypotjietical 
only,  and  the  force  and  certainty  of  the  conclusion  therefrom  being  directly 
proportional  to  the  reality  and  degree  of  the  resemblance  or  simihuily  of  the 
phenomena.  Since  Locke's  and  Leibnitz's  day,  great  advan(;e  has  l)een  made 
in  onr  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  materials  existing  in  the  various  licav- 
enly  bodies,  chiefly  through  the  aid  of  the  spectroscope  and  sjjcctral  analysis, 
not  only  strengthening  and  increasing  the  measure  of  probability  in  (lie  appli- 
cation of  the  conclusion  from  analogy  to  the  conjectured  conditions  of  other 
worlds,  but  in  some  cases  and  to  a  certain  extent  giving  us  well  accredited 
positive  knowledge  in  regard  to  their  constitution.  —  Tr. 

2  (Jf.  A.  C.  Fraser,  Locke's  Essay  dmrerning  Human  Understaniling,  Vol. 
2,  p.  380,  note  2.    Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  18i)4.  —  Tk. 

3  The  probable  conclusion  from  analogy  is  a  rational  hypothesis,  who.se 


550  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk.  iv 

Til.  It  is  upon  the  ground  of  this  analogy  that  Huygens,  in 
his  "  Cosmotheoros,"  ^  judges  that  the  condition  of  the  other 
principal  planets  is  quite  similar  to  ours,  excepting  the  differ- 
ence whiidi  their  different  distance  from  the  sun  must  cause : 
and  Fontenelle,-  who  had  already  before  published  his  conver- 
sations full  of  wit  and  knowledge  on  the  plurality  of  worlds, 

hypothetical  character  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is  not  a  completely  exhaus- 
tive induction  or  a  mathematical  demonstration  from  the  given  data,  therefore 
still  problematical,  aud  whose  rationality  consists  in  the  fact  that  no  known 
reason  exists  against  the  assumed  instance,  hut  on  the  contrary  the  analogy 
itself  dii-ectly  furnishes  occasion  for  a  provisional  consideration  of,  if  not  a 
belief  in,  the  hypothesis. — Tr. 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  150,  note  3.  Huygen's  Cosmotheoros,  sive  de  terris  ccelestibus 
earumque  ornatu  conjectursB  —  a  speculation  concerning  the  inhabitants  of 
the  planets,  and  the  last  work  of  the  great  physicist  and  mathematician  — 
appeared  posthumously,  at  the  Hague,  1()98,  and  in  a  German  trans.,  Leipzig, 
1703,  just  before  Leibnitz  wrote  Bk.  IV.  of  the  A^ew  Essays,  and  in  an  English 
ti'ans.,  entitled.  The  Celestial  World  discovered ;  or  Conjectures  concerning 
the  Inhabitants,  Plants,  and  Productions  of  the  Worlds  in  the  Planets,  Lon- 
don, 1C99,  8vo;  Conjectures  concerninr/  the  Planetary  Worlds,  Glasgow,  1727, 
12mo.  The  work  is  found  in  Huygens,  Opera  Omnia,  Levden,  1824,  2  vols.. 
Vol.  1 ,  pp.  (J41-722.  —  Tr. 

-  Bernard  le  Bovier  de  Fontenelle,  1657-1757,  a  litterateur  rather  than  a 
philosopher,  who,  nevertheless,  according  to  Janet,  "  belongs  to  the  history  of 
philosophy,  through  the  spirit  of  inquiry  and  criticism  which  animates  his 
works,"  attempted,  and  successfully,  in  his  Entretiens  sur  la  pluralite  des 
inondes,  Paris,  168(i,  12mo  (a  sixth  Entretien  was  added  in  the  Paris  ed.  of 
1687,  according  to  Brunet)  to  popularize  the  astronomical  theories  and  doc- 
trines of  Copernicus  and  Descartes.  The  work  is  a  fine  illustration  of  the 
possibility  of  making  science,  without  ceasing  to  be  scientifie,  intelligible  and 
interesting  to  the  men  of  the  world.  Fontenelle  became  a  member  of  the 
"  Acade'mie  Francaise  "  in  1691,  and,  on  the  re\ival  of  the  "Academie  des  Sci- 
ences de  Paris  "  in  1699,  was  nominated  its  perpetual  secretary,  and  continued 
in  that  oflfice  for  tifty-eight  years,  publishing  each  year  a  volume  of  the  Histoire 
of  this  Academie,  containing  clear  and  orderly  arranged  extracts  from  or  anal- 
yses of  the  papers  read  before  the  Academie,  often  accompanied  with  new  and 
profound  A-iews  of  his  own ,  together  with  Ehf/es  of  the  members  dying  in 
each  year,  among  which  is  the  Eloge  de  Leibniz,  "a  masterpiece,"  found  in 
L' Histoire  de  V Academie  Royale  des  Sciences  de  Paris,  annee  1716;  in  Vol.  3, 
1722,  of  the  collection  of  these  Eloc/es,  69  in  number,  entitled  Histoire  du 
renouvellement  de  V Academie  Royale  des  Sciences  en  1G99,  et  Elogeshistoriques 
des  Academiciens  marts  depuis  ce  temps-la,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1708-1722;  in 
(Euvres  de  Fontenelle,  3  vols..  La  Haye,  1728-29,  Vol.  3,  pp.  232-259;  new  ed., 
11  vols.,  Paris,  1766,  Vol.  5,  pp.  447-506;  and  in  F.  Bouillier,  Eloges  de  Fon- 
tenelle avec  line  Introd.  et  des  Notes,  Paris,  1883,  pp.  10.3-134;  cf.  also  Jacques, 
(Euvres  de  Leibniz,  Vol.  2,  pp.  i-xxiv,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  Vol.  1,  pp. 
xix-liii. 

The  Entretiens  sur  la  pluralite  des  mond-'s  is  found  in  (Euri-es  de  Fon- 
tenelle, La  Haye,  1728-1729,  Vol.  1,  pp.  149-2:!4 ;  new  ed.,  Paris,  1766,  Vol.  2, 
pp.  1-190;  there  is  a  German  trans,  by  Gottsched,  1751,  Eng.  trans,  by  Glan- 
viU,  London,  1688,  1768,  by  A.  Behn  and  others,  Loudon,  1801,  aud  from  the 


[.  xvi]  ON    HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  551 

has  said  some  pretty  things  thereupon,  and  has  discovered  the 
art  of  enlivening  a  difficult^  subject.  He  would  say,  as  it 
were,  that  a  harlequin  in  the  empire  of  the  moon  is  altogether 
what  it  is  here.  It  is  true  that  w^e  judge  in  a  wholly  different 
way  of  moons  (which  are  satellites  merely)  than  of  the  princi- 
pal planets.  Kepler-  has  left  a  little  book  which  contains  an 
ingenious  story  upon  the  condition  of  the  moon,  and  an  Eng- 
lishman,'^ an  homme  dfesprit,  has  published  the  humorous  de- 
scription of  a  Spaniard  (of  his  own  invention)  whom  some  birds 
of  })assage  transported  to  the  moon,  not  tcKmention  C5'rano,^ 
who  since  went  to  find  this  Spaniard.  Some  clever  men,  wish- 
ing to  present  a  beautiful  picture  of  the  other  life,  conduct 
very  happy  souls  from  world  to  world;  and  our  imagination 
finds  therein  a  part  of  the  agreeable  occupations  which  may  be 
ascribed  to  genii.  But  however  it  may  strive,  I  doubt  if  it 
can  attain  its  object,  because  of  the  great  interval  between  us 
and  these  genii,  and  the  great  variety  found  therein.  And 
until  we  find  telescopes  like  those  Descartes  made  us  hope 
for  in  order  to  discern  parts  of  the  moon's  sphere  no  larger 
than  our  houses,  we  cannot  determine  what  there  is  in  a  globe 
different  from  ours.     Our  conjectures  will  be  more  useful  and 

"  last  and  best "  ed.,  with  notes  and  a  critical  account  of  the  author's  writing 
by  the  astronomer  Jerome  de  la  Lande,  Paris,  1800,  by  Miss  E.  Gunning,  ISOo. 
Fontenelle  was  author  also  of  Dialo(/ues  de^  morts,  Paris,  1G83;  L'lJistoire 
des  Oracles,  Paris,  1(J87 ;  Doutcs  sur  le  systeine  phyxique  dcs  causes  occasio- 
nelles,  against  Malebranehe,  Paris,  1686. — Tii. 

1  Jacques  reads:  "  fort  difficile."  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  123,  note  2.  The  book  of  Kepler  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz 
is  his  Somiduni  sen  de  astronomla  lanarl,  Francofurti,  l(io4,  4to,  published 
after  his  death  by  his  son,  and  found  in  Frisch,  J.  Kepleri  opera  omnia,  Vol. 
8,  Pt.  I.,  pp.  21-39.  The  concluding  paragraphs,  pp.  38-39,  are  of  a  zoological 
and  ethnological  character.  Michaud  {Biog.  Univ.  22,  313)  says  it  is  a  pliilo- 
sophical  and  allegorical  romance,  in  which  the  author  exposes  the  astronomical 
phenomena  as  they  would  appear  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  moon,  who  lilio 
ourselves  think  that  they  are  at  the  centre  of  the  universe,  l>ut  wlio  are  not  so 
well  situated  as  we  to  raise  themselves  to  the  "  idea  "  of  the  true  system. 
Schaarschmidt  states  that  Kepler  had  occuined  himself  with  Plutarch's  De 
facie  in  oi-he  hinw  (P]ng.  trans,  in  Plutarch's  Morals,  cd.  Goodwin,  5,  2.'}4- 
292  — the  Moon-Da'mons,  289)  and  from  the  tales  about  the  moon-da'mons 
therein  contained  related  by  Sylla,  had  derived  his  idea  of  a  lunar  geography. 
—  Tr. 

3  Franc.  Godwin.     Cf.  ante,  p.  342,  note  2.  — Tr. 

4  Cf.  ante,  pp.  228,  note  2 ;  399,  note  3.  The  reference  is  to  his  Voyaf/e  dans 
la  liine.  Cf.  Th^odicde,  Pt.  III.,  §  :M3;  Gerhardt,  G,  318;  Erdmann,  (i03  b; 
Jacques,  2,  268;  Janet,  2,  359,  360;  Duteus,  1,  -364.  — Tr. 


652  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

more  true  upon  the  internal  parts  of  our  bodies.  I  hope  that 
we  shall  go  beyond  conjecture  on  many  occasions,  and  I  already 
now  believe  that  at  least  the  violent  agitation  of  the  parts  of  the 
y  lire  of  which  you  just  spoke  should  not  be  reckoned  among  the 
things  which  are  only  probable.  It  is  a  pit}'  that  the  hypothesis 
of  Descartes  regarding  the  constitution  (contexture)  of  the  parts 
of  the  visible  universe  has  been  so  little  confirmed  by  the  re- 
searches and  discoveries  since  made,  or  that  Descartes  did  not 
live  fifty  years  later  to  give  us  an  hypothesis  upon  the  basis  of 
present  knowledge  as  ingenious  as  the  one  he  gave  upon  the 
basis  of  the  knowledge  of  his  time.^  As^oiijthe  gradual  con- 
nection_of_spe.eieSj  we  have  said  something  concerning  it  in  a 
preceding  conference,  in  which  I  remarked  that  philosophers 
had  already  reasoned  iqyon  the  vacimm  in  the  forms  or-speei%&.- 
I  Everything  goes  by  degrees  in  nature,  and  nothing  by  lea]DS,  and 
;  this  rule  regarding  changes  is  a  part  of  my  law  of  continuity.^ 
But  the  beauty  of  nature,  which  desires  distinct  perceptions, 
demands  the  appearance  of  leaps,  and  so  to  speak  musical  ca- 
dences in  phenomena,  and  takes  pleasure  in  mixing  the  species. 
Thus  although  there  may  be  in  some  other  world  mediate  spe- 
cies between  man  and  beast  (according  as  w^e  understand  these 
words),  and  although  there  may  be  somewhere  rational  animals 
surpassing  us,  nature  has  found  it  good  to  keep_them-away 
from  us,  in  order  to  give  us  without  contradiction  the^upe- 
-^riority  we  haveln  our  globe.  I  speak  of  mediate  species,  and 
I  should  not  Avish  to  regulate  myself  here  b}^  human  individ- 
uals, who  approach  the  brutes,  because  apparently  this  is  not 
a  clef ect_of  faeulty,  but  a  hindrance  to  its  exCTcise-",  "ScnhatTT 
think  that  the  most  stupid  of  men  (who  is  not  in  a  condition 
contrary  to  nature  by  reason  of  some  disease  or  some  other  per- 
manent defect  taking  the  place  of  the  disease)  is  incomparablj' 
more  rational  and  more  docile  than  the  most  spiritual  of  all 

1  Leibnitz  here  refers  to  Descartes'  theory  of  vortices,  which  he  elaborated 
ill  his  I'rincipia Philosophic,  Pts.  III.  and  IV.  A  brief  account  of  it  will  be 
found  in  the  Encycloj}-  Brit.,  iith  ed.,  article  "Descartes,"  Vol.  7,  pp.  107-108 
(American  Reprint).  Cf.  also  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann's  German  translation,  with 
notes,  of  the  Pria.  Phllos.  (Vol.  26,  Pt.  I.,  of  his  Philos.  Bibliothek.),  2d  ed. 
Heidelberg,  1887.  For  other  references  of  Leibnitz  to  th«  theory,  cf.  Gei- 
hardt,  Leibniz,  philox.  Sdinft.,  i,  283,  288-289,  SIC  (Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om., 
3,  2.-)2-253) ,  M8.— TSr=^ 

2  Cf.  antk,  p.  333;^i_J-TR. 

3  Cf.  ante,  pTSoLnote  1.  —  Tr. 


cii.  XVI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  553 


the  beasts,  altliougli  the  contrary  is  sometimes  said  by  way  of 
a  witticism.  For  the  rest,  I  strongly  approve  the  search  for 
analogies:  plants,  insects,  and  the  comparative  anatomy  of 
animals  will  furnish  them  more  and  more,  especially  if  we 
continue  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  microscope  still  more  than 
we  have  done.  And  in  matters  more  general  you  will  find 
that  my  views  concerning  the  Monads  diffused  everywhere, 
their  unending  duration,  the  conservation  of  the  animal  with 
the  soul,  the  perceptions  undistinguished  in  a  certain  condi- 
tion, such  as  the  death  of  simple  animals,  the  bodies  which 
it  is  rational  to  attribute  to  genii,  the  harmony  of  souls  and 
bodies,  Avhich  causes  each  to  follow  perfectly  its  own  laws 
without  being  disturbed  by  the  other  and  without  the  necessity 
of  distinguishing  therein  the  voluntary  or  the  involuntary  :  yoii 
will  find,  I  say,  that  all  these  views  are  entirely  conformed  to 
the  analogy  of  the  things  which  we  observe  and  which  I 
merely  extend  beyond  our  observations,  without  limiting  them 
to  certain  portions  of  matter  or  to  certain  kinds  of  actions,  and 
that  the  only  difference  therein  is  from  the  great  to  the  small, 
from  the  sensible  to  the  insensible. 

§  13.  Ph.  Yet  there  is  one  case  Avhere  we  defer  less  to  the 
analogy  of  natural  things  which  experience  has  made  knowai 
to  us,  than  to  the  contrary  testimony  of  a  strange  fact  which 
is  far  from  it.  For  when  supernatural  events  are  conformed 
to  the  ends  of  him  who  has  the  power  to  change  the  course  of 
nature,  we  have  no  reason  for  refusing  to  believe  them  Avhen 
well  attested,  and  this  is  the  case  of  miracles  which  find  not 
only  belief  for  themselves,  but  give  it  also  to  other  truths 
which  need  such  confirmation.^     §  14.   Finally,  there  is  a  testi- 

1  Leibnitz  here  takes  no  notice  of  this  remark  of  Locke  concerning  miracles, 
hut  expresses  himself  briefly  on  the  subject  in  the  New  Essayti,  Preface,  ante, 
13.  55,  and  Bk.  IV.,  chaps.  17  ad  fin.,  infra,-\}.  582,  19  ad  fin.,  infra,  p.  600;  and 
more  fully  in  the  Theodic.ee,  Discours  i)rcliminaire,  etc.,  §  3,  Gerhardt,  G,  .50, 
Erdmaiin,"  480,  Jacques,  2,  2(i,  Janet,  2,  34,  Dutens,  1,  (15,  Ft.  I.,  §  54,  Ft.  II., 
§§  207,  208,  Ft.  HI.,  §  240;  Discours  de  metaphysiquc,  168(),  §§  7,  1(5,  G.  4,  432, 
441 ;  Bemarqiies  sur  la  lettre  de  M.  Arnaud,  May  13,  KiSO,  G.  2,  40;  l^etters  to 
Clarke,  G.  7,  352  .s^.,  E.  746  sq.,  Js.  2,  414  sq.,  Jt.  2,  617  sq.,  D.  2,  Ft.  I.,  110  .97., 
trans.  Duncan,  238  sq.,  No.  1,  §  4,  No.  2,  §  12,  No.  3,  §§  13-17,  No.  4,  §§  33,  40, 
42-45,  No.  5,  §§  107, 100-113, 11.5-118 ;  Response  aux  Objections  centre  le  Si/sieme 
de  I'harmonie  preetablie  qui  se  troavcM  dans  le  lim'e  [du  F.  Francois  Lami]  de 
la  Connoissance  de  soy-nreme,  1709,  G.  4,  504,  \l.  4()0,  D.  2,  Ft.  I.,  100,  and  the 
Essay,  first  printed  by  Gerliardt,  4,  577-500,  referi'in.t;-  to  Uic  sanu;  liook,  ami 
dated  Berlin,  Nov.  30,  1702,  G.  4,  587;  Letter  to  Tentzel,  1603,  Dutens,  5,  401 ; 


5o4  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk.  iv 

monv  which  outweighs  all  other  assent,  viz.  revelation,  i.e.  the 
testimony  of  God,  who  can  neither  deceive  nor  be  deceived ; 
and  the  assent  we  give  to  it  is  called  faitli,  which  excludes  all 
doubt  as  perfectly  as  the  most  certain  knowledge.  But  the 
point  is,  to  be  assured  that  the  ];evelatiou  is  divine,  and  to 
know  that  we  understand  its  real  sense;  otherwise,  we  are 
ex]iosed  to  fanaticism  and  the  errors  of  a  false  interpretation. 
And  when  the  existence  and  the  sense  of  revelation  is  only 
probable,  the  assent  cannot  have  a  greater  probability  than 
that  found  in  the  proofs.  But  we  shall  speak  of  this  still 
farther. 

77?.  Theologians  distinguish  between  the  motives  of  credi- 
bility (as  they  call  them),  together  with  the  natural  assent 
wjiich  must  spring  from  them  and  which  cannot  have  more 
probability  than  these  motives,  and  the  supernatural  assent, 
which  is  an  effect   of  the   divine   grace.     Books   have   been 

Annotatiunculse  subitanese  ad  Tolandi  librum,  De  Christianismo  mysferiis 
carente,  written  Aug.  8,  1701,  Duteus,  5,  146,  148;  Letters  to  Hartsoeker,  Feb. 
6,  1711,  G.  3,  517-r.lS,  D.  2,  Ft.  H.,  61,  Dec.  7, 1711,  G.  3,  529;  Systema  theologi- 
cum,  -nritten  probably  c.  1686,  ed.  C.  Haas,  Tubingen,  1860,  p.  139.  Cf.  also 
the  discussions  by  Pichler,  Tlieol.  d.  Leibniz,  1,  226-237 ;  K.  Fischer,  Gesch. 
d.  n.  Phih-'i.,  Bd.  XL,  Leibniz,  3d  ed.,  pp.  573-576;  O.  Pileiderer,  Rdinioiu- 
pMlosophie,  2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1883,  Vol.  1,  pp.  90-94,  Eug.  trans.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  91-93. 
Leibnitz  —  whether  consistently  or  not  with  his  philosophical  system  is 
fairly  open  to  question  —  certaiulj"  admits  the  possibility,  and  upon  sufficient 
and  proper  evidence  the  actuality,  of  miracles  in  the  sense  of  personal  acts  of 
God  in  his  universe,  should  a  sufficient  and  proper  reason  therefor  exist  in 
God's  mind.  Such  acts  were  not  violations  of  law,  but  consisted  simjily  in  the 
substitution  of  a  higher  law  for  a  lower,  and  the  introduction  of  a  new  force 
in  accord  therewith.  Leibnitz  justifies  his  view  thus:  (1)  The  laws  or  order 
of  nature  are  not  metaphysical  necessities,  but  positive  truths,  resting  on  the 
divine  choice  of  the  best  as  governed  by  the  divine  wisdom,  and  therefore 
amenable  to  the  requirements  of  that  wisdom,  the  physical  always  being 
subject  to  the  moral  order  and  purpose  —  "  Cum  natura  rerum  nihil  aliud  sit 
quam  consuetudo  Dei,  ordinarie  aut  extraordinarie  agere  feque  facile  ipsi  est, 
prout  sapientia  ejus  exigit "  (Si/.'it.  theol.  p.  139,  ed.  Hass,  Tiib.  1860);  (2) 
AU  these  acts  were  foreseen  asjJossibie,  and  as  such  included  in  the  original 
ideal  world-plan  by  the  divine  intelligence,  and  therefore  involve  no  change 
or  inconsistency  in  that  plan;  cf.  Discows  de  metaphys.,  §  7,  G.  4,  432: 
"  Or  puisque  rien  ne  se  pent  faire,  qui  ne  soit  dans  I'ordre,  on  pent  dire  que  les 
miracles  sont  aussi  bien  dans  I'ordre  que  les  operations  naturelles,  qu'on  appelle 
ainsi  parce  qu'elles  sont  conformes  a  certaines  maximes  subalternes  que  nous 
appellons  la  nature  des  choses."  And  he  continues  in  language  which  would 
be  quoted  more  appropriately  as  a  parallel  i^assage  to  that  just  cited  from 
the  Syi^t.  theol. :  "  Car  on  pent  dire  que  cette  nature  n'est  qu'une  coustume  de 
Dieu,  dont  il  se  pent  dispenser  a  cause  d'lme  raison  plus  forte,  que  celle  qui 
I'a  mu  a  se  servir  de  ces  maximes."  —  Tr. 


cii.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTAISIDING  555 

written  expressly  on  the  Analysis  of  Faith  wliicli  do  not  alto- 
gether agree  among  themselves,  but  since  we  shall  speak  of 
this  in  the  sequel,  I  do  not  Avish  to  anticipate  here  what  we 
shall  have  to  say  in  its  place. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

OF    REASON 

§  1.  Ph.  Before  speaking  distinctly  of  faith,  we  shall  treat 
of  reason.  It  signifies  sometimes  clear  and  true  principles, 
sometimes  conclusions  deduced  from  these  principles,  and  some- 
times the  cause,  and  particularly  the  final  cause.  Here  we 
consider  it  as  a  faculty  by  which  man  is  supposed  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  beasts  and  in  which  it  is  evident  that  he 
much  surpasses  them.  §  2.  We  need  it  both  to  extend  our 
knowledge^  and  to  regulate  our  ojnnion,  and  it  constitutes, 
properly  understood,  two  faculties,  sagacity,  for  the  discovery 
of  mediate  ideas,  and  the  faculty  of  drawing  conclusions,  or 
inference.  §  3.  We  may  consider  in  reason  these  four  degrees: 
(1)  the  discovery  of  proofs ;  (2)  their  orderly  arrangement  show- 
ing their  connection;  (3)  the  perception  of  the  connection  in 
each  part  of  the  deduction;  (4)  the  drawing  of  the  conclusion. 
We  may  observe  these  degrees  in  mathematical  demonstrations. 

Th.  The  reason  is  the  known  truth  whose  connection  with  i 
another  less  known  makes  us  give  our  assent  to  tlie  latter.     IJut 
in  particular  and  pre-eminently  we  call  it  reason,  if  it  is  the/ 
cause  not  only  of  our  judgment,  but  also  of  the  truth  itself, 

1  Lijcke,  and  in  agreement  with  liira  here  Leibnitz,  uses  "reason,"  as 
Scliaarschiuidt  says,  not  in  the  sense  of  the  V0O5  of  Phito  and  Aristotle,  as  the 
faculty  of  ideas  and  first  principles,  hut  in  the  sense  of  the  Greek  aoyos,  as  the 
power  or  faculty  of  drawing  conclusions,  thus  serving  to  extend  our  knowl- 
edge, a  process  which  may  be  synthetic  and  deductive  as  well  as  analytic  and 
inductive.  Tlie  function  of  logic  iu  regulating  opinion  as  o])poseil  to  its  func- 
tion in  extending  knowledge  is  the  production  of  tbe  logical  arrangement  (tf 
knowledge  and  the  classification  oi  cimcepts,  both  of  which  greatly  influence 
the  reasoning  process  and  its  result,  and  therel^y  effect  both  the  extension  of 
knowledge  and  the  regulation  of  opinion.  For  a  fuller  ex])osilion  of  Locke's 
view,  (/.  J.  H.  V.  Kirchmann,  ErlUutei'ungen  zu  J.  Locke's  Vemurh  ii.  d. 
tncnucM.  Verstand,  No.  4:52,  Vol.  52,  Ft.  IL,  pp.  105-lO.S,  of  his  J'/iihs. 
Blbliothek,  Berlin,  1874.— Tr. 


556  LEIBNITZ'S   CIUTIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

wliich  we  also  call  reason  a  priori,  and  the  cause  in  things  corre- 
isponds  to  the  reason  in  truths.  This  is  why  cause  indeed  is 
loi'ten  called  reason,  and  particularly  final  cause.  Finally,  tlie 
faculty  which  perceives  this  connection  of  truths,  or  the  faculty 
of  reasoning,  is  also  called  reason,  and  this  is  the  sense  you 
employ  here.  K'ow  this  faculty  is  really  affected  by  man  alone 
here  below,  and  does  not  appear  in  other  animals  here  below; 
for  I  have  already  shown  above  that  the  shadow  of  reason  seen 
in  the  beasts  is  only  the  expectation  of  a  similar  event  in  a  case 
apparently^imilar  to  the  past,  without  knowing  whether  the 
same  reason  holds  good.  Men  themselves  act  no  differently  in 
the  cases  where  they  are  only  empirical.  But  they  raise  them- 
selves above  the  beasts,  in  so  far  as  they  see  the  connections  of 
truths,  the  connections,  I  say,  which  themselves  indeed  consti- 
tute the  necessary  and  universal  truths.  These  connections  are 
indeed  necessary  although  they  produce  only  an  opinion,  when 
after  an  exact  research  the  prevalence  of  probability,  so  far  as 
may  be  judged,  may  be  demonstrated,  so  that  then  there  is 
demonstration,  not  of  the  truth  of  the  thing,  but  of  the  side 
prudence  requires  us  to  take.  In  dividing  this  faculty  of 
reason,  I  think  we  do  no  wrong  in  recognizing  two  parts, 
according  to  a  sufficiently  received  opinion  which  distinguishes 
invention  and  judgment,.  As  for  the  four  degrees  which  you 
remark  in  mathematical  demonstrations,  I  find  that  usually  the 
first,  viz. :  the  discovery  of  proofs,  does  not  appear  therein,  as 
is  to  be  desired.  There  are  syntheses,  found  sometimes  with- 
out analysis,  and  sometimes  the  analysis  has  been  suppressed. 
Geometers  in  their  demonstrations  put  first  the  proposition 
which  is  to  be  proved,  and  in  order  to  come  to  the  demonstra- 
tion they  set  forth  by  some  figure  what  is  given.  This  is  called 
ecthesis.  After  this  they  come  to  the  preparation  and  draw  new 
lines  which  they  need  in  the  reasoning;  and  often  the  greatest 
art  consists  in  finding  this  preparation.  This  done,  they  con- 
struct the  reasoning  itself,  by  drawing  inferences  from  what 
Avas  given  in  the  ecthesis  and  from  what  has  been  added  thereto 
by  the  preparation;  and  employing  for  this  purpose  truths 
already  known  or  demonstrated,  the}'  reach  the  conchision. 
But  there  are  cases  where  they  dispense  with  the  ecthesis  and 
the  preparation. 

§  4.  Ph.  It  is  generally  believed  that  the  syllogism  is  the 


CH.  XVII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  557 


great  instrument  of  reason  and  the  best  means  of  makin"-  use 
of  this  faculty.  For  myself  I  doubt  it,  for  it  serves  only  to 
show  the  connection  of  proofs  in  one  single  example  and  no 
more ;  but  the  mind  sees  the  connection  as  easily  and  perhaps 
better  without  it.  Those  who  know  how  to  use  the  figures  and 
the  moods  most  frequently  take  their  use  for  granted  by  an 
implicit  faith  in  their  masters  without  understanding  their 
reason.  If  the  syllogism  is  necessary,  no  one  knew  anything 
whatever  by  reason  before  its  invention,  and  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  say  that  God  having  made  man  a  two-legged  creature, 
left  it  to  Aristotle  to  make  him  a  rational  animal ;  I  mean  from 
that  small  number  of  men  that  he  could  induce  to  examine  tlie 
■grounds  of  syllogisms,  where  among  more  than  sixty  ways  of 
forming  the  three  propositions  there  are  only  about  fourteen  of 
them  valid.  But  God  has  been  much  kinder  to  men;  he  has 
given  them  a  mind  capable  of  reasoning.  I  do  not  say  this  to 
lower  Aristotle,  whom  I  regard  as  one  of  the  greatest  men  of 
antiquity,  whom  few  have  equalled  in  extent,  subtilit}^,  pene- 
tration of  mind,  and  strength  of  judgment,  and  who  by  the  very 
fact  that  he  has  invented  this  brief  system  of  the  forms  of 
argumentation  has  rendered  a  great  service  to  savants  against 
those  who  are  not  ashamed  to  deny  everything.  But  yet  these 
forms  are  not  the  only  nor  the  best  means  of  reasoning;  and 
Aristotle  did  not  find  them  by  means  of  the  forms  themselves, 
but  by  the  original  way  of  the  manifest  agreement  of  ideas; 
and  the  knowledge  acquired  of  them  in  the  natural  order  in 
mathematical  demonstrations  appears  better  without  the  aid 
of  any  syllogism.  To  infer  is  to  draw  a  proposition  as  true 
from  another  already  advanced 'as  true,  by  sup})osing  a  certain 
connection  of  mediate  ideas;  for  example,  from  the  proposition 
that  men  will  be  punished  in  another  world,  we  infer  that  they 
can  determine  themselves  here.  Here  is  the  connection:  3Ien 
will  be  punished  and  God  is  the  one  who  punishes;  therefore 
pninishment  is  just;  therefore  the  punished  is  guilty;  therefore 
he  could  have  done  otherwise;  therefore  he  is  free;  therefore 
finally  he  has  the  power  of  self-determination.  The  connection 
is  seen  better  here  than  if  there  were  five  or  six  involved 
syllogisms,  in  which  the  ideas  would  be  transposed,  repeated, 
and  enshrined  in  artificial  forms.  The  question  is  to  know 
what  connection  a  mediate  idea  has  with  the  extremes  in  a, 


558  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv  ■ 


syllogism;  but  tJiis  is  tuhat  no  syllogism  can  show.  It  is  the 
mind  ^vliicli  can  perceive  these  ideas  so  placed  by  a  kind  of 
JHxtajiosition,  and  that  too  by  its  own  view.  Of  what  use 
then  is  the  syllogism?  It  is  of  use  in  the  schools  where  men 
are  not  ashamed  to  deny  the  agreement  of  ideas  which  plainly 
agree.  Whence  it  comes  that  men  never  make  syllogisms  in 
their  own  inquiries  after  truth  or  in  their  teaching  of  those 
wlio  sincerely  desire  to  know  it.  It  is  quite  plain,  also,  that 
this  order  is  the  more  natural :  — 

man  —  animal  —  alive ; 

i.e.  man  is  an  animal,  an  animal  is  alive,  therefore  man  is      | 
alive,  than  that  of  the  syllogism :  — 

animal  —  alive,  man  —  animal,  man  —  alive ; 

i.e.  the  animal  is  alive,  man  is  an  animal,  therefore  man  is 
alive.  It  is  true  that  syllogisms  may  be  of  use  in  discovering 
a  fallacy  concealed  under  the  brilliant  splendor  of  an  ornament 
borrowed  from  rhetoric,  and  I  had  sometimes  thought  that  the 
syllogism  was  necessary,  at  least  to  guard  against  sophisms 
disguised  under  florid  discourse;  but  after  a  more  severe 
examination,  I  have  found  that  we  have  only  to  distinguish 
the  ideas  upon  which  the  conclusion  depends  from  those  which 
are  superfluous,  and  to  arrange  them  in  a  natural  order  to  show 
their  incoherence.  I  knew  a  man  to  whom  the  rules  of  the 
syllogism  were  wholly  unknown,  who  jDerceived  at  once  the 
weakness  and  false  reasoning  of  a  long  artificial  and  plausible 
discourse  with  which  others  better  skilled  in  all  the  finesse  of 
logic  suffered  themselves  to  be  entrapped;  and  I  believe  that 
there  will  be  few  of  my  readers  who  do  not  know  such  persons. 
If  that  were  not  so,  princes  in  matters  relating  to  their  crown 
and  dignity  would  not  fail  to  introduce  syllogisms  into  the  most 
important  discussions,  where,  however,  everybody  believes  it 
would  be  a  ridiculous  thing  to  make  use  of  them.  In  Asia, 
Africa,  and  America,  among  peoples  independent  of  the  Euro- 
peans, scarcely  any  one  has  ever  been  heard  to  speak  of  them. 
Finally,  it  is  found  after  all  that  these  scholastic  forms  are  not 
less  liable  to  error;  people  also  are  rarely  reduced  to  silence 
by  this  scholastic  method  and  still  more  rarely  convinced  and 
won.     They  will  recognize  at  most  that  their  adversary  is  more 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  559 

adroit,  but  they  do  not  cease  to  be  persuaded  of  the  justice  of 
their  cause.  And  if  fallacies  may  be  involved  iu  the  syllogism, 
the  fallacy  must  be  discovered  by  some  other  means  than  that 
of  the  syllogism.  Yet  I  am  not  of  the  opinion  that  syllogisms 
are  to  be  rejected  or  that  we  are  to  deprive  ourselves  of  any 
means  capable  of  aiding  the  understanding.  There  are  eyes 
which  need  spectacles;  but  those  Avho  use  them  should  not  say 
that  no  one  can  see  well  without  spectacles.  This  Avould  be 
lowering  nature  in  favor  of  an  art,  to  which  they  are  perhaps 
debtors.  Unless  it  may  have  happened  to  them  wholly  con- 
trary to  the  experience  of  persons  who  have  availed  themselves 
too  much  or  too  soon  of  spectacles,  so  that  they  have  so  tlior- 
oughly  obscured  their  sight  by  means  of  them  that  they  are  no 
longer  able  to  see  without  their  aid. 

Th.  Your  reasoning  on  the  little  use  of  syllogisms  is  full  of 
a  number  of  solid  and  fine  remarks,  and  it  must  be  admitted 
that  the  scholastic  form  of  syllogisms  is  little  employed  in  the 
world  and  that  it  would  be  too  long  and  perplexing  if  one 
desired  to  employ  it  seriously.  And  yet,  would  you  believe 
it,  I  consider  the  invention  of  the  form  of  syllogisms  one  of 
the  most  beautiful,  and  also  one  of  the  most  important,  made 
by  the  human  mind.^  It  is  a  species  of  universal  mathematics 
whose  importance  is  not  sufficiently  known;  and  it  may  be  said 
that  an  infallible  art  is  therein  contained,  provided  we  know  and 
can  use  it,  which  is  not  always  allowed.  Now  you  must  know 
that  by  arguments  in  form,  I  mean  not  merely  this  scholastic 
mode  of  argument  used  in  colleges,  but  all  reasoning  whicli 
concludes  by  the  force  of  the  form,  and  in  which  there  is  no 
need  of  supplying  anything,  so  that  a  sorites,  another  syllogistic 
series  which  avoids  repetition,  even  an  account  well  drawn  up, 
and  algebraic  calculation,  an  infinitesimal  analysis,  will  be  for 
me  almost  arguments  in  form,  because  their  form  of  reasoning 
has  been  predemoustrated,  so  that  Ave  are  certain  not  to  be 
deceived  thereby.  The  demonstrations  of  Euclid  most  fre- 
quently come  near  being  arguments  in  form;  for  when  he 
apparently  produces  enthymemes,  the  proposition  suppressed 
and  seemingly  lacking  is  supplied  by  the  citation  on  the  mar- 
gin where  is  given  the  means  of  finding  it  already  demonstrated; 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  :i79,  note  2.  The  letter  to  G.  Waffner  is  Leibnitz's  most  com- 
plete expression  of  his  estimate  of  the  worth  of  formal  logic—  Tit. 


5G0  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

this  gives  a  great  abstract  without  taking  anything  from  its 
force.  These  inversions,  compositions,  and  divisions  of  reasons 
which  he  makes  use  of  are  only  the  species  of  forms  of  argu- 
mentation peculiar  and  characteristic  of  the  mathematicians 
and  to  the  matter  they  treat;  and  they  demonstrate  these  forms 
Avith  the  aid  of  the  universal  forms  of  logic.  Further,  you  must 
know  that  there  are  good  asyllogistic  conclusions  which  also 
cannot  be  rigorously  demonstrated  by  any  syllogism  without 
changing  somewhat  its  terms;  and  this  change  itself  of  terms 
makes  the  conclusion  asyllogistic.  There  are  several  of  these, 
as  among  others,  a  recto  ad  ohliqnum;  for  example,  Jesus  Christ 
is  God;  therefore  the  mother  of  Jesus  Christ  is  the  mother  of 
God.  Again,  that  Avhich  clever  logicians  have  called  inversion 
of  relation,  as,  for  example,  this  conclusion:  if  David  is  the 
father  of  Solomon,  without  doubt  Solomon  is  the  son  of  David. 
These  conclusions  do  not  cease  to  be  demonstrable  by  the  truths 
on  which  the  common  syllogisms  themselves  depend.  Syllo- 
gisms also  are  not  merely  categorical,  but  also  hypothetical,  in 
which  are  comprised  the  disjunctives.  And  we  may  say  that 
the  categorical  are  simple  or  complex.  The  simple  categoricals 
are  those  which  are  usually  reckoned,  i.e.  according  to  the 
moods  of  the  figures ;  and  I  have  found  that  the  four  figures 
have  each  six  moods,  so  that  there  are  twenty-four  moods  in 
all.  The  four  common  moods  of  the  first  figure  are  only  the 
result  of  the  meaning  of  the  signs.  All,  Xo,  Some.  And  the 
two  which  I  add  to  them  in  order  to  omit  nothing  are  only 
the  subalterns  of  the  universal  propositions.  For  of  these  two 
ordinary  moods,  All  B  is  C,  and  all  A  is  B,  therefore  all  A  is 
C ;  again,  No  B  is  C,  All  A  is  B,  then  no  A  is  C,  we  make  these 
two  additional  moods,  All  B  is  C,  All  A  is  B,  then  some  A  is  C ; 
again,  Xo  B  is  C,  All  A  is  B,  then  some  A  is  not  C.  For  it  is 
not  necessary  to  demonstrate  the  subaltern  and  to  prove  its 
conclusions :  All  A  is  C,  then  some  A  is  C ;  again,  No  A  is  C, 
then  some  A  is  not  C,  although  we  may,  however,  demonstrate 
it  by  the  identicals  joined  with  the  moods  already  received  of 
the  first  figure,  in  this  way :  All  A  is  C,  Some  A  is  A,  then 
some  A  is  C ;  again.  No  A  is  C,  Some  A  is  A,  then  some  A  is 
not  C.  So  that  the  two  additional  moods  of  the  first  figure  are 
demonstrated  by  the  first  two  ordinary  moods  of  the  said  figure 
with  the  intervention  of  the  subaltern,  itself  demonstrable  by 


CH.  XVII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  561 


the  other  two  moods  of  the  same  figure.^  In  the  same  way  the 
second  figure  receives  also  two  new  ones.  Thus  the  first  and  the 
second  have  six;  the  third  has  had  six  always;  the  fourth  was 
given  five,  but  it  is  found  to  have  six  also  by  the  same  principle 
of  addition.  But  we  must  know  that  logical  form  does  not 
bind  us  to  this  order  of  propositions  which  we  commonly  use, 
and  I  am  of  your  opinion,  sir,  that  this  other  arrangement  is 
superior  in  value :  All  A  is  B,  All  B  is  C,  therefore  all  A  is  C, 
which  would  be  particularly  by  the  sorites,  which  are  a  chain 
of  such  syllogisms.  For  if  there  were  one  more  of  them:  All 
A  is  C,  All  C  is  D,  therefore  all  A  is  D,  we  may  make  a  chain 
of  these  two  syllogisms,  which  avoids  the  repetition  by  saying: 
All  A  is  B,  All  B  is  C,  All  C  is  D,  therefore  all  A  is  D,  wherein 
we  see  that  the  useless  proposition  All  A  is  C  is  neglected,  and 
the  useless  repetition  of  this  same  proposition  which  the  two 
syllogisms  would  demand  is  avoided;  for  this  proposition  is 
henceforth  useless,  and  the  chain  is  an  argument  perfect  and 
in  good  form  without  this  same  proposition  when  the  force  of 
the  chain  of  reasoning  has  once  for  all  been  demonstrated  by 
means  of  these  two  syllogisms.  There  is  an  infinite  number 
of  other  chains  of  reasoning  more  complex,  not  only  because 
a  greater  number  of  simple  syllogisms  enter  therein,  but  also 
because  the  ingredient  syllogisms  exhibit  greater  differences 
among  themselves,  for  there  may  be  made  to  enter  into  tliem 
not  only  simple  categoricals,  but  also  copulatives,  and  not 
only  categoricals,  but  also  hypotheticals ;  and  not  only  com- 
plete syllogisms,  but  also  enthymemes,  wherein  the  propo- 
sitions believed  evident  are  suppressed.  And  all  this  joined 
with  the  asyllogistic  conclusions,  and  with  the  transjiosi- 
tions  of  the  propositions,  and  with  a  multitude  of  turns  and 
thoughts  which  conceal  these  propositions  through  the  natural 
inclination  of  the  mind  to  abridge,  and  by  the  properties  of 
language  appearing  in  part  in  the  employment  of  the  parti- 
cles, will  make  a  chain  of  reasoning  which  will  represent 
the  entire  argumentation  indeed  of  an  orator,  but  emaciated 

1  Cf.  Bijficnltates  quxdam  logicse,  Gorhardt,  7,  211-217,  Erdmann,  101-104; 
also  Leibiiitz's  letter  to  Bourguet,  March  22,  1714,  G.  ;5,  5(i',)-7(),  E.  72;i  b. 
The  youthful  demonstratiou  referred  to  in  this  letter  is  found  in  tlu;  J)is- 
sertatio  de  Arte  C'ombinatoria,  KKiO,  Problem  II.,  §  VI.,  G.  4,  4(i  .sr/.,  E.  i:'.  I). 
sq.,  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  352  sq.,  and  is  Leilmitz's  mo.st  thorough  and  elaborate 
treatment  of  the  moods  and  tigurcs  of  the  syllogism.  —  Tk. 
2o 


562  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKfi  [bk.  iv 

and  stripped  of  its  ornaments  and  reduced  to  logical  form,  not 
scholastically,  but  always  sufficiently  to  recognize  its  force, 
according  to  the  laws  of  logic,  which  are  none  else  than  those 
of  good  sense,  placed  in  order  and  in  writing,  and  which  differ 
no  more  than  the  custom  of  a  province  differs  from  what  it  had 
been  when  from  unwritten  as  it  was,  it  has  become  written, 
except  that  being  put  in  writing  and  being  capable  of  being 
better  seen  at  once,  it  furnishes  more  light  to  enable  it  to  be 
pushed  and  applied;  for  natural  good  sense  without  the  aid  of 
art,  making  the  analysis  of  certain  reasoning,  will  sometimes 
be  a  little  in  trouble  regarding  the  force"  of  conclusions,  finding 
some,  for  example,  which  include  some  mood,  valid  for  truth 
but  less  ordinarily  used.  But  a  logician  who  wished  us  not  to 
make  use  of  such  series,  or  wished  not  to  make  use  of  them 
himself,  claiming  that  we  must  always  reduce  all  the  complex 
arguments  to  the  simple  syllogisms  on  which  in  fact  they  de- 
pend, would  be,  according  to  what  I  have  already  said  to  you, 
like  a  man  who  wished  to  compel  the  merchants  of  whom  he 
buys  something  to  count  for  him  the  numbers  one  by  one,  as  we 
count  on  the  fingers,  or  as  we  count  the  hours  of  the  town-clock ; 
a  procedure  which  would  indicate  his  stupidity,  if  he  could  not 
count  otherwise,  or  if  he  could  discover  only  at  his  fingers' 
ends  that  five  and  three  make  eight,  or  rather  it  would  indicate 
a  caprice  if  he  knew  these  short  methods  and  did  not  wish  to  use 
them  or  to  allow  us  to  use  them.  He  would  be  also  like  a  man 
who  wished  us  not  to  employ  axioms  and  theorems  already 
demonstrated,  claiming  that  we  must  always  reduce  all  reason- 
ing to  first  principles  in  which  is  seen  the  immediate  connection 
of  the  ideas  upon  which  in  reality  these  mediate  theorems 
depend. 

After  having  explained  the  use  of  the  forms  of  logic  in  the 
way  in  which  I  think  it  should  be  understood,  I  come  to  your 
considerations;  and  I  do  not  see,  as  you  wish,  sir,  that  the 
syllogism  serves  merely  to  exhibit  the  connection  of  proofs  in  a 
single  example.  To  say  that  the  mind  always  sees  easily  the 
conclusions,  is  a  statement  -vvhich  will  not  be  found  true;  for 
we  sometimes  see  some  (at  least  in  the  reasonings  of  another) 
where  there  is  room  for  doubt  at  first  so  long  as  their  demon- 
stration is  not  seen.  Ordinarily,  we  use  examples  to  justify 
conclusions,  but  this  method  is  not  always  sufficiently  sure. 


CH.  XVII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDEESTANDING  563 


although  there  is  an  art  of  choosing  examples  Avhich  would  not 
be  found  true  if  the  conclusions  were  not  valid.  I  do  not 
believe  it  would  be  permitted  in  well-governed  schools  to  deny 
ivithout  any  shame  the  manifest  agreement  of  ideas,  and  it  does 
not  appear  to  me  that  we  employ  the  syllogism  to  show  them. 
At  least  this  is  not  its  unique  and  principal  use.  You  Avill  find 
oftener  than  you  think  (in  examining  the  paralogisms  of 
authors)  that  they  have  sinned  against  the  rules  of  logic,  and 
I  have  myself  found  by  experience  sometimes  in  discussion, 
even  by  writing,  with  persons  of  good  faith,  that  we  began  to 
be  understood  only  when  we  argued  in  form  in  order  to  disen- 
tangle a  chaos  of  reasonings.  It  would  without  doubt  be  ridic- 
ulous to  wish  to  argue  after  the  scholastic  fashion  in  important 
deliberations,  because  of  the  importunate  and  embarrassing 
prolixities  of  this  form  of  reasoning,  and  because  it  is  like 
counting  on  the  fingers.  But  yet  it  is  only  too  true  that  in  the 
most  important  deliberations  regarding  life,  the  state,  salva- 
tion, men  allow  themselves  to  be  dazzled  often  by  the  weight 
of  authority,  by  the  gleam  of  eloquence,  by  examples  badly 
applied,  by  enthymemes  falsely  supposing  the  evidence  of  that 
which  they  suppress,  and  even  by  faulty  conclusions ;  so  tliat  a 
severe  logic,  but  of  another  turn  than  that  of  the  School,  would 
be  only  too  necessary  for  them,  among  other  things,  to  deter- 
mine upon  which  side  is  the  greatest  probability.  For  the 
rest,  the  fact  that  the  common  herd  of  men  ignore  artificial 
logic,  and  that  they  do  not  cease  thereby  to  reason  well  and 
sometimes  better  than  the  class  practised  in  logic,  this  fact 
proves  not  its  inutility  any  more  than  it  would  prove  the 
inutility  of  artificial  arithmetic,  because  we  see  that  some  per- 
sons count  well  on  ordinary  occasions  without  having  learned 
to  read  or  write  and  without  knowing  liow  to  handle  tlie  pen  or 
the  tokens  as  far  as  to  rectify  the  errors  of  another  who  has 
learned  to  calculate,  but  who  may  be  neglectful  or  confused  in 
the  characters  and  signs.  It  is  true  that  syllogisms  also  may 
become  sophistical,  but  their  own  laws  serve  to  recognize  them; 
and  syllogisms  do  not  convert  or  indeed  conquer  always;  but 
this  is  because  the  abuse  of  distinctions  and  of  badly  understood 
terms  renders  their  use  prolix  until  it  becomes  insu]iportal)le, 
if  it  must  be  driven  to  extremities. 

It  remains  for  me  here  only  to  consider  and  to  su|)]>h'nient 


mi  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

your  argument,  employed  as  an  example  of  clear  reasoning 
Avithout  the  form  of  the  logicians:  God  punishes  man  (an 
assumed  fact)  ;  God  punishes  justly  the  one  he  punishes  (a  truth 
of  reason  which  may  be  regarded  as  demonstrated) ;  therefore 
God  punishes  man  justly  (a  syllogistic  conclusion  extended 
asyllogistically  a  recto  ad  ohliquum) ;  therefore  man  is  justly 
punished  (an  inversion  of  relation,  but  which  is  set  aside 
because  of  its  evidence) ;  therefore  man  is  guilty  (an  enthymeme, 
in  which  is  suppressed  this  proposition  which  in  reality  is  only 
a  definition :  he  who  is  punished  justly  is  guilty) ;  therefore  man 
coxdd  have  done  differently  (a  suppressign  of  this  proposition : 
he  who  is  guilty  could  have  done  differently) ;  therefore  man 
teas  free  (a  further  suppression:  he  who  could  have  done  differ- 
ently was  free);  therefore  (by  the  definition  of //"eedo??!)  he  had 
the  poiver  of  self-determination;  which  was  to  be  proved.  Ee- 
garding  which  I  remark  further  that  this  therefore  itself 
includes  in  reality  both  the  unexpressed  proposition  (that  he 
who  is  free  has  the  power  of  self-determination)  and  is  useful 
in  avoiding  the  repetition  of  terms.  And  in  this  sense  noth- 
ing would  be  omitted,  and  the  argument  in  this  view  might  pass 
as  complete.  You  see  that  this  reasoning  is  a  series  of  syllo- 
gis7ns  entirely  in  accord  with  logic ;  for  I  do  not  now  wish  to 
consider  the  matter  of  this  reasoning,  wherein  there  might  per- 
haps be  some  remarks  to  make  or  some  explanations  to  demand. 
For  example,  when  a  man  cannot  do  differently,  there  are  some 
cases  in  which  he  might  be  guilty  before  God,  as  if  he  were 
very  glad  to  be  unable  to  aid  his  neighbor  in  order  to  have  an 
excuse.  To  conclude,  I  admit  that  the  scholastic  form  of 
arguing  is  ordinarily  inconvenient,  insufficient,  badly  managed, 
but  I  say  at  the  same  time  that  nothing  would  be  more  impor- 
tant than  the  art  of  arguing  in  form  according  to  true  logic, 
i.e.  fully  as  to  matter  and  clearly  as  to  the  order  and  force  of 
the  conclusions,  whether  self-evident  or  predemonstrated. 

§  5.  Ph.  I  thought  that  the  syllogism  would  be  still  less 
useful,  or  rather  of  absolutely  no  use  in  probabilities,  because 
it  pushes  only  a  single  tojncal  argument.^     But  I  see  now  that 

1  Aristotle,  Topics,  I.,  1,  100"  27  sq.,  designates  the  "topical  argument"  as 

6  SiaAex-iKOs  crvAAo-yio-MO?,  Or  6  e|  eyBo^uiv  truAAoyi^o^ei'o?,  i.e.  the  dialectic  Syllo- 
gism, or  the  syllogism  which  reasons  from  the  probable  in  distinction  from 
a77o6eifis,  or  the  proof  resting  upon  and  leading  back  to  first  and  necessary 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  565 

it  must  always  furnish  solid  proof  of  what  is  certain  in  the 
topical  argument  itself,  i.e.  the  probability  therein  found,  and 
that  the  force  of  the  conclusion  consists  in  the  form.  §  G.  But 
if  syllogisms  serve  only  in  judging,  I  doubt  whether  they  are 
capable  of  use  in  invention,  i.e.  in  finding  proofs  and  making 
new  discoveries.  For  example,  I  do  not  think  that  the  dis- 
covery of  the  47th  proposition  of  the  first  book  of  Euclid  is  due 
to  the  rules  of  ordinary  logic,  for  we  first  know  it  and  then  are 
able  to  prove  it  in  syllogistic  form. 

Th.  Comprising  under  syllogisms  also  the  series  of  syllo- 
gisms and  everything  which  I  call  formal  argumentation,  we 
may  say  that  knowledge,  not  self-evident,  is  acquired  by  infer- 
ences which  are  valid  only  when  they  have  their  due  form.  In 
the  demonstration  of  the  said  proposition  which  makes  the 
square  of  the  hypotheuuse  equal  to  the  squares  of  the  two 
sides,  we  divide  the  large  square  into  parts  and  likewise  the 
two  small  ones,  and  we  find  that  the  parts  of  the  two  small 
squares  may  all  be  found  in  the  large  one  and  neither  more  nor 
less.  This  is  the  proof  of  equality  in  form,  and  the  equality 
of  the  parts  is  also  proved  by  arguments  in  valid  form.  The 
analysis  of  the  ancients  was,  according  to  Pappus,  to  take  what 
is  asked  and  to  draw  therefrom  conclusions  until  they  come  to 
something  given  or  known.  I  have  remarked  that  for  this 
result  the  proposition  must  be  reciprocal  in  order  that  the 
synthetic  demonstration  may  return  in  the  contrary  direction 
by  the  paths  of  analysis,  but  it  is  always  a  drawing  of  conclu- 
sions. It  is  well,  however,  to  remark  here  that  in  astronomical 
or  physical  hypotheses  the  return  does  not  take  place;  but  in 
like  manner  success  does  not  demonstrate  the  truth  of  the 
hypothesis.  It  is  true  it  renders  it  probable,  but  as  this  proba- 
bility appears  to  violate  the  riTle  of  logic  which  teaches  that 
the  true  may  be  drawn  from  the  false,  it  will  be  said  that 
logical  rules  will  not  have  entire  sway  in  probable  questions. 
I  reply  that  it  is  possible  for  the  true  to  bo  concluded  fi'om  the 

truths.     Cf.   also  Topics,  VIII.,  11,  162"  15,  wliere  he  calls  the  o-uAAoyto-Mos 

SiaAeKTiKos  ail  in-Lx^ip-qixa  OV   attempted    proof,  and    the    o-uAAovktm"?  awoiSciKTiKos   a 

.f)iAo(r60r)M«-  or  demonstration.  On  the  whole  subject,  cf.  Zeller,  P/iilos.  d. 
Griech.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  242  sq.,  M  ed.,  1879;  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Lof/ik,  1,  !«  sq.; 
Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  §  2:5,  pp.  47-48.  Cf.  also,  New 
Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  21,  §  (iG,  Th.  (2),  ante,  p.  214,  note  1;  Bk.  IV.,  cliap.  2, 
§  14,  Th.,  ante,  p.  418,  note  4.  —  Tiu 


666  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

false,  but  it  is  not  always  probable,  especially  Avhen  a  simple 
hypothesis  gives  a  reason  for  many  truths,  a  thing  which  is 
rare  and  difficult  to  find.  We  might  say  with  Cardan,^  that  the 
logic  of  the  probable  has  other  consequences  than  the  logic  of 
the  necessary  truths.  But  the  probability  itself  of  these  con- 
clusions must  be  demonstrated  by  the  conclusions  of  the  logic 
of  the  necessary  truths. 

§  7.  Ph.  You  appear  to  apologize  for  common  logic,  but  I 
see  clearly  that  what  you  bring  forward  belongs  to  a  more 
sublime  logic,  to  which  the  common  is  only  what  the  alphabet 
is  to  scholarship :  a  fact  which  makes  me  remember  a  passage 
of  the  judicious  Hooker,  who  in  his  book  entitled  '"'  Ecclesiasti- 
cal Polit}","  Book  I.,  §  6,  thinks  that  if  we  could  furnish  the  true 
helps  of  knoidedge  and  of  the  art  of  reasoning,  which  in  this  age 
passing  as  enlightened  are  not  much  known  and  for  which 
people  put  themselves  to  very  little  trouble,  there  would  be  as 
much  difference  as  regards  maturity  of  judgment  between  men 
who  would  make  use  of  them  and  what  men  now  are,  as  between 
the  men  of  the  present  and  imbeciles. "-^  I  wish  that  our  con- 
ference may  give  occasion  to  some  to  make  a  discovery  of  these 
true  helps  of  the  art  of  which  this  great  man  who  had  so  pene- 
trating a  mind  speaks.  They  will  not  be  the  imitators  who  like 
the  cattle  follow  the  beaten  track  (imitatorum  servum  pecus).^ 

1  Girolamo  Cardano,  1501-1576,  an  Italian  physician,  mathematician,  and 
philosopher,  whose  complete  works  appeared  at  Lyons,  1G63,  10  vols.,  fol.,  and 
an  account  of  whose  philosophy  will  he  found  in  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d. 
Mittelalters,  in.  [Vol.  4],  452-458.  — Tr. 

2  Richard  Hooker,  1553-1600,  attempted,  in  his  Lmos  of  Ecclesiastical 
Polity,  to  defend  the  Episcopal  form  of  government  of  the  Church  of  Eng- 
land, as  established  by  the  Protestant  sovereign  and  Parliaments,  against  the 
attacks  of  the  Presbyterians.  To  this  end  he  gives  in  the  two  first  books  of 
his  work  an  exposition  of  the  fundamental  principles  by  which  the  disputed 
question  should  be  decided,  especially  of  the  nature  of  law  in  general,  as  a 
philosophical  basis  for  the  rest  of  his  discussion.  It  is  this  portion  of  his 
work  that  gives  it  its  permanent  place  and  value  in  English  literature  and 
philosophy. 

The  passage  here  referred  to  by  Locke  and  Leibnitz  runs  thus,  Eccles. 
Pol,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  6,  §  3,  Work-%  ed.  Isaac  Walton,  Oxford,  Univ.  Press,  1841, 
2  vols.,  8vo,  Vol.  1,  p.  164  :  "  ^Yherefore  if  afterwards  there  might  be  added 
the  right  helps  of  true  art  and  learning  (which  helps,  I  must  plainly  confess, 
this  age  of  the  world,  carrying  the  name  of  a  learned  age,  doth  neither  much 
know  nor  greatly  regard) ,  there  would  undoubtedly  be  almost  as  great  dif- 
ference in  maturity  of  judgment  between  men  therewith  inured,  and  that 
which  men  now  are,  as  between  men  that  are  now  and  innocents." — Tr. 

3  Of.  Horace,  Einst.,  1,  19,  19.  —Tr. 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING 


567 


Yet  I  dare  say  there  are  iu  this  age  some  persons  of  such 
strength  of  judgment  and  of  such  large  extent  of  mind,  that 
tliey  coukl  discover  new  paths  for  the  advance  of  knowledge, 
if  they  would  take  the  trouble  to  turn  their  thoughts  in  that 
direction. 

Th.  You  have  well  remarked,  sir,  with  the  late  Mr.  Hooker, 
that  the  world  troubles  itself  but  little  about  this;  otherwise 
I  think  there  are  and  have  been  persons  capable  of  succeed- 
ing therein.  We  must  admit,  however,  that  now  we  have 
great  helps  both  on  the  side  of  mathematics  and  of  philoso- 
phy, in  which  the  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding 
of  your  excellent  friend  is  not  the  least.  We  shall  see  if 
we  may  not  be  able  to  profit  therefrom. 

§  8.  Ph.  I  must  further  tell  you,  sir,  that  I  have  believed  that 
there  was  a  visible  mistake  in  the  rules  of  the  syllogism ;  but 
since  we  have  conferred  together  you  have  made  me  hesitate. 
I  will,  however,  set  before  you  my  difficulty.  It  is  stated  that 
no  syllogistic  reasoning  can  he  conclusive  unless  it  contains  at  least 
one  universal projMsition.''-  But  it  seems  that  there  are  in  the 
syllogism  only  particular  things,  which  are  the  immediate 
object  of  our  reasonings  and  knowledge;  they  revolve  only 
about  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  each  of  which 
has  only  a  particular  existence  and  represents  only  an  individ- 
ual thing. 

Th.  As  far  as  you  conceive  the  similarity  of  things  you  con- 
ceive something  more,  and  the  universality  consists  only  in 
that.  Yet  you  will  never  propose  to  me  any  one  of  our  argu- 
ments witliout  therein  employing  the  universal  truths.  It  is, 
however,  well  to  remark  that  (as  far  as  form  is  concerned)  the 
particular  propositions  are  comprised  within  the  universals. 
For  although  it  is  true  that  there  is  only  a  single  St.  Peter  the 

1  Locke's  seiisistic  realism  appears  in  sharp  outlines  in  the  present  jiassane 
and  its  immediate  context;  c/'.  further,  Lockt;,  I'IiUds.  Wks.,  X'ol.  2,  pp. 'J!!")- 
21)G.  He  maintains  the  existence,  and  consequently  thi;  knowledj^o,  of  the  par- 
ticular and  individual  only,  and  that  our  reasoning;,  which  relates  to  tlie 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  tilings,  must  ac(!ordiniily,  in  order  to  hit  the 
mark,  confine  itself  to  the  particular.  Leihnitz  argues,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  our  knowledge  of  things,  while  beginning  with  the  i)articular  in  the 
sense-act,  does  not  rest  there,  but  through  thought,  especially  through  Ihe 
medium  of  the  linguistic  form  of  our  mental  creation,  gives  to  the  individual 
and  particular  at  once  the  character  of  universality.  Willi  Locke  the  ele- 
ment of  universality  is  accidental ;  with  Leibnitz  it  is  essential.  —  Tit. 


568  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [hk.  iv 

apostle,  we  may  nevertheless  say  that  whoever  was  St.  Peter 
the  apostle  denied  his  master.  Thus  this  syllogism :  St.  Peter 
denied  his  master,  St.  Peter  was  a  disciple,  therefore  some 
disciple  denied  his  master  (although  it  has  only  particular 
propositions),  is  considered  to  have  them  as  universal  affirma- 
tives, and  the  mood  will  be  Darapti  of  the  third  figure.^ 

Ph.  I  wished  also  to  say  to  you  that  it  appeared  to  me  better 
to  transpose  the  premises  of  the  syllogisms  and  to  say:  All  A 
is  B,  All  B  is  C,  therefore  All  A  is  C,  than  to  say :  All  B  is  C, 
All  A  is  B,  therefore  All  A  is  C.  But  it  seems  from  what  you 
have  said  that  they  do  not  differ,  and  that  both  are  counted  as 
one  and  the  same  mood.  It  is  always  true,  as  you  have 
remarked,  that  the  disposition  different  from  the  common  is 
better  adapted  to  making  a  chain  of  several  syllogisms. 

Th.  I  am  wholly  of  your  opinion.  It  seems,  however,  that 
the  belief  has  been  that  it  was  more  didactic  to  begin  with 
universal  propositions  like  the  majors  in  the  first  and  second 
figures;  and  there  are  indeed  orators  who  have  this  custom. 
But  the  connection  appears  better  as  j^ou  propose.  I  have 
before  remarked  that  Aristotle  may  have  had  a  particular 
reason  for  the  common  disposition.  Por  instead  of  saying  A 
is  B,  he  was  wont  to  say  B  is  in  A.  And  with  this  method  of 
statement,  the  connection  itself  which  you  demand  will  arise 
for  him  in  the  received  disposition.  Por,  instead  of  saying  B 
is  C,  A  is  B,  therefore  A  is  C,  he  will  state  it  thus :  C  is  in  B, 
B  is  in  A,  therefore  C  is  in  A.  For  example,  instead  of  saying : 
The  rectangle  is  isogon  (or  has  equal  angles),  the  square  is  a 
rectangle,  therefore  the  square  is  isogon,  Aristotle,  without  trans- 
posing the  propositions,  will  preserve  the  middle  place  to  the 
middle  term  by  this  method  of  stating  the  propositions,  which 
reverses  the  terms,  and  will  say :  The  isogon  is  in  the  rectangle, 
the  rectangle  is  in  the  square,  therefore  the  isogon  is  in  the  square. 
And  this  mode  of  statement  is  not  to  be  despised,  for  in  reality 

1  Peter  being  the  middle  term,  and  disciple  the  subject  of  the  conclusion, 
the  minor  premise  must  be  converted,  by  which  process  the  universal  affirma- 
tive, "St.  Peter  was  a  disciple,"  becomes  the  particular  atlirmative,  "Some 
disciple  was  St.  Peter,"  from  Mhich  the  particular  conclusion,  "  Some  disciple 
denied  his  master,"  immediately  follows.  The  mood  Darapti  of  the  third 
figure  thus  becomes  the  mood  Darii  of  the  first.  The  universality  of  the 
premises  consists  in  the  fact  that  Peter  constitutes  the  entire  class  to  which 
he  belongs.     Cf.  Hamilton,  Logic,  Boston,  1873,  pp.  314-315.  —  Tr. 


CH.  xVii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  509 


the  predicate  is  in  the  subject,  or  rather  the  idea  of  the  predi- 
cate is  included  in  the  idea  of  the  subject.  For  example,  the 
isogon  is  in  the  rectangle,  for  the  rectangle  is  the  figure  all  of 
whose  right  angles  are  equal  to  each  other,  therefore  in  the 
idea  of  the  rectangle  is  the  idea  of  a  figure  all  of  whose  angles 
are  equals,  which  is  the  idea  of  the  isogon.  The  common  mode 
of  statement  regards  rather  individuals,  but  that  of  Aristotle 
ideas  or  universals.  Yov  in  saying,  every  man  is  an  animal,  I 
mean  to  say  that  all  men  are  included  in  all  animals;  but  I 
mean  at  the  same  time  that  the  idea  of  animal  is  included  in 
the  idea  of  man.  Animal  includes  more  individuals  than  man, 
but  man  includes  more  ideas  or  more  formalities ; '  the  one  has 
more  examples,  the  other  more  degrees  of  reality;  the  one  more 
extension,  the  other  more  intension.  It  may  also  be  truly  said 
that  the  entire  syllogistic  doctrine  may  be  demonstrated  by 
that  de  continente  et  contento,  the  containing  and  the  contained, 
which  is  different  from  that  of  the  whole  and  the  part;  for  the 
whole  always  exceeds  the  part,  but  the  containing  and  the 
contained  are  sometimes  equal,  as  is  the  case  in  reciprocal 
propositions.^ 

§  9.  Ph.  I  begin  to  form  for  myself  a  wholly  different  idea 
of  logic  from  that  I  formerly  had.  I  regarded  it  as  a  scholar's 
diversion,  but  I  now  see  that,  in  the  way  you  understand  it,  it 
is  like  a  universal  mathematics.  Would  to  God  that  it  might 
push  on  to  something  more  than  it  yet  is,  in  order  that  we 

1  I.e.  essences.  "  The  formalit]/  of  the  vow  lies  in  the  promise  made  to 
God."  —  Stjllingfleet.  —  Tr. 

2  Leibnitz's  thought,  as  .Schaar Schmidt  says,  is  that  sometimes  the  princi- 
ple, •u-hat  is  predicable  of  the  whole  is  pi-eilical)le  of  the'ixivts  —  ab  universnli 
ad  particidare  consequentia  valet  — \s  not  applicable,  as  in  cases  where  the 
concepts  found  in  the  conclusion  are  coiJi-dinate  rather  than  subordinate, 
i.e.  coincident  or  identical  in  extension.  In  such  cases  the  coordination  or 
coincidence  of  the  concepts  — principium  identitatis  — might  be  adduced  as  a 
fundamental  logical  principle.  To  avoid  this,  Leibnitz  pri)poses  the  principle 
De  continente  et  contento,  in  which  in  a  certain  sense  is  given  the  higher 
unity  of  sul)ordination  and  identity,  i.e.  the  subject  may  always  be  thought 
of  as  contained  in  the  predicate,  although  coincident  with  it  in  extension. 
The  principle,  however,  necessarily  considers  "the  containing"  as  more  ex- 
tended than  the  "  contained."  Cases  such  as  Leibnitz  here  refers  to,  in  which 
tlio  coordination  or  agreement  of  terms  is  such  as  to  make  them  identical  — 
"important  cases"  "for  the  most  part  strangely  overlooked"  by  logicians 
(Jevons,  Lessons  in  Logic,  p.  124,  new  ed.,  l.SSO)  —  arc  discussed  by  Jevoiis  in 
his  little  work  entitled  The  Substitution  of  Similars,  London,  Macmillan  &  Co., 
18G9.— Til. 


570  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

luiglit  be  able  to  find  thereby  these  true  helps  of  reason  of  which 
1  looker  spoke,  whicli  would  raise  men  far  above  their  present 
condition.  Reason  is  a  faculty  wliich  so  much  the  more  needs  it, 
as  its  extent  is  quite  limited  and  as  it  fails  us  in  many  instances. 
(1)  Because  often  ideas  themselves  fail  us.  §  10.  Then  (2)  they 
are  often  obscure  and  imperfect;  whilst  where  they  are  clear 
(and  distinct),  as  in  numbers,  we  find  no  insurmountable  diffi- 
culties, and  fall  into  no  contradiction.  §  11.  (3)  Often  also 
the  difficulty  comes  from  the  fact  that  mediate  ideas  are  want- 
ing. You  know  that  before  algebra,  that  great  instrument  and 
noteworthy  proof  of  human  sagacity,  was  discovered,  men 
regarded  with  amazement  many  demonstrations  of  the  ancient 
mathematicians.  §  12.  It  also  happens  (4)  that  the  mind  builds 
upon  false  principles,  which  may  entangle  it  in  difficulties 
where  the  reason  is  more  involved  and  very  far  from  clearing 
them  up.  §  13.  Finally  (5),  terms  whose  meaning  is  uncertain 
embarrass  the  reason. 

Th.  I  do  not  know  Avhether  we  so  much  lack  ideas  as  you 
think,  that  is  to  say,  distinct  ideas.  As  for  confused  ideas,  or 
rather  images,  or,  if  you  prefer,  impressions,  as  colors,  tastes, 
etc.,  which  are  a  resultant  of  many  little  ideas  distinct  in 
themselves,  but  of  which  we  are  not  distinctly  conscious,  we 
lack  an  infinite  number  of  them  suitable  to  other  creatures 
rather  than  to  ourselves.  But  these  impressions  also  serve 
rather  to  give  rise  to  the  instincts  and  to  establish  the  observa- 
tions of  experience  than  to  furnish  matter  to  the  reason,  except 
so  far  as  they  are  accompanied  by  distinct  perceptions.  It  is 
then  principally  the  defect  of  the  knowledge  we  have  of  these 
distinct  ideas,  concealed  within  the  confused,  that  stops  us, 
and  even  when  all  is  distinctly  exposed  to  our  senses  or  to  our 
mind,  the  multitude  of  things  that  must  be  considered  some- 
times perplexes  us.  For  example,  when  there  is  a  pile  of  one 
thousand  cannon-balls  before  our  eyes,  it  is  plain  that  in  order 
properly  to  conceive  the  number  and  properties  of  this  multi- 
tude, it  is  very  useful  to  arrange  them  in  figures  as  is  done  in 
the  magazines  in  order  to  have  distinct  ideas  of  them  and  to 
fix  them,  indeed,  so  that  we  may  be  spared  the  trouble  of 
counting  them  more  than  once.  It  is  the  multitude  of  consid- 
erations also  which  causes  some  very  great  difficulties  in  the 
science  of  numbers  themselves ;  for  short  methods  are  sougrht 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  571 


and  sometimes  we  do  not  know  whether  nature  has  them  within 
its  folds  for  the  case  in  question.  For  example,  wliat  is 
apparently  simpler  than  the  notion  of  the  prime  number?  i.e.  a 
whole  number  indivisible  by  every  other  except  unity  and 
itself.  Yet  we  seek  also  a  positive  and  easy  sign  in  order  to 
recognize  them  certainly  without  trying  all  the  prime  divisors 
less  than  the  square  root  of  the  given  prime.  There  are  a 
number  of  signs  which  make  known  without  mucli  calculation 
that  a  given  number  is  not  prime,  but  we  ask  for  one  which  is 
easy  and  which  makes  known  certainly  that  it  is  prime  when 
it  is  so.  This  it  is  which  also  makes  algebra  as  yet  so  imper- 
fect, although  nothing  is  better  known  than  the  ideas  of  which 
it  makes  use,  since  they  signify  only  numbers  in  general ;  for  the 
public  has  not  yet  the  means  of  extracting  the  irrational  roots 
of  any  equation  beyond  the  fourth  degree  ^  (excepting  in  a  very 
limited  case),  and  the  methods  which  Diophant,''^  Scipio  Ferreus,^ 

1  In  Leibnitz's  day,  as  the  text  states,  equations  of  the  2d,  .3d,  and  4th 
degrees  were  reduced  to  pure  equations,  but  the  reduction  of  equations  of 
higher  degrees  than  the  4th  remained  an  unsolved  problem,  on  which  mathe- 
maticians spent  much  labor,  until  Niels  Henrik  Abel,  1802-1829,  a  Norwegian 
mathematician  of  great  ability  and  acuteness,  demonstrated  (1824)  that  the 
quintic  equation  and  a  fortiori  the  general  equation  of  any  order  higher  than 
live,  is  incapable  of  solution  by  radicals.  Cf.  Abel,  Demonstration  de  I'im- 
pof^sibilite  de  la  resolution  algcbrique  des  equations  gin6ralcs  qui  iKtssent  le 
quatrieme  der/re,  in  GSuvres  completes,  ed.  by  Holmboe,  2  vols.,  Christiania, 
1839,  Vol.  1,'pp.  5-24,  and  iu  Crelle,  "Journ.  f.  Math.,"  182(;,  Vol.  1,  pp. 
65-84.— Tr. 

2  Diophantus,  c.  325-c.  409,  a  celebrated  Greek  mathematician  of  the 
Alexandrian  school,  gave,  in  his  Arillimeticorum  lib.  VI.,  a  metliod  for  the 
solution  of  equations  of  the  1st  and  2d  degrees.  The  Ms.  of  his  Ari/huietic 
was  discovered  in  14(J0  iu  the  Vatican  Library  by  the  astronomer  Regiomon- 
tanus,  143(3-1476,  and  was  published  in  a  Latin  trans.,  without  the  original,  by 
Xylander,  in  1575.  The  Greek  text,  with  a  more  complete  trans.,  and  a  com- 
mentary by  Bachet  de  Merzeriac,  whose  skill  in  indeterminate  analysis 
especially  fitted  him  for  the  task,  appeared  in  1621.  The  best  cd.,  based  upon 
that  of  Bachet,  including  the  Greek  text  with  Latin  trans.,  is  tliat  by  Pierre 
Format,  1601-1665,  tlie  celebrated  Frencli  mathematician,  wlio  supplciiicnied 
the  commentary  of  Bachet  by  valuable  notes  of  his  own.  It  is  found  in  Vol. 
1,  pp.  65-341  of  Fermat,  Opera  Muthernatica,  2  vols.,  fol.,  Tolosae,  l(i7ii,  1(J7'.). 
-Tr. 

3  Scipione  del  Ferro  or  Ferri,  c.  1465-1.')25,  an  Italian  mathematician,  taught 
aritlimetic  and  geometry  at  Bologna  from  1496  till  his  death.  About  15(15  he 
discovered  the  solntitm  of  a  particular  case  of  cubic  equations,  wliicii  be  did 
not  publish,  but  communicated  to  his  favorite  jmpil  Antonio  del  Fiorc,  who  in 
16.35  challenged  Tartaglia  to  a  trial  of  skill  in  resolving  algebraical  problems 
requiring  a  knowledge  of  this  rule.  Tartaglia  in  Ki-'iO  ha<l  already  si-hcd  two 
cases  of  cubic  equations,  and  before  the  time  for  the  contest  came  solved  two 


572  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE  OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

and  Lewis  Ferrari  ^  used  respectively  for  tlie  second,  third, 
and  fourth  degrees  in  order  to  reduce  them  to  tlie  first,  or 
in  order  to  reduce  an  affected  equation  to  a  pure,  are  wholly 
different  from  each  other,  i.e.  that  which  is  used  for  one  degree 
differs  a  degree  from  that  used  for  another.  For  the  second 
degree,  or  the  quadratic  equation,  is  reduced  to  the  first  by 
merely  eliminating  the  second  term.  The  third  degree,  or  the 
cubic  equation,  has  been  solved,  because  in  separating  the 
unknown  quantity  into  parts  there  happily  arises  from  these 
an  equation  of  the  second  degree.  And  in  the  fourth  degree, 
or  the  biquadratics,  something  is  added  to  the  two  sides  of  the 
equation  to  render  it  capable  of  extraction  on  both  sides,  and 
then  it  is  happily  found  that  to  obtain  tliis  result  an  equation 
of  the  third  degree  only  is  needed.  But  all  this  is  only  a  mix- 
ture of  good  luck  or  chance  with  art  or  method.  And  in  trying 
it  on  these  last  two  degrees  we  knew  not  whether  it  would  be 
successful.  Further  still,  another  artifice  is  necessary  to  suc- 
cess in  the  fifth  or  sixth  degree,  which  are  the  sursolids  or 
bicubes.  And  although  Descartes  believed  that  the  method  he 
used  in  the  fourth,  conceiving  the  equation  as  produced  by  two 
other  quadratic  equations  (but  which  cannot  at  bottom  give 
more  than  that  of  Lewis  Ferrari),  would  succeed  also  in  the 
sixth,  it  is  not  found  to  be  so.  This  difficult}^  shows  that  even 
the  clearest  and  most  distinct  ideas  do  not  always  give  us  all 
we  ask  for  and  all  that  may  be  drawn  from  them.  And  this 
makes  us  also  judge  that  algebra  is  very  far  from  being  the  art 

more.  He  thus  easily  won  the  victory,  as  his  problems  could  be  solved  only 
by  one  or  the  other  of  his  own  three  rules  "which  were  unknown  to  Fiore,  and 
not  by  the  remaining  rule  which  was  the  only  one  known  to  Fiore.  Tartaglia's 
discoveries  were  improved  and  published  by  Cardan  iu  connection  with  his 
own  in  1545,  as  a  supplement  to  a  treatise  on  arithmetic  and  algebra  pub- 
lished in  1539.  Cf.  Cardan,  Opera  omnia,  Vol.  4,  pj).  249-2(i4.  On  Ferro,  cf. 
Libri,  Hist,  des  Sciences  Math,  en  Italic,  Vol.  3,  pp.  148-151 ;  Montucla,  Hist, 
des  Math.,  Vol.  1,  p.  479,  ed.  1758,  Vol.  1,  p.  591,  ed.  1799-1802.  —  Tr. 

1  Ludovico  or  Luigi  Ferrari,  ir»22-1562,  or  1505,  an  Italian  mathematician,  a 
pu\n\  of  Cardano  {cf.  ante,  p.  oCCi,  note  1),  and  Professor  of  Mathematics  at  Milan 
and  at  the  University  of  Bologna,  discovered  the  demoustration  of  the  formula 
for  the  resolution  of  equations  of  the  3d  degree,  sent  by  Tartaglia,  c.  1500-1557, 
to  Cardan  under  the  form  of  an  enigma,  and  shortly  after  this  discovery  solved 
equations  of  the  4th  degree.  For  an  account  of  his  demonstration,  cf.  Cardan, 
Ars  magna,  1545,  chap.  15.  De  cubo  et  quadratis  aequalibus  numero,  §  3, 
Opera  omnia,  10  vols.,  Lugduni,  lGfi3,  Vol.  4,  p.  254.  On  Ferrari,  cf.  Libri, 
Hist,  des  Sciences  Math,  en  Italic,  Vol.  3,  pp.  180,  181;  Montucla,  Hist,  des 
Math.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  484,  485,  ed.  1758,  Vol.  1,  pp.  596,  597,  ed.  1799-1802.  —Tr. 


XVII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  573 


of  invention,  since  it  needs  a  more  general  art;  and  wo  may 
say,  indeed,  that  tlie  art  of  signs  {Specieuse)  in  general,  i.e.  the 
art  of  characters,  is  a  marvellous  means  of  assistance,  since  it 
aids  the  imagination.  It  Avill  not  be  doubted  in  view  of  the 
arithmetic  of  Diophant  and  the  geometrical  books  of  Apollonius 
and  Pappus  that  the  ancients  possessed  it  to  a  certain  extent. 
Vieta  ^  has  given  it  more  extension  by  expressing  not  only  what 
is  asked  for,  but  also  the  given  numbers,  by  general  characters, 
doing  in  calculating  what  Euclid  already  did  in  reasoning,  and 
Descartes  has  extended  the  application  of  this  calculus  to 
geometry,  indicating  lines  by  equations.  Nevertheless,  even 
after  the  discovery  of  our  modern  algebra,  Bouillaud  ^  (Ismael 
Bullialdus),  no  doubt  an  excellent  geometer,  whom,  moreover, 
I  knew  in  Paris,  regarded  only  with  wonder  the  demonstrations 
of  Archimedes  upon  the  spiral,  and  could  not  understand  liow 
this  great  man  had  thought  of  employing  the  tangent  of  this 
line  as  the  dimension  of  the  circle.  Father  Gregory  of  St. 
Vincent  ^  appears  to  have  divined  it,  thinking  that  it  was  at- 
tained by  the  parallelism  of  the  spiral  and  the  parabola.  Put 
this  method  is  only  a  particular  one,  whilst  the  new  calculus 
of  infinitesimals  *  which  proceeds  by  the  method  of  the  differ- 
ences which  I  have  thought  of  and  successfully  shared  with  the 
public,  gives  a  general  one,  wherein  this  discovery  concerning 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  468,  note  1.  —  Tr. 

2  Ismael  Boulliau,  I(j05-161t4,  a  French  mathematician  and  astronomer,  who 
was  the  first  to  give,  in  his  Ad  astronoinos  nionita  duo,  l(l.">7,  a  phiiisible  ex- 
planation of  the  cliange  in  the  light  of  some  stars  by  attrilniling  to  liicm  an 
axial  revolution  which  shows  successively  their  obscure  and  huninons  i)arts. 
He  was  the  author  of  several  works,  among  which  is  tlio  JJc  lineis  spiruiibus 
demonstrationes,  1657,  which  Leibnitz,  perhaps,  had  in  mind  here.  —  Tr. 

3  Gre'goire  de  Saint-Vincent,  1584-lt)()7,  a  Flemish  geometer  who  was  much 
occupied  with  the  problem  of  the  quailrature  of  the  circle,  and  whose  prin- 
cipal work  is  the  Opus  cjeomctricutn  quadratwx  circuli  et  seclioimm  coni, 
1G47.  — Tr. 

4  For  Leibnitz's  account  of  his  discovery  of  the  "  calculus  of  infinitesimals," 
rf.  his  Historia  et  orifio  cdlculi  diffcrentialis,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  inat/i.  Sc/iri/t., 
II.,  1  [Vol.  5],  392-410;  also  his  letter,  April  18,  171(!,  to  the  Countess  Kicl- 
mannsegge,  Dutens,  Ldhnit.  op.  oin.,  3,  45()-4(il.  For  Leibnitz's  various  writ- 
ings on  the  subject,  cf.  Gerhardt,  op.  cit.,  II. ,  1  [Vol.  5] ,  141-418 ;  Uutens,  op.  rit., 
Vol.  3,  passim.  Dutens,  Vol.  3,  contains  also  much  material  concerning  tlie 
controversy  between  Leibnitz  and  Newton  regarding  the  discovery  of  the 
calculus.  Further  accounts  are  given  in  Guhrauer,  Lrlhnilz,  Eiiic  liior/roplne, 
1,  28()-320,  Jaucourt,  Historic  vitm  LcihriUii,  and  Montucla,  Hint.  d.  Math., 
Vol.  2  (both  in  Dutens,  op.  ci<.  Vol.  3,  pp.  xii-xl,  xli-lv),  and  in  Enci/clop. 
Brit.,  yth  ed.,  Vol.  13,  Article,  "  Infinitesimal  Calculus."  — Tr. 


574  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

the  spiral  is  mere  play  and  a  sample  of  the  easiest,  like  nearly- 
all  we  have  before  discovered  in  the  matter  of  the  dimensions 
of  curves.  The  reason  of  the  advantage  of  this  new  calculus 
is,  moreover,  that  it  relieves  the  imagination  in  the  problems, 
which  Descartes  excluded  from  his  geometry  under  the  pre- 
text that  they  most  frequently  lead  to  mechanics,  but  at 
bottom  because  they  did  not  agree  with  his  calculus.  As 
for  errors  arising  from  ambiguous  terms,  it  is  our  business 
to  avoid  them. 

Ph.  There  is  also  a  case  in  which  reasoning  cannot  be 
applied,  but  in  which  also  there  is  no  need  of  it  and  in  which 
sight  is  worth  more  than  reasoning.  It  is  in  intuitive  Jcnoicl- 
edge,  where  the  connection  of  ideas  and  truths  is  immediately 
seen.  Such  is  the  knowledge  of  indubitable  maxims,  and  I  am 
tempted  to  believe  that  this  is  the  degree  of  evidence  which 
the  angels  have  at  present,  and  which  the  spirits  of  just  men 
made  perfect  will  have  in  a  future  state  regarding  a  thousand 
things  which  now  escape  our  knowledge.  §  15.  But  demon- 
stration, based  upon  mediate  ideas,  gives  a  reasoned  Jcnoidedge. 
This  is  because  the  connection  of  the  mediate  idea  with  the 
extremes  is  necessary  and  is  seen  by  ?ijxixtaposition  of  evidence, 
similar  to  that  of  a  yard-stick  applied  now  to  one  cloth  and  now 
to  another  to  show  that  they  are  equal.  §  16.  But  if  the  con- 
nection is  only  probable,  the  judgment  gives  only  an  opinion. 

Til.  God  alone  has  the  advantage  of  having  only  intuitive 
knowledge.  But  very  happy  souls,  however  detached  they  are 
from  these  material  bodies,  and  the  genii  themselves,  however 
exalted  they  are,  although  they  have  a  knowledge  without  com- 
parison more  intuitive  than  ours,  and  often  see  at  a  glance  what 
we  discover  only  by  the  force  of  consequences  after  having  em- 
ployed time  and  labor,  must  likewise  find  difficulties  in  their  path 
without  which  they  would  not  have  the  pleasure  of  making  dis- 
coveries, which  pleasure  is  one  of  the  greatest.  And  we  must 
always  admit  that  there  will  be  an  infinite  number  of  truths 
concealed  from  them  either  wholly  or  for  a  time,  whereto  they 
must  attain  by  force  of  consequences  and  by  demonstration  or 
even  frequently  by  conjecture. 

Ph.  [These  genii  then  are  only  animals  more  perfect  than 
we  ;  it  is  just  as  if  you  said  with  the  emperor  of  the  moon  :  it 
is  all  as  here.^ 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  575 


Th.  I  will  say  so,  not  entirely,  but  in  regard  to  the  ground  of 
things,  for  the  modes  and  degrees  of  perfection  vary  infinite l}-. 
Meanwhile  the  ground  is  everywhere  the  same,  a  maxim  which 
is  fundamental  with  me  and  reigns  in  all  my  philosophy.  I  con- 
ceive things  unknown  or  confusedly  known  only  after  the  manner 
of  those  which  are  distinctly  known  to  us ;  a  procedure  which 
makes  philosopliy  very  easy,  and  I  believe  indeed  that  it  must 
do  so.  But  if  this  philosophy  is  simplest  in  its  ground,  it  is 
also  the  richest  in  its  modes,  because  nature  may  vary  them 
infinitely,  as  indeed  she  has  done  with  as  much  abundance, 
order,  and  ornateness  as  it  is  possible  to  imagine.  This  is  the 
reason  why  I  believe  there  is  no  genius  however  sublime  who 
has  not  an  infinite  number  of  them  above  him.  Yet  although 
we  are  very  inferior  to  so  many  intelligent  beings,  we  have  the 
advantage  of  not  being  visibly  controlled  upon  this  globe  where 
we  hold  indisputably  the  first  rank ;  and  with  all  the  ignorance 
in  which  we  are  immersed  we  have  always  the  pleasure  of  seeing 
nothing  which  surpasses  us.  And  if  we  were  vain  we  might 
judge  as  CtBsar,  who  preferred  to  be  first  in  a  country  town 
rather  than  second  in  Rome.  For  the  rest,  I  speak  here  only 
of  the  natural  knowledge  of  these  spirits  and  not  of  the  beatific 
vision,^  or  of  the  supernatural  light  that  God  is  pleased  to  give 
them. 

1  The  term  "beatific  vision"  (visio  beatifica)  denotes  in  theological  and 
i-eligious  thought  the  direct  and  immediate  or  intuitive  vision  of  God  enjoyed 
by  the  saints  and  angels  in  heaven  and  supposed  to  constitute  their  essential 
bliss.  The  philosophical  significance  of  the  idea  as  histori(;ally  developed, 
■nith  respect  both  to  its  speculative  and  practical  uses,  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
vislo  heatifica  was  regarded  as  the  sole  means  of  obtaining  absolute  truth  and 
of  realizing  absolute  blessedness.  The  idea  thus  involved  more  or  less  ex- 
plicitly a  species  of  knowledge  supernaturally  mediated  in  some  unknown  and 
unexplained  way,  but  considered,  because  of  the  method  of  its  mediation,  as 
far  superior  in  certainty  and  completeness  to  any  knowledge  that  finite  beings 
could  attain  through  the  unaided  action  of  their  own  intellectual  powers  — 
in  brief,  as  the  very  perfection  of  knowledge  attaiual)le  by  sucJi  beings. 

The  idea  originated  in  Plato's  conception  of  an  immediate  intuition,  going  • 
beyond  rational  tliouglit,  of  the  pure  forms  of  reality  or  the  Ideas.    Trans- 
forme<l  by  Pliilo  and  Plotinus  into  their  ecstatic  intuition,  or  that  identifica- I 
tion  of  tlie  human  with  Uie  Divine  in  whicli  all  consciousness  of  individual/ 
personality  is  h)St;  combined  by  Clement  and  Origen,  in  view  of  certain  ex-j 
pressions  in  the  Pauline  epistles,  with  the  thought  of  a  personality  in  uuionl 
with  whom   the  self-consciousness  of  the  individual  is  preserved;  and  si  ill 
further  developed  by  Augustine,  as  the  principle  of  the  al)solute  and  imme- 
diate certainty  of  inner  experience  or  consciousness  involving  within  itself 
the  idea  of  God  as  the  absolute  personality  and  the  sum  and  essence  of  all 


57G  LKllJiSITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

§  10.  Ph.  As  each  one  makes  use  of  reasoning  either  with 
rt^ganl  to  himself  or  with  reference  to  another,  it  will  not  be 
useless  to  make  some  reflections  upon  four  sorts  of  arguments 
which  men  are  Avont  to  use  in  order  to  draw  others  to  their 
opinions  or  at  least  so  to  keep  them  in  awe  as  to  prevent  them 
from  contradicting.  The  first  argument  may  be  called  argu- 
mentum  ad  vercundiam,  when  we  cite  the  opinion  of  those 
who  have  acquired  authority  by  their  knowledge,  rank,  power, 
or  otherwise  ;  for  when  another  does  not  yield  to  it  promptly, 
he  is  liable  to  be  censured  as  full  of  vanity  and  even  to  be 
charged  with  insolence.  §  20.  There  is  also  2)  argumentum 
ad  ignorantiam,  i.  e.  to  demand  that  the  opponent  admit  the 
proof  or  assign  a  better.  §  21.  There  is  3)  argumentum  ad 
hominem,  when  we  press  a  man  by  what  he  has  himself  said. 
§  22,  Finally,  there  is  4)  argumentum  ad  judicium,  which  con- 
sists in  employing  proofs  drawn  from  some  one  of  the  sources 
of  knowledge  or  probability.  This  is  the  only  one  of  all  which 
advances  and  instructs  us  ;  for  if  from  respect  I  dare  not  con- 
tradict, or  if  I  have  nothing  better  to  say,  or  if  I  contradict 
myself,  it  does  not  follow  that  you  are  right.  I  may  be  modest, 
ignorant,  deceived,  and  you  prove  yourself  to  be  mistaken  also. 

Til.  It  is  doubtless  necessary  to  make  a  difference  between 
what  is  proper  to  be  said  and  what  is  truly  to  be  believed.  Yet 
as  the  majority  of  truths  may  be  boldly  maintained,  there  is 
some  prejudice  against  an  opinion  that  it  is  necessary  to  con- 
ceal. The  argument  ad  ignorantiam  is  valid  in  cases  of  pre- 
sumption where  it  is  reasonable  to  hold  to  an  opinion  till  the 
contrary  is  proved.  The  argument  ad  hominem  has  this  effect, 
that  it  shows  that  one  or  the  other  assertion  is  false  and  that 

truth,  this  conception  passed  into  the  pliilosophical  and  religious  thinking 
and  life  of  the  Christian  Church,  and  became  especially  prominent  in  the 
teachings  of  the  Mediaeval  Mystics.  On  this  historical  development  cf.  "Win- 
delhand,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  trans,  by  Tufts,  pp.  119  sq.,  227  sq.,  249  5^.,  276  sq.; 
Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  III.,  2  [Vol.  6],  413  sq.,  611  sq.,  854,  note  4,  3d  ed., 
1881 ;  Benn,  Greek  Philosophers,  2,  311  sq. 

In  a  modified  form  this  intuition  of  divine  things  became  -what  the  Church 
fathers  and  the  theological  and  philosophical  writers  of  the  ]\Iiddle  Age  termed 
the  lumen  gratise,  "  the  light  of  grace,"  the  sux^ernatural  light  given  through 
divine  inspiration,  in  opposition  to  the  lumen  naturale  or  "  natural  light,"  the 
rational  knowledge  given  by  nature  to  all  men  as  such.  Cf.  Nev;  Essays, 
Bk.  I.,  chap.  1,  §  21,  Th.,  o?i<e,  p.  71;  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  j)hilos.  Schrif(.,6, 
404  sq.,  503  sq.;  Hamilton's  Reid,  Note  A,  §  V.,  IV.,  1,  note  t,  Vol.  2,  p.  7(53, 
§  VI.,  20-22,  25-26,  pp.  776-778,  54,  p.  785,  8th  ed.,  1880.  —  Tr. 


CH.  xvii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  577 


the  opponent  is  deceived  whatever  way  he  takes  it.  We  might 
bring  yet  other  arguments  which  are  used,  for  example  the 
one  we  might  call  ad  vertiginem,  when  we  reason  thus  :  if  this 
proof  is  not  received  we  have  no  means  of  attaining  certainty 
upon  the  point  in  question,  which  we  take  as  an  absurdity. 
This  argument  is  valid  in  certain  cases,  as  if  any  one  wished 
to  deny  primitive  and  immediate  truths,  for  example,  that  any- 
thing can  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time,  or  that  we  ourselves 
exist,  for  if  he  were  right  there  would  be  no  means  of  knowing 
anything  whatever.  But  when  certain  principles  are  produced 
and  we  wish  to  maintain  them  because  otherwise  the  entire 
system  of  some  received  doctrine  would  fall,  the  argument  is 
not  decisive ;  for  we  must  distinguish  between  what  is  neces- 
sary to  maintain  our  knowledge  and  between  what  serves  as  a 
foundation  for  our  received  doctrines  or  practices.  Use  was 
sometimes  made  among  jurisconsults  of  probable  reasoning  in 
order  to  justify  the  condemnation  or  torture  of  pretended  sor- 
cerers upon  the  deposition  of  others  accused  of  the  same  crime, 
for  it  was  said :  if  this  argument  falls,  how  shall  we  convict 
them?  And  sometimes  in  a  criminal  case  certain  authors 
maintain  that  in  the  facts  where  conviction  is  more  difficult, 
more  slender  proofs  may  pass  as  sufficient.  But  this  is  not  a 
reason.  It  proves  only  that  we  must  employ  more  care,  and 
not  that  we  must  believe  more  thoughtlessly,  except  in  the 
case  of  extremely  dangerous  crimes,  as,  for  example,  in  the 
matter  of  high  treason,  where  this  consideration  has  weight, 
not  to  condemn  a  man,  but  to  prevent  him  from  doing  harm  ; 
so  that  there  may  be  a  mean,  not  between  gidlty  and  not  guilty, 
but  between  condemnation  and  baniHliment  in  the  judgments, 
where  law  and  custom  admit  it.  Use  has  been  made  of  a  similar 
argument  in  Germany  for  some  time  in  order  to  give  color  to 
the  coining  of  bad  money;  for  (they  say)  if  we  must  keep  to 
the  prescribed  rules,  we  cannot  coin  it  without  loss.  We  must 
be  allowed  then  to  debase  its  alloy.  But  besides  the  fact  that 
we  must  diminish  the  weight  only  and  not  the  alloy  or  suix-r- 
scription  the  better  to  obviate  frauds,  we  supjjose  a  ])ractico 
necessary  which  is  not  so ;  for  no  command  of  heaven  nor  any 
human  law  exists  obliging  those  who  have  no  mine  nor  occa- 
sion to  have  silver  in  bars  to  coin  money;  and  to  make  money 
out  of  money  is  a  bad  practice  which  naturally  carries  dctcrio- 
2  p 


578  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

ration  witli  it.  But  how  (they  say)  shall  we  exercise  our 
regale  in  coining  it  ?  The  reply  is  easy.  Content  yourselves 
with  coining  a  little  from  good  silver,  even  at  a  small  loss,  if 
you  think  its  coinage  a  matter  of  importance  to  yourselves, 
since  you  have  no  need  nor  right  to  flood  the  world  with 
debased  small  coin. 

§  23.  Ph.  After  having  said  a  word  concerning  the  relation 
of  our  reason  to  other  men,  let  us  add  something  about  its 
relation  to  God,  which  makes  us  distinguish  between  Avhat  is 
contrary  to  reason  and  what  is  above  reason.  Of  the  first  class 
is  everything  which  is  incompatible  with  our  clear  and  dis- 
tinct ideas ;  of  the  second  is  every  thought  whose  truth  or 
probability  evidently  cannot  be  deduced  from  sensation  or 
reflection  by  the  aid  of  reason.^  Thus  the  existence  of  more 
than  one  God  is  contrary  to  reason,  and  the  resurrection  of  the 
dead  is  above  reason. 

Th.  I  find  something  to  say  regarding  your  definition  of 
that  which  is  above  reason,  at  least  if  you  connect  it  Avith  the 
received  use  of  this  phrase ;  for  it  seems  to  me  that  from  the 
manner  in  which  this  definition  is  couched,  it  goes  too  far  in 
one  direction  and  not  far  enough  in  the  other  ;  and  if  Ave  fol- 
low it,  all  that  of  which  Ave  are  ignorant  and  Avhich  in  our 
present  condition  we  are  unable  to  knoAV,  would  be  above 
reason,  for  example,  that  a  gi\'en  fixed  star  is  greater  or 
less  than  the  sun ;  again,  that  VesuA'ius  Avill  send  out  fire  in 
such  a  year ;  these  are  facts  the  knoAvledge  of  AA^hich  is  beyond 
us,  not  because  they  are  above  reason,  but  because  they  are 
beyond  our  senses ;  for  we  could  very  well  judge  of  them,  if 
we  had  more  perfect  organs  or  more  information  about  the 
circu,mstances.  There  are  also  difficnlties  Avhich  are  beyond 
our  present  faculty,  but  not  beyond  reason  as  a  whole  ;  for 
example,  there  is  no  astronomer  here  beloAV  who  can  calculate 
the  detail  of  an  eclipse  in  the  space  of  a  pater  and  without 
taking  the  pen  in  hand,  yet  there  are  perhaps  genii  to  whom 
that  Avould  be  mere  play.  Thus  all  things  might  be  made 
knoAATi  or  practicable  by  the  aid  of  reason,  by  supposing  more 
information  concerning  the  facts,  more  perfect  organs,  and  a 
more  elevated  mind. 

1  Cf.  Locke,  Exam,  of  Malebranche,  §  53,  Philos.  Wks.,  Vol.  2,  p. 455  (Bohn's 
ed.).  — Tk. 


CH.  XVII]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  579 


Ph.  This  objection  ceases  if  I  understand  my  definition  not 
only  of  our  sensation  or  reflection,  but  also  of  that  of  every 
other  possible  created  spirit. 

Th.  If  you  take  it  so,  you  are  right.  But  the  other  diffi- 
culty remains,  viz. :  that  there  will  be  nothing  above  reason 
according  to  our  definition,  because  God  will  always  be  able 
to  give  the  means  of  apprehending  by  sensation  and  reflection 
any  truth  whatever;  as  in  reality  the  greatest  mysteries  be- 
come known  to  us  by  the  testimony  of  God  which  we  recognize 
by  the  motives  of  credibility,  upon  which  our  religion  is  based. 
And  these  motives  undoubtedly  depend  upon  sensation  and 
reflection.  The  question  then  seems  to  be  not  whether  the 
existence  of  a  fact  or  the  truth  of  a  proposition  can  be  deduced 
from  the  principles  which  reason  uses,  i.e.  from  sensation  and 
reflection,  or  rather  the  external  and  internal  sense,  but  whether 
a  created  spirit  is  capable  of  knowing  the  how  of  this  fact,  or 
the  a  priori  reason  of  this  truth;  so  that  we  may  say  that 
what  is  beyond  reason  may  indeed  be  apprehended,  but  it  can- 
not be  comprehended  by  the  means  and  forces  of  created  reason, 
however  great  and  exalted  it  he.  It  is  reserved  to  God  ajone 
to  understand  it,  as  it  belongs  to  him  alone  to  assert  it.^ 

Ph.    This  consideration  appears  to  me  a  good  one,  and  it  is 

1  Cf.  Th^odic^e,  Disconrs  prelim.,  especially  §§  2,  5,  23,  56;  New  Essays, 
Preface,  ante,  pp.  55,  GO;  AunotatiunciilsB  svbilnnx  ad  Tolandi  libruin,  De 
christianUmo  mysferiis  carente,  1701,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  oin.,  5,  142,  \A'.\; 
Pichler,  Theol.  d.  Leibniz,  1,  208-225;  K.  Fischer,  Gesch.  d.  n.  Philos.,  Bd.  II., 
Leibniz,  3d  ed.,  pp.  541-547. 

According  to  Leibnitz,  reason  and  faith  are  not  absolntely  opposed.  Reason 
must  be  capable  of  apprehc7idin<j  the  supernatural  as  fact,  even  though  in  ils 
present  stage  of  development  —  and  perhaps  in  all  its  development  —  it  may 
never  be  able  to  c.onrprehend  it  exhaustively.  The  sni)ernatural,  while  it  may 
be  outside  of  and  Ijeyond  any  present  or  future  iio.ssil)le  Unite  experience,  is 
not  then  contrary  to  reason.  In  fact,  to  be  apprch(!nd('(l  or  accepted  as  fact 
at  all,  it  must  jpresent  such  intrinsic  rationality  as  is  sutilicient  to  induce  be- 
lief, i.e.  it  must  show  itself  to  be  intrinsically  possible  and  not  contrary  to 
any  well-establislicd  kiu)w]edge.  In  this  sense  it  is  not  wholly  above  reason,  — 
if  it  were,  it  would  not  at  all  concern  us,  —  and  may  tlierefore  become  a  part 
of  the  sum-total  of  our  knowledge.  The  conlcntion  of  Ijoth  Leibnitz  and 
Locke  is,  in  fact,  that  tlu)  opposition  is  not  between  reason  and  failli,  but 
rather  between  reason  and  unfounded  authority.  Leil)nitz  rcjcc-ts  entirely 
both  belief  based  (m  blind  submission  to  mere  authority,  and  tiiat  ultra- 
rationalism  which  refuses  tf)  admit  the  existence  of  anytliing  not  coining 
entirely  witliin  tlie  range  of  experience,  particularly  that  experience  wliicli 
is  sensuous  and  individual  and  excludes  that  which  is  si)iritiial  and  uni- 
versal.—  Tr. 


580  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

thus  that  I  wish  my  definitiou  to  be  xmderstood.  This  same 
eousideratiou  conhrms  me  also  in  my  present  opinion  that  the 
manner  of  speaking  which  opposes  reason  to  faith,  although  it 
has  weighty  authority,  is  improper ;  for  it  is  by  reason  that 
we  verify  what  we  must  believe.^  Faith  is  a  firm  assent,  and 
assent,  regulated  as  it  should  be,  can  only  be  given  upon  good 
reasons.  Thus  he  who  believes  without  any  reason  for  be- 
lieving may  be  in  love  with  his  fancies,  but  it  is  not  true  that 
he  seeks  the  truth,  nor  that  he  renders  lawful  obedience  to  his 
divine  Master,  who  would  have  him  make  use  of  the  faculties 
with  which  he  has  enriched  him  in  ordej  to  preserve  him  from 
error.  Otherwise  if  he  is  in  the  good  way,  it  is  by  chance ; 
and  if  in  the  bad,  it  is  by  his  fault,  for  which  he  is  accountable 
to  God. 

Th.  I  commend  you  strongly,  sir,  when  you  wish  faith  to 
be  grounded  in  reason:  without  this  why  should  we  prefer 
the  Bible  to  the  Koran  or  to  the  ancient  books  of  the  Brahmins  ? 
Our  theologians  also  and  other  learned  men  have  clearly  recog- 
nized it,  and  it  is  this  which  has  caused  us  to  have  such  fine 
worlds  concerning  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion,  and  so 
many  excellent  proofs  as  have  been  put  forward  against  the 
heathen  and  other  unbelievers,  ancient  and  modern.  Wise 
persons  also  have  always  regarded  as  suspicious  those  who 
have  maintained  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  trouble  them- 
selves about  reasons  and  proofs  when  it  was  a  question  of 
belief;  an  impossibility  in  fact  unless  to  believe  signifies  to 
recite  or  rej)eat  or  to  let  pass  without  troubling  themselves,  as 
many  people  do,  and  as  indeed  is  the  character  of  some  nations 
more  than  others.  This  is  the  reason  why,  when  some  Aristo- 
telian philosophers  of  the  fifteenth  or  sixteenth  century,  whose 
remains  were  still  extant  a  long  time  after  (as  we  may  judge 
by  the  letters  of  the  late  Mr.  jSTaude-  and  the   Xaudeaiia) , 

1  Gerliardt  reads:  "car  c'est  par  la  raison  que  nous  verifions  ce  que  nous 
devons  croire."  Erdmann,  Jacques,  and  Janet  read:  "  car  c'est  par  la  raison 
que  nous  devons  croire."  — Tr. 

2  Gabriel  Naude,  1600-1653,  a  celebrated  French  scholar,  bibliographer  and 
librarian,  who  at  first  studied  medicine  and  was  physician  to  Louis  XIII,  but 
who  afterwards  devoted  himself  entirely  to  literary  and  library  work.  He 
was  the  creator  of  the  celebrated  Bihliotheqiie  Mazarine.  His  Xaudecma,  a 
collection  of  anecdotes  drawn  from  his  conversations,  appeared  at  Paris,  1701. 
—  Tr. 


581 


on.  XVII]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING 

desired  to  maintain  two  opposite  truths,  one  philosophical,  the 
other  theological,  the  last  Lateran  Council  under  Leo  X  was 
right  in  opposing  them,  as  I  think  I  have  already  remarked.^ 
And  a  dispute  wholly  similar  was  raised  at  Helmstadt  in 
former  times  between  Daniel  Hofmann,  a  theologian,  and 
Corneille  Martin,  a  philosopher,  hut  with  this  difference,  that 
the  philosopher  reconciled  philosophy  to  revelation  and  the 
theologian  wished  to  decline  its  use.     But  the  Duke  Julius, 

1  Cf.  Th^odic^e,  Discours  prelim.,  §§7,  8,  11.  The  "Aristotelian  philoso- 
phers "  here  referred  to,  were  divided  into  two  schools,  the  Alexaiidrists  and 
the  Averroists,  according  as  they  followed  the  interpretation  of  Aristotle 
given  by  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  c.  200,  or  Averroes,  112(5-1198.  Both 
schools  denied  the  immortality  of  the  individual  soul;  the  Averroists  ground- 
ing their  denial  on,  and  finding  a  compensation  for  such  immortality  in,  the 
unity  of  the  intellect — the  rationally  active  part  of  the  soul  (i-oOs) — in  all 
men  ;  while  the  Alexandrists  regarded  individual  souls,  including  this  rational 
part,  as  naturally  mortal. 

Both  schools  were  opposed  and  condemned  by  the  Church,  and  the  theory 
of  "  the  dou^ble  truth  "  (philosophical  truth  having  its  source  in  natural  reason, 
theological  in  a  supernatural  revelation),  held  by  both  schools  as  a  shield  to 
protect  them,  in  the  exxaosition  and  dissemination  of  their  views,  from  the 
interference  and  ijersecution  of  the  Church,  was  adjudged  heretical  in  the 
decree  "  Apostolici  Regiminis  "  of  the  fifth  Lateran  Council  of  December  19, 
1512,  under  Leo  X.  This  theory  in  the  case  of  many  of  its  advocates  was,  no 
doubt,  the  natural  and  "  honest  expression  of  the  iniu;r  discord  "  resulting 
from  the  opposition  of  the  two  then  prevalent  authorities,  Greek  philosophy 
and  religious  tradition. 

Chief  among  those  who  advocated  this  theory  of  "the  twofold  truth" 
was  Pietro  Pomponazzi,  141)2-1525,  an  Italian  physician  and  philosopher,  in 
his  time  one  of  the  most  sagacious  and  subtle  interpreters  of  Aristotle  of  the 
Alexandrian  school.  He  maintained,  in  his  Tractatus  dc,  immoHaHtale  unimi, 
Bologna,  151(i,  8vo,  that  none  of  the  reasons  assigned  for  the  dogma  of  immor- 
tality were  categorically  demonstrative,  and  that  therefore  the  doctrine  must 
depend  upon  revelation.  When  accused  of  heresy,  he  .stoutly  asserted  his  in- 
nocence, saying  that  he  taught  nothing  contrary  to  the  belief  of  the  Church, 
but  simply  expounded  Aristotle,  and  adding  that  he  denied  as  a  Christian 
what  he  affirmed  as  a  philosopher.  He  attempted  to  discover  a  deeper  foun- 
dation for  the  theory  of  "  the  twofold  trutli,''  tlirough  the  recognition  of  llie 
twofold  nature  of  reason,  the  speculative  and  the  practical,  the  former 
furnishing  the  basis  of  philosophy,  the  latter  that  of  theology  and  ethics. 

On  the  whole  subject,  cf.  M.  Maywald,  Die  Lehre  v.  d.  zweifachcn  Wahr- 
heit,  Berlin,  1871 ;  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Philo.s.,  trans,  by  Tufts,  pp.  'MS  .'>q., 
339 .sg.,  359;  Piinjer,  Gescfi.  d.  christ.  ReligionxphiloH.,  1,  28-29,  37,  Eiig.  trans., 
1,39  sq.,  50-52;  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittdalters,  HI  [Vol.  4],  202-207, 
and  for  an  account  of  Pomponazzi  and  his  philosophy,  ibid.  21.'!-241 ;  cf.  also 
L.  Ferri,  La  Psicologia  di  P.  Pomponazzi,  Rome,  1877.  For  the  decree 
•' .Vpostolici  Regiminis,"  cf.  Acta  C'oncil.  Ref/.,  Vol.  'M,  p.  3:)3,  Paris,  l(i44, 
37  vols.,  fol.;  Labbe,  C'oncil.,  tom.  19,  col.  842;  Stockl,  op.  cit.,Ul  [Vol.4], 
20G,  n.  1.  — Tk. 


582  LKIBXITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

founder  of  the  university,  decided  for  the  philosopher.^  It  is 
true  that  in  our  time  a  person  of  the  most  exalted  position 
said  that  in  a  matter  of  faith  he  must  put  out  his  eyes  in  order 
to  see  clearly,  and  Tertulliau  says  somewhere :  this  is  true, 
because  it  is  impossible :  ^  it  must  be  believed,  for  it  is  an 
absurdity.  But  if  the  intention  of  those  who  explain  them- 
selves in  this  way  is  good,  these  expressions  are  always  ex- 
aggerated and  may  do  harm.  St.  Paul  speaks  more  justly 
when  he  says  that  the  wisdom  of  God  is  foolishness  with 
men;  because  men  judge  of  things  only  according  to  their 
experience,  which  is  extremely  limitedj  and  everything  not 
agreeing  therewith  appears  to  them  an  absurdity.  But  this 
judgment  is  very  rash,  for  there  is  indeed  an  infiaiite  number 
of  natural  things  which  would  pass  with  us  as  absurd,  if  they 
were  told  us,  as  the  ice  which  was  said  to  cover  our  rivers 
appeared  to  the  king  of  Siam.  But  the  order  of  nature  itseK 
not  being  of  any  metaphysical  necessity,  is  grounded  only  in 
the  good  pleasure  of  God,  so  that  he  may  deviate  therefrom 
by  the  superior  reasons  of  grace,^  although  he  must  proceed 
therein  only  upon  good  proofs  which  can  come  only  from  the 
testimony  of  God  himself,  to  which  we  must  defer  absolutely 
when  it  is  duly  verified. 

1  Cf.  TlieorUceo,  Discours  prelira.  §  13.  On  the  controversy  itself,  extend- 
ing from  1598-lGOl,  r/.  Piinjer,  Gesch.  d.  cJirist.  Relif/ionspJnlosojjhie,  1,132- 
141,  Eng.  trans.,  1,  178-190.  For  the  fullest  accounts,  cf.  G.  Thomasius,  De 
C'ontroversia  Hofmanniana,  Erlangen,  1844,  and  E.  Schlee  (who  gives  the 
external  histoi-y  with  complete  references  to  the  literature),  DerStreit  d.  Dun. 
Hofmann  ii.  d.  VThiUtniss  d.  Philos.  z.  TheoL,  Marburg,  1S()2.  Schaarschmidt 
refers  to  E.  L.  Th.  Heuke,  Georg  Callxtiis  v.  seine  Zeit,  Einleitung,  p.  73  sq., 
and  says  that  Duke  Julius  [Henry  Julius,  son  of  the  founder  of  the  Uni- 
versity, and  the  succes.sor  of  his  father  in  the  government  in  1.".89],  who  had 
examined  the  documents  in  tlie  controversy  and  reached  a  decision,  did  rightly 
in  protecting  the  pliilo.sopher  against  his  opponents,  who  spread  abroad  the 
most  horrible  calumnies  concerning  him,  and  treated  him  in  general  very 
har.shly.  —  Tr. 

-  Cf.  Tertullian,  De  Came  Chrisfi,  chap.  5:  "  Mortuus  est  dei  tilius;  prorsus 
credibile  est,  quia  ineptum  est.  Et  sepultus  resurrexit ;  certum  est,  quia  im- 
possibile  est."  Leibnitz  also  refers  to  this  passage  in  the  Theodicee,  Discoui-s 
prelim.  §  50.  —  Tb. 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  4C2,  note  1.  —  Tb. 


cii.  xviii]  ON    HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  583 

CHAPTER   XVIII 

OF    FAITH    AND    KEASON    AND    THEIR    DISTINCT    LIMITS 

§  1.  Ph.  Let  us  accommodate  ourselves  meanwhile  to  the 
received  mode  of  speech,  and  suffer  faith  to  be  distinguished  in 
a  certain  sense  from  reason.  It  is  proper  tliat  this  sense  be  very 
accurately  explained  and  the  limits  existing  between  these  two 
things  be  established ;  for  uncertainty  regarding  these  limits 
has  certainly  produced  in  the  world  great  disputes  and  perhaps 
caused  even  great  disorders.  It  is  at  least  manifest  that,  until 
these  have  been  determined,  it  is  in  vain  for  us  to  discuss,  since 
we  must  employ  reason  in  discussing  faith.  §  2.  I  iind  that 
each  sect  uses  reason  with  pleasure  so  long  as  it  believes  it 
can  derive  therefrom  any  aid  :  but  as  soon  as  reason  fails,  they 
cry  out :  it  is  an  article  of  faith,  which  is  above  reason.  ]^ut 
the  opponent  could  make  use  of  the  same  evasion  if  any  one 
took  it  upon  himself  to  argue  against  him,  unless  we  indicate 
why  that  would  not  be  permitted  him  in  a  case  seemingly 
parallel.  I  suppose  that  reason  is  here  the  discovery  of  the 
certitude  or  probability  of  propositions  drawn  from  knowledge 
whicli  we  have  acquired  by  the  use  of  our  njitural  faculties, 
that  is  to  say  by  sensation  and  by  reflection ;  and  that  faith  is 
the  assent  given  to  a  proposition  based  upon  revelation,  that  is 
to  say  upon  an  extraordinary  communication  from  God  which 
has  made  it  known  to  man.  §  3.  But  a  man  inspired  of  God 
cannot  communicate  to  others  any  new  simple  idea,  because  he 
uses  only  words  or  other  signs  whicli  awake  in  us  the  simjih^ 
ideas  that  custom  has  attached  to  them  or  their  combination  ; 
and  whatever  new  ideas  St.  Paul  received  when  he  was  carried 
up  to  the  third  heaven,  all  tliat  he  could  say  was :  they  are 
things  eye  halh  not-  seen,  ear  hath  not  heard.,  and  which  have 
never  entered  into  the  heart  of  man}  Suppose  there  were  creat- 
ures in  the  jjlanet  Jupiter  provided  with  six  senses  and  that 
God  in  a  supernatural  way  gave  to  a  man  among  us  the  ideas  of 
this  sixth  sense,  he  could  not  by  moans  of  words  make  tlicm 

11  Cor.  2,  !). -Tu. 


584  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

spring  up  in  the  minds  of  other  men.^  We  must  then  distin- 
guish hetweeu  original  and  traditional  revelation.  The  first  is 
an  impression  which  God  makes  immediately  upon  the  mind, 
and  to  this  we  can  fix  no  limits  ;  the  other  comes  only  by  the 
ordinary  means  of  communication  and  cannot  give  new  simple 
ideas.  §  4.  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  truths  which  may  be 
discovered  by  reason  can  be  communicated  to  us  by  a  tradi- 
tional revelation,  as  if  God  had  desired  to  communicate  to  men 
geometrical  theorems,  but  this  would  never  amount  to  so  great 
a  certainty  as  if  we  had  their  demonstration  drawn  from  the 
connection  of  ideas.  It  is  also  as  if  Noah  had  a  more  certain 
knowledge  of  the  deluge  than  that  which  we  have  acquired 
from  the  book  of  Moses  and  as  if  the  assurance  of  one  v/ho  has 
seen  that  Moses  actuall}^  wrote  it  and  that  he  did  the  miracles 
which  justify  his  inspiration  was  greater  than  ours.  §  5.  This 
it  is  which  makes  it  impossible  for  revelation  to  go  against  the 
clear  evidence  of  reason,  because  whenever  the  revelation  is 
immediate  and  original  we  must  know  with  certainty  that  we 
are  not  deceived  in  attributing  it  to  God  and  that  we  compre- 
hend its  meaning ;  and  this  evidence  can  never  be  greater  than 
that  of  our  intuitive  knowledge ;  and  consequently  no  proposi- 
tion can  be  received  as  divine  revelation  when  it  is  contradic- 
torily opposed  to  this  immediate  knowledge.  Otherwise  there 
would  no  longer  remain  any  difference  in  the  world  between 
truth  and  falsehood,  any  measure  of  the  credible  and  incredi- 
ble. And  it  is  inconceivable  that  a  thing  comes  from  God,  this 
beneficent  author  of  our  being,  which  received  as  true  must 
overturn  the  foundations  of  our  knowledge  and  render  all  our 
faculties  useless.  §  6.  Those  who  have  revelation  only  medi- 
ately, or  by  tradition  from  mouth  to  mouth  or  by  writing,  have 
again  more  need  of  reason  to  assure  themselves  of  it.  §  7. 
Meanwhile  it  is  always  true  that  the  things  which  are  beyond 
what  our  faculties  can  discover  are  the  proper  matters  of  faith, 

1  Of.  Lessing's  amplification  of  a  similar  thought,  perhaps  suggested  by  this 
passage  of  Leibnitz,  in  his  Fragment:  Dass  mehr  als  filnf  S'uine  fiir  den 
Menschen  seiu  konnen,  Sdtiunt.  Schrift,  ed.  Lachmann-Maltzahn,  Leipzig, 
1853-1857,  Vol.  11,  Pt.  2,  p.  458.  On  tlie  relation  of  Lessing  to  Leibnitz,  cf. 
Zimmermann,  Leibniz  unci  Lessing,  Eine  StiuUe,  Wieu,  1855;  Piinjer,  Gesch. 
d.ch7nst.  Eelic/ionsphilosophle,  1,421-^5,  Eng.  trans.,  1,  5i)6-570;  Pfleiderer, 
Religionsphilosophie,  1,  143,  Eng.  trans.,  1,  145-146;  K.  Fischer,  Gesch.  d.  n. 
Philos.,  Bd.  II.,  Leibniz,  3d  ed.,  pp.  617-619.  —  Tr. 


nil]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING 


as  the  fall  of  tlie  rebellious  angels,  the  resurrection  of  the 
dead.  §  9.  Here  we  must  listen  solely  to  revelation.  And 
even  as  regards  probable  propositions  an  evident  revelation 
will  determine  us  against  the  probability. 

Th.  If  you  take  faith  as  that  which  is  grounded  in  the 
motives  of  credibility  (as  they  are  called)  and  detach  it  from 
the  internal  grace  which  immediately  determines  the  mind, 
all  that  you  say,  sir,  is  beyond  dispute.  It  must  be  admitted 
that  there  are  many  judgments  more  evident  than  those  de- 
pending upon  these  motives.  Some  are  urged  on  by  them  far- 
ther than  others,  and  there  are  indeed  many  persons  Avho  have 
never  known  them  and  still  less  considered  them  and  who  con- 
secpiently  have  not  even  that  which  might  pass  as  a  motive  of 
prohahility.  But  the  internal  grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  imme- 
diately supplies  it  in  a  supernatural  way,  and  this  it  is  which 
produces  what  the  theologians  properly  call  a  divine  faith. 
It  is  true  that  God  never  gives  it  except  when  the  belief  it 
produces  is  founded  in.  reason;  otherwise  he  would  destroy 
the  means  of  knowing  the  truth  and  open  the  door  to  enthu- 
siasm ;  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  all  who  have  this  divine 
faith  to  know  these  reasons  and  still  less  to  have  them  always 
before  their  eyes.  Otherwise  simple-minded  people  and  idiots, 
to-day  at  least,  would  never  have  the  true  faith,  and  the  most 
enlightened  would  not  have  it  when  they  were  most  in  need 
of  it,  for  they  cannot  always  remember  the  reasons  for  their 
belief.  The  question  of  the  use  of  reason  in  theology  has 
been  one  of  the  questions  most  discussed,  both  between  the 
Socinians  and  those  who  may  be  called  Catholics  in  a  general 
sense,  and  between  the  Reformers  and  the  Evangelicals,  as 
those  are  named  by  way  of  preference  in  Germany  whom  many 
inaptly  call  Lutherans.  I  remember  to  have  read  once  a  Meta- 
physic  of  one  Stegmann,^  a  Socinian  (a  different  man  from 
Joshua  Stegmann,^  who  himself  wrote  against  them),  which  so 

1  Cf.  Theodicee,  Discours  prelim.,  §  10,  where  Leibnitz  refers  to  liiin  as 
Christopher  Stegmann,  a  Socinian.  He  was  the  youngest  brother  of  Joachim 
Stegmann,  also  a  Socinian  and  author  of  many  works  on  mathematics  and 
theology,  who  died  in  exile  at  Clausenburg  in  Siebenbiirgen  in  1(JI52.  Cliristo- 
pher  wrote  a  work  entitled  J)yas  philosopliiat ,  wliich  is,  perhaps,  tlic  "  Meta- 
physic"  of  which  Leibnitz  here  speaks.  Fm-  furtlicr  account  of  him,  cf. 
Jocher,  AUgeme'ines  Gelehrten-Lcxicon,  Pt.  FV.,  794,  Leipzig,  IT-TO.  —  Tu. 

2  Joshua  Stegmann,  ir)88-l(>;52,  a  Lutheran  divine,  was  I'rnli'ssor  at  Leipzig, 
Wittenberg,  and  Rinteln,  and  tlie  author  of  many  theological  works,  and  of 


58G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

far  as  I  know  has  not  yet  been  printed  ;  on  the  other  hand,  one 
Kessler/  a  theologian  of  Saxony,  has  Avritten  a  Logic  and  some 
other  philosophical  treatises  expressly  opposed  to  the  Socinians. 
We  may  say  in  general,  that  the  Socinians  are  too  quick  to 
reject  everything  which  is  not  conformed  to  the  order  of 
nature,  even  when  they  cannot  prove  absolutely  its  impossi- 
bility. But  their  opponents  also  sometimes  go  too  far  and 
push  mystery  to  the  verge  of  contradiction ;  in  which  they 
injure  the  truth  they  try  to  defend.  I  was  surprised  to  see 
once  in  the  "  Summa  Theologise "  of  Father  Honore  Fabry,^ 
who  otherwise  was  one  of  the  most  clever  of  his  order,  which 
he  denied  in  divine  things  (as  do  also  some  other  theologians), 
this  great  principle  which  states  that  things  lohich  are  identical 
tvith  a  third  thing  are  identical  icith  each  other.     This  is  to  give 

the  famous  German  bymn,  "  Ach,  bleib'  mit  deiner  Gnade"'  (Eng.  trans,  in 
Lyi-a  Germanica,  2,  120,  "  Abide  among  ns  with  thy  grace,  Lord  Jesus,  ever- 
more"). He  was  opposed  to  the  Socinians  or  Photinians,  and  wrote  against 
them  his  Photinianismus,  h.  e.  Succincta  Refutatio  Errorum  Fhotlnianorum, 
qainqnaginta  sex  disputationibus  breviter  eomprehensa,  Rinteln,  1623,  8vo; 
Frankfort,  l(i43.  Leibnitz  mentions  him  again  in  the  Thcodicie,  Discours 
prelim.,  §  G2.  For  further  account  of  him,  cf.  "Winer,  Hundbuch  d.  theolog. 
Lit.,  1,  35i;  2,  748;  Jocher,  Allgemeines  Gelehrten-Lexicon,  Pt.  IV.,  794, 
Leipzig,  1750. — Tr. 

1  Andreas  Kessler,  1595-1643,  a  Lutheran  divine,  studied  at  Jena  and 
Wittenberg,  and  was  jjastor  at  Eisfeld,  Eisenach,  and  Coburg,  where  he  died 
in  consequence  of  a  stroke  of  apoplexy  received  while  jireaching.  He  wrote 
against  the  Socinians  or  Photinians  his  P/iysicse  PhotiniansB  examen,  Eisfeld, 
1628,  Wittenberg,  1650,  8vo ;  Metaphyslcse  Photiniana}  examen,  3d  ed.,  Witten- 
berg, 1648,  8vo ;  Logicss  Photlnianse  examen,  2d  ed.,  AA'ittenberg,  1624,  4to,  new 
ed.  1642,  8vo.  His  writings  exhibit  a  good  deal  of  method  and  exactness. 
Leibnitz  also  refers  to  him  in  the  Theodicee,  Discours  prelim.,  §  16.  For  fur- 
ther account  of  him,  cf.  Jocher,  Allgemeines  Gelehrten-Lexicon,  Pt.  II.,  2072, 
Leipzig,  1750.^ — Tr. 

2  Honore  Fabri,  1607-1688,  a  French  mathematician  and  philosopher,  and 
a  Jesuit,  who  taught  philosophy  and  mathematics  in  the  college  of  his  order 
at  Lyons,  and  later  became  Grand-Penitentiary  at  the  holy  office  in  Rome. 
Among  his  writings  are,  Synojjsis  geometrica,  Lugd.,  1669;  Physica  seu  sci- 
entia  i-erum  corporeaymm  in  decemtractatns  dl>itrihiita,  Lugd.,  1669;  Summula 
Theologias,  Lyons,  1669.  Leibnitz  regarded  him  as  one  of  the  most  distin- 
guished men  of  his  time,  and  frequently  mentioned  him  with  praise.  Cf. 
Theodicee,  Pt.  III.,  §  348;  Hypoth.  phys.  nova,  §§  56,  59,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz, 
philos.  Schrift.,  4,  208,  214,  216;  Theoria  motus  abstracti,  prope  fin.,  ibid., 
240,  and  Appendix  thereto,  containing  a  letter  of  Fabri  to  Leibuitz,  ibid.,  241- 
244,  and  of  Leibnitz  to  Fabri,  ibid.,  244-261  (also  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math. 
Sdn-ift.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  81-98).  For  another  Appendix  to  a  letter  of  Leibnitz 
to  Fabri,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  98-106,  trans. 
infra,  Appendix,  pp.  699  sq.  —  Tr. 


xviii]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  587 


a  gained  case  to  the  opponent  without  thinking  and  to  deprive 
all  reasoning  of  certainty.  Wc  must  say  rather  that  this 
principle  is  badly  applied.  The  same  author  rejects  in  his 
philosophy  the  virtual  distinctions,  which  the  Scotists  put 
into  created  things,  because  they  reversed,  he  says,  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction :  and  when  the  objection  is  made  to  him 
that  these  distinctions  must  be  admitted  in  God,  he  replies 
that  faith  orders  it.  But  how  can  faith  order  that,  whatever 
it  be,  which  reverses  a  principle  without  which  all  belief, 
affirmation,  or  negation  would  be  vain?  Two  propositions  true 
at  the  same  time  must  therefore  necessarily  not  be  wholly 
contradictory ;  and  if  A  and  C  are  not  the  same  thing,  it  is 
clearly  necessary  that  B  which  is  identical  with  A  be  taken 
otherwise  than  B  which  is  identical  with  C.  Nicolaus 
Vedelius,'  a  professor  at  Geneva  and  afterward  at  Deventer, 
once  published  a  book  entitled  "  Rationale  Theologicum,"  to 
which  Jean  Musteus,^  a  professor  at  Jena  (Avhich  is  an  Evan- 

1  Cf.  Theodic^e,  Discours  prelim.,  §§  20,  G7.  Nicolas  Vedel,  <'i  (ierman 
Reformed  (Calvinistic)  divine,  was  Professor  of  Philosopliy  and  miuister  at 
Geneva,  of  Theology  and  Hebrew  at  Deventer,  I(jo0-l(i38,  and  of  Theology 
at  Franeker  from  lGo8  till  his  death  in  1642.  He  was  a  great  adversary  of 
the  Arminians,  and  wrote  against  them  his  De  Arcanis  Arininianisini, 
Leyden,  1632-1(5.'!4.  His  Rationale  theologicum,  seit  de  necessitate  et  vera  usu 
pHnclpiorum  rationis  ac  philosophisB  in  controversiis  theologicis,  lib.  tres, 
Geneva,  1628,  was  attacked  by  Earth.  Nihus,  1584-1657,  in  his  Moi-osophiis 
sea  Vedelius  in  sito  ixitionali  ijrorsus  irrationalis,  Cologne,  ICAii,  as  well  as 
by  Mnsseus.  On  the  controversy  between  Vedelins  and  Miisauis,  (/.  Piinjer, 
Gesdi.  d.  Christ.  lieUgionsphilosophie,  1,  118-124,  Eng.  trans.,  159-1(17.  For 
further  account  of  Vedel,  cf.  "Winer,  llandhuch  d.  theol.  Lit.,  1,  353,  375,  565; 
J.  P.  Niceron,  Mem.  d'homvies.  Vol.  33,  1736.  —  Tr. 

-  Cf.  Th^odicde,  Discours  prelim.,  §§  20,  67.  Johannes  Musanis,  16i;!-1681, 
a  Tutheran  divine,  was  Professor  of  History,  1(!42-164(;,  and  of  Theology,  ]64(> 
till  his  death,  at  Jena.  He  was  the  greatest  Lutheran  divine  of  his  century 
after  J.  Gerhard,  1582-1637,  and  Geo."  Calixtns,  158(5-1656.  He  distinguished 
between  theology  and  the  confessions  and  favored  lil)erty  of  sciciililic  and 
theological  researches.  He  Avas  everywhere  acknow  lodged  as  a  very  learned 
man,  and  his  writings  are  distinguished  by  i)hilosophical  acuineu  so  thai  lie 
was  accused  of  "  magis  philosophari  ijuam  (|uod  lofjualur  eloquia  Dei."  lie 
wrote  in  defence  of  Christianity  against  Herbert  of  Clicrl)ury,  15.S1-1648,  a 
work  entitled  Be  lumhiis  naturse  et  ei  iiunxsa  theologix  nuturulis  iii.iiiJHcientiii 
ad  .saluteni,  Jena,  l(i67;  against  Spinoza,  his  Tractatus  theolog.-polit.,  etc., 
Jena,  1674  (on  Musieus  and  Spinoza,  cf.  Piinjer,  Gesch.  d.  christ.  Jicligions- 
philos.,  1,  322-323,  Eng.  trans.,  1,  4:!5).  His  J)e  usu  prineipiorum  rationis  rt 
p/iilosophlx  in  contromrsiis  theologicis  lib.  tres  Nic.  VciHii  Jiationali  Thro- 
logico  potissimuin  oppositi  appeared  at  Jena,  1644;  2d  ed.,  1(K;5.  For  furliicr 
account  of  Mustcus,  cf.  Herzog,  Realencyklopiidic ,  2d  cd.,  10,  376-380.  —  Tii. 


588  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [p.k.  iv 


gelioal  university  in  Thuringia),  wrote  anothev  book  in  oppo- 
sition upon  the  same  subject,  i.e.  upon  "  The  Use  of  Keason  in 
Theohigy."  I  remember  to  have  considered  these  formerly, 
and  to  have  remarked  that  the  principal  controversy  was  ob- 
scured by  incidental  questions,  as  when  it  is  asked, -what  a 
theological  conclusion  is,  and  whether  it  is  necessary  to  judge 
of  it  by  the  terms  which  compose  it,  or  by  the  means  which 
prove  it,  and  consequently  whether  Occam  ^  was  right  or  not  in 
saying  that  the  knowledge  of  one  and  the  same  conclusion  is 
the  same  whatever-  the  means  employed  to  prove  it;  and  he 
delays  upon  a  multitude  of  other  minutiae  of  still  less  import- 
ance, which  concern  only  terms.  Meanwhile  Musaeus  agreed 
with  him  that  the  principles  of  reason  necessary  by  a  logical 
necessity,  i.e.  the  opposite  of  which  implies  a  contradiction, 
must  and  may  be  employed  safely  in  theology ;  but  he  had 
reason  to  deny  that  what  is  only  necessary  by  a  physical  neces- 
sity (/.e.  founded  upon  induction  from  that  which  is  customary 
in  nature,  or  upon  natural  laws  which,  so  to  speak,  are  of  divine 
institution)  is  sufficient  to  refute  the  belief  in  a  mystery  or 
miracle,  since  it  depends  upon  God  to  change  the  ordinary 
course  of  things.  Thus  it  is  according  to  the  order  of  nature 
that  we  may  be  certain  that  one  and  the  same  person  cannot 
be  at  the  same  time  a  mother  and  a  virgin,  or  that  a  human 
body  cannot  fail  to  be  obvious  to  the  senses,  although  the 
contrary  of  both  may  be  possible  to  God.  Vedelius  also 
appears  to  agree  to  this  distinction.     But  we  sometimes  dis- 

1  William  of  Occam,  the  date  of  whose  birth  is  unknown,  and  who  died  at 
Munich  in  1347,  renewed  and  developed  Nominalism  in  the  form  of  Termi- 
tiism,  the  Termini  (concepts)  being  subjective  signs  of  really  existing  things, 
and  not  mere  names — flatus  vocis  —  as  so  frequently  regarded.  The  relations 
of  his  philosophy  to  subsequent  thinking  are  well  set  forth  by  Windelband- 
Tufts,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  pp.  312,  315,  325  sq.,  342  .sg.  For  Leibnitz's  view  of 
his  Nominalism,  cf.  De  stilo  j^hilos.  NizoUi,  §  28,  Erdmann,  68  b-6!)  b;  Ger- 
hardt,  4,  157-158.  On  his  life  and  philosophy,  cf.  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d. 
Mittelalters,  II.,  2  [Vol.  3],  986-1021;  Haure'au,  Hist.  d.  la  Philos.  scolastique, 
II.,  2  [Vol.  3],  356-4.30:  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik,  3,  327-420.  — Tr. 

2  Gerhardt  reads :  "quel  moyen  qu'on  employe,"  etc. ;  Erdmann,  Jacques, 
and  Janet  read:  "que  le  moyen  qu'on  eraploie,"  etc.,  i.e.  "as  the  means 
employed,"  etc.  Schaarschmidt,  in  his  translation,  follows  the  reading  of 
Enlmann,  Jacques,  and  Janet,  and  says  in  his  note  to  the  passage :  "  Dass  wir 
mit  andern  Worten  bei  unserra  Schlussverfahren  uns  nothwendig  im  Cirkel 
bewegten,"  i.e.  "  That  we,  in  other  words,  in  our  reasoning,  necessarily  moved 
in  a  circle."  The  correct  reading  can  be  determined  only  by  the  exact  lan- 
guage of  Occam,  which  thus  far  I  have  been  unable  to  find.  — Tr. 


en.  xviii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  589 

piite  about  certain  principles,  whether  they  are  logically 
necessary,  or  only  physically  so.  Such  is  the  dispute  with 
the  Socinians,  whether  substance  can  be  multiplied  when  the 
individual  essence  does  not  exist;  and  the  dispute  with  the 
Zwinglians,  whether  a  body  can  be  only  in  one  place.  Now 
we  must  admit  that  every  time  that  logical  necessity  is  not 
demonstrated,  we  can  presume  in  a  proposition  only  physical 
necessity.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  a  question  remains,  which 
the  authors  of  whom  I  have  just  spoken  have  not  sufficiently 
examined,  namely  this  :  Suppose  that  on  one  side  we  find  the 
literal  sense  of  a  text  of  Holy  Scripture,  and  on  the  other  a 
great  appearance  of  logical  impossibility,  or  at  least  an  ad- 
mitted 2)hysical  impossibility,  is  it  more  reasonable  to  deny  the 
literal  sense  or  the  philosophical  principle  ?  It  is  certain  that 
there  are  passages  where  to  abandon  the  letter  occasions  no 
difficulty,  as  when  Scripture  gives  hands  to  God  and  attributes 
to  him  anger,  penitence,  and  other  human  affections ;  other- 
wise it  would  be  necessary  to  array  ourselves  on  the  side  of 
the  anthropomorphists,  or  of  certain  English  fanatics  who 
believe  that  Herod  was  really  changed  into  a  fox  when 
Jesus  Christ  called  him  by  that  name.  It  is  here  that  the 
rules  of  interpretation  are  in  place,  and  if  they  furnish  nothing 
which  combats  the  literal  sense  in  order  to  favor  the  philo- 
sophic maxim,  and  if  in  addition  the  literal  sense  has  nothing 
which  attributes  to  God  any  imperfection,  or  entails  any 
danger  in  the  practice  of  piety,  it  is  safer  and  indeed  more 
reasonable  to  follow  it.  These  two  authors  whom  I  have  just 
named  dispute  further  upon  the  undertaking  of  Keckermann,' 

1  Bai'tholemew  Keckermann,  1573-1009,  a  vSemi-Ramist,  was  Professor  of 
Hebrew  at  Heidelberg,  and,  from  KiOl,  of  Tliilosophy  at  tlie  Gymnasium  at 
Dantzic.  He  was  the  author  of  many  compihitions,  made  for  tlie  use  of  his 
pnjnls  in  the  gymnasium,  in  which  he  presented  all  the  sciences  in  a  metliod- 
ical  and  systematic  form.  His  Opera  omnia  appeared  at  Geneva,  l(il4,  2 
vols.,  fol.  Leibnitz  refers  to  him  in  the  same  connection  in  the  Thcodiccc, 
Discours  prelim.,  §  50.  For  further  a(!Couut  (if  liim,  (/.  W.  Gass,  Gcsrh.  d. 
protefttantischen  Dogmatik  in  ihrrin  Zusainmenhanr/c,  mil  d.  Theohxjic,  Vol.  1, 
pp.  408  sq.  Punjer,  Gesch.  d.  christ.  Keliffionsphilos.,  1,  118,  127,  128,  Eiig. 
trans.,  1,  158,  170,  172,  bi-ietly  refers  to  liim. 

According  to  Schaarschmidt,  Keckermann's  proof  of  the  Trinity  from 
reason,  which  is  quite  closely  connected  with  that  of  Lully,  as  Lully's  with 
the  thoughts  of  Augustine,  is  found  in  his  Si/ntemu  ss.  flieolof/ix  (1st  od., 
1602;  2d  ed.,  Hanoviie,  1(107),  cliap.  3,  pp.  20  aq.,  3d  ed.,  Hauoviai,  1(115.  In 
the   introduction    Keckermann   expresses   himself  very  decidedly.      "  Fateor 


590  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

"W'ho  wished  to  demonstrate  the  Trinity  by  reason,  as  Raymond 
Lully  ^  had  also  tried  to  do  formerly.  But  Musaeus  acknowl- 
edged with  sufficient  fairness  that  if  the  demonstration  of  the 
Keformed  autlior  had  been  valid  and  just,  he  would  have  had 
nothing  to  say  on  the  subject ;  that  he  would  have  been  right  in 
maintaining  as  regards  this  article  that  the  light  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  might  be  illumined  by  philosophy.  They  have  also 
discussed  the  famous  question,  whether  those  who,  without 
any  knowledge  of  the  revelation  of  the  Old  or  Xew  Testament, 
died  iu  the  opinions  of  a  natural  piety,  could  have  been  saved 
by  this  means  and  obtained  the  remission  of  their  sins  ?     We 

equidem  ultro,  circa  mysterium  de  ss.  Triade,  ad  id  esse  oraneni  intellectum 
liumanum,  quod  est  oculus  vespertilionis  ad  solem,"  etc.  Keckermann's  de- 
monstration was  refuted  by  Musfeus  in  the  "Dissertatio  altera,"  appended  to 
bis  JJc  usu  princlp.  rallonis  et  philos.  in  coniroversiis  theolor^icis,  2d  ed.,  Jenje, 
1(565.  — Tr. 

1  Raymond  Lully,  12S4  or  123n-1315,  best  known  as  the  inventor  of  the 
"Great  Art,"  attempted  to  demonstrate  against  the  assertions  of  the  Aver- 
roists,  the  inherent  rationality  of  the  doctrines  of  Christianity.  His  Opera 
omnia,  10  vols.  (Vols.  7  and  8  probably  never  printed),  fol.,  ajspeared  at 
Maiuz,  1721-1742.  For  an  account  of  his  life  and  philosophy,  c/.  Stockl, 
GescJi.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  U.,  2  [Vol.  3],  924-9.52;  Erdmann,  Grand,  d. 
Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  §  20(i,  Vol.  1,  pp.  375-393,  Eng.  trans.,  1,  447-468;  Neander, 
Hist,  of  the  Christ.  Relig.  and  Church,  4,  65-71,  426,  435  sq. ;  for  his  Logic, 
cf.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik  im  Ahendlande,  3,  145-177.  Cf.  also  an  article 
by  Delecluse  in  the  "  Revue  de  Deux  Mondes,"  1840. 

Lully  occupied  himself  much  with  the  proof  of  the  Trinity,  discussing  it, 
according  to  Schaarschmidt,  in  his  Qusestiones  [Bisputalio  Erimitie  et  Ray- 
mitndi  —  Erdmann]  super  lib.  Sententiaruin,  Lib.  I.,  qujest.  6 ;  Bi-^putatio  fidelis 
(catliolici)  et  infidelis,  pp.  2,  3;  and  especially  in  the  IHsputatio  Jidei  et  intel- 
lectus,  Pt.  I.,  where  the  question  of  the  demonstrability  of  the  Trinity  is  con- 
sidered in  detail,  and  Pt.  11. ,  where  the  proof  is  attempted.  Schaarschmidt 
thinks  that  Leibnitz  probably  has  in  mind  this  last  work.  All  three  works 
are  found  in  Opera,  Vol.  4,  ed.  Mainz,  1729.  Stockl,  op.  cit.,  II.,  2  [Vol  3],  942- 
944,  gives  an  account  of  Lully's  argument  on  the  Trinity,  based  chiefly  on  the 
Articuli  Jidei  sacrosanctse,  found  in  the  collection  of  Lully's  works  entitled 
Opera  ea  qum  ad  inventam  a  Lullo  artem  universaUm  pertinent,  Argeutorati, 
1598, 1607,  and  1617,  and  also  iu  Opera,  Vol.  2,  ed.  Mainz,  1722.  In  his  list  of 
Lully's  works,  Stockl  cites  the  following  which  discuss  the  Trinity :  Liber  con- 
ti'adictionis  inter  Raiimundum  et  Averroistam  de  centum  syUogismis  circa 
mysterium  Trinitatis;  Liber  de  substantia  et  accidente  in  quo  probatur 
Trinitas.    Cf.  also  Neander,  op.  cit.,  4,  465. 

For  Leibnitz's  own  views  on  the  Trinity,  cf.  his  Defensio  Trinitatis  per 
nova  reperta  logica,  contra  Epistolam  Ariani,  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  ora.,  1,  W- 
16;  Duse  Epist.  ad  Ijwfleruni  de  Trinitate  et  Definitionibus  Mathematicis 
circa  Deum,  Spiritus,  etc.,  Dutens,  op.  cit.,  1,  17-23;  Remarques  sur  le  livre 
d'un  Antiti-initaire  Anglois,  etc.,  Dutens,  op.  cit.,  1,  24-27,  and  Feller,  Leibnit. 
Miscellanea,  No.  IV.,  pp.  8-15;  77«eWicee,  Discours  pre'lim.,  §  22;  Letter  to 
M.  B.,  1696,  Feller,  op.  cit..  No.  VIII.,  pp.  26  sq. —  Tii. 


CH,  xviii]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  591 


know  that  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Justin  Martyr,  and  St. 
Chrysostom  to  a  certain  extent  were  inclined  thereto,^  and 
indeed  I  once  showed  Pelisson  ^  that  a  number  of  excellent 
doctors  of  the  lioman  church,  far  from  condemning  non-opin- 
ionative  Protestants,  even  desired  to  save  the  heatlien  and  to 
maintain  that  the  persons  of  whom  I  have  just  spoken  could 
have  been  saved  by  an  act  of  contrition,  i.e.  penitence  groiinded 
in  the  love  of  benevolence,  in  virtue  of  Avhich  we  love  God 
above  everything,  because  his  perfections  render  him  supremely 
lovable.  This  brings  it  about  that  afterwards  we  are  led  with 
all  our  hearts  to  conform  to  His  will  and  to  imitate  His  per- 
fection in  order  the  better  to  unite  ourselves  with  Him,  since  it 
appears  right  for  G-od  not  to  refuse  his  grace  to  those  who  hold 
such  views.    Not  to  speak  of  Erasmus  and  of  Ludovicus  Vives,^ 

1  Clement  of  Alexandria,  born  c.  150-lCO,  date  and  place  of  death  \uikn<)wn. 
Cf.  Stromata  (or  Miscellanies),  Bk.  VI.,  chaps.  5  and  6.  —  Justin  Martyr, 
c.  114-c.  163.  Cf.  First  Apology,  chap.  4(i;  Second  Apoloqy,  chaps.  S  and  i;5. 
—  John  Chrysostoni,  c.  347-407.  Clement  and  Justin  entered  the  Christian 
church  as  thinkers  trained  in  Gi-eek  philosophy,  which  they  regai-ded  as  the 
gift  of  God  in  preparation  for  the  fuller  light  and  life  of  Christianity  —  -Justin 
in  particular  through  his  view  of  the  "spermatic  logos,"  "the  seed  of  reason 
implanted  in  every  race  of  men"  ;  while  Chrysostom,  trained  in  Greek  rheto- 
ric and  oratory,  took  a  similar  view  of  Greek  culture  as  from  God  and  not 
from  the  evil  one.  All  three  wonld  naturally  look  upon  those  who  lived  up 
to  the  light  they  had  as  likely  to  receive  more  in  due  time,  and  to  accept  it 
and  live  in  it  when  it  came.  —  Tr. 

2  Paul  Fontanier-Pellisson,  1()24-1693,  born  and  educated  a  Protestant,  fol- 
lowed at  first  the  profession  of  the  law,  but  afterwards  abandoned  it  for  that 
of  literature.  He  held  several  public  offices,  among  others  that  of  histori- 
ographer to  Louis  XIV.  To  obtain  this  position  he  was  obliged  to  become  a 
Catholic.  He  published  a  large  number  of  works,  anumg  whicli  was  a  Latin 
paraphrase  of  the  first  book  of  the  Institutes  of  Justinian,  lfi45 ;  Histoire  de 
r Academie frcmraise  jusqu'en  1662,  1053,  8vo;  Traite  de  I'Euehnristie,  1()94, 
12mo,  and  other  religious  works.  He  corresponded  extensively  with  Leibnitz 
on  religious  and  theological  subjects.  The  correspondence  is  contained  in  his 
Reflexions  siir  les  differends  en  matiere  de  religion,  1(!86,  and  following  years, 
4  vols.,  12nio.  Portions  of  the  same  in  Dutens,  Leibnitz  op.  om.,  1,  (i78  sq. ; 
most  complete  in  Foucher  de  Careil,  (Euvre.'i  de  Leibniz,  Vol.  1.  For  tlie 
letter  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz,  cf.  Dutens,  op.  ril.,  1,  ()81-(J.S4,  Foucher  de 
Careil,  op.  cit.  1,  r)5-()() ;  for  Pellisson's  r('i)li('s,  <f.  Dutens,  op.  cil.,  1,  (>!I7,  7i)0- 
702,  Foucher  de  Careil,  op.  cit.,  1,  9(M)2,  iXi-lOO.  For  account  of  the  coutrovei'sy, 
cf.  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz,  Sine  Bioy.,  Pt.  II.,  35  .s-Qf.  —  Tk. 

3  Juan  Luis  Vives,  1492-1540,  a  Spanish  scholar  and  philosopher,  a  younger 
contemporary  and  friend  of  Erasmus,  14()7-153f;,  and  for  a  time  the  instructor 
of  the  Princess  Mary,  daughter  of  Henry  VIII.,  was  a  persistent  and  suci^ess- 
ful  opponent  of  scholastic  Aristotelianism,  and,  as  an  advocate  of  the  direct 
study  of  Nature  by  the  way  of  experiment,  the  jirecursor  of  Descartes  and 
Uacon.    His  Opera  otimia  appeared  at  Basle,  1555,  2  vols.,  fob,  and  at  Valencia, 


592  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

I  bring  forward  the  view  of  Jaques  Payva  Andradius,^  a 
Portuguese  doctor  very  celebrated  in  his  time,  who  was  one 
of  the  theologians  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  and  Avho  said  indeed 
that  those  who  did  not  agree  with  this  view  made  God  supremely 
cruel  (neque  enim,  inquit,  immanitas  deter ior  ulla  esse  potest). 
Pelisson  found  difficulty  in  finding  this  book  in  Paris,  an  indi- 
cation that  authors  esteemed  in  their  time  are  often  neglected 
afterwards.  This  is  what  made  Bayle  think  that  many  cite 
Andradius  only  upon  the  testimony  of  Chemnitius,-  his  antag- 
onist. This  may  indeed  be  so,  but  for  myself  I  had  read  him 
before  quoting  him;  and  his  disputes  -with  Chemnitius  made 
him  celebrated  in  Germany,  for  he  had  written  in  behalf  of  the 
Jesuits  against  this  author,  and  we  find  in  his  book  some  par- 

1782-1790, 8  vols.,  fol.  On  his  life  and  philosophy,  c/".  Stockl,  Gesch.  <J.  Philos.  d. 
MiitelaUers,  III.  [Vol.  4],  285-287 ;  Ueberweg-Heioze,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  7th  ed., 
1888,  Vol.  3,  pp.  24,  25 :  Lange,  Gesch.  d.  Materialisiaus,  Vol.  1,  p.  106,  Iserlohn, 
18()(),  Eng.  trans.,  1,  228,  2d  ed.,  Boston,  1879;  and  Lange's  article  on  "  Vives," 
in  Encijlcl.  d.  ges.  Erzieh.-  u.  UnteiTichtswesen,  Vol.  9,  pp.  737-814. — Tr. 

1  Diego  Payva  d'Andrada,  1528-1575,  a  celebrated  theologian  of  one  of  the 
most  noble  Portuguese  families,  who,  after  completing  his  studies  chietiy  in 
the  Scriptures  and  the  Fathers,  devoted  himself  with  zeal  to  missions  for 
Instructing  the  ignorant,  and  was  sent  at  the  age  of  thirty-three  by  King 
Sebastian  of  Portugal  to  the  Council  of  Trent  to  assist  as  a  theologian.  There 
he  composed  his  Orthodoxarum  explicationum  de  reUgionis  Christiana:  capi- 
tibus  lib.  X.  adversus  hmreticos,  contra  Chemnicium,  Venetiis,  1564,  Svo; 
and  his  Defensio  Tridentinse  fidei  catholicae  et  integerrimse  V.  lib.  compre- 
hensa  adversus  hsereticorum  dctestabilcs  calumnias  et  praesertlm  ilartini 
Chemnicii  Germani,  Olyssipone,  1578,  4to,  Ingolstadt,  1580,  Svo.  In  the  lat- 
ter book  he  maintained  the  opinions  of  Zwingli  and  Erasmus  on  the  salvation 
of  the  heathen,  in  consequence  of  which  the  book  was  much  quoted  by  Prot- 
estants. Leibnitz  refers  to  him  in  this  same  connection  in  the  Theodicee,  Pt.  I., 
§  Of) ;  in  an  excerpt  from  a  letter  to  a  friend  written  Xov.  1697,  cf.  Dutens, 
Leibnit.  op.  om.,  1,  33;  in  his  letters  to  Pellisson,  Dutens,  op.  cit.,  1,  683, 
Foucher  de  Careil,  (Einn-es  de  Leibniz,  1,  65-66;  and  in  his  letters  to  Ant. 
INIagliabechius,  Xo.  28,  26  Nov.,  6  — Dec,  1697,  Dutens,  op.  cit.,  5,  121,  and  to 
Job.  Fabricius,  Prof,  at  Helmstadt,  No.  16,  Sept.  20,  1698,  Dutens,  op.  cit., 
5,  2.35.  —  Tr. 

2  Martin  Chemnitz,  1522-1586,  a  German  Lutheran  theologian,  a  disciple  of 
Melancthon,  1497-1560,  and  said  to  be  the  ablest  theologian  of  the  period  imme- 
diately succeeding  Luther,  was  Professor  of  Theology  at  Wittemberg,  1551-1554, 
and  then  for  thirty  years  pastor  at  Brunswick.  To  him  more  than  to  any  other 
the  Lutheran  church  owes  its  purity  of  doctrine  and  compact  organization. 
His  Loci  Theologici,  Frankfort,  1591,  is  one  of  the  best  expositions  of  Lutheran 
theology  as  modified  by  Melancthon.  His  greatest  work,  the  Ei-amen  Con- 
cilii  Tridcntini,  appeared  at  Frankfort  in  four  parts,  156.5-1573,  again  in  1585, 
4  vols.,  fol.,  and  in  later  eds.  For  further  account  of  Chemnitz,  cf.  Scheukel's 
article  in  Herzog,  Pcaiencyclop.,  2d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1878,  Vol.  3,  pp.  184-192. 
Leibnitz  refers  to  him  also  in  the  Theodicee,  Discours  prelim.  §  67.  —  Tr. 


en.  xviii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  593 


ticulars  touching  tlie  origin  of  this  famous  society.  I  have 
remarked  that  some  Protestants  called  those  Andradians,  who 
were  of  his  opinion  upon  the  subject  of  which  I  have  just  spoken. 
There  have  been  authors  who  have  written  expressly  upon  the 
salvation  of  Aristotle  upon  the  basis  of  these  same  principles 
with  the  approbation  of  the  Censors.  The  books  also  of  Collins  ^ 
in  Latin  and  La  Mothe  le  Vayer  ^  in  French  on  the  salvation  of 
the  heathen  are  well  known.     But  a  certain  Franciscus  Puccius  ^ 

1  Francesco  Collio  — Latin,  Collins  ("  Collins  "  being  a  misprint  for  "  Col- 
lius"  in  all  the  editions  of  Leibnitz's  text)  —was  an  Italian  theologian  of 
great  learning,  a  doctor  of  the  Ambrosian  College  at  Milan,  and  Grand  Peni- 
tentiary of  the  diocese  of  Milan  from  IGol  till  his  death  in  IGIO.  In  his  De  ani- 
mabus puganorum,  2  vols.,  ito,  Mediol.  1622-1623, 2d  ed.,  1738-1740,  he  discussed 
the  question  of  the  eternal  salvation  of  the  pagans,  deciding  as  to  the  fate  of 
individuals  on  the  ground  of  their  knowledge  of  divine  things,  their  moral 
life,  sentimeuts  and  writings,  aud  the  testimony  regarding  therii  given  by  eccle- 
siastical and  profane  writers.  He  considers  Aristotle  as  unsaved.  Dupiii, 
Bibl.  des  AiU.  eccles.,  1711,  tom.  17,  pp.  lO'J-llG  sq.,  gives  ahmg  abstract  from 
this  work,  and  an  estimate  of  its  character  aud  value.  Qf.  also  Tiraljosclii, 
Storia  della  Letteratura  Italluna,  Vol.  14  [Tomo  VIII,  Parte  Prima,  ed.  Rome, 
1782-1784],  pp.  167-168,  Milan,  1824.  — Tr. 

-  Francois  de  La  Mothe  le  Vayer,  1588-1672,  a  French  writer  and  philos- 
ojiher,  was  from  1652-1660  the  instructor  of  Louis  XIV.  of  France,  for  whom 
he  composed  many  elementary  treatises  on  various  subjects  of  study.  The  book 
here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz  is  his  De  la  vertu  des  paiens,  Paris,  1()42,  4to., 
3d  ed.,  1647.  The  subject  is  treated  in  the  conclusion  of  Pt.  I.,  cf.  (Eiwres, 
Vol.  1,  p.  582,  Paris,  A.  Courbe,  1662.  The  best  ed.  is  that  published  at  Dres- 
den, 1756-1759,  7  vols,  in  14, 8vo.  The  De  la  vertu  des  paiens — avec  les  preuves 
des  citations  mises  sous  le  texte  —  is  found  in  Vol.  5,  pp.  1  sq.  of  this  ed. 
Le  Vayer  goes  back  to  the  Church  Fathers  and  later  ecclesiastical  writers, 
and  gives  much  literature.  —  Tr. 

3  Francesco  Pucci,  an  Italian  theologian  (died  1660),  was  led  to  devote  him- 
self to  theology  by  his  participation  in  religious  controversies  at  Lyons,  whither 
he  had  gone  to  learn  commerce.  Adopting  mostly  Protestant  ideas,  he  went 
to  England,  where  he  received  an  Oxford  M.A.  in  1574.  Opposing,  in  his  J)e 
fide  ill  Deum,  quss  et  qualis  sit,  the  Calvinism  then  ruling  at  Oxford,  he  went 
to  Basle  and  joined  himself  to  F.  Sociuus,  but  soon  returned  to  England  in 
consequence  of  persecution  on  account  of  his  views  on  universal  grace,  i)ut 
forth  in  theses  entitled  Universmn  genus  humanum  in  ipso  matris  utero 
efficacite?-  pai-ticeps  esse  beneflciorum  Cliristi  et  vitse  immortalis  et  bealx,  etc. 
He  finally  became  a  Catholic,  1588,  and  secretary  of  Cardinal  Pompei.  In  liis 
De  immortalitate  naturali  pnmi  hominis  ante  peccatmn  hecombatted  certain 
ideas  of  Socinus,  and  in  his  De  Christi  Salvationis  efflcacitate  omnibus  et  sin- 
gulis liondnibus  quatenus  hondnes  sunt  assertio  calholiea,  Gouda,  15!)2,  8vo, 
he  maintained  the  view  that  all  men  could  be  saved  through  the  milural  jjowcr 
of  reason,  or  through  the  natural  belief  in  the  Creator.  He  proposed  to  prove 
by  Scripture  and  the  Fathers  that  (Jhrist  by  his  deatli  made  satisfaction  for  all 
men,  so  that  all  having  a  natural  knowledge  of  God  will  be  saved,  although 
having  no  knowledge  of  Jesus  Christ.  —  Tr. 
2q 


594  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

went  too  far.  St.  Augustine,  wholly  clever  and  penetrating  as 
he  was,  threw  himself  into  another  extreme  view,  even  con- 
demning infants  dying  without  baptism,^  and  the  Scholastics 
appear  to  have  been  right  in  abandoning  it ;  although  persons 
otherwise  clever  and  some  of  great  merit,  but  of  a  disposition  a 
little  misanthropic  in  this  respect,  desired  to  revive  this  doctrine 
of  this  Father  and  have  perhaps  exaggerated  it.  This  spirit 
also  may  have  had  some  influence  in  the  dispute  between  several 
excessively  vehement  doctors  and  the  Jesuit  missionaries  in 
China,  who  had  insinuated  that  the  ancient  Chinese  had  had 
the  tru^e  religion  of  their  time  and  the  true  saints,  and  that  the 
doctrine  of  Confucius  was  in  no  respect  idolatrous  or  atheistic. 
It  seems  that  there  was  more  reason  in  Rome  in  being  unavailing 
to  condemn  one  of  the  greatest  nations  without  understanding  it. 
It  is  well  for  us  that  God  is  more  philanthropic  than  men.  I 
know  some  persons  who,  thinking  to  show  their  zeal  by  severe 
opinions,  fancy  that  we  cannot  believe  in  original  sin  vvdthout 
being  of  their  opinion,  but  in  this  they  are  mistaken.  And  it 
does  not  follow  that  those  who  justify  the  heathen,  or  others 
who  lack  ordinary  aid,  must  attribute  it  to  the  forces  of  nature 
only  (although  perhaps  some  Fathers  were  of  this  opinion),  since 
we  may  maintain  that  God  in  giving  them  the  grace  exciting 
an  act  of  contrition  gives  them  also,  either  explicitly  or  virtu- 
ally, but  always  in  a  supernatural  way,  before  they  die,  even  if 

1  On  this  and  the  iminediate  context,  cf.  Theodicee,  Pt.  I.,  §§  92-95,  Pt.  III., 
§  283.  Augustine's  ^dew  is  found  in  his  works  passim.  Cf.,  among  others, 
Enchir.  ad  Laurent.,  chap.  43;  De  nuptiis  et  coticiipiseenfia,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  22, 
with  which  cf.  Contra  Julianum  Pelugiamim,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  12  (infants  under 
the  power  of  the  devil  on  account  of  original  sin  —  the  "  potestas  diaholi  "  is 
"peccatum  originale"),  and  Bk.  V.,  chap.  44;  Contra  duns  epM.  Pelag., 
Bk.  IV.,  chap.  4 ;  De  peccato?-um  tneritis  et  Remissione  et  de  Baptismo  Parvu- 
lorum,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  25,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  7;  I)e  peccato  oric/inale,  chap.  36;  De 
civitate  Dei,  Bk.  XIII.,  chap.  14.  Cf.  also  Shedd,  Hist,  of  Christ.  Doct..  2,  7(3, 
note  2,  77,  note  1;  Hagenbach,  Hist,  of  Doct.,  ed.  H.  "b.  Smith,  1,  360,  and 
trans,  from  later  German  ed.  T.  &  T.  Clark,  1880,  3  vols..  Vol.  2,  pp.  73  .$q. 
Augustine  believed  that  infants  because  of  hereditary  depravity  —  original 
sin  — belonged  to  the  "  massa  perditionis,"  and,  unless  relieved  from  the  pen- 
alty therein  inhering  by  the  sacrameiit  of  baptism,  which  was  thus  a  means  of 
salvation  to  the  infant,  must  incur  the  penalty  and  be  lost.  Their  condemna- 
tion, however,  since  they  were  guilty  of  no  personal  sin,  would  be  the  lightest 
of  all —  "  in  damnatione  omnium  levissima  "  (C.  Jul.  Pelag.,  V.  44) . 

For  a  brief,  but  most  excellent  and  satisfactory,  di.scussion  of  the  Salvation 
of  Infants,  cf.  E.  G.  Robinson,  Clm.itian  Theology,  §  28,  pp.  164-169,  Roches- 
ter, N.  Y.,  Press  of  E.  R.  Andrews,  1894.  —Tr. 


CH.   xviii]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  595 

only  at  the  last  moment,  all  the  light  of  faith  and  all  the  warmth 
of  love  necessary  to  their  salvation.  Thus  it  is  that  the  Reform- 
ers explain  with  Vedelius  the  view  of  Zwingli/  who  had  also 
expressed  the  same  view  upon  this  point  of  the  salvation  of  the 
virtuous  men  of  Paganism,  as  the  doctors  of  the  Roman  church 
have  done.  This  doctrine  also  has  nothing  in  common  for  that 
reason  with  the  particular  doctrine  of  the  Pelagians  or  Semi- 
Pelagians,  from  which  we  know  that  Zwingli  Avas  far  removed. 
And  since  we  teach  against  the  Pelagians  a  supernatural  grace 
in  all  those  who  possess  faith  (in  which  the  three  received 
religions  agree,  excepting  perhaps  the  disciples  of  Pajon)  -  and 
as  they  allow  also  either  faith  or  at  least  similar  movements  to 
infants  who  receive  baptism,  it  is  not  very  extraordinary  to 
allow  as  much  at  least  in  the  article  of  death  to  persons  of  good 
will  who  have  not  had  the  good  fortune  to  be  instructed  as 
usual  in  Christianity.^  But  the  part  of  the  wisest  is  to  deter- 
mine nothing  upon  points  so  little  known,  and  to  content  him- 
self with  the  general  judgment  that  God  can  do  nothing  which 
is  not  full  of  goodness  and  justice:  melius  est  dubitare  de 
occultis  quam  Utigare  de  incertis  (Augustine,  lib.  8,  Genes,  ad 
lit.  c.  5). 

1  Ulrich  Zwino'li,  1484-1531,  introduced  the  Reformation  info  Rwitzorlaiid 
about  the  same  time  that  Luther,  1483-154(i,  introduced  it  into  Germany. 
His  view  on  the  salvation  of  tlie  heatlien,  a  consequence  of  liis  mikhu'  view 
of  original  sin  or  innate  depravity,  is  found  in  his  Christ.  FidH  Jyrevla  ot  clara 
expositio,  Werke,  ed.,  Schuler  u.  Schulthess,  Ziirich,  1828-1842,  8  vols.,  Vol. 
4,  pp.  42-78.  In  his  treatise  De  Providentia  {ihhl.,Yd\.  4,  pp.  7!t-144)  he 
advanced  the  principle  that  pagans  who  have  acknowledged  the  true  God 
and  have  led  a  good  life,  such  as  Socrates  and  Seneca,  are  capable  of  beiiig 
saved  without  faith;  and  he  extended  this  principle  to  all  who  have  no 
knowledge  of  the  gospel.  —  Tr. 

2  Claude  Pajon,  l(52()-]685,  a  French  Protestant  theologian.  Professor  of 
Theology  at  Saumer,  1666,  and  later  pastor  at  Orleans.  I^jou  taught  tliat 
in  conversion  the  Holy  Spirit  did  not  act  immediately  or  irresistibly  upon  the 
heart,  but  that  the  soul  was  itself  active  in  tlic  work  of  salvation,  allowing 
itself  to  be  convinced  by  the  efficacious  woi'd  of  truth  found  in  Scrii)turc  witii 
which  the  Spirit's  influence  was  intimately  united.  His  views  were  oppo.sed 
by  both  Lutherans  and  Reformed.  For  further  account  of  him,  of.  Alex. 
Schweizer,  Ge?it.ral-Dof/ineii  d.  Reform.  Kirch r,  2  vols.,  18.')4-1H.~)6,  Vol.  2,  i»p. 
564-663,  and  in  Hcrzog,  Reulencydop.  2d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1883,  Vol.  11,  pp.  161- 
163;  W.  Gass,  Gesch.  d.  prot.  Dof/matik,  2,  3.59  .s^. — Tit. 

3  Of.  Feller,  Otium  Hanoveranurn,  No.  LXXXVIH.,  pp.  181-bs:;  (Dntms,  i;, 
311,  312).  — Tr. 


59G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 


CHAPTER  XIX 

OF    ENTHUSIASM 

§  1.  Ph.  [Would  to  Grod  that  all  theologians  and  St.  Angns- 
tine  himself  had  always  practised  the  maxim  expressed  in 
this  passage.]  But  men  think  that  the  dogmatic  spirit  is  an 
indication  of  their  zeal  for  the  truth,  while  it  is  w^holly  the 
contrary.  We  love  the  truth  in  reality  only  in  proportion  as 
we  love  to  examine  the  proofs  which  make  it  what  it  is.  And 
when  we  jiidge  hastily  we  are  always  pressed  by  less  sincere 
motives.  §  2.  The  spirit  of  authority  is  not  one  of  the  less 
common  motives,  and  a  certain  satisfaction  it  has  in  its  own 
reveries  is  another  motive  which  causes  enthusiasm  to  spring 
up.  §  3.  This  is  the  name  which  is  given  to  the  failing  of 
those  who  believe  an  immediate  revelation  when  it  is  not 
grounded  in  reason.  §  4.  And  as  we  may  say  that  reason  is  a 
natural  revelation  of  which  God  is  the  author,  just  as  he  is 
the  author  of  nature,  we  may  also  say  that  revelation  is  a  super- 
natural reason,  i.e.  a  reason  extended  upon  the  basis  of  new 
discoveries  emanating  directly  from  God.  But  these  discov- 
eries suppose  that  we  have  the  means  of  discerning  them, 
"which  is  reason  itself;  and  to  desire  to  proscribe  reason  in 
order  to  make  way  for  revelation  would  be  to  pluck  out  the 
eyes  the  better  to  see  the  satellites  of  Jupiter  through  a  tele- 
scope. §  5.  The  source  of  enthusiasm  is  that  an  immediate 
revelation  is  more  convenient  and  shorter  than  the  long  and 
diiiicidt  process  of  reasoning  which  is  not  always  followed  b}^ 
a  happy  result.  Men  have  been  seen  in  all  ages  whose  melan- 
choly mingled  with  devotion,  united  with  the  good  opinion 
they  have  had  of  themselves,  has  made  them  believe  that  they 
had  an  altogether  different  intercourse  -with  God  from  other 
men.  They  suppose  he  has  promised  it  to  them  and  believe 
themselves  his  people  preferably  to  others.  §  6.  Their  fancy 
becomes  an  illumination  and  a  divine  authority,  and  their 
plans  are  an  infallible  direction  from  heaven,  which  they  are 
oljliged  to  follow.  §  7.  This  view  has  produced  great  results 
and  caused  great  evils,  for  a  man  acts  more  vigorously  when 


CH.  XIX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  597 


he  follows  his  own  impulses  and  when  the  opinion  of  a  divine 
authority  is  sustained  by  his  inclinations.  §  8.  It  is  dilhcult 
to  draw  him  therefrom,  because  this  pretended  certainty  Avith- 
out  proof  flatters  his  vanity  and  love  for  that  which  is  extraor- 
dinary. Fanatics  compare  their  opinions  to  sight  and  feeling. 
They  see  the  divine  light  as  we  see  that  of  the  sun  at  noon 
without  needing  the  twilight  of  their  reason  to  show  it  to  them. 
§  9.  They  are  certain  because  they  are  certain,  and  their  per- 
suasion is  right  because  it  is  strong,  for  this  is  the  result  to 
which  their  figurative  language  reduces  itself.  §  10.  But  as 
there  are  two  perceptions,  that  of  the  proposition  and  that  of 
the  revelation,  we  may  ask  them  where  is  clearness.  If  it  is 
in  the  sight  of  the  proposition,  what  good  is  revelation  ?  It 
must  then  be  in  the  feeling  of  revelation.  But  how  can  they 
see  that  it  is  God  who  reveals  and  not  a  will-of-the-wisp  Avhich 
leads  them  around  this  circle :  this  is  a  revelation  because  I 
believe  it  strongly,  and  I  believe  it  because  it  is  a  revelation. 
§  11.  Is  there  anything  more  suited  to  throw  one  into  error 
than  to  take  the  imagination  for  a  guide  ?  §  12.  St.  Paul  had 
great  zeal  when  he  persecuted  the  Christians  and  did  not  allow 
himself  to  be  mistaken.  We  know  that  the  devil  has  had 
martyrs,  and  if  it  is  sufficient  to  be  well  persuaded  we  shall  not 
be  able  to  distinguish  the  delusions  of  KSatan  from  the  inspira- 
tions of  the  Holy  Spirit.  §  14.  It  is  then  the  reason  which 
makes  known  the  truth  of  revelation.  §  15.  And  if  our 
belief  proved  it,  it  would  be  the  circle  of  which  I  just  spoke. 
The  holy  men  who  received  the  revelations  of  God  had  external 
signs  which  persuaded  them  of  the  truth  of  the  inner  light. 
Moses  saw  a  bush  which  burned  without  being  consumed,  and 
heard  a  voice  from  the  midst  of  the  bush,  and  God,  in  order  to 
give  him  more  assurance  concerning  his  mission  when  he  sent 
him  to  Egypt  to  deliver  his  brethren,  made  use  of  the  miracle 
of  the  rod  changed  into  a  serpent,  (rideon  was  sent  by  an 
angel  to  deliver  the  people  of  Israel  from  the  yoke  of  the  Mid- 
ianites ;  yet  he  demanded  a  sign  in  order  to  be  convinced  that 
this  commission  was  given  him  on  the  part  of  God.  §  K).  I 
do  not,  however,  deny  that  God  sometimes  illumines  tlic  minds 
of  men,  in  order  to  make  them  understand  certain  im])()rtant 
truths  or  to  lead  them  to  good  acts,  by  tlie  immediate  influence 
and  assistance  of  the  Holy  Spirit  without  any  extraordinary 


598  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

sign  accompanying  this  influence.  But  in  these  cases  also  we 
have  reason  and  Scripture,  two  infallible  rules  for  judging  of 
these  illiuuinations ;  for  if  they  agree  with  these  rules  we  run 
at  least  no  risk  in  regarding  them  as  inspired  of  God,  although 
it  is  not  perhaps  an  immediate  revelation. 

Th.  Enthusiasm  was  at  the  beginning  a  good  term.  And  as 
the  sophism  properly  indicates  an  exercise  of  wisdom,  enthusi- 
asm signifies  that  there  is  a  divinity  in  us.  Est  Deiis  in  nobis} 
Socrates  maintained  that  a  god  or  dtemon  ^  gave  him  internal 
warnings,  so  that  enthusiasm  would  be  a  divine  instinct.  But 
men  ha^dng  consecrated  their  passions,^  fancies,  dreams,  and 
even  their  anger  as  something  divine,  enthusiasm  began  to  sig- 
nify a  mental  disturbance  attributed  to  the  influence  of  some 
divinity,  which  is  supposed  to  be  in  those  who  are  smitten  there- 
■\^dth ;  for  the  soothsayers,  male  and  female,  showed  a  mental 
derangement,  when  their  god  seized  them,  as  the  Cumsean 
Sibyl  in  Vergil.^  Since  then  we  attribute  it  to  those  who  be- 
lieve "vsdthout  foundation  that  their  movements  come  from  God. 
Nisus  in  the  same  poet  thinking  himself  pressed  by  I  know 
not  wha.t  impulse  to  a  dangerous  enterprise,  in  which  he  per- 
ished -tt-ith  his  friend,  proi)Osed  it  to  him  in  these  terms  full  of 
a  reasonable  doubt :  — 

Di  ne  hunc  ardorem  mentibus  addunt, 
Euryale,  an  sua  cuique  Deus  fit  dira  cupido  ?  * 

1  Ovid,  Fasti,  6,  5:  "  Est  Deus  in  nobis,  agitante  calescimus  illo."  —  Tk. 

2  On  the  dsemou  of  Socrates,  cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  GHech.,  II.,  1  \Yo\.  3], 
73-91,  4th  ed.,  Leipzig,  1880:  .J.  S.  Bladcie,  Four  PJias^s  of  J/o;-«?.s,  pp.  12.5- 
1'27,  Xew  York,  1872;  H.  Jackson,  "On  the  Saiuofioi-  of  Socrates"  in  the 
"Journal  of  Philology,"  V.,  and  article  "  Socrates,"  Ena/clop.  Brit.,  9th  ed., 
Vol.  22,  p.  2H')  (Amer.  reprint).  — Tr. 

3  Cf.  Vergil,  yEneid,  6,  49:  "  Et  rahie  fera  corrla  tnment."  The  view  here 
mentioned  by  Leibnitz,  that  persons  gifted  ^th  inspiration  or  enthusiasm 
were  also  affected  with  some  derangement  or  disturbance  of  the  ordinary  men- 
tal processes,  was  current  in  one  form  or  another  throughout  all  anticniity, 
and  had  its  influence,  through  the  contact  of  Greek  thought  with  Chris- 
tianity, in  shaping  the  Christian  doctrine  of  inspiration.  Cf.  Plato,  Phsedtiis, 
244,  Jowett's  trans.,  2d  ed.,  187.5,  2,  121,  .Sd  ed.,  1S92,  1,  449^.50:  Ion.  533-oa4, 
Jowett,  2d  ed.,  1,  247-248,  3d  ed.,  1,  501-503;  Tnitseas,  71-72,  Jowett,  2d  ed.,  3, 
6r.4-fi5fi,  .3d  ed.,  3,  492-494;  the  Stoic  view,  Zeller,  PhUos.  d.  Griech.,  III.,  1 
[Vol.  5],  .336  sq.,  Plutarch,  ibid.,  III.,  2  [Vol.  6],  193  sq.,  Philo,  414  sq.,  Plo- 
tinus,  (ill  sq. ;  Pfleiderer,  Rdigionsphilosophie,  2d  ed.,  1884,2,  339  >«5.,  Eng. 
trans.,  4,  4(j  sq.  —  Tr. 

4  Verg.  Aen.  9,  184-185.  —  Tr. 


CH.  xix]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  599 


He  ceased  not  to  follow  this  instinct  althongh  he  knew  not 
whether  it  came  from  fxocl  or  from  an  unfortunate  desire  to 
distinguish  himself.  But  if  he  had  been  successful,  he  would 
not  have  failed  to  acquire  authority  in  another  case  and  to 
think  himself  impelled  by  some  divine  poAver.  The  enthusi- 
asts of  the  present  think  that  they  receive  also  from  God  the 
dogmas  which  they  observe.  The  Quakers  belong  to  this  per- 
suasion, and  Barclay,  their  first  systematic  author,  maintains 
that  they  find  in  themselves  a  certain  light  Avhich  is  made 
known  by  itself.^  But  why  call  that  light  which  reveals  noth- 
ing ?  I  know  that  there  are  some  persons  of  this  disposition 
of  mind  who  see  sparks  and  even  something  more  luminous, 
but  this  image  of  material  light  excited  when  their  minds  are 
aroused  gives  no  light  to  the  mind.  Some  idiots  with  a  restless 
imagination  form  conceptions  which  they  had  not  before ;  they 
are  in  a  condition  to  say  fine  or  at  least  very  animated  things 
in  their  opinion;  they  admire  themselves  and  make  others 
admire  this  fertility  which  passes  for  inspiration.  This  ad- 
vantage comes  to  them  largely  from  a  vivid  imagination  which 
passion  rouses  and  from  an  excellent  memory  which  has  well 
retained  the  methods  of  speech  of  the  prophetic  books  which 
the  reading  or  discourse  of  others  has  rendered  familiar  to 
them.  Antoinette  de  Bourignon  made  use  of  the  facility  she 
had  in  speaking  and  writing  as  a  proof  of  her  divine  mission.^ 
I  know  a  visionary  who  based  his  divine  mission  upon  the  tal- 

1  Cf.  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Thos.  Burnett,  July  17-27,  169(i;  Gerhardt,  Leibniz, 
philoft.  Schrift.,  3,  184.  On  tlie  doctrine  of  the  "  inner  lifj;lit,"  tlu^  inmuHliate 
revelation  of  the  Spirit  of  God  in  each  individual  soul,  "  tlie  light  tliat  lighten- 
eth  every  man,"  —  the  most  characteristic  doctrine  of  the  Quakers,  —  cf.  Robert 
Barclay,  1()48-1()90,  An  Apology  for  the  True  Ohrlstiau  Divinity,  Prop.  II., 
Of  Immediate  Revelation;  and  the  excellent  account  of  Bancrolt,  Hint,  of  the 
U.  S.,  chap.  23,  Vol.  2,  pp.  78  s(?.,  Centenary  ed.,  Boston,  1876. —  Tr. 

2  Antoinette  Bourignon,  1616-1080,  an  enthusiast  whose  religious  doctrines 
made  considerable  stir  in  her  lifetime  and  lor  a  sliort  time  after  in  Holland 
and  Scotland,  but  have  long  ceased  to  have  any  intlnence  and  are  now  ahnost 
wholly  forgotten.  Her  complete  works  in  Frencli  apiicai-(Ml  at  AmstiM-dam, 
16S6, 19  vols.,  8vo  ;  1717,  21  vols.,  8vo,  with  a  life  of  the  author  l)y  Pierre  I'oiret, 
lfi4(;!.17]<),  a  Calvinistic  minister  and  famous  mystic,  who  lieeame  her  disciple, 
edited  her  works,  and  attempted  to  reduce  to  system  her  vague  i-evcrics  in  Ids 
(Economie  de  la  nature,  Amsterdam,  1086,  21  vols.,  8vo.  Her  proi>hetic  views 
were  expounded  in  her  Traitd  de  Vavewilewev.t  des  honnnes  ((Eiivrcs,  ed. 
1686,  Vol.  1.5),  her  La  huniere  du  monde  {ibid.,  Vol.  7),  and  lier  lie  la  himicre 
nee  en  te/iebre.'i  (ibid.,  Vol.  4),  the  last  work  being  "a  collection  of  letters, 
with  a  large  explanation  of  Matt.  24  and  25  " ;  Eng.  tran.s.  The  Light  of  the 


000  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

ents  he  had  iu  speaking  and  praying  aloud  almost  an  entire 
day  without  ceasing  and  without  becoming  exhausted.  There 
are  some  persons  who,  after  having  practised  austerities  or 
after  a  state  of  sadness,  taste  a  peace  and  consolation  in  the 
soul  Avhich  enraptures  them,  and  they  find  therein  so  much  de- 
light that  they  believe  it  to  be  an  effect  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  It 
is  true  that  the  contentment  they  find  in  considering  the  great- 
ness and  goodness  of  God,  in  the  accomplishment  of  his  will, 
in  the  practice  of  the  virtues,  is  a  grace  of  God  and  one  of  the 
greatest ;  but  it  is  not  always  a  grace  which  needs  a  new  super- 
natural aid,  as  many  of  these  good  people  maintain.  Xot  long 
since  there  was  a  young  lady  very  mse  in  everything  else,  who 
believed  from  her  youth  that  she  spoke  with  Jesus  Christ  and 
was  his  wife  in  a  wholly  peculiar  manner.  Her  mother,  to 
Avhom  this  was  related,  was  a  little  given  to  enthusiasm,  but 
the  daughter  having  commenced  early  had  gone  very  much 
farther.  Her  satisfaction  and  joy  was  unspeakable,  her  wis- 
dom appeared  in  her  conduct,  and  her  intelligence  in  her 
discourse.  The  thing  went,  however,  so  far  that  she  received 
letters  addressed  to  our  Lord  and  she  sent  them  back  sealed 
as  she  received  them  with  a  reply  which  sometimes  appeared 
appropriate  and  always  reasonable.  But  finally  she  ceased  to 
receive  them  from  fear  of  making  too  much  disturbance.  In 
Spain  she  would  have  been  another  St.  Theresa.  But  all  per- 
sons who  have  similar  visions  do  not  conduct  themselves  in 
the  same  way.  There  are  some  who  seek  to  form  a  sect,  and 
even  to  make  trouble :  and  England  furnishes  a  strange  proof 
of  this.-     When  these  persons  act  in  good  faith  it  is  difficult  to 

World,  London,  1()96;  The  Light  insen  in  Darkness,  London,  1703.  Leibnitz 
refers  to  her  in  a  fragment,  Sur  Ve.sprit  Sectaire,  1097,  cf.  Dutens,  1,  740.  For 
further  account,  cf.  J.  C.  Adelung,  Gesch.  d.  mensch.  Narrheit,  Leipzig,  178.5- 
1789,  7  vols.,  16mo,  Vol.  5,  pp.  245-391 ;  Gottfried  Arnold,  Eirchen  u.  Eftzerhis- 
torie,  Fraukfort-ou-the-Main,  1729,  Theil.  III.,  Cap.  XYI.,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.5:?-176, 
Th.  IV.,  Sect.  III.,  Num.  XVII.,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1005-1089;  Wetzer  u.  Welte, 
Eirchenlexicon,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1107-1170,  ed.  1883. — Tr. 

1  Leibnitz  here  refei's  to  the  Independents,  who,  arising  in  obscurity  in  Eng- 
land in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  and  gradually  gaining  in  numbers  and  influence 
as  a  result  of  the  persecutioTi  to  which  they  were  subject  at  the  hands  of  the 
established  Church  and  the  State,  and  of  their  success  in  founding  the  New 
England  States,  came  to  the  fi'ont  in  the  time  of  the  Revolution  and  changed 
at  length  the  political  as  well  as  the  religious  life  of  England,  and  became 
a  powerful  and  controlling  force  in  the  life  and  institutions  of  the  American 
people.    In  their  fundamental  principle  that  religion  is  a  matter  of  the  indi- 


CH.  XIX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  601 


reform  them  :  sometimes  the  overthrow  of  all  their  plans  cor- 
rects them,  but  often  it  is  too  late.  There  was  a  visionary  who 
lately  died  who  believed  himself  immortal  because  he  was  very' 
old  and  very  well,  and  without  having  read  the  book  of  an 
Englishman  lately  published  (who  wished  to  make  us  believe 
that  Jesus  Christ  came  to  exempt  true  believers  from  bodily 
death)  was  almost  of  the  same  opinion  for  some  years  past; 
but  when  he  perceived  that  he  was  dying  he  went  so  far  as  to 
doubt  all  religion  because  it  did  not  correspond  to  his  chimera. 
Quirin  Kulman  [s/c],^  a  Silesian,  a  man  of  knowledge  and  judg- 
ment, but  who  had  since  indulged  in  two  kinds  of  visions, 
equally  dangerous,  the  one  of  the  enthusiasts,  the  other  of  the 
alchemists,  and  who  made  some  stir  in  England,  Holland,  and 
even  in  Constantinople,  being  at  last  advised,  to  go  into  Russia 
and  there  to  mix  himself  up  in  certain  intrigues  against  the 
minister,  at  the  time  when  the  Princess  Sophia  governed  it, 
was  condemned  to  be  burned,  and  did  nofc  die  like  a  man  per- 

vidual  reason  and  conscience,  wholly  free  from  State  or  other  control,  they 
bore  in  a  general  way  a  somewhat  close  resemblance  to  the  Quakers  and 
other  enthusiasts  of  their  time. 

In  this  connection  Schaarschmidt  ventures  the  conjecture  that  Leibnitz 
may  have  had  his  attention  called  to  the  persons  and  circumstances  men- 
tioned in  this  chapter  by  a  large  work,  appearing  not  long  before,  entitled, 
Anabapt Istictmi  et  enthusi.asticum  Pantheon,  und  Geistliches  Riisthauss  wider 
die  Alten  Quacker  und  Neuen  Frey-Geister,  u.  s.  w.,  Cothen,  W.  A.  Meyer, 
1702,  since  his  allegations  strikingly  call  to  mind  this  work.  But  may  not 
Bayle's  Dictlonnaire  as  well  have  been  the  source  of  his  information,  inas- 
much as  it  contains  considerably  extended  articles  on  the  persons  mentioned, 
and  was  a  work  with  which  Leibnitz  was  thoroughly  familiar?  —  Tr. 

1  Quirin  Kuhlmann,  1651-1689,  in  consequence  of  a  disordered  brain  result- 
ing from  a  severe  illness  at  the  age  of  18,  became!  subject  to  hallucinations, 
lost  his  previous  taste  for  study,  claimed  to  possess  a  method  by  whicli  ho 
might  know  everything  independent  of  the  usual  processes  of  acquisition,  and 
that  the  Holy  Ghost  was  his  only  teacher,  and  on  these  grounds  considered 
himself  a  saint.  At  Leyden,  falling  in  with  the  works  of  Boelime,  he  imme- 
diately became  an  enthusiastic  disctjile.  It  is  said  that  he  wishoid  to  marry 
Antoinette  Bourjgnon,  but  that  her  "  inviolable  chastity  "  caused  her  to  refuse 
him.  Leaving  Holland  in  1675  he  travelled,  it  is  believed,  in  England,  France, 
and  Turkey.  At  Constantinople  he  addressed  a  letter,  Aug.  1,  1678,  to  the 
Sultan  Mahomet  IV.,  in  which  he  predicted  the  conversion  of  tlie  Turks,  and 
sought  to  win  the  Sultan  to  his  views.  Failing  to  attain  liis  desired  end,  ho 
went  to  Russia  to  set  up  the  true  kingdom  of  God,  was  opposed  by  Pester  the 
Great,  and  after  a  brief  trial  condemned  by  the  Greek  I'atriarch  — it  is  said 
at  the  suggestion  of  a  Lutheran  clergyman  — to  be  burned  alive  a.s  a  heretic 
in  1689.  For  further  account,  cf.  Adelung,  Gnsch.  d.  mp.nnch.  Narrhdt,  Vol. 
5,  pp.  .VOO  (allusion  to  his  alchemistic  impostures,  ibid.,  pp.  52,5:5,05,81); 
Wetzer  und  Welte,  Kirchenlexicon,  7,  1237.  —  Tr. 


002  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

siiaded  of  that  which  he  had  preached.  The  dissensions  of  these 
people  among  themselves  ought  further  to  convince  them  that 
their  pretended  internal  icitness  is  not  divine ;  and  that  other 
signs  are  necessary  to  justify  it.  The  Labadists/  for  exam- 
l)lo,  do  not  agree  with  Mademoiselle  Antoinette,  and  although 
William  Tenn  ai)i)ears  to  have  had  the  design  in  his  travels  in 
Germany,  of  which  he  has  published  an  account,  of  establish- 
ing a  kind  of  understanding  between  those  who  rely  ujoon  this 
witness,  he  does  not  appear  to  have  succeeded.^  It  is  desira- 
ble for  the  truth's  sake  that  good  people  be  intelligent  and 
act  in  concert:  nothing  would  be  more  capable  of  rendering 
the  human  race  better  and  happier,  but  it  would  be  necessary 
for  them  to  be  truly  of  the  number  of  the  good  people,  i.e. 
of  the  beneficent,  and,  further,  docile  and  reasonable ;  instead 

1  'l"he  Labadists  were  a  mystic  sect  or  community  of  the  Reformed  Churcli 
founded  by  Jeau  de  Labadie,  1G10-1G74,  a  noted  Pietist  or  Mystic,  who,  origi- 
nally a  Roman  Catholic,  had  become  a  Protestant,  joined  the  Reformed  Church, 
and  afterwards  at  the  head  of  his  separatist  congregation  at  Middleburg 
developed  his  scheme  for  the  reformation  of  that  ecclesiastical  body.  His 
doctrine  was  in  many  points  similar  to  that  of  the  Anabaptists.  Labadie 
and  his  disciples  wished  to  settle  with  A.  F>ourignon  at  Noordstrandt,  but  she 
woidd  not  consent,  saying:  "I  perceive  and  know  that  we  can  never  agree 
together.  Their  opinions  and  the  spirit  that  governs  them  are  altogether  con- 
trary to  my  light  and  the  spirit  that  governs  me."  Leibnitz  refers  to  Labadie 
in  the  Tlieodic^e,  Discours  prelim.,  §  14;  in  a  letter  to  Theophilus  Spizel, 
Ajiril  7,  KJTl,  Dutens,  5,  ;351-3r)2;  cf.  also,  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz's  deutsche 
Sdirift.,  2,  41)8-4".)!).  For  further  account,  cf.  the  writings  of  two  of  his  most 
enthusiastic  disciples,  Pierre  Yvon,  Ahreqe  precis  de  la  vie  et  de  la  condulte 
et  des  vrais  sentiments  de  feii  M.  de  Labadie;  Anna  Maria  v.  Schiirraan, 
Euderia  (said  to  be,  perliaps,  the  best  exposition  of  his  -sdews),  Altona,  167:3, 
1078;  also  Arnold,  Kirdien  und  Ketzerhistorie,  Theil.  II.,  Buch.  XV'Il.,  Cap. 
XXI.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  1186-1200 ;  Vol.  2,  pp.  1.302-1.350 ;  H.  van  Berkum,  De  Labadie 
en  de  Labadlsten,  Sneek,  1851;  Goehel,  Gesch.  d.  clirist.  Lebens  in  d.  rhein- 
isdi-westphdlischen  Eirdie,  Vol.  2,  Coblentz,  1852;  Heppe,  Gesch.  d.  Pietis- 
mus,  Leyden,  1870;  Ritsclie,  Gesch.  d.  Pietismus,  Vol.  1,  Bonn,  1880. — Tr. 

2  William  Penn,  1644-1718,  made  a  missionary  journey  through  Holland 
and  Germany  in  1671-1672,  in  the  course  of  which  he  founded  a  Quaker  society 
at  Embden  and  became  an  intimate  friend  of  the  Princess  Elizabeth  of  the 
Palatinate,  to  whom  Descartes  dedicated  his  Frineip.  Philas.  His  letters 
written  during  this  journey  C(mtain  a  full  account  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
"  inward  light."  In  1677  he  made  another  missionary  journey  to  the  Conti- 
nent, and  published  in  1694  a  full  account  of  the  same,  entitled  Jouimal  of  my 
Travels  in  Holland  and  Germany.  Cf.  A  Collection  of  the  Works  of  Wm. 
Penn,  London,  2  vols.,  fol.,  1726,  Vol.  1,  pp.  50-116;  Select  Works,  3d  ed.,  Lon- 
don, 1782,  5  vols.,  8vo,  Vol.  3,  pp.  .373  sq.  For  short  selections  therefrom,  cf. 
Janney,  Life  of  Wm.  Penn,  chap.  9,  pp.  125-137,  4th  ed.  revised,  Phila.,  1878; 
for  more  extended  extracts,  cf.  Passages  from  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Wm. 
Penn,  Phila.,  1882,  VIII.,  pp.  141-199.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XIX]  ON  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  603 

of  which  only  too  many  of  those  who  are  called  devout  to-day 
are  accused  of  being  severe,  imperious,  obstinate.  Their  dis- 
sensions make  it  appear  at  least  that  their  internal  witness 
needs  an  external  veriiication  in  order  to  be  believed,  and  mir- 
acles would  be  necessary  in  order  for  them  to  have  the  right 
to  })ass  as  prophets  and  inspired  men.  There  might,  however, 
be  a  case  Avhere  these  inspirations  would  carry  their  proofs 
with  them.  This  would  be  if  they  really  enlightened  the  mind 
by  important  discoveries  of  some  extraordinary  knowledge, 
wliich  without  any  external  aid  would  be  beyond  the  powers 
of  the  person  who  should  have  acqiured  them.  If  Jacob 
Boehme,^  a  famous  shoemaker  of  Lusace,  whose  writings  have 
been  translated  from  German  into  other  languages  under  the 
name  of  the  Teutonic  Philosopher,  and  in  reality  possess  some- 
thing of  grandeur  and  beauty  for  a  man  in  this  condition,  had 
known  how  to  make  gold,  as  some  are  persuaded  he  did,  ()'•  as 
St.  John  the  evangelist  did,  if  we  believe  what  is  said  in  a 
hymn  ^  composed  in  his  honor :  — 

Inexhaustum  fert  tlicsaurum 
Qui  de  virgis  fecit  aurum, 
Gemnias  de  lapidibus, 

there  would  have  been  some  reason  for  giving  more  credence 
to  this  extraordinary  shoemaker.  And  if  Mademoiselle  Antoi- 
nette Bourignon  had  furnished  to  Bertrand  la  Coste,  a  French 
engineer  at  Hamburg,  the  light  in  the  sciences  wliich  he  believed 
he  had  i-eceived  from  her,  as  he  indicated  in  dedicating  to  her 
his  book  on  the  Quadrature  of  the  Circle  (in  which,  making 
allusion  to  Antoinette  and  Bertrand,  he  callefl.  her  the  A  in 
theology,  as  he  said  he  himself  was  the  B  in  mathematics),  we 
should  not  have  known  what  to  say.^     But  we  do  not  see  exam- 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  20S,  note  1.  —  Tr. 

2  Cf.  L.  Gaulier,  (Eiim-ea  Fadtiqups  d'Adnm  de  S.-Victor,  Paris,  IsnH,  2 
vols.,  121110,  Vol.  1,  !>.  229,  and  the  editor's  learned  note;  D.  S.  Wranj,'liain, 
The  Liturf/ical  Poetn/  of  Adam  of  St.  Victor,  from  the  text  of  (lavtier,  xoith 
trcms.  into  Etirjlish  in  the  original  metres,  etc.,  3  vols.,  London,  Kegan 
Paul,  1H81,  Vol.'l,  p.  190.  Leibnitz  probably  knew  tlie  hymn  in  Clicliloveus, 
FJucidatorium  Ecdpsiasticum,  Pt.  I\^,  of  which  there  were  several  editions 
rroin  ISl.^-iriSG,  at  Paris,  Basel,  (Jeneva.  —  Tu. 

3  Berlrand  de  Lacoste,  a  French  engineer,  born  early  in  the  i7th  century, 
who,  after  some  s(M-vicn  as  colonel  of  artillery  in  tlie  army  of  the  Diikc  of 
nriindeiiburii,  ol)tained  lii.s  discliarge  in  KKi:?  and  retired  to  Handiiirg,  when; 
he  devoted  himself  to  the  study  of  mathematics  in  general,  am)  in  particular 


GOl  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

pies  of  a  considerable  success  of  this  nature,  nor  well-detailed 
predictions  Avliich  have  succeeded  in  the  case  of  such  persons. 
The  prophecies  of  Poniatovia,^  of  Drabitius  and  others,  which 
the  good  man  Comenius ''  published  in  his  "  Lux  in  Tenebris," 
and  which  contributed  to  the  disturbances  in  the  hereditary 
lands  of  the  emperor,  were  found  false,  and  those  who  believed 
them  were  unfortunate.  Ragozky,  Prince  of  Transylvania,  was 
impelled  by  Drabitius  ^  to  the  attack  upon  Poland  in  which  he 

to  the  problem  of  the  quadrature  of  the  circle.  On  this  subject  he  published 
t\\  o  works :  Scheda  de  inventa  quadratara  circuli,  1663,  aud,  in  reply  to  a 
refutation  of  the  same  by  Prof.  Miiller,  Demonstration  de  la  quadrature  du 
cercle,  Hamburg,  1666,  4to,  1677,  8vo.  A  Flemish"  translation  appeared  in 
1677,  with  the  title  Klarer  Bewys  von't  Quadrat  des  Clrkels,  dedicated  to 
Antoinette  Bourignon,  whose  person  and  teachings  he  for  a  time  greatly 
admired ;  but  failing  to  interest  her  equally  in  his  mathematical  studies,  he 
finally  opposed  her  and  her  doctrines  as  strongly  as  he  had  before  advocated 
them,  exciting  the  poi^ulace  of  Hamburg  against  her  aud  forcing  her  to 
leave  the  city.  He  wrote  against  her  his  Scheda  contra  Ant.  Bourignoniam. 
—  Tr. 

1  Christine  Pouiatowa,  1610-1644,  a  famous  enthusiast,  the  daughter  of  a 
Polish  noble  and  unfrocked  monk,  claimed  in  1627-1628  that  she  had  visions 
regarding  the  persecutions  of  the  Evangelical  Church  which  were  soon  to  end 
in  its  triumph.  Jan.  27,  1620,  she  fell  into  a  lethargy  so  profound  that  they 
thought  her  dead;  but  at  length  awaking,  she  declared  that  her  ^^sions  were 
ended,  her  mission  complete.  Chagrin  at  seeing  her  predictions  denied  at 
last  caused  her  death.  She  wrote  out  her  revelations  in  the  order  in  which 
she  said  she  had  received  them  from  heaven.  Comenius  {cf.  ante,  p.  466, 
note  2)  translated  them  into  Latin,  and  published  them,  together  with  those 
of  Drabitius,  Kotter,  1.5S5-1647,  and  other  enthusiasts,  in  his  very  rare  Lxiz 
in  Tenebris,  1650,  1657,  4to,  1659,  with  title  HLstoria  revelationum  L'h.  Eottei^, 
Chr.  Poniutovix,  Nic.  Drabltii,  etc.  (the  only  ed.  known  to  Bayle,  and  the 
least  rare  and  complete),  166.5,  2  vols.,  4to,  also  several  other  eds.,  more  or 
less  incomplete.  The  rarity  of  the  work  is  due  to  the  fact  that  Comenius, 
fearing  on  the  one  hand  to  disobey  a  divine  command  if  he  refused  to  tran.s- 
late  these  prophecies  out  of  the  Bohemian  or  Czech  language  in  which  they 
had  first  appeared,  and  on  the  other  of  covering  himself  with  ridicule  if  the 
event  not  far  distant  did  not  verify  them,  allowed  but  few  copies  to  be  printed. 
For  further  account  of  Poniatowa,  cf.  Adelung,  Gesch.  d.  menscli.  Narrheit, 
Vol.  6,  pp.  231-267.  — Tr. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  466,  note  2.     The  Lxix  in  Tpnebri.<<  appeared  in  16.50. — Tr. 

3  Nicolas  Drabitius  or  Drabicius,  c.  1587-1671,  a  Bohemian-Moravian  min- 
ister at  Drakatutz,  vdio  was  compelled  by  the  severity  of  the  imperial  edicts 
against  the  Protestants  to  retire  to  Lednitz  in  Hungary,  turned  to  secular 
pursuits,  became  very  dissipated,  and  was  suspended  from  the  ministry.  In 
1638  he  claimed  to  be  inspired  and  to  have  divine  revelations,  the  chief  of 
which  predicted  the  fall  of  the  House  of  Austria  in  1657,  and  the  success  of  the 
expedition,  which  he  urged  upon  Prince  George  II.  Rakoczy  of  Tran.sylvania, 
against  Poland  in  the  same  year.  Both  predictions  failed.  Prince  George 
was  totally  defeated  July  16,  16.".7,  and  compelled  to  fight  the  Turks,  mused 
to  hostility  by  his  attack  on  Poland,  till  his  death,  June  26,  1660.    The  House 


CH.  xix]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  606 

lost  his  army,  a  result  whicli  finally  cost  liim  tlie  loss  of  his 
estates  together  with  his  life ;  and  the  poor  Drabitius  a  long 
time  after,  at  the  age  of  eighty  years,  at  last  had  his  head  cut 
off  by  the  order  of  the  emperor.  Yet  I  do  not  doubt  that  there 
are  people  now  who  cause  these  predictions  to  be  revived  inaptly 
in  the  present  conjtmcture  of  disorders  in  Hungary,  not  consid- 
ering that  these  pretended  prophets  spoke  of  the  events  of  their 
time ;  in  which  respect  they  did  almost  as  he  who,  after  the 
bombardment  of  Brussels,  published  a  loose  sheet,  in  which 
there  was  a  passage  taken  from  a  book  of  Mademoiselle  Antoi- 
nette, who  did  not  wish  to  come  into  this  city  because  (if  I 
remember  rightly)  she  had  dreamed  that  she  saw  it  on  fire ;  but 
this  bombardment  happened  a  long  time  after  her  death.  I 
knew  a  man  who  went  to  France  during  the  war  which  was  ter- 
minated by  the  Peace  of  ISTimwegen  to  importune  M.  de  Mon- 
tausier  ^  and  M.  de  Pomponne  ^  upon  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
prophecies  published  by  Comenius ;  and  he  would  himself  have 
believed  himself  inspired  (I  think),  if  he  had  happened  to  make 
his  propositions  in  a  time  parallel  to  ours.  This  shows  not  only 
the  little  foundation,  but  also  the  danger  of  these  wayward- 
nesses. Histories  are  full  of  the  bad  effect  of  false  or  misunder- 
stood prophecies,  as  may  be  seen  in  a  learned  and  judicious 
dissertation,  "De  officio  viri  boni  circa  futura  contingentia," 
Avhich  the  late  Jacobus  Thomasius,  a  celebrated  professor  at 
Leipzig,  formerly  gave  the  public''     It  is  true,  however,  that 

of  Austria,  resolving  to  rid  itself  of  the  pretender]  prophet,  arrested  him  as 
a  state  criminal,  tried  and  condemned  him  to  death.  His  licad  and  ri.t,dit 
hand  were  cut  off  and  burned  with  a  copy  of  liis  b()ol<s,  and  the  ashes  thrown 
into  the  Danube,  July  17,  1071.  For  further  account,  cf.  Adelung,  Gesch.  d. 
merifch.  Narrhcit,  Vol.  2,  pp.  27-62.  —Tr. 

1  Charles  de  Sainte-Manre,  Mar(piis  and  then  Dnke  de  Montausier,  IfilO-KiW, 
to  whom  Louis  XIV.,  in  1668,  entrusted  the  education  of  the  Dauphin,  Uien 
seven  years  of  age,  for  whose  instruction  he  edited  the  Delphiue  Classics  and 
a  ReciiP/l  de  maximes  morales  et  politique k.  — Tr. 

2  Simon  Arnanld,  Marquis  de  Pomponne  or  Pompone,  1618-1600,  was  am- 
bassador to  Sweden  under  Louis  XIV.,  and  concIiMbid  tlie  I'cace  of  Nimwegcn. 
1678-1670.  His  Meiaoires  de  Marquis  de  Pompoiuie  appeared  at  Paris,  lS(;i- 
186:;,  2  v(ds.,  8vo.  — Tr. 

3. Jacob  Thomasen,  — Latin  Thomasius,  — 1622-1684,  was  for  many  years 
Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Eloquence  in  the  University  of  Leipzig,  thi^ 
founder  of  the  scientific  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy  in  (iermany,  and 
the  first  to  recommend  disputed  questions  in  this  suhject  as  themes  for  dis- 
sertations. He  was  Leibnitz's  first  teaclier  in  i)hilosopliy,  early  disc,  rnr.l 
the  eminent  abilities   and   promise  of   his  sub.sequently   very  diMuiLiiiislicd 


GOG  LEIHXITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

tliese  persuasions  sometimes  produce  a  good  effect  and  render 
great  service,  for  God  can  make  use  of  error  to  establish  or 
maintain  truth.  But  I  do  not  believe  that  it  is  easily  permitted 
us  to  make  use  of  pious  frauds  for  a  good  end;  and  as  for  the 
dogmas  of  religion,  we  have  no  need  of  new  revelations ;  it  is 
enough  that  we  propose  to  ourselves  salutary  rules  in  order  that 
Ave  may  be  obliged  to  follow  them,  although  the  one  proposing 
them  performs  no  miracle.  And  although  Jesus  Christ  was  pro- 
vided with  miracles,  he  did  not  cease  to  refuse  sometimes  to  per- 
form them  in  order  to  please  that  perverse  race  who  demanded 
signs,  when  he  preached  only  virtue  and  what  had  already  been 
taught  b}^  natural  reason  and  the  prophets!^ 

pupil,  taught  him  to  take  a  broad  and,  for  that  time,  critical  view  of  the 
history  of  philosophy,  and  introduced  him  early  into  the  polemic  against  em- 
piricism. The  pupil  regarded  his  teacher  with  revereut  gratitude  {cf.  Leib- 
nitz's letters  to  Thomasius,  April  20-30,  KiGi),  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  Philos. 
Schrift.,  1, 15,  26-27  ;  to  J.  Christ.  Wolf,  Dec.  11, 1711,  Dutens,  5,  447,  Kortholt, 
Leibnit.  Eiyist.,  1,  270;  Leibnii.  Vita  a  Jac.  Briickero  ncripta,  §  3,  Dutens, 
1,  LVIII.-LXI.,  and  Brncker,  Philos.  Historia,  5,  336-340,  Lipsiffi,  1742-1767), 
and  each  prized  the  esteem  and  friendship  of  the  other.  Leibnitz  sent  Tho- 
masius his  ovax  early  works  for  criticism  ("  Neque  vero  laudem,  sed  examen 
peto,"  letter  of  April  20-30,  1669,  G.  1,  27)  ;  Thomasius  presided  when  Leib- 
nitz defended  his  Be  princ.  indiv.  for  the  degree  of  Bachelor  of  Philosophy 
(c/.  ante,  p.  2.39,  note  1),  and  when  it  was  published  wrote  the  Preface  (for 
which  cf.  Dutens,  2,  Pt.  I.,  11-14).  For  their  coi-respondence,  the  preservation 
of  Leibnitz's  part  of  which  we  owe  to  the  care  of  Thomasius,  cf.  Gerhardt, 
02).  cit.,  1,  1-39.  Most  important  for  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz,  especially  as 
regards  the  beginning  of  his  independent  speculations,  and  as  a  statement  of 
principles  from  which  he  never  departed  but  simjily  worked  out  into  clearer 
and  completer  forms,  is  the  letter  of  April  20-.'!0,  1669,  cf.  G.  1,  15-27,  Erd- 
mann,  48-.")4,  Dutens,  4,  7-19,  also  Guhrauer,  Leibniz'  Dissert,  de  princ.  indiv., 
p.  33.  Leibnitz  refers  frequently  to  Thomasius;  cf.  for  example,  Theodicee, 
Pt.  II.,  §§  184,  220. 

The  essay  of  Thomasius  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz  is  also  cited,  accord- 
ing to  Schaarschmidt,  under  the  title  Be  officio  hominis  circa  notitiam  futu- 
roruni  contingentium,  and,  in  his  opinion,  is  probably  the  same  as  the  one 
which  Christian  Thomasius,  after  his  father's  death,  had  printed  in  his  IHsser- 
tationes  LXIII.  nuifinaui  partem  ad  historiam  philosophicam  et  ecchsiasticani 
pertinentex,  Halle,  1693,  8vo,  as  Programma  XXXVI.,  p.  3<t6,  under  the  title, 
De  provisione  circa  futura  contingentia.  Thomasius  was  the  author  of  a 
great  number  of  dissertations,  full  of  research  and  wTitten  with  purity  and 
elegance.  One  of  them,  Origines  historian  philosophicse  et  ecclesiasticas,  Leip- 
zig, 1665,  4to,  ed.  by  Cli.  Thomasius,  Halle,  1()99,  8vo,  was  for  a  long  time  the 
most  accurate  history  of  ancient  philosophy.  Brucker  was  greatly  indebted 
toit.  — Tr. 

1  Cf.  ante,  pp.  553,  note  1,  582.  Leibnitz,  while  admitting  the  possibility 
and  on  sufficient  and  proper  evidence  the  actuality  of  miracles,  nevertheless 
regards  them  from  the  philosophic  point  of  view  as  exceptional  and  relatively 


CH.  XX]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  007 


CHAPTEE  XX 

OF    ERROK 

§  1.  Ph.  After  having  spoken  of  all  the  means  which  make 
us  know  or  divine  the  truth,  let  us  also  say  something  about 
our  errors  and  bad  judgments.  Men  must  often  be  mistaken 
since  there  are  so  many  dissensions  among  them.  The  reasons 
of  this  may  be  reduced  to  these  four :  (1)  the  lack  of  proofs ; 
(2)  little  skill  in  using  them ;  (3)  lack  of  will  to  make  use  of 
them ;  (4)  false  rules  of  probability.  §  2.  When  I  speak  of  the 
lack  of  proofs,  I  understand  also  those  which  we  might  find  if 
we  had  the  means  and  the  opportunity,  but  this  it  is  which  we 
most  frequently  lack.  Such  is  the  condition  of  men  whose 
life  is  passed  in  seeking  their  subsistence :  they  are  as  little 
informed  of  what  goes  on  in  the  world,  as  a  draught  horse  who 
always  goes  by  the  same  road  may  become  skilled  in  the  map 
of  the  country.  They  would  require  languages,  reading,  con- 
versation, observations  of  nature  and  the  experiments  of  art. 
§  o.  Now,  all  this  not  agreeing  with  their  condition,  shall  Ave 
say  then  that  the  bulk  of  men  are  led  to  happiness  or  misery 
only  by  blind  chance  ?  Must  they  abandon  themselves  to  the 
current  opinions  and  authorized  guides  in  the  country,  even  as 
regards  eternal  happiness  or  misery  ?  Or  will  they  be  eternally 
unhappy  to  have  been  born  rather  in  one  country  than  in 
another?  We  must  admit,  however,  that  no  one  is  so  com- 
pletely occupied  with  the  care  of  providing  for  his  siibsistence 
as  to  have  no  time  left  to  think  of  his  soul  and  to  be  instructed 
in  that  Avhich  concerns  religion,  if  he  were  to  apply  himself 
thereto  as  he  does  to  less  important  things. 

Tit.  Suppose  that  men  are  not  always  in  a  couditiou  to 
instruct  themselves,  and  that  not  l)eing  able  to  give  up  with 

unimportant,  and  (nnphasizcs,  as  here,  the  view  that  the  essence  of  Cliristianity 
consists  in  its  ethical  content,  a  content  intrinsically  rational  and  accordant 
with  nature.  In  addition  to  the  authors  referred  to,  antf,  p.  a.">;?,  note  1,  '/. 
Punjer,  Gesch.  d.  chri.sf.  JMinioiiaplnlos.,  1,  ."SO-IJOO,  :W2-:i7r),  l-jij,'.  trans.. 
^80-51.5,  espec.  48.5-480,  SOl-.Wi;  and  for  an  acute  and  ahle  discn.ssioii  of 
Miracles,  their  idea,  ol^ice,  etc.,  cf.  K.  G.  Kohinson,  Christian.  Theolonu,  §  120, 
pp.  103-109,  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  Press  of  E.  K.  Andrews,  IS'JI.  —  Tu. 


G08  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [uk. 


prudence  the  care  of  the  subsistence  of  their  family  in  order 
to  investigate  difficult  truths,,  they  are  obliged  to  follow  the 
opinions  authorized  among  them,  it  will  always  be  necessary 
to  judge  that  in  the  case  of  those  who  have  the  true  religion 
without  having  its  proofs,  internal  grace  will  supply  the  lack 
of  the  motives  of  credibility,  and  charity  makes  us  also  judge, 
as  I  have  already  indicated  to  you,  that  God  does  for  persons 
of  good  wall,  brought  up  among  the  thick  darkness  of  the  most 
dangerous  errors,  all  that  his  goodness  and  justice  demand, 
although  perhaps  in  a  way  which  is  unknovv^n  to  us.  We  have 
histories  commended  in  the  Eoman  church  of  persons  who  have 
been  expressly  raised  up  in  order  that  salutary  aid  be  not  want- 
ing. But  God  can  assist  souls  by  the  internal  operation  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  without  the  need  of  so  great  a  miracle ;  and 
because  it  is  good  and  consoling  for  the  human  race  to  put  itself 
in  the  condition  of  the  grace  of  God,  only  the  good  but  sincere 
and  serious  mil  is  needed.  I  admit  that  we  have  not  indeed 
this  good  will  without  the  grace  of  God,  forasmuch  as  all 
natural  or  supernatural  good  comes  from  him  ;  but  it  is  always 
enough  that  we  must  only  have  the  wdll,  and  that  it  is  impos- 
sible that  God  can  demand  a  condition  easier  and  more  reason- 
able. 

§  4.  Ph.  There  are  those  who  are  sufficiently  at  their  ease  to 
have  all  the  opportunities  suited  to  illumine  their  doubts ;  but 
they  are  deterred  from  this  by  obstacles  full  of  craftiness,  which 
it  is  easy  enough  to  see,  while  it  is  not  necessary  to  display  them 
in  this  place.  §  5.  I  prefer  to  speak  of  those  who  lack  the  skill 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  proofs  which  they  have,  so  to  speak, 
under  their  hand,  and  who  cannot  retain  a  long  course  of  argu- 
ment nor  weigh  all  the  circumstances.  There  are  some  people 
of  a  single  syllogism,  and  there  are  some  of  two  only.  This  is 
not  the  place  to  determine  whether  this  imperfection  arises  from 
a  natural  difference  of  the  souls  themselves  or  of  the  organs,  or 
whether  it  depends  upon  the  lack  of  exercise  which  polishes  the 
natural  faculties.  It  is  siifficient  for  us  here  that  it  is  visible, 
and  that  we  have  only  to  go  from  the  palace  or  from  the 
exchange  to  the  hospitals  and  small  houses  to  perceive  it. 

Th.  It  is  not  the  poor  alone  who  are  needy ;  certain  rich 
people  lack  more  than  they,  because  these  rich  people  demand 
too  much  and  put  themselves  voluntarily  in  a  kind  of  poverty 


cir.  XX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  609 

which  hinders  them  from  applying  themselves  to  important  con- 
siderations. Example  does  much  here.  One  tries  to  conform 
to  that  of  his  equals,  so  that  he  is  compelled  to  practise  without 
showing  a  spirit  of  perverseness,  and  that  makes  it  easy  for  him 
to  become  like  them.  It  is  very  difficult  to  satisfy  at  the  same 
time  reason  and  custom.  As  for  those  who  lack  capacity,  they 
are  fewer  perhaps  in  number  than  you  think ;  I  think  that 
good  sense  with  application  can  suffice  for  everything  which 
does  not  demand  promptness.  I  presuppose  good  sense,  be- 
cause I  do  not  think  you  would  demand  the  search  for  truth 
from  the  dwellers  in  small  houses.  It  is  true  that  there  are 
not  many  who  could  not  learn  something  of  it,  if  we  knew  the 
means  of  so  doing  and  what  original  difference  exists  between 
our  souls  (as  I  believe  does  in  reality  exist)  ;  it  is  always  cer- 
tain that  one  soul  might  go  as  far  as  another  (but  not  perhaps 
so  rapidly)  if  it  were  led  as  it  should  be. 

§  6.  Ph.  There  is  another  sort  of  people  who  lack  only  will. 
A  strong  attachment  to  pleasure,  a  constant  application  to  Avhat 
concerns  their  fortune,  a  general  idleness  or  negligence,  a  })ar- 
ticular  aversion  to  study  and  meditation,  prevents  them  from 
thinking  seriously  of  the  truth.  There  are  even  some  who 
fear  that  a  research  free  from  all  partiality  would  not  be  fa- 
vorable to  the  opinions  which  most  suit  their  prejudices  and 
plans.  We  know  persons  who  will  not  read. a  letter  which 
they  suppose  brings  bad  news,  and  many  people  avoid  agreeing 
upon  their  accounts  or  informing  themselves  of  the  state  of 
their  property,  for  fear  of  learning  what  they  would  desire 
always  to  be  ignorant  of.  There  are  some  who  have  large  rev- 
enues and  employ  them  all  in  provisions  for  the  body  without 
dreaming  of  the  means  of  perfecting  the  understanding.  They 
take  great  care  always  to  appear  in  a  suital)le  and  brilliant 
equipage,  and  they  suffer  without  difficulty  their  soul  to  be 
covered  with  the  wretched  rags  of  prejudice  and  error,  and  its 
nakedness,  i.e.  its  ignorance  to  appear  as  an  occentricit3^  Not 
to  speak  of  the  interest  they  ought  to  take  in  a  future  state, 
they  do  not  in  the  least  neglect  what  they  are  interested  to 
know  in  the  life  they  lead  in  this  world.  And  it  is  strange 
that  very  often  those  who  regard  power  and  authority  as  an 
appanage  of  their  birth  or  their  fortune,  carelessly  al)andon  it  to 
people  of  a  condition  inferior  to  theirs,  but  who  surpass  tlu'iu 
2r 


GIO  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

ill  knowledge.  For  it  is  very  necessary  that  the  blind  be  led 
by  those  who  see,  lest  they  fall  into  the  ditch,  and  there  is  no 
worse  slavery  than  that  of  the  understanding. 

Th.  There  is  no  more  evident  proof  of  the  negligence  of  men 
as  regards  their  true  interests,  than  the  flttle  care  they  take  to 
know  and  practise  what  agrees  with  their  health,  which  is  one 
of  our  greatest  blessings ;  and  although  the  great  feel  as  much 
and  more  than  others  the  bad  effects  of  this  negligence,  they 
do  not  alter  their  course.  As  far  as  faith  is  concerned,  many 
regard  the  thought  which  would  lead  to  its  discussion  as  a 
temptation  of  the  devil,  which  they  think  they  can  the  better 
surmount  only  by  turning  their  minds  to  an  entirely  different 
thing.  Men  who  only  love  pleasure,  or  who  are  attached  to 
some  occupation,  are  w^ont  to  neglect  other  matters.  A  player, 
a  hunter,  a  drinker,  a  debauchee,  and  even  a  man  curious  about 
trifles,  will  lose  his  fortune  and  his  property  for  lack  of  giving 
himself  the  trouble  to  institute  a  process  or  to  speak  to  the 
men  in  a  guard-house.  There  are  some  like  the  Emperor 
Honorius,  who,  when  the  news  of  the  destruction  of  Kome 
was  brought  to  him,  thought  it  was  his  hen  who  bore  this 
name,  and  this  offended  him  more  than  the  truth.^  It  is 
desirable  that  men  who  have  power  have  knowledge  in  pro- 
portion; but  if  the  details  of  the  sciences,  of  the  arts,  of 
history  and  languages,  should  not  be  theirs,  a  solid  and  prac- 
tised judgment  and  a  knowledge  of  things  equally  great  and 
general,  in  a  word,  summa  rerum,  might  suffice.  And  as  the 
Emperor  Augustus  had  an  abstract  of  the  forces  and  needs  of 
the  State  which  he  called  Breviarhim  Imperii,  he  might  have 
an  abstract  of  human  interests  which  would  deserve  to  be  called 
Enchiridion  Sajventire,  if  men  would  care  for  that  which  is  of 
most  importance  to  them. 

§  7.  Ph.  Finally,  the  majority  of  our  errors  arise  from  the 
false  measures  of  probability  Avhich  we  take,  whether  by  sus- 

1  The  anecdote  here  mentioned  by  Leibnitz  is  thns  given  by  Giovanni  Bat- 
tista  Egnazio,  1473-1553,  in  his  Be  Boiiianis  pi-inc/pihutt,  Lil).  III.,  Venice, 
1516,  near  the  end  of  Book  I.  ((•/'.  Haui-isius,  Scriptnres  historlx  Bvmanse 
Latini  veteres,  quse  extant  oinnes,  Heidelberg,  1713-1745,  3  vols.,  fol.,  Vol.  3, 
p.  625) :  "  Qunm  nnntiatnm  Honorio  esset  Ravennre  Romam  pcrditam,  cre- 
didit  ille  de  pngnaci  Gallo,  cni  nomen  erat  Romre,  signiflcatum  esse:  admira- 
tumque  vehementer  tarn  subito  periisse  euin  quo  cum  paullo  ante  festivissinie 
luserat."'  — Tr. 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  611 

pending-  onr  judgment  in  spite  of  manifest  reasons,  or  in  giving 
it  notwithstanding  contrary  probabilities.  These  false  measures 
consist  (1)  in  doubtful  propositions  taken  as  principles,  (2)  in 
the  accepted  hypotheses,  (3)  in  the  dominant  passions  or  incli- 
nations, (4)  in  authority.  §  8.  We  ordinarily  judge  of  truth  by 
its  conformity  with  what  we  regard  as  indisputable  principles, 
and  this  makes  us  despise  the  testimony  of  others  and  indeed 
of  our  own  senses  when  they  appear  contrary  thereto:  but 
before  relying  upon  these  with  so  much  assurance,  we  should 
examine  them  with  the  utmost  exactness.  §  9.  Children  receive 
the  propositions  taught  them  by  their  father  and  mother,  nurses, 
teachers  and  others  who  are  about  them,  and  these  propositions 
having  taken  root,  are  regarded  as  sacred  as  a  Urim  and  Thuvi- 
mim  which  God  might  himself  have  put  in  the  soul.  §  10. 
We  have  some  difficulty  in  admitting  that  which  clashes  with 
these  internal  oracles,  while  we  believe  the  greatest  absurdities 
which  agree  with  them.  This  appears  in  the  extreme  obstinacy 
which  we  notice  in  different  men  who  believe  strongly  opinions 
as  directly  opposed  as  the  articles  of  faith,  although  they  are 
very  often  equally  absurd.  Take  a  man  of  good  sense,  but  per- 
suaded of  this  maxim  that  he  omist  believe  ivhat  then  of  his 
communion  believe,  as  they  teach  at  Wittenberg  or  in  tSweden, 
what  disposition  has  he  not  to  receive  without  difficulty  the 
doctrine  of  con  substantiation,  and  to  believe  that  one  and  the 
same  thing  is  flesh  and  bread  at  the  same  time. 

Th.  It  is  very  apparent,  sir,  that  you  have  not  l)een  suffi- 
ciently instructed  in  the  views  of  the  Evangelicals,'  Avho  admit 
the  real  presence  of  the  body  of  our  Lord  in  the  I<]ucharist. 
They  have  explained  a  thousand  times  that  they  do  not  nienn 
the  consubstantiation  of  bread  and  wine  with  the  flesh  and  blood 
of  Jesus  Christ,  and  still  less  that  one  and  the  same  thing  is 
flesh  and  bread  at  the  same  time.  They  teach  only  that,  in 
receiving  the  visible  symbols,  we  receive  in  an  invisible  and 
supernatural  manner  the  body  of  our  Saviour,  without  its  lieing 
enclosed  in  the  bread;  and  the  presence  which  they  mean  is 
not  local  or  spatial,  so  to  speak,  i.e.  determined  by  the  dimen- 
sions of  the  present  body,  so  that  all  that  the  senses  can  oj.jiosi^ 

1  I.e.  Lntlieraiis.  For  the  views  and  coiitrovcfsies  resarding  llic  Eiicliarist, 
and  the  Confessions  allndc^d  to  in  tlie  reiiiaindor  of  this  section,  (,/.  the  various 
Church  Histories  and  Histories  of  Doctrine.  — Tu. 


612  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

to  it  does  not  concern  them.  And  in  order  to  show  that  the 
inconveniences  which  may  be  derived  from  reason  no  longer 
affect  them,  they  declare  that  what  they  mean  by  the  substance 
of  the  body  does  not  consist  in  extension  or  dimension ;  and 
they  make  no  difficidty  in  admitting  that  the  glorious  body  of 
Jesus  Christ  preserves  a  certain  ordinary  and  local  presence, 
but  congruous  with  his  position  in  the  exalted  place  where  he 
is  found,  altogether  different  from  this  sacramental  presence 
herein  questioned,  or  from  his  miraculous  presence  by  which  he 
governs  the  church,  which  causes  him  to  be  not  everj^where 
like  God,  but  there  where  he  prefers  to  be.  This  is  the  view  of 
the  more  moderate,  so  that,  in  order  to  show  the  absurdity  of 
their  doctrine,  it  would  be  necessary  to  show  that  the  entire 
essence  of  the  body  consists  only  in  extension,  and  in  that 
which  is  solely  measured  thereby,  which  no  one,  so  far  as  I 
know,  has  3'et  done.  This  whole  difficulty  also  concerns  not 
less  the  Reformers  who  follow  the  Galilean  and  Belgian  confes- 
sions, the  declaration  of  the  Council  of  Sendomir,  composed  of 
people  of  the  two  confessions,  Augustan  and  Swiss,  conformed 
to  the  Saxon  confession,  destined  for  the  Council  of  Trent ;  the 
profession  of  faith  of  the  Reformers  who  came  to  the  Conference 
of  Thorn,  convoked  under  the  authority  of  Yladislas,  King  of 
Poland,  and  the  constant  doctrine  of  Calvin  and  of  Beza,  who  have 
declared  the  most  distinctly  and  the  most  strongly  of  everybody 
that  the  symbols  really  furnish  what  they  represent,  and  that 
we  become  participants  in  the  body  and  blood  of  Jesi;s  Christ. 
Calvin,  after  having  refuted  those  Avho  content  themselves  "s^-ith 
a  metaphorical  participation  of  thoiight  or  of  seal  and  with  a 
union  of  faith,  adds  that  we  can  say  nothing  sufficiently  strong 
to  establish  its  reality,  that  he  is  not  ready  to  subscribe  to,  pro- 
vided we  avoid  everything  which  looks  to  the  circumscription 
of  place  or  the  diffusion  of  dimension ;  so  that  it  appears  that 
at  bottom  his  doctrine  was  that  of  Melanchthon  and  even  of 
Luther  (as  Calvin  himself  conjectured  in  one  of  his  letters), 
except  that  in  addition  to  the  condition  of  the  perception  of  the 
symbols  with  which  Luther  contents  himself,  he  demands  also 
the  condition  of  faith,  in  order  to  exclude  the  participation  of 
the  unworthy.  I  have  found  Calvin  so  positive  upon  this  real 
communion  in  a  hundred  places  in  his  works,  and  even  in  his 
familiar  letters,  where  there  was  no  need  of  being  so,  that  I  do 
not  see  any  reason  to  suspect  artifice. 


.11.  ^x]  ON  HUMAN    UNDERSTANDING  613 

§  11.  Ph.  [I  ask  your  pardon  if  I  have  spoken  of  these  gentle- 
men according  to  the  common  opinion.  I  remember  now  hav- 
ing remarked  that  some  very  clever  theologians  of  the  Anglican 
church  have  been  for  this  real  participation.  But  from  estab- 
lished principles  let  us  pass  to  the  accepted  hypotheses.  Those 
who  admit  that  they  are  only  hypotheses  often  cease  not  to 
maintain  them  with  warmth,  almost  as  if  assured  principles, 
and  to  despise  contrary  probabilities.  It  would  be  unendurable 
to  a  learned  professor  to  see  his  authority  overturned  in  an 
instant  by  a  new  comer  who  should  reject  his  hypotheses  ;  his 
authority,  I  say,  which  has  been  in  vogue  for  thirty  or  forty 
years,  acquired  by  much  labor  at  night,  sustained  by  much 
Greek  and  Latin,  confirmed  by  a  general  tradition  and  by  a 
venerable  beard.  All  the  arguments  which  we  can  employ  to 
convince  him  of  the  falsity  of  his  hypothesis  will  be  as  little 
capable  of  prevailing  upon  his  mind  as  the  efforts  Boreas  made 
to  compel  the  traveller  to  leave  his  cloak,  which  he  held  so 
much  the  more  firmly  as  the  wind  blew  with  more  violence. 

Th.  In  reality  the  Coper nicans  have  experienced  in  the  case 
of  their  adversaries  that  hypotheses  recognized  as  .such  ceased 
not  to  be  maintained  with  an  ardent  zeal ;  and  the  Cartesians 
are  not  less  positive  regarding  their  grooved  particles  and  little 
balls  of  the  second  element  ^  than  if  they  were  the  theorems  of 
Euclid ;  and  it  seems  that  zeal  for  our  hypotheses  is  merely  a 
result  of  the  passion  we  have  of  makiug  ourselves  respected. 
It  is  true  that  those  who  condemned  Galileo  believed  that  the 
rest  of  the  earth  was  more  than  an  hypothesis,  for  they  judged 
it  in  conformity  with  Scripture  and  reason.  But  since  then  it 
has  been  perceived  that  reason  at  least  sustained  it  no  longer ; 
and  as  for  Scripture,  Father  Fabry,  Penitentiary  of  St.  l*eter, 
an  excellent  theologian  and  philosopher,  publisliing  in  Kouie 
itself  an  Apology  for  the  Observations  of  Eustacliio  Diviiii,- 

iC'/".  New  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  51,  line  11 ;  Descartes,  Princij).  Philo.f., 
Pt.  III.,  §§  52,  <K).  The  "grooved  particles"  and  "little  halls  of  the  second 
element"  are  a  part  of  the  vortic^es-theory  {<■/.  ante,  p.  552,  note  1).  For  the 
"matter  of  the  first  and  second  element "  and  tlie  genesis  of  tlic  "  iicrfcct 
glohes  "  or  "  halls  of  the  second  element,"  cf.  I'rincip.  Philos.,  Pt.  III.,  §  IS  .vr/. 
The  notes  of  J.  H.  von  Kirchmann  in  his  German  trans,  of  tliis  work  of  Des- 
cartes (Philos.  Blhliothek.,  Vol.  2f),  2d  ed.,  Heidelberg,  IKS")  arc  a  valuahle 
aid  in  the  study  of  the  theory.  —  Tr. 

^  Eustachio  Divini,  c.  1G20  — c.  KiCt),  an  Italian  in(M-haniciaii,  opticiiiii,  ami 
astrouomer,  noted  for  his  skill  in  making  optical  iiislrnmcnts,  csix^cially  tcl- 


G14  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

a  famous  optician,  hesitated  not  to  declare  that  it  was  only  pro- 
visionally that  they  understood  in  the  sacred  text  a  true  move- 
ment of  the  sun,  and  that  if  the  view  of  Copernicus  were  found 
true,  there  woidd  be  no  difficulty  in  explaining  it  in  like  man- 
ner as  this  passage  of  Vergil : 

terraeque  urbesque  recedunt.i 

However,  they  did  not  cease  to  continue  in  Italy  and  in  Spain 
and  even  in  the  hereditary  states  of  the  emperor  to  suppress 
the  doctrine  of  Copernicus,  to  the  great  detriment  of  these  na- 
tions whose  scholars  might  have  raised  themselves  to  more 
beautiful  discoveries  had  they  enjoyed  a  reasonable  and  philo- 
sophic liberty. 

§  12.  Ph.  The  dominant  passions  appear  to  be  in  reality,  as 
you  sa}',  the  source  of  the  love  we  have  for  hypotheses :  but 
they  also  extend  very  much  farther.  The  greatest  ]3robability 
in  the  world  vnW  avail  nothing  in  showing  his  injustice  to  an 
avaricious  and  ambitious  man;  and  a  lover  will  have  every 
facility  in  the  world  for  allowing  himself  to  be  duped  by  his 
mistress,  so  long  as  it  is  true  that  we  easily  believe  whatever 
we  wish,  and  according  to  the  remark  of  Vergil, 

qui  amaut  ipsi  sibi  somuia  fingunt.^ 

This  is  what  makes  them  make  use  of  two  means  of  escaping 
the  most  apparent  probabilities  when  they  attack  our  passions 
and  our  prejudices.  §  13.  The  first  is  to  think  that  there  may 
be  some  sophistry  concealed  in  the  argument  which  they  opjDOse 
to  us.  §  14.  The  second  in  supposing  that  we  might  put  before- 
hand wholly  as  good  or  even  better  arguments  in  order  to  beat 
the  adversary,  if  we  had  the  opportunity,  or  skill,  or  aid,  which 

escopes,  was  tlie  reputed  author  of  a  little  work  entitled  Brevis  annotatio  in 
Si/stema  Saturniuin  Christiani  Hugenii  [Hag.  Com.,  1G59,  4to],  Rome,  1(560, 
8vo,  in  whicli  an  attempt  was  made  to  refute  Huygeus'  theory  of  the  planet 
Saturn.  Divini,  however,  was  no  Latinist,  and  probably  had  little  share  in 
tlie  book,  contributing  merely  "his  pretended  observation  of  the  three  sepa- 
rate bodies";  the  real  author  was  most  likely  the  Jesuit,  Honore  Fabri  (i-f. 
ante,  p.  5S6,  note  2).  Huygeus  reprinted  the  work  together  with  his  reply, 
Brevis  assertio  systematis  Saturnii  sui,  Hag.  Com.,  IGtJO;  and  Divini  pub- 
lished his  rejoinder,  Septempedamis  pro  sria  annotatione  in  si/s(.  Saturn.  Ch. 
Hugenii,  adversum  ejus  assertionem.,  Rome,  1661.  On  the  whole  subject,  cf. 
Huygens,  QSuvres  completes,  La  Haye,  1888-1893,  5  \o\s.,  passim.  —  Tr. 

i^«.  3,  72.  —  Tr. 

^Edog.S,  108.  — Tr. 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN  UNDEESTANDING  615 

we  must  have  to  discover  them.  §  15.  These  means  of  shield- 
ing themselves  from  conviction  are  sometimes  good,  but  they 
are  also  sophisms  when  the  matter  is  sufficiently  explained  and 
everything  has  been  taken  into  account;  for  after  that  there 
are  means  of  knowing  with  regard  to  all  upon  what  side  the 
probability  is  found.  Thus  there  is  no  room  for  doubting  that 
the  animals  have  been  formed  by  the  movements  of  an  intelli- 
gent agent,  rather  than  by  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms ;  as 
there  is  no  one  who  doubts  in  the  least  whether  the  characters 
of  printing  which  form  an  intelligent  discourse  have  been 
brought  together  by  an  attentive  man,  or  by  a  confused  medley. 
I  should  think  then  that  it  does  not  depend  vipon  us  to  suspend 
our  assent  in  these  instances ;  but  we  can  give  it  when  the 
probability  is  less  evident,  and  we  can  even  content  ourselves 
with  more  feeble  proofs  which  better  agree  with  our  inclina^ 
tion.  §  16.  It  appears  to  me  impracticable  for  the  truth  for  a 
man  to  lean  to  the  side  upon  which  he  sees  the  less  probability ; 
perception,  knowledge  and  assent  are  not  arbitrary,  as  it  does 
not  depend  upon  me  to  see  or  not  to  see  the  agreement  of  two 
ideas,  Avheu  my  spirit  is  turned  toward  them.  We  can  how- 
ever voluntarily  arrest  the  progress  of  our  researches ;  without 
this  ignorance  or  error  could  not  in  any  case  be  a  sin.  It  is  in 
this  that  we  exercise  our  liberty.  It  is  true  that  in  the  in- 
stances where  we  have  no  interests,  we  embrace  the  common 
opinion,  or  the  view  of  the  first  comer ;  but  in  the  jxnnts  where 
our  happiness  or  misery  is  concerned,  the  mind  applies  itself 
more  seriously  to  weighing  the  probabilities,  and  I  think  that 
in  this  case,  that  is,  when  we  are  attentive,  we  have  no  choice 
in  determining  ourselves  for  the  side  we  prefer,  if  between  the 
two  sides  there  are  differences  at  once  visible,  and  that  it  will 
be  the  greatest  probability  that  will  determine  our  assent. 

Th.  I  am  of  your  opinion  at  bottom,  and  we  have  given 
sufficient  explanation  upon  this  matter  in  our  preceding  con- 
ferences when  we  spoke  of  liberty.  I  showed  then  that  we 
never  believe  what  we  wish,  but  rather  what  we  see  is  the  most 
apparent ;  and  that  nevertheless  we  can  make  ourselves  believe 
indirectly  what  we  wish  by  turning  away  the  attention  from  a 
disagreeable  object  in  order  to  apply  ourselves  to  another  wliich 
pleases  us.  This  makes  us  in  regarding  more  tli(^  reasons  of 
a  favorite  side  believe  at  last  the  more  probable.     As  for  the 


61G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

opiuions  in  which  we  take  little  interest  and  which  we  receive 
upon  slight  reasons,  we  do  this  because,  noticing  scarcely  any- 
thing which  opposes  them,  we  find  that  the  opinion  which 
makes  iis  regard  them  favorably  surpasses  as  much  or  more 
the  opposite  opinion,  which  has  nothing  in  its  behalf  in  our 
perception,  as  if  it  had  had  many  reasons  on  both  sides,  for  the 
difference  between  0  and  1,  or  between  2  and  3,  is  as  great  as 
between  9  and  10,  and  we  perceive  this  advantage,  without 
thinking  of  the  examination  which  would  still  be  necessary 
in  order  to  judge,  but  to  which  nothing  impels  us. 

§  17.  Ph.  The  last  false  measure  of  probability  that  I  in- 
tended to  notice  is  improperly  understood  authority,  which  keeps 
more  people  in  ignorance  and  error  than  all  the  others  together. 
How  many  people  we  see  who  have  no  other  basis  for  their 
views  than  the  opinions  received  among  our  friends  or  among 
the  members  of  out  profession  or  of  our  party,  or  of  our  coim- 
try !  Such  a  doctrine  has  been  approved  by  venerable  antiq- 
uity ;  it  comes  to  me  under  the  passport  of  preceding  centuries ; 
other  men  yield  to  it ;  this  is  why  I  am  shielded  from  error  in 
receiving  it.  We  have  as  much  authority  for  tossing  up  in 
order  to  take  these  opinions,  as  to  take  them  upon  the  basis  of 
such  rules.  And  besides  the  fact  that  all  men  are  liable  to 
error,  I  believe  that  if  we  could  see  the  secret  motives  which 
actuate  the  scholars  and  chief  men  of  a  sect,  we  should  find 
often  something  wholly  different  from  the  pure  love  of  the 
truth.  It  is  certain  at  least  that  there  is  no  opinion  so  ab- 
surd that  it  cannot  be  embraced  upon  this  basis,  since  there  is 
scarcely  an  error  which  has  not  had  its  partisans. 

T7i.  It  must,  however,  be  admitted  that  in  many  instances 
we  cannot  avoid  yielding  to  authority.  St.  Augustine  has  pro- 
duced quite  a  remarkable  book  "  De  utilitate  credendi,"  ^  which 
deserves  to  be  read  on  this  subject,  and  as  for  the  received 
opinions,  they  have  for  themselves  something  approaching  to 
that  which  gives  what  is  called  presumption  with  the  juriscon- 
sults :  and  although  we  are  not  obliged  to  follow  them  always 
without  proofs,  we  are  no  more  authorized  to  destroy  them  in 
the  mind  of  another  "withou.t  having  contrary  proofs.  This  it 
is  which  does  not  allow  us  to  change  anything  without  reason. 

1  Cf.  Opp'ra,  Benedictine  art.,  Vol.  S,  pp.  45-70,  Paris,  1688;  Migne,  Patrol, 
s.  Lat.,  Vol.  42  [Vol.  8  of  Augustine],  pp.  65-92.  — Tb. 


CH.  XX]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  617 


TJie  argument  drawn  from  the  great  number  of  the  approvers 
of  an  opiniou  has  been  much  disputed  since  the  hite  J\I.  ]Slcole 
published  his  book  on  the  church ;  ^  but  all  that  may  be  draANii 
from  this  argument,  when  the  question  is  of  approving  a  reason 
and  not  of  attesting  a  fact,  may  be  reduced  merely  to  what  I 
have  just  said.  And  as  one  hundred  horses  do  not  run  faster 
than  one  horse,  though  they  can  draw  more,  so  it  is  with  one 
hundred  men  as  compared  with  one  single  man ;  they  cannot 
go  more  justly,  but  they  will  work  more  effectively ;  they  can- 
not judge  better,  but  they  will  be  capable  of  furnishing  more 
matter  upon  which  the  judgment  may  be  exercised.  This  is 
the  meaning  of  the  proverb  :  plus  vident  ocidi  quam  ocidus.  We 
notice  it  in  the  councils,  where  really  a  multitude  of  consideror 
tions  are  put  upon  the  carpet  which  would  perhaps  escape  one 
or  two,  but  they  run  a  risk  often  of  not  taking  the  better  side 
in  concluding  upon  all  these  considerations,  when  there  are 
no  skilful  persons  charged  with  directing  and  weighing  them. 
Hence  some  judicious  theologians  of  the  Eoman  party,  seeing 
that  the  authority  of  the  church,  i.e.  that  of  the  most  exalted 
in  dignity  and  the  most  supported  by  the  multitude,  could  not 
be  certain  in  a  matter  of  reasoning,  have  reduceil  it  to  the  mere 
attestation  of  the  facts  under  the  name  of  tradition.  This  was 
the  opinion  of  Henry  Holden,^  an  Englishman,  doctor  of  the 
Sorbonne,  author  of  a  book  entitled  "  Analysis  of  the  Faith," 
in  which,  following  the  principles  of  the  "  Commonitorium  "  of 
Vincent  de  Lerins,^  he  maintained  that  we  cannot  make  new 

1  Of.  ante,  p.  5.30,  note  1.— Tr. 

2  Henry  Holden,  1590-1062,  was  an  English  Roman  Cafliolic  divine,  wlio 
graduated  at  the  Sorbonne,  and  was  appointed  Professor  of  Tlieology  tliere. 
In  1()47  he  petitioned  tlie  House  of  Commons  for  toleration  of  tlie  Catholics, 
provided  they  v^ould  take  the  oath  of  allegiauce.  His  Divliix  Fidel  An.ahjsis, 
a  concise  exposition  of  the  Catholic  articles  of  faith  as  distinguished  from 
matters  of  opinion,  appeared  at  Paris,  1052,  with  an  appendix  consisting  of  a 
short  treatise  on  Schism.  It  was  reprinted  at  Paris,  1085,  1707,  at  Cologne, 
10.55,  1782,  Eng.  trans.,  by  "  W.  G.,"  1058.  Dupin,  who  gives  a  full  abstract 
of  the  book  in  his  Bihl.  des  Jut.  ecxles.,  1711,  torn.  17,  pp.  l<J4-2(«,  considers 
him  one  of  the  ablest  controversialists  of  his  time.  In  1056  ho  was  engaged 
in  a  controversy  with  Antoine  Arnauld,  the  Jansenist  {(■/.  ante,  p.  403,  note  4), 
and  his  letters  to  Arnauld  were  printed  in  later  editions  of  tlie  Aiinli/.ih.  —  'rn. 

3  St.  Vincent  of  Lerins,  of  Gallic  origin,  who  died  about  450.  His  .idrrr.'sii.'^ 
profutias  nnuiiiiiii  HOvUatffi  Ilxvcticoriuii  Oomiiiotii/driinn,  writl<'ii  in  4'M, 
three  years  after  the  Council  of  Ephesus,  energetically  afhrms  tlie  aiitliorily 
of  tradition  against  all  religious  and  doctrinal  innovations.  In  chap.  2  of  this 
short  treatise  occurs  the  famous  threefold  test  of  orthodoxy  :  "  Quod  seni]>cr, 


G18  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE  OF   LOCKE  [Bii.  iv 

decisions  in  the  church,  and  that  all  the  bishops  assembled  in 
council  can  do  is  to  attest  the  fact  of  the  doctrine  received  in 
their  dioceses.  The  principle  is  specious  so  long  as  we  continue 
in  generalities ;  but  when  we  come  to  the  fact,  it  is  found  that 
in  different  countries  different  opinions  have  been  received  for 
a  long  time ;  and  in  the  same  countries  also  they  have  gone 
from  one  extreme  to  another,  notwithstanding  the  arguments 
of  Arnauld  against  insensible  changes ;  besides  often  without 
confining  themselves  to  attest  them,  they  have  taken  it  upon 
themselves  to  judge.  It  is  also  at  bottom  the  opinion  of  Gret- 
ser,^  a  learned  Jesuit  of  Bavaria,  author  of  another  Analysis  of 
Faith,  approved  by  the  theologians  of  his  order,  that  the  church 
may  judge  controversies  by  making  new  articles  of  faith,  since 
the  assistance  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  promised  it,  although  most 
frequently  they  try  to  disguise  this  vieAv,  especially  in  France, 
as  if  the  church  were  only  to  explain  doctrines  already  estab- 
lished. But  the  explanation  is  a  statement  already  received, 
or  a  new  one  which  they  believe^may  be  drawn  from  the  re- 
ceived doctrine.  Practice  is  most  frequently  opposed  to  the 
first  sense,  and  in  the  second,  what  can  the  new  statement 
which  is  established  be  but  a  new  article  ?  I  am  not,  however, 
of  the  opinion  that  we  despise  antiquity  in  the  matter  of  relig- 
ion; and  I  also  believe  that  we  may  say  that  God  has  pre- 
served the  truly  ecumenical  councils  hitherto  from  all  error 
contrary  to  wholesome  doctrine.  For  the  rest,  sectarian  prej- 
iidice  is  a  strange  thing.  I  have  seen  people  embrace  with 
ardor  an  opinion  for  the  sole  reason  that  it  is  received  in  their 
order,  or  even  solely  because  it  is  contrary  to  that  of  a  man  of 
a  religion  or  of  a  nation  which  they  do  not  like,  although  the 

quod  ubique,  quod  ab  omnibus  creditum  est."  The  work  has  been  edited  by 
Baluze,  Paris,  16IJ3,  lOdil,  1G84,  Kliipfel,  Vienna,  1801),  Pusey,  Oxford,  1838, 
Herzog,  Breslau,  1839,  and  others;  Eng.  trans,  by  Flower,  London,  1866. 
See  also  Migne,  Patrol.  Theol.  cur.  compl.,  Vol.  1,  p.  911,  Paris,  184f").  A 
full  account  of  it  is  given  in  Smith- Wace,  Diet,  of  ChYist.  Bio(/.,  4,  1154- 
11.58.  —  Tr. 

iJac.  Gretser,  15f)l-lii25,  a  learued  Jesuit,  was  Professor  of  Philosophy 
and  various  parts  of  Theology  at  Ingolstadt  for  twenty-four  years.  A  man 
of  immense  erudition,  and  a  voluminous  author,  he  was  lacking  in  taste  and 
critical  power,  and  was  very  harsh  and  bitter  in  discussion.  It  is  said  of  him 
that,  when  asked  by  the  magistrates  of  :Nrarckdorf  in  Swabia,  his  birthplace, 
for  his  portrait  to  be  placed  in  the  town  hall,  he  refused  it,  saying  they  had 
no  place  therein  for  the  head  of  an  ass.  His  complete  works  appeared  at 
Ratisbonne,  1739  sq.,  17  vols.,  fol.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XX]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  619 


question  had  almost  no  connection  with  the  religion  or  the 
interests  of  the  people.  They  did  not  know  perhaps  what  was 
in  reality  the  source  of  their  zeal ;  but  I  knew  that,  upon  the 
first  news  that  such  an  one  had  Avritten  this  or  that  thing,  they 
would  ransack  the  libraries  and  puzzle  their  brains  to  find 
something  to  refute  it.  This  it  is  which  is  practised  so  often 
by  those  Avho  maintain  theses  in  the  universities  and  who  seek 
to  distinguish  themselves  against  their  adversaries.  But  what 
shall  we  say  of  the  doctrines  prescribed  in  the  Symbolic  books 
of  the  sect,  even  among  ^  the  Protestants,  which  we  are  often 
obliged  to  embrace  with  an  oath?  which  some  think  signi- 
fies with  us  only  the  obligation  to  profess  what  these  books 
or  formularies  contain  of  Holy  Scripture ;  in  which  they  are 
contradicted  by  others.  And  in  the  religious  orders  of  the 
Roman  party,  without  contenting  themselves  with  the  doctrines 
established  in  their  church,  they  prescribe  narrower  limits  to 
those  who  teach  them ;  witness  the  propositions  the  teaching 
of  which  in  their  schools  the  General  of  the  Jesuits,  Claudio 
Acquaviva  ^  (if  I  am  not  mistaken),  defends.  It  would  be  well 
(to  mention  it  in  passing)  to  make  a  systematic  collection  of 
the  x^i'opositions  determined  and  censured  by  councils,  popes, 
bishops,  superiors,  faculties,  which  would  be  of  use  in  ecclesi- 
astical history.  We  may  distinguish  between  teaching  and 
embracing  an  opinion.  There  is  no  oath  in  the  world  nor  pro- 
hibition which  can  force  a  man  to  abide  in  the  same  opinion, 
for  opinions  are  involuntary  in  themselves :  but  he  may  and 
should  abstain  from  teaching  a  doctrine  which  is  regarded  as 
dangerous,  unless  he  finds  himself  compelled  thereto  by  his 
conscience.  In  this  case  he  must  declare  himself  sincerely  and 
leave  his  post  when  he  has  been  charged  with  teaching ;  sup- 
posing, however,  that  he  can  do  so  without  exposing  himself 
to  an  extreme  danger  which  might  force  him  to  leave  without 

1  Gerhardt,  Erdniaim,  and  Jacques  read:  "  pariiii  "  ;  Janet  reads:  "par," 
i.e.  "by."— Tr. 

2  Claudius  Aquaviva,  1543-l()ir),  General  of  the  Jesuits,  158I-l()iri.  For  a 
brief  account  of  liis  Ratio  Studiorum,  15'.)<),  cf.  Hughes,  Loi/ola  hikI  the  E'ln- 
rational  Systmi  of  the  Jemits,  pp.  141  .sq.  (in  Tlie  Great  Educators  Scries,  ed. 
by  Nicolas  Murray  Butler),  New  York:  Clias.  Scribner's  Sons,  1WI2.  For  the 
text  of  the  Ratio,  and  a  full  account  of  its  srowtli  from  its  preliminary  to  its 
final  form,  with  the  letters  of  Aquaviva  and  other  docunicnls,  '/.  M<iiiiniiii,lii 
Gerinunix  Pxdac/ogica,  Berlin,  A.  Hofmann  &  Co.,  188f)  .s^.,  Bd.  V.,  Tom.  II. 
—  Tr. 


G20  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  it 

fame.  "We  see  but  little  other  means  of  reconciling  the  rights 
of  the  public  and  of  the  individual ;  the  one  being  under  obli- 
gation to  prevent  what  it  judges  bad,  and  the  other  not  being 
able  to  dispense  with  the  duties  demanded  by  his  conscience. 

§  18.  Ph.  This  oi^position  between  the  public  and  the  indi- 
vidual and  even  between  the  public  opinions  of  different  sects 
is  an  inevitable  evil.  But  often  these  very  oppositions  are  only 
apparent  and  consist  only  in  the  formulas.  I  am  obliged  also 
to  say,  in  order  to  be  just  to  the  human  race,  that  there  are  not 
so  many  people  involved  in  error  as  is  ordinarily  siipposed. 
Not  that  I  think  that  they  embrace  the  truth,  but  because  in 
realit}'  upon  the  doctrines  upon  which  tlijey  make  so  much  stir, 
they  have  absolutely  no  positive  opinion,  and  because  without 
having  examined  anything  and  without  having  in  the  mind  the 
most  superficial  ideas  upon  the  matter  in  question,  they  are 
resolved  to  hold  themselves  fast  to  their  party,  as  soldiers  who 
do  not  examine  the  cause  they  defend :  and  if  the  life  of  a  man 
shows  that  he  has  no  sincere  regard  for  religion,  it  is  sufiicient 
for  him  to  have  the  hand  and  tongue  ready  to  maintain  the 
common  opinion,  in  order  to  commend  himself  to  those  who  can 
procure  him  support. 

Til.  This  justice  which  you  render  to  the  human  race  does 
not  redound  to  its  praise ;  and  men  would  be  more  excusable  in 
follo^Wng  their  opinions  than  in  disguising  them  for  the  sake 
of  their  interests.  Perhaps,  however,  there  is  more  sinceritj^  in 
their  deeds  than  you  seem  to  give  any  one  to  understand.  For 
without  any  knowledge  of  a  reason,  they  can  perhaps  attain  to 
an  implicit  faith  hj  submitting  themselves  in  general  and  some- 
times blindly,  but  often  in  good  faith,  to  the  judgment  of  others 
whose  authority  they  have  once  recognized.  It  is  true  that  the 
interest  they  find  therein  contributes  to  this  submission,  but 
this  does  not  prevent  them  at  last  from  forming  an  opinion. 
They  are  contented  in  the  Roman  church  with  this  almost 
implicit  faith,  not  perhaps  having  any  article  thereupon,  due  to 
the  revelation  which  is  judged  absolutely  fundamental  thereto 
and  which  is  considered  as  necessary  necessitate  medii,  i.e.  the 
belief  of  which  is  a  condition  absolutely  necessary  to  salvation. 
And  they  are  all  necessitate  pr(]e-cej)ti,  by  the  necessity  therein 
taught  of  obeying  the  church,  as  they  call  it,  and  of  giving  all 
attention  to  that  which  is  proposed  therein,  all  under  pain  of 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING  621 


mortal  sin.  But  this  necessity  demands  only  a  reasonable  docil- 
ity and  does  not  compel  absolute  assent,  according  to  the  most 
learned  doctors  of  this  cliurch.  Cardinal  BeUarmine  himself 
believed,  however,  that  nothing  was  better  than  this  faith  of  a 
child  who  submits  himself  to  an  established  authority,  and  he 
relates  with  approval  the  statement  of  a  dying  man,  Avho  escaped 
the  devil  by  this  circle,  which  they  heard  him  often  repeat : 

I  believe  all  that  the  cliurch  believes, 
The  church  believes  what  I  believe. 


CHAPTER   XXI 

OF    THE    DIVISION    OF    THE    SCIENCES 

§  1.  Ph.  Here  we  are  at  the'  end  of  our  course,  and  all  the 
operations  of  the  understanding  are  explained.  Our  purpose  is 
not  to  enter  into  the  detail  indeed  of  our  knowledge,  yet  it  will 
perhaps  be  proper  here,  before  we  conclude,  to  make  a  general 
review  by  considering  the  division  of  the  sciences.  All  that 
can  enter  into  the  sphere  of  human  understanding  is  eitlier  the 
nature  of  things  in  themselves,  or  in  the  second  place,  man  in  the 
character  of  an  agent,  tending  towards  his  end  and  in  particular 
towards  his  happiness,  or  in  the  third  place  the  means  of  acquir- 
ing and  communicating  knowledge.  Science  then  is  divided 
into  three  kinds.  §  2.  The  first  is  Physics  or  Natural  Philoso- 
phy, which  comprises  not  only  bodies  and  their  properties,  as 
number,  figure,  but  also  spirits,  God  himself  and  the  angels. 
§  3.  The  second  is  Practical  Philosophy  or  Ethics,  which  teaches 
the  means  of  obtaining  good  and  useful  things,  and  proposes  to 
itself  not  only  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  but  also  the  ])raetico 
of  that  which  is  right.  §  4.  Pinally,  the  third  is  Logic  or  the 
knowledge  of  signs,  for  Aoyos  signifies  word.  We  need  .s7y/;/.s  of 
our  ideas  to  enable  us  to  communicate  our  thoughts  to  one 
another,  as  well  as  to  register  them  for  our  own  use.  Perhaps 
if  we  should  consider  distinctly  and  with  all  possible  c4re  that 
this  last  kind  of  science  revolves  about  ideas  and  words,  we 
should  have  a  logic  and  criticism  ^  different  from  that  which  lias 

1  Locke  has:  "critic,"  Philos.  Wlcs.,  Vol.  2,  p.  ;«8,  Bohii's  ed.;  Krascr, 
Locke's  Essay  coyiccrnim/  Human  Under -itanding.  Vol.  2,  p.  4G2.  — 'J'k. 


622  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

hitherto  been  seen.  And  these  three  kinds,  Physics,  Ethics, 
and  Logic,  are  like  three  great  provinces  in  the  intellectual 
world,  entirely  separate  and  distinct  the  one  from  the  other. 

Til.  This  division  has  already  been  a  celebrated  one  among 
the  ancients ;  for  under  Logic  they  comprised,  as  you  do,  all 
that  relates  to  words  and  to  the  explication  of  our  thoughts : 
Artes  dicendi.  Nevertheless,  there  is  some  difficult}^  therein; 
for  the  science  of  reasoning,  of  judgment,  of  invention  appears 
very  different  from  the  knowledge  of  the  etymologies  of  words 
and  the  use  of  languages,  which  is  something  indefinite  and 
arbitrary.  Farther,  in  explaining  words,  we  are  obliged  to  make 
an  incursion  into  the  sciences  themselves,  as.  appears  by  the 
dictionaries ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  treat  of  science 
without  giving  at  the  same  time  definitions  of  the  terms.  But 
the  principal  difficulty  found  in  this  division  of  the  sciences  is 
that  each  part  appears  to  absorb  the  whole ;  in  the  first  jDlace, 
Ethics  and  Logic  will  fall  into  Physics,  taken  as  generally  as 
you  have  just  stated;  for  in  speaking  of  spirits,  i.e.  of  sub- 
stances having  understanding  and  will,  and  in  explaining  this 
understanding  to  the  bottom,  you  will  make  it  include  all  logic : 
and  in  explaining  in  the  doctrine  of  spirits  what  belongs  to  the 
will,  it  would  be  necessary  to  speak  of  good  and  evil,  of  happi- 
ness and  misery,  and  it  will  only  depend  upon  you  to  push  this 
doctrine  far  enough  to  make  it  include  all  j^ractical  jihilosophy. 
In  return,  all  might  be  included  in  practical  philosophy  as  serv- 
ing for  our  happiness.  You  know  that  Theologj^  is  rightl}'  con- 
sidered as  a  practical  science,  and  Jurisprudence  as  well  as 
Medicine  are  not  less  so ;  so  that  the  doctrine  of  human  happi- 
ness or  of  our  good  and  ill  will  absorb  all  these  branches  of 
knowledge,"  should  we  desire  to  explain  sufficiently  all  the  means 
serving  the  end  which  reason  proposes  to  itself.  Thus  it  is 
that  Zwinger  has  included  all  in  his  "  Magnum  theatrum  vitse 
humani,"  which  Beyerling  has  disturbed  by  arranging  in  alpha- 
betical order.^     And  in  treating  all  matters  in  dictionaries  fol- 

1  Laurent  Beyerliuck,  or  Beierlynck,  1578-1627,  a  Flemish  scholar,  Professor 
of  Poetry  aud  Rhetoric  at  Vaulx,  and  Canon  of  the  Antwerp  Cathedral,  pub- 
lished, with  additions  and  corrections,  the  Theatrum  vitsehunicmie  of  Zwinger 
(cf.  ante,  p.  o48,  note  1),  with  the  title  Magnum  theatrum  ritse  humanse, 
Cologne,  l(i31,  8  vols.,  fol.  Schaarschmidt  states  that  this  new  edition  in 
alphabetical  order  is,  in  fact,  worth  less  than  the  old  redaction  of  the  book, 
which  handled  the  materials  systematically  in  their  essential  aspects.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XXI]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  623 

lowing  tlie  order  of  the  alphabet,  the  doctrine  of  languages 
(which  you  with  the  ancients  put  in  Logic),  i.e.  in  discursive 
logic,  takes  possession  in  its  turn  of  the  territory  of  the  two 
others.  Here,  then,  your  three  great  x^rovinces  of  encyclopedia 
are  in  continual  war,  since  one  is  always  encroaching  upon  the 
rights  of  the  others.  The  JSTominalists  believed  that  there  were 
as  many  particular  sciences  as  truths,^  which  they  coini)osed 
after  the  wholes  according  as  they  arranged  them ;  and  others 
compare  the  entire  body  of  our  knowledge  to  an  ocean,  which 
is  all  of  a  piece  and  which  is  divided  into  Caledonian,  Atlantic, 
Ethiopic,  Indian  only  by  arbitrary  lines.  It  is  usually  found 
that  one  and  the  same  truth  may  be  put  in  different  places, 
according  to  the  terms  it  contains,  and  also  according  to  the 
mediate  terms  or  causes  upon  which  it  depends,  and  according 
to  the  inferences  and  results  it  may  have.  A  simple  categoric 
proposition  has  only  two  terms ;  but  a  hypothetic  proposition 
may  have  four,  not  to  speak  of  complex  statements.  A  remark- 
able history  may  perhaps  be  placed  in  the  annals  of  universal 
history  and  in  the  history  of  the  country  where  it  hapi)cned, 
and  in  the  history  of  the  life  of  a  man  who  was  interested 
therein.  And  suppose  the  question  therein  concerns  some  tine 
precept  of  morals,  some  stratagem  of  war,  some  invention  use- 
ful in  the  arts  which  serve  the  conveniences  of  life  or  the  health 
of  men,  this  same  history  will  be  related  to  some  purpose  in  the 
science  or  art  it  concerns,  and  indeed  it  can  be  mentioned  in 
two  parts  of  this  science,  viz.,  —  in  the  history  of  the  discipline 
in  order  to  recount  its  efficient  growth,  and  also  in  the  precepts 
to  confirm  them  or  illuminate  them  by  examples.  For  example, 
what  is  very  properly  told  in  the  life  of  Cardinal  Ximenes,  that 
a  Moorish  woman  cured  him  by  rubbings  only  of  a  hectic  almost 
desperate,  deserves  also  place  in  a  system  of  medicine,  as  well 
in  the  chapter  on  hectic  fever,  as  when  the  cpu'stion  concci-Hs  a 

1  The  phrase  "  as  many  sciences  as  truths  "  —  "  tot  esse  seientias  quot  vori- 
tates"— is,  as  Schaarschmidt  says,  "the  sharpest  expression  of  nouiiiialislic 
individualism."  "  According  to  Nominalism,  we  have  a  knowledge  of  partio 
ulars  only,  all  universals  being  merely ./Jr/'/'en^a  mmtis,  ])roducts  of  a))slrac- 
tion.  Hence  true  and  genuine  science  always  relates  to  particulars  only,  and 
thus  there  are  as  many  sciences  as  (particular)  truths." 

On  Leibnitz's  studies  of  Nominalism,  cf.  (Inhrauer,  Lcihnii.  Jii.^srrlnlio  ilr 
princ.  individ.,  pp.  o9  sq.,  Leibnitz,  De  stilo  philo.s.  Nizolii,  §  'J«,  (icrhardt, 
4,  157-158,  Erdmann,  68-69.  -Tu. 


624  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

medicinal  diet  comprising  these  exercises ;  and  this  observation 
will  serve  also  the  better  to  discover  the  causes  of  this  disease. 
But  we  might  further  speak  of  this  in  medicinal  logic,  where 
the  question  is  about  the  art  of  discovering  remedies,  and  in  the 
history  of  medicine,  in  order  to  show  how  remedies  have  come 
to  the  knowledge  of  men,  and  that  it  is  often  by  the  aid  of  sim- 
ple empirics  and  even  charlatans.  Beverovicius,^  in  a  remark- 
able book  on  ancient  medicine,  drawn  wholly  from  aiithors  not 
ph3^sicians,  would  have  rendered  his  work  still  more  useful,  if 
he  had  passed  down  to  modern  authors.  We  see  by  this  that 
one  and  the  same  truth  may  have  many  places  according  to  the 
different  relations  it  can  have.  Those  "who  arrange  a  library 
very  often  do  not  know  where  to  place  certain  books,  being  in 
suspense  between  two  or  three  places  equally  suitable.  But 
let  us  now  speak  only  of  general  doctrines  and  put  aside  partic- 
idar  facts,  history  and  languages.  I  find  two  principal  dispo- 
sitions of  all  doctrinal  truths,  each  of  which  should  have  its 
deserts  and  which  it  would  be  well  to  unite.  The  one  would 
be  synthetic  and  theoretic,  ranking  truths  according  to  the  order 
of  proofs,  as  the  mathematicians  do,  so  that  each  proposition 
would  come  after  those  on  which  it  depends.  The  other  dispo- 
sition would  be  analytic  and.  j)ractical,  commencing  with  the  end 
of  men,  i.e.  with  the  goods  whose  consummation  is  happiness, 
and  seeking  in  order  the  means  available  for  acquiring  these 
goods  or  avoiding  the  contrary  evils.  These  two  methods  have 
place  in  general  encyclopedia,  while  some  have  practised  them 
in  particular  sciences  ;  for  geometry  itself,  treated  synthetically 
by  Euclid  as  a  science,  has  been  treated  by  some  others  as  an 
art,  and  might  nevertheless  be  treated  demonstratively  under 
this  form,  which  would  show  indeed  some  invention ;  as  if  some 

1  Jan  van  Beverwyck,  —  Latin  Beverovicius,  — 1594-1647,  a  noted  Dntoh 
physician,  who  studied  at  Leyden,  Caen,  Paris,  Montpelier  and  Padua,  where 
he  received  his  M.  1).,  and  on  his  return  became  Professor  of  Medicine  at  Dor- 
drecht and  physician  to  the  city,  in  which  also  he  held  several  ci\il  offices, 
among  them  that  of  burgomaster.  He  labored  to  simplify  the  methods  of  pre- 
scribing for  disease.  He  published  a  number  of  books  distinguished  for  purity 
of  style  and  relation  of  facts,  and  which,  adorned  with  copper-plates  and  witli 
the  verses  of  Jakob  Cats,  1577-1600,  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  popular  Dutch 
poets,  "made  in  his  time  much  sensation  and  met  with  much  approbation."' 
Among  them  was  the  Idea  medicine  vetenun,  Lugd.  Bat.,  1637,  12mo,  here 
mentioned  by  Leibnitz.  His  entire  works  were  published  at  Amsterdam, 
1651,  etc.  —  Tr. 


CH.  XXI]  ON  HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  025 

one  proposed  to  measure  all  kinds  of  plane  figures,  and  begin- 
ning- with  reetilinears,  reflected  that  they  may  be  divided  into 
triangles  and  that  each  triangle  is  half  of  a  parallelogram^  and 
that  parallelograms  can  be  reduced  to  rectangles  whose  measure 
is  easy.  But  in  writing  the  encyclopedia,  following  both  these 
two  dispositions  together,  we  might  take  measures  for  references 
in  order  to  avoid  repetitions.  To  these  two  dispositions  the  third 
according  to  the  terms  should  be  joined,  which  in  reality  would 
be  only  a  kind  of  index,  either  systematic,  arranging  the  terms 
according  to  certain  predicaments  which  would  be  common 
to  all  the  notions,  or  alphabetical  according  to  the  languages 
received  among  scholars.  Now  this  index  would  be  necessary 
in  order  to  find  together  all  the  propositions  into  which  the 
term  enters  in  a  sufficiently  remarkable  manner;  for  according 
to  the  two  preceding  ways,  where  the  truths  are  arranged  accord- 
ing to  their  origin  or  use,  truths  concerning  one  and  the  same 
term  cannot  be  found  together.  For  example,  it  was  not  per- 
mitted Euclid,  when  he  was  teaching  how  to  find  the  half  of  an 
angle,  to  add  the  means  of  finding  its  third,  because  h(!  Avould 
have  been  obliged  to  speak  of  the  conic  sections,  knowledge  of 
which  he  could  not  yet  assume  in  this  place.  But  the  index 
may  and  should  indicate  the  places  where  are  found  the  impor- 
tant propositions  which  concern  one  and  the  same  subject.  And 
we  still  lack  such  an  index  in  geometry,  which  would  be  of  great 
use  in  facilitating  indeed  invention  and  in  pushing  the  science, 
for  it  would  relieve  the  memory  and  often  sjjare  iis  the  trouble 
of  seeking  again  that  which  has  already  been  found.  And  these 
indices  would  further  be  of  use  for  a  much  stronger  reason  in 
the  other  sciences,  where  the  art  of  reasoning  has  less  power, 
and  would  be  above  all  extremely  necessary  in  Medicine.  But 
the  art  of  making  such  indices  would  be  no  slight  one.  Now 
considering  these  three  dispositions,  I  find  it  remarkable  that 
they  correspond  to  the  ancient  division,  which  you  have  renewed, 
which  divides  science  or  philosophy  into  theoretic,  practical  and 
discursive,  or  rather  into  Physics,  Ethics,  and  Logic.  For  the 
synthetic  disposition  corresponds  to  the  theoretic,  the  analytic^al 
to  the  practical,  and  that  of  the  index  according  to  tlie  terms  to 
logic :  so  that  this  ancient  division  does  very  well,  ])r()vided  we 
understand  these  dispositions  as  I  have  just  explained,  i.e.  not 
as  distinct  sciences,  but  as  different  arrangements  of  the  same 
2s 


G26  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE  [bk.  iv 

truths  as  far  as  we  judge  it  advisable  to  repeat  them.  There 
is  also  a  civil  division  of  the  sciences  according  to  the  faculties 
and  professions.  We  make  use  of  it  in  the  universities,  and  in 
the  arrangements  of  libraries  ;^  and  Draudius,"  with  his  continuer 
Ijipenius/'  who  have  left  us  the  amplest,  but  not  the  best  cata- 
logue of  books,  instead  of  following  the  method  of  the  Pandects 
of  Gesner,*  which  is  wholly  systematic,  have  contented  them- 
selves with  the  use  of  the  great  division  of  the  materials  (much 


1  For  Leibnitz's  sketch  of  a  library  classification  and  catalogue,  cf.  his  Idea 
LeihnUiana  Bibllothecw  FubllcsB  secundum  classes  scientiarum  ordinandse, 
Duteus,  5,  209-214.  Cf.  also  his  Representation  a  S.  A.  S.  le  Due  de  Wolfen- 
huttel,pour  V encouragei-  a  I'entretien  de  sa  Bibliotheque,  ibid.,  5,  207-208;  the 
same,  in  German,  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz's  Deutsche  Schrift.,  2,  470-472. — Tr. 

■•^  Georg  Draud,  157;3-l()oO  or  1635,  a  student  at  Marburg  University  and 
afterwards  a  proof-reader  at  Frankfort,  Basle,  and  at  the  famous  typography 
at  Feyerabend,  and  minister  of  the  gospel  at  Gros-Carben,  Ortenberg  and 
Dauernheim,  was  the  first  to  attempt  an  extended  systematic  bibliograijhy. 
His  Bibliotheca  classica  sive  catalogus  officinalis,  in  quo  singuli  singularum 
facidtatum  «c  professionum  libi'i  —  secundum  urtes  et  oi-dine  alphabetico 
recensentur,  Frankfort,  1611,  was  the  most  complete  bibliograijhy  of  printed 
books  that  had  then  appeared.  A  2d  ed.,  increased  by  all  the  books  iirinted 
from  1611-1625  of  which  the  editor  had  knowledge,  appeared  in  1625.  —  Tr. 

3  Martin  Lix>euius,  l()o0-1692,  a  learned  German  bibliographer,  who  studied 
at  Wittemlierg,  and  was  co-rector  of  the  gymnasium  at  Halle,  and  of  the  acad- 
emy at  Lubeck,  and  rector  and  professor  in  the  gymnasiiun  at  Stettin.  He 
published  Bibliotheca  realis  juridica,  1679,  the  most  valuable  of  his  series, 
edited  with  additions  by  F.  W.  Struve,  in  1720,  by  G.  A.  Jenichen,  1709-1759, 
a  jurist,  pliilologian  and  historian,  with  corrections  in  1736,  and  a  supplement 
in  two  parts,  1742 ;  also  several  subsequent  editions  with  corrections  and  addi- 
tions; Bibliotheca  realis  medica,  16T.),  piiilosophica,  1682,  theologica,  1685. 
Tliey  were  called  realis  because  the  books  were  listed  in  the  alphabetical  order 
of  subjects  and  not  under  the  names  of  their  authors.  —  Tr. 

*  Conrad  Gesner,  1516-1.565,  called  the  "  German  Pliny,"  because  of  his 
vast  erudition,  was  Professor  of  Greek,  1537,  at  Lausanne,  and  of  Physics  and 
Natural  History,  1541,  at  Ziirich.  He  made  "  the  first  comprehensive  attempt 
at  a  general  encyclopedia  of  literature,  constructed  in  the  form  of  a  catalogue  " 
in  his  Bibliotheca  universaUs.  The  work  contained  the  titles  of  all  then  known 
books,  existent  or  lost,  published  or  announced,  in  Hebrew,  Greek  and  Latin, 
giving  under  each  important  name  a  vast  amount  of  bibliographical  informa- 
tion and  criticism,  original  and  selected,  and  often  some  specimens  of  their 
style.  The  first  vol.,  Zurich,  1545,  is  arranged  alphabetically  according  to 
the  authors'  names;  the  second,  entitled  Pandectse  sive  partitionnm  univer- 
salhim,  lib.  XXI.,  —  totius  philosophic  et  omnium  bonarum  artlum  atque  stu- 
diorum  locos  communes  et  ordines  universales  simul  et  particulares,  —  Ziirich, 
1548,  is  arranged  according  to  subjects  and  divided  into  19  books,  book  21,  a 
theological  encyclopedia,  not  being  jiublished  till  1549,  and  book  20,  the 
medical  writings,  never  appearing  because  in  the  author's  view  tot)  imperfect 
for  publication.  It  was  reprinted  and  greatly  enlarged  by  Simler  in  1574,  and 
by  J.  J.  Fries,  Zurich,  1583.  —  Tr. 


CH.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  627 


the  same  as  the  libraries)  following  the  four  faculties  (as  they 
are  called)  of  theology,  jurisprudence,  medicine  and  i)hilosophy, 
and  have  afterwards  arranged  the  titles  of  each  faculty  accord- 
ing to  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  principal  terms  entering 
into  the  inscription  of  the  books:  this  lightened  the  task  of 
these  authors,  because  they  had  no  need  to  see  the  book  or  to 
understand  the  matter  which  the  book  treats,  but  it  does  not 
sufficiently  serve  others,  at  least  it  does  not  make  references  in 
the  titles  to  others  of  parallel  signification ;  for  not  to  speak  of  a 
number  of  mistakes  they  have  made,  we  see  that  often  one  and 
the  same  thing  is  called  by  different  names,  as,  for  example, 
observationes  juris,  miscellanea,  conjectanea,  electa,  semestria, 
probahiUa,  henedicta,  and  a  multitude  of  similar  inscriptions ; 
such  books  of  the  jurisconsults  signify  only  the  miscellanies  of 
the  Roman  Law.  This  is  why  the  systematic  disposition  of  the 
materials  is  without  doubt  the  best,  and  we  may  join  with  it 
alphabetical  indices  very  full  according  to  the  terms  and  the 
authors.  The  civil  and  received  division,  according  to  the  four 
faculties,  is  not  to  be  despised.  Theology  treats  of  eternal 
felicity  and  all  that  relates  thereto,  so  far  as  it  depends  on  the 
soul  and  the  conscience  ;  it  is  like  a  jurisprudence  which  regards 
what  is  said  to  exist  de  foro  interno  and  employs  invisible  sub- 
stances and  intelligences  :  Jurisprudence  has  for  its  object  gov- 
ernment and  the  laws,  whose  end  is  the  happiness  of  men  so 
far  as  the  external  and  sensible  can  contribute  thereto ;  but  it 
regards  j)rincipally  only  that  which  depends  upon  the  nature 
of  the  spirit,  and  does  not  enter  much  farther  into  the  detail  of 
material  things  whose  nature  it  assumes  in  order  to  emi)loy 
them  as  means.  Thus  is  it  relieved  at  once  of  an  imi)ort;uit 
point  which  concerns  the  health,  strength  and  perfection  of  tlu^ 
human  body,  the  care  of  which  is  given  to  the  faculty  of  Medi- 
cine. Some  have  believed  with  some  reason  that  we  miglit  add 
to  the  others  the  Economic  Facnlfij,  which  would  contain  the 
Mathematical  and  Mechanical  Arts,  and  all  that  concerns  the 
detail  of  the  subsistence  of  men  and  of  the  conveniences  of  life, 
in  which  Agriculture  and  Architecture  would  be  includiMl.  I'.iit 
we  abandon  to  the  faculty  of  Philosophy  all  wliidi  is  not 
included  in  the  three  faculties  which  we  call  superior.  \\r  (h) 
'this  qiute  badly,  for  we  do  it  without  giving  means  to  thosi^ 
who  are  of  this  fourth  facidty  for  perfecting  themselves  by 


0-28  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE  [inc.  iv 

practice  as  those  can  do  who  teach  the  other  faculties.  Thus 
the  mathematics  perhaps  excepted,  we  consider  the  faculty  of 
philosophy  only  as  an  introduction  to  the  others.^  This  is  why 
we  wish  tlie  youth  to  learn  history,  and  the  arts  of  speaking 
and  some  rudiments  of  theology  and  natural  jurisprudence, 
independent  of  divine  and  human  laws,  under  the  title  of  meta- 
physics or  psychology,  ethics  and  politics  with  a  little  of  physics 
also,  in  order  to  serve  as  young  physicians.  This,  then,  is  the 
civil  division  of  the  sciences  following  the  bodies  and  profes- 
sions of  the  scholars  who  teach  them,  without  speaking  of  the 
profession  of  those  who  work  for  the  public  otherwise  than  by 
their  discourses  and  who  ought  to  be  directed  by  true  scholars, 
if  the  limits  of  knowledge  were  well  understood.  And  even  in 
the  more  noble  manual  arts,  knowledge  has  been  very  much 
bound  up  with  performance,  and  might  be  more  so.  As  in  fact 
they  are  joined  together  in  medicine,  not  only  formerly  among 
the  ancients  (where  physicians  were  also  surgeons  and  apothe- 
caries), but  also  to-day  especially  among  the  chemists.  This 
alliance  also  of  practice  and  theory  finds  itself  at  variance  both 
among  those  who  teach  what  are  called  exercises,  as  also  among 
the  painters,  or  sculptors  and  musicians,  and  among  some  other 
kinds  of  virtuosi.  And  if  the  principles  of  all  these  professions 
and  arts,  and  even  of  the  trades,  were  taught  practically  among 
the  philosophers,  or  in  some  other  faculty  of  scholars  as  they 
might  be,  these  scholars  would  be  truly  the  teachers  of  the 
human  race.^    But  it  would  be  necessary  to  change  much  of 

1  I.e.  in  the  broader  sense  of  the  term  in  which  it  is  equivalent  to  the 
Humanities,  —  artes  liberale.s,  — the  liberal  education,  disciplinary,  stimulative 
and  cultural  of  the  student's  entire  powers,  which  was  considered  until  very 
recently,  and  is  regarded  even  now  by  mauj^  of  the  deepest  and  farthest-sighted 
thinkers  on  education,  as  an  essential  precedent  and  preparation  for  all  later 
special  professional  study.  The  custom  of  regarding  the  Faculty  of  Arts 
or  Philosophy  as  introductory  to  that  of  Theology,  Medicine  and  Jurispru- 
dence, goes  back  to  the  university  curricula  of  the  Middle  Age,  the  Trivium 
and  the  Quadrivium,  with  their  respective  degrees  of  A.B.  and  A.^NI.,  whicli  in 
their  essential  character  and  principles,  with  the  necessary  changes  incident 
to  an  advancing  civilization,  have  been,  till  within  a  short  time  at  least,  the 
controlling  influence  in  shaping  the  curricula  and  methods  of  all  modern  col- 
legiate and  university  education.  —  Tr. 

2  On  this,  as  on  every  subject  he  touched,  Leibnitz  utters  a  suggestive  and 
stimulating  thought,  which  has  in  recent  times  brought  forth  much  fruit  in  • 
the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  technical  and  art  schools  of  every  kind. 
—  Tk. 


OH.  xxi]  ON   HUMAN   UNDERSTANDING  629 

the  present  state  of  things  in  literature  and  the  edncation  of  the 
youth,  and  consequently  of  the  government.  And  when  I  con- 
sider how  much  men  have  advanced  in  knowledge  in  the  last 
century  or  two,  and  how  easy  it  would  be  for  them  to  go  incom- 
i:)arably  farther  in  order  to  render  themselves  happier,  I  do  not 
despair  that  a  considerable  improvement  will  come  in  a  more 
trantpiil  period  under  some  great  prince  whom  God  will  be  able 
to  raise  up  for  the  good  of  the  human  race.^ 

1  Leibnitz  constantly  labored  to  secure  the  sympathy  and  active  co-opera- 
tion of  the  "  great  princes  "  in  the  initiation  and  furtherance  of  learuiuj^,  sci- 
ence, and  the  higher  ideal  interests  of  mankind  in  general,  a  conspicuous 
example  of  his  success  being  that  of  the  great  reformatory  genius  of  his  time, 
Peter  the  Great  of  Russia.  Their  correspondence  is  found  in  Foucher  de 
Careil,  (Euvres  de  Leibniz,  7,  395-598.  Cf.  also  W.  Guerrier,  Leibniz  in  seinen 
Beziehungen  zu  Russland  und  Peter  dem  Grossen,  St.  Petersbui-g  and  Leii> 
zig,  1873;  Foucher  de  Careil,  Leibniz  et  Pierre  le  Grand,  Paris,  1873.  For  a 
general  account  of  his  various  efforts  in  this  direction,  cf.  Fischer,  Gesch.  d. 
u.  Philos.,  Vol.  2,  Leibniz,  3d  ed.,  1889,  pp.  211-249;  and  "for  a  brief  account, 
Merz,  Leibniz  (Blackwood's  Philos.  Class.),  pp.  74-83.  — Tu. 


APPENDIX 


LEIBNITZ   TO   JACOB  THOMASIUS^ 

April  20-30,  IGfiO 

[From  the  Lathi] 

IIow  mucli  that  yeS/xa  of  philosophical  history  of  yours  has  made 
the  mouths  of  all  water  cannot  be  told  ;  for  it  is  appai-ent  how  much 
difference  there  is  between  mere  enumerations  of  names  and  those 
profou.nd  views  concerning  the  connections  of  opinions.  And  cer- 
tainly all  acquainted  with  the  subject  that  I  hear  sj^eak  of  your  essay 
(you  know  that  I  never  flatter),  unanimously  affirm  that  from  no 
one  man  can  a  complete  body  of  philosophical  history  preferably  be 
expected.  Very  many  skilled  in  antiquity  rather  than  in  art  have 
given  us  lives  rather  than  opinions.  You  will  give  the  history  not  of 
philosophers  but  of  philosophy.  They  say  in  England  that  Joseph 
Glanvill's  History  of  the  growth  of  the  sciences  since  Aristotle  is  in 
press.^  But  I  think  he  will  pursue  for  the  most  part  the  mathemati- 
cal, mechanical,  and  physical  periods  of  this  inquiry  only,  so  I  think 

1  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.l,  15-27;  Erdmann,  48-i54;  Dutens,  4, 
Pt.  I.  7-19;  Kortholt,  Leibnit.  epist.  ad  diversus,  Lipsiiw,  1734-42,2,  121-142. 
Kortholf  s  text  gives  the  piece  as  printed  by  Leibnitz  in  his  edition  of  Nizo- 
lius,  and  differs  considerably  from  that  given  by  Gerhardt,  which  is  tlie  text 
followed  in  this  translation.  Cf.  also,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  pliilos.  Sc/iri/t.,  4, 
102-174.  In  this  "  impression,"  says  Gerhardt,  Eiiileitung,  ibid.,  p.  9,  note  *'*, 
"  the  copy  of  the  Royal  Library  at  Hanover  has  been  used,  in  which  are  found 
3IS.  notes  of  Leibnitz."  —  Tr. 

2  Joseph  Glanvill,  163(;-lfi80,  Court  Chaplain  to  Cliarles  IL,  publislied  liis 
defence  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  entitled  7'/((.s-  Ultra,  or  t/ie  I'rof/re.ss 
and  Advancement  of  Knowledge  since  the  dai/s  of  Aristoth',  in  KKJK.  In  his 
idea  of  causation  Glanvill  was  a  predecessor  of  Hume.  His  Scepiti.s  .trientijien, 
or  Vanity  of  Docjmatisinr/,  London,  16()5,  edited  by  John  Owen,  1S85,  and  his 
Be  incremcntia  scientiarum,  London,  1670,  attacked  the  Aristotelian  and  Car- 
tesian dogmatism.  Though  a  thorough-going  sceptic  in  the  direction  of  tlic 
scholastic  philosojjhy,  he  was  opposed  to  tlie  materialism  of  Hobl)es.  Some 
account  of  Glanvill's  views  will  be  found  in  Lei-ky,  Rationalism  in  Kurujic, 
1,  129  sq.     D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  New  York,  187G.  —  Tr. 

031 


632  LEIB2>31TZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

he  has  forestalled  you  in  nothing.  But  I  wish  that  you  would  pro- 
duce a  style  and  form  for  this  more  modern  age  and  admonish  our 
inconsiderate  youth  that  neither  everything  nor  nothing  is  to  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  restorers.  Bagheminus^  is  not  the  only  critic  to  whom  you 
are  indebted ;  there  are  the  Patricii,  Telesii,  Campanella?,  Bodini, 
Nizolii,  Fracastorii,  Cardauii,  GalUsei,  Verulamii,  Gassendi,  Hobbii, 
Cartesii,  Bassones,  Uigbaji,  Sennerti,  Sperlingii,  Derodones,  Deusingii, 
and  many  other  names  among  whom  the  cloak  of  philosophy  is 
divided. 2  To  remind  the  world  of  these  will  be  a  diversion  for  you,  a 
profit  to  the  public. 

Who  does  not  assent  to  j^our  estimate  of  Bagheminus?  There  is  no 
skUful  adjustment  in  hypotheses,'^  no  logical  sequence  of  reasons,  but 
in  a  word  strange  notions ;  certainly  imless  he  has  something  to 
observe  useful  in  special  physics,  he  will  better  be  silent.  But 
Scaliger,  Sennert,  and  Sperling,  — for  he  acknowledged  himself  a  pupil 
of  this  one  also,  —  seem  to  me  to  be  the  parents  of  the  opinion  of  that 
one  concerning  God,  the  primary  matter  of  things,  who  think  that 
forms  are  produced  not  from  the  passive  power  of  matter,  but 
from  the  active  power  of  the  efficient  one.  Wherefore  the  conclu- 
sion is  that  they  believe  that  God  produces  creatures  rather  from  his 
own  active  power,  than  from  nothing  by  objective  and  as  it  were 
passive  power.  God  therefore  in  their  opinion  produces  things  out  of 
himself,  and  so  will  be  the  primary  matter  of  things.  But  as  to  this 
you  will  more  properly  judge. 

As  to  Descartes  and  Clauberg,  I  think  in  brief  with  you  that  the 
disciple  is  clearer  than  the  master.  Nevertheless,  I  should  venture 
again  to  affirm  that  hardly  any  one  of  the  Cartesians  have  added  any- 
thing to  the  discoveries  of  the  master.      Certainly  Clauberg,  Ra?us,'* 

1  Gf.  the  letter  of  Jacob  Thomasius  to  Leibnitz,  October  2,  1(568,  Gerhardt, 
Leihniz.  X)hiloH.  Schrift.,1,  14:  Kortholt,  Leibnit.  Epistolse  ad  diversos,  3, 
35:  "Bagheminus  ille,  cujus  negotium  geritur,  Scabinus  est  Stetinensis,  et  a 
nostra  turn  theologica,  turn  philosophica  facultate  petiit  philosophite  sute  nova? 
censuram.  Theologi  responderunt.  A  nobis  nihil  aliud  repositum  illi  est, 
quam  disputatio  mea,  qua"  si  in  maniis  hominis  pervenit,  facile  judicabit,  quo 
in  banc  novitatem  animo  simus."  —  Tr. 

-  For  some  account  of  the  lives  and  philosophy  of  the  persons  whose  names 
are  here  mentioned,  cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atoinistik :  Stockl,  Gesch.  d. 
Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  III.  [Vol.  4].  — Anton  Deusing,  1612-1(506  (not  referred 
to  in  the  works  cited),  was  a  German  physician  and  Professor  of  Medicine  at 
Groningen.  He  had  an  extended  knowledge  of  philosophy,  mathematics,  and 
oriental  languages,  and  published  many  works,  among  them,  De  vero  sij-fte- 
mate  mundi,  dissertatio  mathematlca,  qtia  Copernid  systema  mundi  reforma- 
tur,ete..  Amsterdam,  Elzevir,  1643,  4to. — Tr. 

3  Erdmann  reads :  "  hypothesibus  ejus,"  i.e.  his  hypotheses.  —  Tr. 

^Jean  de  Raey,  date  of  birth  unknown,  died  1702,  was  Professor  of  Philoso- 
phy in  the  University  of  Leyden  1(5.52-16(58,  and  entered  upon  his  Professorship 
at  Amsterdam  in  January,  1669,  with  an  Oratio  de  sapientia  veterum.    In  his 


APPENDIX  633 


Spinoza,!  Clerselier,^  Heei-bord,^  Tobias  Andreaj,*  Henry  Regius,5have 
published  nothing  but  parapln-ases  of  their  master.  Rut  I  call  those 
Cartesians  only  who  follow  the  principles  of  Descartes,  from  which 
number  those  great  men  Bacon,  Gassendi,  Hobbes,  Digby,  Cornelius 
of  IIogheland,«  etc.,  whom  the  common   people   coufouiid  with  the 

Clavis  philosophise  naturalis  seu  introductio  ad  naturse  contemplationem 
Aristotelico-Cartesianam,  1654,  2d  ed.,  ICTT,  he  sought  to  improve  and  com- 
plete the  doctrine  of  Aristotle  through  that  of  Descartes.  He  explained 
Erkenntnisslehre  wholly  after  the  manner  of  Aristotle;  hut  contested  his 
assumption  of  the  eternity  of  the  world  or  the  divine  nature  of  the  stars.  He 
discussed  mainly  the  nature  of  matter  aud  the  origin  of  motion,  wh(jlly  on  a 
Cartesian  basis.  —  Tr. 

1  In  the  impression  of  this  letter  given  by  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos. 
Schrift.,  4,  1()2  sq.,  Leibnitz  has  erased  the  names  of  Spinoza  and  Cornelius 
van  Hooghelande,  and  added  after  Bacon  that  of  Galileo.  This  impression 
omits  also  the  names  of  Rams  and  Clerselier.  For  the  other  textual  changes, 
c/'.  the  impression  itself.  —  Tr. 

2  Claude  Clerselier,  1614-1()84,  the  father-in-law  of  Rohault  (cf.  ante,  p.  233, 
n.  2),  was  a  zealous  disciple  of  Descartes  and  edited  some  of  his  works:  Le 
monde,  ou  traite  de  la  luiniere,  Paris,  1677  ;  Ti-aiM  de  Vhonime,  Paris,  1664; 
Les  lettres  de  Rene  Descartes,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1657-16(;7.  — Tr. 

3  Adrian  Heereboord,  1614-1659,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University 
of  Leyden,  was  one  of  the  first  and  most  zealous  advocates  of  the  new  ten- 
dency of  thought  introduced  by  the  philosophy  of  Descartes.  He  united  to  a 
certain  extent  Cartesianism  with  the  traditional  authority  of  Aristotle,  evi- 
dence of  which  appears  in  his  Parallelismus  AristotelioB  et  Cartcsianse  phi- 
losophias  naturalis,  1643.  Other  writings  of  Heereboord  are:  Meletemata 
phllosophica,  1654;  Philosophia  rutionalis,  moralis,  et  naturalis,  1654,  2d  ed., 
1660;  Philosophia  ptiPtinuUicn,  l(i.59. — Tr. 

■*  Tobias  Andrea^  1604-1674,  Professor  of  History  and  Greek  Language  at 
Groningen,  successfully  cultivated  philosophy  and  became  known  as  a  zealous 
partisan  of  the  philusoijhy  of  Descartes.  He  wrote,  in  1653,  against  Jacob 
Revius,  Assertio  methodi  Cartesianx,  aud  was  also  author  of  Brevis  expli- 
catlo,  brevi  explicatione  juentis  humansB  Ilenr.  Ber/ii  reposita.  —  Tr. 

5  Hendrik  van  Roy,  l.")!)8-l()79,  usually  called  Regius,  was  a  Dutcli  physician, 
who  in  1638  became  Professor  of  Botany  and  Theoretical  Medicine  at  Utrecht. 
He  was  a  zealous  disciple  and  advocate  of  the  ideas  of  Descartes,  until  the 
Voet-Schoock-Descartes  controversy  and  Descartes'  rejection  of  him  as  a  true 
representative  of  his  views  resulted  in  their  falling  out.  Regius  regarded  tlic 
soul  as  a  mode  of  the  bodily  substance,  and  in  physics,  while  resting  through- 
out on  Cartesian  principles,  differed  from  Descartes  in  his  conception  of 
motion  and  rest.  On  this  doctrine  of  Regius,  significant  for  the;  prol)lein  of 
Imdy,  i\f.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  405-408.  Regius  publislied,  among 
other  works,  Fundamental  physiciB,  Leyden,  1646;  Plilloxophia  iiatitralis, 
Amsterdam,  16(il.  Dr.  James  Martiniiau,  A  Stndi/  of  Spinoza,  London, 
Macmillan  &  Co.,  18S2,  page  75,  line  7,  and  foot-note  1,  in  translating  "  Regis" 
instead  of  "Regius"  has  misunderstood  Leibnitz's  reference  and  wrongly 
attributed  to  him  a  "  lapsus  meniorisB.'^  —  Tr. 

6  Cornelius  Van  Hooghelande,  a  Catholic  nobleman  who  lived  at  Leyden, 
was  a  friend  and  disciple  of  Descartes.  In  his  doi/itation's,  1646,  I  looglu'laiiijc 
"so  developed  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  Descartes  that  the  only  Cartesian- 


634  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Cartesians,  must  in  a  won!  be  left  out,  since  however  they  were  either 
tiie  equals  or  even  the  superiors  of  Descartes  in  age  and  natural 
capacities ;  I  acknowledge  that  I  am  anything  but  a  Cartesian. 
That  rule  I  hold  common  to  all  these  renovators  of  philosophj'^,  that 
nothing  is  to  be  exj)lained  in  bodies  except  by  magnitude,  figure,  and 
motion.  In  respect  to  Descai'tes  I  hold  the  argument  only  of  his 
method,  for  when  we  come  to  the  present  matter,  he  relaxed  utterly 
from  that  severity,  and  descended  abruptly  to  certain  extraordinary 
hypotheses,  a  course  which  in  his  case  Vossius  rightly  indeed  repre- 
hended in  his  book  on  Light. 

Wherefore  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  tliat  I  ajiprove  more  things 
in  the  books  of  Ai-istotle  irepl  cjivcnKrj';  d/cpoacrecos,  than  in  the  Medi- 
tations of  Descartes ;  so  far  am  1  from  being  a  Cartesian.  Xay  more,  I 
would  venture  to  add  that  all  those  eight  books  can  be  received  with- 
out violation  of  the  refoi'med  philosophy.  By  which  very  method 
those  difficulties  will  ipso  facto  be  met  which  you,  most  distinguished 
man,  are  investigating  in  regard  to  the  ii'reconcilable  Aristotle. 
For  the  conclusions  of  Aristotle  concerning  matter,  form,  privation, 
nature,  place,  infinity,  time,  motion,  are  for  the  most  part  certain  and 
demonstrated,  this  one  thing  generally  excepted,  what  he  asserted 
about  the  impossibility  of  a  vacuum  and  motion  in  a  vacuum.  For 
to  me  neither  vacuum  nor  plenum-  is  necessary,  and  the  nature 
of  things  seems  capable  of  explanation  by  either  method.  In  behalf 
of  the  vacuum  contend  Gilbert,  Gassendi,  Gericke ;  for  the  plenum, 
Descartes,  Digby,  Thomas  Anglus.^  Clerk-  in  his  book  "  De  plenitu- 
dine  mundi."  For  the  possibility  of  each,  Thomas  Hobbes  and  Robert 
Boyle.  And  I  confess  that,  with  difficulty  indeed,  yet  without  a 
vacuum,  the  rarefactions  of  things  can  be  explained.  I  saw  recently 
the   book   of  John   Baptist   du   Hamel,^  a   French   scholar,  on  the 

ism  of  his  work  was  tlie  dedication."  Descartes  regarded  him,  says  Kuno 
Fischer,  Descartes  and  his  School,  translated  hy  Gordy,  p.  503,  "  as  a  well- 
disposed  man  without  a  calling  to  philosophy,  and  without  understanding  his 
doctrine."  Cousin,  (Euvres  de  Descartes,  (J,  279-281,  gives  a  letter,  with  a 
foot-note  of  an  unknown  editor  stating  his  belief  that  Descartes  wrote  this 
letter  to  Van  Hooghelande  in  March,  1636,  at  Amsterdam.  —  Tr. 

1  Thomas  White,  1582-1676,  called  Anglus,  Albius,  Candidas,  etc.,  published 
his  lastitntionuin  PerLpateticarum  ad  mentem  surmni  clarissimique  Philoso- 
phi  Kenelmi  Equltis  Diyhmi  at  Lyons,  1646.  Leibnitz  refers  to  him  briefly 
in  the  Tlieoria  motus  concreti,  §  55  (Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  4, 
207;  Math.  Schrift.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  47),  and  in  the  Theoria  motus  abstracti 
{ibid.,  i, 228:  II.,  2  [Vol.6],  67),as  "  subtilissimus"  and  "  acutissimus."  — Tr. 

•^  Gilbert  Gierke,  1626-1697?,  a  mathematician  and  theological  writer,  in  his 
first  work,  De  Plenitudine  Mundi,  etc.,  1660,  reviewed  Descartes  and  attacked 
Bacon  and  Hobbes,  and  published  in  1662  his  Tractatus  de  Restitutionc  Cor- 
porum,  results  of  studies  following  Torricelli  and  Boyle.  —  Tr. 

''Jean  Baptiste  du  Hamel.  1024-1706,  was  a  French  experimental  philoso- 
pher and  astronomer,  who  lectured  on  phj'sics  and  experimented  so  far  as  his 


APPENDIX  635 


harmony  of  ancient  and  modern  pliilosopliy,  published  not  lono- 
since  at  Paris,  in  which  he  elegantly  expounds  and  often  acutely 
estimates  the  hypotheses  of  some  of  the  most  celebrated  ancients 
and  moderns.  He  also  has  not  a  few  words  concerning  the  con- 
flicting views  about  the  vacuum.  As  to  the  rest,  scarcely  any  sane 
man  will  call  in  question  all  the  remaining  things  discussed  by 
Aristotle  in  Bk.  VIII.  Phys.  and  the  entire  JMetaphysics,  Logic, 
and  Ethics.  Who  does  not  admit  the  substantial  form  also;  namely, 
that  by  wdrich  the  substance  of  one  body  differs  from  the  substance 
of  another  body?  Nothing  is  truer  than  primary  matter.  This  one 
thing  is  in  question,  whether  the  abstract  discussions  of  Aristotle  con- 
cerning matter,  form,  and  change,  are  to  be  explained  by  magnitude, 
figure,  and  motion.  The  Scholastics  deny,  the  Reformers  atiirm,  it. 
The  opinion  of  the  Reformers  seems  to  me  not  only  the  truer,  but  the 
more  in  harmony  with  that  of  Aristotle;  I  will  speak  briefly  of  each. 
And  first  of  Aristotle.  For  that  the  Scholastics  strangely  pre- 
verted  his  meaning,  to  whom  is  it  better  known  than  to  you, 
most  distinguished  man,  who  have  been  the  first  to  bring  forth 
into  the  light  a  good  many  of  this  class  of  errors?  Since  with 
you  in  metaphysics  Soner^  and  Dreier,'-' in  logic  Viottus,  Zabarella,^ 

position  and  the  instruments  then  existing  allowed.  He  publislied,  anidiig 
other  works,  Astronomia  physica,  and  De  nietPorilms  et  fosMlihus,  Paris, 
11)60;  De  consensu  veteris  et  novie  philosnphix,  Paris,  1W3  and  later  editions, 
the  work  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz  ;  De  corporum  affectionibus,  KiTO;  his 
Opera,  Norimberga,  1«S1.     Cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2, 4;);5. 494.  —Tr. 

1  Ernst  Soner,  1572-l(;i2,  was  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Medicine  at 
Altdorf,  and  in  philosophy  an  Aristotelian.  He  was  the  antlior  of  many 
Disputationes,  the  greater  part  of  which  appeared  in  Felwinger's  Philosopliia 
Altdorfiana,  Norimberga,  1G44;  also  of  Commentaries  on  Aristotle's  INIeta- 
physics  and  Physics,  1G07 ;  he  also  wrote  against  eternal  punishment  in  his 
Demo7istrationes  quid  seterna  impiorum  supplicia  non  arc/itant  Dei  Justitiam 
sedinjustitiam,  and  some  medical  works.  Cf.  Magn.  Dan.  Omeisius,  Gloria 
Academise  AUdorJianx,  etc.,  Altdorf,  KiSo.  Leibnitz  in  his  PreUminanj 
Dissertation  to  his  edition  of  Nizolins  (Gerliardt,  4,  15.");  Prdmann,  (i.Ha; 
Dutens,  4,  Pt.  L,  57)  speaks  of  his  contribniion,  togetlier  with  that  of  Drcicr, 
to  the  understanding  of  Aristotle's  Metnphysies  ;  and  in  the  Theodici'e,  l'\.  111., 
§  2<i5,  of  his  argument  against  eternal  punishment.  — Tk. 

2  Christian,  or  Peter,  Dreier,  KJIO-IGSS,  was  Professor  of  Theology  at  Ktiii- 
igsberg,  and  published  his  Supientia  sen  Philosophia  prima,  ex  Aris/otele 
ejusque  optimis  commentaioribus,  conscriptu,  Konigsl)erg,  l(i44,  Ito.  Lcihnjtz 
refers  to  him  in  his  Preliminary  Dissertation  to  Nizcdius  (Gerliiirdt,  4,  155; 
Erdmanu,  08  a;  Dutens,  4,  Pt.  L  57)  and  also  in  the  Tlidodir^c,  PI.  II..  §  1S4  : 
"M.  Dreier  de  Konigsberg  a  bien  remarque  (pie  la  vraie  MU'la|>liysi(}uo 
qu'Aristote  cherchait,  et  qu'il  appelait  r'nv  inTov^tvy^v,  son  desiiteralum,  elait 
la  theologie."  —  Tii. 

3  Jacopo  Zaliarella,  15,3:5-1580,  was  a  teacher  of  Logic  at  Padua.  I  lis  l)c  rebus 
7iaturalibus,Hb.  A'.Y.Y.,  appeared  at  C(d.,  1.590,  fob;  his  Opera  hu/iea.  Col., 
1.597,  fol. ;  both  al.so  in  several  later  editions.  An  account  of  Zabarella  will  bo 
found  in  StSckl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelaliers,  HI.  [Vol.  I],  2(i:'.-272.— Tii. 


63G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Juiijr,^  in  civics  Jason  Denores,"^  Piccart,^  Conring,  Felden/  Durrius,^ 
ajul  many  others,  acknowledge  this,  why,  I  pray,  shall  we  not  suspect 
the  same  or  worse  in  physics,  aids  in  the  knowledge  of  which  must  be 
sought  from  sense  and  experiment,  of  which  means  the  Scholastics 
contiued  for  the  most  part  in  closed  monasteries  were  absolutely 
deprived?  It  is  probable  enough,  therefore,  that  in  physics  they  were 
deceived ;  how  if  I  shall  show  more  than  this,  that  it  is  altogether 
certain  ?  In  which  thing  I  may  be  engaged  again  in  a  twofold  way. 
For  either  it  is  shown  that  the  Reformed  Philosophy  can  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  Aristotelian  and  is  not  contrary  to  it,  or  further,  it 
is  shown  that  the  one  not  only  can,  but  also  must,  be  explained  by  the 
other;  nay,  rather,  that  the  very  things  which  are  discussed  with 
so  much  pomp  by  the  moderns  flow  from  the  Aristotelian  principles. 
By  the  former  way  the  possibility,  by  the  latter  the  necessity,  of  the 
reconciliation  is  accomplished,  although  in  this  very  instance  if 
a  possible  reconciliation  is  shown,  the  thing  is  accomplished.     For 

1  Joachim  Jung,  1.587-1657,  an  erainent  mathematician  and  physicist,  and 
an  earnest  advocate  of  the  corpuscular  theory,  published  Log'tca  Hambiirr/- 
eiisis,  Hamburg,  1(J3S,  Svo ;  et  recpusente  Joh.  Vegetio,  1C81,  8vo  ;  and  various 
disputations.  Leibnitz  refers  to  liis  Geometria  empirica,  Hamburg,  1681,  Svo, 
in  the  Theodicee,  Pt.  II.,  §  214.  For  an  account  of  him  and  his  corpuscular  the- 
ory, cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  245-261;  E.  Wohlwill,  J.  Jungius 
und  die  Erneurung  atomistische?'  Lehren  im  17  Jahrhundert,  Hamburg,  1887 ; 
G.  E.  Guhrauer,  J.  Jung  und  seiii  Zeiialter,  Stuttgart  u.  Tiibingeu,  1859.  — Tr. 

2  Jason  Deuores,  died  1590,  was  well  acquainted  with  the  peripatetic  jAi- 
losophy,  and  ijublished  DelV  ottima  7-epublica,  Venice,  1578,  4to ;  and  De  con- 
stitutione  philos.  Aristotelis,  Patavii,  1584,  4to.  —  Tr. 

3  Michael  Piccart,  1574-1620,  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Poetry  at  Altdorf, 
tvas  one  of  the  most  learned  men  of  his  times,  and  especially  distinguished  as 
an  interpreter  of  Aristotle.  Among  his  works  were  Isugoge  in  lectionem 
Aristotelis,  Nuremberg,  1605,  Svo,  reprinted  with  the  notes  of  J.  C.  Durrius, 
Altdorf,  1660,  1666,  Svo;  Organum  Aristotelicum  in  qusest.  et  respons.  redac- 
tutn,  Leipzig,  1613,  Svo ;  In politicos  Ubros  Aj-istotelis,  Leipzig,  1615,  Svo,  Jena, 
1659,  Svo,  a  highly  esteemed  work,  which  was  reprinted  with  the  title:  Argu- 
menta  lihrorum politicorum  Aristotelis,  cum prrsefafione  de  7isevis  istius  operis 
Aristotelici,  Helmstadt,  1715,  4to.     Cf.  Morhof ,  Polyhistoria,  2,  63.  —  Tr. 

4  Johannes  Felden,  a  jurisconsult,  lived  during  the  seventeenth  century. 
Leibnitz  refers  to  him  in  his  Prelim.  Disso't.  to  Nizolius  (Gerhardt,  4,  155- 
156:  Erdmann,  67  b,  68  a:  Dutens,  4,  Pt.  I.,  57,  58),  as  the  author  of  eruditis- 
simsB  .  .  .  meditationes  on  the  Topics  and  Analytics  of  Aristotle,  "  not  yet 
published,"  of  notes  on  Grotius,  of  Elementa  Juris  ttniversalis,  and  A)ialy.'>is 
Politicorum  Aristotelis.     Cf..  also,  Morhof,  Polyhistoria,  2,  559.  —  Tr. 

5  Johann  Conrad  Durrius,  162.5-1()77,  was  Professor  of  Theology  and  Moral 
PMlosophy  at  Altdorf.  Among  his  writings  were  Compendium  thcologiis 
moralis,  in  several  editions,  one  of  the  best  being  that  of  1698,  4to :  Oratio 
adversns  Spinozam,  Jena,  1672 ;  Notx  in  I.sagogen  Piccarti,  perhaps  the  work 
Leibnitz  here  had  in  mind  in  referring  to  Durrius.  Morhof,  Polyhistoria,  2, 
63,  gives  some  account  of  an  edition  of  Piccart 's  Isagoge  in  lectionem  Aristo- 
telis, by  Durrius,  which  appeai-ed  at  Altdorf,  1665,  Svo.  —  Tr. 


APPENDIX  637 


although  each  explanation,  both  of  the  Scholastics  and  of  the 
moderns,  were  possible,  nevertheless  from  two  possible  hypotheses 
must  always  be  chosen  the  clearer  and  more  intelligililei  such  as 
indisputably  is  the  hypothesis  of  the  moderns,  which  makes  for  itself 
no  incorporeal  entities  in  the  midst  of  bodies,  but  besides  magnitude, 
figure,  and  motion  assumes  nothing.  What  possibility  there  is 
of  reconciliation  I  cannot  better  show  than  by  asking  that  some 
principle  of  Aristotle  be  given  me  which  cannot  be  explained  by 
magnitude,  figure,  and  motion. 

Primary  matter  is  the  mass  itself,  in  wliich  there  is  notlung  else 
than  extension  and  avrtrvTrto.  or  impenetrability;  it  has  extension 
from  the  space  which  it  fills;  the  nature  itself  of  matter  consists 
in  this,  that  it  is  something  crass  and  impenetrable,  and  consecpientlv 
movable  when  another  meets  it  (while  the  second  must  yield).  Now 
this  continuous  mass  filling  the  world,  while  all  its  parts  are  at  rest,  is 
primary  matter,  from  which  all  things  are  produced  through  motion, 
and  into  which  they  are  resolved  through  rest.  For  there  is  in 
it  no  diversity,  mere  homogeneity,  except  through  motion.  Hence 
already  all  the  difficulties  of  the  Scholastics  are  solved.  First,  they 
inquire  concerning  its  entitative  character  previous  to  all  form.  And 
the  reply  must  be  that  it  is  an  entity  previous  to  all  foi'm,  since  it  has 
its  own  existence.  For  all  that  exists,  which  is  in  any  space,  a  fact 
which  cannot  be  denied  of  that  entire  mass  although  without  motion 
and  discontinuity.  But  the  essence  of  matter  or  the  form  ilseK  of 
corporeity  consists  in  dvTiTVTna  or  impenetrability ;  matter  also  has 
quantity,  but  interminate,  as  the  Averroists  say,  or  indefinite ;  for 
while  it  is  continuous,  it  is  not  cut  into  parts,  and  thei-efore  no 
termini  are  actually  given  in  it :  yet  extension  or  quantity  is  given. 
All  things  not  concerning  the  extrinsic  termini  of  the  world,  or 
the  entire  mass,  but  concerning  the  intrinsic  termini  of  tlie  parts, 
harmonize  in  a  wonderful  maimer. 

From  matter  let  us  pass  to  form  through  the  dispositions.  Here 
again,  if  we  assume  form  to  be  nothing  else  than  figure,  all  things 
wonderfully  accord.  For  since  figure  is  the  terminus  of  body,  to 
introduce  figures  into  matter  there  will  be  need  of  a  terminus. 
In  order,  therefore,  that  various  termini  may  arise  in  matter,  there 
is  need  of  a  discontinuity  of  parts.  For  while  for  this  very  reason 
the  parts  are  discontinuous,  any  one  you  please  has  separate;  t(M-niini 
(for  Aristotle  defines  continua  wv  to,  ecrxara  iv)  ;  but  discontinuity  can 
be  induced  in  that  mass  before  continuous  in  two  ways;  in  one  way 
so  that  at  the  same  time  contiguity  is  destroyed,  which  hapjums 
when  they  are  so  violently  separated  from  one  anotJKfr  that  a 
vacuum  is  left,  or  so  that  contiguity  remains,  whicli  hapix'ns  when 
those  which  are  immediate  to  themselves  remain,  yet  are  moved  in 
diiferent  directions;  for  example,  two  spheres,  one  of  which  includes 


638  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 

the  other,  can  he  moved  in  different  directions,  and  yet  remain  con- 
tiguous, although  they  cease  to  be  continuous.  From  these  con- 
siderations it  is  evident  tliat,  if  indeed  from  the  beginning  a  mass 
discontinuous  or  broken  up  by  vacuities  was  created,  some  forms 
of  matter  are  at  once  conci^ete ;  but  if,  indeed,  it  is  continuous  from 
the  beginning,  forms  must  of  necessity  arise  through  motion  (for 
concerning  the  annihilation  of  certain  parts  in  order  to  obtain  vacui- 
ties in  matter,  because  it  is  beyond  nature  I  do  not  speak,  because 
from  motion  division,  from  division  termini  of  parts,  from  termini 
of  parts  their  figures,  from  figure  forms,  therefore  from  motion 
forms  arise).  From  which  it  is  evident  that  all  disposition  to  form 
is  motion,  evident  also  the  solution  of  the  vexed  qiiestion  concern- 
ing the  origin  of  forms.  Which  question  the  distinguished  man 
Herm.  Conring  could  satisfactorily  answer  by  his  special  disserta- 
tion only  by  asserting  that  forms  arise  from  nothing.^  We  shall 
say  they  arise  from  the  power  of  matter,  not  by  producing  any- 
thing new,  but  only  by  destroying  the  old,  and  causing  termini  by 
division  of  the  parts,  as  he  who  makes  a  column  does  nothing  else 
than  2  remove  the  useless  parts,  the  residuum  after  the  other  parts 
are  removed  by  this  very  means  receiving  that  figure  which  we  call 
a  column ;  that  is  to  say,  all  the  figures  or  forms  which  are  contained 
in  the  mass  itseK  need  only  determination  and  actual  sej^aration 
from  the  others  adhering  to  them.  If  this  explication  is  admitted, 
whatever  arguments  are  produced  against  the  origin  of  forms  from 
the  power  of  matter  are  mere  trifles. 

It  now  remains  for  us  to  come  to  changes.  Changes  are  enum- 
erated commonly  and  rightly:  generation,  corruption,  increase, 
diminution,  alteration,  and  local  change  or  motion.  The  moderns 
think  all  these  can  be  explained  through  local  motion  alone.  And 
first.  From  increase  and  diminution  the  thing  is  manifest ;  for  a 
change  of  quantity  in  the  whole  takes  place  when  a  part  changes 
its  place,  and  either  approaches  or  departs.  It  remains  for  us  to 
explain  generation  and  corruption  and  alteration  through  motion, 
and  I  note  beforehand  that  the  same  numerical  change  is  a  gen- 
eration and  alteration  of  different  things,  for  example,  since  it  is 
evident  that  putrefaction   consists  in  those  worms  imperceptible  to 

1  Gerhardt  reads:  "  Conriagius  peculiari  dissertatione  non  aliter  satisfacere 
potuit,  quam  formas  ex  iiihilo  oriri."  Erdmanu  reads:  "  Courin.<riiis  peculiari 
dissertatione  non  aliter  occurrit,  quam  concedendo  formas  ex  nihilo  oriri.  sed 
meditationes  istae  compendiosiorem  viam  monstrant,  ut  illuc  confugere  necesse 
non  sit.  Discimus  enim  formas  oriri,"  etc.;  i.e.,  Conring  met  in  his  special 
dissertation  not  otherwise  than  by  admitting  that  forms  spring  from  nothing, 
but  these  very  meditations  show  a  more  advantageous  way,  so  that  it  is  not 
necessary  to  flee  thither.    For  we  say  that  forms  arise,  etc. 

2  Erdmann  and  Dutens  read:  "  quam  quod  inutilia  tollit,"  i.e.,  than  that 
which  removes  the  useless  parts.  —  Tr. 


APPENDIX  639 


the  naked  eye,  any  putrid  infection  will  be  an  alteration  of  the 
man,  a  generation  of  the  worm.  In  a  similar  way  Hooke^  shows 
in  his  "  Micrographia,"  that  rust  in  iron  is  a  minute  little  forest 
(sylvulam)  which  has  sprung  np ;  to  rust  therefore  will  be  an  alter- 
ation of  the  iron,  a  generation  of  little  shrubs.  But  both  genera- 
tion and  corruption,  as  well  as  alteration,  can  be  explained  by  a 
minute  motion  of  parts;  for  example,  since  white  is  that  which 
reflects  the  most  light,  black  that  which  reflects  little,  those  things 
will  be  white  whose  surface  contains  the  largest  number  of  little 
specula;  this  is  the  reason  why  foaming  water  is  white,  because  it 
consists  of  innumerable  little  bubbles;  moreover  as  many  bubbles, 
so  many  specula,  since  before  well-nigh  the  entire  water  was  nothing 
but  one  speculum,  as  in  a  broken  glass  mirror  (speculum),  so  many 
parts  become  so  many  mirrors  (specula)  :  which,  indeed,  is  the  reason 
why  ground  glass  is  whiter  than  that  which  is  whole.  In  a  simi- 
lar manner,  therefore,  when  water  is  broken  by  bubbles  into  separate 
specula,  whiteness  arises,  which  is  the  reason  also  why  snow  is 
whiter  than  ice,  and  ice  than  water.  For  it  is  false  that  snow  is 
condensed  water,  since  it  is  rarefied  rather,  whence  also  it  is  lighter 
than  water  and  occupies  more  space.  By  which  reasoning  the 
sophism  of  Anaxagoras  concerning  black  snow  is  explained  (diluitur). 
From  these  considerations  it  is  evident  that  colors  arise  from  change 
alone  of  figure  and  position  in  the  surface  ;  the  same  explanation  as 
regards  light,  heat,  and  all  qualities,  if  occasion  should  allow,  could 
easily  be  given.  But  now,  if  qualities  are  changed  through  motion 
alone,  by  the  same  process  also  substance  will  be  changed  :  for  if 
all,  nay  even  if  some,  of  the  necessary  qualities  are  changed,  the 
tiling  itself  is  destroyed ;  for  example,  if  you  destroy  either  the 
light  or  heat,  you  will  destroy  the  fire.  And  if  the  motion  is  set 
in  operation  (inhihito),  yon  will  produce  each.  And  this  is  the 
reason  why  a  closed  fire  dies  for  want  of  the  nourishing  air,  so 
tliat  I  may  pass  over  in   silence  the  fact  that  the   essence  differs 

1  Robert  Hooke,  1635-1703,  Professor  of  Geometry  in  Gresham  Collesp,  Ox- 
ford, and  Secretary  of  the  Royal  Society,  published  his  Mirronrnphhi,  o?- 
some  Physiolof/ical  Descriptions  of  Minute,  Bodies  in  KiliS.  Tills  book  "  con- 
tained the  earliest  investigation  of  the  '  faiitaslical  colours  of  thin  ])lates, 
with  a  quasi-explanation  by  interference,  the  first  notice  of  the  '  black  sjjot ' 
in  soap-bubbles,  and  a  theory  of  light,  as  'a  very  short  vibrativo  motion' 
transverse  to  straight  lines  of  propagation  through  a  '  homogeneous  medium.' 
Heat  was  defined  as  '  a  property  of  a  body  arising  from  the  motion  or  agita- 
tion of  its  parts.'  "  From  his  paper  (May,  KM\)  on  cnrviliiK^n-  motion,  illus- 
trated with  the  aid  of  the  "circular  pendulum,'"  showing  expurimentally  (hat 
the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  earth  and  moon  is  the  point  describing  an  ellipse 
around  the  sun,  dates  "the  clear  statement  of  the  i)lanetary  movements  :is  a 
problem  in  mechanics."  For  an  account  of  liis  Viliration-lhcory.  ':/'•  l.asswil/, 
Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  329-338.  Au  abridgment  of  bis  Micro<jmplua  appeared 
at  London,  1780.  — Tu. 


G40  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

from  its  own  qualities  only  in  relation  to  the  sense.  For  as  the 
same  city  presents  another  aspect  of  itself,  if  you  look  down  from 
a  tower  in  the  midst  of  the  city  (in  Grund  gelegt),  which  is  just 
the  same  as  if  you  beheld  its  essence ;  it  a^jpears  otherwise  if 
you  approach  from  without,  which  is  just  the  same  as  if  you  per- 
ceive the  qualities  of  the  body;  and  as  the  external  aspect  of  the 
city  varies,  according  as  you  depart  from  the  eastern  or  the  west- 
ern side,  so  in  a  similar  way  the  qualities  vary  in  proportion  to  the 
variety  of  the  organs.  From  these  considerations  now  it  is  easily 
manifest  that  all  changes  can  be  explained  through  motion.  It  is  no 
objection  that  generation  takes  place  in  an  instant,  that  motion  is 
successive,  for  generation  is  not  motion  but  the  end  of  motion ; 
therefore  the  end  of  motion  is  in  an  instant,  for  some  figure  is 
produced  or  generated  by  the  very  last  instant  of  motion,  as  the 
circle  is  produced  by  the  very  last  moment  of  the  circumgyration. 
From  these  considerations  it  is  evident  why  the  substantial  form 
consists  in  the  indivisible,  and  does  not  receive  more  or  less.  For 
figure  also  does  not  receive  more  or  less.  For  although  one  circle 
may  be  greater  than  another,  yet  the  one  circle  is  not  more  a  circle 
than  the  other,  for  the  essence  of  the  circle  consists  in  the  equality 
of  the  lines  drawn  from  the  centre  to  the  circumference ;  now 
equality  consists  in  the  indivisible  and  does  not  receive  more  or 
less.  Nor,  indeed,  must  the  figure  or  the  magnitude  of  the  object 
be  accidents,  nor  in  fact  are  they  always  accidents  ;  for  although, 
for  example,  flowing  is  an  accident  of  lead,  for  it  flows  not  unless 
in  the  fire,  it  is  nevertheless  of  the  essence  of  mercury.  Now 
the  cause  of  flowing  is  without  doubt  the  free  curvilineity  of 
the  parts,  whether  it  consists  of  globes  or  cylinders  or  ovals  or 
other  spheroids  :  the  curvilineity  therefore  of  the  subtile  parts  is 
an  accident  of  the  lead,  but  essential  to  the  mercuiy.  The  reason 
is,  because  all  metals  arise  from  fixed  mercury  by  means  of  the 
salts,  and  the  nature  of  the  salts  consists  in  rectilinear  figures  fitted 
for  rest;  hence,  if  we  allow  salts  dissolved  in  water  to  crystallize 
freely,  some  forms  known  to  the  chemists  as  tetraedric,  others  as 
hexaedric,  octaedric,  etc.,  but  none  round  or  curvilinear,  appear. 
Hence  salts  are  the  cause  of  fixity ;  therefore  those  acid  salts  mixed 
with  the  mercury  in  the  bowels  of  the  earth,  as  it  were,  through 
the  smallest  parts  impede  the  freedom  of  the  curvilinear  parts 
by  their  interposition  and  constitute  the  metal.  But  in  the  fire 
the  metal  returns  to  the  nature  of  mercury,  for  the  fire  interposing 
itself  in  the  subtile  parts,  fi'ees  the  curvilinear  hydrargyrate  parts 
from  the  plane-sided  salts;  hence  the  flowing  in  the  fire.  Thiis 
it  is  evident  that  there  is  scarcely  anything  in  the  Aristoteliair 
physics  which  cannot  be  properly  explained  and  illustrated  by  the 
reformed. 


APPENDIX  641 


These  examples,  indeed,  have  occurred  to  me  spontaneously  (de 
meo),  while  -writing;  very  many  more  are  collected  by  others  through 
all  natural  philosophy,  l^ov  do  I  fear  that  in  what  I  have  hitherto 
said,  you  will  think  that  I  have  followed  too  much  the  descriptions 
of  Rseus  or  his  authority.  I  was  acquainted  with  such  things 
some  time  before  I  even  heard  of  Rseus.  I  read  Rtwus,  to  be  sure, 
but  in  such  a  way  that  I  now  scarcely  remember  what  subjects 
he  discussed.  Nor,  indeed,  was  Rajus  the  first  and  only  one  of  those 
promoting  a  union  between  Aristotle  and  the  moderns.  Scaliger 
seems  to  me  to  have  been  the  first  to  pave  the  way;  in  our  times 
Kenelm  Digby  and  his  follower,  Thomas  Anglus,  the  latter  in  his 
book  on  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  former  in  his  "  Peripatetic 
Institutions,"  treated  ex  professo  the  same  subject  long  before  lla^us. 
Nor  do  both  Abdias  Trew  ^  and  especially  Erhard  Weigel  differ 
from  them.  Hitherto  we  have  shown  the  possibility  only  of  recon- 
ciliation ;  it  remains  for  us  to  show  the  necessity  also.  Of  what 
else,  namely,  does  Aristotle  in  the  eight  books  of  the  "  Phys.  Auditus  " 
treat  than  figure,  magnitude,  motion,  place,  time?  If  thei"efore  the 
nature  of  body  in  general  is  completed  (absoh'itur)  by  these,  the 
nature  of  body  in  particular  will  be  completed  by  a  given  figure, 
a  given  magnitude,  etc.  And,  indeed,  he  himself  says.  Book  :}, 
chajiter  (text.)  24,  Phys.,  that  all  natural  science  is  concerned  with 
magnitude  (wdth  which  figure  is  connected),  motion,  and  time. 
Aristotle  often  says  the  same,  that  movable  being  is  the  subject  of 
pliysics,  that  natural  science  treats  of  matter  and  motion ;  he  himself 
also  makes  heaven  the  cause  of  all  things  which  take  place  in  the 
sublunary  worlds.  Now  heaven,  he  says,  does  not  act  upon  the 
bodies  below  it  except  through  motion.  But  motion  does  not 
produce  anything  but  motion  or  termini  of  motion,  namely  magni- 
tude and  figure,  and  from  these  the  resulting  position,  distance, 
number,  etc.  From  these,  therefore,  everything  in  nature  must  be 
explained.  The  same  Aristotle  likewise  often  says  (as  Book  T. 
of  the  "Phys.  Aud.,"  chap.  69)  that  the  relation  of  the  brass  to  the 
figure  of  the  .statue  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  matter  to  the  form. 
But  I  might  prove  that  the  figure  is  the  substance,  or  ratlier  that  the 

1  Abdias  Trew,  1597-1669,  was  Professor  of  Physics  and  Astroiioniy  in  tlic 
University  of  Altdorf,  where  he  erected,  1657,  the  first  observatory  seen  in 
that  part  of  the  world.  He  made  discoveries  in  the  theory  of  music,  espe- 
cially as  regards  the  most  accurate  temperament,  whieh  lie  set  forth  in  his 
Janitor  lycml  nvaslcl,  Rotheuburg,  o.  T.,  Ki.T).  Ills  cliicf  work  was  in  astron- 
omy and  meteorology,  and  he  carefully  observed  all  the  comets  appearing 
during  his  lifetime.  As  a  chronologer  he  contrilmted  to  the  adoption  of  tlui 
Gregorian  calendar. by  the  Protestant  states.  He  published,  among  other 
works,  JD^rec<or■^MTO  mathematicum,  Nuremberg,  16.57;  Lr/n-bm-h  d.  sphnrl- 
schen  Astronomic,  Nuremberg,  KiST;  Grandliche  Calendarkunsl,  humhorg, 
1666.  —  Tr. 


642  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

space  is  the  substance,  that  the  figure  is  something  substantial,  because 
all  science  is  concerned  with  substance  ;  further  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  geometry  is  a  science.  You  replied  that  you  could  produce  the 
place  in  which  Aristotle  had  denied  that  geometry  was  a  science 
sooner  than  I  would  produce  that  in  which  he  affirmed  it.  I  do  not 
indeed  doubt,  illustrious  sir,  that  there  are  some  places  of  Aristotle 
which  can  be  drawn  or  twisted  to  this  purpose,  but  yet  I  think  that 
these  are  overthrown  by  a  very  large  number  of  his  other  expressious. 
For  what  is  more  frequent  in  all  the  books  of  the  "  Analytics " 
than  examples  of  geometers,  so  that  he  seems  to  have  wished 
geometrical  demonstrations  to  be,  as  it  were,  the  measure  of  the  rest. 
Now  the  more  ignoble  is  absurdly  constituted  the  measure  of  the 
more  noble.  And  so  meanly,  indeed,  did  the  •  Scholastics  think  of 
mathematics  at  first,  that  they  made  every  effort  to  exclude  mathe- 
matics from  the  number  of  the  perfect  sciences,  principally  by  means 
of  this  argument,  because  it  does  not  always  demonstrate  from  causes. 
But  if  we  consider  the  matter  more  accurately,  it  will  appear  that 
it  does  demonstrate  from  causes.  For  it  demonstrates  figures  from 
motion  :  from  the  motion  of  the  point  is  produced  the  line,  from  the 
motion  of  the  line  the  surface,  from  the  motion  of  the  surface  the 
body.  From  the  motion  of  the  right  line  upon  right  lines  arises 
the  rectangle.  From  the  motion  of  a  right  line  about  an  immovable 
point  arises  the  circle,  etc.  The  constructions  of  figiires,  therefore, 
are  motions ;  now  from  constructions  relations  {affectiones)  con- 
cerning the  figures  are  demonstrated.  Therefore  from  motion,  and 
consequently  a  priori,  and  from  cause.  Geometry,  therefore,  is  a  true 
science.  Therefore  with  Aristotle's  consent  its  subject,  namely  space, 
will  be  a  substance.  Xor  is  it  so  very  absurd  that  geometiy  treats 
of  the  substantial  form  of  bodies.  For  behold  the  passage  of  Aristotle, 
13  "  Met."  chap.  3,  in  which  he  expressly  says  that  geometry 
abstracts  from  matter,  from  the  final  and  the  efficient  cause ;  in 
accordance  with  which  supposition  it  follows  that  he  treats  either 
of  the  substantial  or  accidental  form.  But  he  does  not  treat  of  the 
accidental,  because  the  accidental  form  in  its  own  real  definition 
involves  the  subject  or  matter  in  which  it  is,  although  Aristotle 
nevertheless  says  that  geometry  abstracts  from  matter.  Therefore 
geometry  treats  of  the  substantial  form.  Hence  there  immediately 
arises  in  my  mind  as  I  write  these  things  a  certain  beautiful  harmony 
of  the  sciences,  the  matter,  of  course,  having  been  accurately  con- 
sidered :  theology  or  metaphysics  treats  of  the  efficient  cause  of  things, 
namely  mind ;  moral  philosophy  (whether  practical  or  civil,  for,  as  I 
learned  from  you,  it  is  one  and  the  same  science)  treats  of  the  final 
cause  of  things,  namely  the  good ;  mathematics  (I  mean  the  pure,  for 
the  rest  is  a  part  of  physics)  treats  of  the  form  or  idea  of  things, 
namely  figure ;   physics  treats  of  the  matter  of  things,  and  of   the 


APPENDED  648 


single  affection  resulting  from  its  combination  with  other  causes, 
namely  Jnotion.  For  the  mind  in  order  to  obtain  for  itself  a  good 
and  pleasing  figure  and  position  of  things,  supplies  motion  to  matter. 
For  matter  by  itself  is  devoid  of  motion.  For  the  origin  of  all 
motion  is  mind,  as  Aristotle  also  rightly  saw. 

For  to  come  to  this  point,  Aristotle  seems  nowhere  to  have  pictured 
to  himself  any  such  substantial  forms,  which  are  in  themselves 
the  cause  of  motion  in  bodies,  as  the  Scholastics  conceive;  he 
indeed  defines  nature  as  the  origin  of  motion  and  rest,  and  form 
and  matter  he  calls  nature,  but  form  in  a  higher  degree  than  matter, 
but  from  this  what  the  Scholastics  mean  (uolunt)  does  not  follow, 
that  form  is  a  certain  immaterial  entity,  irrational  nevertheless  in 
bodies,  which  itself  spontaneously  without  the  impact  of  an  external 
thing  gives  motion  downwards  to  a  body,  for  example,  to  a  stone. 
For  the  form,  indeed,  is  a  cause  and  source  of  motion,  but  not  at 
first.  For  a  body  is  not  moved,  except  from  the  outside,  as  Aristotle 
rightly  not  only  says,  but  also  demonstrates ;  for  example,  a  globe 
may  be  in  a  plane,  if  it  is  once  at  rest  it  will  not  move  of  itself 
forever,  unless  in  consequence  of  an  added  external  impulsor,  for 
example,  another  body.  If  this  now  approaches,  the  second  body  is 
the  source  of  the  impressed  motion,  but  the  figure,  namely  globosity, 
is  the  source  of  the  motion  taken  up,  for  if  globosity  were  absent, 
having  been  produced  by  chance  according  to  circumstances,  the 
body  would  not  yield  to  the  second  body  so  easily.  From  this  it 
is  evident  that  the  scholastic  concept  does  not  follow  from  the  defi- 
nition of  the  Aristotelian  form.  Form,  therefore,  is  the  source  of 
motion  in  its  own  body,  and  body  itself  is  the  source  of  motion  in 
another  body,  I  confess;  but  the  primary  source  of  motion  is  the 
i:irimary  and  in  reality  from  matter  abstracted  form  (which  at  the 
same  time  is  efficient),  namely  mind.  Hence  liberty  and  spontaneity 
occur  in  minds  alone.  Therefore  it  is  not  absurd  that  of  the  substan- 
tial forms  mind  only  is  called  the  primary  source  of  motion,  the 
others  having  their  motion  from  mind.  And  by  this  argument  he^ 
ascends  to  the  first  mover.  To  this  objection  you  give  a  twofold 
reply;  first,  this  argument  can  avail  nothing  with  Epicurus,  wiio 
bestows  upon  his  atoms  per  se  downward  motion.  I  admit  tiiat  this 
argument  can  avail  nothing  with  him,  unless  it  be  ]ireviously  demon- 
strated to  him  that  this  itself  is  absurd  and  impossil)le,  namely,  tiiat 
a  body  has  motion  from  its  own  self,  a  thing  which  Cicero  also  if 
T  am  not  mistaken  already  at  that  time  did  in  his  books  "  I)e  natura 
Deorum,"  gracefully  laughing  at  Epicurus  because  lie  introduced 
in  this  way  something  without  cause  and  reason  in  his  hypotheses. 
For  in  the  nature  of  things  nothing  is  down  save  a.s  regards  us, 

1  Aristotle.  —  GerhardVs  Note.—'ru. 


G-l-1  LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

and  so  there  is  no  reason  why  any  body  should  move  in  this 
rather  than  in  that  direction  (plagam).  Therefore  we  shall  easily 
answer  Epicurus,  denying  that  whatever  is  moved  is  moved  by 
another  outside  itself,  and  shall  vindicate  the  laboring  certainty  of 
the  existence  of  God.  Second,  you  object  that  Aristotle  seems  to 
have  reasoned  not  so  much  from  this  axiom  that  the  source  of  all 
motion  is  outside  the  moved  body,  as  from  the  other  that  progress 
into  infinity  is  not  granted.  But  in  truth,  most  noble  sir,  consider 
carefully  whether  or  not  either  connection  of  ideas  is  needed. 
For  unless  it  is  admitted  that  what  is  moved  extraneously  is  moved, 
plainly  Ave  shall  arrive  at  no  progress,  still  less  at  infinity ;  for  the 
opponent  will  resist  steadfastly  from  the  beginning  and  any  given 
body  will  reply  that  it  is  itself  sufficient  to  produce  its  own  motion 
through  its  own  substantial  form,  and  needs  therefore  no  mover, 
much  less  the  first.  Therefore  that  ladder  will  tumble  down  as 
soon  as  the  first  step,  and  as  it  were  the  foundation,  is  taken  away. 
Then  also  Epicurus  was  wont  to  admit  progress  into  infinity ;  there- 
fore we  must  consider  not  so  much  what  Epicurus  admits  or  does 
not  admit,  as  what  can  certainly  be  demonstrated.  The  Aristotelian 
philosophy,  the  inevitable  result  of  the  reformed  philosophy  itself, 
must  be  briefly  touched  upon.^  It  is  jalain  that  what  must  be  dis- 
cussed by  the  theologians  must  be  discussed  by  the  philosophers 
also.  The  holy  fathers  illustrated  the  Holy  Scripture  by  the  best 
interpretations :  soon  the  monks  obscured  them  by  superstitions. 
The  light  of  souls  having  arisen,  the  reformed  theology  is  three- 
fold: the  one  heretical,  which  rejects  the  scriptures  themselves,  as 
of  the  fanatics ;  the  second  schismatical,  which  harmonizes  the  an- 
cient fathers,  the  doctors  of  the  church,  with  the  sacred  scripture 
and  the  primitive  church,  as  of  the  Evangelicals. ^  In  like  manner 
the  Greek  interpreters  ^  illustrated  Aristotle,  the  Scholastics  obscured 


1  The  Latin  text  reads:  "  Aristotelicam  philosophiam  reformatre  ipsius 
philosophife  inevitabilis  eventus  breviter  attingenda  est."  Gerhardt's  note 
reads :  "  In  diesem  Satze  felilt  etwas,"  i.e.  In  this  sentence  something  is  want- 
ing. Erdmaim  gives  the  following:  "Obsem.  T/iomasii.  Sic  scrii^tum  erat  a 
librario,  sed  hiat  alias  liaec  periodus:  nee  lectionem  ejus  constituo,"  i.e.  Note 
of  Thomasius.  Thus  it  was  written  by  the  copyist,  but  this  sentence  is  other- 
wise lacking:  I  do  not  determine  its  reading.  —  Tr. 

2  Gerhardt's  note  reads:  "  Auch  hier  scheiut  etwas  zu  fehlen,"  i.e.  Here 
also  something  appears  to  be  wanting.  Erdmanu  gives  the  following :  "  Ob.serv. 
Thoniasli.  Etiam  hie  aliqnid  deest;  datur  enim  pro  triplici  theologia  tantum 
dujilex.  Scrijisisse  puto :  alia  schismatica,  alia  vera,  qufe  prisoos  Patres,  etc. 
Confer  sequentem,"  i.e.  Note  of  Thomasius.  Here  also  something  is  wanting; 
for,  instead  of  the  threefold  theology,  only  a  twofold  is  given.  I  think  he  wrote : 
the  .second  schismatic,  the  third  true,  which  the  ancient  Fathers,  etc.  Cf.  the 
following.  —  Tr. 

'^  Gerhardt  reads,  "  interpretes  "  ;  Erdmann,  "  Patres."  —  Tb. 


APPENDIX  645 

him  with  trifles.  The  light  having  arisen,  the  reformed  philosophy 
is  threefold :  the  first  stupid,  like  that  of  Paracelsus,i  Heliiiont,^  and 
of  the  others  who  utterly  reject  Aristotle;  the  second  bold,  which 
with  small  regard  for  the  ancients,  nay  with  open  contempt  for 
them,  render(s)3  (their)  its  own  meditations  even  when  o-ood  sus- 
pected, such  as  that  of  Descartes ;  the  third  true,  by  whom  ^Aristotle 
is  recognized  as  a  great  man  and  in  most  things  rioht. 

The  reformed  philosophy  having  Just  been  reconciled  with  Aris- 
totle, it  now  remains  to  show  its  truth  per  se,  precisely  as  the  Chris- 
tian religion  can  be  proved  both  from  reason  and  history  and  from 
the  sacred  Scripture.  But  it  must  be  proved  that  no  entities  are 
given  in  the  world  besides  mind,  space,  matter,  motion.  Mind  I  call 
thinking  being.  Space  is  a  primarily  extended  entity  or  mathemati- 
cal body,  which  manifestly  contains  nothing  else  than  three  dimen- 
sions, and  is  also  that  universal  place  of  all  things.  Matter  is  a 
secondarily  extended  entity,  or  that  which  besides  extension  or  math- 
ematical body  has  also  physical  body,  that  is,  resistance,  avTirvTriav, 
density,  the  power  of  filling  (repletivitatem)  space,  inipenetrabilitv, 
which  consists  in  this,  that  it  is  compelled  by  the  approach  of  another 
such  being  to  move  or  to  stop  the  other;  from  which  nature  of  im- 
lienetrability  therefore  motion  flows.  Matter  therefore  is  an  entity 
which  is  in  space  or  an  entity  coextensive  with  space.  IMotion  is  a 
change  of  space.  But  figui-e,  magnitude,  position,  number,  etc.,  are 
not  entities  really  distinct  from  space,  matter,  and  motion,  but  only 
conditions  (JmhilufJinex)  amid  space,  matter,  motion,  and  their  parts 
made  by  the  supervenient  mind.  I  define  figure  further  as  the  ter- 
minus of  extension,  magnitude  as  the  number  of  jiarts  in  the  exten- 
sion. I  define  number  as  one,  and  one,  and  one,  etc.,  or  unities. 
Position  is  reduced  to  figure,  for  it  is  a  formation  {confgnrntio')  of 
many  (figures).  Time  is  nothing  else  than  magnitude  of  motion. 
And  since  every  magnitude  is  a  number  of  parts,  what  wonder 
Aristotle  defined  time  as  the  number  of  motion?  But  thus  far  ter- 
mini only  have  lieen  explained,  and  the  sense  in  which  we  use  them 
set  forth,  but  nothing  as  yet  proved.  Now  let  us  show  that  there  is 
no  need  of  any  other  things  in  order  to  explain  the  plienomena  of  1  he 


1  Theophrastus  Paracelsus,  147.3-1.541.  On  his  philoso]ihy,  cf.  Slockl,  Gcsch. 
d.  Philos.d.  MUtelalte.rs,  III.  [Vol.4],  4:50-45'2;  Lasswitz,  G'e.vc//.  d.  Ahnuistik, 
1,  298-306.— Tr. 

2  Joli.  Bapt.  Van  Hclniont,  1577-1644.  On  his  philosophy,  cf.  Stockl,  Gctch. 
d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  III.  [Vol!  4],  458^72;  Lasswitz,  Gesdi.  d.  A/oniintik, 
1,  .34:3-351.  — Tr. 

3  The  Latin  text  reads,  "  suas  suspectas  reddunt,"  as  thouph  tho  writer  had 
in  mind  those  holding  the  view  ratlier  tlian  the  view  itself  with  whicli  I  lie 
sentenee  began,  and  in  consistency  with  which  beginning  the  verb  slioiild 
have  been  "redilit."  —  Tr. 


GiG  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

world  and  to  assign  their  causes,  nay,  also  that  there  can  be  no  other 
things,  although  if  we  show  that  there  is  no  need  of  other  things 
besides  mind,  matter,  space,  and  motion,  by  this  very  thing  it  will 
be  shown  that  the  hypotheses  of  the  moderns  who  employ  these 
things  alone  in  the  assignment  of  phenomena  are  the  better.  For  it 
is  a  defect  in  an  hypothesis  to  assume  unnecessary  things.  Now  that 
all  things  in  the  entire  world  can  indeed  be  explained  from  these 
alone,  the  reading  of  the  modern  philosophers  sutBciently  teaches,  and 
it  is  evident  from  the  considerations  which  I  put  down  a  little  before 
when  I  was  showing  the  possibility  of  an  Aristotelic  harmony.  Then 
it  must  also  be  noted  that  these  hypotheses  are  the  better  which  are 
the  clearer.  Now,  indeed,  the  human  mind  can  imagine  nothing  else 
than  mind  (when,  namely,  it  thinks  of  itself  ),•  space,  matter,  motion, 
and  what  results  from  these  when  united  with  each  other ;  whatever 
else  you  add  are  words  only,  which  can  be  named  and  variously 
combined  with  each  other,  but  cannot  be  explained  and  understood. 
For  who  can  imagine  to  himself  a  being  which  partakes  of  neither  ex- 
tension nor  thought?  What  need  therefore  to  posit  souls  of  animals 
and  plants,  the  incorporeal  forms  of  the  elements,  the  substantial 
forms  of  the  metals,  devoid  of  extension  ?  More  correctly  there- 
fore Campanella  ^  in  his  book  "De  Sensu  rerum  et  Magia,"  and  Marcus 
Marci,2  "  De  Ideis  operatricibus,"  falsely  indeed,  yet  in  agreement 
nevertheless  with  their  hypotheses,  attributed  to  these  substantial 
forms  of  inanimate  things,  deprived  of  extension,  sense,  knowledge, 
imagination,  will.  Nor  is  the  occult  philosophy  of  Agrippa,^  who  adds 
an  Angel  as  it  were  an  obstetrician  to  everything,  unlike  it,  nor  the 
discussions  of  Scaliger  irepl  Sura/iews  TrAaoriK^s  and  its  intelligence. 
Thus  it  returns  to  as  many  little  gods  (deunculos)  as  substantial 
forms,  and  to  a  race  almost  TroXvOeiaixov-  For  hence  is  attributed  to 
them  appetite,  and  the  natural  instinct  from  which  also  follows 
natural  cognition,  hence  these  axioms :  Nature  does  nothing  in  vain, 
everything  shuns  its  own  destruction,  like  takes  pleasure  in  like, 
matter  desires  a  nobler  form,  and  others  of  this  description,  since 
nevertheless  there  is,  in  truth,  in  nature  no  wisdom,  no  appetite,  but 
a  beautiful  Order  springs  out  of  it,  because  it  is  the  clock  of  God. 
From  these  considerations  it  is  evident  that  the  hypotheses  of  the 
reformed  philosophy  are  superior  to  the  scholastic  hypotheses  for  this 

1  Tommaso  Campanella,  15()8-1639.  Brief  account  of  his  views  is  given 
in  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atoinistlk,  1,  340-343.  Cf.,  also,  Stockl,  Gesch.  d. 
Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  III.  [Vol.  -4],  343-360.— Tr.' 

2  Cf.  infra,  p.  67(),  n.  2.  —  Tr. 

3  Heinrich  Cornelius  Agrippa  vou  Nettesheim,  1486-153.").  His  Opei'a  omnia, 
Lugduni,  1600;  the  Be  occulta  pJiilosophia  in  Vol.  1.  For  an  account  of  his 
views,  cf.  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mittelalters,  III.  [Vol.  4],  412-426; 
Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  1,  290-293.  —  Tr. 


APPENDIX  647 


reason,  because  they  are  not  supeifluous,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  they 
are  clear. 

It  remains  for  us  to  prove  by  more  subtle  reasoning  that  other 
entities  than  those  I  have  mentioned  cannot  indeed  be  assumed 
in  explaining  the  nature  of  bodies.  It  will  be  done  thus:  All  call 
that  body  which  is  endowed  with  some  sensible  quality,  then  out 
of  the  sensible  qualities  many  can  be  taken  away,  provided  never- 
theless that  the  body  remains.  For  although  a  body  is  deprived  of 
all  color,  odor,  taste,  yet  it  is  called  a  body.  For  you  will  grant 
that  air,  for  example,  is  a  body,  although  it  is  transparent,  and 
so  not  colored,  besides  it  is  devoid  of  taste,  and  for  the  most  part  also 
of  both  odor  and  sound.  Therefore  the  qualities  visible,  audible,  and 
those  of  taste  and  smell,  may  be  cast  aside  as  least  constitutive 
of  the  nature  of  body.  To  tactile  qualities,  therefore,  everything 
returns.  And  indeed  these  primary  qualities  —  heat,  moisture,  dry- 
ness, cold  —  can  each  be  absent ;  heat  can  be  absent  from  water, 
moisture  from  the  earth,  dryness  from  the  air,  cold  from  the  fire,  and 
yet  any  of  these  is  a  body.  The  other  tactile  qualities  —  for  example, 
smoothness,  lightness,  tenacity,  etc.,  are  acknowledged  even  by  you 
not  to  belong  to  the  constitutive  nature  of  a  body,  for  this  very 
reason,  because  they  are  called  secondary,  and  so  have  arisen  from 
others,  and  further  because  there  is  no  one  of  them  which  cannot  be 
absent  from  a  body.  There  remains,  therefore,  to  be  sought  for  some 
sensible  quality  which  is  competent  to  all  and  single  bodies  and  from 
which  as  it  were  by  a  sign  men  may  distinguish  body  from  non-body. 
This  without  doubt  is  density  (crassities),  or  avTLTviTLa,  taken  with 
extension.  Whatever  men  certainly  think  extension  is  (although 
in  truth  it  always  is  body  and  has  avTiTvirta,  although  insensible 
to  us,  yet  perceptible  by  the  intellect),  they  do  not  at  once  call  that 
body,  for  they  sometimes  think  that  it  is  a  mere  appearance  and 
cfidvTaafxa.  But  whatever  they  not  only  see  but  also  touch,  that  is,  in 
which  they  find  dvriTUTrta,  that  they  call  body ;  but  whatever  lacks 
avTLTvn-La,  that  they  deny  to  be  body.  In  the  two,  therefore,  men 
both  educated  and  uneducated  place  the  nature  of  body,  in  extension 
and  dvTLTVTria  taken  together ;  they  take  that  from  siglit,  this  from 
touch  ;  whence  also  from  the  union  of  both  senses  we  are  wont  to  be 
certified  concerning  things  that  they  are  not  phantasmata.  But 
extension  is  nothing  else  than  existence  in  space;  dvTLTviria  is  tlu^ 
inability  to  exist  wnth  another  in  the  same  space,  but  tlu;  one  or  the 
other  (alteriUrum)  must  be  moved  or  keep  quiet.  From  these  con- 
siderations it  is  evident  that  the  nature  of  body  is  constituted  by 
extension  and  antitypy,  and  since  there  is  nothing  in  things  willimit 
cause,  nothing  even  must  be  assumed  in  bodies,  the  cause  of  whicli 
cannot  be  made  to  appear  from  their  i:)rimary  constitutive  principles. 
Now  the  cause  cannot  be  made  to  appear  from  these  except  through 


C48  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

their  definitions.  Nothing,  therefore,  is  to  be  assumed  in  bodies 
which  does  not  flow  from  tlie  definition  of  extension  and  antitypy. 
But  tliere  flow  from  this  definition  only  magnitude,  figure,  position, 
number,  mobility,  etc.  Motion  itself  does  not  flow  from  these.  Whence, 
properly  speaking,  motion  is  not  given  in  bodies  as  a  real  entity 
in  them,  but  I  have  demonstrated  that  whatever  moves  is  continually 
created,  that  bodies  at  any  instant  in  assignable  motion  are  some- 
'thing,  at  any  intervening  time  between  the  instants  in  assignable 
motion  are  nothing,  a  thing  which  was  unheard  of  till  now,  but 
which  is  plainly  necessary  and  will  shut  the  mouth  of  the  atheists. 
From  these  considerations  it  is  evident  that  the  exj)lanation  of  all 
qualities  and  changes  must  be  taken  from  magnitude,  figure,  motion, 
etc.,  and  that  heat,  color,  etc.,  are  nothing  but  subtile  motions  and 
figures.  As  to  what  remains,  I  dare  affirm  that  atheists,  socinians, 
naturalists,  sceptics,  would  never  have  been  truly  met  unless  by  this 
established  philosophy ;  which  I  indeed  believe  a  gift  of  God  given 
to  the  old  age  of  the  world  as  an  unique  plank  by  which  pious  and 
prudent  men  are  about  to  save  themselves  in  the  shipwreck  of  the 
now  overhanging  atheism.  However  small  my  knowledge  of  learned 
men  after  a  little  time,  I  nevertheless  tremble  as  often  as  I  think  how 
many  men  at  the  same  time  intellectual  and  absolutely  atheistic 
I  have  met.  And  there  is  flying  through  the  hands  of  men  an 
unknown  book  of  Bodin  ^  (and  would,  as  I  wish  in  the  case  of 
NaudfBus,  it  was  never  to  be  published),  powerful  certainly,  which  he 
calls,  "  Ai'cana  sublimium,"  in  which  he  is  the  professed  enemy 
of  tlie  Christian  religion.  The  dialogues  of  Vaninus  -  are  child's  plav 
when  compared  with  it.  I  have  read  it  carefidly,  and  I  thank  Goil 
from   my   heart,  because   he   furnished  me  with   those  defences  of 

1  Jean  Bodin,  1530-1596  or  1597,  the  eminent  writer  ou  Political  Science, 
and  advocate  of  tolerance  in  rehgion,  iiublished  his  greatest  work,  —  "the  first 
elaborate  attempt  in  modern  times  to  construct  a  system  of  political  science,"' 
—  Les  six  Livres  de  la  Repuhlique,  at  Paris,  157<J.  His  Univei-sse  naturpc 
t/ieatrum  appeared  at  Hanover,  1(505,  the  Preface  dated  February  25,  1590. 
For  some  account  of  its  doctrine,  cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  1,  o2(i- 
.■i27,  411-413.  G.  E.  Guhrauer  ijublished  an  Abstract,  in  German,  with  a 
partial  translation  of  the  Latin  text,  of  his  very  famous  MS.,  here  referred  to 
by  Leibnitz,  the  Colloquium  heptaplomeres  de  abditis  rerum  sublimium  arca- 
nis,  Berlin,  1841,  and  the  complete  original  text,  from  a  MS.  in  the  Giessen 
Library,  was  edited  and  xjublisbed  by  L.  Noack,  Schwerin,  1837.  The  work  is 
'"a  conversaticm  between  seven  learned  men, —  a  Jew,  a  ^lahometan,  a 
Lutheran,  a  Zwinglian,  a  Roman  Catholic,  an  EiMcurean,  and  a  Theist  "  ; 
and  "the  conclusion  to  which  they  are  represented  as  coming  is,  that  they 
will  live  together  in  charity  and  toleration  and  cease  from  further  disputa- 
tions as  to  religion."  —  Tr. 

^Lucilio  Vanini,  1585-1()19,  who  called  himself  by  the  name,  among  others, 
of  Julius  Csesar,  was  a  disciple  of  Pomponatius  ((/.  ante,  p.  581,  u.  1).  He 
denied  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  advocated  a  doctrine  of  pantheistic 


APPENDIX  649 


pliilosophy  (in  which  I  should  be  ungrateful,  if  I  should  deny  that 
T  owed  much  to  you),  by  which  I  repelled  his  weapons  with  no 
dilticulty.  The  labor  of  the  distinguished  Spizel  is  to  be  praised, 
which  he  now  again  expends  in  eradicating  atheism.  His  letter 
on  this  subject,  recently  published  (in  these  nine  days),  I  think  you 
have  seen.  Hear  what  happened  to  me  in  connection  with  him. 
I  had  written  some  time  when  at  leisure,  a  leisure  nevertheless 
disturbed  in  the  inn,  about  two  sheets,  in  which  I  was  discussing 
the  demonstration  more  accurately  than  usual  of  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  and  the  existence  of  God.  These  I  had  sent  to  my 
friend.  Through  him  they  came  into  the  hands  of  the  Most  Rev- 
erend Spener,!  pastor  at  Frankfort,  a  neglected  yet  deserving  autlior. 
Spener  sent  them  to  Spizel ;  ^  Spizel  placed  them  at  the  end  of 
that  recent  letter  of  his  to  Ant.  Reiser  3  on  the  eradication  of 
atheism,  under  the  title  "  Confessio  naturse  contra  atheistas."  I 
do  not  blame  him,  but  I  am  grieved,  because  that  ax^^tov  was 
so  very  incorrectly  printed  ;  that  sorites,  especially,  by  which  1  tried 
to  demonstrate  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  was  thrown  into  strange 
confusion  by  the  misplacing  of  its  opening  lines.  Spizel  acknowl- 
edged tliat  he  was  ignorant  of  the  author.      I  desire  a  judgment 

naturalism.  He  published  De  admirandin  naturmreginse  clexque  mortalium 
arcanis,  lib.  quat.,  Paris,  1616.  His  philosophical  works,  translated  into 
French  by  Rousselot,  appeared  at  Paris,  1841.  Leibnitz,  in  a  letter  to  Sebas- 
tian Kortholt,  Marcli  15,  1713,  says:  "  Apologiam  Vanniiii  uondiun  vidi,  nee 
magnopere  dignam  legi  puto.  Scripta  ejus  parvi  momenti  sunt,  sed  homo 
iueptus,  imo  stultus  comburi  non  merebatur,  claudi  jure  poterat,  ne  alios 
inficeret"  (Dutens,  5,  321).— Tr. 

1  Philip  Jacob  Spener,  1635-1705,  was  chief  pastor  of  the  Lutheran  church 
at  Fraukfort-oii-the-Main,  from  1666-108(1,  first  Court-cliaplain  at  Dresden, 
1686-1691,  and  rector  of  St.  Nicolas,  in  Berlin,  with  the  title  of  "  Cotisistorial- 
rath,"  from  1691.  He  directed  the  foundation  of  the  University  of  H;dle  in 
1691.  Though,  according  to  Ritschl,  Gcsch.  d.  Pietistnuii,  2,  163,  Boini,  1884, 
"  himself  not  a  Pietist,"  Speuer  has  justly  been  called  "  the  father  of  Pietism." 
He  was  a  voluminous  author.  Two  letters  of  Leibnitz  to  Spener  are  given  by 
Dutens,  5,  467-468.  — Tr. 

■■^  Theophil  Gottlieb  Spitzel,  or  Spizel,  1639-lf)91,  a  German  pastor  and  poly- 
historian,  was  deacon  of  St.  James's  churcli,  Augsburg,  in  1(!62  and  pastor  from 
1682  to  1690.  "  As  a  theologian,  in  spite  of  his  many-sided  and  univ(!rsal  .sci- 
entific interests,  he  remained  well-nigh  unfruitful."  Leibnitz  refers  lo  the 
matter  here  alluded  to  again  in  his  letter  to  Spizel,  December  12-22,  KifJO;  cf. 
Dutens,  5,  343.  The  Confessio  NatursR  contra  Atheistas  first  appeared  as  a 
Postscriptum  in  Theo.  Spizelii  de  Atheismo  eradicando  ad  Virum  p7-a:slantis- 
simum  Dr.  Antonium  Reiserum  Auciustanum,  etc.,  Epistola.  .  .  .  Augu.st. 
Vindel.  1669.— Tr. 

3  Anton  Reiser,  1628-1686,  a  learned  and  distinguished  Lutheran  theologian, 
was  an  earnest  defender  of  evangelical  truth.  He  published  De  orir/ine,  pro- 
f/rcssu  et  incremento  antitheismi  seu  Atheismi,  Augs])urg,  16()9,  8vo;  Index 
MSS.  bibliothecve  Augustanse,  Augsburg,  1675,  4to. — Tr. 


650  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

concerning  the  reasoning  itself  of  the  demonstration.  Nor  do  I 
seek  praise,  but  criticism,  since  it  is  important  to  religion  that  it 
be  not  perfunctorily  defended.  Although  meanwhile  I  seem  to 
myself  to  have  penetrated  far  more  deeply  into  both.  For  neither 
the  thoughts  which  I  have  thrown  out  since  that  time  concerning 
perpetual  creation  in  motion,  nor  the  inmost  nature  of  thinking 
being  or  mind,  are  brought  together  therein.  1  wi'ote  you  at  one 
time  about  the  society  which  certain  Germans  are  starting.  It 
will  show  its  existence  by  a  German  paper  published  by  the  book- 
seller Goezius  with  the  title  "  Collegium  Philadelphicum."  But  to 
me  it  seems  a  pleasant  dream,  like  the  society  of  the  Red  Cross. 
It  is  wonderful  how  great  a  dissension  in  Parnassus  that  Schurz- 
fleisch  1  who  is  with  you  excited.  I  very  much  wish  to  know  what 
the  great  men  with  you  by  whom  he  hopes  he  will  be  advanced, 
think  of  this  specimen.  Boeder  ^  threatens  that  one  from  the  court. 
The  author  of  the  "  Itinerarium  politicum  "  which  is  now  appearing 
is  without  doubt  Burgoldensis,^  that  commentator  on  the  "  lustru- 
mentum  pacis."     I  am  astounded  at  the  audacity  of  the  man. 

As  for  the  rest,  most  illustrious  sir,  I  have    discoursed   the  more 

1  Konrad  Samuel  Schurtzfleisch,  1641-1708,  was  Professor  of  History  at 
Wittenberg,  and  because  of  his  great  learning  was  given  the  nickname  of  a 
living  library  and  a  walking  museum.  While  at  Wittenberg  he  published, 
under  the  name  of  Eubulus  Theosdatus  Sarckmasius,  a  pamphlet,  Judicin  de 
novissimis  prudentisR  civilis  Scriptoribus,  Leipzig.  1(!()9,  in  which  he  freely  ex- 
pressed his  opinion  of  the  most  celebrated  German  jurisconsults,  and  which 
aroused  against  him  many  adversaries.  He  continued  the  history  of  Sleidan 
(c/.  ante,  p.  114,  n.  1).  — Tr. 

2  .Johaun  Heinrich  Boeder,  1611-1692,  Professor  of  Eloquence  at  Strassburg 
and  Upsala,  and  afterwards  of  History  at  Strassburg,  was  author  of  many 
commentaries  on  classical  authors  and  of  works  of  history,  politics,  criticism, 
morals,  etc.  Among  them  were :  De  jure  GalUiB  in  Lotharingiam,  Strass- 
burg, 1663;  Ad  Grotium  de  jure  belli  et  pacis  dissert.,  V.,  1665.  The  Elector 
of  Mayence  appointed  him  "conseiller  "  in  1662,  and  the  next  year  the  Em- 
peror Ferdinand  III.  bestowed  on  him  the  same  title  and  made  him  Count 
Palatine.  — Tr. 

3  Philippus  Andrea  Oldenburgerus,  the  anagram  of  which  is  Burgoldensis, 
a  pupil  of  H.  Conring,  was  Professor  of  Law  and  History  at  Geneva,  where  he 
died  in  1678.  He  published  a  large  number  of  valuable  works,  some  of  them 
under  assumed  names,  among  which  are:  Itinerarium  Germanias  Politicum. 
modernam  prascipuarum  Aularum  Imperii  faciem  reprxsoitans,  Cosmopoli 
(Geneva),  1668,  12mo;  Limnxus  enucleatus,  an  abstract  of  Limne,  De  jure 
iinperii  Romano-germanici,  Geneva,  1670,  fol. ;  Notitia  Imperii,  sive  Discur- 
svs  in  Instrumentum  Pacis  Osnabrugo-Monasteriensis  (this  work  under  the 
name  of  Burgoldensis),  Freistadt,  1(!()9,  4to.  Of  the  Itinerarium  Germanix 
Politicina,  Morhof,  Po/t/historia,  2,  497,  says:  "  in  quo  multa  est  rerum  iiiej)- 
tissimarum  farrago,  quibus  nonnunquam  immiscentur  aliqua  notatu  non  in- 
digna,  sed  lectore  prudente  opus  est,  qui  cum  judicio  ilia  legere  posit,"  The 
freedom  with  which  the  author  spoke  of  the  political  interests  and  vices  of  the 
German  courts  led  to  the  interdiction  of  his  book.    It  was,  nevertheless. 


APPENDIX  651 


at  length  of  this  whole  matter  to  you  for  this  reason,  because  I 
had  no  more  learned  and  equitable  judge  of  these  things.  Since 
you  have  examined  all  the  recesses  of  the  ancients  aifd  do  not 
despise  the  discoveries  of  the  moderns  when  deserving,  you  alone 
of  all  can  best  examine  this  and  also  illustrate  them.  For  you 
rightly  judge,  that  although  new  opinions  are  brought  forth  and 
their  truth  most  evidently  shown,  yet  from  the  views  publicly 
received  we  must  scarcely  ever  depart,  a  thing  which  we  should  not 
strive  for  if  the  Scholastics  had  done  it.  Farewell,  ornament  of 
our  country,  and  do  not  bring  to  an  end  (absolve)  your  noble  thoughts 
(for  many  are  both  begun  and  at  the  same  time  perfected  witli  rare 
felicity  of  mind),  but  produce  them. 


II 
FEAGMENT  ^ 

[From  the  Latin] 

The  primary  matter  2  of  Aristotle  is  identical  with  the  subtile  matter 
of  Descartes.  Each  is  divisible  to  infinity.  Each  is  po-  se  lacking  in 
form  and  motion,  and  each  receives  forms  through  motion.  Each 
receives  motion  from  mind.  Each  is  formed  into  certain  rings  (gijros), 
and  there  is  no  more  solidity  in  the  vortices  of  Aristotle  than  of 
Descartes.  Each  has  solidity  from  motion,  because  nothing  drives 
it  asunder,  although  Descartes  himself  has  not  assigned  this  cause 
of  solidity.  Each  ring  (gyrus)  extends  (propagat)  the  action  im- 
pressed through  motion  on  account  of  the  continuity  of  matter  into 
another  ring.  For  Aristotle  also,  no  less  than  Descartes  or  Ilobbes, 
derives  all  particulars  from  the  motion  alone  of  universal  rings. 
Whence  Aristotle  adds  intelligences  only  to  the  principal  rings, 
because  from  the  impacts  of  these  rings  the  actions  of  the  others 
follow.  In  this  Aristotle  erred,  because  he  made  the  earth  the 
centre  of  the  universe  and  of  all  gyrations.  But  he  should  be  par- 
several  times  reprinted.  In  Pt.  IV.  of  his  Thesaurus  rerum  puhlicarum  totius 
orbis,  Geneva,  167r),  4  vols.,  8vo,  lie  repudiated  the  errors  and  (condemned  the 
reprehensible  expressions  which  he  had  employed  in  the  earlier  work.  Of  the 
Discu7-sus  in  Instrumeutum  Pads,  Lenglet  dii  Fresnoy  remarks :  "  a  bold  and 
learned  piece."  — Tr. 

1  Gerhardt,  Leibniz. philos.  Schrift.,  7,  259-dO.  In  his  FAnleitinifj, ihid.,2TA, 
G.  says:  "  The  fragment,  u.  I.,  which  was  written,  perhaps,  at  the  time  of  the 
composition  of  the  Hypothesis  physica  (KiTl),  contains  a  comijarison  of  the 
metaphysics  of  Aristotle  and  Descartes,  what  Leibnitz  borrowed  from  l)olh, 
and  what  he  has  added  of  his  own."  —  Tr. 

2  Upon  a  bit  of  paper  without  date  and  superscription,  proceeding  according; 
to  the  handwriting  from  the  earliest  period.  —  Gerhardt's  Note.  —  Tk. 


052  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 

doned  for  this,  because  pliiiosopliy  was  not  yet  sufficiently  instructed 
by  observations. 

To  these  I  now  add,  that  primary  matter  if  at  rest  is  nothing.  Tliis 
also  is  a  statement  which  certain  Scholastics  have  obscurely  made, 
that  primary  matter  also  has  existence  from  form.  Of  this  fact 
there  is  demonstration.  Because  w^hatever  does  not  think,  is  nothing. 
But  that  in  which  there  is  no  variety  also  does  not  think.  In 
like  manner :  If  primary  matter  moves  in  one  direction,  that  is, 
in  parallel  lines,  it  is  at  rest,  and  consequently  is  nothing.  All 
things  are  full,  because  primary  matter  and  space  is  the  same  thing. 
Therefore  every  motion  is  circular,  either  composed  of  circulars  or 
at  least  returning  into  itself.  ISIany  circulations  mutually  hinder 
each  other,  or  mutually  lead  into  each  other..  Many  circulations  try 
to  unite  in  one  or  all  bodies  tend  to  rest,  that  is,  annihilation.  Jf 
bodies  are  without  mind,  it  is  impossible  for  motion  to  have  been  eternal.  ^ 
From  universal  conflicting  circulations  are  produced  particular  bodies. 
Matter  is  actually  divided  into  infinite  parts.  There  are  infinite  creatures 
in  any  given  body  ivhatever.  All  bodies  cohere  among  themselves.  All  are 
indeed  forcibly  separated  (^distrahuntw)  from  all,  but  not  without  resist- 
ance. There  are  no  atoms,  or  bodies  whose  parts  are  never  foi'cibly 
separated.  There  are  two  principles  by  which  motion  is  changed  : 
compositions  of  efforts  (conatuum),  and  compositions  ...  [a  word 
and  two  lines  are  in  consequence  of  the  destruction  of  the  paper 
illegible.  —  Gerharpt]. 


Ill 

DEMONSTEATION  AGAINST   ATOMS   TAIOEN  FEOM 
THE  CONTACT   OF  ATOMS  ^ 

October  23,  1G90 

{From  the  Latin] 

Definition  I.  A  thing  is  distinguished  from  other  things  in  two 
ways,  either  through  itself,  or  extrinsically.  Through  itself  a  thing  is 
distinguished  from  another,  when  a  method  of  distinguishijig  through 
the  consideration  alone  of  the  thing  is  used,  no  operation  or  change 
being  made  in  the  thing.  Extrinsically,  when  by  external  application 
something  new  is  produced  in  the  thing,  which  does  not  appear  in 

i  Over  the  words,  "  motum  fuisse  tEternum.'"  Leibnitz  has  written,  "  potest 
diminui  sine  fine,"  i.e.  can  be  diminished  without  end. —  GerhardV s  Xote.—T'R. 

2  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  28-1-26S;  Stein,  Leibniz,  u.  Spinoza, 
Beilage  XIV.,  pp.  325-328.  — Tk. 


APPENDIX  653 

another.  Thus  the  sphere  and  the  cube  can  be  distinguished  both 
by  consideration  and  also  by  operation  ;  by  consideration,  because  in 
the  sphere  no  angles  are  found,  of  which  there  are  eight  in  the  cube ; 
by  operation,  as,  if  both  are  placed  upon  an  inclined  plane,  the  sphere 
will  descend  the  plane  by  rolling,  the  cube  by  sliding. 

Axiom.  Whatever  is  distinguishable  estriusically  from  another,  is 
also  distinguishable  through  itself.^ 

For  example,  let  there  be  two  coins  from  the  same  stamp  (jypo),  one 
of  true  gold,  the  other  of  false,  which  may  be  easily  distinguished 
extrinsically  by  the  blow  of  the  hammer.  I  say  even  before  the 
blow,  by  an  attentive  consideration,  differences  in  the  composition 
itself  of  each  would  be  detected  by  the  naked  or  equipped  eye,  and 
although  the  keenness  of  vision  could  not  reach  thither,  yet  differ- 
ences exist  within  and  can  be  detected  by  some  more  acute  creature 
(for  example,  by  an  angel). ^ 

Observation.  Certain  bodies  are  mutually  separated  violently 
from  each  other. 

Conceded  Hypothesis.  Matter  is  uniform,  or,  motion  and  figure 
excepted,  everywhere  like  itself. 

Definition  II.    An  Atom  is  a  body  which  cannot  be  broken. 

Postulate.  If  there  are  atoms,  we  may  assume  them  of  any  figure 
and  size  whatever  and  in  any  position  whatever. 

theorem. 

It  is  impossible  for  all  bodies  to  consist  of  atoms. 

Let  us  assume  (by  the  postul.)  three  atoms,  A,  B,  C,  of  whicli  A  is 
cubical,  but  B  and  C  are  triangular  prisms,  composing  the  cu1)e  D, 
similar  and  equal  to  the  former  A.  The  cube  D  cannot  (by  the 
conceded  hypothesis)  be  distinguished  from  the  cube  A.  Therefore 
they  cannot  be  distinguished  extrinsically  (by  Axiom  I.).  If  there- 
fore other  bodies  strike  against  the  cube  D,  they  will  be  able  either 
to  separate  the  atoms  B  and  C,  or  they  will  not  be  able.  If  able  to 
separate  them,  then  the  same  bodies  striking  in  the  same  way  against 

1  On  the  margin  of  the  Ms.,  Leibnitz  has  remarked:  "Whatever  is  dis- 
tinguishable in  itself,  is  also  distinguishable  extrinsically.  If  two  bodies  are 
similar  through  a  third  similar  body,  they  cannot  be  distinguished.  If  two 
bodies  are  similar,  but  mutually  unequal  per  sp,  they  can  Ix;  disliiignislied, 
no  third  body  even  being  assumed.  Similar  aud  equal  bodies  ciuinot  be  dis- 
tinguished extrinsically,  nay,  rather,  in  any  way,  and  so  are  one  and  the  s;uiie." 
—  Gerhardt's  Note.  —  Tr. 

2  Stein  here  inserts  in  his  text  the  following  marginal  gloss,  wanting  in 
Gerhardt's  text :  "Hie  osteuditur  ex  hypothesi  Atomistica  scqui,  quod  novin 
Atomi  nasci  possint,  nee  tamen  iternm  dissolvi  contra  natunu  niorcm,"  i.r. 
Here  it  is  shown  to  follow  from  the  Atomistic,  hypothesis,  that  new  atoms  can 
be  produced,  but  nevertheless  cannot  again  be  dissolved  contrary  to  the  law 
of  nature.  — Tk. 


654 


LEIBNITZ'S   CHITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


the  cube  A  will  be  able  violently  to  separate  the  same  into  parts,  for 
otherwise  A  and  B  might  be  distinguished  extrinsically  (by  Defin.  I.), 
the  contrary  of  which  has  been  shown.  But  if  the  cube  A  is  vio- 
lently separated  into  parts,  it  certainly  (by  Defin.  II.)  will  not  be  an 
atom,  as  was  sujiposed.  But  if  other  bodies  cannot  again  separate 
the  cube  Z>  into  component  paiits,  it  follows  that  the  atom  was  not 


Fit;.  1. 

produced  from  non-atoms  through  contact.  And  the  same  principle 
will  hold,  whatever  figure  the  atoms  be  assigned.  Whence  it  follows 
that  atoms  which  have  once  touched  each  other  cannot  again  be 
violently  separated.  Now  if  all  bodies  are  composed  of  atoms,  bodies 
do  not  touch  each  other  except  through  the  atoms.  Therefore  they 
cannot  be  violently  separated  after  contact,  unless  the  atom  of  the 
one  is  violently  separated  from  the  atom  of  the  other,  which  we 
have  shown  cannot  be  done.  But  bodies  not  be  violently  sepa- 
rated. .  .  .  ^  And  so  it  is  not  true  that  all  bodies  are  composed  of 
atoms.     Q.  E.  D. 


Scholium  to  the   Demonstration  agaixst  Atoms   takex 
FROM  the  Contact  of  Atoms. 

October  24,  1690. 

I  do  not  see  what  reply  can  be  made  to  this  demonstration  unless 
by  a  denial  of  the  postulate.  For  we  postulated  that  it  be  conceded 
us :  If  there  are  atoms,  they  can  be  assumed  of  any  figure  and  size 
and  in  any  position  whatever.  This  alone  seems  possible  to  be  said  with 
any  reason,  atoms  cannot  be  granted,  the  parts  of  which  are  connected 
only  by  a  point  or  line.     And  so  there  cannot  (for  example)  be  an 

1  More  words  illegible.  —  Gerhardt's  Note.  Stein  omits  this  incomplete 
sentence.  — Tr. 


APPENDIX  655 


atom  similar  to  one  composed  from  two  spheres  touching  each  other. 
But  if  then  atoms  spherical  or  terminated  by  any  other  curved  sur- 
faces whatever  are  granted,  they  never  touch  each  other  save  in  a 
point,  and  so  never  compose  a  body  similar  to  an  atom.  Here  in 
some  way  I  think  a  reply  can  be  made,  in  the  first  place  if  the  contact 
in  the  surface  is  the  cause  of  stability,  it  follows  that  stability  is 
greater  when  the  surface  is  greater.  Whence  the  atoms  would  not 
be  equally  stable.  And  so  there  would  be  a  certain  determinate 
force  of  violent  separation  by  which  stabilities  could  be  measured. 
I  do  not  see  where  we  can  find  this  force,  if  it  is  not  in  the  motion  of 
bodies,  unless  we  advocate  certain  spiritual  powers  whose  method  of 
acting  in  bodies  nevertheless  cannot  be  known.  But  if  the  stability 
of  all  atoms  is  equal,  it  does  not  matter  how  great  the  contact  is ; 
even  contact  in  a  line,  nay  in  a  point,  would  suffice. 

A  second  reply  which  can  be  made  is  this:  it  has  at  least  been 
demonstrated  by  us  that  bodies  cannot  be  composed  of  atoms  ter- 
minated by  plane  sides.  But  besides  the  fact  which  can  be  doubted, 
whether  indeed  curvilinears  properly  called  are  granted,  this  excei> 
tion  does  not  seem  in  agreement  with  the  reasons  of  things,  that  if 
comiiosition  from  atoms  is  possible  it  must  necessarily  take  place 
through  bodies  destitute  of  a  plane  surface. 

The  third  reply  is  this :  not  only  the  atoms  of  plane  surfaces  but 
also  of  concave  must  be  assumed  {tollendas)  from  nature.  Otherwise 
we  shall  be  permitted  to  make  atoms  from  the  non-atom,  as  often  as 
the  concave  surface  of  one  atom  happens  to  be  applied  to  the  convex 
surface  of  another,  and  that  will  happen  until  all  the  atoms  of  the 
concave  surfaces  shall  be  filled  as  far  as  can  be  done  by  the  convex 
existing  in  nature.  But  this  restriction  also  does  not  seem  in  har- 
mony with  the  reasons  of  things.  And  in  general,  if  any  one  denies 
that  there  are  other  atoms  than  the  perfectly  spherical,  in  order  to 
escape  the  force  of  the  demonstration,  these  things  are  devised  which 
indeed  are  accommodated  to  the  latter,  but  do  not  accord  with  the 
primal  reasons  and  amplitude  of  nature.  In  brief  :  from  tlie  hypo- 
thesis of  atoms  I  can  deduce  absurdity,  provided  I  am  allowed  to 
assign  to  the  atoms  size,  figure,  and  motion  as  1  will.^ 

1  On  the  margin  of  the  Ms.,  Leibnitz  has  remarked :  "  Anotlior  argument 
coukl  be  set  up,  namely:  If  atoms  could  be  granted,  bodies  similar  and  ('([ual, 
and  nevertheless  different  from  each  other,  as  M'ould  bo  two  equal  splierea, 
could  be  granted.  If  atoms  were  granted,  no  cause  of  reflection,  which  in  fact 
must  be  taken  from  an  elastic  body  (Elaterio),  could  ha  perceived,  nor  would 
the  atoms  striking  each  other  leap  apart,  in  turn,  from  each  otlier.  Further 
superficial  contact  is  the  cause  of  cohesion,  two  atoms  coming  together  in 
sides  or  surfaces  would  not  leap  apart;  thus,  if  the  velocity  of  each  approach 
is  equal,  the  whole  force  would  perish."  —  (Icrhardt's  Note.  Stein  has  i)Ut  tliis 
marginal  gloss  into  the  text,  with  a  note  stating  that  it  is  a  marginal  gloss. 
—  Tb. 


650  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


Appendix  to   the   Demonstration   against  Atoms  taken 
FROM  THE  Contact  of  Atoms. 

If  any  one  denies  that  there  can  be  atoms,  the  parts  of  which  touch 
each  other  in  a  point  only  or  line,  and  so  requires  contact  in  the  sur- 
face for  cohesion,  that  he  may  avoid  the  force  of  our  demonstration, 
that  one  will  entangle  himself  in  other  new  difficulties. 

For  if  cohesion  arises  from  superficial  contact,  a  case  can  be  seen 
in  which  an  atom  is  unable  to  graze  {radere)  an  atom  ;  for  where  a 
part  of  the  side  of  the  atom  B  coincides  with  a 
part  of  the  side  of  the  atom  ,^4,  they  are  not 
onty  unable  to  leaji  apart  and  also  to  separate 
violently,  but  even  the  one  will  not  be  able  to 
slide  upon  the  other,  for  they  touch  each  other 


g  in  the   surface.      Xay,   rather,   what  is   more 

Fig.  2.  wonderful,  the  atom  A  coming  by  its  own  mo- 

tion from  the  place  ^A  into  the  place  ^A  so 
situated,  that  it  is  unable  to  proceed  farther,  because  it  gi-azes  the 
atom  B,  is  there  arrested  without  any  obstacle  as  if  it  were  an  en- 
chanted object.  N'or  does  it  suffice  to  say  that  no  such  atoms  are 
given,  and  that  no  others  exist  unless  spherical  or  at  least  bounded 
by  convex  surfaces.  For  it  suffices  that  atoms  bounded  by  plain  or 
concave  sides  are  possible,  if  those  bounded  by  convex  sides  are 
possible ;  and  from  the  supposed  possibility  of  these  that  which  is 
absurd  follows,  whence  it  follows  that  convex  atoms  are  not  to  be 
admitted. 

But  if  any  one  because  of  these  considerations  now  requires  no 
longer  superficial  contact  only,  but  also  the  rest  of  bodies  tangent  to 
each  other  for  cohesion,  lest  forsooth  one  atom  be  kept  from  sliding 
upon  another,  that  one  is  unable  to  bring  forth  proof  of  his  opinion, 
nor  does  it  appear  why  the  nature  and  the  force  of  the  present  state 
which  is  contact  must  depend  upon  a  past  state,  so  that  foi'sooth  the 
present  contact  causes  cohesion,  if  it  has  remained  for  some  consider- 
able time  in  the  same  place,  as  if  there  were  need  of  a  certain  habi- 
tude, whence  indeed  it  would  follow  that  stability  is  increased  by 
duration  and  that  atoms  newly  produced  are  the  more  stable  the 
longer  they  cohere,  a  fact  which  no  one  will  surely  easily  affirm.  But 
neither  can  the  moment  be  assigned  in  which  the  cohesion  of  two 
atoms  begins,  because  it  is  entirely  perfect  at  once.  And  if  it  does 
not  begin  unless  it  has  continued  for  some  time,  it  will  never  begin, 
for  it  would  itself  be  prior  to  itself.  IMoreover,  all  rest  can  be  under- 
stood as  composed  of  two  motions,  so  that  if  a  body  is  moved  at  the 
same  time  by  two  moving  bodies  and  so  remains  quiet  accidentally, 
shall  it  then  be  understood  also  to  adhere  to  the  sides  of  another  body 


APPENDIX  657 


r 

which  it  grazes  ?  Aud  so  whithersoever  we  are  turned,  we  fall  into 
airopa,  which  is  not  strange,  because  we  assumed  an  liypothesis  lack- 
ing in  reason,  namely,  that  the  highest  stability  is  witiiout  an  intelli- 
gible cause. 

But  if  any  one  thinks  that  atoms  can  be  produced  at  least  by  the 
decree  of  God,  we  confess  to  him  that  God  can  make  atoms,  but  a 
perpetual  miracle  would  be  needed  to  resist  a  forcible  separation, 
since  in  a  body  itself  a  principle  of  perfect  stability  cannot  be  per- 
ceived. God  can  perform  whatever  is  possible,  but  it  is  not  always 
possible  to  transfer  his  power  to  creatures,  and  to  bring  it  to  pass 
that  they  themselves  can  do  per  se  what  they  accomplish  through  his 
own  power  alone. 


IV 

ESSAY  ON  DYNAMICS  ON  THE  LAWS  OF  MOTION,  IN 
WHICH  IT  IS  SHOWN  THAT  NOT  THE  SAME  QUAN- 
TITY OF  MOTION  IS  PFtESERVED,  BUT  THE  SAME 
ABSOLUTE  FORCE,  OR  RATHER  THE  SAME  QUANTITY 
OF   MOVING  ACTION    (U ACTION  MOTRICE)^ 

[From  the  French] 

The  opinion  that  the  same  quantity  of  motion  is  preserved  and 
abides  in  the  concourse  of  bodies  has  reigned  a  long  time,  and  passed 
as  an  incontestable  axiom  among  modern  philosophers.  We  under- 
stand by  the  quantity  of  motion  the  product  of  the  mass  by  the  velocity, 
so  that  the  mass  of  the  body  being  as  2  and  the  velocity  as  3,  the 
quantity  of  motion  of  the  body  will  be  as  6.  Thus  if  there  were  two 
concurrent  bodies,  multiplying  the  mass  of  each  by  its  velocity  and 
taking  the  sum  of  the  products,  it  is  maintained  tliat  this  sum  nnist 
be  the  same  before  and  after  the  concourse. 

We  begin  now  to  be  disabused  of  this  opinion,  especially  since  it 
has  been  abandoned  by  some  of  its  most  ancient,  most  skilful,  aud 
most  eminent  defenders,  and  above  all  by  the  author  hinis<'lf  of  (he 
"  Search  after  Truth."  ^  But  in  this  case  an  inconvenience  lias  arisen, 
namely,  that  we  have  been  thrown  too  far  into  the  other  extreme,  and 
do  not  recognize  the  conservation  of  anything  absolute  which  might, 
hold  the  place  of  the  quantity  of  motion.  But  our  mind  looks  for 
this,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  I  remark  that  philosophers  who  do 

1  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  II.  2  [Vol.  6],  pp.  2ir)-2.'51.  Published 
from  the  Ms.  in  the  Royal  Library  at  Hanover.  Writlen,  according  to  <J<'r- 
hardt,  probably  about  1091,  cf.  op.  cit.,  Einleituny,  p.  14. —Tu. 

2  Cf.  ante,  p.  176,  note  1.  —  Tit. 

2  u 


658  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

not  enter  into  the  profound  discussions  of  mathematicians  have  diffi- 
culty in  abandoning  an  axiom  such  as  this  of  the  quantity  of  con- 
served motion  witliout  giving  themselves  another  to  vfhich  they  may 
hold. 

It  is  true  that  the  mathematicians  who  a  long  time  since  established 
the  rules  of  motion  based  on  experiments  have  remarked  that  the 
same  relative  velocity  is  preserved  between  the  concurrent  bodies. 
For  example,  if  one  of  the  two  is  at  rest,  or  if  both  are  in  motion,  and 
proceed  the  one  against  the  other,  or  in  the  same  direction,  there  is  a 
relative  velocity,  with  which  they  approach  or  depart  the  one  from  the 
other ;  and  we  find  that  this  relative  velocity  remains  the  same,  so 
that  the  bodies  depart  after  the  impact  with  the  velocity  with  which 
they  were  approaching  before  the  impact.  But  this  relative  velocity  can 
remain  the  same  although  the  true  velocities  and  absolute  forces  of 
the  bodies  change  in  an  infinite  number  of  ways,  so  that  this  conser- 
vation does  not  concern  that  which  is  absolute  in  bodies. 

I  remark  also  another  conservation,  namely,  that  of  the  quantity  of 
progress,  but  neither  is  this  the  conservation  of  that  which  is  abso- 
lute. I  call  prcxjress  the  quantity  of  motion  with  which  a  body  pro- 
ceeds in  a  certain  direction,  so  that  if  the  body  went  in  a  contrary 
direction,  this  progress  would  be  a  negative  quantity.  Now  if  two  or 
more  bodies  are  concurrent,  we  take  the  progress  from  the  direction 
whence  proceeds  their  common  centre  of  gravity,  and  if  all  these 
bodies  proceed  from  the  same  direction,  then  we  must  take  the  sum 
of  the  progress  of  each  for  the  total  progress;  and  it  is  plain  that  in 
this  case  the  total  progress  and  the  total  quantity  of  motion  of  the 
bodies  are  the  same  thing.  But  if  one  of  the  bodies  proceeded  from  a 
contrary  direction,  its  progress  in  the  direction  in  question  would  be 
negative  and  consequently  must  be  subtracted  from  the  others  in 
order  to  have  the  total  progress.  Thus  if  there  are  only  two  bodies, 
one  of  which  proceeds  in  the  direction  of  the  common  centre,  and  the 
other  in  a  contrary  direction,  from  the  quantity  of  motion  of  the  first 
must  be  subtracted  that  of  the  second,  and  the  remainder  will  be  the 
total  progress.  Now  it  will  be  found  that  the  total  progi"ess  is  con- 
served, or  that  there  is  as  much  progress  in  the  same  direction  before 
or  after  the  impact.  But  it  is  also  plain  that  this  conservation  does 
not  correspond  to  that  which  is  demanded  of  something  absolute. 
For  it  may  happen  that  the  velocity,  quantity  of  motion,  and  force  of 
bodies  being  very  considerable,  their  progress  is  null.  This  occurs 
when  the  two  opposed  bodies  have  their  quantities  of  motion  equal. 
In  such  case,  according  to  the  sense  we  have  just  given,  there  is  no 
total  progress  at  all. 

Long  since  I  corrected  and  rectified  this  doctrine  of  the  conser- 
vation of  the  Quantity  of  Motion,  and  put  in  its  place  the  con- 
servation of  some  other  absolute  thing ;   but  as  regards  the  precise 


APPENDIX  659 


form  ill  \,liicli  Lliis  doctrine  should  be  conceived,^  that  is  to  say,  the 
conservation  of  absolute  force,  it  is  true  that  commonly  they  do  not 
appear  to  have  entered  sufficiently  into  my  reasons  nor  to  have  appre- 
hended the  beauty  of  that  which  I  have  observed,  as  I  remark  in  all 
that  has  been  published  in  France  or  elsewhere  on  the  laws  of  motion 
and  mechanics,  even  after  what  I  have  written  on  Dynamics.  But  as 
some  of  the  most  profound  mathematicians  after  many  discussions 
have  yielded  to  my  opinion,  I  promise  myself  with  time  general  ap- 
proval. To  return  then  to  what  I  said  of  the  conservation  of  absolute 
force,  we  must  know  that  the  origin  of  the  error  concerning  the  quan- 
tity of  motion  arises  from  that  which  has  taken  it  as  force.  We  have 
been  led,  I  think,  naturally  to  believe  that  the  same  quantity  of  the 
total  force  abides  before  or  after  the  impact  of  the  bodies,  and  I  have 
found  this  very  true.  Now  the  quantity  of  motion  and  force  being 
taken  as  one  and  the  same  thing,  we  have  concluded  that  the  quan- 
tity of  motion  is  conserved.  What  has  contributed  the  most  to  con- 
found force  with  quantity  of  motion  is  the  abuse  of  the  static  doc- 
trine. For  we  find  in  statics  that  two  bodies  are  in  equilibrium  when 
in  virtue  of  their  position  their  velocities  are  reciprocal  to  their 
masses  or  weights,  or  when  they  have  the  same  quantity  of  motion. 

But  we  must  know  that  this  equality  of  force  in  this  case  arises 
from  another  principle,  for  generally  absolute  force  must  be  estimated 
by  the  violent  effect  which  it  can  produce.  I  call  the  effect  violent 
which  consumes  the  force  of  the  agent,  as,  for  example,  to  give  such 
a  velocity  to  a  given  body,  to  raise  a  given  body  to  such  a  height,  etc. 
And  we  can  conveniently  estimate  the  force  of  a  heavy  body  by  the 
product  of  the  mass  or  of  the  weight  multiplied  by  the  heiglit  to 
which  the  body  might  rise  by  virtue  of  its  motion.  Now  two  bodies 
being  in  equililjrium,  their  heights  to  which  they  might  rise  or  from 
which  they  might  descend  are  reciprocal  to  their  weights,  or  rather 
the  products  of  the  heights  by  the  weights  are  equal.  And  it  happens 
only  in  the  case  of  equilibrium  or  of  dead  force,  that  the  hoiglits  are 
as  the  velocities,  and  that  thus  the  products  of  the  weiglits  by  the 
velocities  are  as  the  products  of  the  weights  by  the  lieights.-  Tliis, 
I  say,  happens  only  in  the  case  of  dead  force,  or  of  the  infinitely  small 
motion  which  I  am  accustomed  to  call  solicitation,  wliicli   takes  place 

1  The  French  is :  "  Mais  justement  de  cette  chose  qu'il  fallait ."  — Tr. 

2  On  the  margin  of  the  manuscript  Leibnitz  lias  remarked:  "Thus  it  is 
astonishing  that  Descartes  lias  avoided  so  well  the  rock  of  velocity  taken  for 
force,  in  his  little  treatise  on  Statics  or  dead  force,  where  there  was  Homo 
danger,  having  reduced  all  to  weights  and  heights,  when  it  was  indifferent, 
and  that  he  has  aliandoned  the  heights  for  the  velociti(;s  in  the  (^ase  wliero 
he  should  have  done  wholly  the  contrary;  that  is  to  say,  when  he  rliscusses 
l)orcussions  or  living  forces  which  must  be  measured  by  weights  and  heights." 
—  (lerhardl's  Note.  —  Tu. 


GOO  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

when  a  heavy  body  tries  to  commence  movement,  and  has  not  yet 
conceived  any  impetuosity ;  and  this  happens  precisely  when  bodies 
are  in  equilibrium,  and,  trying  to  descend,  are  mutually  hindered. 
But  when  a  heavy  body  has  made  some  progress  in  descending  freely, 
and  has  conceived  some  impetuosity  or  living  force,  then  the  heights 
to  which  this  body  might  attain  are  not  proportional  to  the  veloci- 
ties, but  to  the  squares  of  the  velocities.  And  it  is  for  this  reason 
that  in  case  of  living  force  the  forces  are  not  as  the  quantities  of 
motion  or  as  the  products  of  the  masses  by  the  velocities. 

Nevertheless  it  is  noticeable,  and  has  contributed  to  the  error,i  that 
two  bodies  unequal  in  absolute  living  force,  —  for  it  is  of  this  I  speak, 
—  but  whose  quantity  of  motion  is  equal,  can  stop  each  other,  which 
fact  has  made  men  believe  them  absolutely  equal  in  force ;  as,  for 
example  two  bodies  A  of  mass  3  velocity  2,  and  B  of  mass  2  velocity  3. 
For  although  A  is  absolutely  weaker  than  B,  A  being  able  to  raise 
a  pound  only  12  feet,  if  B  can  raise  a  pound  18  feet ;  nevertheless  in 
the  concourse  they  can  stop  each  other,  the  reason  of  which  is  that 
bodies  are  hindered  only  according  to  the  laws  of  dead  or  static  force. 
For  being  elastic  as  we  suppose,  they  act  between  themselves  only  by 
dead  foi'ces  or  according  to  the  equilibrium  in  the  concourse,  that  is 
to  say,  by  inassignable  changes,  because  in  pressing,  resisting,  and 
continually  weakening  each  other  more  and  more  until  they  come  to 
rest,  they  destroy  one  another  at  each  moment  only  by  the  infinitely 
small  motion,  or  dead  force,  equal  on  both  sides ;  now  the  quantity  of 
dead  force  is  estimated  according  to  the  laws  of  equilibrium  by  the 
quantity  of  motion,  infinitely  small  in  truth,  but  whose  contiiaual 
repetition  exhausts  at  last  the  whole  quantity  of  motion  of  the  two 
bodies,  which  being  supposed  equal  in  both  bodies,  each  quantity  of 
motion  is  exhausted  in  the  same  time,  and  consequently  the  two 
bodies  are  reduced  to  rest  in  the  same  time  by  the  pressures  of  their 
elasticities,  which,  restoring  themselves  afterwards,  i-eproduce  the 
motion.  It  is  (in)  this  continual  diminution  of  the  quantity  of  motion 
according  to  the  equilibrium  in  the  concourse  of  the  two  elasticities 
that  the  cause  of  this  paradox  consists,  that  two  absolute  unequal 
forces,  but  which  have  the  quantities  of  motion  equal,  must  stop  each 
other  because  this  happens  in  a  relative  action  where  the  contest 
takes  place  only  according  to  the  quantities  of  motion  infinitely  small 
continually  repeated. 

Now  it  is  found  by  reason  and  by  exj)eriment,  that  it  is  living  abso- 
lute force,  or  that  which  is  estimated  by  the  violent  effect  it  can  pro- 
duce, which  is  preserved,  and  nowise  the  quantity  of  motion.  For  if 
this  living  force  could  ever  be  augmented,  the  effect  would  be  more 

1  The  French  text  reads :  "  Cependant  il  est  remarquable  et  a  contribuer  a 
I'erreur,"  etc.    The  reading  should  be:  "  et  a  coutribue,"  etc.  —  Tr. 


APPENDK  661 

powerful  than  the  cause,  or  rather  the  perpetual  meclianical  motion, 
that  is  to  say,  which  could  reproduce  its  cause  and  something-  more', 
which  is  al>surd.  But  if  the  force  could  be  diminished,  it  woukf  perish 
at  last  entirely ;  for  never  being  able  to  increase,  and  being  able  never- 
theless to  diminish,  it  would  always  go  more  and  more  into  decay,  winch 
is  without  doubt  contrary  to  the  order  of  things.  Experiment  con- 
firms it  also,  and  we  shall  find  always  that  if  bodies  should  convert 
their  horizontal  into  ascending  motions,  they  could  always  raise  on 
the  whole  the  same  weight  to  the  same  height  before  or  after  the 
impact,  supposing  that  no  force  lias  been  absorbed  in  the  impact  by 
the  parts  of  the  bodies,  when  these  bodies  are  not  perfectly  elastic, 
without  speaking  of  that  which  the  medium,  the  base,  and  other  cir- 
cumstances absorb.  But  as  this  is  a  thing  which  I  have  sufficiently 
explained  before,  I  will  not  repeat  it  here. 

Now  I  am  very  happy  to  give  still  another  turn  to  the  matter  and 
to  show  further  the  conservation  of  something  approaching  more  the 
quantity  of  motion,  namelj^,  the  conservation  of  moving  action  (I'action 
motrice).  Here  then  is  the  general  rule  that  I  establish.  Whatever 
changes  may  take  place  between  concurrent  bodies,  of  whatever  nuni- 
ber,  there  must  ahvai/s  be  in  the  concurring  bodies  between  themselves  alone 
the  same  quantity  of  moving  action  in  one  and  the  same  interval  of  time. 
For  example,  there  must  be  during  this  hour  as  much  moving  action 
in  the  universe  or  in  the  given  bodies,  acting  between  themselves 
alone,  as  there  will  be  during  any  other  hour  whatever. 

To  understand  this  rule,  it  is  necessary  to  explain  the  estimate  of 
moving  action  (faction  motrice),  wholly  different  from  the  quantity 
of  motion,  in  the  manner  that  the  quantity  of  motion  has  been 
wont  to  be  understood  as  has  been  explained  above.  Now  iu 
order  that  the  moving  action  may  be  estimated,  we  must  first  esti- 
mate VciQ  formal  effect  of  motion.  This  formal  or  essenti.al  effect  of 
motion  consists  in  that  which  is  changed  by  the  motion,  namely,  in 
the  ([uantity  of  the  mass  which  is  transferred,  and  in  the  space  or  in 
the  length  through  which  this  mass  is  transferred.  There  is  the 
essential  effect  of  motion,  or  that  which  finds  itself  changed:  for  this 
body  was  there,  now  it  is  here  :  the  body  is  so  much  and  the  distance 
is  so  much.  I  conceive  in  order  to  greater  facility  tliat  the  liody  is 
moved  so  that  each  point  describes  a  straight  line  ecjual  and  jJaiiilU'l 
to  that  of  every  other  point  of  the  same  body.  I  mean  also  a  uKjtion 
uniform  and  continuous.  This  assumed,  the  formal  effect  of  motion 
is  the  product  of  the  mass  which  is  transferred  mnliiplied  by  the 
length  of  the  removal,  or  rather  the  formal  effects  are  in  reason  com- 
posed of  the  masses  and  the  lengths  of  the  remov.al,  so  tliat  a  body,  as 
2,  being  transported  the  length  of  ;5  feet,  and  another  body,  as  ;},  being 
transported  the  length  of  2  feet,  the  formal  effects  are  e(iual.  It  is 
necessary  carefully  to  distinguish  what  I  here  call  the  formal  effect,  or 


662  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

that  essential  to  motion,  from  that  which  I  called  above  the  violent 
effect.  For  the  violent  effect  consumes  the  force  and  is  exercised 
upon  something  without ;  but  the  formal  effect  consists  in  the  body  in 
motion,  taken  in  itself,  and  does  not  consume  the  force,  and  even 
conserves  it  rather,  since  the  same  translation  of  the  same  mass  must 
always  be  continued,  if  nothing  from  without  prevents ;  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  absolute  forces  are  as  the  violent  effects  which  con- 
sume them,  but  nowise  as  the  formal  effects. 

Now  it  will  be  easier  to  imderstand  what  moving  action  (Vaction 
motrice)  is :  it  must  then  be  estimated  not  only  by  the  formal  effect 
which  it  produces,  but  also  by  the  vigor  or  velocity  with  which  it  pro- 
duces it.  We  wish  to  transport  100  pounds  to  a  distant  place ;  that 
is  the  formal  effect  which  is  demanded.  One  desires  to  do  it  in  one 
hour,  another  in  two  hours ;  I  say  that  the  action  of  the  first  is  double 
that  of  the  second,  being  doubly  quick  with  reference  to  an  equal 
effect.  I  supi^ose  always  continual  and  uniform  motion.  We  may 
say  also  that  a  body,  as  3,  being  transported  the  length  of  5  feet,  in  1.5 
minutes,  is  the  same  action  as  if  a  body,  as  1,  were  transported  the 
length  of  one  foot  in  one  minute. 

This  definition  of  moving  action  (Vaction  motrice)  is  justified  sufii- 
cieutly  a  priori  because  it  is  manifest  that  in  a  purely  formal  action 
taken  by  itself,  as  is  here  that  of  a  moving  body  considered  by  itself, 
there  are  two  points  to  examine,  —  the  formal  effect  or  that  which  is 
changed,  and  the  promptness  of  the  change ;  for  it  is  very  manifest 
that  that  which  produces  the  same  formal  effect  in  less  time  is  the 
more  active.  But  if  any  one  is  obstinately  bent  upon  disputing  with 
me  this  definition  of  moviiig  action,  it  would  suffice  me  to  say  that  I 
am  free  to  call  moving  action  what  I  just  explained,  provided  that 
nature  justifies  afterwards  the  reality  of  this  nominal  definition,  which 
will  be  when  I  shaU  show  that  it  is  precisely  this  whose  quantity 
nature  conserves. 

Now  since  moving  action  is  that  which  comes  by  multiplying  the 
formal  effect  by  the  velocity,  I  wish  to  give  more  distinctly  the  esti- 
mate of  velocity.  We  know  that  when  two  movable  bodies  run  over 
uniformly  the  same  space  in  unequal  times,  the  velocity  of  that  one 
which  runs  over  it  in  less  time  will  be  the  greater,  in  proportion  as  the 
time  is  sliorter.  Thus  the  spaces  gone  over  being  equal,  the  velocities 
are  reciprocally  proportional  to  the  times.  But  if  the  times  were 
equal,  the  velocities  would  be  as  the  spaces  gone  over.  For  one  body 
in  motion  having  gone  over  a  foot  in  one  minute,  and  the  other  two 
feet,  it  is  manifest  that  the  velocity  of  the  second  is  double.  Thus 
the  velocities  are  in  reason  composed  of  the  direct  of  the  spaces  gone 
over  and  of  the  reciprocal  of  the  times  employed.  Or  what  is  the 
same  thing,  to  estimate  the  velocity,  w'e  must  take  the  space  and 
divide  it  by  the  time.     For  example,  A    accomplishes  4  feet  in   3 


APPENDIX 


663 


seconds  and  B  2  feet  in  1  second;  the  velocity  of  A  will  be  as  4 
divided  by  3,  namely  as  f,  and  the  velocity  of  B  will  be  as  2  divided 
by  1,  namely  as  2,  so  that  the  velocity  of  .1  will  be  to  that  of  B  as  *  to 
2,  that  is  to  say,  as  2  to  3. 

Now  the  question  is  to  verify  the  conservation  of  the  moving  action 
{V action  motrice).  I  can  give  its  general  demonstration  in  a  few 
words,  because  I  have  already  proved  elsewhere  that  the  same  force  is 
conserved,  and  because  at  bottom  the  exercise  of  force  or  the  force 
taken  at  the  time  is  action,  the  abstract  nature  of  force  consisting 
only  in  that.  Thus  since  the  same  force  is  conserved,  and  since  action 
is  the  product  of  the  force  by  the  time,  the  same  action  will  be  con- 
served in  equal  times.  But  I  wish  to  verify  it  by  the  detail  of  the  laws 
of  motion  established  hj  experiment  and  commonly  received.  I  shall 
content  myself  with  one  example ;  but  we  shall  find  it  the  same  in 
every  other  example  we  might  choose.  And  indeed  we  could  see  at 
once  the  general  reason  of  it,  by  making  the  calculation  in  aJ)Mrncto,  or 
in  general  and  by  letters,  without  employing  any  particular  numbers. 
But  to  suit  the  intelligence  of  everybody  I  prefer  to  give  an  example 
in  numbers. 

Let  there  be  a  right  angle  LMN  (Fig.  3),  whose  sides  LM,MN  may 


3D 


4-   =D 


"ii 


,c 

4C3C3E 

2C 

^1 

9 

e 

Fig.  3. 

„E 


,E  ,E 


be  prolonged  at  discretion.  Let  a  straight  line  AM  be  taken,  so  that 
prolonged  beyond  the  point  M  it  would  cut  the  angle  LAfN  into  two 
equal  parts.  We  might  consider  ^AM  as  the  hypotenuse  of  a  square 
whose  side  may  be  called  1.     This  being  so,  I  suppose  that  tlie  body,  A  ,1 

1  We  take  no  account  here  of  the  thickness  of  the  bodies,  which  wo  sui)poHO 
inconsiderable.  —  Leibnitz' a  Note. 


G64  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

being  in  the  place  j.l  at  the  moment  1,  A  goes  from  the  point  ^4.  to  the 
point  M,  during  the  time  1,  2,  and  there  meets  at  the  moment  2  the 
two  bodies  B  and  C,  which  had  been  in  repose  during  the  1,  2,  which 
is  known  in  the  figure  in  that  their  place  is  designated  by  ^B  and  by 
^B,  as  also  by  jC  and  by  ^C.  Now  the  body  A  meeting  the  two  bodies 
in  M  at  the  moment  2,  being  in  M  or  oA,  will  drive  them  forward  and 
come  to  rest  in  M,  a  point  which  will  also  be  3.4  and  ^A,  because  A  will 
remain  there  during  the  times  2,  3  and  3,  4,  as  I  sui^pose  the  two 
mutually  equal,  and  to  the  times  1,  2.  But  B  will  go  towards  L  from 
the  moment  2  during  the  time  2,  3  with  a  velocity  as  1,  and  will  meet 
at  tlie  moment  3  the  body  D,  which  had  before  gone  in  front  of  it 
during  the  times  1,  2,  irom  the  place  jZ)  to  the  place  ^D,  and  during 
the  times  2,  3,  from  the  place  ^D  to  the  place  ,D,  with  a  velocity  as  J. 
Xow  B,  meeting  D  at  the  moment  3,  will  give  it  the  velocity  M^D; 
that  is  to  say,  in  the  times  3,  4,  ^D  will  reach  ^D,  and  during  that 
time,  B  wDl  go  from  oB  to  ^B  with  the  velocity  c.B^B.  It  will  be  the 
same  on  the  other  side,  where  C,  pushed  by  A  in  the  moment  2,  will 
go  towards  N  with  the  velocity  1,  and  will  meet,  at  the  moment  3,  the 
body  E,  which  goes  against  it,  having  gone  before,  during  the  times  1,  2, 
from  the  place  ^E  to  the  place  ^E,  and  during  the  times  2,  3  from  the 
place  2^  to  the  place  ,E,  with  a  velocity  as  f.  Now  C,  meeting  E  at 
the  moment  3,  will  give  it  the  velocity  ^E^E;  that  is  to  say,  that  in 
the  times  3,  4,  it  comes  from  ^E  to  ^E.  And  during  this  time,  C  will 
go  from  gC  to  ^C  with  the  velocity  ^C^C 

The  register  of  the  masses  and  velocities  follows. 

The  masses  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D,  E  are  1,  1,  1,  2,  J. 

During  the  times  1,  2  the  velocities  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D,  E  are 
V2,  0,  0,  i,  |. 

During  the  times  2,  3  the  velocities  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D,  E 
are  0,  1,  1,  J,  |. 

During  the  times  3,  4  the  velocities  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D,  E 
are  0,  \,  \,  f ,  ^,  where  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  body  C,  instead 
of  advancing,  reflects  backward  with  the  velocity  \. 

The  justification  of  these  numbers  will  be  found  in  the  rules 
or  equations  which  we  shall  assign  farther  on. 

Let  us  now  make  the  calculation  of  the  moving  actions  (actions 
motrices)  during  the  times  equal  between  them  —  1,  2 ;  2,  3  ;  3,  4. 
During  the  times  1,  2. 

J^  is  in  mass  1,  the  length  of  the  transfer  ^A^A  is  ^/l.  Then 
multiplying  one  by  the  other,  the  formal  effect  is  ^2.  The 
velocity  comes  from  dividmg  the  length  ^2  by  the  time  1,  which 
makes  y/2.  And  multiplying  the  effect  by  the  velocity,  the  moving 
action  is  2. 

B  and  C  are  at  rest  during  this  time  in  Jj,  .,/?,  or  jC,  ^C,  conse- 
quently their  moving  action  is  0. 


APPENDIX 


66f 


D  is  in  mass  2,  the  length  of  the  transfer  ^,  the  formal  effect 
2  by  ^  or  1.  The  length  J  being  divided  by  the  time  1,  the  velocity  h 
arises,  and  the  effect  multiplied  by  the  velocity  is  1  by  4,  or  ,^,  which 
is  the  action  oi  D. 

E  is  in  mass  \,  the  length  of  the  transfer  f,  consequently  the 
effect  I.  Now  the  length  f  divided  by  1  gives  the  velocity  f,  which, 
multiplied  by  the  effect,  furnishes  |  the  action  of  E. 

And  the  sum  of  all  the  moving  actions  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D, 
E,  duruig  the  times  1,  2,  is  2  +  0  +  0  +  J  + 1  =  if. 
During  the  times  2,  3. 

A  is  at  rest,  and  its  action  is  0. 

B  is  in  mass  1,  tlie  length  of  the  transfer  1  (namely,  .,B.Ji),  the 
formal  effect  1  ;  the  length  1  divided  by  the  time  1  gives  the  velocity 
1,  which,  being  multiplied  by  the  effect  1,  1  arises,  which  is  the  action 
ofB. 

C ;  the  calculation  is  the  same  in  regard  to  C  and  there  arises  the 
same  action  1. 

D  has  the  same  action  as  in  the  preceding  time ;  namely,  J. 

E  likewise  has  the  same  action  as  in  the  preceding  time ;  namely,  ^. 

And  the  sum  of  all  the  moving  actions  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D,  E, 
during  the  times  2,  3,  is  0  +  1  +  1  +  ^  +  f  =  ff,  as  before. 
Finally,  during  the  time  3,  4. 

A  is  at  rest,  and  its  action  is  0. 

B  is  in  mass  1,  the  length  of  the  transfer,  namely,  ^B^B,  is  \,  conse- 
quently the  effect  is  ^.  The  same  length,  i,  divided  by  the  time  1, 
gives  \  for  the  velocity,  which  multiplied  by  the  effect,  J  arises,  the 
action  of  B. 

C  is  in  mass  1,  the  length  of  the  transfer  ^C^C  is  \,  consequently 
the  formal  effect  is  \.  For  it  matters  not  here  when  we  seek  absolute 
things,  whether  C  advances  by  -^C^C,  or  reflects  backward,  as  it  does 
in  fact.  The  same  length,  i,  divided  by  the  time  1  gives  the  velocity  ]j, 
which,  multiplied  by  the  eifect,  there  arises  J^  as  the  action  of  C. 

D  is  in  mass  2,  the  length  of  the  transfer  ^D^D  is  f,  consequently 
the  eifect  is  |.  The  same  length  divided  by  the  time  1  is  ;■;,  or  the 
velocity,  which  multiplied  by  the  effect,  there  arises  \l,  which  is  the 
action  of  D. 

E  is  in  mass  \,  the  length  of  the  transfer  is  y,  the  effect  %.  The 
same  length  divided  by  the  time  1  is  '/,  that  is  to  say,  the  velocity, 
which,  multiplied  by  the  effect,  produces  |J-  for  the  action  of  E. 

And  the  sum  of  all  the  moving  actions  of  the  bodies  A,  B,  C,  D,  E, 
during  the  time  3,  4,  is 

^1       1       25     98      18  +  2  +  225  +  106  _  441  _  40 
9      81       18      HI  1G2  l(i2      18' 

as  in  each  one  of  the  preceding  times. 


666  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

I  have  followed  in  this  calculation  the  general  method,  for  as  the 
moving  actions  are  not  only  equal  in  equal  times,  but  proportional  to 
the  times  in  unequal  times,  I  have  divided  the  space  by  the  time,  in 
order  to  have  the  velocity ;  but  when  the  time  is  always  the  same,  as 
here,  and  thus  we  can  take  it  as  unity,  the  division  by  the  time  changes 
nothing,  and  consequently  for  the  velocity  we  can  take  the  number  of 
the  length  of  the  transfer,  the  velocities  being  as  the  spaces:  whence 
it  is  manifest  that  the  eifect  being  the  product  of  the  mass  and  the 
space,  and  the  velocity  being  as  the  space,  the  action  is  as  the  product 
of  tlie  mass  by  the  square  of  the  space  of  the  transfer  (we  mean  a 
horizontal  transfer  in  falling  bodies),  or  as  the  product  of  the  mass  by 
the  square  of  the  velocity.  Now,  I  shall  prove,  further  on,  in  the  3d 
equation,  that  the  sum  of  these  products  of  the. masses  by  the  squares 
of  the  velocities  is  conserved  in  the  concourse  of  the  bodies.  Con- 
sequently, it  is  proved  that  the  moving  action  is  conserved,  without 
speaking  of  other  proofs  by  which  I  have  shown  elsewhere  that  the 
forces  are  conserved,  and  that  the  forces  are  as  the  products  of  the 
masses  by  the  squares  of  the  velocities,  while  the  actions  are  as 
the  products  of  the  forces  by  the  times,  so  that  if  we  did  not  know 
elsewhere  this  estimate  and  conservation  of  force,  we  might  learn  it 
here,  in  finding  by  the  calculation  in  detail,  or  even  in  general,  by  the 
3d  equation,  further  on,  that  the  moving  action  is  conserved  ;  now  it 
is  clear  that  the  moving  actions  are  in  reason  composed  of  the  forces 
and  the  times,  and  the  times  being  the  same,  the  moving  actions  are 
as  the  powers  or  forces. 

But  shall  we  be  astonished  whence  comes  this  success,  which  will 
never  fail,  however  intricate  may  be  the  example  which  we  may 
choose?  It  may  be  proved  a  priori,  independently  of  the  rules  of 
motion  received ;  and  this  is  what  I  have  shown  many  times  in  dif- 
ferent ways.  But  here  I  shall  show  that  it  is  proved  by  these  very 
rules  of  percussion  which  experience  has  justified,  and  whose  rationale 
we  may  give  by  the  method  of  a  boat,  as  Huygens  has  done,  and  in 
many  other  ways,  although  w^e  are  always  obliged  to  assume  something 
non-mathematical,  which  has  its  source  higher.  But  I  shall  i-educe 
the  whole  to  three  equations  very  simple  and  beautiful,  and  which 
contain  all  which  concerns  the  central  concourse  of  two  bodies  in  one 
and  the  same  straight  line. 

Conspiring  velocities 
of  the  body  a  before  the  impact  v  after  x. 
b  y  z. 

I  call  these  conspiring  velocities,  because  I  suppose  they-all  tend  fi-om 
the  side  whence  proceeds  the  centre  of  gravity  common  to  the  two 
bodies.  But  if  perchance  any  velocity  proceeds  really  in  the  contrary 
direction,  then  the  letter  which  expresses  the  conspiring  velocity  sig- 
nifies a  negative  quantity.     But  we  shall  always  take  the  body  a  as  a 


APPENDIX  667 


body  whose  velocity  is  really  conspiring,  or  proceeds  from  the  side  of 
the  centre  of  gravity  before  the  impact,  and  also  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  body  a  follows  and  does  not  precede  the  common  centre  of 
gravity.  Thus  the  signs  do  not  vary  in  v,  but  they  may  vary  in  y,  z,  x. 
Here,  now,  are  our  three  equations:  — 

T.    Lmeal  equation,  which  expresses  the  conservation  of  the  cause 
of  the  impact,  or  of  the  relative  velocity 

V  —  y  =  z  —  X, 

and  V  -  y  signifies  the  relative  velocity  between  the  bodies  before  tlie 
impact  with  which  they  approach,  and  z  —  x  signifies  the  relative 
velocity  with  which  they  depart  after  the  impact.  And  this  relative 
velocity  is  always  the  same  in  quantity  before  or  after  the  impact, 
supposing  that  the  bodies  are  very  elastic,  which  this  equation  states. 
It  is  necessary  only  to  remark  that  while  the  signs  vary  iu  the  explica- 
tion of  the  detail,  this  general  rule  will  embrace  all  the  particular 
cases.     This  also  occurs  in  the  following  equation  :  — 

II.  Plane  equation,  which  expresses  the  conservation  of  the  common 
or  total  progress  of  the  two  bodies 

av  +  by  =  ax  +  bz. 

I  call  progress  here  the  quantity  of  motion  which  proceeds  from  tlie 
side  of  the  centre  of  gravity,  so  that  if  the  body  b,  for  example,  sliould 
proceed  in  the  contrary  direction  before  the  impact,  and  thus  its  con- 
spiring velocity  y  be  negative  or  be  expressed  by  —(//),  understand- 
ing by  (2/)  mass  {molem),  or  that  which  is  positive  in  y,  then  the 
progress  of  a  will  be  av,  the  progress  of  h  will  be  —b(y).  And  the 
total  progress  will  be  av  —  b(y),  which  is  the  difference  of  the  quanti- 
ties of  motion  of  the  two  bodies.  If  the  bodies  a  and  b  jiroceed  from 
one  and  the  same  side  before  and  after  the  impact,  these  letters,  v,  y, 
X,  z,  signify  only  conspiring  velocities  real  or  affirmative,  and  conse- 
quently in  this  case  it  appears  by  this  equation  that  the  same  (piantity 
of  motion  will  be  conserved  after  and  before  the  impact.  But  if  the 
bodies  a  and  b  should  proceed  in  a  contrary  direction  before  the 
impact  and  in  the  same  direction  after  the  impact,  the  difference  of 
the  quantity  of  motion  before  the  impact  would  be  (iqual  to  the  sum 
of  the  quantity  of  motion  after  the  im]>act.  And  there  will  be  other 
similar  variations  according  to  the  variation  of  the  signs  of  the  hitters 
y,  X,  z. 

III.  Solid  equation,  which  expresses  the  conservation  of  tin'  tt>l;il 
absolute  force  or  of  the  moving  action 

aw  +  byy  =  axx  4-  bzz. 

This  equation  has  this  excellence,  that  all  the  variations  of  tlie  signs 
which  can  arise  only  from  the  diverse;  direct-inn  of  the  velocities  ?/,  x, 
2,  y  cease,  by  the  fact  that  all  the  letters  which  exi)ress  these  veloci- 


668  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

ties  mount  here  to  the  square.  Now  —  y  and  +  y  have  the  same 
square  +  yy,  so  that  all  these  different  directions  of  y  produce  noth- 
ing more.  And  it  is  also  for  that  reason  that  this  equation  gives 
something  absolute,  independent  of  the  relative  velocities,  or  of  the 
progressions  from  a  certain  side.  The  question  here  concerns  only  the 
estimating  of  masses  and  velocities,  without  troubling  ourselves  from 
what  side  these  velocities  arise.  And  this  it  is  which  satisfies  at  the 
same  time  the  rigor  of  the  mathematicians  and  the  wish  of  the  philoso- 
phers,—  the  experiments  and  reasons  drawn  from  diiferent  principles. 
Although  I  put  together  these  three  equations  for  the  sake  of  beauty 
and  harmony,  nevertheless  two  of  them  might  suffice  for  our  needs. 
For,  taking  any  two  of  these  equations,  we  can  infer  from  them 
the  remaining  one.  Thus,  the  first  and  the  second  give  the  third 
in  the  following  manner.  By  the  first,  we  shall  have  v  +  x=y  +  z-^ 
by  the  second,  we  shall  have  a,  v  —  x  =  b,  z  —  y ;  and,  multiplying  one 
equation  by  the  other,  according  to  the  corresponding  sides,  we  shall 
have  a,  V  —  X,  V  +  X  =  b,  z  —  y,  z  +  y,  which  makes  aw  —  axx  =  bzz  —  byy, 
or  the  third  equation.  In  the  same  way,  the  first  and  the  third  give 
the  second ;  for  a,  vv  —  xx  =  b,  zz  —  yy,  which  is  the  third,  divided  by 
the  first  V  +  x  =  z  +  y,  side  by  side,  we  shall  have  a,  vv  —  xx,:,v  +  x  =  b, 
zz  —  yy, :,  z  +  y,  which  makes  a,  v  —  x  =  b,  z  —  y,  that  is,  the  second 
equation.  Finally,  the  second  and  the  third  equation  give  the  first. 
For  the  third  a,  vv  —  xx  =  b,  zz  —  yy  divided  by  the  second,  namely, 
hj  a,  V  —  X  =  b,  z  —  y,  gives 

a,  nv  —  XX  _b,  zz  —  yy 
a,  V  —  X  h,  z  —  y 

which  makes  v  +  x  =  z  +  y,  according  to  the  first  equation. 

I  would  add  only  one  remark,  which  is  that  many  distinguish 
between  hard  and  soft  bodies,  and  the  hard  themselves  as  elastic 
or  not,  and  build  thereupon  different  rules.  But  we  may  take  bodies 
naturally  as  hard-elastic,  without  however  denying  that  the  elas- 
ticity must  always  come  from  a  fluid  more  subtile  and  penetrating, 
whose  motion  is  disturbed  by  the  tension  or  by  the  change  of  the 
elasticity.  And  as  this  fluid  must  be  composed  itself  in  its  turn  of 
little  solid  bodies,  elastic  between  themselves,  we  see  well  that  this 
replication  of  solids  and  of  fluids  continues  to  infinity.  Now  this 
elasticity  of  bodies  is  necessary  to  nature,  in  order  to  obtain  the 
execution  of  the  grand  and  beautiful  laws  which  its  infinitely  wise 
author  has  proposed,  among  which  not  the  least  are  these  two  laws 
of  nature  which  I  first  made  known,  the  first  of  which  is  the  law 
of  the  conservation  of  absolute  force  or  of  moving  action  in  the  uni- 
verse, with  some  other  absolutely  new  conservations  which  depend 
upon  it  and  which  I  will  explain  some  day,  and  the  second  is  the 
law  of  continuity,  in  vii'tue  of  which,  among  other  effects,  every  change 


APPENDIX 


669 


must  take  place  through  inassignable  passages  and  never  by  a  leap 
This  also  is  the  reason  why  nature  suffers  no  hard  non-elastic 
bodies.  In  order  to  show  this,  let  us  pretend  that  a  hard  non-elastic 
globe  proceeds  to  strike  against  a  similar  globe  at  rest:  after  the 
impact  it  is  necessary  that  the  two  globes  rest,  in  which  case  the 
law  of  the  conservation  of  force  is  violated,  or  that  there  be  some 
motion  and  that  the  globe  which  was  at  rest  receive  it,  being  unable 
to  be  taken  as  immovable,  although  even  if  it  should  feign  to  be 
such,  the  striking  body  (in  order  to  preserve  the  force)  would  nec- 
essarily be  reflected  suddenly  backward.  This  is  a  forbidden  (defend u) 
change,  since  it  would  be  by  a  leap,  a  body  which  proceeds  from  a 
certain  side  being  obliged  to  abate  its  motion,  even  to  rest,  before 
beginning  to  proceed  gradually  further  and  further  backward.  But 
the  globe  which  is  struck  being  obliged  to  receive  motion,  there 
will  also  be  a  change  by  a  leap,  the  struck  globe  which  was  at  rest 
being  obliged  to  receive  a  certain  degree  of  velocity  suddenly,  not 
being  pliable  so  as  to  receive  it  gradually  and  by  degrees.  It  "being 
also  manifest,  as  is  necessary,  either  that  the  globe  striking  passes 
suddenly  to  rest,  which  would  be  already  a  change  by  a  leap,  or  that 
if  this  striking  globe  retains  a  certain  velocity,  the  struck  globe  which 
was  at  rest  receives  suddenly  an  amount  which  is  not  less  than  that 
of  the  striking  globe,  since  the  globe  struck  must  either  stop  the 
striking  globe,  or  go  before  it.  Thus  the  sti-iking  globe  passes 
suddenly  from  velocity  to  rest,  or  at  least  the  struck  globe  passes 
suddenly  from  rest  to  a  certain  degree  of  velocity,  witliout  passing 
through  the  intermediate  degrees,  which  is  contrary  to  the  law  of 
continuity,  which  admits  no  change  by  a  leap  in  nature.  I  have  also 
many  other  reasons  all  of  which  concur  in  banishing  hard  non-elastic 
bodies,  but  this  is  not  the  place  to  enlarge  upon  them. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  admit,  that  although  bodies  must  be  thus 
naturally  elastic  in  the  sense  which  I  have  just  explained,  nevertlieless 
the  elasticity  often  appears  insufficient  in  the  masses  or  bodies  which 
we  employ,  even  if  these  masses  should  be  composed  of  ehistic  parts 
and  shovild  resemble  a  sack  full  of  hard  balls  which  would  yield  to  a 
moderate  impact,  without  leaving  the  sack,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  soft 
bodies  or  those  which  yield  without  recovering  themselves  sufficiently. 
The  reason  is  that  the  parts  are  not  siiffieiently  united  therein  to  trans- 
fer their  change  to  the  whole.  AVhence  it  conies  that  in  the  impact  of 
sucli  bodies  a  part  of  the  force  is  absorbed  by  the  small  jiarts  which 
compose  the  mass,  without  this  force  being  given  to  tlie  whole  ;  and 
this  must  always  happen  when  the  pressed  mass  does  not  recover  per- 
fectly; although  it  also  happens  that  a  mass  shows  itself  more  or  less 
elastic  according  to  the  different  manner  of  the  impact,  witness  tiio 
water  itself  which  yields  to  a  moderate  impression,  and  makes  a  can- 
non-ball rebound. 


670  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Now  when  the  parts  of  the  bodies  absorb  the  force  of  the  impact,  as 
a  whole,  as  when  two  pieces  of  rich  earth  or  of  clay  come  into  collision, 
or  in  part,  as  -when  two  wooden  balls  meet,  which  are  much  less  elastic 
than  two  globes  of  jasper  or  tempered  steel ;  when,  I  say,  some  force  is 
absorbed  by  the  parts,  it  is  as  good  as  lost  for  the  absolute  force,  and 
for  the  respective  velocity,  that  is  to  say,  for  the  thii-d  and  the  first 
equation,  which  do  not  succeed,  since  that  which  remains  after  the 
impact  has  become  less  than  what  it  was  before  the  impact,  by  reason 
of  a  part  of  the  force  being  turned  elsewhere.  But  the  quantity  of  prog- 
ress, or  rather  the  second  equation,  is  not  concerned  therein.  And 
even  the  motion  of  this  total  progress  remains  alone,  when  the  two 
bodies  proceed  together  after  the  impact  with  the  velocity  of  their  com- 
mon centre,  as  do  two  balls  of  rich  earth  or  clay.  But  in  the  semi- 
elastics,  as  two  wooden  balls,  it  happens  still  further  that  the  bodies 
mutually  depart  after  the  impact,  although  with  a  weakening  of  the 
first  equation,  following  this  force  of  the  impact  which  has  not  been 
absorbed.  And  in  consequence  of  certain  experiments  touching  the 
degree  o£  the  elasticity  of  this  wood,  we  might  predict  what  should 
happen  to  the  balls  which  should  be  made  of  it  in  every  kind  of  col- 
lision or  impact.  But  this  loss  of  the  total  force,  or  this  failure  of  the 
third  equation,  does  not  detract  from  the  inviolable  truth  of  the  law 
of  the  conservation  of  the  same  force  in  the  world.  For  that  which 
is  absorbed  by  the  minute  parts  is  not  absolutely  lost  for  the  universe, 
although  it  is  lost  for  the  total  force  of  the  concurrent  bodies. 


ESSAY  ON  DYNAMICS  IN  DEFENCE  OF  THE  AVONDER- 
FUL  LAWS  OF  NATURE  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  FORCES 
OF  BODIES,  DISCLOSING  THEIR  MUTUAL  ACTIONS 
AND   REFERRING   THEM   TO   THEIR   CAUSES  i 

[From  the  Latiri] 

Part  I 

From  the  time  we  made  mention  of  the  founding  of  a  New  Science 
of  Dynamics,  many  distinguished  men  in  various  places  have  asked 
for  a  fuller  explication  of  this  doctrine.     Since,  therefore,  we  have  not 

1  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  11.,  2  [Vol.  6],  pp.  234-246.  Dutens, 
Leibnit.  op.  om.,  3,  315-324.  First  published  iu  the  "  Acta  Eruditor.  Lips.,"  iu 
April,  1G9d.  — Tk. 


APPENDIX  671 


yet  leisure  to  compose  the  book,i  we  will  give  in  tliis  place  those  things 
which  may  kindle  some  light,  which  perhaps  will  return  to  us  with 
interest,  if,  indeed,  we  shall  elicit  the  opinions  of  those  who  unite 
energy  of  thought  with  elegance  of  speech,  whose  judgments  also  we 
openly  confess  will  be  acceptable  to  us,  and  we  hope  useful  in  the  set- 
ting forward  of  the  work.  We  have  elsewhere  suggested  that  there 
is  in  corporeal  things  something  besides  extension,  nay,  prior  to  ex- 
tension, namely,  the  force  itself  of  nature  everywhere  implanted  by  its 
Author,  which  consists,  not  in  the  simple  faculty  with  which  the  schools 
seem  to  have  been  content,  but,  besides,  is  provided  with  a  tendency 
(conutu)  or  effort  (insu)  which  will  have  its  full  effect  unless  impeded 
by  a  contrary  tendency  (co7iatn).  This  effort  often  appears  to  the 
senses,  and  in  my  judgment  is  known  everywhere  in  matter  by  the 
reason,  even  when  it  does  not  appear  to  the  sense.  But  if  now  this 
force  must  not  be  assigned  to  God  tlirough  a  miracle,  it  is  certainly 
necessary  that  this  force  in  bodies  themselves  be  produced  from  the 
body  itself,  nay,  that  it  constitute  the  inmost  nature  of  bodies,  since 
to  act  is  a  mark  of  substances,  and  extension  means  nothing  else  than 
the  continuation  or  diffusion  of  the  already  presupposed  struggling 
and  withstanding,  that  is,  resisting  substance,  so  far  is  it  from 
being  itself  able  to  produce  substance.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  because 
every  corpoi-eal  action  arises  (est)  from  motion,  and  motion  itself  does 
not  exist  unless  from  motion,  either  in  the  body  already  before  exist- 
ing or  impressed  from  something  external  to  it  {aliunde).  For 
motion  (just  as  time)  never  exists,  if  you  reduce  the  thing  to  uKpi- 
/3etav,  because  a  whole  never  exists,  when  it  has  not  coexisting  parts. 
And  nothing  is  so  real  in  itself,  as  that  momentary  increment  (momen- 
taneum)  which  must  be  constituted  in  a  foi'ce  striving  for  change.  To 
this,  therefore,  returns  whatever  there  is  in  corporeal  nature  besides 
the  object  of  geometry  or  extension.  And  by  this  method,  in  fact, 
regard  is  had  at  the  same  time  for  both  the  truth  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  ancients.  And  as  our  age  has  freed  from  contempt  the  atoms  of 
Democritus,  the  ideas  of  Plato,  and  the  tranquillity  of  the  Stoics  in  tlie 
l)est  nexus  of  things,  so  now  the  traditions  of  the  Peripatetics  concern- 
ing forms  or  entelechies  (which  deservedly  seemed  euigiuatical  and 
scarcely  rightly  perceived  by  the  authors  themselves)  will  be  referred 
to  intelligible  notions,  so  that  we  think  it  necessary  ratlier  to  explain 
the  philosophy  thus  received  by  so  many  ages,  so  that  it  may  be  con- 
sistent (where  this  is  permitted)  and  to  illustrate  and  tlien  increase 
it  with  new  truths,  than  to  destroy  it. 

And  this  kind  of  studies  seems  to  me  especially  suited  both  Id  the 
intelligence  (prudentice)  of  the  teacher  and  to  the  profit  of  the  learners, 

iFor  the  work  referred  to,  cf.  Gcrliardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schri/t.,  II.,  2 
[\ol.  G],  pp.  281sf;.  — Th. 


672  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

so  that  we  may  not  seem  more  desirous  of  destroying  than  of  building, 
nor  be  tossed  between  jierpetual  changes  of  doctrine,  daily  uncertain 
because  of  the  pride  of  audacious  geniuses,  but  at  length  the  human 
race,  the  lust  of  sects  being  curbed  (which  the  inane  glory  of  change 
[;}oro?i(/j]  stimulates),  the  certain  dogmas  established,  without  stum- 
bling, not  less  in  philosophy  than  in  mathematics,  will  make  further 
advance,  since  in  the  writings  of  distinguished  men,  ancient  and  mod- 
ern (if  you  take  away  entirely  those  things  in  which  they  speak  too 
severely  against  others),  there  is  wont  to  be  very  much  that  is  true  and 
good,  which  deserves  to  be  rescued  and  to  be  distributed  into  the  pub- 
lic treasury.  And  would  that  men  preferred  to  do  this  rather  than 
spend  their  time  in  censures  by  which  they  only  appease  their  own 
vanity.  But  somehow  very  many  even  hostile  views  do  not  displease 
us  certainly,  whom  fortune  has  so  favored  in  certain  new  views  of  ours, 
that  friends  often  bade  us  think  of  these  only,  and  each  view  is 
considered  according  to  its  own  value,  although  diverse;  the  reason 
of  which  perhaps  is  that  in  discussing  many  things  we  have  learned 
to  despise  nothing.     But  now  let  us  return  to  our  subject. 

Active  force  (which  with  some  you  call  not  ill  poiver  —  virtus')  is  two- 
fold, namely  primitive,  which  exists  in  every  corporeal  substance  per  se 
(since  I  think  a  wholly  quiescent  body  abhorrent  to  the  nature  of 
things),  or  derivative,  which  by  a  limitation  as  it  were  of  the  primi- 
tive, resulting  through  the  conflicts  of  bodies  with  each  other,  is  vari- 
ously exercised.  And  the  primitive  force  indeed  (which  is  nothing 
else  than  evTeXe;!(eta  rf  Trpwrrj)  corresponds  to  (he  substantial  soul  or 
form,  but  indeed  for  this  reason  pertains  only  to  general  causes,  which 
cannot  suffice  for  the  explanation  of  phenomena.  And  so  we  agree 
with  those  who  deny  that  forms  must  be  employed  in  handing  down 
the  particular  and  special  causes  of  sensible  things :  to  point  out 
which  is  worth  while,  lest,  while  we  lead  them  as  it  were  back  again 
to  the  open  fountains  of  things,  at  the  same  time  we  seem  to  desire 
to  return  to  the  '  vain  repetitions '  (battologias)  of  the  vulgar  school. 
Meanwhile  a  knowledge  of  them  is  necessary  to  correct  philosophiz- 
ing, nor  may  any  one  think  he  is  master  of  the  nature  of  body,  unless 
he  has  turned  his  mind  to  such  things  and  understood  that  that  crass 
notion  of  corporeal  substance  is  imperfect,  not  to  say  false,  and 
depends  upon  the  imagination  alone  and  was  introduced  inconsider- 
ately some  years  since  by  an  abuse  of  the  corpuscular  philosophy  (in 
itself  excellent  and  most  true),  as  indeed  is  evident  by  this  argument 
which  does  not  entirely  exclude  cessation  and  rest  from  matter,  and 
cannot  bring  forward  reasons  for  the  laws  conti'olling  the  derivative 
force  of  nature.  In  like  manner  passive  force  also  is  twofold,  either 
primitive  or  derivative.  And  indeed  the  primitive  force  of  enduring  or 
resisting  constitutes  that  very  thing  which  is  called  primary  matter,  if 
you  rightly  interpret  it,  in  the  schools,  by  which  it  happens  that  body 


APPENDIX  673 


is  not  penetrated  by  body,  but  forms  an  obstacle  to  it,  and  it  is  en- 
dowed at  the  same  time  with  a  certain  laziness,  so  to  speak,  that  is, 
repugnance  to  motion,  and  does  not  indeed  suifer  itself  to  be  set  in 
motion  unless  by  the  somewhat  broken  force  of  the  active  body. 
Whence  afterwards  the  derimtlve  force  of  enduring  variously  exhibits 
itself  iu  secondary  matter.  But  it  is  our  part  now  to  proceed  fartlier, 
having  removed  those  general  and  primitive  forces  and  substituted 
those  by  which  we  are  taught  that  because  of  form  every  body  always 
acts  and  because  of  matter  every  body  always  endures  and  resists, 
and  in  this  doctrine  of  derivative  forces  and  resistances  to  investigate 
how  far  bodies  prevail  by  various  efforts  or  again  variously  resist ;  for 
the  laws  of  actions,  which  are  known  not  only  by  reason,  but  are 
confirmed  also  by  sense  itself  through  phenomena,  are  adapted  to 
these. 

Derivative  force  therefore,  by  which  bodies  in  action  act  mutu- 
ally on  each  other  or  mutually  suffer  from  each  other,  we  under- 
stand in  this  place  as  no  other  than  that  which  is  connected  with 
motion  {i.e.  local),  and  in  turn  tends  to  produce  further  local 
motion.  For  we  admit  that  through  local  motion  other  material 
phenomena  can  be  explained.  Motion  is  a  continual  change  of 
place,  and  thus  requires  time.  Yet  the  movable  element  {mobile) 
existing  in  motion,  as  it  has  motion  in  time,  so  in  any  moment 
whatever  has  velocity,  which  is  so  much  the  greater  as  more  space 
is  run  over  and  less  time  is  expended.  Velocity  taken  in  connection 
with  direction  is  called  conatus  ;  but  impetus  is  the  product  of  the  mass 
of  the  body  into  the  velocity,  and  its  quantity  is  so  nuich  that  the 
Cartesians  are  wont  to  call  it  the  quantity  of  motion,  namely,  the  mo- 
mentary increment  (mow!e?z/a«e«m),  although,  speaking  more  accurately, 
the  quantity  of  motion  itself,  existing  forsbotli  in  time,  arises  from  the 
aggregate  of  the  impetuses  (equal  or  unequal)  existing  in  the  mov- 
able element  in  the  given  time  multiplied  in  order  into  the  time.  We, 
nevertheless,  in  discussing  with  these  have  followed  their  fashion  of 
speaking.  Nay  even  as  (not  inconveniently  for  the  doctrinal  use  of 
speaking)  we  can  distinguish  the  accession  which  now  is  made  from 
the  accession  already  made  or  to  be  made,  as  an  increment  of  accession 
or  element ;  or  as  we  may  distinguish  the  present  descent  from  the 
descent  already  made,  which  it  increases ;  so  we  can  discern  and  call 
Motion  the  momentary  or  instantaneous  element  of  motion  diffused  by 
the  motion  itself  through  a  period  of  time;  and  so  that  which  is  com- 
monly ascribed  to  motion  is  called  the  quantity  of  motion.  And  altliough 
in  the  use  of  terms  we  are  compliant  {faciles)  in  accord  with  an  ac- 
cepted interpretation,  nevertheless  it  especially  beliooves  us  to  be  care- 
ful in  their  use  lest  we  be  caught  by  their  ambiguity. 

Moreover,  as  the  estimate  of  motion  through  a  period  of  time  is 
made  from  infinite  impulses,  so  in  turn  the  impulse  itself  (aUhough 
2x 


G74  LEIBNITZ'S   CHiriQUE    OF   LOCKE 

a  momentary  thing)  is  made  from  infinite  degrees  successively  im- 
pressed upon  that  same  movable  body  {mohile),  and  has  a  certain  ele- 
ment from  which,  unfolded,  nothing  but  infinity  can  arise. 

Conceive  a  tube  AC  (Fig.  4)  to  revolve  with  a  certain  fixed  uniform 

velocity  in  the  horizontal  plane  of  this  page  about  an  immovable 

centre  C,  and  a  ball  B,  existing  in  the  cavity  of 

the  tube,  to  be  freed  from  its  chain  or  impediment, 

and  to  begin  to  be  moved  by  the  centrifugal  force ; 

it  is  manifest  that  the  attempt  in  the  beginning 

to  depart  from  the  centre  by  which,  namely,  the 

ball  in  the  tube  tends  towards  its  extremity  ^4,  is 

infinitely  small  in  respect  to  the  impulse  whicli  it 

already  has  from  the  rotation,  or  by  which  with 

the  tube  itself,  the  ball  B  tends  fi'om  the  place 

D  towards  {D),  its  distance  from  the  centre  being 

retained.     But  with  the  continuance  for  some  time 

Fig.  4.  of  the  centrifugal  impression  proceeding  from  the 

rotation,  from  its  own  progress  there  must  arise  in 

the  ball  a  certain  complete  centrifugal  impulse  (i))(iJ),  comparable 

with  the  impulse  of  rotation  D(D).     Hence  it  is  evident  that  the 

effort  is  twofold,  elementary  to  be  sure,  or  infinitely  small,  which  I 

call,  also,  solicitation,  and  formed  by  the  continuation  or  repetition 

of  elementary  efforts ;  that  is,  the  impulse  {impetum)  itself,  although 

I  do  not,  for  that  reason,  mean  that  these  mathematical  entities  are 

really  so  found  in  nature,  but  only  that  they  are  useful  in  making 

accurate  estimates  by  mental  abstraction. 

Hence  force  also  is  twofold :  the  one  elementary,  which  I  call  also 
dead,  because  motion  (inotus')  does  not  yet  exist  in  it,  but  only 
a  solicitation  to  motion  (solicitatio  ad  motum),  such  as  that  of  the 
ball  in  the  tube,  or  of  the  stone  in  the  sling,  even  while  it  is  held 
still  by  the  chain ;  the  other,  however,  is  ordinary  force,  united  with 
actual  motion,  which  I  call  living.  And  an  example  of  dead  force 
indeed  is  the  centrifugal  force  itself,  and  likewise  the  force  of  gravity 
or  centripetal  force,  the  force  also  by  which  the  tense  elastic  body 
{elastrum)  begins  to  restore  itself.  But  in  percussion,  which  arises 
from  a  heavy  body  falling  ah-eady  for  some  time,  or  from  a  bow 
restoring  itself  for  some  time,  or  from  a  similar  cause,  the  force 
is  living  force,  w^iich  has  arisen  from  an  infinite  number  of  con- 
tinued impressions  of  dead  force.  And  this  is  what  Galileo  meant, 
when  in  his  enigmatical  manner  of  speaking  he  spoke  of  the 
infinite  force  of  percussion,  namely  if  compared  with  the  simple 
effort  of  gravity.  But  although  the  impulse  {impetus:)  is  always 
united  with  living  force,  yet  we  shall  show  below  that  these  two  are 
different. 

Living  force  in  any  aggregate  of   bodies  again  can  be  known  as 


APPENDIX  676 


twofold,  namely  total,  or  partial;  and  partial  again  is  either  re- 
spective or  directive,  that  is,  either  proper  or  common  to  the  parts. 
Respective  (respectiva)  or  proper  (propria)  force  is  that  by  which  the 
bodies  comprised  in  the  aggregate  can  act  among  themselves  mutually; 
directive  or  common  force  is  that  by  which,  besides,  this  aggregate 
can  act  outside  itself.  But  I  call  it  direct,  because  the  total  force 
of  direction  is  preserved  intact  in  this  partial  force.  But  this  alone 
would  remain,  if  suddenly  the  aggregate  were  imagined  to  congeal 
by  the  intercepted  motion  of  its  parts  among  themselves.  Whence 
from  respective  and  directive  taken  together  total  absolute  force  is 
composed.  But  these  things  will  be  better  understood  from  the 
rules  to  be  propounded  below. 

The  ancients,  as  far  as  known,  had  a  science  of  dead  force 
alone,  and  this  it  is  which  is  commonly  called  Mechanics,  treating 
of  the  lever,  block,  inclined  plane  (where  belongs  the  wedge  and  the 
spiral),  the  equilibrium  of  liquids,  and  similar  things,  in  which  they 
treat  in  turn  only  of  the  first  tendency  (conatu)  of  the  bodies  among 
themselves,  before  they  received  an  impulse  by  acting.  And  although 
the  laws  of  dead  force  can  in  some  fashion  be  transferred  to  living 
force,  yet  there  is  need  of  great  caution,  as  even  they  may  have  been 
deceived,  for  this  reason,  who  confounded  force  in  general  with  the 
quantity  i^roduced  by  the  multiplication  of  the  mass  into  the 
velocity,  because  they  understood  that  force  is  dead  in  the  regular 
theory  of  these.  For  this  thing  happens  thei'e  for  a  special  reason, 
as  we  already  long  ago  suggested,  since  (for  example),  in  dif- 
ferent descending  weights,  in  the  very  beginning  of  motion  at 
least  the  descents  themselves  or  the  quantities  of  the  spaces  gone 
through  in  the  descent,  certainly  infinitely  small  or  elementary 
hitherto,  are  proportional  to  the  velocities  or  to  the  efforts  to  descend. 
But  the  progress  being  made  and  living  force  having  arisen,  the 
acquired  velocities  are  no  longer  proportional  to  the  spaces  already 
run  over  in  the  descent,  by  which,  nevertheless,  we  have  shown 
formerly  and  shall  further  show,  that  the  force  must  be  estimated, 
but  only  to  the  elements  of  these  velocities.  Galileo  began  to 
discuss  concerning  living  force  (although  under  another  name,  nay, 
I  should  rather  say,  concept)  and  was  the  first  to  explain  how  by 
the  acceleration  of  descending  weights  motion  arises.  Descartes 
rightly  distinguished  velocity  from  direction,  and  saw  even  in  the 
conflict  of  bodies  that  follow  by  which  the  former  conditions  are 
least  changed.  But  he  did  not  rightly  estimate  tlie  least  change, 
while  he  changes  the  direction  alone  or  the  velocity  alom-.  since 
the  change  moderated  by  mixing  would  be  obtained  troin  lioth: 
but  how  this  must  come  about  escaped  him,  because  to  liini.  intent 
at  that  time  upon  modal  manifestations  rather  tlian  upon  realities, 
phenomena  so  heterogeneous  did  not  seem  capable  of  being  compared 


676  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

and  modified  by  vinioii,  so  that  we  shall   say  no  more  of  his  other 
errors  in  this  doctrine. 

Ilonoratus  Fabri,i  Marcus  Marci,^  Joh.  Alph.  Borellus,^  Ignatius 
Baptista  Pardies,^  and  Claudius  de  Chales,^  and  other  men  very  acute 
in  learning  have  published  things  not  to  be  despised  on  motion,  but 
nevertheless  have  not  shunned  these  capital  errors.  Huygens,^  the 
first  that  I  know  who  has  adorned  our  age  with  splendid  discoveries, 
seems  to  me  in  this  argument  also  to  have  reached  the  pure  and  un- 
adulterated truth  and  to  have  freed  this  doctrine  from  paralogisms, 

1  Cf.  ante,  p.  586,  note  2.  — Tr. 

2  Johaunes  jMarcus  Marei  von  Kronland,  1595-1667,  a  German  physician, 
mathematician,  and  physicist,  published  his  De  proportione  motus,  sen  regida 
sphygmica  ad  celeritatem  et  tarditaterii  ptulsuum,  ex  illins  inotu  pjonderibus 
geometricis  lihrato,  absque  errore  raetiendnm,  PragiE,  1639,  a  remarkable 
•work  on  the  theory  of  imi:)act,  preceding  by  thirty  years  the  researches  of 
Wallis,  Wren,  and  Huygens.  This  is  probably  the  work  to  which  Leibnitz 
here  refers.  —  Tr. 

3  Giovanni  Alfonso  Borelli,  1G08-1G79,  a  distinguished  Italian  physician  and 
mathematician,  the  founder  of  the  iatromathematical  theory  of  medicine,  was 
Professor  of  Mathematics  at  Pisa  and  Naples.  He  was  the  author  of  several 
medical  and  mathematical  works,  among  which  were  Theorica  mediceonnn 
planetarum  ex  causis  physicis  deducta,  Florent.,  16GG;  De  motu  aniinaUiim, 
Eome,  1G80-1G81;  De  vi  percusslonis,  Lugd.  Bat.,  1G8G;  and  De  Motionihas 
naturalihus,  a  gravitate  pendentibus,  Lugd.  Bat.,  1()86.  The  two  latter  works 
are  probably  the  ones  referred  to  by  Leibnitz.  For  an  account  of  his  views, 
cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  AtondstiJc,  Hamburg  u.  Leipzig,  1890,  Vol.  2,  pp.  300-328. 
—  Tr. 

*  Ignace  Gaston  Pardies,  163G-1673,  a  French  Jesuit  and  geometer,  was 
Professor  of  Philosophy,  and  afterwards  of  Mathematics,  at  Paris.  In  his 
correspondence  with  Newton,  he  sought  to  explain  the  dispersion  of  light  as 
a  diffraction  by  aid  of  the  assumption  that  the  transmission  of  light  depends 
upon  a  wave-movement.  He  intended  to  write  a  great  work  on  Mechanics,  of 
which  only  Pts.  1  and  2,  Discoitrs  du  mouvement  local,  Paris,  1670,  and  La 
statique  ou  la  science  des  forces  mouvantes,  Paris,  1673,  appeared.  His  (Euvres 
de  mathematiqiies,  etc.,  4th  ed.,  appeared  a  La  Haye,  1710.  Cf.  Lasswitz, 
Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  340.  Leibnitz  refers  to  Pardies  in  a  communication  to 
H.  Fabri,  rf.  GerhnnU, Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  81,  84;  Gerhardt, 
Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  4,  244,  247.  — Tr. 

5  Claude  Francois  Milliet  Deschales,  1621-1678,  a  French  Jesuit  and  dis- 
tinguished mathematician  and  physicist,  published  his  Cnrsus  sen  mu>idus 
7natheniaticiis,  3  tomi,  1st  ed.,  Lugduni,  1674,  2d  ed.,  1G90.  Leibnitz  refers  to 
him  briefly  in  a  communication  to  H.  Fabri,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz. philos.  Schrift., 
4, .245;  Leibniz,  math.  Srhriff.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  81.  Brief  accoimt  of  his  ^iews 
is  given  in  Lasswitz'  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2, 487—190.  —  Tr. 

6  Cf.  ante,  p.  150,  note  3.  The  doctrine  of  Huygens,  here  referred  to,  is  found 
in  his  De  motu  corporum  ex  percussione  (1()G9),  which  was  first  published  in 
1703 ;  Opera  reliqua,  Amstel.,  1728,  Vol.  2 ;  (Eurres  completes.  La  Haye,  1888  sq. 
His  correspondence  with  Leibnitz  is  found  in  Gerhardt,  I^eibniz.  math.  Schrift., 
I.,  2  [Vol.  2],  1-208.  Eeferences  to  the  doctrine  of  motion  occur  on  pp.  140, 
184.  An  account  of  Huygens'  physical  and  mechanical  views  is  given  in  Lass- 
witz, Gesch.d.  Atomistik,  2,  341-397.  — Tr. 


APPENDIX  677 

by  certain  rules  formerly  published.  Wren  ^  also,  Wallis^  and 
Mariotte,3  men  excellent  in  these  studies  though  diverse  in  method, 
demonstrated  nearly  these  same  rules.  But  concerning  the  causes, 
nevertheless,  opinion  is  not  the  same;  whence  men  distinguished  in 
these  studies  do  not  always  admit  the  same  conclusions.  And  indeed 
the  true  sources  of  this  science  have  not  yet,  as  is  evident,  been  dis- 
closed. Nor  indeed  is  what  seems  certain  to  me  admitted  by  all: 
that  rebounding  or  reflection  springs  only  from  elastic  force,  that  is, 
from  internal  resistance  to  motion.  Nor  has  any  one  before  us  ex- 
plained the  notion  itself  of  forces,  which  thing  hitherto  has  disturbed 
the  Cartesians  and  others,  who,  even  for  this  reason,  could  not  com- 
prehend that  the  sum  of  the  motion  or  impulse  (which  they  regard 
as  the  quantity  of  the  forces)  can  appear  different  after  the  encounter 
from  before,  because  for  this  very  reason  they  believed  the  quantity 
of  the  forces  to  be  changed. 

From  me,  still  a  youth,  and  at  that  time  constituting  the  nature  of 
body,  with  Democritus  and  his  adherents  in  this  nuitter,  (lassendi 
and  Descartes,  in  inert  mass  alone,  there  escaped  a  little  book 
"  Hypothesis  Physica  "  *  by  title,  in  which  I  set  forth  a  theory  of 
motion,  at  the  same  time  abstract  (ahstractam)  from  the  system  and 
concrete  (concretam)  for  the  system,^  which  beyond  the  merit  of  its 

1  Sir  Christopher  Wren,  1031-1723,  best  known  as  the  architect  of  St.  Paul's, 
London,  was  distinguished  at  Oxford  for  liis  knowledge  of  geometry  and 
applied  mathematics.  In  16()0  he  was  elected  Savilian  Professor  of  Astronomy 
at  Oxford.  Newton,  in  his  Principia,  ed.  1713,  p.  19,  speaks  highly  of  his 
work  as  a  geometrician.  Leibnitz  refers  to  liim  in  the  Hypoth.  phy.i.,  cf. 
Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  IL,  2  [Vol.  G],  2G,  29,  30,  75  ;  Phllos.  Sclmff., 
4,  IS",  VM,  191,  2.36.  — Tr. 

2  .Tohn  Wallis,  161G-1703,  an  eminent  English  mathematician,  appointed 
Savilian  Professor  of  Geometry,  at  Oxford,  1649,  publislied  Ids  Mechanica, 
sive  de  Mota  Tructatus  Geometricus,  3  parts,  1669-1671.  His  complete  works 
were  published,  Oxford,  1695-1699,  3  vols.,  fol.  The  correspondence  between 
Leil)iiitz  and  Wallis  is  found  in  Vol.  3  of  this  ed.,  and  also  in  (ierhanlt,  Leibniz. 
math.  Schrift.,  I.,  4  [Vol.  4],  1-82.  — Tr. 

3  Cf.  ante,  p.  121,  note  4.  An  elaborate  treatise  on  the  percussion  of  bodies, 
De  la  percussion  ou  choc  des  corps,  probably  the;  one  to  wliicli  Leibnitz  here 
refers,  is  found  in  first  volume  of  his  (Eavres,  Leydeii,  1717.  —  Tr. 

4  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  SchHft.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  17-SO  ;  Gerliardt,  Leih- 
niz.philos.  Schrift.,  4,  177-240;  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  am.,  2,  PI.  II.,  1-4.S.  — Tr. 

5  The  compressed  and  somewhat  obscure  text  is  explained  by  tlie  titles  of 
two  essays  forming  the  Hypothesis  Physica  nova.  The  title  of  tlie  first  essay 
is :  Theoria  motus  concreti  seu  Hypothesis  de  rationibus  phxnomenoriini  no.stri 
Orbis;  that  of  the  second  is:  Theoria  motus  abstracti  .sen  Rationes  viotiium 
universales  a  sensu  et  phxnmnenis  iyidepcndentes.  Cf.  (ierhardt's  Einh'itiuig, 
Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  4,  9-12,  and  especially  the  porti.m,  (here  (pi.. led,  of 
a  letter  to  Foucher,  found  also  in  op.  cit.,  1,  415 ;  Erdmann,  Leibnit.  op.  philos., 
117  ;  F.  de  Careil,  Lettres  et  Opuscides  imUlils  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  l.sr)4,  1  l'.t-12() ; 
Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  2,  Pt.  I.,  242 ;  transl.  Duncan,  Philos.  Wks.  of  Leibnitz, 
64-65.— Tr. 


678  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

mediocrity  I  see  has  pleased  many  distinguished  men.  I  there  estab- 
lished, ha:k'ing  assumed  such  a  conception  of  body,  the  fact  that  every 
striking  body  gives  its  impulse  (conatuiii)  to  the  receiving  or  dii-ectly 
opposing  body  as  such.  For  since,  in  the  moment  of  attack,  the 
receiving  body  undertakes  to  go  forward  and  thus  run  away  Vvitli 
itself,  and  that  impulse  (on  account  of  the  indifference  then  believed 
by  me  of  the  body  to  motion  or  rest)  must  have  its  effect  wholly  in 
the  receiving  body,  unless  hindered  by  a  contrary  impulse,  nay,  even 
if  hindered  by  it,  since  it  is  so  necessary  that  these  different  impulses 
should  be  adjusted  among  themselves  ;  it  was  manifest  that  no  cause 
could  be  given  why  the  striking  body  should  not  attain  the  effect 
towards  which  it  tends,  or  why  the  receiving  body  should  not  receive 
the  entire  impulse  of  the  striking  body,  and  'so  the  motion  of  the 
receiving  body  was  composed  of  its  own  pristine  imj)ulse,  and  of  the 
newly  received  or  foreign  impulse.  From  which  then  I  was  showing 
that  if  mathematical  notions  alone,  —  magnitude,  figure,  place,  —  and 
the  change  of  these,  or  in  the  moment  itself  of  impact  (^concursus) 
the  impulses  to  change  were  perceived  in  the  body,  no  theory  of  meta- 
physical notions  being  held,  namely,  of  power  active  (actricis)  in  form 
and  of  inactivity  (ignavice),  or  of  resistance  to  motion  in  matter,  and 
so  if  it  were  necessary  for  the  concourse  of  events  to  be  determined 
by  the  geometrical  composition  of  impulses  alone,  as  we  have  ex- 
plained :  then  it  must  follow  that  the  impulse  of  the  striking  body, 
even  the  least,  is  impressed  upon  the  entire  receiving  body,  although 
the  greatest,  and  so  the  greatest  body  at  rest  is  dragged  away  by  the 
striking  body,  however  small,  without  any  retardation  of  this  body, 
since  indeed  no  repugnance,  but  rather  indifference  of  it  to  motion, 
is  contained  in  such  a  notion  of  matter.  Whence  it  would  not  be 
any  more  difficult  to  impel  a  large  quiescent  body  than  a  small  one, 
and  thus  there  would  be  action  withoiit  reaction,  and  there  could  be  no 
estimate  of  power,  since  anything  whatever  could  be  proved  by  any- 
thing whatever.  And  since  these  things,  and  many  others  of  the 
same  kind,  are  opposed  to  the  order  of  things  and  conflict  with  the 
principles  of  a  ti-ue  metaphysic,  I  thought  at  that  time  therefore  (and 
indeed  truly)  that  the  most  wise  Author  of  things  in  the  construction 
of  the  system  shunned  those  things  which  would  follow  of  themselves 
from  the  mere  laws  of  motion  derived  from  pure  geometry. 

But  afterwards,  having  examined  things  more  deeply,  I  saw  in 
what  the  systematic  explanation  of  things  consisted,  and  regarded 
tliat  former  hypothesis  of  the  notion  of  the  body  as  incomplete,  and 
both  by  other  arguments  and  also  by  this  itself  it  was  proved  that  in 
body  there  must  be  placed  something  besides  magnitude  and  impene- 
trability, whence  the  consideration  of  forces  arises,  by  adding  the  met- 
aphysical laws  of  which  to  the  laws  of  extension  those  very  rules  of 
motion  are  produced  which  I  culled  systematic ;  namel}-,  that  every 


APPENDIX  679 


change  takes  place  gradually,  and  eveiy  action  is  accompanied  witli 
reaction,  and  new  force  is  not  produced  without  loss  of  the  former,  and 
so  the  one  dragging  always  is  retarded  by  the  one  dragged,  and  neither 
more  nor  less  power  is  contained  in  the  effect  than  in  the  cause. 
And  since  this  law  is  not  derived  from  the  notion  of  mass,  it  must 
necessarily  follow  from  another  thing,  which  is  in  bodies,  namely, 
from  the  force  itself,  which  certainly  always  preserves  its  own  quaii- 
tity  the  same,  although  it  is  employed  by  different  bodies.  Hence 
therefore,  besides  considerations  purely  mathematical,  and  subject  to 
the  imagination,  I  have  concluded  that  certain  considerations  meta- 
physical, and  perceptible  by  the  mind  alone,  must  be  admitted,  and 
a  certain  principle  superior  to  the  material  mass,  and,  so  to  speak,  a 
formal  addition,  since  indeed  all  the  truths  of  corporeal  things  can- 
not be  concluded  from  logical  and  geometrical  axioms  alone,  namely, 
from  great  and  small,  whole  and  part,  figure  and  position,  but  some 
others  must  be  added  from  cause  and  effect,  and  action  and  passion, 
by  which  the  reasons  of  the  order  of  things  are  saved.  Whether  we 
call  that  principle  form,  or  ivreXex^ia,  or  foi'ce,  does  not  matter,  pro- 
vided we  remember  that  it  is  intelligibly  exhibited  through  the 
notion  of  forces  alone. 

But  although  to-day  certain  distinguished  men,  seeing  this  very 
thing,  that  the  common  notion  indeed  of  matter  is  not  sufficient, 
fetch  in  God  dwo  jU.-»^;^ai/^9,  and  take  away  all  force  of  acting  from 
things,  a  kind  of  Mosaic  philosophy  as  it  were  (as  Fhidd  once  called 
it),  I  cannot  assent.  For  although  I  admit  that  it  has  been  very 
cleaiiy  perceived  by  them  that  there  is  no  proper  influx  of  one  cre- 
ated substance  into  another,  if  the  thing  is  driven  to  metapiiysical 
strictness,  and  I  confess  even  freely  that  all  things  always  proceed 
from  a  continuous  creation  by  God;  yet  I  think  there  is  no  natural 
truth  in  things,  the  reason  of  which  is  to  be  sought  inunediatcly  in 
the  divine  action  or  will,  but  that  always  in  the  tilings  themselves 
something  has  been  placed  by  God,  wlience  all  their  predicates  are 
explained.  It  is  certainly  evident  tliat  God  has  created  not  only 
bodies,  but  also  souls,  to  which  correspond  the  primitive  entelecliies. 
But  these  things  will  be  demonstrated  elsewhere  by  their  own  ju-oper 
reasons  more  profoundly  drawn  out. 

Meanwhile^  although  F  admit  an  active  principle  superior  to  ?na(('- 
rial  notions  and,  so  to  speak,  vital  everywhere  in  bodies,  yet  I  do  not 
therefore  here  agree  with  Henry  More  and  other  men,  distinguished 
for  piety  and  genius,  who  so  make  use  of  a  certain  Arch;eus  '  or  iiylar- 
chic  principle  even  for  tlie  management  of  phenomena  (ml  plifrnomrnn 
procuranda),  as  if  forsooth  all  things  cannot  be  explained  mccliani- 
cally  in  nature,  and  as  if  those  who  undertake  this  seem  to  make  way 

1  Cf.  New  Essai/ft,  ante,  p.  07,  note  .'?.  —  Tu. 


680  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

with  incorporeal  things,  not  without  suspicion  of  impiety ;  or  as  if 
with  Aristotle  it  is  necessary  to  imagine  intelligences  in  the  revolving 
orbs,  or  the  elements  must  be  said  to  be  driven  up  or  down  by  their 
own  form,  by  a  short  (compendlosn)  but  useless  method  of  teaching : 
with  these,  I  say,  I  do  not  agree,  nor  has  that  philosoi^hy  pleased  me 
any  more  than  that  theology  of  certain  ones,  who  so  believed  that 
Jupiter  thundered  or  snowed  that  they  even  branded  the  searchers 
after  proper  causes  with  the  crime  of  atheism.  In  my  ojainion  the 
temperament  is  the  best  which  satisfies  both  piety  and  science,  so 
that  we  admit  that  all  corporeal  phenomena  indeed  can  be  sought 
from  efficient  mechanical  causes,  but  we  know  that  the  mechanical 
laws  in  the  universe  are  derived  from  higher  reasons,  and  so  we  make 
use  of  a  higher  efficient  cause  only  in  establishing  general  and  remote 
things.  But  these  once  established,  as  often  as  afterwards  we  treat 
of  the  near  and  special  efficient  causes  of  natural  things,  we  give 
no  place  to  souls  or  entelechies,  no  more  than  to  the  idle  faculties 
or  inexplicable  sympathies,  since  the  primal  and  most  universal 
efficient  cause  itself,  must  not  intervene  unless  as  far  as  the  ends 
are  regarded,  which  the  divine  wisdom  had  in  so  ordering  things, 
that  we  neglect  no  occasion  of  singing  his  praise  and  the  most  beau- 
tiful hymns. 

And  in  truth  final  causes  (as  I  have  shown  by  a  wholly  remarkable 
example  of  an  optical  principle,  with  the  strong  approval  of  the  very 
celebrated  Molyneux  in  his  "  Dioptrics  ")  are  repeatedly  emjoloyed 
with  large  result  even  in  sjiecial  j^hysics,  not  only  that  we  may  admire 
the  more  the  most  beautiful  works  of  the  supreme  Author,  but  also 
that  we  may  sometimes  in  this  way  divine  what  through  the  way  of 
efficient  causes  not  equally  or  only  hypothetically  are  manifest.  Thus 
far  perhaps  philosophers  have  not  yet  sufficiently  observed  this  use. 
And  it  must  be  maintained  in  general,  that  everything  in  things  can 
be  explained  in  two  ways :  through  the  kingdom  of  power  or  efficient 
causes,  and  through  the  Ungdom  of  loisdom  or  through  final  causes ; 
God  regulating  bodies  as  machines  after  the  manner  of  an  architect 
according  to  the  laws  of  magnitude  or  mathematical  laws,  and  indeed 
for  the  use  of  souls  ;  but  souls,  capable  of  wisdom,  as  his  own  fellow- 
citizens  and  sharers  of  a  certain  society  with  himself,  after  the  manner 
of  a  leader,  nay  of  a  father  rather  according  to  the  laws  of  goodness 
or  moral  laws  for  his  own  glory,  both  kingdoms  everywhere  inter- 
penetrating, yet  unconfused  and  undisturbed  the  laws  of  each, 
so  that  at  the  same  time  both  in  the  kingdom  of  power  the  great- 
est and  in  the  kingdom  of  wisdom  the  best  is  obtained.  But  we 
propose  in  this  place  to  establish  the  general  rules  of  productive 
forces,  which  we  can  then  use  in  the  explanation  of  special  efficient 
causes. 

Next  I  came  to  the  true,  and  indeed  precisely  the  same,  estimate 


APPENDIX  G81 


of  forces,  by  the  most  different  ways :  one  indeed  a  priori,  from  the 
simplest  consideration  of  space,  time,  and  action  (which  1  elsewhere 
will  explain),  the  other  a  posteriori,  namely,  by  estimating  the  force 
by  the  effect  which  it  produces  in  consuming  itself.  For  I  under- 
stand here  not  any  effect,  but  that  for  which  force  must  be  expended 
or  in  which  it  must  be  consumed,  which  you  can  call,  for  that  reason, 
violent,  such  as  that  effect  is  not,  which  a  heavy  body  employs  in  run- 
ning through  a  perfectly  horizontal  plane,  because  in  such  an  eifect 
however  produced  it  always  retains  the  same  force,  although  also  in 
this  very  effect  rightly  treated,  so  to  speak,  as  Jiarmless,  we  have  followed 
this  our  method  of  estimating,  but  now  it  is  laid  aside  by  us.  Further 
I  chose  that  effect  of  the  violent  effects  which  is  especially  capable  of 
homogeneity  or  division  into  similar  and  equal  parts,  such  as  exists 
in  the  ascent  of  a  body  possessed  of  weight :  for  the  elevation  of  a 
heavy  body  two  or  three  feet  is  precisely  double  or  triple  the  eleva- 
tion of  the  same  heavy  body  one  foot ;  and  the  elevation  of  a  doubly 
heavy  body  one  foot  is  precisely  double  the  elevation  of  a  single 
heavy  body  to  the  height  of  one  foot;  whence  the  elevation  of  a 
doubly  heavy  body  three  feet  is  precisely  six  times  the  elevation  of 
a  simple  heavy  body  one  foot,  supposing  namely  (at  least  for  the 
sake  of  teaching,  although  perhaps  in  truth  the  matter  is  otherwise 
constituted,  but  the  error  here  nevertheless  is  impercei^tible),  that 
the  heavy  bodies  gravitate  equally  in  the  greater  or  less  distance 
from  the  horizon.  For  in  an  elastic  body  homogeneity  has  not  with 
equal  ease  a  place.  When  therefore  I  wished  to  compare  bodies 
different  or  endowed  with  different  velocities,  I  easily  saw  tliat,  if 
the  body  A  is  single  and  the  body  B  is  double,  but  the  velocity  of 
each  equal,  the  force  of  that  one  is  simple,  of  this  double,  since,  in 
short,  whatever  is  placed  in  that  once  is  placed  in  this  twice.  For  in 
B  there  is  a  body  twice  the  equal  and  equivalent  of  A  itself,  and 
nothing  besides.  But  if  the  bodies  A  and  C  are  equal,  but  the 
velocity  in  A  is  simple  and  in  C  double,  I  saw  that,  not  in  short  wiiat 
is  in  A,  is  doiibled  in  C,  since  the  velocity  indeed  is  doubled,  yet  not 
also  the  body.  And  I  saw  that  here  an  error  has  been  made  by  those 
who  believed  that  the  force  itself  is  doul)led  by  that  redu])lication  of 
modality  {modalitatis)  alone;  as  already  1  once  observed  aud  sug- 
gested, and  that  the  true  and  not  hitherto  (although  after  so  many 
Elements  of  universal  Mathematics  have  ])een  written)  liandcd-dowii 
art  of  estimating  consists  in  this,  that  finally  it  attains  to  somctliing 
homogeneous;  that  is,  a  reduplication  accurate  and  of  all  kinds,  not 
only  of  modes,  but  also  of  things.  Of  which  method  \w  otlicr  licttcr 
or  more  remarkable  specimen  could  be  given  than  that  wliicli  is 
exhibited  in  this  argument  itself. 

In   order,  therefore,  to  obtain  these   results,  I  considered  wlidhcr 
these  very  two  bodies  A  and  C,  equal  in  magnitude  Imt  different  in 


lAl 


G82  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

velocity,  could  produce  some  effects  equal  to  their  causes  and  homo- 
geneous among  themselves.  For  thus  those  things  which  by  them- 
selves could  not  easily  be  compared,  by  their  effects  at  least  might  be 

compared    accurately.      I   assumed, 

P  E  moreover,   that  the   effect  must  be 

[  ^x  equal  to  its  cause  if  it  is  produced 

\  !        """s.  by  the  expenditui'e  or  consumption 

\  I  ""^^  =  C     of  the  entire  force :    in  which  case 

\  !  ^V       it  matters  not  in  how  much  time  it 

\^;A    I  y   I         is  produced.     Let  us  suppose,  there- 

|-J>-L.-rrfll__(5-'----'-- -!         fore,  the  bodies  A  and  C  (Fig.  .5) 

H      ^Q  R        to  V>e  heavy,   and  to   convert  their 

•p       K  force  into  an  ascent,  which  will  hap- 

pen, if  at  the  moment  in  which  they 
have  their  said  velocities,  A  simjile,  B  double,  are  known  to  exist  at 
the  extremities  of  the  vertical  pendulums  PA^  EC.  But  it  is  evident 
from  the  demonstrations  of  Galileo  and  others  that,  the  body  A  with 
a  velocity  as  1  at  the  highest  ascending  above  the  horizon  HR  to 
the  height  of  one  foot  ^A  H,  the  body  C  with  a  velocity  as  2  can  surely 
ascend  (at  the  highest)  to  the  height  ^CR  of  four  feet.  Whence  it 
alread}^  follows  that  a  heavy  body  having  a  velocity  as  2  is  in  power 
four  times  as  much  as  the  one  having  a  degree  of  velocity  as  1,  since  by 
the  expenditure  of  all  its  force  it  can  accomplish,  in  short,  four  times 
as  much.  For  raising  a  pound  (that  is,  itself  —  id  est  se  ipxum)  four 
feet,  in  short  raises  four  times  one  pound  one  foot.  And  in  the 
same  manner  it  is  inferred  generally  that  the  forces  of  equal  bodies 
are  as  the  squares  of  the  velocities,  and  thence  the  forces  of  bodies 
in  general  are  in  reason  composed  of  the  simple  of  the  bodies  and  the 
doubles  of  the  velocities. 

I  have  confirmed  the  same  things  to  absurdity  (namely,  to  per- 
petual motion)  by  bringing  back  the  contrai'v  opinion,  generally 
received,  especially  among  the  Cartesians,  according  to  which  forces 
are  believed  to  be  in  reason  composed  of  bodies  and  velocities  :  wliich 
method,  indeed,  I  used  repeatedly  to  define  a  posteriori  two  states  unequal 
in  force,  and  to  distinguish  the  greater  at  the  same  time  from  the  less 
by  a  certain  mark.  And  since  in  substituting  the  one  for  the  other, 
perpetual  mechanical  motion  or  an  effect  more  powerful  than  the 
cause  does  not  arise,  those  states  are  not  in  the  least  equivalent  to 
themselves,  but  that  which  was  substituted  for  the  other  was  more 
powerful  because  it  has  caused  something  greater  to  be  performed. 
But  I  assume  as  certain  that  nature  never  substitutes  things  unequal 
to  the  forces  themselves,  but  the  complete  effect  is  always  equal  to 
tlie  full  cause ;  and,  in  turn,  those  things  which  are  equal  to  the 
forces,  with  safe  reckoning  can  be  substituted  by  us  for  them  with 
the  freest  supposition,  as  if  we  made  that  substitution  in  act,  and  thus 


APPENDIX  683 


with  no  fear  ^  of  perpetual  mechanical  motion.  But  if,  therefore,  it 
were  true,  as  men  generally  persuade  themselves,  that  a  heavy  body 
^  as  2  (for  so  now  we  assume  it)  endowed  with  a  velocity  as  1,  and 
a  heavy  body  C  as  1  endowed  with  a  velocity  as  2,  are  equivalent  to 
each  other,  we  ought  to  be  able  to  substitute  with  impunity  the  one 
for  the  other.  But  this  is  not  true.  For  let  us  assume  that  A  as  2 
has  acquired  a  velocity  as  1  in  the  descent  ^A^A  from  the  height  ,.4// 
less  than  a  foot ;  and  now  in  ^A  itself  or  in  the  existing  horizon,  let 
us  substitute  instead  of  it  the  equivalent  (as  they  wish)  weight 
(pondus)  C  as  1  with  a  velocity  as  2,  whicli  ascends  as  far  as  to  C,  or 
to  the  height  of  four  feet.  And  so  by  the  descent  alone  of  the  weight 
A  of  two  pounds  from  the  height  of  one  foot  .2^H,  and  having  sub- 
stituted its  equivalent,  we  have  accomplished  the  ascent  of  one  pound 
four  feet,  which  is  double  the  former.  Therefore  we  have  gained 
just  as  much  force,  or  we  have  j^roduced  perpetual  medumical  mo- 
tion, which  is  certainly  absurd.  And  it  does  not  matter  vvliether  by 
the  laws  of  motions  we  can  actually  accomplish  this  substitution; 
for  between  equivalents  indeed  substitution  can  safely  be  made. 
Although,  indeed,  Ave  have  thought  out  various  plans  by  wliicli  it 
will  be  accomplished  actually  so  nearly  as  we  wish,  that  the  entire 
force  of  the  body  A  will  be  transferred  to  the  body  C,  before  at  rest, 
but  which  now  (^4  itself  being  brought  to  rest)  is  alone  put  in  motion. 
Whence  it  will  happen,  that,  instead  of  a  weight  of  two  pounds  of  a 
velocity  as  1,  would  succeed  one  pound  of  a  velocity  as  2,  if  these 
were  equivalent;  whence  we  have  shown  that  an  absurdity  arises. 
For  these  things  are  not  indeed  worthless,  nor  do  they  consist  in 
logomachies,  but  are  of  the  greatest  use  in  comparing  machines  and 
motions.  For  if  any  one  has  force  from  water  or  animals  or  from 
other  cause,  by  which  a  heavy  body  of  a  hundred  pounds  is  kept  in 
constant  motion,  so  that  within  a  fom-th  part  of  a  minute  of  time 
it  can  complete  a  horizontal  circle  of  a  diameter  of  thirty  feet;  but 
another  maintains  that  a  double  weight  in  its  place,  in  the  same 
time,  uniformly  accomplishes  only  half  the  circle  with  less  expendi- 
ture, and  reckons  that  to  you  as  if  it  were  a  gain  ;  be  it  known  tliat 
you  are  deceived  and  caught  by  half  of  the  forces.  But  now  having 
put  to  flight  errors,  let  us  set  forth  a  little  more  distinctly  in  the 
second  part  of  this  hastily  tin-own-off  production  (Schediasmatis)  the 
true  and  truly  to  be  admired  laws  of  nature. ^ 

1  Gerhardt  reads,  "  motu,"  evidently  a  typographical  (irror.  Diitoiis,  Leihnit. 
op.  om.,  3,  324,  reads,  "  metu,"  which  the  triuislatioii  follows.  —Tk. 

2Duteus  {Leibnit.  op.  om.,  3,  .3'24)  adds:  "  proponeiims,  inciise  Maio  cxhi- 
benda,"  i.e.  to  be  presented  in  the  month  of  May.  TIk;  articli!,  liowover,  never 
appeared  in  print,  but  remained  in  Ms.  among  Leibnitz's  papers,  antl  was  first 
printed  by  Gerhardt.  in  liis  edition  of  Lc'il)nil/,'s  mathematical  writiugs.  A 
translation  of  the  article  is  heruwiUi  givcu.  —  Tii. 


684  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


ESSAY  ON  dyna:\itcs  in  defence  of  the  wonder- 
ful LAWS  OF  NATURE  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  FORCES 
of  BODIES,  DISCLOSING  THEIR  MUTUAL  ACTIONS 
AND   REFERRING   THEM   TO   THEIR   CAUSES  i 

[From  the  Latin] 

Part  II 

The  nature  of  body,  nay,  of  substance  in  general,  not  being  suffi- 
ciently known,  had  brought  it  about  (a  fact  we  have  already  touched 
upon)  that  certain  distinguished  philosophers  of  our  time,  since  they 
placed  the  notion  of  body  in  extension  alone,  wei'e  compelled  to  have 
recourse  to  ^od  in  order  to  explain  the  union  between  the  soul  and 
the  body,  nay,  also,  the  communication  of  bodies  with  each  other. 
For  it  must  be  confessed  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  mere  extension, 
involving  only  geometrical  notions,  to  be  capable  of  action  and 
passion :  and  so  this  alone  seemed  to  be  left  to  them,  that,  when  man 
thinks  and  undertakes  to  move  his  arm,  God,  as  it  were,  by  a  primeval 
compact,  moves  his  arm  instead  of  he  himself ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
when  the  motion  exists  in  the  blood  and  spirits,^  God  excites  percep- 
tion in  the  mind.  But  these  very  things,  since  they  are  foreign  to  a 
cori'ect  method  of  philosophizing,  ought  to  admonish  the  authors  that 
they  are  resting  upon  a  false  principle,  and  that  they  have  not  assigned 
rightly  the  notion  of  body,  from  which  such  things  followed.  We 
have  shown,  therefore,  that  there  is  in  every  substance  a  force  of 
action  and,  if  it  is  created,  of  passion  also,  that  the  notion  of  extension 
is  in  itself  not  complete,  but  that  a  relation  to  something  which  is 
extended,  whose  diffusion  or  continued  replication  it  makes  known, 
and  so  the  substance  of  a  body  is  presupposed,  which  involves  a  power 
of  acting  and  resisting,  and  everyv^^here  exists  as  a  corporeal  mass, 
and  the  diffusion  of  this  is  involved  in  extension.  Whence  one  day 
we  shall  kindle  a  new  light,  also,  for  the  explanation  of  the  union  of 
the  soul  and  the  bod3^  But  now  we  must  show  how  from  thence 
follow  wonderful  and  extremely  useful  practical  theorems,  pertaining 
to  Dynamics,  that  is,  the  science  which  teaches  the  rules  especially  of 
corporeal  forces. 

It  must  be  known  before  all  things  that  force,  indeed,  is  some- 
thing truly  real,  even  in  created  substances ;  but  spiace,  time,  and 
motion  have  something  of  a  rational  entity,  and  are  true  and  real, 

iGerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  G],  pp.  2-1G-254;  aus  d. 
Manuscript,  der  Kouigl.  Biblioth.  zu  Hannover. 

2  Cf.  Bacon's  theory  of  the  Spirifus,  a  brief  account  of  which  is  given  by 
Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  1,  431-432.  —  Tr. 


APPENDIX  685 

not  of  themselves,  but  since  they  involve  divine  attributes,  —  im- 
mensity, eternity,  operation,  or  the  force  of  created  substances.  Hence 
it  already  follows  that  there  is  no  vacuum  in  space  or  time;  that 
motion,  moreover,  separated  from  force,  or  where  in  it  only  the  geo- 
metrical notions,  —  magnitude,  figm-e,  — and  the  variation  of  these 
are  considered,  is  in  truth  nothing  else  than  a  change  of  position,  and 
so  motion,  as  far  as  (quoad)  jjhenoinena  are  concerned,  consists  in  a  mere 
relation,  which  also  Descartes  acknowledged,  when  he  defined  transla- 
tion from  the  neighborhood  of  one  body  into  the  neighborhood  of 
another.  But  in  deducing  his  consecpiences  he  forgot  his  deiinition, 
and  determined  the  rules  of  motions  as  if  motion  was  something  real 
and  absolute.  So,  therefore,  we  must  consider,  if  an  indefinite  num- 
ber of  bodies  are  in  motion,  that  from  the  phenomena  it  cannot  be 
deduced  in  which  of  them  absolute  determinate  motion  or  rest  exists, 
but  to  any  one  you  please  taken  from  these  can  be  attributed  rest, 
provided  that  the  same  phenomena  come  forth.  Hence  it  follows 
(a  result  which  Descartes  did  not  notice)  that  the  uniformity  of  the 
hypotheses  is  changed  neither  by  the  encounters  (coticursus)  of  bodies  loith 
each  other;  and  besides,  that  such  rules  of  motions  must  be  assigned 
that  the  respective  nature  of  motion  may  remain  intact,  nor  from  the 
event  after  the  encounter  can  it  be  divined  through  the  i^henomena 
where  before  the  encounter  there  had  been  rest  or  determinate  abso- 
lute motion.  "Whence  the  rule  of  Descartes  does  not  at  all  accord 
with  the  facts,  by  which  he  asserts  that  a  body  at  rest  can  in  no  way 
be  driven  from  its  place  by  another  smaller  body,  and  other  things  of 
this  sort.  Than  which  nothing  is  more  remote  from  the  truth.  It 
follows,  also,  from  the  relative  nature  of  motion,  that  the  action  of 
bodies  against  each  other  by  turns  or  percussion  is  the  same,  provided  they 
approacJi  each  other  ivith  the  same  velocity ;  that  is,  the  same  appearance 
remaining  in  the  given  phenomena,  whatever  at  length  be  the  true 
hypothesis,  or  to  whichever  at  length  we  rightly  ascribe  motion  or 
rest,  the  same  event  appears  in  the  phenomena  sought  or  resulting, 
even  in  respect  to  the  action  of  bodies  among  themselves.  And  this 
also  is  what  we  find  by  experience  (experimur),  that  we  shall  feel  the; 
same  pain,  whether  our  hand  runs  against  a  stone  at  rest,  sus])en(li'(l, 
if  you  please,  from  a  thread,  or  the  stone  with  tlie  same  vehjcity  runs 
against  our  hand  at  rest.  Meanwhile,  we  speak  thus,  according  as 
the  thing  demands,  for  a  more  suitable  and  sim])l('r  exjjlanation  of 
the  phenomena,  precisely  as  in  spherics  we  employ  the  motion  of  tlic. 
primum  mobile,  and  in  the  theory  of  the  planets  we  iiuist  use  the 
Copernican  hypothesis,  so  that  already  these  disputes,  urged  on  with 
so  nmch  effort  (in  which  even  theologians  were  implicated),  straight- 
way disappear.  For  although  force  is  something  real  and  absoluti-, 
nevertheless  motion  pertains  to  the  class  of  relative  phenomena,  and 
truth  is  looked  for  not  so  much  in  phenomena  as  in  causes. 


080  LEIBNITZ'S   CUITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

From  our  notions  also  of  body  and  forces  this  principle  arises,  that 
what  happens  in  substance  can  he  knotvn  to  happen  spontaneously  and  in 
an  orderly  manner.  With  this  is  connected  the  principle  that  no 
change  takes  place  by  a  leap.     This  posited,  it  follows  also  that  atoms 

cannot  be  allowed.     That  we  may  seize  the 

J  A  oA  „B  jB      force  of  this  conclusion,  let   us   assume 

I     I  r    ^  r^    that  the  bodies  A  and  B  (Fig.  6)  meet 

A^  y.  B     together  and  that  ^A  comes  to  2^5  and 

'     ^^   '     ^^ again  jZ>  to  ^B,  and  thus  meeting  in  g-^jS 

I'lci.  0.  are   reflected  from  2^   to  ^A   and  from 

^B  to  gB.  But  supposing  that  atoms 
exist,  that  is,  bodies  extremely  hard  and  thus  inflexible,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  change  takes  place  by  a  leap  jov  momentary  incre- 
ment (motnentaneam),  for  direct  motion  in  the  moment  {inornento') 
itself  of  the  encounter  becomes  retrograde  unless  we  can  assume  that 
immediately  after  the  encounter  the  bodies  rest,  that  is,  lose  their 
force,  which  thing,  besides  the  fact  that  it  would  otherwise  be  absurd, 
would  continue  again  the  change  by  a  leap,  a  momentary  increment 

(^momentaneam) ,  namely,  from  motion  to 
rest,  and  not  however  a  transition  by 
intermediate  steps.  And  so  we  must 
know,  if  the  bodies  A  and  B  (Fig.  7) 
meet  and  come  from  ^A-^B  into  the  place 
jTjQ.  7_  of   concourse  0A.2B,  that  there   they  are 

gradually  compressed  like  two  inflated 
balls,  and  more  and  more  approach  each  other  in  turn  by  the  con- 
tinually increased  pressure ;  that,  moreover,  by  this  thing  the  motion 
itself  is  weakened,  the  force  itself  of  the  effort  being  carried  over 
into  the  elasticities  (elastra)  of  the  bodies,  until  at  length  they  are 
reduced  to  rest ;  but  then  at  length  the  elasticity  of  the  bodies 
restoring  them,  they  themselves  rebound  from  each  other  in  turn 
with  a  retrograde  motion  begun  again  from  rest  and  continually 
increasing ;  at  length  with  the  same  velocity  with  which  they  ap- 
proached each  other,  regained  but  turned  in  the  opposite  direction, 
they  recede  in  turn  from  each  other  and  return  into  the  positions 
g^^/j  which  coincide  with  the  positions  lA^B,  if  the  bodies  are  supposed 
equal  and  of  equal  velocity.  Thence  it  is  already  evident  how  no 
change  takes  place  by  a  leap,  but  the  progress  being  gradually  dimin- 
ished and  at  length  reduced  to  rest,  then  at  length  a  regress  arises. 
So  that  as  from  one  figure  another  is  not  made  (as  from  a  circle  an 
oval)  unless  through  innumerable  intermediate  figures,  nor  is  there 
any  passing  over  from  a  place  to  a  place  or  from  a  time  to  a  time 
unless  through  all  intermediate  places  and  times,  so  not  from  motion 
is  rest  produced,  and  much  less  an  opposite  motion,  unless  througln 
all  the  intermediate    degrees  of  motions.     And  since  this  principle 


APPENDIX  687 

is  of  so  great  consequence  in  nature,  I  wonder  it  is  so  little  thought 
of.  From  these  considerations  follows  what  Descartes  had  attacked 
in  his  letters,  and  now  also  certain  great  men  are  unwilling  to  admit, 
that  all  rejlection  arises  from  elasticihj,  and  a  reason  is  given  of  many 
remarkable  experiments  which  indicate  that  a  body  bends  before  it  is 
propelled,  as  Mariotte  has  very  beautifully  illustrated.  Finally,  that 
especially  wonderful  principle  follows  from  these  considerations,  that 
no  body  is  so  poor  but  that  it  has  elasticity,  and  so  is  pervaded  by 
a  fluid  still  more  subtile ;  and  then  that  there  are  no  elements  of  bodies, 
and  that  neither  the  most  fluid  matter  nor  certain  solid  globules  of 
the  second  element,  exact  and  durable,  are  to  be  granted,  but  that 
analysis  proceeds  to  infinity. 

It  is  consistent  with  this  law  of  continuity,  excluding  leap  from 
change,  that  a  case  of  rest  can  be  considered  as  a  special  case  of 
motion,  namely,  as  an  evanescent  or  very  small  motion,  and  a  case 
of  equality  can  be  considered  as  a  case  of  evanescent  inequality. 
Whence  the  consequence  is,  that  such  laws  of  motions  must  be 
assigned  that  there  be  no  need  for  peculiar  rules  for  bodies  equal 
and  at  rest,  but  these  rules  spring  from  the  rules  of  bodies  unequal 
and  moving  of  themselves,  or,  if  we  wish  to  enounce  peculiar  rules 
for  rest  and  equality,  we  must  be  careful  lest  we  assign  such  as  do 
not  agree  with  the  hypothesis  which  considers  rest  as  the  last  motion 
or  equality  as  the  last  inequality,  otherwise  we  shall  violate  the 
harmony  of  things  and  our  rules  will  not  agree  among  tliemselves. 
This  new  system  of  testing  our  own  or  others'  rules,  T  published  first 
in  the  "Nouvelles  de  la  Republique  des  Lettres,"  July,  1087,  article 
8,1  and  called  it  a  general  principle  of  order  (prinripium  ordinis  gen- 
erale),  springing  from  the  notion  of  the  infinite  and  the  continuum, 
adding  to  it  the  axiom,  that  from  orderly  data  the  results  also  are 
orderly  (datis  ordinatis  etiam  qucesita  sunt  ordinata).  I  expressed  the 
principle  universally  thus  :  If  a  case  approaches  a  case  continually  in 
the  data  and  at  lenrjth  disappears  in  itself,  the  results  of  the  cases  7nust 
also  approach  each  other  continually  in  the  things  sought  for,  and  at  length 
cease  in  turn  in  themselves.  {Si  casus  ad  casum  continue  accedat  in  datis 
tandemque  in  ipsum  evanescat,  necesse  est  ut  etiam  eventus  casuum  sibi  con- 
tinue accedant  in  qucesitis  tandemque  in  se  invicem  desinant.)  Precisely 
as  in  geometry  the  case  of  the  ellipse  approaches  continually  the  ca.se 
of  the  parabola,  in  proportion  as  one  focus  remaining  anotJier  more 
and  more  remote  is  regarded  as  assumed,  until  in  the  case  of  anotlier 
focus  infinitely  removed  tlie  ellipse  passes  into  the  parabola.  "Wlicncc 
all  the  rules  of  the  ellipse  must  be  verified  in  the  ])arabola  (lakcn  a.s 
an  ellipse  whose  other  focus  is  infinitely  distant).  Wlience  tlie  radii 
falling  parallel  into  a  parabola  can   be  conceived  as  coming  from 

1  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schri/t.,  .'5,  .'Jl-SS;  Enlmann,  101   KM'..  -  Tk. 


088  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

another  focus  or  tending  towards  it.  Since,  therefore,  in  the  same 
way  a  case  in  which  tlie  body  A  runs  against  B  in  motion  can  be 
varied  continually,  so  that  the  motion  of  A  itself  remaining,  the 
motion  of  B  itself  is  regarded  as  less  and  less,  until  at  length  it  is 
regarded  as  disappearing  in  rest  and  thence  again  grows  in  the  con- 
trar)^  direction ;  I  say  the  result  of  the  attack,  but  rebounding  into 
what  whether  in  A  itseK  or  in  B  itself,  continually  appi'oaches  by 
both  motions  the  result  of  the  attack  which  exists  in  the  case  of  B  at 
rest,  and  in  it  finally  ceases ;  and  thus  the  case  of  rest  both  in  the 
data  (m  datis)  and  in  the  result  or  that  which  is  sought  (^qucesitis)  is 
the  limit  of  the  cases  of  motion  in  a  straight  line,  or  the  com^mon 
limit  of  direct  and  continuous  motion,  and  thus  as  it  were  a  special 
example  of  either.  With  regard  to  this  touchstone  {lydium  lapidem), 
brought  over  by  me  from  geometry  to  physics,  when  I  examined  the 
Cartesian  rules  of  motions,  it  haj)pened,  wonderful  to  say,  that  a  cer- 
tain hiatus  or  leap  showed  itself  utterly  abhorrent  to  the  nature  of 
things,  for  in  expressing  quantities  by  lines,  and  taking  for  abscissas 
(pro  ahscissis)  the  motions  of  B  itself  before  the  encounter,  the  data, 
and  for  ordinates  (pro  ordinathn  applicatis)  the  motion  of  the  same 
after  the  encounter,  the  results  sought  for,  and  by  drawing  the  line 
through  the  extremities  of  the  ordinates  (ordinatarum),  according  to 
the  precept  of  the  rules  of  Descartes,  this  line  was  not  a  continuum, 
but  something  wonderfully  gaping  and  leaping  in  a  certain  absurd 
and  unthinkable  manner.  And  when  on  that  occasion  I  observed  also 
that  the  rules  of  Rev.  Father  Malebranche  did  not  bear  this  examina- 
tion in  all  things,  the  distinguished  man  having  considered"  the  matter 
again  according  to  his  candor,  declared  publicly  that  from  this  an 
occasion  had  arisen  for  him  to  change  his  rules,  for  which  reason, 
also,  he  published  a  brief  pamphlet.  Although  it  must  be  confessed, 
that  because  he  had  not  yet  directed  his  attention  sufficiently  to  the 
use  of  this  new  system,  he  has  left  something  now  also  not  yet  suffi- 
ciently in  all  things  complete  (quadrant). 

From  what  has  been  said,  this  wonderful  principle  also  follows, 
that  the  passion  of  every  body  is  spontaneous,  or  arises  from  internal  force, 
although  upon  external  occasion.  I  understand  here,  however,  passion 
proper,  which  arises  from  percussion,  or  which  remains  the  same, 
whatever  hypothesis  at  length  is  assigned,  or  to  whatever  at  length 
we  ascribe  absolute  rest  or  motion.  For  since  the  percussion  is  the 
same,  to  whatever  at  length  true  motion  corresponds,  it  follows  that 
the  resvdt  of  the  percussion  is  distributed  equally  between  botli,  and 
thus  hath  act  equally  in  the  encounter,  and  thus  half  the  result  arises 
from  the  action  of  the  one,  the  other  half  from  the  action  of  the  other; 
and  since  half,  also,  of  the  result  or  passion  is  in  one,  half  in  the  other, 
it  is  sufficient  that  we  derive  the  passion  which  is  in  one  from  the 
action  also  which  is  in  itself,  and  we  need  no  influence  of  the  one  upon 


APPENDIX  689 


the  other,  although  by  the  action  of  one  an  occasion  is  furnished  the 
other  for  producing  a  change  in  itself.  Certainly,  while  .4  and  B 
meet,  the  resistance  of  the  bodies,  united  with  their  elasticity,  causes 
them  to  be  compressed  because  of  the  percussion,  and  the  conipression 
is  equal  in  each  and  according  to  whatever  hypothesis,  as  the  experi- 
ments show  also,  if  any  one  conceives  two  inflated  balls  to  meet,  whether 
both  are  in  motion,  or  each  is  at  rest,  even  if  the  one  at  rest  be  sus- 
pended from  some  thread,  in  order  that  it  may  most  easily  recede ; 
for,  always  provided  the  velocity  of  approach  or  the  respective  velocity 
be  the  same,  the  compression,  or  the  intensity  of  the  elasticity,  will  be 
the  same  and  equal  in  both.  Then  the  balls  A  and  B,  restorino-  them- 
selves by  the  force  of  their  own  violent,  namely,  compressed  and  con- 
fined, elasticity,  mutually  repel  each  other  by  turns,  and  spread  out, 
as  it  were,  in  an  arc,  and,  with  a  force  equal  on  both  sides,  each  is 
driven  back  by  the  other,  and  so,  not  by  the  force  of  the  other,  but  by 
its  own  force,  it  recedes  from  that  one.  But  what  is  to  be  understood 
in  the  case  of  inflated  balls  is  to  be  understood  in  the  case  of  every 
body  so  far  as  it  is  passive  in  percussion,  namely,  that  the  rebounding 
and  leaping  apart  arises  from  the  elasticity  in  itself,  that  is,  from  the 
motion  of  the  permeating  etherial  fluid  matter,  and  thus  from  force 
internal,  or  proceeding  from  within.  I  understand,  however,  as  I  have 
said,  that  the  proper  motion  of  bodies  is  separated  from  the  common, 
which  can  be  ascribed  to  the  centre  of  gravity ;  whence  their  proper 
motion  is  so  to  be  conceived  (to  be  conceived,  I  say,  by  the  way  of 
hypothesis)  as  if  they  were  produced  on  board  a  ship,  which  would 
have  the  motion  of  their  common  centre  of  gravity,  but  they  them- 
selves on  board  ship  were  so  moved  that  from  the  composite  common 
motion  of  the  ship  or  centre,  and  their  own  proper  motion,  tlie 
phenomena  are  preserved.  From  what  has  been  said,  also,  it  is  under- 
stood that  the  action  of  bodies  is  never  loilhout  reaction,  and  both  are  eijual 
to  each  other,  and  directly  contrary. 

Since,  then,  only  force,  and  thence  nascent  effort  exists  in  any  mo- 
ment (for  motion  never  truly  exists,  as  we  have  explained  above), 
and  every  effort  tends  in  a  straight  line,  it  follows  that  (dl  motion  is 
rectilinear,  or  composed  of  rectilinears.  Hence,  already  it  not  only  fol- 
lows that  those  bodies  ivhich  move  in  a  curved  line,  try  always  to  jn-oceed 
in  the  straight  line  taufjent  to  it,  but  also,  what  any  one  least  ex]iects, 
hence  arises  the  true  notion  of  stability  (firmitatis).  For,  if  we  su]ii)ose 
that  some  one  of  those  bodies  whicli  we  call  stable  (although  in  truth 
nothing  is  absolutely  stable  or  fluid,  but  everything  has  a  certain  degree 
of  stability  or  fluidity,  by  us,  however,  it  is  named  from  a  predominant 
regard  for  our  senses)  circulates  about  its  own  centre,  the  parts  will 
attempt  to  fly  away  by  the  tangent,  nay,  they  will  really  begin  to  fly 
away;  but  since  this  separation  of  themselves  from  each  oWwr  ii\  turn 
disturbs  the  motion  of  the  encircling  body,  hence  they  are  repelled,  or 
2  Y 


090  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

again  crowded  together  towards  themselves  in  turn,  as  if  there  were 
in  tlie  centre,  a  magnetic  force  of  attraction,  or  as  if  there  were  in  the 
parts  themselves  a  centripetal  force,  and  therefore  the  revolutiou  will 
arise  from  the  composition  of  the  effort  (nisu)  to  recede  from  the 
rectilinear  by  the  tangent  and  the  centripetal  effort  (conatu).  And 
thus  it  remains  that  all  curvilinear  motion  arises  from  the  composition 
among  themselves  of  rectilinear  efforts,  and  at  the  same  time  it  is 
understood  that  this  crowding  together  by  the  encircling  body  is  the 
cause  of  all  stability.  Otherwise  it  could  not  be  that  all  curvilinear 
motion  was  composed  of  nothing  but  rectilinear  motions.  Whence, 
also,  again,  we  have  a  new  and  not  less  than  before  unexpected  argu- 
ment against  atoms.  Moreover,  nothing  could  be  devised  more  incon- 
sistent with  things  than  that  stability  be  sought  from  rest,  for  true 
rest  never  exists  in  bodies,  nor  from  rest  can  anything  arise  but  rest ; 
but  although  A  and  B  are  mutually  at  rest  with  themselves,  if  not  in 
fact,  at  least  relatively  (although  this  never  occurs  exactly,  for  no  body 
jjreserves  exactly  the  same  distance  from  another,  however  small  the  time), 
and  although  whatever  is  once  at  rest  will  always  be  at  rest  unless  a 
new  cause  is  added,  nevertheless  it  does  not  follow,  for  this  reason, 
that  because  B  resists  the  impelling  body,  it  resists,  also,  the  one 
separating  it  fi'om  another,  so  that  certainly,  as  the  resistance  of  B 
itself  is  overcome,  or  B  itself  driven  forward,  at  the  same  time  A 
follows.  But  were  the  attraction,  which  is  not  given  in  natru-e,  but 
from  the  primitive  stability  {firmitate),  explained  through  rest  or 
something  similar,  it  would  assuredly  follow.  And  so  stability,  also, 
should  not  be  explained  unless  by  the  crowding  together  produced  by 
the  encircling  body.  For  pressm-e  alone  does  not  sufficiently  exjalain 
the  matter,  as  if  the  sej^aration  of  B  itself  from  A  itself  only  is  im- 
peded, but  it  is  to  be  understood  that  in  fact  they  separate  from  each 
other  in  turn,  that  moreover  one  is  again  impelled  to  the  other  by  the 
encircling  body,  and  thus,  from  the  composition  of  the  two  motions, 
this  conservation  of  the  conjunction  is  produced.  And  so  those  who 
conceive  in  bodies  certain  tablets  or  insensible  laj'ers  (for  example,  of 
two  polished  marbles,  which  are  exactly  applied  to  each  other),  whose 
separation  is  made  difficult  on  account  of  the  resistance  of  the  ambient 
body,  and  hence  explain  the  stability  of  two  sensible  bodies,  although 
very  often  they  speak  truly,  yet  when  they  suppose  some  stability  in 
the  layers  again,  they  do  not  give  the  last  reason  for  stability.  From 
these  considerations,  also,  it  can  be  understood  Avhy  I  cannot  in  this 
thing  continue  (stare)  in  certain  philosophic  opinions  of  certain  great 
mathematicians,  who,  besides  the  fact  that  they  admit  vacant  space, 
and  seem  not  to  shrink  back  from  attraction,  consider  motion,  also, 
as  an  absolute  thing,  and  hasten  to  prove  it  from  the  revolution  and 
the  centrifugal  force  which  has  thence  arisen.  But  since  the  revolu- 
tion also  arises  only  from  the  composition  of  rectilinear  motions,  it 


APPENDIX  691 


follows,  if   the  equivalent  of  the  hypotheses  is  sound  in  rectilinear 
motions,  however  assumed,  that  it  will  be  sound  in  the  curvilinears. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  can  also  be  understood  that  the  common 
motion  in  many  bodies  does  not  change  their  actions  among  themselves,  since 
the  velocity  with  which  they  approach  each  other  in  turn,  and  thus 
the  force  of  the  encounter  by  which  they  act  on  each  other  in  turn, 
is  not  changed.  Whence  the  remarkable  experiments  follow  which 
Gassendi  mentions  in  his  letters  on  motion  impressed  by  a  trans- 
ferred motor,  that  he  might  satisfy  those  who  seemed  to  themselves 
to  be  able  to  infer  the  rest  of  the  earth's  sphere  from  the  motion 
of  projectiles.  Nevertheless,  it  is  certain  that,  if  any  [persons]  are 
borne  in  a  large  ship  (closed,  if  agreeable,  or  certainly  so  constituted 
that  the  external  phenomena  cannot  be  observed  by  the  travellers), 
and  if  the  ship  is  moved,  although  with  great  velocity,  yet  quietly  or 
uniformly,  they  themselves  will  have  no  principle  by  which  to  dis- 
tinguish (from  those  things,  namely,  which  take  place  on  shipboard) 
whether  the  ship  is  at  rest  or  moves,  even  if  by  chance  they  play  ball 
on  the  ship,  or  practice  other  movements.  And  this  fact  must  be 
noted  in  favor  of  those  whose  belief  accords  with  the  not  rightly 
understood  notion  of  the  Copernicans,  that  according  to  tliese,  things 
projected  from  the  earth  into  the  air  are  carried  off  (ahripi)  by  the 
air  with  the  gyrating  earth,  and  thus  the  motion  of  tiie  bottom  fol- 
lows, and  fall  back  upon  the  earth  just  as  if  this  were  at  rest;  a  view 
which  is  properly  judged  insufficient,  since  the  very  learned  men  who 
make  use  of  the  Copernican  hypothesis  conceive,  rather,  that  some- 
thing on  the  surface  of  the  earth  is  moved  with  the  earth,  and,  just 
as  if  discharged  from  a  bow  or  hurling  machine  (tormento),  carries 
with  itself  the  impetus  made  by  the  gyration  of  the  earth,  together 
with  the  impetus  made  by  the  projection.  Thence,  when  their  double 
motion  is  the  one  common  with  the  earth,  the  other  peculiar  to  the 
projection,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  common  motion  changes  nothing. 
Meanwhile,  it  is  not  to  be  disguised  that,  if  tlie  projectiles  could  be 
driven  so  far,  or  if  the  ship  were  conceived  so  large,  and  borne  with 
such  velocity,  that  before  the  descent  the  heavy  earth  or  sliip  descril)ed 
an  arc  perceptibly  different  from  a  straight  line;  a  distinction  wouM 
be  discovered,  because  then,  indeed,  the  motion  of  the  eartli  or  ship 
(because  circular)  does  not  remain  common  to  tiie  motion  which  was 
impressed  upon  the  missile  by  the  gyration  of  tlie  ship  or  eartii 
(because  rectilinear).  And  in  the  effort  of  heavy  bodies  towards  liu' 
centre,  external  action  is  added,  which  can  no  less  produce  a  diversity 
of  phenomena,  than  if  the  compass  were  kept  closed  on  the  siiip,  whidi 
would  certainly  indicate  a  variation  of  the  ship.  As  often,  iiowfver, 
as  the  question  concerns  the  equivalence  of  liypotheses,  ail  things  must 
be  united  which  concur  in  the  phenomena.  From  these  considenv- 
tions,  also,  it  is  understood  that  any  composition  of  motions  or  reso- 


692  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

liition,  whatever,  of  one  motion  into  two  or  more  can  safely  be 
emploj'ed,  concerning  which,  nevertheless,  a  certain  very  clever  man 
in  the  works  of  Wallis  had  hesitated,  not  without  reason.  For  the 
matter  certainly  deserves  proof,  and  cannot  (as  is  done  by  many)  be 
assumed  as  in  itself  known. 


VI 

ON  THE  EADICAL   ORIGIN   OF  THINGS  ^ 

November  23,  1697 
[F7'om  the  Latin] 

Besides  the  world  or  the  aggregate  of  finite  things,  there  is  a 
Unique  Being  who  rules,  not  only  as  the  mind  in  me,  or  rather  as  I 
in  my  body  rule  myself,  but  also  in  a  much  higher  manner.  For 
this  unique  sovereign  of  the  universe  not  only  rules  the  world,  but 
also  frames  or  fashions  it,  and  is  superior  to  the  world  and,  so  to 
speak,  outside  the  world  (exti-amundanum) ,  and  thus  is  the  ultimate 
reason  of  things.  For  the  sufficient  reason  of  existence  can  be  foimd 
neither  in  any  single  thing,  nor  in  the  entire  aggregate  and  series 
of  things.  Let  us  suppose  that  there  was  an  eternal  book  of  the 
Elements  of  Geometry,  one  copy  always  made  from  another,  it  is 
evident  that,  although  we  can  accomit  for  the  present  book  by  the 
past,  whence  it  has  been  copied,  nevertheless  we  never,  by  assuming 
in  the  past  as  many  books  as  we  please,  come  to  Jihe  complete  reason, 
for  we  may  always  wonder  why,  from  all  time,  such  books  have 
existed;  that  is  to  saj',  why  these  books  w'ere  written,  and  why  so 
wi-itten.  What  is  true  of  books  is  likewise  true  of  the  different  states 
of  the  world,'  for  the  following  state  has  in  a  measm-e  been  copied 
from  the  preceding  (although  according  to  certain  laws  of  change), 
and  so  to  whatever  extent  you  go  back  into  anterior  states,  you  will 
never  find  in  these  states  the  full  reason;  that  is  to  say,  why  an}' 
world  exists  rather  than  none,  and  why  such  an  one. 

Therefore,  although  you  imagine  the  world  to  be  eternal,  since, 
nevertheless,  you  assume  only  a  succession  of  states,  and  do  not  find 
in  any  one  of  these  whatever  the  sufficient  reason,  nay  more,  since  by 
assuming  any  number  you  please  you  do  not  advance  even  the  loast 
towards  accounting  for  them,  it  is  evident  that  the  reason  must  be 
sought  elsewhere.     For  in  eternal  things  we  must  understand  that, 

1  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Sch7'ift..  7,  302-.308;  Erdmann,  147-ir)(>;  Janet, 
2,  546-553  (in  French) .  —  Tr. 


APPENDIX  693 


even  if  there  were  no  cause,  yet  there  is  a  reason,  which  in  persistin"- 
things  is  the  necessity  itself  or  the  essence ;  but  in  a  series  of  clianot 
ing  things,  if  we  suppose  that  this  series  proceeds  from  a  prior  series 
eternally,  the  reason  would  be  the  prevalence  of  inclinations,  as  we 
shall  soon  see,  in  which,  that  is  to  say,  the  reasons  do  not  necessitate 
(with  an  absolute  or  metaphysical  necessity  so  as  to  imply  the  con- 
trary), but  incline.  From  these  considerations  it  is  evident  that  we 
cannot  escape  the  ultimate  extramundane  reason  of  thino's  or  God 
by  assuming  the  eternity  of  the  world. 

The  reasons  therefore  of  the  world  lie  concealed  in  sometliino- 
outside  the  world,  different  from  the  chain  of  circumstances  or  series 
of  things,  whose  aggregate  constitutes  the  wol-ld.  We  must  then 
come  from  physical  or  hypothetical  necessity,  which  determines  the 
posterior  states  of  the  world  from  the  prior  states,  to  souieLliing  which 
is  of  absolute  or  metaphysical  necessity,  the  reason  for  wliich  cannot 
be  given.  For  the  present  world  is  physically  or  hypothetically  but 
not  absolutely  or  metaphysically  necessary.  In  fact,  having  assumed 
that  it  is  what  it  is,  it  follows  that  henceforth  things  must  be  what 
they  are.  Since,  therefore,  the  ultimate  root  must  b6  in  something 
which  is  metaphysically  necessary,  and  since  there  is  no  reason  of 
the  existing  unless  from  the  existing,  it  is  therefore  necessary  that 
a  unique  being  exist  of  metaphysical  necessity,  or  whose  essence  is 
existence,  and  that  thus  something  exists  diiferent  from  the  plurality 
of  beings  or  the  world,  which  we  have  admitted  and  shown  not  to 
be  of  metaphysical  necessity. 

But  that  we  may  explain  a  little  more  distinctly  how  temporal, 
contingent  or  physical  truths  originate  in  eternal,  or  essential  or 
metaphysical  truths,  we  must  first  know,  that,  by  the  very  fact  itself 
that  something  rather  than  nothing  exists,  there  is  some  demand 
for  existence  in  possible  things  or  in  possibility  itself  or  essence,  or 
(so  to  speak)  a  stretching  forth  to  existence,  aiid,  to  sum  it  up  in 
a  word,  that  essence  per  se  tends  to  existence.  Whence  it  hereafter 
follows,  that  all  possible  things,  or  those  expressing  essence  or  pos- 
sible reality,  with  equal  right  tend  to  essence  (essenliain^)  in  pro- 
portion to  the  quantity  of  essence  or  reality,  or  in  proportion  in  the 
degree  of  perfection  which  tliej^  involve;  for  perfection  is  nothing 
else  than  quantity  of  essence. 

But  from  this  we  see  most  clearly  that  from  tlie  infinite  combina- 
tions of  possible  things  and  possible  series  there  stands  foi'tli  one 
through  which  the  greatest  quantity  of  essence  or  possibility  is 
brought  through  to  existence.     There  is  always,  in  fact,  in  things  a 

1  The  reading  according  to  both  Gerhardt  and  Erdmaim.  Jaiicl's  Froiich 
version  reads:  "  rexistencc."  The  argument  would  seoiii  lo  rc(|uir<^  the  read- 
ing "  existeutiain."  —  Tr. 


69-1  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 

principle  of  determination  which  is  to  be  sought  from  the  maximum 
or  minimum,  so  that  beyond  question  the  greatest  effect  is  manifested 
with,  so  to  speak,  the  least  expense.  And  here  time,  place,  or,  in  a 
word,  the  receptivity  or  capacity  of  the  world  can  be  considered  as 
the  expense  or  ground  upon  which,  as  conveniently  as  jiossible,  it 
must  be  built,  while  the  varieties  of  the  forms  correspond  to  the 
proportion  of  the  building  and  the  number  and  elegance  of  the 
rooms.  And  it  is  as  in  certain  games  when  all  the  places  at  a  table 
must  be  filled  according  to  certain  laws,  where,  unkss  you  employ 
a  certain  skill,  hindered  finally  by  the  unfavorable  places,  you  will 
be  compelled  to  leave  vacant  more  places  than  you  were  able  or 
desired  to  do.  There  is,  however,  a  certain  method  by  which  the 
greatest  possible  space  is  most  easily  filled.  If  therefore,  for  instance, 
we  assume  that  it  has  been  decreed  that  there  be  a  triangle,  though 
with  no  other  accidentally  determining  condition,  the  result  is  an 
equilateral  triangle ;  and  if  it  is  assumed  that  we  must  proceed  from 
point  to  point,  though  nothing  determines  the  road  beyond,  the 
easiest  and  the  shortest  way  will  be  choseir ;  thus  having  once  assumed 
that  being  prevails  over  non-being,  or  that  there  is  a  reason  why 
something  rather  than  nothing  existed,  or  that  from  possibility  a 
transition  must  be  made  to  act,  it  follows  hence,  in  the  absence  of 
any  further  determination,  that  the  quantity  of  existence  is  as  great 
as  possible  in  proportion  to  the  capacity  of  the  time  and  place  (or 
the  order  of  possible  existence),  just  as  tiles  are  so  laid  that  in  the 
proposed  area  as  many  as  possible  may  be  contained. 

From  these  considerations  we  understand  already  in  a  wonderful 
way  how,  in  the  very  original  formation  of  things,  a  certain  Divine 
Mathematics  or  Metaphysical  Mechanics  is  employed,  and  the  deter- 
mination of  the  greatest  amount  of  existence  has  place.  Thus  the 
right  angle  is  the  determinate  of  all  the  angles  in  Geometry,  and 
liquids  placed  in  different  media  arrange  themselves  in  the  most 
capacious  form,  namely,  the  spherical;  but  especially  in  general 
Mechanics  itself,  when  many  heavy  bodies  struggle  with  each  other, 
such  a  motion  at  length  arises,  through  which  the  greatest  descent 
on  the  whole  is  accomplished.  For  if  all  possibilities  with  equal 
right  tend  to  existence  according  to  the  measure  of  reality,  so  all 
weights  by  equal  right  tend  to  descend  in  proportion  to  the  measure 
of  gravity,  and  as  here  the  motion  appears,  in  which  is  contained 
the  greatest  possible  descent  of  the  heavy  bodies,  so  there  the  world 
appears,  through  which  is  realized  the  greatest  possible  production 
of  possibilities. 

And  so  also  we  already  have  physical  necessity  from  metaphysical : 
for  although  the  world  is  not  metaphysically  necessary,  so  that  the 
contrary  implies  contradiction  or  logical  absurdity,  it  is  nevertheless 
physically   necessary   or   determined    so   that    the    contrary   implies 


APPENDIX  695 


imperfection  or  moral  absurdity.  And  as  possibility  is  the  source 
of  essence,  so  perfection  or  the  degree  of  essence  (through  which 
the  greatest  number  of  things  are  conipossible)  is  the  source  of  exist- 
ence. Whence  it  is  at  the  same  time  evident  how  freedom  exists  in 
the  Author  of  the  world,  although  he  does  all  things  deterniinately 
because  he  acts  from  the  principle  of  wisdom  or  perfection.  Indif- 
ference certainly  arises  from  ignorance,  and  the  greater  one's  wisdom 
the  more  he  is  determined  to  the  most  perfect. 

But  (you  will  say)  this  comparison  of  a  certain  determining  meta- 
physical mechanism  with  the  physical  one  of  heavy  bodies,  although 
it  seems  elegant,  nevertheless  is  wanting  in  this  because  tlie  struggling 
heavy  bodies  truly  exist,  but  the  possibilities  or  essences  before  or 
besides  existence  are  imaginary  or  fictitious,  therefore  no  reason  of 
existence  can  be  sought  in  them.  I  reply  that  neither  these  essences 
nor  the  eternal  truths  which  they  call  from  them  are  fictitious,  but 
exist  in  a  certain  so  to  speak  region  of  ideas,  namely  in  God  himself, 
the  source  of  every  essence  and  of  the  existence  of  the  rest.  That 
we  do  not  seem  to  have  spoken  gratuitously,  the  existence  itself  of 
an  actual  series  of  things  indicates.  For  since  reason  is  not  found 
in  this  series,  as  we  showed  above,  but  must  be  sought  in  meta- 
physical necessities  or  eternal  truths ;  moreover,  since  existences 
cannot  exist  unless  from  existences,  as  already  we  maintained  above, 
eternal  truths  must  have  existence  in  a  certain  absolute  or  meta- 
physically necessary  subject,  that  is  in  God,  through  whom  these 
things,  which  otherwise  would  be  imaginary,  are  (to  speak  barbar- 
ously but  significantly)  realized. 

And  in  truth  actually  in  the  world  we  observe  that  all  things  take 
place  according  to  the  laws  of  the  eternal  verities  not  only  geomet- 
rical but  also  metaphysical,  that  is,  not  only  according  to  material 
necessities,  but  also  according  to  formal  reasons ;  and  that  is  true 
not  only  generally  in  that  reason  of  the  existing  ratlier  than  non- 
existing,  and  the  so  rather  than  otherwise  existing  world  which  we 
liave  now  explained  (which  certainly  is  to  be  sought  from  the  tend- 
ency of  possibilities  to  existence),  but  also  l)y  descending  to  specials 
we  see,  by  a  wonderful  plan  in  all  nature,  tlie  metapliysical  laws  of 
cause,  power,  action,  have  place,  and  these  prevail  over  the  purely 
geometrical  laws  themselves  of  matter,  as  in  giving  the  reasons  of 
the  laws  of  motion  I  have  observed  to  such  an  extent  that  T  was 
finally  compelled  to  abandon,  as  elsewhere  T  have  more  at  length  ex- 
plained, the  law  of  the  geometrical  composition  of  impulses  (roiKitunnt), 
defended  formerly  by  me,  a  youth,  when  I  was  more  materialistic. 

Thus,  therefore,  we  have  the  ultimate  reason  of  reality  botli  of 
essences  and  of  existences  in  one,  which  assuredly  greater,  abovc^  and 
before  the  world  itself  is  necessarily  existent,  sinci!  through  itself 
not  only  existences,  whicli  the  world  embraces,  but  also  possibilities. 


096  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

J . 

nave  reality.  But  this  can  be  sought  only  in  one  source  on  account 
of  the  connection  of  all  things  with  each  other.  It  is  evident,  more- 
over, that  from  this  source  existing  things  continually  spring  forth 
(pi-omanai-e)  and  are  produced  and  the  j)roducts  exist,  since  it  is  not 
apj)arent  why  one  state  of  the  world  rather  than  another,  yesterday 
rather  than  to-day,  flows  from  itself.  It  is  also  evident  how  God  acts 
not  only  physically  but  also  freely,  and  is  in  himself  not  only  the 
efficient  but  also  the  final  cause  of  things,  and  how  an  account  is 
taken  by  him,  not  only  of  grandeur  and  power  in  the  mechanism  of 
the  universe  already  constituted,  but  also  of  goodness  and  wisdom 
in  that  to  be  constituted. 

And  lest  any  one  may  think  that  moral  perfection  or  goodness  is 
here  confounded  with  metaphysical  perfection  or  magnitude,  and  the 
latter  being  granted  may  deny  the  former,  it  is  to  be  understood  that 
it  follows  from  what  has  been  said,  not  only  that  the  world  is  the 
most  perfect  physically,  or,  if  you  prefer,  metaphysically,  or  that 
that  series  of  things  has  been  produced  in  which  the  gi-eatest  pos- 
sible reality  is  actually  manifest,  but  also  that  it  is  the  most  perfect 
morally,  because  in  reality  moral  perfection  in  souls  themselves  is 
j)hysical.  Whence  the  world  is  not  only  an  especially  admirable 
mechanism,  but  also,  as  far  as  it  is  composed  of  souls,  is  the  best 
Republic,  tlu'ough  which  there  is  brought  to  souls  the  gi'eatest  pos- 
sible felicity  or  joy  in  which  their  physical  perfection  consists. 

But,  you  will  say,  we  experience  the  contrary  in  the  world,  for  the 
best  very  often  fare  the  worst,  the  innocent,  not  only  beasts,  but  also 
men,  are  struck  down,  and  even  killed  with  torture ;  finally,  the  world, 
esi)eciaUy  if  the  government  of  the  human  race  be  regarded,  seems 
rather  a  certain  confused  chaos  than  a  thing  arranged  by  a  certain 
supreme  wisdom.  So  at  first  view  I  confess  it  seems,  but  the  contrary 
must  be  established  by  a  more  thorough  inspection  ;  a  priori,  it  is 
evident  from  these  very  considerations  which  have  been  brought  for- 
ward, that  the  highest  possible  perfection,  namely,  of  aU  things,  and 
so  also  of  mind,  is  obtained. 

And  in  truth  it  is  unjust  to  judge,  unles.  ifter  an  investigation  of 
the  whole  law,  as  the  jurisconsults  say.  Wl  vUow  a  small  part  of  the 
eternity  extending  into  immensity ;  for  how  little  is  the  memory  of  a 
few"  thousands  of  years  which  history  i-ecounts  for  us.  And  yet,  from 
so  small  experience  we  judge  rashly  concerning  the  immense  and  the 
eternal,  as  men  in  a  prison,  or,  if  you  prefer,  born  and  educated  in 
the  subterranean  salt-pits  of  the  Sarmatians,  thought  that  there  is  no 
other  light  in  the  world  but  that  dim  lamp  light  scarceh'  suiBcieut 
to  direct  their  steps.  We  look  at  a  very  beautiful  picture,  we  cover 
this  entu-eljr,  reserving  a  small  portion  ;  what  else  in  this  will  appear, 
even  if  you  look  very  attentively,  nay,  how  much  more  will  you  observe 
from  near  by  than  a  certain  confused  congeries  of  colors  without 


APPENDIX 


6)7 


choice,  without  art;  and  nevertheless,  when  the  whole  coverino-  j, 
removed,  and  you  shall  see  the  whole  picture  in  the  proper  position 
you  will  know  that  that  which  seemed  thoughtlessly  spread  upon  tht 
canvas  has  been  done  with  the  highest  art  by  the  author  of  the  work. 
What  the  eyes  observe  in  pictures,  the  ears  perceive  in  music.  Eminent 
composers  very  often  mix  discords  with  concords  in  order  to  arouse, 
and,  as  it  were,  sting  the  hearer,  and  as  more  solicitous  concerning 
the  outcome,  all  having  soon  been  restored  to  order,  that  he  may 
rejoice  so  much  the  more,  in  short,  that  we  may  take  pleasure  in 
petty  dangers  or  experiences  of  evils  by  the  sense  itself,  or  by  the 
display  of  either  our  power  or  happiness ;  or,  as  we  delight  in  the 
spectacle  of  the  rope-dancers,  or  in  the  sword-dance  (saltatione  inter 
f/lddlos  —  sauts  periUeux,  Leibnitz),  things  that  themselves  excite  terror, 
and  we,  our  very  selves,  half  let  down  the  children  in  sport,  as  it 
were,  now  almost  about  to  throw  them  before  us,  just  as  the  ape 
bore  Christian,  king  of  Denmark,  when  an  infant,  and  wrapped  in 
swaddling  clothes,  to  the  roof  of  the  house,  and  while  all  were  anxious, 
like  one  in  sport  bore  him  safe  back  again  into  his  cradle.  In  accord 
with  the  same  principle,  it  is  insipid  always  to  eat  sweet  things; 
sharp,  sour,  nay  more,  bitter  things  which  excite  the  taste,  are  to  be 
mixed  with  them.  He  who  has  not  tasted  the  bitter,  has  not  deserved, 
nay  more,  will  not  apjjreciate  the  sweet.  This  itself  is  the  law  of  joy, 
that  pleasure  does  not  proceed  ixn interruptedly ;  for  this  produces 
disgust,  and  makes  us  inert,  not  joyful. 

But  what  we  have  said  of  this  part  which  can  be  disturbed  while 
the  harmony  on  the  whole  is  preserved  is  not  so  to  be  interpreted  as 
if  no  account  is  taken  of  the  parts,  or  as  if  it  would  suffice  that  the 
whole  world  be  complete  in  its  own  parts,  although  it  can  happen 
that  the  human  race  is  wretched,  and  that  there  is  no  care  for  justice 
in  the  universe,  or  account  taken  of  us,  as  some  think,  who  judge  not 
rightly  enough  concerning  the  totality  of  things.  For  we  must  know 
that,  as  in  the  best  constituted  repulilic,  care  is  taken  that  it  be  as 
well  as  possible  with  ind  iduals,  so  tlie  universe  would  not  be  suffi- 
ciently perfect  unless,  wl  .e  the  harmony  of  the  universe  is  preserved, 
as  much  regard  is  had  '  jr  particular  intei'ests.  Of  which  thing  no 
better  measure  could  be  constituted  than  the  law  itself  of  justice, 
saying  that  each  should  take  part  in  the  perfection  of  the  universe, 
and  in  happiness  proper  in  proportion  to  the  measure  of  his  own 
virtue  and  of  that  will  which  is  a  disposition  of  mind  {affectum)  toward  i 
the  common  good,  by  which  that  itself  is  completed  wliich  we  call  the 
affection  and  love  of  God,  in  which  alone  the  force  and  also  the  power 
of  the  Christian  religion  consists,  in  the  judgment  even  of  the  wise 
theologians.     Nor  should  it  seem  wonderful  that  so  much  is  conferred 

1  Gerhardt  reads,  incorrectly, "  (tro  "  ;  Erdmann,  correctly,  "  erga"   -  Tr. 


658  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

j3on  souls  in  the  universe,  since  they  very  closely  reproduce  the  image  ^ 
R  the  supreme  author,  and  are  related  to  him  not  only  as  machines  to 
he  maker  (like  the  rest),  but  also  as  citizens  to  the  prince,  and  will 
[iontinue  in  existence  equally  with  the  universe  itself,  and  express  and 
concentrate  in  a  measure  the  whole  in  themselves,  so  that  it  can  be 
fsaid  that  souls  are  the  entire  parts. 

But  as  regards  the  sufferings  especially  of  good  men,  it  must  cer- 
tainly be  maintained  that  they  result  in  their  greater  good,  and  that 
is  true  not  only  theologically,  but  also  physically,  as  the  gi-ain  cast 
into  the  earth  suffers  before  it  bears  fruit.  And  on  the  whole,  it  can 
be  said  that  sufferings,  temporarily  evil,  are  in  effect  good,  since  they 
are  the  short  roads  to  greater  perfection.  So,  in  physics,  those  liquors 
which  ferment  slowly  are  improved  more  slowly,  but  those  in  which 
the  fermentation  is  stronger  are  improved  more  readily,  the  parts 
being  thrown  off  with  greater  force.  And  this  is,  as  you  would  say, 
to  go  back,  in  order,  by  a  greater  effort,  to  leap  forwards  (qu'on  recule 
pour  mieux  sauter,  —  you  go  back  to  take  a  better  leap) .  These  views, 
therefore,  must  be  maintained  to  be  not  only  pleasing  and  comforting, 
but  also  most  true.  And  in  general,  I  think  there  is  nothing,  both 
truer  than  happiness,  and  more  propitious  and  more  delightful  than 
truth. 

Respecting  the  increase  also  of  the  beauty  and  general  perfection 
of  the  divine  works,  a  certain  perpetual  and  very  free  progress  of  the 
whole  universe  is  to  be  recognized,  so  that  it  proceeds  to  ever  greater 
culture.  As  for  instance,  a  great  part  of  our  earth  receives  culture 
and  will  receive  more  and  more.  And  although  it  is  true  that  some- 
times some  parts  grow  wild  again  or  are  destroyed  and  depreciated, 
yet  this  must  so  be  understood,  as  a  little  before  we  interpreted  suf- 
fering, namely,  that  this  destruction  and  depreciation  itself  is  useful 
in  the  attainment  of  something  greater,  so  that  in  some  measure  we 
gain  by  the  very  loss. 

And  as  to  the  objection  which  might  be  made  that  thus  the  world 
should  long  ago  have  been  made  a  paradise,  the  reply  is  at  hand  : 
although  already  many  substances  have  attained  great  perfection, 
nevertheless,  on  account  of  the  divisibility  of  the  continuum  to  infinity, 
there  always  remain  in  the  abyss  of  things  parts  hitherto  asleep,  to  be 
aroused  and  carried  forwards  to  something  greater  and  better,  and,  in 
a  word,  to  a  better  culture.  And  accordingly,  progress  never  comes 
to  an  end. 

1  Both  Gerhardt  and  Erdmann  read,  "  imagine  "  ;  manifestly  a  typographi- 
cal error  for  "  imagiuem."  —  Tr. 


APPENDIX  699 


VII 
APPENDIX » 

May,  1702 
[From  the  Latin] 

Up  to  the  present  time,  I  liave  published  no  book,  indeed,  against 
the  Cartesian  philosophy,  but  often  in  the  "  Acta  Eruditoruni  Lipsien- 
sium  "  and  the  "Journaux  "  of  France  and  Holland  hastily-thrown-ofl' 
productions  {Schediasmata)  will  be  found  inserted  by  me,  in  wliioli  I 
have  borne  witness  to  my  dissent  from  it.  But  first  (not  to  speak 
now  of  the  others),  about  the  nature  of  the  body  and  what  motive 
forces  are  in  the  body ;  in  all  others  ray  opinion  was  the  same.  The 
Cartesians,  it  is  true,  place  the  essence  of  body  in  extension  alone,  but 
I,  although  with  Aristotle  and  Descartes  against  Democritus  and  (ias- 
sendi  I  admit  no  vacuum,  and  against  Aristotle  with  Democritus  and 
Descartes  think  there  is  nothing  but  an  apparent  rarefaction  and  con- 
densation, yet  I  think  with  Democritus  and  Aristotle  against  Des- 
cartes, that  there  is  something  passive  in  body  besides  extension,  that, 
namely,  by  which  body  resists  penetration  ;  but  besides  this,  I  also 
recognize  with  Plato  and  Aristotle  against  Democritus  and  Descartes 
an  active  force  or  evreAe'xeta,  so  that  I  think  Aristotle  so  far  rightly 
defined  nature  as  the  source  (principium)  of  motion  and  rest,  not 
because  I  think  any  body,  unless  already  in  motion,  can  be  moved  by 
itself  or  be  put  in  motion  by  any  quality  such  as  gravity,  but  because 
I  think  every  body  always  has  implanted  in  it  motive  force  {matricem), 
nay,  rather  motion  actually  intrinsic  (motum  intrinxcum  acliialein),  from 
the  very  beginning  of  things.  Moreover,  I  agree  with  Democritus  and 
Descartes  against  the  multitude  of  the  Scholastics,  that  the  exercise  of 
the  motive  (moLricis)  power  and  the  plienomena  of  bodies  can  always 
beexi^lained  mechanically,  the  causes  themselves  of  the  laws  of  motion 
being  withdrawn  whicli  spring  from  a  higher  source,  namely,  from  the 
entelechy,  which  cannot  be  derived  from  the  passive  mass  alone  and 
its  modifications. 

But  in  order  that  my  opinion  may  be  better  understood  and  its 
reasons  also  may  be  somewhat  ap]-)arent,  I  tliink,  in  tJK^  first  place, 
that  the  nature  of  body  does  not  consist  in  extension  alone,  because 
in  evolving  the  notion  of  extension  we  must  notice  tliat  it  is  relative 
to  something  that  is  extended  and  signifies  a  diffusion  or  repetition 

1  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrifl.,  II,  2  [Vol.  fi]-  98-106;  Gerhardt,  Leibniz. 
philos.  Schrift.,A,\)':)o-Am;  cf.  (i.\  Mnlritnn;/,  ibid.,  271-272.  Tlio  Intlfir  to 
Honoratus  Fabri,  aiid  tliis  Appendix,  wore  priuted  by  Gerhardt  from  the  Ms. 
in  the  Royal  Library  at  llauovcr. 


700  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

of  a  certain  nature.  For  every  repetition  (or  multitude  of  the  same 
things)  is  either  discrete,  as  in  numbers  where  aggregate  parts  are 
discerned;  or  is  continuous,  where  the  parts  are  indeterminate  and 
can  be  assumed  in  infinite  ways.  Continua,  however,  are  of  two  kinds ; 
the  one  successive,  as  time  and  motion,  the  other  simultaneous  or 
consisting  of  coexisting  parts,  as  space  and  body.  And  as  in  time 
we  conceive  nothing  else  than  the  disposition  or  series  itself  of  varia- 
tions, which  can  occur  in  itself,  so  in  space  we  perceive  nothing 
else  than  the  possible  disposition  of  bodies.  And  so  when  space  is 
said  to  be  extended,  we  accept  the  statement  in  the  same  sense  as 
when  time  is  said  to  endure  or  number  to  be  numbered;  for,  in 
truth,  time  adds  nothing  to  duration  nor  space  to  extension,  but  as 
successive  variations  are  in  time,  in  body  thoae  things  are  diverse 
which  can  be  diffused.  For,  because  extension  is  a  simultaneous 
continuous  repetition  as  duration  is  a  successive  one,  as  often  as  the 
same  nature  is  diffused  at  the  same  time  through  many  things,  as 
ductility  or  specific  gravity  or  the  yellow-color  in  gold  or  the  white- 
color  in  milk,  extension  is  said  to  have  place  generally  in  body  as 
resistance  or  impenetrability,  although  it  must  be  confessed  that  that 
diffusion  continuous  in  color,  weight,  ductility,  and  things  similar  in 
kind  but  homogeneous,  is  only  apparent  and  has  no  place  in  parts 
however  small,  and  so  the  extension  of  resistance  alone  which  is 
diffused  through  matter  preserves  this  name  with  the  strict  investi- 
gator. But  it  is  evident  from  these  considerations,  that  extension  is 
not  an  absolute  predicate,  but  relative  to  that  which  is  extended  or 
diffused,  and  from  the  nature  of  which,  diffusion  can  just  as  little  be 
separated  as  number  from  the  thing  numbered.  And  hence  those 
who  assumed  extension  as  an  absolute  primitive  attribute,  indefinable 
and  apprjTov,  erred  by  defect  of  analysis  and  took  refuge  in  the 
occult  qualities  which  for  the  rest  they  so  despised,  as  if  extension 
were  something  that  cannot  be  explained. 

The  question  now  is  asked,  What  is  that  nature  whose  diffusion 
constitutes  body?  We  have  already  said  that  matter  is  constituted 
by  the  diffusion  of  resistance ;  but  since  in  our  opinion  there  is  some- 
thing else  in  body  besides  matter,  the  question  is  asked  in  what  its 
nature  consists.  We  say,  therefore,  it  can  consist  in  nothing  else 
than  iv  to!  SwayntKw  or  the  indwelling  principle  of  change  and  per- 
sistence. Whence  also  it  uses  the  physical  doctrine  of  the  two  mathe- 
matical sciences  to  whose  principles  it  was  subordinated,  geometry 
and  dynamics,  the  elements  of  which  latter  science  not  yet  suflBciently 
propounded,  I  have  elsewhere  promised.  Moreover,  geometry  itself, 
or  the  science  of  extension,  again  is  subordinated  to  arithmetic,  be- 
cause in  extension,  as  T  said  above,  there  is  repetition  or  multitude, 
and  dynamics  is  subordinated  to  metaphysic  which  treats  of  cause 
and  effect. 


APPENDIX  701 


Again,  to  8vvafx.tK6v  or  power  in  body  is  twofold,  — passive  and  active. 
Passive  power  properly  constitutes  matter  or  mass,  active  ei/TeAe'xeta 
or  form.  Passive  power  is  the  resistance  itself  by  Avhich  body  resists 
not  only  penetration  but  also  motion,  and  by  which  it  happens  that 
another  body  cannot  enter  into  its  place  unless  itself  yields,  but 
itself  does  not  yield  unless  by  retarding  somewhat  the  motion  of  the 
impelling  body,  and  so  it  attempts  to  continue  steadfastly  in  its 
former  state,  not  merely  that  it  may  not  depart  thence  voluntarily, 
but  also  that  it  may  resist  change.  And  so  there  are  therein  two 
resistances  or  masses  :  the  first  antitypy,  as  they  call  it,  or  impenetra- 
bility ;  the  second  resistance,  or  what  Kepler  calls  the  natural  inertia 
of  bodies,  which  Descartes  also  somewhere  in  his  letters  acknowledged, 
from  the  fact  that  bodies  certainly  receive  no  new  motion  unless  by 
force,  and  so  resist  the  impression  and  break  its  force.  This  would 
not  happen  if  there  were  not  in  the  body,  besides  extension,  to  Bvva- 
[xiKov  or  the  principle  of  the  laws  of  motion,  by  which  it  happens  that 
the  quantity  of  forces  cannot  be  increased,  nor  can  a  body  even  be 
impelled  by  another  unless  its  own  force  is  broken.  This  passive  force 
in  the  body,  moreover,  is  everywhere  the  same  and  proportional  to 
its  magnitude.  For  although  some  bodies  appear  more  dense  than 
others,  this  nevertheless  happens  because  their  pores  are  more  filled 
with  matter  pertaining  to  the  body,  while,  on  the  contrary,  the  rarer 
bodies  have  the  nature  of  a  sponge,  so  that  another  more  subtile 
matter  glides  through  their  pores  which  is  not  reckoned  with  the 
body  nor  its  motion  followed  or  looked  for. 

Active  force,  which  also  absokitely  is  customarily  called  force,  is 
not  to  be  conceived  as  a  simple  common  power  of  the  schools,  or  as  a 
receptivity  of  action,  but  involves  a  conatus  or  tendency  to  action,  so 
that,  unless  something  else  hinders,  action  follows.  And  in  this 
properly  consists  ivreX^X'^ia,  too  little  understood  by  the  schools ;  for 
such  a  power  involves  act  (actu77i),  and  does  not  persist  in  a  naked 
faculty,  although  it  does  not  always  proceed  wholly  to  the  action 
{actionevi)  to  which  it  tends,  as  often,  namely,  as  an  impediment  is 
thrown  in  its  way.  Again  active  force  is  twofold,  —  primitive  and  deri- 
vative ;  that  is,  either  substantial  or  accidental.  Primitive  active  force, 
which  is  called  by  Aristotle  ei/TeAe'xei"- 17  Trpwrrj,  generally  the  form  of 
substance  (foTma  suhstantiie),  is  another  natural  principle  which  with 
material  or  passive  power  con)pletes  the  corporeal  substance,  wliicli  is, 
forsooth,  a  imum  per  se,  not  a  mere  aggregate  of  many  substances;  for 
there  is  much  dilference,  for  example,  between  an  animal  and  a  liock. 
And  so  this  entelechy  or  soul,  or  something  analogous  to  the  soul, 
exists,  and  always  naturally  actuates  some  organic  body,  which  itself 
separately  assumed  (quod,  ipsmn  separatim  sunitum),  when  the  soul  is 
separated  forsooth  or  removed,  is  not  one  substance,  but  an  aggregate 
of  many ;  in  a  word,  a  natural  machine. 


702  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

This  natural  uiacliine,  moreover,  lias  this  highest  prerogative  as 
compared  Avith  an  artificial,  that  exhibiting  a  proof  of  a  divine  author, 
it  consists  of  infinite  organs  wrapped  up  in  itself,  and  so  can  never  be 
utterly  destroyed,  just  as  it  cannot  be  absolutely  produced,  but  can 
be  diminished  only  and  increased,  and  be  involved  and  evolved,  this 
being  to  a  certain  extent  itself  a  substance,  and  in  it  (however  trans- 
formed) a  certain  degree  of  vitality,  or,  if  you  prefer,  of  primitive 
activity  being  always  preserved.  For  what  is  said  of  animate  things 
must  also  be  said  iiroportionally  of  those  which  are  not  properly  ani- 
mals. Meanwhile,  it  must  be  maintained  that  intelligences,  or  the 
more  noble  souls  which  are  also  called  spirits,  are  ruled  by  God  not 
only  as  machines,  but  also  as  subjects,  and  are  not  liable  to  those 
changes  to  which  other  living  beings  are  exposed, 
r  Derivative  force  is  that  which  some  call  impetus,  a  conatus  evidently 
or  tendency,  so  to  speak,  to  a  certain  determinate  motion,  by  which 
accordingly  primitive  force  or  the  principle  of  action  is  modified.  I 
have  shown  that  this  is  not  preserved  the  same  in  the  same  body,  but 
yet,  however  distributed  in  many,  it  remains  the  same  in  the  amount 
and  differs  from  motion  itself,  whose  quantity  is  not  preserved.  And 
this  itself  also  is  the  impression  which  a  body  receives  by  impulse,  by 
Avhose  aid  projectiles  continue  their  motion  and  do  not  need  any  new 
impulse,  which  Gassendi  also  has  illustrated  bj^  elegant  expei-iments 
made  on  shipboard.  Thus  also  some  incorrectly  think  that  projectiles 
have  their  motion  continued  by  the  ak.  Further,  derivative  force 
differs  from  action  only  as  the  instantaneous  from  the  successive ;  for 
there  is  already  force  in  the  first  instant,  but  action  requires  a  period 
of  time,  and  so  is  brought  to  pass  by  the  prolongation  of  forces  in 
time,  which  is  perceived  in  any  part  of  the  body  whatever.  And  so 
action  is  in  reason  composed  of  body,  time,  and  force  (vis)  or  energy 
(vii-tutis),  since  by  the  Cartesians  the  quantity  of  motion  is  estimated 
by  the  calculation  of  velocity  in  the  body,  and  forces  are  considered 
far  otherwise  than  as  velocities,  as  will  soon  be  stated. 

To  place  active  force  in  bodies  moreover,  many  things  compel  us, 
and  especially  the  experience  itself,  which  shows  that  motions  are  in 
matter,  although  these  motions  must  be  attributed  originally  to  the 
general  cause  of  things, —  God ;  immediately,  however,  and  specifically, 
they  must  be  attributed  to  the  force  placed  in  things  by  God.  For  to 
say  that  God  in  creation  has  given  to  bodies  a  law  of* action,  is  nothing 
unless  he  has  given  at  the  same  time  something  hj  which  the  law  is 
observed ;  otherwise  he  himself  Avill  be  obliged  always  to  procure  in 
an  extraordinary  manner  the  observance  of  the  law.  Yea,  rather  his 
law  is  efficacious,  and  makes  bodies  efficient;  i.e.  he  gave  to  them 
natural  (insitani)  force.  Further,  ^^e  must  consider  that  derived  force 
and  action  is  a  certain  mode  (moc/o/e), -since  it  admits  change.  But 
every  mode  is  constituted  by  some  modification  of  something  persist- 


APPENDIX  703 


ing  or  more  absolute.  And  just  as  figure  is  a  certain  limitation  or 
modification  of  passive  force  or  extended  mass,  so  derivative  force  and 
moving  action  (actio  viotrix)  is  a  certain  modification  not  certainly  of 
a  thing  jnerely  passive  (otherwise  a  modification  or  limit  would  involve 
more  reality  than  the  thing  itself  which  is  limited),  but  of  somethuig 
active,  that  is,  of  the  primitive  entelechy.  Therefore,  derivative  and 
accidental  or  changeable  force  will  be  a  certain  modification  of  the 
primitive  energy  {virtutis)  essential  to  and  abiding  in  every  corjioreal 
substance.  Whence  the  Cartesians,  since  they  acknowledge  no  active 
principle  substantial  and  capable  of  modification  in  the  body,  are 
compelled  themselves  to  reject  (ahjudicare)  all  action,  and  to  trans- 
fer it  to  God  alone,  a  far-fetched  mechanical  view  (accersitiim  ex 
Machina),  which  is  not  philosophical. 

But  primitive  force  is  changed  by  derivative  in  the  impacts  of 
bodies,  according  as  the  exercise  of  primitive  force  is  turned  within 
or  without.  For  in  truth,  every  body  has  an  internal  motion,  nor  can 
it  ever  be  brought  to  rest.  This  internal  force,  again,  tunis  itself  with- 
out, when  it  performs  the  duty  of  elastic  force,  when,  namely,  internal 
motion  is  impeded  in  its  accustomed  com-se,  whence  every  body  is 
essentially  elastic,  water  not  even  excepted,  and  how  violently  this 
rebounds,  even  the  cannon  balls  {pike  tormentarice)  show.  And 
unless  every  body  were  elastic,  the  laws  of  motions  could  not  be 
proved  true  and  binding.  Meanwhile  this  force  does  not  always 
render  itself  conspicuous  in  the  sensible  parts  themselves  of  bodies, 
since  these  manifestly  do  not  sufficiently  cohere.  But  the  harder  a 
body  is,  the  more  elastic  it  is  and  the  more  strongly  it  rebounds. 
Indeed  in  impact,  when  bodies  mutually  rebound  from  each  other, 
this  occurs  through  elastic  force,  whence  indeed  bodies  always  have 
their  own  special  motion  from  impact  by  their  own  special  force,  to 
which  a  foreign  impulse  furnishes  only  an  occasion  of  acting,  and,  so 
to  speak,  a  determination. 

Hence,  moreover,  we  understand  that,  although  that  primitive 
force  or  form  of  substance  (which,  it  is  true,  determines  even  the 
forms  in  matter,  while  it  pi-oduces  motion)  is  admitted,  yet  in  ex- 
plaining elastic  force  and  other  phenomena  we  must  always  proceed 
mechanically,  certainly  by  the  forms  which  are  modifications  of 
matter  and  by  impulses  which  are  modifications  of  form.  And  it  is 
useless,  when  distinct  and  specific  reasons  should  be  given,  to  liave 
recourse  immediately  and  in  general  (f/enerice)  to  form  or  primitive 
force  in  a  thing,  as  it  is  useless  in  explaiiiingtlie  phenomena  of  created 
things  to  recur  to  the  first  substance  or  (iod,  unless  his  means  or  ends 
are  at  the  same  time  specifically  exiilained,  and  the  proximate  ellicieiit 
or  even  the  special  final  causes  are  rightly  assigned,  so  tiiat  liis  power 
and  wisdom  appear.  For  in  general  (whatever  Descartiis  may  iiayc 
said),  not  only  efficient,  but  also  final  causes,  belong  to  physical  dis- 


704  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

cussion  (traclationis)  ;  precisely  as  a  house  is  badly  exhibited,  if  any  of 
its  parts  betrays  its  structure  only,  not  its  use.  I  have  further  already 
pointed  out  above  that,  since  we  affirm  that  all  things  in  nature  are 
explained  mechanically,  the  reasons  themselves  of  the  laws  of  motion 
or  the  principles  of  mechanics  must  be  excepted,  which  should  be 
deduced  not  from  mathematics  alone  and  the  imagination  of  the  sub- 
ject, but  from  a  metaphysical  source,  namely,  from  the  equality  of 
cause  and  eifect,  and  from  other  law's  of  this  kind  which  are  essential 
to  eutelechies.  Certainly,  as  has  already  been  said,  j)hysics  is  subor- 
dinate through  geometry  to  arithmetic,  through  dynamics  to  meta- 
physics. 

But  the  Cartesians,  not  sufficiently  understanding  the  nature  of 
forces,  confounding  motive  force  with  motion,  .have  seriously  erred 
in  determining  the  laws  of  motions.  For  although  Descartes  knew 
that  the  same  force  must  be  preserved  in  nature,  and  that  a  body, 
although  he  attributed  a  part  of  its  force  (namely,  the  derivative) 
to  another,  so  retains  a  part  that  the  sum  of  the  forces  remains  the 
same,  (yet),  deceived  by  the  example  of  equilibrium  or  dead  force 
as  I  call  it  (which  here  does  not  enter  into  the  reckoning,  and  of 
living  force  or  of  that  ■which  is  now  in  question,  it  is  only  an  infini- 
tesimal part),  (he)  believed  that  force  exists  in  a  composite  system 
(ralione  composita)  of  masses  and  velocities,  or  that  it  is  the  same  as 
that  which  he  calls  quantity  of  motion,  by  which  term  he  under- 
stands the  product  of  the  mass  into  the  velocity  {ex  ductu  masscB  in 
celeritatein) ,  when,  nevertheless,  it  has  elsewhere  been  demonstrated 
by  me  a  priori  that  forces  exist  in  a  composite  system  of  simple 
masses  and  double  velocities.  I  know  that  lately  certain  learned 
men,  when  at  length  they  were  compelled  to  admit  agamst  the 
Cartesians  that  the  same  quantity  of  motion  is  not  preserved  in 
nature,  and  considered  this  too  alone  as  absolute  force,  concluded 
that  this  force  also  does  not  abide,  and  took  refuge  in  the  conserva- 
tion alone  of  relative  {respectivce)  force,  but  we  have  discovered  that 
not  in  the  conservation  of  absolute  force  even  has  natiire  been 
mindful  of  her  own  constancy  and  perfection.  And  the  opinion 
of  the  Cartesians  indeed,  in  which  the  quantity  of  motion  is  pre- 
served, contradicts  all  the  phenomena,  (while)  ours  is  wonderfully 
confirmed  by  experiments. 

The  Cartesians  err,  also,  in  this,  because  they  think  that  changes 
occur  by  a  leap  (per  salturn)  ;  as  if,  for  example,  a  body  at  rest  can  in 
a  moment  pass  over  into  a  state  of  determined  motion,  or  as  if  a  body 
placed  in  motion  can  suddenly  be  brought  back  to  rest,  not  by  passing 
through  the  intermediate  grades  of  velocity,  because  they  have  plainly 
not  understood  the  use  of  elastic  force  in  the  concoiu-se  of  bodies. 
Which,  if  it  were  absent,  I  confess  that  neither  the  law  which  I  call 
the  law  of  continuity  would  be  observed  in  things,  through  which 


APPENDIX 


705 


leaps  are  avoided,  nor  the  law  of  equivalence  by  which  absolute  forces 
are  conserved,  nor  other  excellent  inventions  of  nature's  architect 
have  place,  by  which  the  necessity  of  matter  and  the  beauty  of  form 
are  united.  Moreover,  the  elastic  force  itself  implanted  in  every  body 
shows  that  there  is  in  every  body,  also,  internal  motion  and  infinite 
(so  to  speak)  primitive  force,  although  in  the  impact  itself,  when 
circumstances  demand,  it  is  determined  by  derivative  force.  [For,  as 
in  an  arch,  any  part  whatever  sustains  the  entire  weight,  or  in  a  tense 
cord  the  traction,  and  any  portion  whatever  of  compressed  air,  has  as 
much  force  as  the  weight  of  the  aii-  pressing  upon  it,  so  any  corpuscle 
whatever,  of  the  entire  ambient  (amhientis)  mass  is  solicited  to  action 
by  the  conspiring  force,  and  awaits  nothing  but  an  occasion  for  exer- 
cising its  power,  as  is  shown  by  the  example  of  gunpowder  (pulveris 
pyrii)-\. 

There  are  many  other  thhigs  in  which  I  have  been  obliged  to  de- 
part from  Descartes,  but  those  which  I  have  now  brought  forth  relate 
chiefly  to  the  principles  themselves  of  corporeal  substances,  and,  if  you 
interpret  them  rightly,  are  capable  of  vindicating  the  ancient  philos- 
ophy of  a  healthier  school,  which  I  see  deserted  by  many  of  the 
more  recent  scholars,  even  those  well  disposed  towards  it,  where  there 
was  no  need.  The  philosophy  of  Rev.  Father  Ptolemacus,^  a  man 
very  versed  in  the  principles  of  the  ancients  and  the  moderns,  whose 
remarkable  teaching  I  examined  myself,  at  Rome  (from  which  philos- 
ophy I  promise  myself  very  much),  has  not  yet  reached  us. 

In  a  note,  Leibnitz  has  added :  In  addition,  I  am  pleased  to  state, 
that  although  very  many  Cartesians  boldly  reject  forms  and  forces  in 
bodies,  Descartes  nevertheless  spoke  more  moderately,  and  professed 
this  only,  that  he  found  no  reason  for  using  them.  I  indeed  admit 
that  they  should  be  rejected  if  of  no  use ;  but  in  this  very  thing  I 
have  shown  that  Descartes  has  erred.  For  not  only  in  entelechies,  or 
Tc5  Suva/xtKO),  are  placed  the  principles  of  mechanism,  by  which  all 
things  are  regulated  in  bodies,  but  I  have  also  shown  in  the  "  Acta 
Eruditorum,"  ^  when  I  was  replying  to  the  very  celebrated  man,  .John 
Christopher  Sturm,^  who  attacked,  in  his  "Pliysica  Eclectica,"  my  in- 

1  Giovanni  Battista  Tolomei,  165.V172G,  was  acquainted  witli  all  the  Euro- 
pean languages  and  had  a  very  extensive  knowledge  of  all  tlie  soienees  of  liis 
time,  and  was  reputed  a  profound  tlieologian  and  skilful  critic.  Among  lii.s 
works  was  PhiloHophia  mentis  et  sensuum,  Ronia3,  l(j'J6,  fol.,  Augustai  Viu- 
delicorum,  1G98,  fob  — Tr. 

2  Sept.  1698.  The  piece  is  tlie  De  ipsa  natum,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Lcihnh..  philos. 
Sdu'ift.,  4,504-516;  Erdmann,  154-160;  Jacques  (in  French),  1,4.^5-16«;  Janet 
(in  French),  2,  553-567 ;  transl.,  Duncan,  112-126.  (Jf.  also  Gerhardfs  Einlei- 
tung,  op.  cit.,  4,  417.  —  Tk. 

3  Johann  Christoph  Sturm,  lfi.'55-170.'3,  was.  from  1660,  Professor  of  Mathe- 
matics and  Physics  at  the  University  of  Alldorf.  His  J'/nj.-iini  Krlrrfica 
appeared  at  Nuremburg,  1(;'.)7,  4to.    Wliile  not  celebrated  for  pliysical  dis- 

2z 


700  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

sufficiently  understood  doctrine,  with  irrefragable  demonstration  that, 
completeness  being  assumed,  if  there  were  nothing  in  matter  but  mass 
itself  and  arrangement  of  its  parts,  it  would  be  impossible  for  any 
perceptible  variation  whatever  to  occur,  since  equivalences  are  substi- 
tuted for  limits,  and  by  banishing  conatus,  or  the  force  of  tendency, 
to  the  future  (the  entelechies,  that  is,  being  removed),  the  state  of 
things  present  at  one  moment  cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  state 
at  any  other  moment.  And  I  think  Aristotle  perceived  this  when  he 
saw  that,  besides  local  motion,  change  is  necessary  in  order  to  satisfy 
the  phenomena.  But  changes,  although  in  appearance  manifold,  just 
as  qualities,  are  reduced  in  the  last  analysis  to  variation  alone  of  forces. 
For  all  the  qualities  of  bodies,  that  is,  all  their  real  stable  accidents, 
except  forms  (that  is,  those  which  do  not  exist  in  transition,  as  motion, 
but  are  known  as  present,  although  referred  to  the  future),  are  at 
length,  when  analysis  is  set  up,  reduced  to  forces.  Further,  when 
forces  are  removed,  nothing  real  remains  in  motion  itself,  for  from 
variation  alone  of  arrangement  it  cannot  be  determined  where  the 
true  motion  or  the  cause  of  variation  is. 


YIII 

LETTER  OF  LEIBNITZ  TO  BASNAGE  DE  BEAUVAL, 
EDITOR  OF  THE  "HISTOIRE  DES  OUVRAGES  DES 
SAVANTS,"  PRINTED  IN  THAT  JOURNAL,  JULY,  1698, 
pp.  329  sq.^ 

Explanation  of  the  difficAiUies  which  M.  Bayle  has  found  in  the  Xeio 
System  of  the   Union  of  the  Soul  and  the  Body 

[Fro)n  the  French] 

I  take  the  liberty.  Sir,  to  send  you  this  explanation  of  the  diffi- 
culties which  M.  Bayle  has  found  in  the  hypothesis  which  I  have 
proposed  in  order  to  explain  the  union  of  the  soul  and  the  body. 
Nothing  is  kinder  than  the  manner  which  he  has  used  towards  me, 
and  I  consider  myself  honored  by  the  objections  he  has  placed  in 
his  excellent  Dictionary,  in  the  article  Rorarius.  Moi'eover,  a  mind 
as  great  and  as  profound  as  his  cannot  make  them  without  instruct- 
ing, and  I  shall  try  to  profit  by  the  light  which  he  has  shed  upon 

coveries,  he  emphasized  the  method  of  experiment,  and  spread  abroad  a  taste 
for  experimenting.  Germany  is  said  to  owe  to  him  the  introduction  of  the 
teaching  of  mathematics  into  the  gymnasia  and  the  common  schools.  — Tr. 

1  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leihniz.  philos.  Schrift.,  4,  517-r)24,  of.  G.'sEinleitunff,  ibid., 
419;  Erdmann,  Leibnit.  op.  philos.,  150-154;  Jacques,  (Euvres  de  Leibniz,  1, 
481-487;  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  2,  Pt.  I.,  74-79. 


APPENDIX  707 


these  matters  in  this  part  as  well  as  in  many  other  parts  of  his  work. 
He  does  not  reject  what  I  had  said  of  the  conservation  of  the  soul 
and  also  of  the  animal,  but  he  does  not  yet  appear  satisfied  with  the 
manner  in  which  I  have  claimed  to  explain  the  union  and  the  inter- 
course of  the  soul  and  the  body  in  the  "  Journal  des  Savants"  of  June 
27  and  of  July  i,  1695,  and  in  the  "  Histoire  des  ouvrages  des  savants," 
February,  1G96,  pp.  274,  275. 

Here  are  his  words,  which  seem  to  indicate  wherein  he  has  found 
difficulty:  "I  cannot  understand,"  he  says,  "the  series  of  actions, 
internal  and  spontaneous,  which  would  cause  the  soul  of  a  dog  to 
feel  pain  immediately  after  having  felt  joy,  although  it  were  alone  in 
the  universe."  I  reply  that  when  I  said  that  the  soul,  although  only 
God  and  it  should  exist  in  the  world,  would  feel  all  that  it  now 
feels,  I  only  employed  a  fiction  in  supposing  that  which  cannot  happen 
naturally,  in  order  to  show  that  the  feelings  of  the  soul  are  only  a 
consequence  of  that  which  is  already  in  it.  I  know  not  whether  the 
proof  of  incomprehensibility  which  M.  Bayle  finds  in  this  series  must 
be  sought  alone  in  that  which  he  calls  lower,  or  whether  he  wished 
to  introduce  it  from  this  time  by  the  example  of  the  spontaneous  pas- 
sage from  joy  to  pain ;  perhaps,  by  wishing  to  throw  out  a  hint  that 
this  passage  is  contrary  to  the  axiom  which  teaches  us  that  a  tiling 
always  continues  in  the  state  in  which  it  is  once  if  nothing  occurs 
which  obliges  it  to  change,  and  that  thus  the  animal  having  once  joy 
will  always  have  it  if  it  is  alone  or  if  nothing  external  makes  it  pass 
to  pain ;  in  every  case  I  agree  with  the  axiom,  and,  further,  I  main- 
tain that  it  is  in  my  favor,  as  in  fact  it  is  one  of  my  grounds.  Is  it 
not  true  that  from  this  axiom  we  conclude,  not  only  that  a  body  at 
rest  will  always  be  at  rest,  but  also  that  a  body  which  is  in  motion 
will  always  preserve  this  motion  or  change,  that  is  to  say,  the  same 
volocity  and  the  same  direction,  if  nothing  occurs  to  hinder  it?  Thus 
a  thing  does  not  remain  only  so  long  as  it  depends  upon  itself  (d'elle) 
in  the  state  in  which  it  is ;  but  also  when  this  is  a  state  of  change, 
it  continues  to  change,  following  always  one  and  the  same  law.  Now 
it  is,  according  to  my  view,  the  nature  of  created  substance  to  change 
continually  according  to  a  certain  order  whicli  conducts  it  spontane- 
ously (if  i  may  avail  myself  of  this  word)  through  all  the  states 
which  will  happen  to  it,  so  that  he  who  sees  all,  sees  in  its  present 
state  all  its  past  and  future  states.  And  this  law  of  order,  which  con- 
stitutes the  individuality  of  each  particular  substance,  has  an  exact 
relation  to  that  which  happens  in  every  substance  and  in  the  entire 
universe.  Perhaps  I  do  not  make  too  bold  a  statement  if  T  say  tliat 
I  can  demoiistrate  all  this,  but  at  present  the  question  is  only  of 
maintaining  it  as  a  possible  hypothesis  suitable  for  exi>1ainiiig  tlio 
phenomena.  Now  in  this  way  the  law  of  the  cliange  of  the  substance 
of  the  animal  bears  it  from  joy  to  pain  at  the  moment  that  a  continu- 


708  LEIBNITZ'S    CIIITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

ous  solution  is  made  in  its  body,  because  the  law  of  the  indivisible 
substance  of  this  animal  is  to  represent  what  is  done  in  its  body  in 
the  way  that  we  experience  it,  and  also  to  represent  in  some  fashion 
and  in  relation  to  this  body  all  that  is  done  in  the  w'orld ;  the  unities 
of  substance  being  nothing  else  than  different  concentrations  of  the 
universe  represented  according  to  the  different  points  of  view  which 
distmguish  them. 

M.  Bayle  continues :  "  I  understand  why  a  dog  passes  immediately 
from  pleasure  to  pain  when,  being  very  hungry,  and  eating  bread, 
we  give  him  a  blow  with  a  stick."  I  do  not  know  whether  we 
understand  it  sufficiently.  No  one  knows  better  than  M.  Bayle  him- 
self, that  it  is  in  this  that  the  great  difficulty  consists  of  explaining 
why  that  which  passes  in  the  body  produces  a  change  in  the  soul,  and 
that  it  is  this  which  has  forced  the  defenders  of  occasional  causes  to 
recur  to  the  care  which  God  must  take  to  represent  continually  to  the 
soul  the  changes  which  take  place  in  the  body ;  whilst  I  believe  that 
it  is  the  nature  itself  which  God  has  given  it  to  represent  in  virtue  of 
its  own  laws  what  passes  in  the  organs.     He  continues : 

"  But  that  his  soul  is  constructed  in  such  a  way  that  at  the  moment 
he  is  struck  he  would  feel  the  pain,  although  we  should  not  strike 
him,  although  he  should  continue  to  eat  the  bread  undisturbed  and 
unhindered,  this  is  what  I  cannot  understand."  I  do  not  remember, 
also,  to  have  said  it,  and  w-e  could  say  it  only  by  a  metaphysical  fiction, 
as  when  we  suppose  that  God  annihilates  a  body  in  order  to  produce 
a  vacuum,  both  being  equally  contrary  to  the  order  of  things.  For 
since  the  nature  of  the  soul  was  made  at  first  in  a  manner  suited  to 
represent  successively  the  changes  of  matter,  the  case  we  suppose 
cannot  happen  in  the  natural  order.  God  could  give  to  each  substance 
its  phenomena  independent  of  those  of  others ;  but  in  this  way  he 
would  have  made,  so  to  speak,  as  many  worlds  without  connection  as 
there  are  substances ;  almost,  as  we  say,  that  when  we  dream  we  are 
in  a  world  apart,  and  that  we  enter  into  the  common  world  when  we 
awake.  It  is  not  that  the  dreams  are  unrelated  to  the  organs  and  the 
rest  of  the  body,  but  that  they  are  related  in  a  manner  less  distinct. 
Let  us  continue  with  M.  Bayle : 

"I  find,  also,"  says  he,  "the  spontaneity  of  this  soul  very  incompati- 
ble with  the  feelings  of  pain,  and,  in  general,  with  all  the  perceptions 
which  are  displeasing  to  it."  This  incomprehensibility  would  be  cer- 
tain, if  spontaneous  and  voluntary  were  the  same  thing.  Everything 
voluntary  is  spontaneous ;  but  there  are  spontaneovis  actions  which 
are  without  choice,  and  consequently  are  not  voluntary.  It  does  not 
depend  upon  the  soul,  always,  to  procure  feelings  which  please  it, 
since  the  feelings  it  will  have  depend  upon  those  which  it  has  had. 
M.  Bayle  proceeds  : 

"  Moreover,  the  reason  why  this  clever  man  does  not  approve  the 


APPENDIX  709 


Cartesian  system  appears  to  me  to  be  a  false  supposition  :  for  it  cannot 
be  said  that  tlie  system  of  occasional  causes  makes  the  action  of  God 
intervene  by  a  miracle  (Deum  ex  machina)  in  the  reciprocal  dependence 
of  the  body  and  soul;  for,  as  God  intervenes  only  according  to  general 
laws,  he  does  not  act  there  in  an  extraordinary  way."  It  is  not  for 
this  reason  alone  that  I  do  not  approve  of  the  Cartesian  system ;  and 
if  you  consider  mine  a  little,  you  see  clearly  that  I  find  in  itself  that 
which  leads  me  to  embrace  it.  Moreover,  if  the  hypothesis  of  occa- 
sional causes  should  not  need  miracle,  it  seems  that  mine  would  not 
cease  to  have  other  advantages.  I  have  said  that  we  may  ima"ine 
three  systems  to  explain  the  intercourse  we  find  between  the  soul  and 
the  body ;  namely,  first,  the  system  of  the  influence  of  the  one  upon 
the  other,  which  is  that  of  the  schools  taken  in  the  common  sense, 
which  I  believe  impossible,  after  the  Cartesians ;  second,  that  of  a 
perpetual  overseei",  who  represents  in  the  one  that  which  takes  place 
in  the  other,  very  much  as  if  a  man  were  charged  with  making  two 
bad  clocks  always  to  agree,  which  of  themselves  would  not  be  capable 
of  agreeing,  and  this  is  the  system  of  occasional  causes ;  and  third, 
that  of  the  natural  agreement  of  two  substances  such  as  would  exist 
between  two  very  accurate  clocks ;  and  I  find  this  as  possible  as  the 
system  of  the  overseer,  and  niore  worthy  of  the  author  of  these  sub- 
stances, clocks  or  automata.  But  let  us  see  whether  the  system  of 
occasional  causes  does  not  in  reality  suppose  a  perpetual  miracle. 
They  say  here,  no,  because  God  would  act  according  to  this  system 
only  tlirough  general  laws.  I  agree,  but,  in  my  opinion,  that  is  not 
sufficient  in  order  to  remove  the  miracles :  if  God  did  it  continually, 
they  would  not  cease  to  be  miracles,  taking  this  word  not  jjopidarly, 
as  a  thing  rare  and  wonderful,  but  philosophically,  as  that  whicli 
exceeds  the  forces  of  created  beings.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  tliat 
God  has  made  a  general  law;  for,  besides  the  decree,  there  must  also 
be  a  natural  means  of  executing  it ;  that  is  to  say,  what  takes  place 
must  be  capable  of  being  explained  by  the  nature  which  (Tod  gives  to 
things.  The  laws  of  nature  are  not  so  arbitrary  or  so  indifferent  as 
many  think.  If  God  decreed,  for  example,  that  all  bodies  should 
have  a  tendency  toward  a  circular  line,  and  that  the  radii  of  the  circles 
should  be  proportional  to  the  size  of  the  bodies,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  say  that  there  is  a  means  of  executing  this  decree  by  more  simple 
laws,  or  rather,  it  would  be  necessary  to  admit  that  CJod  will  execute 
it  miraculously,  or  at  least  by  angels  expressly  charged  with  this  care, 
very  nearly  like  those  who  were  sometimes  given  to  the  celestial 
spheres.  It  would  be  the  same  if  some  one  said  that  God  lias  given 
to  the  bodies  natural  and  primitive  gravities  by  whicli  each  sliould 
tend  to  the  centre  of  its  globe,  without  being  pushed  by  otlnu-  l)odieH; 
for  in  my  opinion  this  system  would  need  a  perpetual  miracle,  or  at 
least  the  assistance  of  the  angels. 


710  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

"  Does  the  internal  and  active  property  communicated  to  tiie  forms 
of  bodies  know  the  series  of  actions  it  is  to  produce  ?  Xot  at  all ;  for 
we  know  by  experience  that  we  are  ignorant  that  we  have  in  an  hour 
such  or  such  perceptions."  I  reply  that  this  property,  or  rather  this 
soul  or  form,  does  not  know  them  distinctly,  but  that  it  feels  them 
confusedly.  There  is  in  each  substance  traces  of  all  which  has  hap- 
pened to  it  and  of  all  which  will  happen  to  it.  But  this  infinite  mul- 
titude of  perceptions  hinders  us  in  distinguishing  them ;  as  when  I 
hear  a  gi'eat  confused  noise  of  a  whole  people,  I  do  not  distinguish 
one  voice  from  another. 

"It  would  be  necessary,  then,  that  the  forms  be  directed  by  some 
external  principle  in  the  production  of  their  acts ;  would  not  this  be 
the  Deus  ex  macJdna,  just  the  same  as  in  the  system  of  occasional 
causes  ?  "  The  preceding  reply  puts  a  stop  to  this  inference.  On  the 
contrary,  the  present  state  of  each  substance  is  a  natural  result  of  its 
preceding  state ;  but  there  is  only  one  infinite  intelligence  therein 
which  can  see  this  result,  for  it  envelops  the  universe  in  souls  as  well 
as  in  each  portion  of  matter. 

M.  Bayle  concludes  with  these  words :  "  Finally,  as  he  supposes 
with  much  reason  that  all  souls  ai'e  simple  and  indivisible,  we  cannot 
understand  how  they  can  be  compared  to  a  pendidum,  that  is  to  say, 
that  by  their  original  constitution  they  can  diversify  their  operations, 
by  availing  themselves  of  the  spontaneous  activity  which  they  would 
receive  from  their  Creator.  We  conceive  cleai-ly  that  a  simple  being 
will  always  act  uniformly,  if  no  foreign  cause  turns  it  aside.  If  it 
were  composed  of  many  pieces,  as  a  machine,  it  would  act  diversely, 
because  the  particular  activity  of  each  piece  might  change  at  every 
moment  the  course  of  that  of  the  others ;  but  in  a  single  substance, 
where  will  you  find  the  caiise  of  the  change  of  operation?"  I  find 
that  this  objection  is  worthy  of  M.  Bayle,  and  that  it  belongs  to  those 
which  most  deserve  to  be  cleared  up.  But  I  also  think  that  if  I  had 
not  provided  for  it  at  first,  my  system  would  not  deserve  to  be  ex- 
amined. I  have  compared  the  soul  to  a  pendulum  only  in  regard  to 
the  regulated  precision  of  its  changes,  which  is  indeed  but  imperfect 
in  the  best  clocks,  but  which  is  perfect  in  the  works  of  God ;  and  we 
may  say  that  the  soul  is  an  immaterial  automaton  of  the  most  accurate 
kind.  When  it  is  said  that  a  simple  being  will  always  act  uniformly, 
there  is  a  distinction  to  be  made,  if  to  act  uniformly  is  to  follow  per- 
petually one  and  the  same  law  of  order  or  of  continuity,  as  in  a  cer- 
tain rank  or  series  of  numbers,  I  admit  that  every  simple  being  itself, 
and  indeed  every  complex  being  acts  uniformly ;  but  if  unlfonnb/ 
means  likewise,  I  do  not  agree.  To  explain  the  difference  of  this 
sense  by  an  example,  a  movement  in  a  parabolic  line  is  uniform  in 
the  first  sense ;  but  it  is  not  so  in  the  second,  the  portions  of  the  para- 
bolic line  not  being  similar  among  themselves  like  those  of  the  straight 


APPENDIX 


711 


lines.  It  is  true,  to  mention  it  in  passing,  that  a  simple  body  left  to 
itself  describes  only  straight  lines,  if  we  speak  only  of  the  centre 
which  represents  the  motion  of  this  entire  body;  but  when  a  simple 
and  rigid  l)ody,  having  once  received  a  turbination  or  circulation 
around  its  centre,  retains  it  in  the  same  sense  and  with  the  same  velo- 
city, it  follows  that  a  body  left  to  itself  may  describe  circular  lines  by 
its  points  distant  from  tlie  centre,  when  the  centre  is  at  rest,  and  even 
certain  quadratrices,  when  this  centre  is  in  motion,  which  have  the 
ordinate  composed  of  the  straight  line  running  through  the  centre, 
and  of  the  right  sine  whose  versed  sine  is  the  abscissa,  the  area  being 
to  the  circumference  as  this  straight  line  is  to  a  given  straight  line. 
We  must  consider  also  that  the  soul,  wholly  simple  as  it  is,  has  always 
a  feeling  composed  of  many  perceptions  at  once,  wliich  fact  effects 
as  much  for  our  purpose  as  if  it  were  composed  of  pieces  like  a 
machine.  For  each  preceding  perception  influences  the  following, 
conformably  to  a  law  of  order  which  exists  in  perceptions  as  in  move- 
ments. Thus  the  majority  of  philosophers,  for  many  centuries,  who 
allow  thoughts  to  souls  and  to  angels,  which  they  believe  destitute  of 
all  body,  to  say  nothing  of  the  intelligences  of  Aristotle,  admit  a 
spontaneous  change  in  a  simple  being.  I  add  that  since  the  percep- 
tions which  are  found  together  in  one  and  the  same  soul,  at  tlie  same 
time,  involve  a  multitude  veritably  infinite  of  minute  indistinguishable 
feelings  as  the  sequel  must  develop,  we  must  not  be  astonished  at  the 
infinite  variety  of  that  which  must  result  therefrom  in  time.  All  this 
is  only  a  consequence  of  the  representative  nature  of  the  soul,  which 
must  express  what  passes  and  indeed  what  will  pass  in  its  body,  and 
in  some  fashion  in  all  others,  through  the  connection  or  correspon- 
dence of  all  parts  of  the  world.  It  would  perhaps  suffice  to  say  that 
God,  having  made  atoms  corporeal,  might  also  well  have  made  them 
immaterial  to  represent  the  first;  but  we  have  thought  it  would  be 
well  to  dwell  upon  it  a  little  more. 

For  the  rest,  I  have  read  with  pleasure  wliat  M.  Rayle  says  in  the 
article  Zeno.  It  might,  perhaps,  be  perceived  that  what  can  be  drawn 
therefrom  agrees  better  with  my  system  than  witli  every  other,  for 
what  there  is  of  reality  m  extension  and  motion  consists  only  in  the 
ground  of  the  order  and  the  regulated  series  of  phenomena  and  per- 
ceptions. In  like  manner,  as  many  academicians  and  sceptics  as 
those  who  wish  to  reply  to  them,  seem  to  be  embarrassed  principally 
only  because  they  sought  a  greater  reality  in  sensible  tilings  outside 
of  us  than  that  of  the  regulated  phcniomena.  We  conceive  extensum 
in  conceiving  an  order  in  coexistences,  but  we  nnist  not  conceive 
it  any  more  than  space,  after  the  fashion  of  a  substance.  It  is  like 
time,  which  presents  to  the  mind  only  an  order  in  changes.  And  as 
for  motion,  what  is  real  therein  is  the  force  or  the  ])ower ;  tliat  is  to 
say,  what  there  is  in  the  present  state  which  carries  with  itself  a 


712  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

change  for  the  future.  The  rest  is  only  phenomena  and  relations. 
The  consideration  of  this  system  shows  also  that,  when  we  enter  into 
the  heart  of  things,  we  iiud  more  reason  than  we  thought  in  the 
majority  of  the  philosophic  sects.  The  little  substantial  reality  of 
the  sensible  things  of  the  Sceptics ;  the  reduction  of  all  to  harmonies 
or  numbers,  ideas,  and  perceptions  of  the  Pythagoreans  and  Platon- 
ists ;  the  one  and  also  the  all  of  Parmeuides  and  of  Plotinus  without 
any  Spinozism ;  the  Stoic  connection,  compatible  with  the  spontaneity 
of  the  others ;  the  vital  philosophy  of  the  Kabbalists  and  Hermetics 
who  put  feeling  above  everything;  the  forms  and  entelechies  of 
Aristotle  and  the  Scholastics,  and  even  the  mechanical  explanation 
of  all  particular  phenomena,  according  to  Democritus  and  the  moderns, 
and  so  forth,  find  themselves  reunited  as  in  a  centre  of  perspective, 
whence  the  object,  obscured  in  regarding  it  from  an  entirely  different 
point,  shows  its  regularity  and  the  agreement  of  its  parts ;  we  have 
failed  thi'ough  a  sectarian  spirit  in  limiting  ourselves  by  the  rejection 
of  others.  The  formalist  philosoi^hers  blame  the  material  or  cor- 
pusculary  ones,  and  vice  versa.  We  wrongly  give  limits  to  the  division 
and  subtilty  as  well  as  to  the  richness  and  beauty  of  nature  when  we 
posit  atoms  and  the  vacuum,  when  we  imagine  certain  primary  ele- 
ments, such  as  the  Cartesians,  instead  of  veritable  unities,  and  when 
we  do  not  recognize  the  infinite  in  everything,  and  the  exact  expres- 
sion of  the  greatest  in  the  smallest,  united  to  the  tendency  of  each 
to  develop  itself  in  a  perfect  order,  which  is  the  most  admirable  and 
the  most  beautiful  result  of  the  sovereign  principle,  whose  wisdom 
would  leave  nothing  better  to  be  desired  by  those  who  could  under- 
stand its  economy. 


IX 

FEAGMENT   OF   A  LETTER  TO   A^   UNIOs^OWX 
PERSON 

October  16,  17071 

[From  the  French] 
P 

I  think,  then,  I  have  good  reasons  for  believing  that  all  the  differ- 
ent classes  of  beings  whose  union  forms  the  universe,  exist  in  the 
ideas  of  God  only  as  so  many  ordinates  of  the  same  curve,  the  union 
of  which  does  not  allow  the  placing  of  others  between  them,  because 
that  would  indicate  disorder  and  imperfection.     Men  are  connected 

1  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz,  Eine  Biographie,  Anmerkungen  z.  zw.  Buche,  pp. 
31-33.  Guhrauer  says  in  the  note  which  contains  the  Fragment  here  translated : 
"  The  Principle  of  Continuity,  with  which  Leibnitz  accomplishes  so  much  in 


APPENDIX  713 


with  the  animals,  these  with  the  plants,  and  these  again  with  the 
fossils,  which  will  be  united  in  their  turn  with  bodies  which  the 
senses  and  the  imagination  represent  to  us  as  perfectly  dead  and 
shapeless.  Now  since  the  law  of  continuity  demands  tliat  ivhen  the 
essential  determinations  of  a  being  approach  those  of  another  so  that  like- 
wise accordingly  all  the  properties  of  the  first  must  graduaUij  approach 
those  of  the  last,  it  is  necessary  that  all  the  orders  of  natural  beings 
form  only  one  chain,  in  which  the  different  classes,  like  so  many 
links,  connect  so  closely  the  one  to  the  other,  that  it  is  impossible 
for  the  senses  and  the  imagination  to  fix  the  precise  point  where  any 
one  begins  or  ends:  all  the  species  which  border  on  or  which  occupy, 
so  to  speak,  the  regions  of  inflection  and  retrogression  being  obliged 
to  i)e  equivocal  and  endowed  with  characters  which  can  refer  to  the 
neighboring  species  equally.^'  Thus  the  existence  of  Zoophytes  for 
example,  or,  as  Buddeus^  calls  them,  Plant-Aiiimals,' is  nowise  mon- 
strous, but  it  is  indeed  agreeable  to  the  order  of  Nature  that  there 
are  some.  And  such  is  the  force  of  the  principle  of  continuity  with 
me  that,  not  only  should  I  not  be  astonished  to  learn  that  beings  had 
been  found  which  as  regards  many  properties,  for  example,  those  of 
maintaining  and  multiplying  themselves,  might  pass  for  vegetables 
with  as  good  right  as  for  animals,  and  which  would  reverse  the  oixli- 
nary  rules,  based  upon  the  supposition  of  a  perfect  and  absolute  sepa- 
ration of  the  different  orders  of  simultaneous  beings  which  fill  the 
universe ;  I  should  be  so  little  astonished,  I  say,  that  I  am  indeed 
convinced  that  there  must  be  such,  that  Natural  History  will  perhaps 
some  day  succeed  in  knowing  them,  when  it  shall  have  studied  more 
this  infinite  number  of  living  beings,  whose  minuteness  hides  them 
from  ordinary  observation  and  which  are  found   concealed  in   the 

Psychologj^  led  him  to  surprising  glimpses  in  his  views  of  animate  nature. 
Nowhere  has  Leibnitz  expressed  himself  so  clearly  upon  this  subjeet,  as  in  the 
letter  to  an  unknown  person,  of  Oct.  16,  1707,  of  wliich  a  fragment  occasioned 
the  notorious  controversy  between  Maupertuis  and  Konig,  1752.  It  stands 
with  many  others  in  Konig's  Appel  au  Public  du  jugeiaent  de  I'acadeviie 
royale  de  Berlin,  Site.  See  p.  45.  [Then  follows  the  letter].  .  ,  .  This  is  the 
same  letter  which  the  Berlin  Academy,  under  the  inspiration  of  Maupertuis, 
declared  a  forgery,  and  struck  off  the  list  of  the  Academicians  Professor 
Konig  as  an  impostor.  —  There  are  perhaps  few  pieces  of  Ijcibnitz,  wliose 
genuineness  are  so  certified  to  the  connoisseur,  as  tliis  letter  (whicli  Dutens 
and  Erdmann  have  overlooked).  Voltaire  also  (in  his  letter  to  Kotiig)  re(!og- 
nized  its  genuineness  at  once,  although  only  from  motives  which  he  drew  from 
the  style.  The  Academy  was  right  only  in  the  fact  that  the  letter  could  not 
have  been  addressed  to  Hermann.  Cf.  Leibn.  opp.  [ed.  Dutens] , ."?,  .'531."  —  Tii. 
1  Leibnitz  probably  refers  to  Johann  Franz  Buddeus,  1()(;7-172;),  assistant 
in  the  philosophical  faculty  at  Wittenberg,  Professor  of  (Irecik  and  ]>atiii  at 
Coburg  Gymnasium,  of  Philosophy  at  Halle,  and  of  Theology  at  Jena.  Ho 
published  Elementa  philosophiiB  practice  instrumentalis  ct  theoreticx,  Haliw, 
1703.  — Tk. 


714  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

bowels  of  the  earth  and  the  depths  of  the  -uaters.  We  remarked 
only  since  yesterday  what  grounds  have  we  for  denying  to  reason 
what  we  have  not  yet  had  occasion  to  see?  p'he  principle  of  con- 
tinuity is  then  beyond  doubt  with  me,  and  might  aid  in  establishing 
many  important  truths  in  the  true  philosophy,  which,  raising  itself 
above  the  senses  and  the  imagination,  seeks  the  origin  of  phenomena 
in  the  regions  of  the  intellect.  I  flatter  myself  that  I  have  some  ideas 
concerning  them,  but  this  age  is  not  qualified  to  receive  them.] 

X 

THAT  THE  MOST  PEEFECT   BEING  EXISTS  ^  , 

[From  the  Latin] 

I  call  every  simple  quality  which  is  positive  and  absolute,  or 
expresses  whatever  it  expresses  without  any  limits,  a  perfection. 

But  a  quality  of  this  sort,  because  it  is  simple,  is  therefore  iiTesolv- 
able  or  indefinable,  for  otherwise,  either  it  will  not  be  a  simple 
quality  but  an  aggregate  of  many,  or,  if  it  is  one,  it  will  be  circum- 
scribed by  limits  and  so  be  known  through  negations  of  further 
progress  ^  contrary  to  the  hypothesis,  for  a  purely  positive  quality  was 
assumed. 

From  these  considerations  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  that  all  perfec- 
tions are  compatible  with  each  other  or  can  exist  in  the  same  subject. 

For  let  the  proposition  be  of  this  kind : 

A  and  B  are  incompatible 
(for  understanding  by  A  and  B  two  simple  forms  of  this  kind  or 
perfections,  and  it  is  the  same  if  more  are  assumed  like  them  ^),  it  is 
evident  that  it  cannot  be  demonstrated  without  the  resolution  of 
the  terms  A  and  B,  of  each  or  both;  for  otherwise  their  nature 
would  not  enter  into  the  ratiocination  and  the  incompatibility  could 
be  demonstrated  as  well  from  any  others  as  from  themselves.  But 
now  (by  hypothesis)  they  are  irresolvable.  Therefore  this  proposi- 
tion cannot  be  demonstrated  from  these  forms. 

But  it  might  certainly  be  demonstrated  by  these  if  it  were  true, 
because  ^  it  is  not  true  per  se,  for  all  propositions  necessarily  true  are 

1  Gerbardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  261-262.  Cf.  Gerhardt's  Einleitung, 
ihid.,2bl.  —  Tvi. 

-  Leibuitz  bad  first  written :  "  atque  ita  ope  negationum,"  i.e.  and  thus  also 
by  means  of  negations.  —  Gerhardt.  —  Tr. 

3  Tbe  words,  "  idemque  est  .  .  .,"  were  added  later.  —  Gerhardt.  —  Tr. 

■*  For  tbe  following,  up  to  tbe  words:  "  aut  per  se  notie,"  Leibnitz  at  first 
wrote:  "(esset  euim  neeessaria,  neque  tamen  per  se  nota)"  i.e.  for  it  would 
be  necessary,  and  yet  not  known  per  se. —  Gerhardt.  — Tr. 


APrENDIX  715 


either  demonstrable  or  known  per  se.  Therefore,  this  proposition  is 
not  necessarily  true.  Or  i  if  it  is  not  necessary  that  A  and  B  exist  in 
the  same  subject,  they  cannot  therefore  exist  in  the  same  subject,  and 
since  the  reasoning  is  the  same  as  regards  any  other  assumed  qualities 
of  this  kind,  therefore  all  perfections  are  compatible. 

It  is  granted,  therefore,  that  either  a  subject  of  all  perfections  or 
the  most  perfect  being  can  be  known. 

Whence  it  is  evident  that  it  also  exists,  since  existence  is  contained 
in  the  number  of  the  perfections.- 

Gerhardt  says  :  "  In  the  foregoing  is  found  what  Leibnitz  brought 
before  Spinoza.     The  following  he  appears  later  to  have  added :  " 

[The  same  can  be  shown  also  as  regards  the  forms  composed  from 
the  absolute  forms,  provided  they  are  granted.] 

I  showed  this  reasoning  to  D.  Spinoza  when  I  was  in  The  Ilague,^ 
who  thought  it  solid;  for  when  at  first  he  opposed  it,  I  put  it  in  wi'it- 
ing  and  read  this  paper  before  him. 

SCHOL. 

The  reasoning  of  Descartes  concerning  the  existence  of  the  most 
perfect  being  assumed  that  the  most  perfect  being  can  be  known,  or 
is  possible.  For  this  being  assumed  because  a  notion  of  this  kind  is 
granted,  it  immediately  follows  that  that  being  exists,  since  we  framed 
the  notion  in  such  a  way  that  it  immediately  contains  existence.  But 
the  question  is  asked  whether  it  is  witliin  our  power  to  conceive  such 
a  being,  or  whether  such  a  notion  exists  on  the  side  of  the  thing,  and 
can  be  clearly  and  distinctly  known  without  contradiction.  For  the 
opponents  will  say  that  such  a  notion  of  the  most  perfect  being  or  of 
a  being  existing  through  his  essence  is  a  chimera.  Nor  is  it  sullicient 
for  Descartes  to  appeal  to  experience  and  to  allege  that  he  perceives 
the  same  in  such  a  manner  in  himself  clearly  and  distinctly,  for  this 
is  to  break  off,  not  to  complete  the  demonstration,  unless  he  show.s 
the  method  through  which  others  also  can  attain  the  same  experience; 
for  as  often  as  we  bring  experiences  into  the  midst  of  the  demonstra- 
tion, we  ought  to  show  others  also  the  method  of  producing  tlie  same 
exi^erience,  unless  we  wish  to  convince  them  by  our  autliority  alone. 

1  This  seutence  up  to  "oinnes  perlectionos,"  was  added  later.  —  Gerhardt. 
—  Tr. 

2  At  first :  "  inter  perfectiones."  —  Gerhardt.  —  Tk. 

3 November,  1G76  :  (/.  Giiln-auer,  Leibnllz,  J'Jiiie  JSioi/raji/iie,  Pt.  I.,  LSI.  -  Tit. 


710  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


XI 
WHAT   IS   IDEA^ 

[^From  the  Latin] 

First  of  all  (however),  l)y  the  term  Idea  we  mean  sometMncj  ivhich 
is  in  our  mind ;  marks  (vestigia)  therefore  impressed  upon  the  brain 
are  not  ideas,  for  I  assume  as  certain  that  the  mind  is  something  else 
than  the  brain,  or  a  more  subtile  part  of  the  brain  substance. 

But  there  are  many  things  in  our  mind  —  for  example,  thoughts, 
perceptions,  affections  —  which  we  know  well  are  not  ideas,  although 
without  ideas  they  would  not  be  produced.  For  idea  for  us  consists 
not  m  a  certain  act  of  thought,  hut  in  a  power  (facultate),  and  we  say 
we  have  an  idea  of  a  thing,  although  we  do  not  think  of  it,  provided 
we  can  on  a  given  occasion  think  of  it. 

There  is  nevertheless  also  in  this  a  certain  difficulty,  for  we  have  a 
remote  power  of  thinking  about  all  things,  even  of  those  of  which  we 
have  not  perchance  ideas,  because  we  have  the  power  of  recovering 
tliem ;  idea,  therefore,  demands  a  certain  power  near  at  hand  of  thinking 
about  a  thing  or  facility. 

But  not  even  this  suffices,  for  he  who  has  a  method  which  if  he 
follows  he  can  attain  the  thing,  does  not,  therefore,  have  an  idea  of  it. 
As,  if  I  should  enumerate  in  order  the  sections  of  a  cone,  it  is  certain 
that  I  would  come  into  the  knowledge  of  opposite  hyperbolas,  although 
I  have  not  yet  an  ideg,  of  them.  There  must  necessarily,  therefore, 
be  something  in  me,  which  not  only  leads  to  the  thing,  but  also  expresses  it. 

That  is  said  to  express  anything  in  which  are  contained  conditions 
corresponding  to  the  conditions  of  the  thing  to  be  expressed.  But 
these  expressions  are  varied ;  for  example,  the  model  of  the  machine 
expresses  the  machine  itseK,  a  perspective  drawing  of  a  thing  in  a 
plane  expresses  a  solid,  an  oration  expresses  thoughts  and  truths, 
letters  express  numbers,  an  algebraic  equation  expresses  a  circle  or 
other  figure ;  and  because  these  expressions  have  something  common, 
from  the  contemplation  of  the  conditions  of  the  expressing  thing,  we 
can  come  into  the  knowledge  of  the  corresponding  properties  of  the 
thing  to  be  expressed.  Whence  it  is  evident  that  it  is  not  necessary 
that  that  which  expresses  be  similar  to  the  thing  expressed,  provided 
a  certain  analogy  of  conditions  is  preserved. 

It  is  also  evident  that  some  expressions  have  a  basis  in  nature,  but 
others  at  least  are  partly  based  in  will  (arhitrio),  as  are  the  expressions 
which  are  produced  by  sounds  or  characters.     Those  things  which 

iGerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  2Ga-2(>4.  Cf.  Gerhardt's  Einleitung, 
ma.,  251-252.  — Tr. 


APPENDIX  717 


are  based  upon  nature  demand  either  some  similitude,  such  as  exists 
between  a  great  circle  and  a  little  one,  or  between  a  region  and  a  map 
of  the  region ;  or  at  least  a  connection  such  as  exists  between  a  circle 
and  an  ellipse  which  represents  it  in  perspective  (oplice),  for  any  point 
whatever  of  an  ellipse  corresponds,  according  to  a  certain  fixed  law, 
to  some  point  of  a  circle.  N"ay,  rather,  the  circle,  by  any  other  similar 
figure  in  such  a  case,  would  be  badly  represented.  In  like  manner, 
every  complete  effect  represents  a  complete  cause ;  for  I  can  always, 
from  the  knowledge  of  such  effect,  come  to  the  knowledge  of  its  cause. 
Thus  the  deeds  of  each  one  represent  his  mind,  and  the  world  itself 
ill  a  measure  represents  God.  It  can  also  happen  that  those  things 
which  arise  from  the  same  cause  express  themselves  by  turns ;  for 
example,  gesture  and  discourse.  So  certain  deaf  persons  understand 
those  who  speak,  not  by  the  sound,  but  by  the  motion  of  the  moutli. 

And  so  the  idea  of  things  existing  in  us  is  nothing  else  than  the 
fact  that  God,  the  author  alike  of  things  and  the  mind,  has  impressed 
this  power  of  thought  upon  the  mind,  so  that  out  of  its  own  workings 
it  can  draw  those  things  which  perfectly  correspond  to  those  wliich 
follow  from  things.  And  so,  although  the  idea  of  a  circle  is  not  like 
the  circle,  yet  from  it  truths  can  be  drawn  which  in  the  true  circle 
experience  would  no  doubt  confirm. 


XII 

ON   THE   METHOD  OF  DISTINGUISHINa  liEAL 
FROM  IMAGINARY  PHENOMENA' 

[From  the  Latin] 

Being  is  that  the  concept  of  which  involves  something  positive,  or 
that  wiiich  can  by  us  be  conceived,  provided  that  which  we  conceive 
is  possible,  and  does  not  involve  a  contradiction,  which  we  know, 
both  if  the  concept  is  perfectly  explained,  and  involves  no  confusion  ; 
and  briefly,  if  the  thing  actually  exists,  for  that  which  exists  is  cer- 
tainly a  being  or  a  possible  thing. 

But  as  far  as  Being  is  explained  by  a  distinct  concept,  so  is  Kxistcncn 
by  a  distinct  perception;  and  that  we  may  the  better  iiiidiirsland  Mils, 
we  must  see  in  what  ways  existence  is  proved.  And  in  (lie  first  place, 
without  proof,  I  affirm  existence,  from  the  simple  pera^piion  or  ex- 
perience of  which  I  am  conscious  within  myself;  tiiat  is,  in  the  lir.st 
place,  riDjself,  thinking  the  various  things,  then  the  various  fi/inioinma 

iGerhar.lt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schri/l.,  7,  :n!)-:i22;  ]':nl.MMnr,,  Lrihnit.  opera 
philos.,  443^45.  — Tr. 


718  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


themselves,  or  the  appearances  which  exist  in  my  mind.  For  these 
two,  since  they  are  immediately  perceived  by  the  mind  with  the  inter- 
vention of  no  other,  can  be  wholly  proved,  and  it  is  equally  certain 
that  there  exists  in  my  mind  the  species  of  a  mountain  of  gold  or  of  a 
centaur,  when  I  dream  of  these,  as  it  is  certain  that  I  exist  who  dream  ; 
for  each  is  contained  in  this  one  thing,  that  it  is  certain  that  the 
centaur  appears  to  me. 

Let  us  now  see  by  what  signs  we  may  know  what  phenomena  are  real. 
We  determine  this  now,  both  from  the  phenomenon  itself,  and  from 
the  antecedent  and  consequent  phenomena.  From  the  phenomenon 
itself,  whether  it  be  vivid,  multiplex,  congruous.  It  will  be  vivid,  if 
the  qualities,  as  light,  color,  heat,  appear  sufficiently  intense ;  it  will 
be  multiplex  if  they  are  varied,  and  adapted  to  many  tests  and  to  the 
institution  of  new  observations ;  for  example,  if  we  experience  in  the 
phenomenon  not  only  colors  but  also  sounds,  odors,  flavors,  tactile 
qualities,  and  those  things  both  in  the  whole  and  in  its  various  parts, 
which  again  we  can  discuss  in  various  relations  (^variis  causis  trac- 
tare).  Which  things,  indeed,  a  long  series  of  observations,  instituted 
especially  with  design  and  with  choice,  is  wont  to  meet  neither  in 
dreams  nor  in  those  images  which  the  memory  or  the  phantasy  pre- 
sents, in  which  the  image  is  very  often  weak  and  also  disappears 
(^(Usparel)  in  tlie  course  of  the  discussion.  The  phenomenon  will  be 
congruous  when  it  consists  of  many  phenomena,  the  reason  of  which 
can  be  given  from  themselves  in  turn,  or  from  some  common  hyjiothesis 
sufficiently  simple ;  then  it  will  be  congruous  if  it  preserves  the  usage 
of  other  phenomena  which  have  frequently  presented  themselves  to  us 
so  that  the  parts  of  the  phenomenon  have  that  position,  order,  result, 
which  similar  phenomena  have  had.  Otherwise,  they  will  be  suspected  ; 
for  if  we  should  see  men  moved  in  the  air,  sitting  upon  the  hippogi'yphs 
of  Ariosto,  we  should  doubt,  I  think,  whether  we  were  dreaming  or 
awake.  But  this  proof  can  be  referred  to  another  head  of  con- 
siderations assumed  from  the  preceding  phenomena.  With  whicli 
phenomena  the  present  phenomenon  must  be  congruous,  if,  namelj', 
they  preserve  the  same  usage,  that  is,  if  the  reason  of  this  can  be 
given  from  the  preceding,  or  all  agree  with  the  same  hypothesis  as  a 
common  reason.  But,  undoubtedly,  the  strongest  proof  is  the  agree- 
ment with  the  whole  course  of  life,  especially  if  very  many  others 
affirm  that  the  same  agrees  with  their  own  phenomena  also ;  for,  that 
other  substances  similar  to  us  exist,  is  not  only  probable,  but  indeed, 
certain,  as  I  shall  soon  say.  But  the  most  powerful  proof  of  the  reality 
of  phenomena,  which,  indeed,  alone  suffices,  is  the  success  in  predicting 
future  plienomena  from  the  past  and  present,  whether  that  prediction 
is  founded  in  reason,  or  in  the  hypothesis  thus  far  succeeding,  or  in 
the  usage  thus  far  observed.  Nay,  although  this  entire  life  were  said 
to    be   nothing  but   a  dream,   and  the  visible   world  nothing  but  a 


APPENDIX  719 


phantasm,  I  should  call  this  dream  or  phantasm  real  enough,  if,  usino- 
reason  well,  we  were  never  deceived  by  it ;  but  just  as  we  know  from 
these  what  phenomena  must  be  regarded  as  real,  so,  on  the  other 
hand,  whatever  phenomena  conflict  with  these  which  we  judge  real, 
also  those  whose  fallacy  we  can  explain  from  their  own  causes,  these 
only  we  think  apparent. 

But  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  proofs  of  real  phenomena  which 
thus  far  have  been  brought  forward,  howsoever  united,  are  not  demon- 
strative;  for,  although  they  have  the  greatest  probability,  or,  as  is 
commonly  said,  produce  a  moral  certainty,  they,  nevertheless,  do  not 
create  a  metaphysical  certainty,  so  that  the  assertion  of  the  contrary 
implies  a  contradiction.  And  thus,  by  no  argument  can  it  be  abso- 
lutely demonstrated  that  there  are  bodies,  nor  anything  keep  certain 
well-ordered  dreams  from  being  objects  to  our  mind,  which  are 
considered  by  us  as  true,  and  on  account  of  tiie  agreement  among 
themselves  with  respect  to  use  are  equivalent  to  truths.  Nor  is  the 
argument  of  great  weight,  as  they  commonly  allege,  that  thus  God 
would  be  a  deceiver ;  certainly,  every  one  sees  how  far  this  is  from 
a  demonstration  of  metaphysical  certainty,  for  we  are  deceived  by  our 
own  judgment,  not  by  God,  when  we  assert  anything  without  accu- 
rate proof.  And  although  there  is  present  great  probability,  never- 
theless God  is  not  therefore  a  deceiver  who  presents  this  to  us.  For 
what,  if  our  nature  were  not  perchance  capable  of  real  plienoniena ; 
surely  God  would  be  not  so  much  to  be  blamed  as  to  be  thanked,  for, 
by  causing  these  phenomena,  since  they  could  not  be  real,  to  be  at 
least  accordant,  he  showed  us  that  which  in  the  entire  usage  of  life 
would  equal  in  w^orth  real  phenomena ;  what,  indeed,  if  this  whole 
short  life  were  nothing  but  a  certain  long  dream,  and  we  should  awake 
only  in  death?  a  conception  such  as  the  Platonists  seemed  to  have; 
for  since  we  are  destined  for  eternity,  and  this  whole  life,  although  it 
should  continue  many  thousands  of  years,  has  in  respect  of  eternity 
the  value  of  a  point,  how  small  will  be  the  interposition  of  sucli  a  little 
dream  in  the  full  truth,  the  ratio  of  which  is  much  less  than  that  of 
the  dream  to  life;  and  yet  no  sane  person  will  say  that  God  is  a 
deceiver,  if  by  chance  he  should  happen  to  observe  any  short  but 
distinct  and  congruous  dream  in  his  mind. 

Hitherto  I  have  spoken  of  those  things  wliich  appear;  now  we 
nmst  see  about  those  which  do  not  appear,  wliicli,  neveiilieless,  can 
be  inferred  from  those  which  do  appear.  And  indeed  it  is  certain 
that  every  phenomenon  has  some  cause.  Now  if  any  one  says  tliat  the 
cause  of  the  phenomena  is  in  the  nature  of  our  mind,  in  wliich  the 
phenomena  are,  he  will  affirm  nothing  indeed  false,  but  nev(!rthelc.ss 
he  will  not  express  the  whole  truth.  For,  in  the  first  place,  tliens  is 
necessarily  a  reason  wliy  w'e  ourselves  exist  ratlier  than  not  exist,  and 
althouo-h  we  should  assume  that  we  existed   from  eternity,  y<'1-   I  In' 


720  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

reason  of  the  eternal  existence  must  be  sought,  which  reason  must 
be  found  either  in  the  essence  of  our  mind  or  outside  it.  And, 
indeed,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  existence  of  innumerable  other 
minds  as  ^Yell  as  ours ;  but  all  possible  minds  do  not  exist,  ^Yhich  I 
prove  from  this,  because  all  existing  things  have  intercourse  with 
each  other.  Further,  minds  can  be  known  of  another  nature  than 
ours  and  having  intercourse  with  this  of  ours.  Moreover,  that  all 
existing  things  have  intercourse  with  each  other  is  demonstrated  botli 
from  this,  that  otherwise  we  cannot  say  whether  anything  in  respect 
to  these  things  happens  now  or  not,  and  so  the  truth  or  falsitj-  of 
such  a  proposition  is  not  given,  which  is  absurd,  and  because  many 
extrinsic  denominations  are  given ;  nor  does  any  one  become  a 
widower  in  India  by  the  death  of  his  wife  in  Europe,  without  a  real 
change  happening  in  him.  For  every  predicate  is  truly  contained  in 
the  nature  of  the  subject.  If  now  some  possible  minds  exist,  we  ask 
why  not  all ;  then  because  it  is  necessary  that  all  existing  things  have 
inteiT.ourse,  it  is  necessary  that  there  be  a  cause  of  this  intercourse, 
nay,  it  is  necessary  that  all  express  the  same  nature,  but  in  a  different 
way ;  but  the  Cause  through  which  it  happens,  that  all  minds  have 
intercourse  or  express  the  same  thing  and  so  exist,  is  that  which  per- 
fectly expresses  the  universe,  namely  God.  The  same  cause  has  no 
cause  and  is  unique.  Hence  it  is  at  once  evident  that  many  minds 
exist  besides  ours,  and  since  it  is  easy  to  think  that  men  who  are  con- 
versant with  us  can  have  just  as  much  reason  to  doubt  concerning  us 
as  we  concerning  them,  and  no  greater  reason  wages  war  in  our 
behalf,  they  also  exist  and  wiU  have  minds.  Hence  already,  sacred 
and  profane  history,  and  whatever  things  pertain  to  the  state  of  minds 
or  rational  substances,  are  considered  as  confirmed. 

With  respect  to  bodies,  I  can  demonstrate  that  not  only  light,  heat, 
color,  and  similar  qualities  are  api^arent,  but  also  motion  and  figure 
and  extension.  And  if  anything  is  real,  that  alone  is  the  power  of 
acting  and  enduring,  and  so  in  this  (as  it  were  matter  and  form), 
consists  the  substance  of  the  body ;  but  those  bodies  which  have  no 
substantial  form,  those  only  are  phenomena,  or  at  least  aggregates  of 
the  true. 

Substances  have  metaphysical  matter  or  passive  power  as  far  as 
they  express  anything  confusedly,  active,  as  far  as  they  express  it 
distinctly. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS 


The  following  Additions  and  Corrections  are  made  in  the  interest  of  the 

greater  accuracy  and  completeness  of  the  book.     The  material  incorporated 

therein  has  been  obtained  chiedy  since  the  earlier  portion  of  the  book  was  in 

type.     As  it  could  not  be  introduced  in  its  proper  place,  it  is  deemed  liest  to 

insert  it  here  rather  than  to  omit  it  altogether.     It  will  be  noticed  that  it  piT- 

i  tains   chiefly  to  the   earlier  portion  of  the   New  Essays,  the  annotation  of 

I!  which,  not  a  part  of  the  Translator's  plan  at  the  outset,  began  with  the  prinl- 

I  ing  and  has  grown  with  the  progress  of  the  work.  —  Tr. 

Page  3,  note  2,  add :  Erdmann,  677-678.  The  letter,  after  speaking 
I  of  the  nature,  proce.sses,  and  extent  of  our  knowledge  of  physics,  proceeds 
thus:  ''You  enquire  concerning  the  things  of  spirits  or  rather  concern- 
ing incorporeal  things  ;  and  you  say  that  we  see  the  mechanical  dLsposi- 
tion  of  the  parts,  but  that  we  do  not  see  the  principles  of  the  mechanism. 
Very  well,  but  when  we  see  motion  also,  then  we  know  the  cause  of  the 
motion  or  force.  The  source  of  the  mechanism  is  primitive  force  (vis 
primitiva),'b\xt  the  laws  of  motion,  according  to  which  impulses  (impehis) 
or  derivative  forces  arise  out  of  this  primitive  force,  proceed  from  the 
perception  of  good  and  evil,  or  from  that  which  is  most  fitting.  Thus 
it  happens  that  efficient  causes  depend  upon  final  causes,  and  spiritual 
things  are  by  natui-e  prior  to  material  things,  as  indeed  to  us  they  are 
prior  in  knowledge,  because  we  perceive  more  immediately  (interius)  the 
mind  (nearest  —  intimam  —  to  us)  than  the  body,  as  indeed  Plato  and 
Descartes  have  observed.  This  force,  you  say,  is  known  by  its  effects, 
not  as  it  is  in  itself.  I  reply  that  so  it  would  be  if  we  had  no  mind,  ami 
did  not  know.  The  mind  has  in  itself  perceptions  and  appetites,  and  in 
these  its  nature  consists.  And  as  in  the  body  we  know  avTirvTriav,  and 
form  in  general,  although  we  do  not  know  wliat  the  forms  of  the  insensible 
bodies  are,  so  in  the  mind  we  know  perception  and  appetite,  althougli  wr. 
do  not  know  distinctly  the  insensible  ingredients  of  tlie  confused  pcrcc]!- 
tions,  by  which  the  insensible  things  of  bodies  are  expre.s.sed.  Spiritual 
things  are  perceived,  you  say,  just  as  the  air,  the  wind,  the  liglit,  yet  not 
on  that  account  sufficiently  known  ;  but  to  me  the  air,  tlu3  wind,  llie  light 
seem  to  be  no  more  spiritual  than  running  water,  nor  do  they  differ  from 
this  save  in  subtility.  Spirits,  minds,  and  simple  substances  or  moiia<ls  in 
the  universe  cannot  be  comprehended  by  the  .senses  and  tlie  imagination, 
because  lacking  in  parts.  Do  you  ask  whether  I  believer  that  tlnn!  are 
bodies  which  do  not  fall  within  the;  range  of  vision  ?  Why  may  I  not 
a  A  721 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


believe  ?  nay,  rather,  concerning  them  I  think  I  cannot  doubt.  In  micro- 
scopes we  see  aniinalcula  otherwise  imperceptible,  and  the  nerves  of  these 
animalcula  and  other  aninialcnla  by  chance  swimming  in  their  own  fluids 
cannot  be  seen.  Tlie  subtility  of  nature  proceeds  into  infinity.  Finally 
you  seek  for  definitions  of  matter,  body,  spirit.  Matter  is  that  whicli  con- 
sists in  antitypia,  or  that  which  resists  penetration,  and  so  naked  matter 
is  merely  passive.  Body,  moreover,  has  besides  matter  also  active  force. 
Body,  moreover,  is  either  a  corporeal  substance  or  a  mass  collected  from 
corporeal  substances.  Corporeal  substance  I  call  that  which  consists  in  a 
sim^jle  substance  or  monad  (i.e.  in  the  mind  or  somewhat  analogous  to 
the  mind)  and  in  an  organic  body  united  to  it.  But  mass  is  an  aggregate 
of  corporeal  substances,  as  a  cheese  sometimes  consists  of  a  conflux  of 
worms.  Then  a  monad  or  a  substance  simple  in  kind  contains  perception 
and  appetite,  and  is  either  primitive  or  God,  in  which  is  the  ultimate 
reason  of  things,  or  derivative,  that  is  a  created  monad,  and  this  is  either 
endowed  with  reason,  Mind  (mens),  or  endowed  with  sense,  that  is 
Soul  {anima),  or  endowed  with  a  certain  lower  grade  of  perception 
and  appetite,  or  analogous  ivith  soul  {animoR  analoga),  which  is  content 
with  the  naked  name  of  monad,  since  we  do  not  know  its  various  grades. 
Every  monad,  furthermore,  is  inextinguishable ;  for  simple  substances 
can  neither  begin  nor  end,  except  by  creation  or  annihilation,  that  Ls, 
miraculously.  And,  moreover,  every  created  monad  is  endowed  with  a 
certain  organic  body,  by  means  of  which  it  perceives  and  appetizes, 
although  it  is  variously  (e)volved  through  births  and  deaths,  involved, 
transformed,  and  exists  in  a  perpetual  flux.  Monads,  then,  contain  in 
themselves  the  Entelechy,  or  the  primitive  force  (vis  primitiva),  and 
without  them  matter  would  be  passive  merely  ;  and  any  mass  whatever 
contains  innumerable  monads,  for  although  each  organic  body  of  nature 
has  its  own  corresponding  monads,  yet  it  contains  in  the  parts  other 
monads  endowed  in  like  manner  with  their  own  organic  bodies  serving 
the  primary  body  ;  and  all  nature  is  nothing  else^  for  all  aggregates  must 
necessarily  result  from  simple  substances,  as  it  were  from  true  elements. 
But  atoms  or  extended  bodies,  and  yet  infrangible,  are  a  fiction,  which 
cannot  be  explained  except  by  a  miracle,  and  are  without  reason  ;  nor 
may  we  from  them  assign  the  causes  of  the  forces  and  motions.  And 
although  they  might  be  admitted,  they  would  not  be  truly  simple,  for  this 
very  reason,  because  they  are  extended  and  endowed  with  parts.  Thus  I 
have  replied  to  your  questions,  and  set  forth  my  views,  as  far  as  may  be 
in  a  few  words  and  by  letter." 

Page  9,  line  15.  For  "  1709,"  reatl  "  1704,"  and  cf.  infra,  p.  101,  note 
1,  line  3  from  bottom,  and  infra,  p.  501,  note  2,  ^^  2,  3,  where  this  por- 
tion of  note  1,  p.  101,  is  corrected. 

Page  13,  note  1.  Add:  translation  also  in  Duncan,  Philos.  Wis.  of 
Leibnitz,  94-99 ;  German  translation  in  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann,  Die  klein. 
philos.  wichtig.  Schrift.  v.  Leibniz,  86-92  (Philos.  Bibliothek,  Bd.  81; 
Erliiuterungen,  Bd.  82),  Leipzig,  1879. 


ADDITIONS   AND  CORRECTIONS.  723 


Page  15,  note  2.  After  "  translation,"  instead  of  "Appendix,"  etc., 
read  "  Duncan,  Fhilos.  WIcs.  of  Lpihnitz,  pp.  71-80  ;  German  translation 
in  J.  H.  V.  Kirclimann,  Die  klein.  philos.  ivichtig.  Schrift.  v.  Leibniz, 
55-67." 

Page  16,  line  22,  "  Huygens."  Cf.  infra,  p.  150,  note  3.  On  Huygens' 
physical  views,  cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  341-397.  New  ed. 
Huygens,  (Euvres  completes,  La  Haye,  1888-1893,  5  vols.,  still  in  prog- 
ress.    These  5  volumes  contain  correspondence  only. 

Page  16,  line  30,  "pliable."  "  Leibnitz  means,"  says  J.  H.  v.  Kircli- 
mann, Erliiuterungen  zii  Leibniz,  d.  klein.  philos.  wichtig.  Schrift.,  Leipzig, 
1879,  p.  109,  "  that,  although  bodies  contain  no  vacuum,  yet  from  the  fact 
that  they  can  become  greater  or  lesser  in  extent,  the  other  substances 
which  fill  out  the  gaps  of  the  body  proper  are  by  pressure  removed  from 
it,  or  conversely  with  the  cessation  of  the  pressure  penetrate  into  its 
vacuum.  An  actual  extension  or  cohesion  of  a  definite  homogeneous  body, 
which  contains  no  gaps,  Leibnitz  does  not  assume,  although  the  Scholastics 
affirmed  it  for  a  long  time."  On  the  development  of  Leibnitz's  views 
from  the  atomism  to  which  he  was  at  first  inclined,  but  almost  immedi- 
ately rejected,  to  the  dynamic  idealism  of  his  monad  doctrine,  (/.  D. 
Selver,  Der  Entwicklungsgang  d.  Leibniz.  3Ionadenlehre  bis  1605,  Leip- 
zig, William  Englemann,  1885  ;    Lasswitz,  (iesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  446  sq. 

Page  17,  line  11,  "  De  Seriebus  infinitis."     Cf  infra,  p.  424,  note  2. 

Page  21,  line  12,  "Fabritius."  Cf.  infra,  p.  102,  note  2.  The  letter 
of  Fabritius  to  Spinoza  here  mentioned  is  found  in  Spinoza,  Opera,  cd. 
Van  Vloten  and  Land,  2,  181-182 ;  Philos.  Wks.  Elwes'  translation,  2, 
374. 

Page  26,  line  4,  "  Clerc."  Jean  Le  Clerc,  1657-1736,  Professor  of 
Philosophy,  Belles-Lettres,  and  Hebrew  in  the  Remonstrant  Seminary  at 
Amsterdam,  1684-1712,  and  thereafter  of  Church  History,  exercised  con- 
siderable influence  in  the  direction  of  scientific  Biblical  criticism,  and 
wrote  several  philosophical  works  ;  but  his  greatest  literary  influence  wa.s 
exercised  through  the  serials  or  reviews  of  which  he  was  the  editor, 
among  which  were  the  "  Bibliothfeque  universelle  et  historiciue,"  licrc^ 
mentioned;  the  "  Bibliothfeque  choisie,"  Amsterdam,  1703-1713;  and  tlu^ 
"  Bibliotheque  ancienne  et  moderne,"  1714-1726. 

Page  28,  line  6,  "Understanding."  Cf,  also,  infra,  p.  41.  'I'lie  imn 
is  used  in  the  sense  of  the  Greek  voOs,  Latin  intcllectns,  to  indicate  tiie 
totality  of  the  human  intellectual  powers,  the  RcJison  in  ti.e  larger  sense 
of  that  term,  in  the  language  of  Kant  and  his  school,  1  ernmtjl. 

Page  42  lino  10,  "Plato."  Schaarschmidt  says :  "Tliis  cnmparis.m 
is  to  be  considered  as  provisional  only,  in  order  to  illustrate  tlii^  oi)p..sition 
between  the  author's  and  Locke's  point  of  view  by  a  fan.diar  exampir. 
Strictly  taken  the  parallel  does  not  hold  good,  as  may  be  seen  fmni  ti.e 


724  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

addition  Leibnitz  makes.  Aristotle,  that  is  to  say,  —  to  call  to  mind  only 
the  chief  antitheses  of  the  respective  theories  of  knowledge, — assumes 
before  all  thini^s  principles  which  are  peculiar  to  the  spirit  as  such,  while 
Locke  denies  the  same  ;  Plato,  again,  recognizes  experience  by  means  of 
sense-perception  in  a  wholly  different,  more  real,  sense  than  Leibnitz  and 
affirms  in  no  wise,  as  Leibnitz,  an  absolute  spontaneity  of  the  presenta- 
tive  power." 

Page  42,  line  13,  "  Acroamatic."     Cf.  infra,  p.  272,  note  1. 

Page  42,  line  5  from  bottom,  "Aristotle."  Schaarschmidt  says: 
"Ari.stotle  has  certainly  compared  the  mind  (or  the  Reason  — in  his 
language  vovs),  though  not  the  soul  in  general,  with  an  unwritten  tablet." 
CfYlepl  -^vxris,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  4,  §  11,  Berlin  Academy  ed.,  439b  31  ; 
ed.  E.  Wallace,  Cambridge,  1882,  p.  159:  fie?  5'  oiirws  uxrwep  iv  ypafi/iareiu) 
u)  firid^u  virdpxei-  eireXexeig  yeypaix/x^vov  6irep  avp-fialvei.  eirl  rod  vov.  "  This 
meanwhile  is  by  no  means  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  that  thought  is 
merely  something  taken  up  from  without,  the  spirit  a  merely  receptive 
faculty.  According  to  Aristotle,  the  thinking  spirit  is  rather  partly  re- 
ceptive or  passive,  partly  productive  or  active,  as  is  clear  fi'om  this  same 
Bk.  III.  of  the  Uepl  '^'ux^s."  Cf.,  also,  Zeller,  Fliilos.  d.  Griech.,  3d  ed., 
II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  566  sq. 

Page  43,  line  1,  "Schoolmen."  The  Scholastic  philosophy,  to  which 
Leibnitz  frequently  refers  in  this  and  other  works,  "assumed,"  says 
Schaarschmidt,  " a  three-fold  source  of  knowledge:  1.  Experientia,  ex.- 
perience  through  the  senses  ;  2.  Ratio,  the  logical  faculty  of  drawing 
conclusions  ;  3.  Intellectus,  the  faculty  of  ideas,  which  is  precisely  the 
understanding  (or  spirit)  of  Aristotle,  active  for  itself  from  within,  not 
creative  out  of  sense-experience." 

Page  43,  line  4,  "Prolepses."  The  Stoics  derived  general  ideas  or 
conceptions,  —  Koival  evvoiai  or  TrpoXrjxpeis,  commnnes  notioues, — like  all 
knowledge,  from  sensuous  perception,  explaining  them  by  the  persistence 
and  combination  of  the  sense-impressions.  They  are  not  to  be  under- 
stood, therefore,  in  the  later  sense  as  innate  ideas,  independent  of  ex- 
perience and  peculiar  to  the  spirit  as  such.  The  Stoic  theory  was  more 
like  Locke's  than  like  Aristotle's ;  and  according  to  Plutarch,  Placita 
philosopJinriim,  IV.,  11,  considered  the  soul  as  originally  a  blank  tablet 
(tabula  7-asa),  upon  which  the  outer  world  made  its  impressions. 
Through  Boethius  [470-524]  the  Stoic  theory  of  knowledge  became  the 
source  of  mediseval  nominalism.  On  the  Stoic  docti'ine  of  knowledge, 
cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  GriecJi.,  3d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1880,  III.,  1  [Vol.  5],  70-86  ; 
Benn,  Greek  Philosophers,  2,  15 ;  Windelband-Tufts,  Hist,  of  Philos., 
202  sq. 

Page  43,  line  14,  "Necessary  truths."  "Leibnitz,"  .says  Schaar- 
schmidt, "here  hints  at  his  later  more  closely  grounded  division  of  truths 
into  necessary  and  factual  (contingent).     The  former  are,  according  to 


ADDITIONS  AND   CORRECTIONS  726 


Leibnitz,  the  '  eternal  truths  of  reason,'  partly  logical  huYS,  partly  general 
notions  which  belong  to  the  mind  as  such,  and  are  developed  out  oi  itself 
in  order  to  come  into  consciousness.  The  latter,  the  factual  truths,  are 
formed  by  us  through  abstraction  from  experience,  and  therefore  real. 
To  this  antithesis,  further  developed  in  the  second  book,  Kant  joins  on 
that  of  the  so-called  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  thought,  in  that  he  assigned 
to  the  former  the  character  of  necessity  and  universality,  to  the  latter 
that  of  contingency  and  actuality  (particularity)." 

Page  44,  line  13,  "Innate."  Leibnitz,  in  here  maintaining  that  expe- 
rience can  never  furnish  anything  absolutely  and  universally  valid,  and 
is  therefore  incapable  of  serving  as  the  foundation  of  tlie  sciences  dealing 
with  and  requiring  absolutely  universal  fundamental  truths,  such  as 
l^ogic,  Metaphysics,  and  Ethics,  indicates  in  the  sharpest  and  clearest 
manner  his  opposition  to  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge. 

As  regards  the  nature  of  these  pure  truths  of  reason  and  the  method  by 
which  they  arise  in  consciousness,  Leibnitz  assumes  and  maintains  that 
they  are  developed  by  the  mind  out  of  itself,  and  thus  come  into  conscious- 
ness. Of  this  self-development,  "this  transition  from  potentiality  to 
actuality  (a  potentia  ad  actum),''''  sense-experience  furnishes  the  occasion, 
but  is  not  the  sufficient  reason.  Leibnitz  to  this  extent,  therefore,  main- 
tains against  Locke  the  "  Innateness  of  Ideas."  But  "  he  oversteps  this 
idealistic  principle  in  so  far  as  he  assumes  an  absolute  spontaneity  of  the 
understanding,  while  at  the  same  time  that  the  understanding  itself  in  its 
development  is  plainly  shown  in  reciprocal  action  with  experience,  which 
forms  the  expression  of  real  relation  to  other  beings.  In  Leibnitz's 
theory  the  '  eternal '  and  '  necessary '  truths  of  reason  are  in  substance 
the  principles  of  all  knowledge,  and  furnish  accordingly  not  only  the 
ground-principles  of  the  formal  sciences,  like  Logic  and  Mathematics,  but 
also  of  Metaphysics  and  Ethics"  (Schaarschmidt). 

Page  44,  line  9  from  bottom,  "The  same  reasons  hold  good."  Cf. 
H.  S.  Reimarus,  1694-1708,  AUffemeine  Betrachtumjen  ilber  die  ICiiusl- 
triebe  der  Tliiere,  1760,  4th  ed.  1798,  chap.  2,  who,  says  Schaarschmidt, 
has  treated  the  antithesis  between  the  knowledge  of  man  and  brute, 
the  investigation  of  which  in  our  times  has  led  to  inti-resting  contro- 
versies, better  than  most  of  the  later  writers.  Leibnitz  a.ssumes  a  specific 
difference  between  the  souls  of  brute  and  man,  and  does  not  at  all  agree 
with  Descartes'  view  that  animals  are  living  but  soulle.ss  automata.  On 
animal  intelligence,  cf.  Romanes,  Animal  Intellif/enre  [International  Sci- 
entific Series,  Vol.  44,  D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  New  York,  1st  ed.  18S;],  2<l  ed. 
1886];  Ilerital  Evolution  in  Animals,  New  York,  1884,  D.  Appleton  &  Co. ; 
Wm.  Wundt,  Lectures  on  Human  and  Animal  rsiirholnijij,  translated 
from  the  2d  German  edition,  by  J.  E.  Creighton  and  E.  B.  Titchenor, 
London  and  New  York,  1894,  Lectures  23,  24,  pp.  340-306.  Wumlf's 
Lectures  include  some  criticism  of  Romanes,  as  somewhat  wanting  in 
critical  attitude  and  exhibiting  too  nuich  sympathetic  imagination. 


726  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Page  45,  line  6  from  bottom,  "  Intellectual  ideas."  Intellectual,  i.e.  as 
opposed  to  "sensuous"  (i.e.  belonging  to,  or  arising  from,  the  senses). 
Leibnitz  means  to  say,  says  Schaarschmidt,  either  we  fasten  our  attention 
upon  sense-pictures,  whose  source  is  sense-perception,  or  upon  intellect- 
ual, verstandesmiissigen  (formulated,  sprachgeformten).,  ideas,  thought- 
pictures,  for  whose  rise  those  general  ideas,  which  Kant  called  Kategories 
or  original  notions  of  the  understanding,  are  requisite  ;  general  ideas 
which  do  not  arise  from  experience  through  the  senses,  but  must  belong 
to  our  understanding  as  such  and  therefore  be  considered  as  "  innate"  or 
"  implanted." 

Page  46,  line  18,  "Virtual."  I.e.  Potential,  or,  as  opposed  to  "  actual," 
the  real-possible.  "  It  is  here,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "  the  facidty  through 
which  a  substance  (the  soul)  out  of  its  own  supreme  power  goes  over  into 
a  new  condition  as  for  it  a  new  realization.  Our  soul  -contains  an  tuiend- 
iug  number  of  possible  ideas,  as  capacities,  seeds  or  traces  left  behind  and 
remains  of  former  activity,  which  upon  definite  occasion  it  realizes,  i.e. 
calls  into  consciousness.  This  Leibnitzian  application  of  the  —  originally 
wider  —  Aristotelian  concept  of  power  to  the  soul  has  become  for  modern 
philosophy  in  the  highest  degree  weighty  and  fruitful." 

Page  46,  line  7  from  bottom,  "Reminiscence."  On  the  Platonic  doc- 
trine of  "  reminiscence  "  or  "  recollection"  {ava.fxv7](ns),  an  essential  part 
of  his  doctrine  of  Ideas,  cf.  Windelband-Tufts,  Hist,  of  Pliilos.  pp.  118, 
119;  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  4th  ed.  1889,  II.,  1  [Vol.  3],  823,  824, 
835,  836. 

In  Plato's  philosophy  the  ideas  which  are  the  objects  of  our  rational 
thought  were  intuited  by  the  soul  in  its  pre-existent  and  exalted  state 
when  it  dwelt  in  the  presence  of  the  archetypal  forms  (TrapaSeiyfiara), 
which  Plato  called  ideas  {etdrj  or  Id^ai).  The  soul  in  its  earthly  life  is 
but  dimly,  if  at  all,  conscious  of  these  archetypal  forms,  till  the  percep- 
tion of  their  imperfect  copies  in  corporeal  things  arouses  the  slumbering 
recollection  and  stimulates  the  soul  to  reproduce  them  in  consciousness 
and  with  the  aid  of  dialectic  again  to  attain  the  knowledge  of  true  and 
ideal  reality.  Cf,  also,  ]Vev;  Essays,  Book  I.,  chap.  1,  §  5,  Th.  (3),  infra, 
p.  79 

Page  47,  line  8,  "Reflection."  "Provided,"  as  Schaarschmidt  says, 
' '  that  Reflection,  which  with  Locke  has  to  do  only  with  the  activities  of 
the  inner  nature  as  such,  receives  that  further  content  which  embraces 
the  '  eternal '  and  '  necessary  '  gi'ound-truths,  and  to  which  we  are  in  fact 
led  if  we  keep  in  mind  the  presuppositions  and  modalities  under  which 
those  activities  proceed." 

Page  47,  lines  18,  19,  "The  book  of  Boyle  against  absolute  rest."  Cf. 
infra,  p.  324,  note  2.  The  treatise  is  also  found  in  Vol.  1  of  the  Latin 
version  of  his  works,  Opera  varia,  Geneva,  1080,  and  later,  with  the  title 
Dissertatio  de  intestinis  motihns  particularura  solidorum  quiescentium,  in 
qua  absoluta  corporum  qtiies  in  disquisitionem  vacatur.     On  Boyle,  cf. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  727 


Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  AtomisWc,  2,  261-298  ;  Lan-e,  Ga^ch  d  Mnterialis- 
mus,  2d  ed.  Iserlohn,  1873.  1,  255;  English  translatiou,  Boston,  2d  ed 
1879,  1,  299-306.  ,  ,  ^u  eu. 

Page  47,  line  21,  "Doing  away  with  atoms."  Leibnitz  rejects  atoms 
in  favor  of  his  own  monads,  because  the  monads  contain  in  themselves  the 
principle  of  motion  as  active  force,  while  the  atoms  are  assunu'd  in  conse- 
quence of  a  force  in  movement  foreign  to  them.  On  Leibnitz's  view  and 
its  development,  cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  470  sq. 

Page  48,  line  7  from  bottom,  "Confused  in  the  parts."  Cf  infra 
pp.  120,  317,  note  2,  319,  320,  458,  459.  Leibnitz's  doctrine  of  ""  minute 
perceptions"  or,  in  the  philosophical  language  of  to-day,  "unconscious 
mental  states,"  is  of  the  greatest  significance  in  psychology  and  episte- 
mology,  and  never  more  so  than  at  the  present  time.  Eor  an  excellent 
exposition  of  it,  cf.  Windelband-Tufts,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  pp.  423  sq.,  462  sq. 

Page  48,  last  line,  "  Hippocrates."     Cf  infra,  p.  476,  note  2. 

Page  49,  line  15,  "  Sufficiently  distinguished."  That  is,  to  reach  con- 
sciousness. The  perceptions  are  not  sufficiently  strong  to  call  forth  a 
conscious  activity  of  the  soul. 

Page  49,  line  12  from  bottom,  "Author  of  the  most  excellent  of  dic- 
tionaries."    The  reference  is  to  Bayle.     Cf.  infra,  p.  507,  note  1. 

Page  49,  note  1.  The  note  should  read:  Cf.  Vergil,  Georg.  IV.,  393. 
Gerhardt's  reading :  "que"  is  evidently  a  typographical  error.  Erdmann 
and  Janet  read :  "■  qiioi  mox  futura,"  etc.;  Jacques,  correctly:  quxK  mox 
Ventura  trahantur." 

Page  50,  line  15,  "  Pneumatology. "     Cf.  infra,  p.  362,  note  2. 

Page  50,  line  20,  ''Law  of  Continuity.''''  Cf.  infra,  p.  334,  note  1  ; 
p.  552. 

Page  50,  note  3.  Add :  The  correspondence  of  Leibnitz  and  Basnage 
is  found  in  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3,  73  sq. 

Page  51,  line  7,  "  Numero.''''     Cf,  also,  infra,  p.  332,  note  1. 

Page  51,  lines  11-13,  "Perfect  globes  of  the  second  element,  born  of 
cubes  pei'fect  and  original."  The  reference  is  to  Descartes,  Principiie 
Philosophicie,  Pt.  III.,  §§  48  sq.  Cf,  also,  Neio  Essays,  infra,  p.  552, 
note  1.  Mahaffy,  Descartes,  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  Edin- 
burgh, 1881,  p.  159,  says  Descartes'  theory  of  general  physics  was  claljo- 
rated  as  regards  minerals.  This  fact  perh.aps  accounts  for  ScIiaarscIiiMitlt's 
translation  :  "  des  sichtbarcn  Metalls"  and  his  reference  to  J'rin.  J'hihis., 
Pt.  IV.,  §§  70,  75,  in  his  note,  ErUmternmi,  400,  p.  101,  to  tiie  passage, 
New  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  16,  §  12,  Th.,  p.  5:52  of  liis  (Jcrman  transhv- 
tion.  Descartes,  says  Mahaffy,  ihid.,  p.  159,  gave  special  explanation 
of  the  growth  of  the  human  body,  but  that  of  plants  and  tlie  lower 
animals  was  wanting  when  he  died.  On  Descartes'  theory,  <•/.  Lasswitz, 
Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  89. 


728  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Page  51,  lines  19,  20,  "Present  considerations."  While  the  process  of 
abstraction  allows  us,  in  order  to  their  better  apprehension,  to  concen- 
*trate  our  attention  for  the  time  on  certain  i^roperties  or  attributes  of  a 
subject  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  yet  we  must  remember  that  in  so  doing 
we  are  departing  from  reality  and  only  partially  representing  it  in  con- 
sciousness. 

Page  51,  line  20.  Instead  of  the  rendering  :  "  If  it  were  very  well 
understood,"  read,  after  Schaarschmidt,  "If  we  take  it  as  pure  and 
simple  gospel,"  etc. 

Page  51,  line  29,  "Some  exception."  Nature  gives  us  no  perfect 
circles,  perfect  spheres,  etc.  Perfect  mathematical  regularity  of  form 
exists  only  in  thought. 

Page  52,  line  7  from  bottom,  "Strong-minded."  .That  is,  the  "Free- 
thinkers," as  Leibnitz  at  other  times  called  them,  who  thought  they  might 
deny  immortality  itself  after  the  jDreteuded  proofs  for  it  given  by  Scholas- 
ticism had  been  disproved. 

Page  53,  line  8  from  bottom,  "  Averroists  and  some  bad  Quietists." 
Cf.  infra,  p.  581,  note  1.  The  Mystics  and  Quietists  approached  very 
nearly  this  Averroistic  doctrine  of  a  denial  of  personal  immortality.  In 
Leibnitz's  time  the  Mystics  and  Quietists  were  especially  the  followers  of 
Madame  Guyon,  who  was  ready  "to  burst  from  an  overplus  of  divine 
grace,"  and  of  Ant.  Bourignon,  on  whom  cf.  infra,  p.  599,  note  2  ;  also, 
according  to  Schaarschmidt,  Leibnitz's  letter  CXLIV.,  Feder,  Commercii 
epistoUci  Leihnitiani,  Hanover,  1805,  p.  459. 

Page  54,  note  1.  Add:  Leibnitz  was  much  interested  in  the  Locke- 
Stillingfleet  controversy,  as  his  correspondence  with  Thomas  Burnett 
shows.  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3,  149-^^29,  passim,  and 
especially  pp.  205,  216,  and  the  two  essays,  pp.  223-242  ;  also  Foucher 
de  Careil,  Lettres  et  opuscules  inklits  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1854,  Introduc- 
tion, pp.  Ixii  sq.,  and  Leibnitz's  Bemarques  sur  7e  Sentiment  de  M.  de 
Worcester  et  de  M.  Loclce,  ihid.,  pp.  1-26.  The  latter  piece  is  identical 
with  that  published  —  not  therefore  for  the  first  time  —  bj"^  Gerhardt,  op. 
cit.,  3,  229-242.  The  controversy,  like  that  of  Leibnitz  and  Aruauld, 
served  to  bring  Locke  to  the  further  explication  and  limitation  of  his 
views. 

Page  55,  lines  16,  17,  "  French  version."  That  is,  by  Pierre  Coste, 
with  the  co-operation  of  Locke.  It  appeared  in  1700,  then  in  1729,  and 
again  in  1742.  Cf.  ante,  p.  4,  note  1.  For  the  correspondence  of  Leib- 
nitz and  Coste,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3,  377-436.  Before 
Locke  published,  in  1G90,  his  Essay,  he  publislied  an  abstract,  translated 
into  French  by  Le  Clerc  in  Le  Clerc's  "  Biblioth^que  universelle,"  Janu- 
ary, 1688.  Cf.  ante,  p.  4,  note  1,  and  Eraser's  Locke's  E.'^say,  1,  15, 
note  2.  The  abstract  or  "  Epitome  "  is  found  in  Lord  King's  Life  and 
Correspondence  of  Locke,  new  ed.,  London,  1830,  2,  231-293  ;  Bohn's  ed., 
1858,  1  vol.,  pp.  365-399. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  729 


Page  55,  last  line,  "  Intentional  species."     Cf.  infra,  p.  381,  note  1. 

Page  56,  line  3.     Por  the  Latin  verse,  cf.  Ovid,  Tristia,  I.,  8,  7. 

Page  59,  line  4  from  bottom,  "Inexplicable  qualities."  That  is,  the 
qualitates  occultce  of  the  mediaeval  philosophers. 

Page  60,  line  6  from  bottom,  "Instructive."  Leibnitz,  as  Schaar- 
schmidt  says,  "avails  himself  of  Stillingfleet's  polemic  against  Locke, 
which  is  of  particular  interest  because  it  shows  Locke's  uncertainty  in 
regard  to  the  weighty  question  of  the  substantiality  of  the  soul,  to  add 
thereto  the  statement  that  the  soul  must  be  immaterial.  Locke  himself 
so  he  argues,  has  admitted  that  thought  is  not  conceivable  as  a  modifica- 
tion of  matter,  or  that,  in  other  words,  a  thinking  being  cannot  be  a  mere 
mechanism  ;  thus  the  soul  is  to  be  considered  as  soniething  immaterial, 
since  tlie  thought,  that  God  may  through  a  miracle  have  bestowed  thought 
upon  matter,  is  an  unpermissible  subterfuge."  For  further  discussion'' of 
the  point,  cf.  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  IV. 

Page  62,  line  10  from  bottom,  "  Miracle  pure  and  simple."  Cf.  infra, 
p.  428.  The  doctrine  of  a  purifying  fire  througli  wliicli  souls  have  to  pass 
after  death  goes  back  to  the  early  period  of  the  church,  but  became  more 
prominent  and  was  more  generally  adopted  from  the  time  of  Gregory  the 
Great  (c.  540-004).  Cf.  Hagenbach,  Hist,  of  noctrines,  ed.  H.  B.  Snutli, 
§  141,  Vol.  1,  p.  373 ;  §  206,  Vol.  2,  p.  126.  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Stro- 
mateis,  vli. ,  6,  says:  (paix^v  5'  ij/xeis  dyid^eiv  t6  irOp,  ov  to.  Kpia,  dXXa  rds 
dfiapTwXods  ypvx^s  "  Trvp  ov  rb  ird/jLcpayov  /cat  fidvavcrov,  dXXd  rb  (ppSvifiov 
X^yovres,  rb  duKPorj/jLevov  Bid  ^pvxv^  '''V^  8iepxop.ivr]s  rb  Trvp,  i.e.  "  We  say  that 
fire  sanctifies  not  flesh,  but  sinful  souls,  speaking  of  that  fire  which  is 
not  all-devouring,  such  as  is  used  by  artisans,  but  of  that  which  is  dis- 
crimfnative,  pervading  the  soul  which  passes  tln-ough  the  fire  "  (the  phrase 
"discriminative"  ((ppSvLixov),  or  as  Bigg,  The  Christian  I'latonists  uf 
Alexandria  [Bampton  Lectures  for  1886],  p.  113,  translates  it,  "  wise  fire," 
"  comes,"  says  Bigg,  "from  Heraclitus  and  the  Stoics.")  Cf.  Bigg,  o;). 
cit.,  295;  Hagenbach,  op.  cit.,  §  77,  1,  222.  And  Augustine,  De  Civit. 
Dei,  Bk.  XXL,  chap.  10,  Benedictine  ed.,  Paris,  1685,  Vol.  7,  p.  031, 
says:  "Cur  enim  non  dicamus,  quamvis  miris,  tamen  veris  modis  etiam 
spiritus  incorporeos  posse  poena  corporalis  ignis  affligi,  si  si)iritns  hntMi- 
num,  etiam  ipsi  in-ofecto  incorporei,  et  nunc  potuerunt  inchidi  coriiorali- 
bus  membris,  et  tunc  poterunt  corporum  suoruni  vinculis  insohiliilitci 
alligari  ?  "  i.e.  "  For  why  may  we  not  assert  that  even  immaterial  spirits 
may,  in  some  extraordinary  way,  yet  really  be  pained  by  tlic  iiunisiinu'ut 
of  material  fire,  if  the  spirits  of  men,  whicli  also  are  certainly  immaterial, 
are  both  now  contained  in  material  members  of  tlie  body,  and  in  the 
world  to  come  shall  be  indissolubly  united  to  their  own  bodies  'i'  "  (  The 
City  of  God,  2,  435,  translated  by  Rev.  Marcus  Dods,  M.A.,  T.  &,  T.  CMark, 
Edinburgh,  1871).  In  chapter  7,  after  having  in  i)revi()ns  ciiapters  cited 
many  real  or  supposed  facts  from  the  natural  world  in  supjjort  of  the  pos- 
sibility at  least  of  the  view,  he  admits  tliat  it  is  miraculous  and  beyond  our 


730  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

knowledge,  and  maintains  the  omnipotence  of  God  as  the  ultimate  reason 
for  belief  in  miracles.  Thos.  Aquinas,  Summa  Theol.,  Qmest.  70,  Art.  3, 
Concl.,says:  "  Respondeo :  Dicendum  quod  ignis  inferni  [i.e.  purgato- 
rial lire,  according  to  the  context]  non  sit  metaphorice  dictus,  nee  ignis 
imaginarius,  sed  verus  ignis  corporeus,"  etc.  Only  those  requiring  purga- 
tory go  there,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  cf.  Qutest.  69,  Art.  2.  Bellamin, 
154iV1621,  in  his  De  Pm-gatorio,  chaps.  10-12,  investigates  the  method 
of  the  purgatorial  fire  and  follows  Augustine  in  teaching  that  it  is  mate- 
rial and  miraculous  in  its  action  upon  the  soul. 

Page  63,  line  10  from  bottom,  "Demons  or  goblins."  "Leibnitz  is 
perhaps  liere  thinking,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "of  the  so-cailed  Spirits  of 
the  Elements  (Elemeutarffeister),  of  which  the  'philosophers  and  physi- 
cians of  the  past,'  especially  Theoph.  Paracelsus  \_cf.  infra,  p.  645,  note  1], 
had  treated,  both  in  his  Philosophia  sagax,  and  in  a  special  book,  De 
nymphis,  syljjhis,  pijgmms  et  salamandris,  or  even  of  the  ^  spiritus  famili- 
aris '  of  others,  as  of  the  Italian  philosopher  and  jihy.sician  Hieronymus 
Cardanus  [cf.  infra,  p.  566,  note  1],  who  in  his  interesting  autobiography 
[De  vita  propria'],  chap.  47,  discusses  the  subject  and  at  the  same  time 
narrates  marvellous  experiences  of  his  own  past  life." 

Page  63,  note  3.  Add :  In  the  Philos.  Mosaica,  and  also  in  his 
Utriusque  Cosnii — Metaphysica,  physica  atque  technica  Historia,  Oppen- 
heimii,  1617  fol.,  "God  appears,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "as  the  ani- 
mating and  moving  principle  of  things,  in  that  all  power  streams  forth 
in  a  miraculous  way  from  him  into  matter,  in  order  afterwards  to  turn 
back  again  from  the  thereby  occurring  differentiation  to  unity."  On 
Eludd,  cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  1,  329  ;  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos. 
d.  Mitteialters,  III.  [Vol.  4],  472-476. 

Page  64,  note  1.  Add :  Prof.  A.  C.  Eraser,  in  his  edition  of  Locke's 
Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Oxford,  1894,  follows  Ccste's 
French  version  in  separating  the  introductory  chapter  from  the  First  Book, 
and  making,  with  Leibnitz  here,  but  three  chapters  in  Bk.  I. 

Page  64,  note  2,  line  2.  After  "1674,"  add:  new  ed.  Avith  notes  by 
Bouillier,  Paris,  1880,2  vols.  ;  line  4,  after  "  Bernier,"  add:  On  Gassendi, 
cf.  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d.  Mitteialters,  III.  [Vol.  4]  316-327  ;  Lange, 
Gesch.  d.  3Iaterialismus,  2d  ed.,  Gerlohn,  1873,  1,  223-2-34,  Eug.  trans.  2d 
ed.  1,  253-269  ;  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  126-188.  On  Bernier's 
later  divergence  from  Gassendi,  cf.  ibid.  2,  504. 

Page  65,  line  13.     Imstead  of  "  Doctors,"  read :   "scholars." 

Page  65,  note  1.  Add:  Lady  Masham,  1659-1708,  was  one  of  Locke's 
most  intimate  and  truest  friends,  kept  him  by  her  at  her  country  seat  at 
Oates  and  nursed  him  in  his  last  illness.  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos. 
Schrift.  3,  365.  Lady  Masham  presented  Leibnitz  with  a  copy  of  her 
father's  Ititcllectnal  Sy.^tem,  as  appears  by  his  letter  of  March  29, 1704,  cf. 
Gerhardt,  3,  338. 


ADDITIONS  AND  CORRECTIONS  731 


Page  65,  note  3.  Add  :  The  objections  referred  to  in  the  text  are  the 
objectiones  quintce  against  Descartes'  Meditatioms  de  prima  philosophia, 
"  which  indeed,"  as  Schaarschmidt  says,  "  contain  a  series  of  very  acute 
objections  and  gave  Descartes  much  trouble."  The  Cinquiemes  Objec- 
tions of  "Gassendy,"  with  the  Beponses  of  Descartes  thereto,  are  found 
in  Cousin,  (Euvres  de  Descartes,  2,  89  sq.,  241  sq. 

Page  66,  line  6,  "  Inclined  towards  ethics."  Leibnitz,  who  to  a  certain 
extent  may  be  considered  as  giving  utterance  to  his  own  views  in  the 
person  of  Theophilus,  here  throws  out  a  hint  to  be  well  taken  to  heart  as 
regards  his  own  course  of  development.  As  a  natural  consequence  of  his 
early  studies  in  jurisprudence,  Leibnitz  was  led  to  a  deeper  study  of  ctliioal 
conceptions,  and  in  like  manner  his  study  of  Descartes  made  him 
acquainted  with  the  problems  of  mathematics  and  physics,  which  he 
thoroughly  examined  only  later  after  his  sojourn  in  Paris. 

Page  66,  lines  13,  14,  "No longer  a  Cartesian."  Cf.  the  entire  context, 
pp.  66-69,  also  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Remond  de  Montmort,  January  10, 
nii,  GerhMxlt,  Leibniz.  2:>hilos.  Schrift.  3,  606-607,  Erdmann,  701-702,  in 
which  Leibnitz  gives  a  brief  account  of  his  own  philosophical  studies  and 
development,  including,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  Scholastics  and  thence 
passing  to  the  moderns,  rejecting  the  "substantial  forms  "  for  the  mechan- 
ism of  the  Cartesian  system,  and  then  developing  his  own  doctrine  of  Pre- 
established  Harmony.  The  difficulties  and  controversies  within  the 
Cartesian  School  and  against  it  led  Leibnitz  to  his  own  doctrine,  and  he 
remarks  in  his  Considerations  sur  le  Principe  de  Vie,  1705,  Gerhardt,  6, 
540,  Erdmann,  430,  as  also  in  the  letter  here  cited,  that  if  Descartes  had 
known  that  Nature  conserves  not  only  the  same  force,  but  also  the  same 
total  direction  in  the  laws  of  motion,  he  would  himself  have  come  to  the 
system  of  pi-e-established  harmony.  Cf.  W.  Sigwart,  Die  L('ibniz''sche 
Lehre  v.  d.  prdstabilirten  Harmonie.  Tiibingen,  1822,  pp.  110-112,  117, 
118,  121,  132,  etc.  For  Leibnitz  against  Descartes  and  Cartcsianism,  cf. 
Gerhardt,  4,  265-406  ;  also,  Stein,  Leibniz  u.  Spinoza,  60  sq. 

Page  G6,  line  17,  "New  System."  That  is,  The  System  of  Pro- 
established  Harmony,  in  explanation  and  defence  of  which  Leibnitz 
published  in  the  journals  mentioned  many  essays,  most,  if  not  all,  of  wliich 
are  mentioned  later  in  either  the  text  of  the  Neto  Essa>/s  or  notes  thereto. 
"Leibnitz,"  as  Schaarschmidt  well  says,  "can  truly  boast  tiiat  he  lias 
turned  to  af^count  for  his  own  system  moments  of  all  the  doctrines  named 
in  the  text,"  it  being  "a  characteristic  feature  of  Leibnitz's  thougiit  to 
ascribe  a  relative  truth  to  each  philosophic  system  and  accordingly  to  wisli 
to  extract  from  it  a  good  side  in  order,  by  harmonizing  these  different 
elements,  to  bring  to  pass  the  possibly  best  view  of  tlie  world."  Cf. 
Leibnitz's  letter  to  Remond  de  Montmort,  January  10,  1714,  Gerliardt, 
Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.  3,  606,  Erdmann,  701:  "Outre  (jue  j'ay  <■»  «"'" 
de  tout  diriger  h  Tediiication,  j'ay  taclie  de  di'terrer  et  de  reunir  la  vrrWC- 
ensevelie  et  dissip^e  sous  les  opinions  des  differentes  Sectes  dcs  Philosoplies, 


732  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

et  je  crois  y  avoir  adjonte  quelque  chose  du  mien  pour  faire  quelques  pas 
en  avant." 

Page  GG,  note  1.  Add :  Geronimo  Rorario,  1485-1566,  an  Italian 
litterateur,  Nuncio  of  Clement  VII.  at  the  Court  of  Ferdinand,  King  of 
Hungary,  maintained,  against  the  Cartesians  and  the  followers  of  Aristotle, 
that  the  beasts  have  reason  and  make  better  use  of  it  than  man.  His  book, 
Quod  animalia  hruta  svcpe  ratione  utantiir  melius  homine,  appeared  first 
in  1648,  then  1654  at  Amsterdam. 

Page  G7,  lines  3,  4,  "Life  and  perception  in  all  things."  The  doctrine 
of  the  universal  soulhood  (AUbeseeltheit)  goes  back  to  the  world-soul  of 
Plato,  as  developed  especially  by  Plotinus  (c/.  Windelband-Tufts,  Hist,  of 
Fhilos.,  245  sq.),  and  is  connected  in  part  therewith,  and  partly  with  the 
pantheistic  tendencies  represented,  for  example,  by  the  Averroists  (c/. 
New  Essays,  infra,  p.  581,  note  1).  Leibnitz  rejects  both  errors  by  his 
Monadology,  which  conceives  the  universal  soulhood  of  substances  in  an 
individual  and  not  in  a  pantheistic  way.  In  modern  times  the  doctrine 
appears  in  Giordano  Bruno,  1548-1600  (cf.  Delia  Causa,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  239- 
241,  ed.  A.  Wagner,  Leipzig,  1829,  new  ed.  by  P.  de  Lagarde,  2  vols., 
Gottingen,  1888,  German  trans,  by  Lasson,  Berlin,  1872,  in  J.  H.  v.  Kirch- 
mann's  Philos.  Bibliothek,  Vol.  53),  and  in  Jacob  Boehme  {cf.  infra, 
p.  298,  note  1).  On  the  doctrine  as  found  in  Bruno  and  Boehme,  cf. 
Windelband-Tufts,  op.  cit.,  367  sq.,  373  sq.  Spinoza,  Ethica,  Pt.  II., 
Prop.  XIII.,  Scholium,  ed.  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  1,  86-88 ;  Elwes' 
trans.,  2,  92,  also  gives  expression  to  the  same  thought. 

Page  67,  line  5,  "Countess  of  Connaway."  Anne  —  Viscountess  Con- 
way—died  Feb.  23,  1678-9,  was  a  metaphysician  and  an  earnest  student 
of  Plato,  Plotinus,  Philo  Jud^eus  and  the  "  Kabbala  Denudata."  In  spite 
of  never-ceasing  sufferings  from  a  severe  headache  lasting  till  her  death, 
she  pursued  her  metaphysical  studies  with  extraordinary  devotion  and 
assiduity.  Her  physician,  Francis  Mercury  van  Helmont  {cf.  infra,  242, 
note  2),  encouraged  her  in  this  course.  She  was  very  friendly  with  H. 
More  and  corresponded  with  him  on  philosophical  and  theological  topics. 
She  wrote  many  works  of  which  only  one  has  been  printed  :  Opuscula 
philosophica  quihus  continentur  principia  philosophic^  antiquissimoi  et 
recentissimae,  Amsterdam,  1690.  It  was  the  first  in  a  collection  of  philo- 
sophical treatises  appearing  in  Latin  in  that  year  at  Amsterdam,  translated 
as  "a  work  by  a  certain  English  countess,  'learned  beyond  her  sex,' " 
and  ascribed  by  Leibnitz  in  a  German  literarj"  journal,  on  the  authority  of 
Van  Helmont,  to  the  Countess  of  Conway.  The  treatise  was  re-trans- 
lated into  English  and  published  with  the  title  The  Principles  of  the  Most 
Ancient  and  Modern  Philosophy,  etc.,  London,  1692,  Bvo. 

Page  67,  note  1.  Add:  On  Carapanella,  cf.  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  d. 
Mittelalters,  III.  [Vol.  4.],  343-366  ;  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  1,  340- 
342. 

Page  67,  note  2.  Add  :  On  Van  Helmont,  cf.  infra,  p.  242,  note  2  ;  on 
H.  More,  cf.  infra,  pp.  380,  note  1  ;  382,  note  2,  and  addition  thereto, 
infra  p.  768. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  733 


Page  67,  note  3.  Add :  Further  references  to  Archreus  in  Leibnitz's 
writings  are:  Specimen  Dynamicum,  Gerliardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift., 
II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  242,  also  infra,  Appendix,  p.  679 ;  Hypothesis  phys.  nova, 
Theoria  motus  concreti,  §  60,  Gerhardt,  Leibniz.  2MI0S.  Schrift.  4,  217  ; 
math.  Schrift.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  6],  57;  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  2,  Pt.  II.,' 
33  ;  Leibnit.  Animadversiones  circa  Assertiones  aliquas  Theoria;  Medico; 
vera;  Clar.  Stahlii,  Dutens,  op.  cit.,  2,  Pt.  II.,  136.  Cf.,  also,  Windel- 
band-Tufts,  Hist,  of  Philos.  371  sq. 

Page  68,  line  10,  '' Ilorte  carent  animce.'"  Cf.  Ovid,  Metamorphoses, 
15,  158. 

Page  68,  line  20,  "Spontaneity."  Leibnitz  ascribes  absolute  spon- 
taneity to  the  soul,  to  which  the  activity  of  the  body  perfectly  corresponds 
through  the  Pre-established  Harmony,  and  therefore  neither  influences 
nor  disturbs  it. 

Page  68,  line  7  from  bottom,  "Epitome."  That  is  in  the  Monad,  each 
monad  representing  in  itself  and  to  itself  the  entire  universe.  Leibnitz 
constantly  recurs  to  this  thought,  which  is  one  of  the  chief  points  of  his 
system.    Cf.  Systeme  nouveau  de  la  nature,  §  16  ;  Monadologie,  §  65,  etc. 

Page  69,  note  1.  Add :  also  G.  Croom  Robertson,  Philos.  Bemains, 
Williams  &  Norgate,  1894,  pp.  334-342. 

Page  70,  line  5  from  bottom,  "  Copernicans."  Kant,  later  in  the 
Preface  to  the  2d  ed.  of  his  Kritik  d.  reinen  Vernunft,  makes  use  of  the 
same  comparison  of  Copernicus. 

Page  71,  line  24,  "  Confused  perceptions."  Cf.  ante,  p.  48  and  note  to 
line  7  from  bottom,  ante,  p.  727.  "  While  Leibnitz,"  says  Schaarschmidt, 
"often  returns  to  this  antithesis  of  truths  of  reason  and  of  fact,  he  has 
unfortunately  nowhere  given  accurate  definitions  of  the  former,  nor  any 
wholly  satisfactory  criterion  of  a  truth  of  reason.  Kant  first  undertook 
this  task,  in  that  he  certainly  on  the  one  side  significantly  restricted  the 
service  of  the  truths  of  reason,  on  the  other,  that  against  Leibnitz  he 
recognized  that  for  the  reason  as  such  complete  (ferticje)  concepts  arc  to 
arise  out  of  the  truths  of  reason." 

Page  72,  note  1.  Add:  "  The  Later  Arminians,"  says  Schaarschmidt, 
"  are  here  referred  to,  as  the  leaders  of  this  religious  sect,  such  as  Episco- 
pius,  Limborch,  J.  Clericus,  like  Descartes  and  Leibnitz  himself,  assume 
a  knowledge  of  God  derived  from  natural  reason." 

Page  74,  line  8  from  bottom,  "Natural  light."  Cf  infra,  pp.  575-57<!, 
note  1. 

Page  74,  lines  4,  3,  from  bottom,  "  Verification."  Cf.  ante,  p.  71,  note 
to  line  24,  above,  and  also  New  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chaps.  9,  11.  L(!ibnitz 
here  presents  as  the  criterion  or  test  of  innate  ideas  their  immediacy  in 
consciousness.  Spinoza  before  him  (Ethicn,  Pt.  II.,  Prop.  43,  Scholium, 
ad  fin.,  ed.  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  1,  111  ;  Elwcs'  trans.,  2,  115  ;  cf,  al.so, 
E.  Pollock,  Spinoza,  his  Life  and  Philosophy,  129  sq.),  said  :   "  Sane  sicut 


734  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

lux  seipsam  et  tenebras  manifestat,  sic  Veritas  norma  sui  et  falsi  est." 
Cf.,  also,  Descartes,  rrin.  Philos.,  Bk.  I.,  §  45  ;  ed.  Cousin,  3,  90;  Veitch's 
trans.,  212,  where  he  sets  forth  the  doctrine  of  "clear  and  distinct" 
knowledge  and  of  intuition  through  which  we  become  immediately  con- 
scious of  the  truth  as  such.  (7/".,  also,  Descartes,  lieguhe  ad  directionem 
ingenii  {Begles  pour  la  direction  de  V esprit),  Opuscnla  posthuma  Cartesii, 
Amsterdam",  1701,  III.,  p.  6  ;  IV.,  p.  9  ;  VI.,  p.  14  ;  ed.  Cousin,  11,  209, 
215,  226. 

Page  75,  note  1.  Dele  note.  The  Ludolph  here  referred  to  by  Leibnitz 
is  Ludolph  van  Ceulen,  or  Keulen,  1539-1610,  Professor  of  ^lilitary  Archi- 
tecture in  the  University  of  Leyden  since  1600,  and  previously  teacher  of 
mathematics  in  Breda,  Amsterdam,  and  Leyden.  He  published  his  Van 
de  CircJcel,  daarin  geleert  loird  te  finden  de  nreste  proportie  des  Circkels- 
diameter  iegen  synen  Omloop,  Delft,  1596  ;  Latin  trans,  by  Snellius,  en- 
titled De  circulo  et  adscriptis,  1615.  His  De  arithmetische  en  geometrische 
fondamenten,  etc.,  Leyden,  1616.  Fundamenta  arithmetica  et  gcometrim 
and  Zetemata  (seu  ProhJemata)  geonietrica,  both  trans,  from  the  Dutch 
by  Snellius,  Lugd.  Bat.,  1615.  He  computed  the  ratio  of  the  diameter 
to  the  circumference  of  the  circle  to  35  places  of  decimals.  The  ratio 
is  commonly  known  in  Germany  by  the  name  "  Ludolphische  Zahl." 
Leibnitz  refers  to  him  in  liis  mathematical  writings,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz, 
math.  Schrift.  II.,  1  [Vol.  5],  95,  119.  For  Leibnitz's  discussions  of  the 
subject,  cf.  infra,  p.  424,  note  2. 

Page  77,  line  6  from  bottom,  "  Suhvenire.''''  »Schaarschmidt  translates 
"Beikommen,"  and  in  his  note  to  the  passage  states  that  "the  French 
souvenir  (to  remember)  made  from  suhvenire,  originallj^  means :  to  come 
to  the  aid  of.  The  expression  of  help  introduced  by  the  Herbartian  phi- 
losophy could,  unfortunately,  not  be  used,  since  the  word-play  would  be 
wholly  lost." 

Leibnitz's  thought  is  that  reminiscence,  the  active  and  voluntary  factor 
in  the  reproduction  of  the  past  and  in  bringing  the  now  unconscious 
knowledge  again  into  consciousness,  requires  and  receives  the  aid  of 
rememhrance  or  memory,  the  conservative  factor  in  the  process,  which  in 
some  unknown  and  mysterious  way,  and  out  of  consciousness,  preserves 
as  in  a  store-house  the  knowledge  previously  acquired  or  possessed.  Cf. 
Hamilton,  Metaphys.,  Lect.  20,  pp.  274-275,  American  ed.,  Boston,  1875. 

Page  78,  line  16  from  bottom.  The  sentence  should  read  thus  :  "For 
through  an  admirable  arrangement  of  nature  we  cannot  have  abstract 
thoughts  which  do  not  require  something  sensuous,  although  this  should 
consist  only  of  such  characters  as  are  the  forms  of  the  letters  and  the 
sounds." 

Page  79,  line  8  from  bottom,  "Opinion  of  the  Platonists."  Cf.  ante. 
p.  46,  and  note  to  line  7  from  bottom,  ante,  p.  726. 

Page  80,  note  1.  Add:  Janet  also  reads:  "ou."  Schaarschmidt 
translates  "wo,"  cf.  his  translation,  p.  45,  line  13  from  bottom.     The 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORKECTIONS  735 


context  seems  to  require  here  the  reading  "oil,"  where.     The  readiu" 
"  ou  "  is  probably  a  MS.  or  typographical  error.  '       '^ 

Page  83,  note  1.  Add :  For  an  account  of  his  views,  c/.  Lasswitz 
Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  188-207.  Digby's  doctrine  on  the  subject  men- 
tioned in  Leibnitz's  text  is  found  in  his  Demonstratio  immortalitatis 
animce  rationalis,  Tract.  I.,  cap.  3,  p.  2G  sq.,  ed.  Francofurti,  1604,  full 
title  of  which  Lasswitz  gives,  op.  cit.,  2,  188,  note  3  ;  and  in  his  Institu- 
tiones  peripatetica:,  published  as  an  Appendix  to  the  Demonstratio,  ed. 
of  1664.  Schaarschmidt  gives  1st  ed.  of  Demonstratio,  Paris,  1G55.'  A 
treatise  of  the  nature  of  bodies,  Paris,  1644. 

Page  86,  line  8,  "  Sadness  is."  Says  Schaarschmidt :  "  We  are  imme- 
diately conscious  of  the  theoretical  ground-truths  as  such.  With  the 
practical,  the  case  is  different.  Joy  and  sorrow  we  certainly  feel  immedi- 
ately as  such,  but  to  find  out  their  real  nature  requires  subsequent  rellec- 
tion.'" 

Page  87,  note  2.  After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet ;  and  after  "  Bohn's 
edition,"  add:   Fraser's  Locke'' s  Essay,  1,  67,  line  18. 

Page  88,  line  13  from  bottom,  '■'■Instinct.''''  "Leibnitz  understands 
here  by  in.stinct,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "a  definite  inclination  to  a  certain 
manner  of  action,  which  arises  out  of  need  and  serves  to  satisfy  the  same. 
'  Truths  of  instinct '  thus  refer  themselves  back  to  our  nature  and  are 
accordingly,  in  conformity  with  Leibnitz's  general  view,  innate  truths." 

Page  89,  note  2.  Add :  A  German  translation,  by  G.  E.  Bottger,  ajv 
peared  at  Nordhausen,  Gross,  1787. 

Page  89,  note  3.  Add  :  According  to  Schaarschmidt,  the  story  is  found 
in  Bk.  II.,  chap.  1,  p.  73,  of  Baumgarten's,  "very  interesting  but  rare," 
Perigrinatis  in  yEgyptum,  Arahiam,  Pahjcstinam  et  Syriam,  Noribergae 
ex  off.  Gerlachiana,  p.  P.  Kaufmannum,  1694,  4to. 

Page  91,  line  5,  ''esse.'"  Cf.  Digest  or  Pandects,  Bk.  I.,  Tit.  1,  §  3, 
where  Florentinus  says:  "  Ut  vim  atquo  injuriam  propulsemus.  Nam 
jure  hoc  evenit,  ut  quod  quisque  ob  tutelani  corporis  sui  fecerit,  jure 
fecisse  existimetur,,  et,  cum  inter  nos  cognationem  quandam  natura  con- 
stituit,  consequens  est  hominem  homini  insidiari  nefas  esse."  Corpus 
Juris  Civilis  Academicum  Parisiense,  p.  229,  7th  ed.,  Lutetiaj  Parisiorum 
1862  ;  Corpus  Juris  Civilis  (Digesta  recog.  T.  Mommsen,  and  paged  sepa- 
rately), Berlin,  Weidmann,  1893,  "Vol.  1,  p.  1. 

Page  91,  line  8  from  bottom,  "  Complete  certitude  to  morals."  Scliaar- 
schmidt  here  compares  Hume,  "the  most  acute  (scharfsinnigstf)  of  the 
English  philosophers,"  who  "reached  a  similar  result,  wholly  indojien- 
dent  of  Leibnitz,"  in  his  An  Inquiry  concerning  the  Principh's  of  Morals, 
Section  I.,  cf.  The  Philos.  Wks.  of  David  Hume,  4  vols.,  1-ittie,  Brown,  & 
Co.,  Boston,  4,  233  :  "  The  final  sentence,  it  is  probable,  whicli  ])roMounce3 
characters   and   actions   amiable  or  odious,  praiseworthy   or   hhiiiKiblc  ; 


736  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

that  which  stamps  on  them  the  mark  of  honor  or  infamy,  approbation  or 
censure ;  tliat  which  renders  morality  an  active  principle,  and  constitutes 
virtue  our  happiness,  and  vice  our  misery;  it  is  probable,  I  say,  that  this 
final  sentence  depends  on  some  internal  sense  or  feeling,  tchich  nature  has 
made  universal  in  the  lohole  species.  .  .  .  But  in  order  to  pave  the  way 
for  such  a  sentiment,  and  give  a  proper  discernment  of  its  object,  it  is 
often  necessary,  we  find,  that  much  reasoning  should  precede,  that  nice 
distinctions  be  made,  just  conclusions  drawn,  distant  comparisons  formed, 
complicated  relations  examined,  and  general  facts  fixed  and  ascertained." 
Cf.,  also,  Hume,  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Bk.  III.  Of  Morals, 
Ft.  I.,  Sect.  II.,  ed.  Green  and  Grose,  2,  2-17. 

Page  91,  line  3  from  bottom,  "Boutan."  That  is,  Bhutan,  a  district 
in  the  Eastern  Himalayas,  north  of  Assam. 

Page  92,  line  6,  "  Often  confused."  "Feeling  here  means,"  as  Schaar- 
schmidt  says,  "  not  the  sensuous-psychical  sensation,  but  the  confused 
complex  of  presentations  (  Vorstellungen)  —  a  frequently  used  significa- 
tion of  the  term  —  which  occupies  the  soul  and  therefore  often  drives  it  to 
action.  Feelings  of  this  kind  may  by  self-reflection  be  resolved  into  more 
or  less  clear  and  distinct  ideas  (Vorstellungen),  a  process  necessary  for 
testing  and  correctly  estimating  their  content.  Leibnitz  at  this  time 
appears  to  regard  all  feelings  without  exception  as  such  undeveloped 
ideas  and  judgments." 

Page  93,  line  20,  "  Joseph  Scaliger."     Cf.  infra,  p.  106,  note  2. 

Page  95,  note  1.  Add  :  The  five  principles  here  referred  to  are  found 
in  the  De  Veritate,  and  in  the  De  Beligione  Laid,  annexed  to  the  3d  ed., 
London,  1645,  of  the  De  Verit.  Cf.  Eraser's  Locke'' s  Essay,  1,  80,  note  2  ; 
81,  note  1. 

Page  96,  note  1.  After  "  ad  iHiY.,"  add  :  15,  Berlin  Academy  ed.,  1106b 
36 :  tcTTLv,  &pa  T)  dpcTT]  e^is  TrpoatpeTLKrj  iv  /xeadrTjTi  odcra  rrj  irpbs  i]fj.ds 
wpiaixevrj  \6y({)  Kal  is  av  6  <f>p6vLp.os  bpicreLev  •  yuecronjs  5^  bvo  KaKiwv,  rfji  p-kv 
Kad'  inrepl3o\T]v  riji  6e  Kar'  fWeL^iv  .  .  .  dtb  Kara  fxiv  ttjv  ovcriav  Kal  tov 
\6yov  TOV  tL  Tjv  eivai  Xeyovra  fieaoTTjs  iarlv  i]  dperr),  Kara  dk  to  dpuTTOv  Kal  to 
ed  OLKpoTrjs. 

Page  97,  note  1.  Add:  A  long  time  after  this  note  was  in  type,  I 
came  across  the  following  in  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz''s  Deutsche  Schriften,  2, 
509,  among  some  Vermischte  Bemerkungen  und  Urtheile  .  .  .  Aus  dem 
Monatlichen  Auszuge:  "(October,  1701).  Herr  Boileau  Despreaux,  ein 
franzbsischer  Academicus  und  beriihmter  Sat3'ricus,  hat  eine  neue  und 
vermehrte  Edition  seiner  Satyren  machen  lassen,  und  denselben  seinen 
Xamen  vorgesetzt,  und  dabey  zu  verstehen  gegeben,  dass  er  diese  und 
keine  audere  Edition  vor  die  seine  erkenne."  Possibly  the  edition  here 
referred  to  contained  the  lines  as  Leibnitz  gives  them,  the  author  chang- 
ing them  in  later  editions. 

Pace  99,  lines  7-9.     Cf.  ante,  p.  66,  and  note  to  line  17,  ante,  p.  731. 


ADDITIONS  AND   CORRECTIONS  737 


Page   99,  note   1.     Add:    The    Chronicon,  379-468,  is  also  found  in 
M.  Bouquet,  Hec.  Jiist.  Gaules,  new  ed.,  Paris,  1869-1880,  19  vols.,  fol.,  ' 
Vol.  1,  p.  612 ;  A.  Duchesne,  Hist.  Franc.  ScrijH.,  1,  183;  Migne,  Patrol, 
s.  Lat.,  74,  675. 

Page  100,  lines  16,  17.  "The  knowledge  of  being  is  wrapped  up  in 
that  knowledge  which  we  have  of  ourselves."  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  II., 
chap.  27,  §  9,  Th.,  infra,  pp.  245  sq.,  and  note  to  p.  247,  lines  7-9,  infra, 
p.  760.  Also  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  categories,  to  which  Leibnitz's 
thought  at  this  point  is  very  closely  related.  Our  self-consciousness  gives 
us  an  immediate  knowledge  of  being,  i.e.  of  our  own  particular  being, 
but  not  yet  the  concept  of  being  or  substance  in  general  nor  any  ' '  eternal 
truth."  What  is  given  is  an  internal  expei-ience,  whose  essential  and 
necessary  content,  implications  and  full  significance  are  reached  only  after 
profound  and  protracted  thought. 

Page  101,  note  1.  The  following  changes  or  corrections  arc  to  be  made 
in  this  note  :  In  line  23,  instead  of  "Appendix,"  read:  Duncan,  37-40  ; 
in  line  25,  after  "  ilfai/i.  Schrift.,  6,  234  sq.,''^  insert:  trans..  Appendix, 
infra,  pp.  670-692 ;  in  line  27,  instead  of  "Appendix,"  read:  Duncan, 
71-80;  in  line  28,  instead  of  "  Appendix,"  read:  Duncan,  112-120  ;  in 
line  30,  dele  "  trans..  Appendix  "  ;  line  5  from  bottom,  "  As  Leibnitz  was 
occupied,"  etc.,  cf.  infra,  p.  531,  note  2,  HIT  2,  3.  The  statement  made 
in  these  two  notes  would  probably  more  nearly  represent  the  trutli  in  tlie 
matter  if  made  thus:  "As  Leibnitz  was  occupied  with  the  comj^sition 
of  his  'New  Essays'  from  1700-1704,  and  with  their  revision  until  tlie 
end  of  1707,  and  perhaps  later  ((f.  Gerhardt's  Introduction  to  the  '  New 
Essays,'  ante,  pp.  8,  9,  and  Leibnitz's  Correspondence  with  Coste,  Gcr- 
hardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3,  377  sq.,  especially  391-400)  the  relative 
date,"  etc. 

Page  103,  line  7,  "  Witsen."  Nicolas  Witsen,  c.  1640-1717,  Dutch 
ambassador  at  the  Russian  Court,  alderman  and  burgomaster  at  Amster- 
dam, published  ArcMtcctonica  nautica  nov-antiqua,  Amstelod.,  1671  ; 
Noord-en  Oost-Tartarye,  met  Landkaerten,  beschreven,  getekent,  etc., 
2  vols.,  fol.,  ib.,  1692  and  1705.  For  Witsen's  correspondence  with 
Leibnitz,  cf  Dutens,  6,  Pt.  II.,  199-203  ;  Eoucher  de  Careil,  ^Juvres  de 
Leibniz,  7,  450,  453-459,  464. 

Page  103,  line  8,  "Barantola."  The  old  name  for  Lhasa,  the  capital 
of  Thibet.     Cf  Dutens,  6,  Pt.  II.,  p.  201. 

Page  103,  note  2.     Add :   Chap.  3  in  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay. 

Page  103,  note  3.     Add  :   Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  1,  99. 

Page  105,  note  1.  Add:  Cf  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  1,  109.  Kras.'r 
numbers  21,  and  states  in  his  note  that  tlie  section  was  iuUh-d  in  IIk; 
second  edition 

Page  108,  note  2,  line  5  from  bottom.     Instead  of  "Vol.  3,"  read: 
III.,  2  [Vol.  6]. 
3b 


738  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

Pack  109,  note  2.  Cf.  ante,  p.  733,  note  to  p.  68,  line  7  from  bottom. 
Leibnitz  regards  each  monad,  and  especially  the  human  soul,  as  a  mirror 
of  the  universe.  So  far  as  the  ideas  are  clear  and  distinct,  the  soul  ex- 
presses the  picture  of  the  ideal  universe  existing  in  the  mind  of  God  as 
the  "  best  world"  and  realized  out  of  his  goodness  ;  so  far  as  they  are 
confused,  the  soul  is  like  the  phenomenal  world  in  space  and  time. 

Page  110,  lines  18,  19,  '■'■Intrinsic  connotations.''''  The  intrinsic,  inner 
activity  of  every  "  substantial  thing"  determines  its  external  activity  and 
relations  to  each  and  all  other  things.  In  Leibnitz's  view,  this  activity 
consists  in  representation  or  is  conceived  as  analogous  to  representation. 
That  is,  all  external  change  is  apparent  merely,  depending  upon  that  in- 
ternal change  in  the  condition  of  substances  which  we  call  representation 
and  which  is  the  real  occurrence. 

Page  112,  line  11  from  bottom,  "Certain  author."  Locke,  Bk.  II., 
chap.  1,  §  10  (in  Coste's  translation,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
the  one  used  by  Leibnitz  as  the  basis  of  his  critique,  4th  ed.,  Amsterdam, 
1742,  p.  G5,  4  vol.  ed.,  Amsterdam,  1774,  1,  152),  says:  "Car  il  s'est 
trouvd  un  Auteur  qui  ayant  lu  la  premiere  Edition  de  cet  Ouvrage,  et 
n'^tant  pas  satisfait  de  ce  que  je  viens  d'avancer  contre  I'opinion  de  ceirs 
qui  soutiennent  que  V Ame  pense  toiijoiirs,  me  fait  dire,  qu'wne  chose  cesse 
cVexister  parceque  nous  ne  sentons  pas  qiCelle  existe  pendent  notre  sorn- 
meil,^''  etc.;  but  he  does  not  name  the  author  referred  to.  In  the  English 
editions  of  the  Essay,  for  example,  Bohn's,  Vol.  1,  p.  212  ;  Eraser's,  Vol. 
1,  p.  129,  Locke  makes  the  reference  general :  "  How  could  any  one  make 
it  an  inference  of  mine,"  etc.  Philalethes  rightly  takes  exception  to  the 
opinion  thus  falsely  imputed  to  the  partisans  of  Locke. 

Page  118,  line  10  from  bottom,  "Beg  the  question."  Schaarschmidt 
has  put  the  argument  in  logical  form  thus  :  "  That  of  which  we  are  not 
conscious  is  not  in  the  soul ;  "We  are  often  conscious  of  no  ideas  ;  there- 
fore. We  are  often  without  ideas  (or,  therefore,  often  we  do  not  think). 
And  he  goes  on  to  say  that,  the  circle,  of  which  Leibnitz  speaks,  con.sists 
in  the  fact  that  he  who  so  concludes  has  already  put  the  conclusion  in 
the  major  premise  in  assuming  that  to  have  no  consciousness  of  ideas  is 
the  same  as  to  be  without  ideas  {Nichtvorstellen)  or  not  to  think  {NicM- 
denken).  The  latter  statement  is  false.  One  can  have  ideas,  and  actu- 
ally does  have  them,  without  being  directly  conscious  of  his  ideas 
(Vorstellens).  Thus  the  major  premise  of  that  argument  is  false,  and 
therefore  the  conclusion  likewise,  while  the  minor  is  true.  According  to 
Leibnitz,  substance  is  always  active  —  is  indeed  action  itself  —  thus  also 
the  soul,  since  for  him  it  is  a  substance,  and  since  the  proper  activity  of 
the  soul  is  to  have  ideas  (das  Vorstellen') ,  therefore  the  soul  is*  always 
having  ideas  (vorstellend) .'''' 

Page  118,  note  1,  line  2.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  119,  line  8  from  bottom,  "Independently  of  the  senses."  Cf. 
ante,  p.  723,  note  to  p.  42,  line  10,  ad  fin.  ;  p.  725,  note  to  p.  44,  line  13 ; 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  739 


p.  733,  note  to  p.  68,  line  20.    In  accord  with  Leibnitz's  principle  of  the 

absolute  spontaneity  of  substances,  all  activity,  that  of  the  soul  as  well, 
springs  out  of  the  depths  of  its  own  being. 

Page  119,  note  1,  line  2.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  120,  line  6,  "■  Ex  professo.'"  Schaarschmidt  says  the  term  Ex 
\  professo  is  a  technical  expression  occurring  in  classical  literature  (for 
example,  Seneca  and  Quintilian) ,  which  signifies :  in  a  positive,  precise 
way,  in  a  pronounced  or  aforementioned  manner.  Leibnitz  means  to 
say,  hitherto  have  we  each  set  forth  and  justified  his  own  speculative 
point  of  view  (erkeiuitniss-theoretischen  Standputikt)  ;  now  we  come  to 
the  consideration  of  some  classes  of  ideas  in  which  we  shall  more  than 
hitherto  agree  with  each  other. 

Page  120,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  121,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann's,"  add:  Janet's. 

Page  122,  lines  1,  2.  "The  membranes  receive  the  sensation,"  etc. 
Cf.  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Arnauld,  April,  1687  (Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos. 
Schrift.,  2,  90,  91):  "Les  nerfs  et  les  membranes  sont  des  parties  plus 
sensibles  pour  nous  que  les  autres,  et  ce  n'est  peutestre  que  par  elles  que 
nous  nous  appercevons  des  autres,  ce  qui  arrive  apparemment,  parceque 
les  mouvemens  des  nerfs  ou  des  liqueurs  y  appartenantes  imitent  mieux 
les  impressions  et  les  confondent  moins,  or  les  expressions  plus  distinctes 
de  I'ame  repondent  aux  impressions  plus  distinctes  du  corps.  Ce  n'est 
pas  que  les  nerfs  agissent  sur  I'ame,  k  parler  metaphysiciuement,  mais 
c'est  que  I'un  represente  I'estat  de  I'autre  spontanea  relatione,''''  i.e.  "The 
nerves  and  the  membranes  are  the  parts  more  sensitive  for  us  than  the 
others,  and  it  is  perhaps  only  by  them  that  we  perceive  the  others,  which 
happens  apparently,  because  the  movements  of  the  nerves  or  of  the  Huids 
belonging  thereto  imitate  better  the  impressions  and  confuse  them  less, 
now  the  more  distinct  impressions  of  the  soul  correspond  to  tlie  more 
distinct  impressions  of  the  body.  Not  that  the  nerves  act  upon  the 
soul,  to  speak  metaphysically,  but  that  the  one  represents  the  state  of 
the  other  by  reason  of  a  spontaneous  relation.''''  Modern  psychological 
investigation  and  experiment  prove  that  the  end-organs  rather  than  the 
nerves  "receive  the  sensation,"  or,  in  modern  phrase,  'are  acted  upon 
directly  by  the  stimulus,'  the  character  of  the  sensation  depending  upon 
the  peculiar  structure  of  these  different  end-organs,  and  not  upon  tiie 
nerves.  The  formerly  held  doctrine  of  the  "  specific  energy  of  the 
nerves"  as  being  the  cause  of  specific  sensations,  or  as  'accounting  for 
the  quality  of  the  sensation' — a  doctrine  which,  according  to  Schaar- 
schmidt in  his  note  to  the  passage  {Erli'iuternn(jen  z.  d.  Neucn  Ahhand- 
lungen'u.  d.  menschlich.  Verstand  v.  G.  W.  Leibniz,  IJerlin,  1874,  J.  II. 
v.  Kirchmann's  Philos.  JUbliothelc,  Bd.  50,  Erliiuterung,  92,  p.  27)  i-on- 
tradicts  Leibnitz's  statement  in  the  text,  — is  now  given  up.  LiMlmitz'.s 
statement,  while  partly  true,  is  nevertheless  incomplete.  He  is  riglit  in 
stating  "that  tastes  make  themselves  known  to  some  extent  througli  the 


740  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

nose,  by  reason  of  the  connection  of  these  organs,"  — modem  experiments 
having  proved  taste  and  smell  to  be  interdependent  in  their  action  in  sen- 
sation, —  but  wrong  as  to  the  assistance  of  the  teeth  in  the  transmission 
of  sound,  the  teeth  not  being  ordinarily  concerned  in  the  process.  If  by 
"membranes"  Leibnitz  meant  "end-organs,"  his  statement,  with  the 
exception  of  the  part  regarding  the  hearing,  would  be  correct,  and  his 
theory  exhibit  a  remarkable  degree  of  insight  and  foresight  and  of  ap- 
proximation to  the  modern  view  of  the  subject.  But  this  interpretation 
of  his  language  seems  on  the  whole  inadmissible,  "membranes"  with 
him  signifying  probably  the  skin  and  the  muscles,  so  that,  while  we  may 
not  justly  regard  him  as  having  attained  the  fulness  and  completeness  of 
the  modern  understanding  of  the  sensation-process,  we  may  yet  justly 
attribute  to  him  a  measure  of  insight  into,  and  foresight  of,  what  through 
subsequent  investigation  and  experiment  has  been  proved  to  be  its  true 
nature. 

Page  122,  Chap.  IV.,  §  1,  line  5,  "Solidity."  On  Locke's  idea  of 
solidity,  cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  505-508. 

Page  123,  note  3.    After  "  Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  124,  lines  9,  10  from  bottom,  "The  scholastic  conception  of  the 
air."  Cf.  Nevj  Essays,  Bk.  L,  chap.  1,  §  18,  Th.,  ante,  p.  83,  Imes  11,  12. 
On  "rarefaction  and  condensation,"  line  12  from  bottom,  cf.  Lasswitz, 
Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  Vol.  1,  passim. 

Page  125,  la.st  line  of  text  and  note  1,  "  Animant."  Some  time  after 
the  text  and  note  were  in  type,  I  came  upon  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Leuwen- 
hoek,  "  Sur  I'Aimant,"  cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  2,  Pt.  II.,  92-94.  In 
the  correspondence,  in  Latin,  of  Leibnitz  with  Des  Bosses  there  is  con- 
siderable allusion  to  the  Magnet,  cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift., 
2,  437  (Postscript  to  Letter  of  Leibnitz  to  Des  Bosses,  February  5,  1712), 
492-495,  497-498  (Leibnitz  to  Hartsoeker,  April  29,  1715,  in  French), 
505,  513  (Response  de  Mr.  Hartsoeker,  in  French).  As  from  this  corre- 
spondence it  is  evident  that  Leibnitz  was  occupied  more  or  less  with  the 
study  of  the  Magnet,  it  seems  as  if  the  reading  of  the  text  should  be 
"aimant,"  and  the  translation  accordingly  "magnet,"  and  thus  the  view 
expressed  in  the  last  sentence  of  note  1,  ante,  p.  125,  is  confirmed.  Janet 
also  reads  "aimant."  Cf,  also,  a  rough  draft  of  letter  of  Leibnitz  to 
Peter  the  Great,  January  16,  1712,  Foucher  de  Careil,  CEuvres  de  Leibniz, 
7,  507,  and  a  rough  draft  of  a  memorial  of  Leibnitz  concerning  the  study 
of  languages  and  the  observation  of  the  variation  of  the  magnetic  needle 
in  the  RiLssian  Empire,  ibid.,  519,  531  sq. ;  also,  Observations  uber  die 
Magnet-Xadel,  ibid.,  562  sq. 

Page  126,  line  1,  "  Vacuum."  That  is,  the  effort  of  all  bodies,  particu- 
larly air  and  water,  to  fill  up  empty  space.  The  doctrine  of  the  universal 
attraction  of  all  bodies  has  put  an  end  to  this  false  notion  of  "the  fear  of 
a  vacuum"  —  horror  vacui.  On  the  vacuum,  cf  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Ato- 
viistik,  pas.sim. 


ADDITIONS   AND  CORRECTIONS  741 


Page  127,  note  2.  Add  :  Leibnitz's  correspondence  with  Guerike,  c/. 
Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  1,  89-112. 

Page  129,  line  1,  "  The  view  of  the  Cartesians."  Janet,  (Euvres  philos. 
de  Leibniz,  1,  95,  note  1,  refers  to  Descartes,  Prin.  Philos.,  II.,  §  4. 
Cf.  Veitch's  trans.,  pp.  233-234. 

Page  129,  line  6,  "Disagreement."  Schaarschmidt  remarks  on  this 
chapter  as  follows  :  "In  this  chapter  on  Solidity  the  antithesis  of  the 
Lockian  and  Leibnitzian  view  comes  out  wit%  great  acuteness.  Locke, 
starting  out  from  Sensualism,  affirms  that  solidity  is  the  most  real  property 
of  bodies,  a  statement  which,  if  logically  developed,  must  lead  to  the  as- 
sumption of  hard  impenetrable  atoms.  On  the  other  hand,  Leibnitz  rightly 
maintains  that  all  the  properties  of  the  body  which  Locke  derives  from 
solidity  may  be  won  without  the  assumption  of  a  space-filling  and  im- 
penetrable first  being,  and  that  'solidity  ...  is  conceivable  by  pure 
reason,  although  the  senses  furnish  the  reason  with  the  means  of  proof 
thereto.' "  He  also  compares,  on  the  atoms,  Leibnitz's  Nunvcau  systeme 
de  la  nature,  §  \l  sq. 

Page  129,  last  line,  "Demonstration."  This  view  of  Leibnitz,  as 
developed  by  Christian  Wolf,  became  the  seed  from  which  sprang  the 
Kantian  doctrine  of  the  categories. 

Page  130,  line  13  [Chap.  7,  line  G],  "Idea  of  existence."  Schaar- 
schmidt says  :  "  The  validity  of  this  protest  is  clear,  although  Sensualism 
until  the  present  time  has  not  allowed  itself  to  be  brought  back  from  the 
Lockian  view.  The  concept  of  existence  springs  from  the  source  of  self- 
consciousness,  not  from  the  sensitivity.  Sense-perception  is  as  such  first 
possible,  after  we  have  won  the  concept  of  existence  from  self-conscious- 
ness, and  now  after  the  analogy  of  our  own  being  have  placed  it  under 
the  sense-phenomena  for  their  explanation." 

Page  130,  note  1.  Add :  Schaarschmidt  translates :  "  Inbetracht- 
nahme  des  Daseins." 

Page  130,  note  1.  Add  :  Dr.  E.  G.  Robinson,  President  of  Brown 
University,  and  Professor  of  Philosophy,  1872-1889,  gave  in  his  MS. 
Lectures  to  his  classes  on  Psychology  the  following  account  of  Cmi- 
sciousness  : 

Consciousness 

"  As  tills  is  the  one  controlling  source  of  all  our  knowledge  of  miud,  it 
is  indispensable  that  we  determine  as  precisely  as  we  can  just  wliat  wc; 
understand  by  it. 

"  It  is  manifest  at  the  outs(>t  that  consciousness  is  the  invariable  accom- 
paniment and  necessary  condition  of  all  actual  knowledge  and  of  every 
cognitive  act.  It  is  itself  never  an  act  but  always  a  state  of  mind  without 
which  mental  acts  are  impossible  and  which  itself  is  possible  only  through 


742  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

cognitive  acts,  and  this  is  true  whatever  the  acts  of  cognition  may  be, 

wliether  relating  to  objects  in  the  external  world,  to  the  bodily  organism, 
or  to  strictly  subjective  thought  and  feeling. 

"It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  we  cannot  with  Reid  regard  conscious- 
ness as  a  faculty.  A  faculty  can  be  called  into  exercise,  consciousness 
cannot  be,  but  always  exists  as  a  condition  of  the  exercise  of  a  faculty. 
Neither  can  we  regard  it  as  an  intuitive  idea,  a  regulative  notion.  An 
intuitive  idea  can  exist  only  in  consciousness.  If  consciousness  be  an 
intuitive  idea,  it  must  itself  exist  as  the  condition  of  its  own  existence. 
Neither  can  we  regard  it  as  identical  with  feeling,  as  simdry  sensational- 
ists do,  since  feeling  can  exist  only  in  consciousness.  Nor  yet  again  can 
we  with  Sir  William  Hamilton  regard  consciousness  as  the  genus  of 
which  cognitive  acts  are  the  species,  as  the  complement  of  the  cognitive 
faculties.!  A  genus  can  exist  only  as  made  up  of  species.  The  distinc- 
tion between  consciousness  and  cognition  is,  according  to  their  definition 
when  analyzed,  only  verbal  and  not  real.  Consciousness  can  be  neither 
a  special  faculty,  nor  an  intuitive  idea,  nor  a  distinct  species  of  knowl- 
edge, nor  the  complement  of  the  cognitive  faculties,  but  is  that  within 
which  all  ideas  must  exist,  any  species  of  knowledge  be  acquired,  and 
every  faculty  be  exercised. 

"It cannot,  accordingly,  be  correct  to  define  consciousness  as  the  soul's 
knowing  that  it  knows,!  or  '  the  power  by  which  the  soul  knows  its  own 
acts  and  states,'  ^  or  the  power  to  know  that  it  is  itseK  that  knows. ^ 
But  consciousness  is  rather  the  soiiVs  actual  knowing  with  itself  that  it 
knows,  that  is,  is  that  relation  to  itself  into  which  the  ego  is  brought  by 
cognition  of  any  object  other  than  itself,  is  the  ego  as  subject  commun- 
ing with  itself  as  object  through  the  mediation  of  some  object  distinct 
from  itself.  It  is  not  a  power  of  the  soul  but  is  a  state,*  a  condition,  a 
function  of  the  soul  which  always  necessarily  accompanies  any  normal 
or  voluntary  exercise  of  the  soul's  powers.  Speaking  figuratively  and 
popularly,  it  is  the  mind's  illumination  of  itself  by  its  own  action. 

' '  That  the  foregoing  is  a  correct  account  of  consciousness  seems 
evident: 

"  1.  From  the  difference  between  cognition  and  consciousness  and  the 
relation  of  the  one  to  the  other.  Cognition  is  a  voluntary  act  of  the  ego, 
and  consciousness  is  an  involuntary  state  or  condition  of  the  ego  which 
always  accompanies  its  cognitions,  and  neither  one  can  by  auj'  possibility 
exist  without  the  other.  Simple  cognition  is  only  a  given  correlation  of 
subject  and  object ;  whereas  in  consciousness,  which  must  always  accom- 

1  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Metaph.,  133  sq.,  143  sq.,  Amer.  ed. ;  Discussions, 
p.  54,  Amer.  ed. 

2  President  Noah  Porter.  Hum.  Intellect,  p.  83. 

3  President  Mark  Hopkins,  Outline  Study  of  Man,  p.  107. 

^  In  the  oral  exposition  of  this  passage,  Dr.  Robinson  remarked  in  substance 
as  follows:  "A  'state'  is  usually  considered  as  somethins  inert,  stable,  in- 
active ;  but  not  so  with  Consciousness.  Consciousness  is  an  active  state. 
'  State'  is  preferable  to  'act,'  as  the  latter  implies  volition.  Consciousness  is 
an  involuntary  state  or  condition  of  the  ego." 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  743 


pany  cognition,  the  knowing  subject  is  in  and  by  the  cognitive  act 
brought  into  correlation  to  itself  as  coexistent  or  conjunctive  object. 

"  2.  The  very  word  consciousness,  which  all  are  agreed  in  using,  implies 
in  its  composition  a  partnership  and  an  intercommunication  between  self 
as  knowing  subject  and  self  as  known  object,  an  intercommunication 
which  occurs  momentarily  and  continuously  in  every  cognitive  act. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  origin  of  the  word,  whether  with  philoso- 
phers or  the  unlettered,  it  etymologically  vindicates  the  view  of  conscious- 
ness here  given. 

"3.  It  is  admitted  on  all  hands  that  knowledge  is  impossible  without 
consciousness.  But  if  consciousness  itself  be  a  distinct  kind  of  knowl- 
edge, whether  generic  or  specific,  then  since  all  knowledge  is  possible 
only  in  consciousness,  consciousness  itself  must  have  its  conditioning 
consciousness  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  But  not  only  does  the  conscious- 
ness of  every  individual  being  have  an  absolute  beginning,  but  every 
given  instant  of  consciousness  is  as  distinct  and  separate  from  the 
preceding  as  is  every  act  of  cognition  from  its  preceding,  and  every 
given  instant  of  consciousness  is  dependent  on  some  given  act  of  cogni- 
tion. Consciousness,  therefore,  is  not  an  act  of  cognition,  nor  a  power 
to  cognize,  Init  is  the  simple  reflex  action  of  the  ego  upon  itself  in  its  own 
acts  of  cognition  ;  and  it  cannot  be  the  mind's  power  to  know  itself  or  to 
know  that  it  is  itself  that  knows,  since  it  is  a  state  or  a  relation  of  the  ego 
to  itself  which  is  always  dependent  on  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  know. 

"If  what  has  been  said  be  true,  then  it  is  evident  that  consciousness, 
although  always  inseparable  from  bodily  sensation,  is  predicable  only  of 
mind  as  active  intelligence  or  intellect.  It  is  by  the  mind  alone  as  the 
perceiving,  thinking  power  of  the  soul  that  any  of  the  soul's  energies, 
cognitive,  cogitative,  emotive,  volitional,  can  be  brought  into  exercise  or 
continued  in  action,  and  since  it  is  only  by  the  exercise  of  these  energies 
that  consciousness  exists,  it  is  of  the  mind  alone,  the  perceiving  and 
thinking  power  of  the  soul,  that  consciousness  is  predicable.  Again,  it 
also  follows  that  there  can  be  but  one  kind  of  consciousness,  that  it  is 
always  spontaneous,  the  invariable  and  necessary  accompaniment  of  cog- 
nition, that  is,  it  always  accompanies  cognition  whether  the  cognition 
be  of  objects  external  or  internal.  It  may  vary  in  degree  according  to 
degrees  of  attention  in  acts  of  cognition,  but  it  never  changes  from  itself 
into  consciousness  of  another  kind. 

"  The  so-called  self-consciousness  or  the  reflective,  acquired,  philo- 
sophical consciousness,  is  nothing  else  than  that  act  of  mind  by  which 
the  ego  itself,  its  acts  or  states  or  its  consciousness  are  made  objects  of 
attention.  This  does  not  differ  from  any  other  act  of  cognition  and 
knowledge.  It  furthermore,  like  every  other  act  of  knowledge,  is  always 
accompanied  by  a  consciousness  of  the  act,  and  tlic  consciousness  of  our 
consciousness,  when  it  is  made  an  object  of  attention  and  knowUulge,  is 
just  as  clear  as  the  consciousness  we  have  when  we  perceive  an  external 
object  or  when  we  make  a  percept,  a  concept,  or  an  inward  emotion  an 
object  of  attention  and  scrutiny." 


744  LEIBNITZ'S  CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


Thk  Components  of  Consciousness  and  theik  Reality 

"  When  we  make  consciousness  an  object  of  attention  and  analyze  it 
into  its  component  parts,  we  find  it  always  to  consist  of  three  distinguish- 
able elements,  namely :  the  ego  cognizing,  the  object  cognized,  and  the 
communion  of  the  ego  with  itself  in  the  cognitive  act ;  that  is,  we  find  the 
soul  communing  with  itself  in  the  act  of  knowing  something  which  is  not 
itself.  But  these  three  elements,  when  themselves  analyzed,  reveal  the 
existence  of  but  two  distinct  quantities  or  entities,  the  ego  and  the  object 
of  its  knowledge.  Out  of  these  two  factors,  subject  and  object,  carefully 
analyzed,  come  directly  or  indkectly  the  entire  materials  of  mental  phi- 
losophy. 

"  As  to  the  real  existence  of  these  factors  of  consciousness,  the  subject 
and  its  objects,  we  may  begin  with  the  objects.  If  there  be  any  doubt  as 
to  the  reality  of  the  mind's  objects,  the  so-called  subject-objects,  whether 
they  be  sensations,  feelings,  perceptions,  ideas,  volitions,  or  whatever  else 
simple  or  complex,  there  is  still  stronger  reason  for  doubting  the  existence 
of  an  external  world  from  which  as  cause  or  occasion  these  subject-objects 
have  sprung,  and  reasons  stronger  still  for  doubting  the  existence  of  our 
doubt.  If  mental  objects  be  unreal,  doubt  has  no  existence.  The  truth 
is,  if  there  be  any  reality  anywhere  it  is  in  the  mind's  own  acts  of  subjec- 
tive cognition. 

"In  like  manner,  if  the  object  in  consciousness  has  a  real  existence, 
still  more  indubitably  real  is  the  existence  of  the  personal  ego  that  knows 
the  object  in  consciousness.     This  is  evident  in  three  ways : 

"First.  We  are  conscious  only  while  one  of  our  mental  faculties  or 
powers  is  in  exercise.  In  the  act  of  its  exercise  the  ego  immediately 
intuits  itself  as  exercising  its  own  energy.  Self  immediately  cognizes 
self  as  active  in  every  successive  moment  of  consciousness. 

"  Second.  It  is  plain  that  the  objects  cognized  on  which  the  existence  of 
consciousness  is  always  dependent,  even  the  most  subjective  and  subtle  of 
them,  are  clearly  distinguishable  from  the  ego  that  cognizes  the  object. 
In  fact,  no  object  in  consciousness  is  ever  pognized  unless  the  cognizing 
self  clearly  distingTiishes  between  itself  and  the  object.  Such  discrimina- 
tion cannot  take  place  unless  the  ego  that  makes  it  has  an  indubitably 
real  existence. 

"  Third.  The  existence  of  memory  proves  the  real  existence  of  the  per- 
sonal ego.  Consciousness  is  a  succession  of  instants  each  of  which  is 
distinct  from  the  preceding  and  following  and  each  of  which  changes 
with  the  ever-changing  objects  of  cognition  and  thought,  and  yet  these 
vanishing  instants  so  leave  their  traces  on  the  personal  ego  that  it  can  at 
will  recall  long  series  of  them.  Thus  memory  not  only  proves  the  exist- 
ence but  the  persistent  identity  of  the  ego  that  has  an  object  of  thought 
with  its  accompanying  consciousness  to-day  which  it  can  reproduce  to- 
morrow, the  next  day,  and  with  indefinite  frequency  thereafter. 

"Finally.  The  real  existence  of  object  and  subject  being  indubitably 
established,  it  necessarily  follows  that  the  existence  of  consciousness, 


ADDITIONS  AND   CORRECTIONS  745 


within  which  both  subject  and  object  are  found,  and  consequently  its 
trustworthiness  as  a  source  of  knowledge  in  Psychology,  must  be  unhesi- 
tatingly admitted."  {Lects.  on  Psychol,  MS.,  §§  12,  13,  as  given  to  the 
class  of  1884.) 


Requisites  and  Difficulties  in  Consulting  Consciousness 

"  That  is,  in  practising  the  so-called  self-consciousness. 

"First.  Requisites:  It  is  necessary  that  there  be  close  and  concen- 
trated attention,  patience  and  persistence  in  observation,  frequent  and 
varied  observations,  careful  discrimination  between  different  classes  as 
well  as  between  different  species  of  the  same  class  of  mental  phenomena ; 
that  each  particular  phenomenon  be  analyzed  and  traced  to  its  cause  or 
causes  ;  that  there  be  a  distribution  of  phenomena  according  to  their 
nature  and  causes  so  far  as  these  can  be  ascertained. 

"  But  with  the  utmost  care,  attention,  and  discrimination  in  the  anal- 
ysis and  classification  of  the  phenomena  given  in  consciousness,  there  is 
a  constant  liability  to  error.  The  nature,  relations,  and  causes  of  the 
phenomena  to  be  observed  are  many  of  them  so  subtle  and  obscure  that 
diversity  and  even  conflict  of  view  may  be  inevitable,  but  the  disagree- 
ments, it  must  be  remembered,  turn  chiefly  on  the  theories  respecting  the 
origin  of  the  lahenomena  and  their  relation  to  realities  and  not  on  the 
reality  of  the  existence  of  the  mental  phenomena  themselves. 

"Second.  Difficulties:  The  observation  and  examination  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness,  however,  as  compared  with  the  observation 
and  examination  of  phenomena  in  the  external  world,  is  attended  with 
various,  and  to  inexperienced  minds  with  serious,  difficulties.     Thus  : 

"  (a)  So  large  a  portion  of  early  life  is  spent  among  and  in  the  obser- 
vation of  the  phenomena  of  the  outer  world  that  it  is  difficult  for  many 
persons  to  acquire  the  habit  of  accurate  observation  of  the  subjective 
phenomena  of  mind.     This  difficulty  is  heightened  : 

"  (6)  By  the  necessity  the  conscious  subject  is  under  of  becoming  the 
object  of  its  own  observation,  the  necessity  of  compelling  himself  to  act 
and  to  observe  himself  at  the  same  instant.  Upon  the  phenomena  of  the 
outer  world  the  mind  can  concentrate  an  undivided  attention,  but  when 
the  mind  makes  its  own  action  an  object  of  attention  there  is  requisite 
the  double  effort  to  produce  mental  movement  and  to  observe  oneself 
in  the  process,  the  result  beinc  at  best  but  constrain(!d  and  halting  action 
of  which  from  divided  attention  we  can  catch  only  hasty  and  imperfect 
views. 

"  (c)  Subjective  acts  and  states  occurring  in  rapid  succession  can  bo 
observed  only  instantaneously,  while  most  objects  of  sense  remaining 
comparatively  permanent  in  form  can  generally  be  (!xamined  repeatedly 
and  at  leisure.  The  most  evanescent  of  physical  phenomena  give  ample 
time  for  observation  in  comparison  with  the  most  enduring  i)henomena  of 
mind. 

"  (d)  Every  individual  consciousness  is  isolated  from   that  of  every 


74G  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

other,  and  the  report  of  no  one's  consciousness,  notwithstanding  the 
unanimity  in  the  deliverance  of  all  consciousnesses,  can  be  accepted  or 
even  understood  by  another  without  a  personal  scrutiny  of  his  own ; 
whereas  in  the  natural  sciences  there  may  be  many  or  few  observers,  and 
their  reports  can  be  understood  and  received  without  personal  experiment. 

"  (e)  The  objects  of  consciousness  are  many  of  them  complex  in  them- 
selves and  their  causes  and  subtle  in  their  relations  to  one  another  ;  they 
therefore  are  much  more  difficult  of  observation  and  require  much  more 
careful  discrimination  in  observing  them  than  objects  in  the  external 
world,  the  mechanical  and  chemical  origin  of  which  are  at  once  and  pal- 
pably discernible."     {Lects.  on  Psychol.,  §  14,  ed.  of  1884.) 

To  the  above,  as  presenting  more  completely  Dr.  Robinson's  view  of 
Consciousness,  —  a  subject  which  "he  regarded  as  fundamental  to  all 
order  and  rectitude  of  thought"  in  Psychology,  and  on  which  "he  ex- 
pended much  time  and  thought"  in  perfecting  his  conception  and  its 
statement,  — may  be  added  what  he  dictated  to  his  classes  on  the  question : 

"  Can  there  be  an  Unconscious  Modification  of  Mind  ? 

"  That  is,  can  there  be  mental  processes  and  the  mind  itself  unaware  of 
them  ?  The  answer  must  manifestly  depend  on  the  meaning  attached  to 
the  word  mind.  If  by  mind  be  meant  the  thinking  personal  essence,  or  if 
it  denotes  the  co-ordinated  psychical  forces  which  constitute  personal 
being,  there  can  be  no  good  ground  for  doubting  that  there  may  be 
unconscious  modifications  of  both  its  states  and  its  powers.  There  are 
depths  in  the  potentialities  of  the  personal  being  which  consciousness 
never  reaches.  Consciousness  knows  nothing  of  the  inner  sources  of 
energy  whence  thoughts,  feelings,  desires,  and  volitions  emanate,  but 
only  of  thoughts,  feelings,  desires,  and  volitions  after  they  have  taken 
form  in  the  mind.  It  is  upon  the  existence  of  these  that  consciousness 
depends,  and  of  their  existence  alone  can  consciousness  inform  us.  There 
may  therefore  be  modifications  of  states  of  soul,  increments  and  diminu- 
tions of  intellectual  and  moral  power,  and  losses  of  intellectual  possessions 
of  which  we  may  be  unconscious  and  of  which  we  may  remain  uncon- 
scious till  we  learn  them  from  unwonted  phenomena. 

"So  also  thoughts  and  accompanying  states  of  consciousness  often 
spring  from  instinct  and  hereditary  bias  which  have  long  lain  latent  and 
have  existed  and  operated  below  consciousness.  Instances  of  knowledge 
lost  under  some  given  condition  of  the  brain  and  restored  under  other 
cerebral  conditions  are  examples  of  the  same  kind  of  unconscious  changes. 
Every  species  of  mental  action  is  more  or  less  dependent  on  the  state  of 
the  brain,  but  to  ascribe  these  changes  to  unconscious  cerebration  is  to 
assume  that  thought  is  the  equivalent  of  physical  force,  is  both  the  quan- 
titative and  qualitative  product  of  the  brain  alone,  rather  than  the  product 
of  an  active  agent  which  uses  the  brain,  and  it  is  an  assumption  for  which 
there  is  no  sufficient  ground. 

"But  if  by  mind  be  meant  the  soul's  acquisitive  and  cogitative  powers. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  747 


the  intellect,  the  intelligence,  the  question  whether  it  may  not  be  uncou- 
sciously  modified  is  equivalent  to  the  query  whether  there  may  not  be  an 
unconscious  mental  act  or  (which  is  the  same  thing)  an  unconscious  state 
of  consciousness,  a  contradiction  of  terms.  Every  modification  of  mind, 
in  the  sense  of  the  word  mind  here  under  consideration,  must  be  by  some 
mental  act.  But  any  mental  act  in  order  to  be  such  must  be  a  conscious 
mental  act.  Cognition  and  consciousness  always  coexist.  An  uncon- 
scious modification  of  mind  would  necessitate  a  mental  act  of  which  one 
was  unconscious. 

"  The  facts  often  cited  in  proof  of  an  unconscious  modification  of  mind 
do  not  seem  to  warrant  the  conclusions  drawn  from  them  ;  for  instance, 
acts  performed  in  obedience  to  any  established  habits,  single  but  synthetic 
visions  of  complex  objects,  sudden  and  apparently  unaccountable  thoughts, 
sudden  and  mysterious  recollection  of  long-forgotten  persons  and  events, 
the  apparently  simultaneous  carrying  forward  of  several  trains  of 
thought.  All  these  may  be  instances,  not  of  unconscious  cerebration  or 
of  unconscious  modification  of  the  mind,  but  of  mental  movements,  the 
successive  steps  of  which  are  too  occult  or  too  rapid  and  minute  for  the 
mind  in  the  study  of  itself  to  follow.  In  compound  and  complex  mental 
processes  it  is  possible  that  simple  steps  may  be  so  inadvertently  taken  as 
to  be  apparently  taken  unconsciously  ;  but  an  analysis  of  the  process  will 
show  that  while  the  degrees  of  consciousness  may  be  indefinitely  numer- 
ous, running  down  to  the  lowest  stages  of  latent  or  sub-consciousness, 
yet  unconsciousness  is  so  far  removed  from  ever  so  low  a  degree  of  con- 
sciousness as  to  be  separated  from  it  by  an  impassable  chasm.  As  there 
are  luany  degrees  in  life  but  none  in  death,  so  there  are  degrees  in  con- 
sciousness but  none  in  unconsciousness."  (Lects.  on  Psychol.,  §  20,  ed. 
of  1884.) 

Page  138,  note  1.  Add  :  For  the  letter  of  Molyneux  here  referred 
to,  dated  March  2,  169-5,  cf.  Locke's  correspondence  with  Molyneux,  in 
Locke's  WorJcs,  9,  34,  12th  ed.,  London,  1824,  9  vols.  8vo.  Berkeley,  An 
Essay  toward  a  New  Theory  of  Vision,  §§  132,  133,  Eraser's  ed.,  Vol.  1, 
pp.  9(5,  97,  refers  to  it;  also  Locke,  Fldlos.  Wks.,  Bolin's  ed.,  1,  257-258, 
note  t.  On  the  relations  of  Locke  and  Molyneux,  (/.  Eraser,  Locke, 
Blackwood's  Philos.  Classics,  Edinburgh  and  Philadelphia,  1890,  p.  234  sq., 
the  letter  referred  to,  p.  238.  Molyneux  died  as  a  result  of  a  journey, 
undertaken  when  ill,  to  see  Locke. 

Page  1.39.  lines  17-20,  "In  this  case  .  .  .  united  with  that  sense-knowl- 
edge with  which  touch  has  before  furnished  him."  Cf.  "  Tlie  Mentor," 
a  monthly,  published  by  the  Alumni  Association  of  the  Perkins  Institu- 
tion for  the  Blind,  Boston,  Mass.,  U.S.A.,  Vol.  2,  No.  3,  March  1892,  pp. 
81-80,  "Sculpture  by  the  sense  of  Touch,"  giving  an  account  of  a  blind 
sculptor,  Johnson  M.  Mundy,  whose  sight  began  to  fail  in  his  youth  and 
slowly  but  surely  grew  less,  until  it  practically  vani.shed  entirely.  lie 
learned  the  sculptor's  art  between  the  ages  of  22  and  29,  and  practiseil  it 
for  twenty  years  till  the  loss  of  sight  compelled  him  to  give  it  up.     Unable, 


748  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

however,  long  to  endure  "  the  monotony  of  an  idle  and  useless  existence  " 
and  "  with  unabated  aspiration  and  fondness  for  his  art,"  he  resumed  his 
work,  performing  the  actual  work  of  sculpture  by  the  sense  of  touch.  His 
last  work  up  to  the  date  of  the  article  here  referred  to  was  a  heroic  statue 
of  Washington  Irving. 

Page  144,  note  1.  Add:  Gf.  Gerhardt,  Ltibniz.  philos.  Schrift.,  6, 
522-528,  letter  5  to  Sophie  Charlotte  ("  hitherto  not  published,"  Gerhardt, 
op.  cit.,  6,  477,  note  *  —  he  should  have  said  'published  entire,'  as  Toucher 
de  Careil,  Lettres  et  opuscules  inedits  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1854,  pp.  252-254, 
published  a  fragment  of  the  same),  in  which  Leibnitz  subjects  Bouhours' 
book  to  a  sharp  critique.  Leibnitz  also  refers  to  Bouhours  in  his  letter  to 
Sebastian  Kortholt,  Sept.  30,  1708,  Kortholt,  Leibnit.  Ejnstolce,  1,  282  ; 
Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  5,  306-307  ;  to  Fried.  Wilhelm  Bierling,  Oct.  24, 
1709,  Kortholt,  op.  cit.,  4,  8  ;  Dutens,  op.  cit.,  5,  355';  Gerhardt,  Leibniz, 
philos.  Schrift.,  7,  487:  "  Bouhursius  mihi  contemtu  vindicandus,  nee 
verbis  a  Germanis,  sed  rebus  refellendus  videbatur."  Cf.,  also,  Dutens, 
op.  cit.,  5,  190:  "  Mediocris  vir  fuit  Bouhursius,  qui  neglecto  religionis 
suse,  cui  se  addixerat,  habitu.  Damaretum  quendam  effingere,  et  foemi- 
neam  elegantiam  exprimere  satagebat." 

Page  147,  line  2  from  bottom,  "Modes."  Cf.  De.scartes,  Prin.  Philos., 
Bk.  I.,  §  56,  ed.  Cousin,  3,  98  ;  Veitch's  English  trans.,  217  ;  German 
trans,  by  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann,  2d  ed.,  Heidelberg,  1887  (Bd.  26  of  his 
Philos.  Bibliothek),  p.  28:  "  Lorsque  je  dis  ici  fagon  ou  mode,  je 
n'entends  rien  que  ce  que  je  nomme  ailleurs  attribut  ou  quality.  Mais 
lorsque  je  considfere  que  la  substance  en  est  autrement  dispos^e  ou  diver- 
sifi6e,  je  me  sers  particuliferement  du  nom  de  mode  ou  fa^on  ;  et  lorsque, 
de  cette  disposition  ou  changement,  elle  pent  etre  appelfe  telle,  je  nomme 
qualit^s  les  diverses  fagons  qui  font  qu'elle  e.st  ainsi  nomm^e  ;  eufin, 
lorsque  je  pense  plus  g^n^ralment  que  ces  modes  ou  qualitfe  sont  en  la 
substance,  dans  les  consid^rer  autrement  que  comme  les  d^pendances  de 
cette  substance,  je  les  nomme  attributs.  Et,  parceque  je  ne  dois  conce- 
voir  en  Dieu  aucune  vari6t6  ni  changement,  je  ne  dis  pas  qu'il  y  ait  en 
lui  des  modes  ou  des  qualit^s,  mais  plutot  des  attributs ;  et  meme  dans 
les  choses  cr^^es,  ce  qui  se  trouve  en  elles  toujours  de  meme  sorte,  comme 
1' existence  et  la  dur^e  en  la  chose  qui  existe  et  qui  dure,  je  le  nomme 
attribut,  et  non  pas  mode  ou  quality."  Cf,  also,  Xexo  Essays,  Bk.  II., 
chap.  30,  §  4,  infra,  p.  276,  and  note  to  p.  277,  line  8,  infra,  p.  763. 

Page  147,  note  1.     Dele  "Appendix,  p. ."  and  substitute  "  Duncan, 

71-80."  Cf,  also.  New  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  10,  §  7,  Th.,  ad  fin.,  infra, 
p.  505,  §9,  Th.,  p.  507. 

Page  149,  line  15  from  bottom,  "The  shortest  great-arc  of  a  circle." 
The  French  text  is :  "La  longueur  du  plus  petit  grand-arc  de  cercle,"  etc. 

Page  150,  line  13,  "Buratini."  Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  6,  Pt.  I., 
319 :  "  Gravius,  Anglus,  in  descriptione  ^gypti  apud  Thevenot,  Vol.  1, 
p.  14,  mentiouem  facit,  Titi  Livii  Buratini,  jeuue  homme  Venitien  fort 


ADDITIONS   AND   COKRECTIOXS  749 


spirituel,  qui  dtoit  dans  la  compagiiie.  Thevenot  in  niargine  annotat : 
Buvatini  est  niaintenant  niaitre  de  la  nionnoye  du  Koi  de  Pologne,  et  c'est 
de  lui  que  Pon  vit  il  y  a  dix  ou  douze  ans  un  modelle  d'une  machine  pour 
voler.'''' 

PaCxE  153,  line  7,  "Lessius."  Leonard  Lessius,  1554-1023,  a  Flemish 
Jesuit,  was  Professor  of  Philosophy  at  Douay,  and  of  Theology,  1583-1023, 
at  Louvain.  He  opposed  the  doctrine  of  grace  of  Thos.  Aquinas,  and  was 
charged  with  favoring  Semi-Pelagianism.  He  w^as  well  acquainted  with 
theology,  law,  mathematics,  medicine,  and  history.  For  two  of  his 
02)era,  cf.  Migne,  Theol.  cur.  compl,  3,  787  ;  15,  445.  Janet,  CEuvres 
philos.  de  Leibniz,  1,  120,  note  1,  states  that  he  was  a  celebrated  casuist, 
often  cited  in  Pascal's  Frovinciales,  and  adds  that  of  his  ethical  works 
the  chief  is  the  Be  justitia  et  jure  (Migne,  op.  cit.,  15,  445) ;  and  that  of 
the  theological  works  we  have  Be  perfectionihus  moribusque  divinis;  Be 
Ubertate  arbitrii  et  pro&scienUa  Bei ;  Be  sunimo  bono;  Be  I'rovidentia 
numinis. 

Page  154,  line  13,  "Accidents  or  abstracts."  The  strong  contrast 
between  Locke's  and  Leibnitz's  philosophies  comes  here  again  to  the  front. 
Locke  regards  substance  as  a  mere  creation  of  thought,  a  subjective  expe- 
dient of  the  understanding  which  "invents"  it  as  a  unitary  support  to, 
or  bearer  of,  the  accidents.  Leibnitz  looks  upon  the  "  substance-concept 
as  the  suitable  expression  of  the  idea  of  the  actual,  to  which  we  refer 
back  the  accidents.  Every  phenomenon  as  such,  in  his  view,  presupposes 
an  actual  being,  since  through  such  an  actual  being  the  phenomenon  is 
first  possible.  Substance,  accordingly,  is  in  the  case  of  all  phenomena  that 
which  is  constantly  to  be  presupposed,  the  non-irrational  {Xicht-nichtsii- 
denkeude),  but  in  no  sense  a  mere  auxiliary  concept  of  only  subjective 
validity."  — Schaarschmidt.  Leibnitz  is  in  the  direct  line  of  Hegel  in  his 
emphasis  of  the  concrete  rather  than  the  abstract. 

Page  154,  line  4  from  bottom,  "  Indefinite."  Cf.  Descartes,  Frin.  riiilos., 
Pt.  II.,  §  21,  ed.  Cousin,  Vol.  3,  p.  138:  "Nous  saurons  aussi  que  cc 
monde,  ou  la  mati^re  dtendue  qui  compose  I'univers,  n'a  point  do  bornes, 
parceque,  quelque  part  on  nous  en  voulions  fcindre,  nous  pouvons  encore 
imaginer  au-delh.  des  espaces  inddfiniment  (itendus,  que  nous  n'imaginons 
pas  seulement,  mais  que  nous  concevons  etre  tels  en  effet  que  nous  les 
imaginons  ;  de  sorte  qu'ils  contiennent  un  corps  ind^finement  dtendu," 
i.e.  We  know  that  this  world,  or  the  extended  matter  which  composes  tiie 
universe,  has  no  limits  because,  should  we  wish  anywiiere  to  feign  such 
limits,  we  can  still  imagine  beyond  .spaces  indefinitely  extended,  which  we 
do  not  imagine  only,  but  which  we  conceive  to  be  in  fact  such  as  wt;  imag- 
ine them,  so  that  they  contain  an  indefinitely  extended  body. 

Page  154,  note  1,  line  4.  Listead  of  "Appendix,"  read:  Duncan,  ]>]). 
08-70  ;  line  7,  ditto,  pp.  71-80  ;  line  10,  ditto,  pp.  1 12   I2(i. 

Page  155,  line  20,  "Motion."  C/".  Leibnitz's  4th  letter  to  Clarke,  <td 
Jin.,  Gerhardt,  7,  377  ;   Erdmann,  758  ;  Jac(iues,  2,  437  ;   Janet,  2,  (MU  ; 


750  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 

trans.  Duncan,  253  ;  5th  letter  to  Clarke,  §  22,  Gerhardt,  7,  394  ;  Erd- 
niann,  765 ;  Jacques,  2,  450  ;  Janet,  2,  654 ;  Duncan,  259. 

Page  156,  note  1.  Phys.,  VIII.  [or  H],  6,  258''  10:  iirel  5e  8eT  Kivr]cnv 
del  eivat  kuI  fxi)  diaXeiweiv,  dvdyKi]  eivai  ti  o  Trpwrov  Kivei,  etre  ev  etre  TrXeioj, 
Kal  TO  irpQjTov  kivovv  dKlvrjTov. 

Page  157,  note  1.  Add:  ^vaiKrjz  ' AKpodcrews,  A,  11,  219''  1  :  tovto  yap 
icTTLv  6  xpovos,  dpid/JLOS  Kivrjaeios  Kara  to  wpOTepov  Kal  vaTepov.  ovk  apa  Kivrjais 
6  xp^voi  °-^^'  V  dpifffMov  ex^'  V  Kiv7](jLS.  ^V(riKi]s  'AKpodcreuis,  A,  11,  219^  8:65^ 
Xpouos  i(TTl  TO  dpidfjLov/xevov  Kal  ovx  <?  dpi6/jLovp.ev.  Cf.  Zeller,  Philos.  d. 
Griech.,  3d  ed.,  1879,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  402. 

Page  158,  note  1.  Add  :  SjDinoza  regards  all  determination  as  a  nega- 
tion —  Omnis  determinatio  est  negatio  —  of  this  originally  posited  or 
necessarily  presupposed  absolute.  Hegel  likewise  in  his  Logik  maintains 
essentially  the  same  position  as  Leibnitz,  so  that  Leibnitz  may  rightly  be 
said  to  be  in  the  direct  line  of  the  philosophical  development  culminating 
in  Hegel.  Cf.  Wallace,  The  Logic  of  Hegel,  1st  ed.,  1874  ;  2d  ed.,  revised 
and  augmented,  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  1892-1894,  passim. 

Page  160,  line  9,  "Transcendent."  Janet,  CEuvres  philos.  de  Leibniz, 
1,  128,  in  his  note  to  this  passage,  says:  "Expressions  of  the  scholastic 
mathematical  language,  rarely  employed  to-day.  The  srird  {le  sourd)  is 
the  incommensurable,  for  example,  V^  ;  le  rompu  —  the  broken  —  is  the 
fraction,  as  J  ;  the  transcendent  is  that  which  cannot  be  calculated  by  a 
limited  number  of  arithmetical  operations,  for  example,  log  3.  These 
three  terms  are  comprised  between  two  whole  numbers." 

Page  162,  note  1.  Add  :  Locke'' s  Essay,  ed.  Fraser,  1,  295,  line  9  from 
bottom. 

Page  162,  note  2.  Add :  Cf.  the  note  of  Foucher  de  Careil,  Sur  les 
trots  sens  du  mot  infini  dans  la  philosophie  de  Leibniz,  XouveUes  Lettres 
et  Opuscules  inedits  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1857,  pp.  404-407  ;  also  A.  Penjon, 
De  injinito  apud  Leibnitium,  Paris,  1878. 

Page  162,  note  3.     Add:  Lockers  Essay,  ed.  Fraser,  1,  277,  line  14. 

Page  166,  note  1.     Add  :  Locke''s  Essay,  ed.  Fraser,  1,  300,  line  10. 

Page  167,  note  1.  Add :  The  definition  referred  to  runs  as  follows : 
"Jjjirtre  autem  sive  diligere  est  felicitate  alterius  delectari,  vel  quod 
eodem  redit,  felicitatem  alienara  adsciscere  [Erdmann  —  asciscere]  in 
suam.  Unde  difficilis  nodus  solvitur,  magni  etiam  in  Theologia  momenti. 
quomodo  amor  non  mercenarius  detur,  qui  sit  a  spe  metuque  et  onnii 
utilitatis  respectu  separatus :  scilicet  quorum  utilitas  [Erdmann  —  felici- 
tas]  delectat,  eorum  felicitas  nostrara  ingreditur,  nam  quaj  delectant  per 
se  expetuntur."  Cf.  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  4,  Pt.  IV.,  295  ;  Erdmann, 
118,  b.  The  entire  preface  to  the  Codex  juris  is  given  in  Dutens,  op.  cit. . 
4,  Pt.  III.,  287-;328. 


ADDITIONS   AND   COREECTIONS  751 

Page  1G8,  note  1,  ad  Jin.  Add  :  Infra,  pp.  177  sq.,  188.  Also,  Theo- 
dicee,  III.,  §  404,  Gerhardt,  6,  357  ;  Erdmaiin,  620  ;  Jacques,  2,  300  ; 
Janet,  2,  402.  Cf.,  also,  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann,  Erluuteriuigen  zur  Theo- 
dicee  von  Leibniz  (Bd.  80,  of  his  Philus.  Bibliothek,  Leipzig,  1879), 
Erlauterung,  264,  pp.  145-147. 

Page  172,  line  4  from  bottom,  "Displeasure."  Schaarschmidt  says 
that  neither  Locke  nor  Leibnitz  have  yet  reached  the  distinction  between 
emotion  and  passion,  as  appears  from  the  language  of  both  ;  and  that 
Kant  first  grasped  the  distinction  and  attempted  to  determine  it  more 
accurately. 

Page  174,  note  1.  Add:  Phys.,  V,  201"  10:  17  toD  owifiei  oiros  ivrt- 
Xe'xeia,  17  toiovtov,  KlvqcrU  idriv,  olov  rod  fj.^v  dXXoiwrou,  rj  dWoiwTdi',  dXXotoxns, 
Tov  8^  au^r]Tod  Kai  rod  avTiKeLixevov  (pdLTOv  (oyS^v  yap  6voixa  kolvov  (it''  dfj.(f)o2p) 
av^rjcris  /cat  (pOicris  tov  di  yev-qrov  Kal  (pdaprov  y^veais  /cat  (pOopd,  rod  5i  ipoprjTox) 
(popd.  Metaphys.,  K,  1065''  16:  rriv  tov  dvvdp.eL  rj  toiovtov  icrTLv  ivipyeLav 
"Keycj  KLvrjaiv.  Cf.  Zeller,  Fhilos.  d.  Griech.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  351  sq., 
389  sq. ;  Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  §  42,  p.  77,  3d  ed., 
1883. 

Page  174,  note  2.  Add  :  Translations  of  the  two  pieces  last  referred 
to  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix,  infra,  the  Beilage  to  the  letter  to  Pabri, 
pp.  699  sq.  ;  the  Specimen  Dynamicum,  pp.  670  sq. 

Page  175,  line  5,  "Idea  of  power."  Leibnitz  carefully  distinguishes 
between   mere   power   and   force    ("Macht"    and    "Kraft").      Cf.  IJe 

primoi  pihilos.  emendatione,  etc.,  Gerhardt,  4,  469;  Erdniann,  122; 
Jacques,  1,  453  [in  French]  ;  Janet,  2,  525  [in  Frencli];  Duncan,  i%(V//,s\ 

Wks.  of  Leibnitz,  69. 

Page  175,  line  18,  "Because  of  our  ignorance."  Tliat  is,  we  are  thus 
far  incapable  of  resolving  our  sense-impressions,  i.e.  the  simple  sense- 
(lualities,  into  anything  more  simple,  and  are  therefore  compelliid  to 
regard  them  as  simple  presentations,  although  in  themselves  possibly 
composite  and  in  fact  in  many  cases  in  indirect  ways  shown  to  be  so. 
Cf.,  also.  New  Essays,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  3,  §  18,  Th.,  infra,  p.  317,  and 
note  2. 

Page  175,  line  24,  "Primitive  truths."  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  I.,  chap. 
1,  and  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  2,  infra,  pp.  404  sq. 

Page  176,  line  13  from  bottom,  "Casati."  Paolo  Oasati,  1617-1707, 
a  learned  Italian  Jesuit,  who  taught  mathematics  and  tlieology  at  liome, 
and  was  said  to  have  converted  Queen  Christiana,  of  Sweden,  to  (lie 
Catholic  faith.  On  his  return  from  Sweden  he  became  Director  of  ilic 
University  of  Parma.  Among  his  works  are  Vacuum  proscrijitum, 
Genoa,  1649  ;  De  terra  machinio  mota,  liome,  1668  ;  Mechanirorum  lib. 
VIIL,  Lyons,  1684  ;  De  igne  dissertationes  physira',,  Venice,  16K6,  1695 ; 
Hydrostaticce  dissert.,  1695;  Optian  dissert.,  1705.  Lasswitz,  (lesrh.  d. 
Atomistik,  2,  490,  says:   "  Im  Einzclnen  (ibenfalls  durchaus  korpuskular 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


siud  die  physikalisclien  Erkliiruugeii  des  Jesuiten  Paolo  Casati  .  .  .  Aber 
seine  allgeiueiue  Auffassuug  der  Xatur  ist  dabei  vollstaiidig  scliolast- 
iscb." 

Page  176,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  421-428, 
especially  423-424.  Malebrauche  changed  bis  views  under  tbe  influence 
of  lluygens  and  Leibnitz.  Tbe  Loix  generales  de  la  comimuiication  des 
onunvements,  Lasswitz  says,  was  added  as  an  Appendix  to  tbe  later  edi- 
tions of  tbe  Becherche  de  la  verite. 

Page  180,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.  §  13  of  tbis  chapter,  ijifra.  pp.  182-184, 
JVeio  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  0,  ad  Jin.,  infra,  p.  462,  note  1  ;  also,  Ger- 
hardt,  7, 108-111  ;  Erdmann,  669  ;  also  the  fragment  entitled  De  Libertate, 
published  by  Foucher  de  Careil,  Xouvelles  Lettres  et  Opuscules  inedits  de 
Leibniz,  Paris,  1857,  pp.  178-185.  "Apart  from  the  freedom  of  fact  and 
of  right,"  says  Scbaarschmidt,  "Leibnitz  distinguishes  between  ethical 
freedom  and  free-will  (  Willk'ur).  The  former,  ethical  freedom,  is  the 
power  to  follow  the  ethical  insight  in  spite  of  opposing  internal  hin- 
drances, such  as  the  passions.  This  concept  also  is  clear  and  simple. 
The  difficulty  proper  lies  bidden  in  the  conception  of  free-will  (der 
Willk'dr),  the  liberum  arbitrium,  by  which,  as  Leibnitz  expresses  him- 
self, is  meant,  'that  the  strongest  reasons  or  impressions  which  tbe 
understanding  presents  to  tbe  will  do  not  prevent  the  act  of  the  will  from 
being  contingent,  and  do  not  give  it  an  absolute  and,  so  to  speak,  meta- 
physical necessity.'  "  Leibnitz  regards  tbe  action  of  the  will  as  a  motive 
which  inclines,  but  does  not  compel,  — but  at  the  same  time  he  assumes, 
Theodicee,  Pt.  I.,  §  52,  a  self-determination  of  tbe  will  over  against  which 
tbe  expression  incline  appears  as  a  mere  evasion.  Cf.  infra,  p.  462,  note 
1.  On  Leibnitz's  doctrine  of  the  Will  and  Freedom,  cf.  G.  Class,  Die 
metaphys.Voraussetznncien  d.  Leibnitziscli  Deterininismus,  Tiibingen,  1874, 
pp.  9,  78  sq. ;  F.  Kirchner,  Leibniz's  Pstjchologic,  Cothen,  1875,  pp.  82  sq. ; 
M.  Penzler,  Die  Monadenlehre  u.  Hire  Bezieliung  z.  griech.  Philos., 
Minden,  1878,  p.  23  ;  L.  Braeutigam,  Leibniz  nnd  Herbart  liber  die  Frei- 
lieit  des  menschl.  Willens,  Heidelberg,  1882,  pp.  3-17,  28-39  ;  M.  Nour- 
risson.  La  Philosophic  de  Leibniz,ViiX\s,  1860,  pp.  268-286  ;  Kuno  Fischer, 
Gesch.  d.  n.  Philos.,  A''ol.  2  [Leibniz]  pp.  512-533,  3d  ed.  Heidelberg, 
1889.  For  a  clear  analysis  and  able,  though  brief,  discussion  of  the  vari- 
ous senses  in  which  tbe  "  freedom  of  will "  is  used,  and  of  "  determinism," 
cf.  Robinson,  Principles  and  Practice  of  Morality,  pp.  122-137. 

Page  180,  note  2.  After  "  1881,"  add  :  pp.  68  sq.  The  Greek  text  of 
the  passages  referred  to  reads  thus:  'RdiKa.  NiKO/udxeia,  V,  4,  1112"  15:  ^ 
yap  TTpoaipeffis  fieTo,  \6yov  Kai  diavolas.  5,  1112"  30  :  (iovXevSfjieda  5^  irepi  tQv 
€(p'  Tifuv  irpaKTlhv.  Cf.,  also,  Sir  Alexander  Grant,  The  Ethics  of  Aristoth\ 
3d  ed.,  London,  1874,  Vol.  2,  pp.  17,  10,  'RO.  Nt/c.,  III.,  chap.  2,  §  17;  chap. 
3,  §  7.  Peter's  translation  follows  the  chapter  and  section  numbering  of 
Grant's  text.  Cf,  also,  the  following  pasages  from  the  so-called  'UdiKo. 
Mey  dXa  —  Magna  Moralia  —  "which,"  Scbaarschmidt  says,  "  at  lea-st  for 
Leibnitz,  was  a  genuine  work  of  Aristotle,"  —  though  now  regarded,  ac 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  753 


cording  to  Zeller,  as  "a  skotch  compiled  from  both  "  the  Nicomacliean  and 
FAidemian  ethics,  "but  more  especially  from  the  Eudemiau  "  (J'hilos.  d. 
Griech.,  II.,  '2.  \_Vo\.  4],  102,  note  1 ;  Outlines  of  the  Hist,  of  Greek  Pliilos., 
New  York,  IHHO,  p.  175)  :  A,  16,  1188''  25 :  iird  8i  rd  eKowiov  iv  oi)S€/ni?E 
opfirj  ecrriu,  Xoiirbv  &v  eL-f]  to  eK  diavoias  yiyvo/xevov.  IISS^  31  :  is  rod  eKOvaiov 
ouTos  iv  Tw  SLavoridrivaL.  1188''  37  :  evravda  dpa  rb  eKo6cnov  wlTTTei.  ets  rb  fi^ra 
dcavoias.  A,  17,  1189*  31  :  ei  toIvvv  17  irpoalpeais  6pe^is  rts  ^ovXevTiKrj  tiera. 
Siavoia^,  ovk  effri  to  eKo{i<xi.ov  irpoaipeT6v.  eKbvTes  yap  TroXXa  wpd.TTop.ev  irpb 
rod  diavori0r]vaL  (cat  ^ovXe^Kraffdai,  olov  Kadigo/xev  kuI  a.vi(TTap.eda  Kal  &\\a.  TroXXd 
TOiavTa  €K6vTes  p.kv  avev  5^  tov  dLavo-qdTJvai,  rb  Si  Kara  irpoalpeffLv  wdv  fjv  peTo. 
diavoias.  ovk  dpa  Tb  eKovawv  TrpoatperoV,  dXXo,  rb  TrpoacpeTbv  iKoiaiov  •  &v  ti 
yap  Trpoaipu)p.eOa  TrpdrreLV  ^ovXsvadpevoi,  eKovres  irpaTTopev.  With  this  last 
passage,  rf.  'Hd.  Ni/c.,  T,  4,  1111''  G:  17  -n-poalpea-LS  dr]  (kovjiov  piv  (paiveTai, 
ov  ravTbv  5^,  dXX'  eirl  ttX^ov  rb  eKovcriov.  1112*  14  :  eKova-iov  piv  drj  (palveTai. 
[t]  TTpoaipeais^,  Tb  5'  eKomiov  ov  irdv  irpoaipeTdv.  1113"  9  :  6vtos  de  tov  irpoai- 
peTov  ^ovXevTov  opeKTov  tCiv  icp'  ijpTv,  Kal  7}  ir poaipe<ns  hv  dt)  jiovXevTiKT]  6p€^is 
Tuiv  i<p'  i^piv.  The  'H6'.  Nt/c.,  F,  3,  1111"  22,  defines  Tb  eKo(i(nov,  the  vol- 
untary, —  das  Freiwillirje,  — thus  :  t6  eKovaiov  86^€i.ev  cLv  elvai  ov  i]  dpxr]  iv 
avTip  eidoTL  to.  Kad'  ^Kacrra  iv  oh  ij  irpd^Ls.  'Hd.  Evdripca,  B,  8,  1224"  (> : 
XeiireTai  iv  Tip  diavovpevSv  tt&js  irpdrreiv  eivai  Tb  eKovcriov.  B,  9,  1225"  30  : 
iivel  Si  Tovr'  exet  riXos,  Kal  ovTe  ttj  opi^ei  ovts  t-q  irpoaipio'ei.  rb  eKOvaiov  ujpia- 
Tai,  Xonrbv  Stj  opicraadai  to,  /caret  didvoiav.  B,  10,  122(5''  G  :  i)  yap  wpoaipcffn 
a'ipeffis  piv  iaTiv,  ovx  an-Xws  5^,  dXX'  iripov  wpb  iripov  •  tovto  di  oiix  ol6v 
re  dvev  (T/ce'i/'eaJS  Kal  ^ovXyjs.  Sib  e/c  So^ijs  ^ovXevTiKTJs  iarlv  17  irpoalpecrii.  Cf., 
also,  Zeller,  Philos.  d.  Griech.,  3d  ed.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  4],  587  .s^. 

On  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  Will  and  Freedom,  cf.  'Hd.  Nt\-.,  T.  1-8, 
1109-1115;  Grant,  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  2,  5-32,  and  notes;  also  his  Plan 
of  Book  III.,  ibid;  iii-,  iv.,  and  Essay  V.,  1,  284  sq.;  Essay  VII.,  1,  37G  !<q.  ; 
J.  A.  Stewart,  Notes  on  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  Oxford, 
Clarendon  Press,  1892,  Vol.  1,  pp.  224-230,  232-236,  240,  243-245,  250, 
279  ;  Vol.  2,  pp.  16,  17,  379,  380  ;  Trendelenburg,  Ilistur.  Beitraye  z. 
Philos.,  2,  149  sq. ;  Windelband-Tufts,  Hist,  of  Philos.,  §  IG,  2,  pp.  191, 
192. 

On  Leibnitz's  relations  and  indebtedness  to  Aristotle,  cf.  D.  Jacoby, 
Be  Leihnitii  Studiis  Aristotelicis,  Berlin,  1867  ;  D.  Nolen,  Quid  Lrih- 
nizius  Aristoteli  debuerit,  Paris,  1875  :  M.  Pcnzler,  Die  Monadenlehre  u. 
ihre  Beziehung  z.  griech.  Philosophic,  Minden,  1878,  p.  29. 

Page  183,  line  13  from  bottom,  "The  best."  Cf.  Neio  Es-iai/.^,  Bk. 
IV.,  chap.  6,  ad  Jin.,  infra,  p.  462,  note  1. 

Page  184,  lines  7,  6  from  bottom,  "A  freedom  of  equilibrium  alisolutidy 
imaginary  and  impracticable."  Leibnitz  argues  against  indeterininisiu 
and  eciuilibrium  of  will,  cf.  Gerhardt,  7,  109:  "■  Libertas  indiffcrentia-  cut 
impossibilis.  Adeo  ut  ne  in  Deum  (luidom  cadat,  nam  dctcrminatus  illo 
est  ad  optinmm  efficiendum.  Et  creatume  semper  ex  ratioiiihus  inttTiiis 
externisque  determinantur "  (ib.,  110,  in  French);  Enlmann,  (!(i9  (in 
Latin).  Cf.  Robinson,  Principles  and  Practice  of  Morality,  p.  126. 
3c 


754  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Pack  185,  line  20,  ''Vigor  of  WilV  Cf.  Robinson,  Principles  and 
Practice  of  Morality,  p.  138,  where  Virtue  is  defined  as  "the  soul's  or  the 
will's  iiersistency  of  compliance,  —  its  energy  in  complying  with  the  moral 
law,"  — a  definition  perhaps  suggested  by  that  of  Kant,  quoted  in  the 
foot-note :   "the  strength  of  the  human  will  in  the  performance  of  duty." 

Page  185,  note  1.     After  "Erdmaun,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  192,  line  8,  "Clearly  felt."  Schaarschmidt  says:  "Our  feelings 
can  be  very  lively,  while  the  ideas  causing  them  may  be  obscure,  con- 
fused, nay  even  senseless  (let  one  think,  for  example,  of  religious  fanati- 
cism, of  drunkenness,  the  aberrations  of  revenge,  etc.) ;  on  the  other  hand, 
our  thoughts  can  be  distinctly,  i.e.  from  one  another,  indeed  be  distin- 
guishable, without  being  clearly,  i.e.  in  their  own  content,  conceived." 

Page  192,  note  2.  Add:  The  passage  from  the  Etkica  referred  to  in 
this  note  is  found  in  Vol.  1,  pp.  270  sq.  of  this  edition.  Cf.  also  the 
Short  Essay  on  God,  etc.,  Korte  Verhandeling  van  God,  etc.,  Bk.  II., 
chaps.  5  and  19,  ed.  Van  ^loten  and  Land,  2,  310,  338;  Schaarschmidt's 
German  trans.,  pp.  54,  84  sq.,  in  J.  H.  v.  Kirchmann's  Philos.  Bibliothek, 
Bd.  18,  2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1874. 

Page  193,  line  6,  "  Francisco  Borgia."  General  of  the  Jesuits,  1-565- 
1572. 

Page  199,  note  1.  Add:  The  texts  of  Erdmann,  Jacques,  and  Janet, 
and  the  translation  of  Schaarschmidt  end  at  "pleasure." 

Page  203,  note  2.  The  note  should  read  as  follows  :  Gerhardt  reads  : 
"  Ou  venous  au  propos  ;  "  the  phrase  is  wanting  in  the  texts  of  Erdmann. 
Jacques,  Janet,  and  in  Schaarschmidt's  translation. 

Page  204,  note  1.  After  "proposer,"  the  note  should  read:  wanting 
in  the  texts  of  Erdmann,  Jacques,  Janet,  and  in  Schaarschmidt's  trans- 
lation. 

Page  204,  note  2.  After  "gauche,"  the  note  should  read  :  wanting  in 
the  texts  of  Erdmann,  Jacques,  Janet,  and  in  Schaarschmidt's  transla- 
tion.    For  the  allusion,  etc. 

Page  205,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  205,  note  2.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  206,  line  12  from  bottom,  "  Following  the  good."  Leibnitz  is  a 
forerunner  of  Kant  in  the  expression  here  used  that  the  chief  end  of 
reason  is  practical.  "In  Kant's  view,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "theo- 
retical reason  has  only  the  negative  significance  of  raising  us  above  the 
contemplation  of  nature  and  the  sphere  of  experience  to  tliat  position 
where  beyond  the  sensuous  the  practical  principles,  by  means  of  a  legis- 
lation derived  from  freedom,  unconditionally  determine  the  will."  Cf. 
also  Leibnitz's  definition  in  the  same  sense  of  "  wisdom  as  the  science  of 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORllECTIONS  755 


happiness,"  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  7,  80;  Erdmanii,  071: 
"  Weisheit  ist  nichts  anders  als  die  Wissenschaft  der  Gliickseeligk'eit,  so 
uiis  uehmlich  zur  Gliickseeligkeit  zu  gelaugen  lehret." 

Page  208,  line  21,  "  Endure  forever."  Cf.  Spinoza,  Korte  Verhandcling 
van  God,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  26,  ed.  Vloten  and  Land,  2,  359  ;  Schaarschniidt's 
trans.  105  :  "Zo  konnen  wy  't  met  reden  voor  een  groote  ongerijmtheid 
achten,  't  geene  veele,  en  die  men  anders  voor  groote  god-geleerde  acht, 
zeggen  ;  nanielijk,  byaldien  op  de  liefde  Gods  geen  eeuwig  leeveu  en 
kwam  te  volgen,  zy  als  dan  haar  zelfs  best  zouden  zoeken ;  even  als  of  zy 
lets  dat  beter  was,  als  God,  zouden  uytvinden.  Dit  is  alzo  onnozel  als  of 
een  vis  wonde  zeggen  (voor  welke  doch  buyten  het  water  geen  leven  is)  : 
by  aldien  my  op  dit  leven  in  het  water  geen  eeuwig  leveu  en  zoude 
komen  te  volgen,  zo  wil  ik  uyt  het  water  na  het  land  toe  ;  ja  maar  wat 
konnen  ons  die  God  niet  en  kennen  dog  anders  zeggen?"  i.e.  "Thus 
we  can  rightly  pronounce  exceedingly  absurd  the  statement  which  many, 
whom  we  otlierwise  deem  great  theologians,  make  ;  namely,  that  if  eternal 
life  did  not  follow  from  the  love  of  God,  then  man  should  seek  his  own 
best  good,  as  though  man  thereby  could  find  something  better  than  God. 
This  were  just  as  foolish  as  if  a  fish  [for  whom  out  of  the  water  there  is 
no  life]  should  say,  if  for  me  after  this  life  in  the  water  no  eternal  life 
follows,  I  will  go  out  of  the  water  on  to  the  land.  Wliat  else,  how- 
ever, can  they  who  do  not  know  God  say  to  us  ?  "  Schaarschmidt  thinks 
that  Leibnitz's  accord  with  Spinoza  was  perhaps  mediated  by  the  Stoic 
doctrine. 

Page  208,  line  25,  "  Absolutely  indispensable."  Cf.  infra,  p.  2(51,  note 
2.  Leibnitz,  while  admitting  the  truth  of  the  Aristotelian  and  Stoic  view, 
nevertheless  contests  that  in  this  life  we  cannot  always  demonstrate  the 
identity  of  the  virtuous  and  useful,  and  supports  the  life  of  duty  and 
overcomes  the  dualism  between  duty  and  pleasure  through  the  "  thouglit 
of  God  and  immortality."  Kant  grounded  rational  belief  in  immortality 
upon  this  very  dualism. 

Page  210,  note  1.     After  "Erdmann"  add:  Janet. 

Page  210,  note  2.  Add:  Eraser,  LocJce\s  Esaaij,  1,  358,  reads:  §  (1(5. 
His  edition  gives  full  account  of  all  the  various  Headings  and  changes  in 
the  various  editions  of  Locke's  Essay,  including  those  in  the  translation 
of  Coste.  It  is  in  all  respects  the  best  edition  of  the  Essay  yet  i.ssucd, 
and  the  tlianks  of  all  students  of  philosophy  are  most  heartily  rendered 
to  Prof.  Eraser  for  his  splendid  woi-k. 

Page  211,  note  1.  Add  :  3d  ed.,  enlarged,  2  vols.,  8vo,  A.  .<:  V.  Hlack, 
Edinburgh,  1893. 

Page  212,  line  25,  "Turn  them  aside  from  it."  Cf  Nrw  Essai/s,  Rk. 
IL,  chap.  27,  §  30,  Th.  ;  ante,  pp.  194  .sr/.,  §  53,  Th.,  207.  I'erfcclibility  is 
Leibnitz's  ethical  norm,  and  tlie  "himinous  pleasures"  are^  tlmsc  wliidi 
assist  us  in  our  efforts  to  attain  this  perfectifin,  because  they  spring  out 


75(3  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

of  the  need  of,  and  therefore  also  out  of  the  idea,  though  obscure,  of  the 
true  good. 

Tage  213,  line  12,  "Greatness  of  the  consequent."  Janet,  CEuvres 
2Jhilos.  de  Leibniz,  1,  185,  note  1,  says :  "  The  greatness  .of  the  conse- 
quence, i.e.  the  greater  or  less  probability  that  the  foreseen  good  or  evil 
will  occur  ;  the  greatness  of  the  consequent,  i.e.  the  greater  or  less  good 
or  evil  which  the  outcome  must  bring." 

Page  213,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  214,  note  1,  line  1.  After  "  70^  3,"  add  :  to  fiev  eUbs  eart  irpoTaais 
ei'SoJos  •  6  yap  ais  errt  to  ttoXv  laacnv  o'vto}  yLVOfievov  -^  /j.7)  yivo/mevov  t]  ov  ri  fxr]  6v, 
tovt'  eariv  sIkos,  i.e.  "The  probable,"  etc.  And  in  line  5,  after  "  1357'»  34," 
add:  to  fiev  yap  €Ik6s  eaTiv  ws  iiri  to  iroXii  yivoaevov,  i.e.  "  Eor  the  proba- 
ble," etc. 

Page  217,  line  2  from  bottom,  "World."  "Because,"  as  Schaar- 
schmidt  says,  "mathematics  as  the  science  of  magnitude  is  applicable 
only  to  sensible  things." 

Page  218,  lines  18,  19,  "  The  term  thought  in  the  same  general  way." 
"We  exercise  an  inner  activity,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "either  so  that  we 
produce  perception-(phantasie-)  images  or  (formulated  —  sprachgeformtc) 
thought-images.  The  lower  situated  entelechies  do  the  former,  of  the 
latter  minds  only  are  capable.  We  can,  continues  Leibnitz,  in  case  of 
necessity  designate  both  of  these  activities  as  thought.  To-day  we  [the 
Germans]  use  '  Vorstellen '  as  the  most  general  expression  to  indicate 
the  inner  activity. ' ' 

Page  218,  note  1.     Add :  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  1,  371,  line  3. 

Page  219,  line  26,  "Comes  from  thought.]"  Schaarschmidt  .says  in 
his  note  to  this  passage  :  "These  weighty  expressions  are  the  pure  result 
of  the  fundamental  thought,  that  every  substance  acts  from  an  inner 
spontaneity.  Passion  thus  has  for  the  spirit  only  the  significance  of  a 
confused  and  therefore  imperfect  activity,  whose  most  pregnant  exjjres- 
sion  for  the  subject  is  pain  ;  for  bodies,  however,  passion  means  an 
imparted  or  mediated  activity,  in  connection  with  which  it  is  to  be  con- 
sidered tliat,  since  bodies  are  mere  phenomena,  their  changes  are  also 
only  phenomenal,  whose  grounds  must  always  be  sought  in  the  spontane- 
ous forces  of  simple  substances  (out  of  whose  joint-existence  —  Znsam- 
r)iensein  —  our  confused  thought  forms  the  corporeal  mass)."  Gf.  Nexn 
Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  8,  ante,  p.  131,  note  1.  Schaarschmidt  adds: 
"Activity  in  the  absolute  sense,  however,  is  the  transition  to  gi-eater 
perfection  and  thence  also  accompanied  with  pleasure." 

Page  219,  note  1.     After  "  Jacques,"  add  :  and  Janet. 

Page  220, line  2  from  bottom,  "Complete  separation."  Schaarschmidt 
says  in  his  note  to  the  text  at  this  point,  "Separation  arises  from  the 
Aristotelian  concept  x^pur/nis.    Xuipi^eiv  is  the  separation  or  loosing  of  the 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  757 


purely  spiritual  from  the  material.  After  Descartes  had  agaiu  renewed 
the  ancient  Platonic-Aristotelian  Dualism  in  another  way,"  Spinoza  and 
Leibnitz,  each  in  his  own  way,  again  set  up  a  monism,  which  the  realistic 
tendency  of  Locke  in  another  way  and  towards  another  goal  also  endeav- 
ored to  attain." 

Page  220,  note  1,  line  2.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  222,  line  10  from  bottom,  "  Old  word."  That  is  "  chevauchier," 
"chevalchier,"  "  chevaucher,"  "  chevalcher,"  "cevaucier,"  all  these  dif- 
ferent forms  occurring  in  the  old  writers.  For  examples,  cf.  Litlre,  who 
gives  the  Provencal  "cavalcar,"  "cavalguar,"  Italian  "cavalcare,"  all 
derived  from  the  Low-Latin  "  caballicare."  "  Ciievaucher,"  says  Littr^, 
is  reserved  for  elevated  style  and  especially  for  narrations  regarding  the 
Middle  Age  ;  "aller  h  cheval"  is  the  common  and  daily  form  of  speech. 

Page  222,  line  2  from  bottom,  "Seen."  Schaarschmidt  says:  "That 
Locke  here  makes  the  formation  of  the  mixed  or  compound  modes  pro- 
ceed from  wider  experience,  to  which  he  certainly  adds  'invention'  — 
from  a  purpose  —  Leibnitz  not  only  allows  in  a  noteworthy  fashion,  but 
he  also  adds  thereto  as  a  further  source  the  activity  of  the  fancy.  Locke 
undoubtedly  understands  by  mixed  modes  something  wholly  dilTerent 
from  that  which  is  formed  by  means  of  dreams  and  fancies ;  namely, 
abstractions  from  given  compound  relations,  whicli,  according  to  the 
measure  of  our  interest,  or  at  least  of  our  attention,  are  formed  and 
linguistically  fixed." 

Page  223,  note  1.  Add  :  For  Leibnitz  on  Mademoiselle  de  Scudery,  in 
the  "  Monatlicher  Auszug  aus  allerliand  neu  herausgogeben,  niitzlichen 
und  artigen  Blichern,"  Dec,  1700,  pp.  909,  910,  and  Dec,  1701,  IV.,  cf. 
Guhrauer,  Leihnitz^s  Deutsche  Schriften,  2,  414-420.  Cf.,  also,  Fouchcr 
de  Careil,  Lettres  et  opuscules  inedits  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1854,  pp.  254- 
260  ;  F.  de  Careil,  CEuvres  de  Leibniz,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1809,  2,  515-517. 

Page  224,  line  23,  "Called  causes  in  the  schools."  Cf.  Appendix, 
infra,  pp.  637,  672  sq.,  699  sq.,  for  Leibnitz's  further  exposition  of  the 
doctrine  here  set  forth.  In  this  place,  "without  allowing  himself  to 
enter  upon  a  critique  of  Lockci's  exposition  of  the  term  prinuil  cause, 
Leibnitz,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "contents  himself  with  ascribing  to  it  a 
double  signification,  one  of  which  goes  back  to  the  Aristotelian  termi- 
nology ;  the  other  indicates  the  end.  At  the  same  time,  h<nvever,  he 
mentions  the  fact  that  the  primal  cause  may  also  be  understood  ius  the 
material  ground  of  a  thing.  Critical  investigation  of  this  imiiortant  con- 
ception first  begins  with  Hume." 

Page  227,  line  11,  "Promoter."  CIk'tucI,  THctionnaire  drs  Institu- 
tions Francniscs,  sub  voc,  says  :  "  Promoteur  "  :  "  Kccl(''sia.sti(|ue  ciiarg^ 
du  mini.stfere  public  dans  les  officialit6s  (voy.  cc  mot)  [in  tiial  article  it 
is  explained  that  officiality  =  the  court  of  a  bishop  or  archliisimpj,  dans 
les  assemblees  du  clerg6,  dans  les  chanibres  supc'n-ieurH  eocl6siasli.iMes,  en 
un  mot  dans  tous  les  tribunaux  ecclesiastiques.     Les  functions  des  pro- 


758  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

mnteurs  consistaient  surtout  h  maintenir  les  droits,  libertes  et  immunitfe 
de  TKglise;  il  veiller  i\  I'observation  de  la  discipline  eccl(5siastique  et  i\ 
poursuivre  les  crimes  et  dt^iits  qui  etaieat  de  la  competence  des  juges  de 
I'Eglise.  II  y  avait  quelquefois  dans  les  officialit^s  un  vice-promoteur ;  il 
etait,  comme  le  promoteur,  nomm6  par  I'eveque." 

In  short,  the  promoteur  was  a  sort  of  ecclesiastical  district  attorney, 
and  he  is  here  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  case  from  the  young  lawyer. 
When  he  calls  the  lawyer  "  doctor  juris,"  the  latter  objects  that  he  ought 
to  call  him  "doctor  juris  utriusque,"  i.e.,  doctor  of  both  civil  and  canon 
law,  or  in  our  phrase,  doctor  of  laws,  LL.D.  To  which  the  promoteur 
replies  sarcastically. 

Page  227,  note  2,  line  3.  After  "Eucken,"  insert:  Gesch.  inul  Kritik 
der  Griindbegriffe  der  Gegenwart,  Leipzig,  1878,  pp.  69-78  (Leibnitz,  p. 
70)  ;  Die  Grundbegriffe  der  Gegenwart  historisdi  und  kritisch  entwickelt, 
|2te,  vollig  umgearbeitete  Aufiage,  Leipzig,  1893,  pp.  98-102  (Leibnitz, 
p.  98),  but  not  so  fully  as  in  the  1st  ed.,  the  author  stating  in  the  Preface, 
that  "the  historical  statements  are  strictly  limited  to  that  which  appears 
immediately  requisite  to  the  undei'standing  of  the  present  time."  Eng. 
trans,  of  1st  ed. ,  The  Fundamental  Concepts,  etc.  At  end  of  note,  add  : 
Schaarschmidt  states  Leibnitz's  view  thus  :  "Knowledge  a  priori  means 
with  Leibnitz,  who  with  his  predecessors  in  this  matter  attached  himself 
to  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  the  irpbrepov  ttj  (pixrei,  knowledge  from 
the  cause,  and,  accordingly,  knowledge  a  posteriori  means  with  him 
knowledge  from  the  working  or  result,  and  therefore  from  external  ex- 
perience resting  upon  the  phenomenon  of  things."  Kant's  usage  differs 
from  that  of  Leibnitz.  ^4  priori  knowledge  is  for  Kant  that  which  pro- 
ceeds from  pure  reason  and  not  from  experience  ;  while  a  posteriori 
knowledge  comes  only  from  external  experience,  not  "from  result  and 
working  in  general."  Of.,  also,  J.  H.  von  Kirchmann's  Erlauterung, 
No.  25,  to  the  Theodicee,  Bk.  I.,  §  44;  p.  34  of  his  Erlduterungen  zur 
Theodicee  v.  Leibniz,  Leipzig,  1879. 

Page  228,  note  2.     Of.  infra,  pp.  399,  note  3,  551,  note  4. 

Page  229,  note  2,  line  1.  After  "  II.  and  VI.,"  add  :  ed.  Cousin,  1, 
246  sq.,  322  sq. 

Page  230,  note  1.  After  "-Dioptrica,  IV.,  1  s^.,"  add:  ed.  Cousin,  5, 
34  sq. ;  after  "-Passiones  Animas,  I.,  31  .s^.,"  add:  ed.  Cousin,  4,  63  sq.; 
after  "PrtK.  Philos.,  IV.,  189,  196,  197,"  add:  ed.  Cousin,  3,  500,  507, 
509. 

Page  230,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.,  also.  Cousin,  (Euvres  de  Descartes,  8, 
200,  where  Descartes,  in  a  letter  (dated  by  the  annotator  1640  — the 
letter  in  Rk.  II.,  No.  36,  in  ed.  of  1666)  to  Meissonier,  "mMecin  de 
Lyon,"  says:  "  Mon  opinion  est  que  cette  glande  "  ["la  petite  glande 
nomm^e  conarion  "]  "  est  le  principal  sidge  de  I'ame,  et  le  lieu  oil  se  font 
toutes  nos  pens^es.  La  raison  qui  me  donne  cette  cr^ance  est  que  je  ne 
trouve  aucune  partie  en  tout  le  cerveau,  excepts  celle-lk  seiile,  qui  ne  soit 


ADDITIONS  AND   CORRECTIONS  769 


double,"  etc.  In  a  letter  to  Mersenne,  dated  by  the  amiotator  April  1, 
1040,  Cousin,  (Euvres  de  Descartes,  8,  215  sq.  [ed.  of  1(566,  Bk.  II.,  Letter 
No.  38],  Descartes  makes  substantially  the  same  statement  and  ijives  the 
same  reasons  therefor,  and  adds  :  "  Mais  je  crois  que  c'est  toute  le  reste 
du  cerveau  qui  sert  le  plus  k  la  m^moire,"  etc. 

Page  233,  line  4  from  bottom,  "The  union  of  the  sonl  and  the  body." 
Leifcuitz  was  undoubtedly  satisfied  that  his  Pre-established  Harmony 
satisfactorily  explained  the  "union  of  the  soul  and  the  body,"  and  for 
those  who  accept  his  philosophy  it  does.  But  those  who  look  for  another 
explanation,  for  example,  in  a  real  reciprocal  action  between  the  sonl  and 
certain  substances  of  the  body,  find  in  Leibnitz's  serai-spiritualistic  inter- 
pretation of  matter  a  clue  or  suggestion  thereto. 

Page  235,  end  of  chap.  24,  "Comprising  substances."  Leibnitz,  ac- 
cording to  Schaarschmidt,  means  to  say  that,  strictly  understood,  the 
collective  ideas  are  not  signs  of  substances,  rather,  indeed,  are  the  single 
objects  themselves  substances,  as,  for  example,  the  army,  the  herd,  con- 
sist of  substances.  Yet  the  collective  ideas  serve  to  a  certain  extent  indi- 
rectly to  indicate  substances.  Leibnitz  adds  this  concession  here  because 
in  his  system  of  monads  he  departs  very  widely  from  the  customary  con- 
ception of  substance,  and  yet  may  not  lose  all  touch  with  the  linguistic 
usage. 

Page  235,  line  6,  5  from  bottom,  ^^  Essence  of  reason/^  That  is,  ens 
rationis,  which  actuality  reaches  only  so  far  as  it  is  a  thought-image. 

Page  235,  line  3  from  bottom,  "Comes  from  the  supreme  reason." 
"Relations,  so  Leibnitz  will  have  us  understand  the  matter,"  .says  Schaar- 
schmidt, "are  in  the  first  place  products  of  our  thought,  for  they  are 
neither  tlie  expression  of  substances,  nor  of  the  determinations  (Attribute, 
Modi)  inliering  in  them,  but  the  expression  of  our  subjective  conception 
of  the  relation  of  things  to  one  another.  But  this  human  conception, 
although  also  subjective,  is  yet  again  grounded  in  tiie  nature  of  things,  in 
particular  in  the  nature  of  the  mind,  and  to  this  extent  springs  out  of  its 
own  constitution,  like  the  eternal  truths.  And  the  con.stitution  of  tlie 
mind,  as  the  'mirror  of  the  universe,'  corresponds  again  to  reality  in 
virtue  of  the  pre-established  harmony.  Tlie  thorougligoing  i)araiiclism  .'f 
the  inner  with  the  oiiter  occurrence  gives  consequently  to  tlie  relatinns. 
according  to  Leibnitz,  a  certain  real  meaning." 

Page  239,  note  1,  line  4.     Instead  of  "Le6cH,"  read  :   Eiuv  liiixirnj'hif. 

Page  241,  note  1.  Add  :  Corpus  Juris  Civilis,  Gth  stereotyped  vi\.,  \'ni.  1. 
p.  659,  a  ;  Dir/rsta,  ed.  Mommsen,  Berlin,  Weidmann,  1803.  Sdiaai-schmiilt 
says  it  is  "a  definition  springing  from  Stoicism,"  and  compares  (J('>i>- 
pert,  Ueber  einhcitliche,  zusammemjesetzte  und  (1  esammlsarlun  mirh  r!',iii. 
Becht,  pp.  7  sq.,  20  sq.,  Halle,  1871. 

Page  242,  line  4,  "Soul."  Leibnitz  is  right  in  placing  the  identity  of 
man  in  the  soul  and  its  con.servation,  instead  of  in  thc^  "well-organized 


760  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

body,"  as  Locke  does.     The  relative  unity  of  tlie  bodily  organism  results 
from  the  absolute  unity  of  the  soul. 

Page  245,  note  1.  Cf.  Eraser,  Locke's  Essay,  1,  448,  note  3.  This  sec- 
tion is  numbered  §  11  in  Eraser's  ed. 

Page  245,  note  2.     After  "  Erdniann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  246,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  247,  lines  7-0.  '■'■The  self  constitutes  identity  real  and  physical," 
etc.  This  sentence  contains  the  gist  of  the  whole  discu.ssion.  "  The  self  " 
or  the  ego  which  "constitutes  identity  real  and  physical"  is  "the  pre- 
supposition of  that  consciousness  of  the  subject  of  itself  to  which  the 
conviction  of  its  own  reality  attaches."  Consciousness  itself  is  an  active 
though  involuntary  modification  or  state  of  this  self  or  ego.  '■^  The  phe- 
nomenon ofself''  is  the  ego's  actual  consciousness  of  itself,  as  the  subject 
of  all  its  inner  experience,  and  as  the  constant  accomijaniment  of  the 
same.  The  self  is  accordingly  by  Leibnitz  regarded  as  a  real  entitj%  a 
substance,  constituting  in  itself  "real  and  physical  identity"  which  is 
recognized  as  "personal "  in  consciousness.  But  it  must  be  remembered 
that  for  Leibnitz  substance  is  dynamic,  its  essence  is  action,  and  its  real 
identitj'  consists  in  the  continuity  and  connection  of  its  activity.  When 
this  activity  becomes  distinctly  conscious  or  is  brought  into  distinct  con- 
sciousness, it  constitutes  moral  and  personal  identity. 

Page  249,  note  1.     Add:  Janet  reads  :  "  ^tant." 

Page  250,  note  1.  Add :  Cf,  also.  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  Bk.  II., 
chaps.  13,  14;  Philos.  Writings,  ed.  in  1  vol.,  London,  1662,  pp.  116-121 
(each  treatise  paged  separately  in  this  ed.). 

Page  251,  lines  12,  13,  "Indifferent  to  every  sort  of  matter."  Janet, 
(Euvres  philos.  de  Leibniz,  1,  224,  in  bis  note  to  this  passage,  says : 
"  Aristotle  believed  also  that  the  soul  is  not  indifferent  to  every  kind  of 
matter,  and  avails  himself  of  the  fact  to  combat  the  doctrine  of  metemp- 
sychosis." Cf  Uepi  ^ux^s,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  5,  Berlin  Academy  ed.,  409* 
31-411t>  30  ;  ed.  E.  Wallace,  Cambridge,  1882,  pp.  44-57. 

Page  251,  note  1.     After  "Gerhardt,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  251,  note  2.    After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  252,  line  6  from  bottom,  "Two  persons."  On  double  and  alter- 
nate personality,  cf.  James,  Psychology,  1,  379-392. 

Page  252,  note  1.     Add :  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  1,  460,  line  8. 

Page  252,  note  2.  Add:  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  1,  461,  line  6. 
"Sober"  =  "  sane." 

Page  254,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  254,  note  2.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORKECTlUNS  761 


Page  256,  lines  17-20.  "  For  since  there  is  an  individual  diversity," 
etc.  Gf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  27,  §  3,  Th.,  ante,  p.  23S),  and  note  1  ; 
Bk.  III.,  chap.  6,  §  8,  Th.,  infra,  pp.  ool,  and  332,  note  1.  All  true  or 
actual  difference  is  individual  difference,  consisting  in  some  internal  dif- 
ferentiating principle  specifying  the  existence  in  this  or  that  definite  way, 
even  though  it  first  reveals  itself  only  in  "  the  course  of  time."  \Vith  this 
thought  is  closely  connected  that  of  identity,  on  which  cf.  ante,  p.  247, 
and  note  to  lines  1-9,  ante,  p.  700. 

Page  257,  note  1.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  258,  line  10,  "  Mafjnitude  wliich  I  call  imperfect.''''  An  imperfect 
magnitude  is  one  which,  because  of  its  infinite  minuteness,  admits  of  no 
measurement. 

Page  259,  note  1.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 
Page  259,  note  3.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  261,  note  1.  Add:  Piinjer,  Gesch.  d.  christUch.  Beligionsphi- 
losophie,  Braunschweig,  1880,  1,  123,  Eng.  trans.,  Edinburgh,  1887,  1, 
165,  in  his  account  of  the  controversy  of  Vedelius  and  Joh.  Mus;bus  (cf. 
ante,  p.  587,  notes  1,  2),  gives,  from  Mus?eus,  another  use  of  the  term. 
Piinjer  says  :  "1st  aber  die  philosophische  Pramisse  allgemein,  die  theo- 
logische  partikular,  dann  muss  sorgfaltig  untersucht  werden,  ob  die 
betreffendeu  philosophischen  Principien  nothwendig  und  allgemein  gel- 
ten  (absolute  et  simpliciter  necessaria)  odcr  nur  fiir  ein  besonderes 
Gebiet,  hedingungstveise  (secundum  quid  et  physicey  ;  i.e.  "But  if  the 
philosophical  premiss  is  universal  and  the  theological  premiss  is  particular, 
then  it  must  be  carefully  examined  whether  the  philosophical  principle  in 
question  is  necessarily  and  universally  valid  (absolute  et  simpliciter  neces- 
saria), or  applies  only  to  a  particular  sphere  and  conditionaUy  (secundum 
quid  Qi physice).''''     [Italics  are  mine.  — Tr.] 

Page  261,  note  2.     Add  :   Cf  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  21,  §  55,  ante, 

p.  208,  and  note  to  p.  208,  line  25,  ante,  p.  755. 

1, 
Page  262,  note  1.     Add:   Leibnitz,  Obsei-vationes  de  Principio  Juris, 
§  13  (Dutens,  Leihnit.  op.  om.,  4,  Pt.  HI.,  273),  says:  "  Deum  esse  oninis 
naturalis  juris  auctorem  (quod  ait  §  41)  verissimum  est,  at  non  vohintate, 
sed  ipsa  essentia  sua,  qua  ratione  etiam  auctor  est  veritatis,"  etc. 

Page  202,  note  2.  Add:  Cf,  also.  Dr.  Robinson's  Lecture,  "Moral 
Law  in  its  relations  to  Physical  Science  and  to  Popular  Keligion,"  in 
Boston  Monday  Lectures  —  Christ  and  Modern  77fo»^/(/  — 1880-1881, 
pp.  31-59. 

Page  263,  note  1.  Add:  Teubner,  Leipzig,  1805.  \'opiscus  .says  .if 
Bonosus:  "  Bibit,  quantum  homiimm  nemo.  De  lioc  Aurcliamis  sacpe 
dicebat:  'Non  ut  vivat  natus  est,  sed  ut  bibat,'  ([uem  (inideni  din  in 
lionore  habuit  causa  militiic.  Nam  si(juando  U^iiii  barbaninim  nnde- 
cumque  gentium  venissent  ipsi  propinabantur,  ut  cos  inobriaret  aUjuo  ab 


762  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


his  per  vinum  cuncta  cognosceret.  Ijise  quantumlibet  bibisset,  semper 
securus  et  sobrius  et,  ut  Onesimus  dicit,  scriptor  vitse  Probi,  adhuc  in 
vino  prudentior. " 

The  reference  in  the  next  line,  also  taken  from  Vopiscus,  ibid.,  is  to 
Proculiis,  and  not  Bonosus,  and  the  text  should  be  corrected  accordingly. 

Page  264,  line  10,  "Depends  ui)on  truth."  I.e.,  as  Schaarschmidt 
says,  "upon  the  ever-equal  reality  of  the  ethical  world-order." 

Page  267,  note  1.  After  "  Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  270,  note  1.  After  "Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  273,  note  1.  After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  273   note  2.  After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  274,  note  1.  After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet.  After  "§15," 
add  :  So  also  Eraser's  Locke'' s  Essay,  1,  493. 

Page  274,  note  3.     Add  :  Eraser's  Locke''s  Esswj,  1,  494,  reads  §  10. 

Page  275,  note  1.  After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet.  Eraser's  Locke''s 
Essay,  1,  494,  reads:  "betwixt  the  100,000th  and  the  1,000,000th  part 
of  it." 

Page  276,  note  1.  Add  :  Cf.  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  3,  225, 
where  Leibnitz  says:  "II  est  encor  a  propos  de  considerer  qu'il  y  a  deux 
abus  considerables  dans  les  definitions,  qu'on  pent  commettre  en  voulant 
former  des  idees  :  Pun  est  ce  que  I'excellent  Jungius  {cf.  Appendix,  infra, 
p.  636,  note  1),  appelloit  obreption,  I'autre  est  ce  que  j'appelle  chimerisme, 
par  exemple  si  quelqu'un  raisonnoit  aiusi :  il  m'est  permis  de  combiner  les 
id^es,  et  de  donner  un  nom  k  ce  qui  en  resulte  ;  prenons  done  I'idee  d'une 
substance  ou  il  n'y  ait  rien  que  de  I'etendue  et  appellons  cela  corps,  done 
les  corps  qui  sont  dans  la  nature  n'ont  rien  que  de  I'etendue,  il  y  auroit  a 
la  fois  ces  deux  fautes  dans  ce  raisonnement.  V obreption  y  seroit  en  ce 
qu'ayant  donn^  au  mot :  corps,  la  definition  qui  bon  me  semble  (ce  qui 
est  en  i^uelque  fa9on  arbitraire),  je  veux  par  aprfes  I'appliquer  k  ce  que 
d'autres  hommes  appellent  corps.  C'est  comme  si  darts  la  Geometrie 
quelqu'un  donnoit  k  ce  mot:  ovale,  la  definition  que  d'autres  Geometres 
donnent  a  1' Ellipse,  et  vouloit  prouver  par  apres  que  les  ovales  de  M.  des 
Cartes  sont  des  sections  du  cone.  Le  chimerisme  est  icy  d'avoir  fait  une 
combinaison  impossible,  car  on  n'accorde  point  qu'il  est  possible  qu'il  y 
ait  une  substance  qui  n'ait  que  de  I'etendue.  Je  sgais  que  ces  Messieurs 
veulent  se  justifier  de  I'obreption,  en  disant  qu'on  ue  s^auroit  concevoir 
autre  chose  dans  les  corps  qui  sont  dans  la  nature,  que  ce  qu'ils  ont  mis 
dans  Icur  definition ;  mais  en  cela  ils  commettent  une  fausse  supposition, 
ou  bien  ils  confondent  concevoir  et  imaginer  ;  car  11  est  bien  vray  qu'on  ne 
s§auroit  imaginer  que  ce  qui  est  etendu,  mais  ils  reconnoissent  eux  memes 
ailleurs  qu'on  con§oit  des  choses  qui  ne  sont  pas  imaginables.  Ouy, 
diront  ils,  mais  ce  n'est  que  la  pens^e  qu'on  ne  pent  point  imaginer.  Je 
reponds,  qu'en  cela  ils  font  encor  une  autre  fausse  supposition,  en  pre- 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  763 

tendant  que  rien  ne  s^auroit  estre  conqu  que  pensee  et  eteudue,  oublians 
qu'ils  parlent  souvent  eux  meines  de  la  force  (lui  n'est  pourtaut  ny  Tun 
ny  r autre,  outre  qu'ils  n'ont  point  prouv6  qu'il  n'y  a  rien  de  possible  que 
ce  que  nous  concevons. ' ' 

Page  277,  line  8,  "Capable  of  existing  together."  Leibnitz,  in  argu- 
ing against  Locke's  view  of  the  passivity  of  the  mind  in  relation  to  its 
"simple  ideas"  and  its  activity  in  their  combination  into  "complex 
ideas,"  affirms  that  the  mind  "is  active  in  reference  to  simple  ideas," 
that  the  relations  are  objectively  significant  and  valid  through  the  deter- 
mination of  the  "supreme  intelligence,"  that  the  mixed  modes  "may  be 
real  accidents,"  vyhich  do  not  become  merely  subjective  from  the  fact 
that  we  perceive  them  by  thought.  According  to  Leibnitz,  everything 
really  possible  is  in  a  certain  sense  an  actual  object  of  intelligence :  to 
the  divine  intelligence  an  actual,  to  the  human  intelligence  a  universally 
possible  object.  The  external  existence  of  this  thought-object  really  adds 
nothing  to  the  being  of  this  object,  and  alters  nothing  in  the  relation  of 
the  thought  to  it.  Cf.,  also,  New  Essmjs,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  12,  §  3,  Ph., 
ante,  p.  147,  and  note  to  line  2  from  bottom,  "modes,"  ante,  p.  748. 

Page  277,  note  1.  Add :  Eraser's  Locke'' sEssmj,  1,  500.  In  §  1,  Locke 
has  '■'Fantastical  or  chimerical,''''  Eraser's  ed.,  1,  497;  Bohn's  ed.,  1,  508. 

Page  277,  note  2,  line  1.  After  "345'^  25,"  add:  oi  5^  irepl  'Ava^ay6pav 
Kal  ^TjfioKpLTOv  (puis  elvai  to  ydXa  Xeyovcnf  &(TTpwv  tlvwv  •  top  yap  r]\iov  vjrb 
rrjv  yiji'  (pepofievov  ovx  opdv  '4vLa  tQiv  aarpajv. 

Page  281,  note  2.  Add:  The  Greek  text  of  the  passages  referred  to 
in  the  note  is  as  follows :  Ilept  '^'ux^s  T,  6,  430''  2G-30 :  r/  p.ei>  ojjf  twv 
ddiaipiTtiiv  v6ri<ns  ev  tovtois,  irepl  a  ouk  idri  rb  \j/ev8os  •  ev  oh  8i  Kal  rb  i/'e05os 
Kal  TO  aXjides,  avvdeais  r:s  ^Sr/  vorjfxaTwv  wa-irep  ev  Svtuv,  KaBdirep  'E^7re5oKX^s 
ftpT]  "y  woWCii'  fJ-^v  KOpaai  dvavx^ves  ej3\d(TT7}(xav,"  eweiTa  ffvvTideadai  ttj  (f)i\l<f. 

Ilept  'Epfj-Tjueias  I.,  IG*  12:  a-nixelov  5'  iarl  Toude-  Kal  yap  6  Tpay4\a(pos 
(Tr)p.aivei  p.iv  tl,  oviru  8e  d\rjd^s  t)  ypeudos,  idv  p-rj  to  elvai  fj  /xtj  e'lvai  TrpoffTeOrj, 
71  ctTrXcDs  fj  Kara  xP°vov.  Cf.,  also.  New  Essai/s,  Bk.  III.,  chap.  3,  infra, 
pp.  310-318,  and  the  notes,  especially  pp.  310,  note  2,  317,  note  3. 

Page  281,  line  17,  "Possibility."  Schaarschmidt  states  that  Christian 
Wolf  placed  this  definition  of  truth  here  given  by  Leibnitz  at  the  head  of 
his  collected  science.  According  to  Wolf,  Lui/.  Disc,  pndertt.,  philoso- 
phy is  the  science  of  the  possible  so  far  as  it  can  be.  Ueberwcg,  Hist,  of 
Philos.,  Eng.  trans,  by  Morris,  New  York,  1871,  Vol.  1,  p.  4,  gives  it, 
Philos.  Bationalis.  Disc,  rroilim.,  §29:  "philosophia  est  scientia  possl- 
bilium,  quatenus  esse  possunt." 

Page  281,  note  1.  After  "Essays,"  add  :  Bk.  III.,  chap.  3,  §  15,  Tli., 
infra,  pp.  315  sq.,  especially  p.  317,  note  3  ;  after  "  cha]).  5,"  add  :  ad  fin., 
infra,  p.  452,  and  note  1. 

Page  282,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  .hinct. 

Page  282,  note  2.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add :  Janet. 


7G4  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 

Pace  283,  line  17,  "  Ottavio  Pisani."  vVn  Italian  Jjnrist,  wlio  ixiblislied 
in  Italian  his  Lycurtjiis  seu  leges  promptam  justitiam  promoventes  ;  trans- 
lated into  German,  and  published,  Sulzbach,  l(i06,  12iuo.  Leibnitz  men- 
tions him  in  his  Bedenken  xoelchergestalt  den  Mdngeln  des  Jiistiz-Wesens 
IN  THEOKiA  abzuhelfen,  cf.  Guhrauer,  Leibnitz^s  deutsche  Schrift.,  1,  257, 
also  Beilagen,  ibid.,  42  ;  Diitens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  4,  Pt.  3,  230-234  (Latin 
trans,  of  the  same,  regarding  which,  cf.  Guhrauer,  op.  cit.,  1,  41  sq. — On 
p.  41,  op.  cit.,  line  9  from  bottom,  "220-24"  should  read:  230-234,  as 
above  cited,  the  present  reading  being  a  typographical  error). 

Page  283,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  284,  line  17,  "  Inclinations."  Schaarschmidt  says  that  "in  these 
remarks  lies  the  germ  of  the  recognition  of  the  law  of  association,  wdiich  " 
Johann  Gebhard  Ehrenreich  Christian  Maass,  1766-1823,  Professor  of 
Philosophy  at  Halle  University,  "  further  elaborated  in  his  Ve.rsuch  iiber 
die  Einbildungskraft,  Halle  and  Leipzig,  1797  ;  afterwards  J.  F.  Fries, 
1773-1843,  in  his  Nene  Kritik  der  Vernunft,  2d  ed.,  1828-1831,  p.  148  sq., 
and  which  finally  J.  F.  Herbart,  1776-1841,  and  his  school  have  attempted 
more  closely  to  investigate  and  establish."  F.  II.  Bradley,  The  Princi- 
2des  of  Logic,  pp.  279,  297,  312,  313,  refers  to  a  portion  of  Maass'  discu.s- 
sion.  "  Cf.,  also,  Hamilton's  Seid,  Notes  D**  and  D*»*,  2,  882-917,  espe- 
cially 890,  899,  913  sq.  Maass  followed  Wolff's  Psi/ch.  Emp.,  Frankfort 
and  Leipzig,  1732,  ed.  JVova,  1738  ;  but  he  may  also  have  been  influenced 
somewhat  by  Leibnitz,  as  the  iVeio  Essays  were  published  in  1765  by 
Raspe,  and  therefore  accessible  for  nearly  thirty  years  before  his  own 
work  appeared. 

Page  284,  note  1.  After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  .lanet. 

Page  284,  note  2.  After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  284,  note  3.  After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  284,  note  4.  After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  286,  note  1.  Add:  Recently  JNIr.  E.  L.  Garner  has  been  investi- 
gating the  language  of  monkeys,  with  the  aid  of  the  phonograph,  and 
published  an  account  of  his  investigations  in  an  interesting  book  entitled 
llie  Speech  of  Monkeys,  New  York,  Chas.  L.  Webster  &  Co.,  1892.  An 
unfavorable  notice  of  the  book  appeared  in  "The  Nation,"  October  6, 
1892,  p.  207  b,  the  gist  of  which  appears  in  the  following  sentence  :  "As 
a  scientific  record  of  original  discoveries,  it  has  little  value." 

Page  288,  note  1.  Add  :  Cf  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  IIL,  chap.  3,  §  5,  Th., 
infra,  pp.  307,  308.  Also,  Hamilton,  Metaphysics,  Lcct.  XXXVI.,  pp. 
492  sq.,  Boston,  1875. 

Page  297,  line  11,  "  Hypothesis,"  etc.  Leibnitz's  hypothesis  has  been 
wholly  verified  by  modern  philology. 

Page  297,  note  1.  Add :  For  an  interesting  account  of  Leibnitz's 
services  to  comparative  philology,  cf.  Max  Miiller,  Lects.  on  the  Science 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS 


of  Language,  2cl  cd.,  London,  1862,  Lect.  4,  pp.  131-135  ;  New  York, 
Chas.  Scribner,  18t52,  pp.  135-139.  (7/.,  also,  Giiln-auer,  Leibnitz,  Eine 
Biographie,  2,  12G  sq. ;  Foucher  de  Careil,  GEuvres  de  Leibniz.  7,  519  sq., 
a  rough  draft  of  a  memorial  of  Leibnitz  concerning  the  study  of  lan- 
guages ...  in  the  Russian  Empire. 

Paoe  298,  note  1,  line  3  from  end.  After  "p.  409,"  insert:  "Lites  de 
Boehmianis  sententiis  inanes  esse  censeo,  et  Boehmiinn  nee  sibi,  nedum 
aliis  iiitellectum,"  i.e.  etc. 

Page  300,  note  3.     After  "  Erdmann,"  adtl :  Janet. 

Page  300,  note  4.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  300,  note  5.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  304,  note  1,  line  8.  After  "Dutens,  op.  cit.,  Vols.,"  add:  4,  Pt. 
II.,  p.  56:  Ab  insigni  apud  Bremenses  Theologo  Gerhardo  Meiero,  qui 
(ut  hoc  obiter  dicam)  hortatu  meo  prfeclarum  opus  aggressus  est  Glossarii 
Saxonici  titulo,  in  quo  origines  Germanicarum  vocum  nmltas  eruet  illus- 
trabitque,  nee  pauca  non  pervulgata  proferet  in  lucem."  At  end  of  note, 
add :  Janet,  CEuvres  pliilos.  de  Leibniz,  1,  274,  note  3,  gives  tlie  dates  of 
Meier's  birth  and  deatli,  1046-1680,  and  titles  of  his  "principal  philo- 
sophical works  "  :  Compendium  logicce  divincc ;  Aranearum  telas  divincc 
existentioi  tefites  ,•  De  dubitatione  sceptica  et  cartesiana. 

Page  304,  note  2.  Add:  The  date  of  Schilter's  death  being  1705,  and 
the  mention  of  the  same  in  the  text  as  having  "just"  occurred,  is  evi- 
dence that  Leibnitz  at  least  briefly  touched  up  this  jjart  of  the  Neio 
Essays  as  late  as  1705. 

Page  308,  line  10  from  bottom.  Read:  Greathead,  instead  of  "■large 
head  ;  "  and  line  8  from  bottom,  read  :  great,  instead  of  "  large." 

Page  308,  line  3  from  bottom.  After  "wormwood,"  insert:  {absin- 
thium). 

Page  313,  line  8,  "Living  rational  being."  Cf.  Trendelenburg,  Ilistor. 
Beitr.  z.  Philos.,  3,  53,  54. 

Page  316,  note  1.  After  "(Bohn's  ed.),"  add  :  Eraser's  Locke's  K.^saij, 
•2,  28. 

Page  317,  note  1.  Add:  cf.  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  4,  §  '.,  Tli., 
infi'a,  p.  445,  note  1. 

Page  317,  note  2.  Add  :  Cf,  also,  mw  Es.';a>/s,  Bk.  II.,  chap.  21,  §  3, 
Th.,  ante,  p.  175,  and  note  to  p.  175,  line  18,  ante,  p.  751. 

Page  317,  note  3.  Add:  Cf,  also,  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logilc,  Bd.  1, 
p.  516,  note  33,  where  he  refers  to  Cicero,  Off.,  I.,  2,  7;  Fin.,  H.,  2,  5; 
D.  orat.,  I.,  42,  189  :  "  est  cnim  definitio  earuni  rerum,  qua-,  sunt  eiua  rei 
propriaj  quam  definire  volumus,  brevis  et  circumscripta  qu;udam  e.\plica- 


7GG  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

tio";  IL,  39,  164;   IIL,  29,   110;    Orat.,  33,  166;   Top.  5,  26;   Quint., 
Inst.,  VII.,  3,  15. 

Page  318,  note  1.     Add :  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  2,  29. 

Page  319,  note  2.     Add  :  Eidmann,  443-445. 

Page  321,  note  4.  After  "chap.  9,  ad  med.,^^  add:  "  'How  can  tliat 
be  ? '  cried  Don  Quixote ;  '  didst  thou  not  tell  me  that  thou  sawest  her 
winnowing  wheat  ?  '  '  Take  no  heed  of  that,  sir,'  replied  the  squire  ;  '  for 
the  fact  is,  her  message,  and  the  sight  of  her  too,  were  both  by  Jiearsay, 
and  I  can  no  more  tell  who  the  lady  Dulcinea  is  than  I  can  buffet  the 
moon.'  " 

Page  322,  note  ].  Add:  Aldricli,  Artis  logicce  rtidimenta,  ed.  H.  L. 
Mansel,  3d  ed.,  Oxford,  1856,  pp.  30,  31  (diagram  on  p.  31). 

Page  323,  note  1,  line  3.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  324,  note  2.  Add :  Hypoth.  phys.  nova,  §  57  ;  Gerhardt,  4,  208. 
Cf.,  also,  Neio  Essays,  note  to  p.  47,  lines  18,  19,  ante,  p.  726. 

Page  326,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.  note  to  p.  43,  line  14,  ante,  p.  724. 
"Leibnitz,"  says  Schaarschmidt,  "makes  here  a  weighty  remark.  All 
demonstration  appeals  only  to  the  (real)  possible  and  to  that  which  in  a 
logical  waj"  inferred  from  the  same  is  so  far  thought-wise  necessary  ; 
reality  or  the  actual,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  known  only  historically 
or  empirically,  not,  however,  philosophically." 

Page  326,  note  2.  Add :  Janet,  CEuvres  philos.  de  Leibniz,  1,  293, 
agrees  with  the  reading  of  Jacques. 

Page  329,  note  1,  line  2.  After  "  1888,"  add  :  Paris  Academy  ed.,  by 
C.  M.  Galisset,  7th  ed.,  1862,  p.  140  ;  Corpus  Juris  Civilis,  Berlin,  Weid- 
maun,  1893  {Inst,  of  Justinian,  ed.  by  Paul  Krueger),  Vol.  1,  p.  13  b; 
line  3,  after  "  1890,"  add  :  CoUectio  Librorum  Juris  Antejustiniani,  ed. 
Krueger,  Mommsen,  and  Studemund,  Vol.  1,  pp.  50,  51,  3d  ed.,  Berlin, 
Weidmann,  1891;  line  4,  after  "1870,"  add:  Corptis  Jiiris  Civilis 
(Digest,  ed.  by  Mommsen,  and  paged  separately),  Vol.  1,  p.  112.  At 
end  of  note,  add :  Kudolph  Sohm,  Institutes  of  Boman  Laio,  trans,  from 
4th  German  ed.,  by  Jas.  Cranford  LecUie,  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  1892, 
pp.  258-268. 

Page  332,  note  1.  Add  :  For  Hegel's  inteipretation  of  Leibnitz's  prin- 
ciple of  individuation, — principium  individnationis, — (<■/.  Xew  Essays, 
ante,  p.  239,  note  1)  cf.  Wallace,  The  Logic  of  Hegel,  2d  ed.,  Oxford, 
Clarendon  Press,  1892,  pp.  217,  218. 

Page  333,  note  1.     Add:  Eraser's  Locke's  Essay,  2,  68. 

Page  334,  note  1.  Add  :  On  the  natural  order  in  the  vegetable  king- 
dom, Schaarschmidt  cites  J.  II.  Burckhardl,  Epist.  ad  Leibnitium,  Wolffen- 
biittel,  1703.  Cf,  also,  Ejiist.  G.  G.  Leibnitii  ad  A.  G.  GackenhoUzium, 
M.D.,  de  methodo  Botanica,  §  10  ;  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  2,  Pt.  II.,  173. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  767 


Page  335,  note  1,  line  1.  After  "  50,"  add  :  Fraser's  Locke's  Essay, 
2,  69.  So  also  Coste's  translation,  p.  3G0,  ed.  Amsterdam,  1742.  Vol.  3, 
p.  129,  ed.  in  4  vols.,  Amsterdam,  1774. 

Page  337,  note  3.     Add  :  A  5th  ed.,  Hamburg,  1887. 

Page  343,  note  1.  Add:  Also  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,  I.,  2 
[Vol.2],  1-208,  Brief wechsel  zwischen  Leibniz  und  Hiujens  van  Zulirhem. 
Also  an  earlier  ed.  in  Pt.  II.  of  Christ.  Hugenii  aliorumque  seciili  A'VIL 
viroriim  celebrium  exercitationes  mathematicoi  et  philosophiac.  Ex  manu- 
scriptis  in  bibliotheca  Lngduno-Batavce  servatis  edidit.  P.  I.  Uylenbroek, 
HagiB  Comitum,  1833.  On  the  relation  of  Gerhardt's  ed.  to  that  of  Uylen- 
broek, cf.  Gerhardt,  op.  cit.,  II.,  2  [Vol.  2J,  9,  10.  Gerhardt  says,  p.  10: 
"Es  hatte  mithin  in  jedem  Falle  auf  die  Sammlung  Uylenbroek's  RUck- 
sicht  genomnien  werden  mvissen,  der  die  Leibuizischen  Originale  vor 
sich  hattij."     Cf..,  also,  Neio  Essays,  note  to  p.  16,  line  22,  ante,  p.  723. 

Page  344,  note  4.  Add  :  Professor  Schaarschmidt  having  kindly  sent 
me  Ulrich's  note,  and  Ulrich's  translation  being  rare  and  generally  inac- 
cessible, it  is  here  given  :  "  Dieser  Knabe  ward  1601  in  einom  Alter  von 
neun  Jahren  in  eineni  Walde  von  Litthauen  von  den  Jaegern  unter  den 
Biiren  gefunden.  Es  vFar  noch  ein  anderer  Knabe  bei  ihm,  der  aber  den 
Jaegern  entv^^ischte.  Dieser  wehrte  sich  als  man  ihn  fangen  wollte  anfiing- 
lich  mit  seinen  Niigeln  und  Zalmen  ungemein  tapfer,  musste  aber  zuletzt 
der  Gewalt  nachgeben.  Er  war  iibrigens  wohl  proportionirt,  weiss,  hatte 
blonde  Haare  und  eine  angenehme  Gesichtsbildung;  man  kommte  ihn  aber 
durch  nichts  bandigen,  vielweniger  zu  Kleidung  und  menschlicher  Nahr- 
ung  gewolinen.     Er  erhielt  in  der  Taufe  den  Namen  Joseph  Ursinus." 

The  story  is  of  course  fabulous,  it  being  impossible  during  the  winter 
to  live  in  Poland  without  clothes,  even  were  it  anywise  ijrobable  tliat 
bears  would  live  with  children  without  eating  them." 

Page  349,  note  1,  line  3  from  bottom.  Dele  "2d  ed."  —  since,  accord- 
ing to  the  author's  "  Avertissement,"  the  work  "is  not  a  2d  ed."  of  his 
earlier  work,  entitled  De  la  philosnphie  scholastique,  2  vols.,  Paris.  1850, 
but  an  entirely  new  and  independent  work. 

Page  353,  line  5,  "Prophetic  vision."  Leibnitz  wrote  a  critical  essay 
on  the  Story  of  Balaam,  which  is  found  in  Dutens,  Leibnit.  op.  om.,  4, 
Vt.  II.,  275-278.  Wilhelm  Brambach  has  published  a  monograph,  en- 
titled Gottfried  Wilhelm  Leihniz  Verfisser  der  Ilistoire  de  Bileam,  Leipzig. 
1887,  in  which  he  gives  an  account  of  the  various  arguments  f<(r  ami 
against  its  Leibnitzian  authorship,  maintains  that  Leibnitz  was  the  auliior, 
and  gives  Leibnitz's  approved  text  of  the  piece. 

Page  357,  note  1.     Add:  Fraser's  Locke's  Essay,  2,  80. 

Page  359,  note  1.     Add  :  Fraser's  Locke's  Essay,  2,  88. 

Page  380,  note  1.  Add  :  On  More,  cf.  Tullocli,  IlntionnI  Thenlofjy 
and  Christian  Philosophy  in  England  in  the  17th  Century,  Ivlinburgli, 


768  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 

Win.  Blackwood  &  Sons,  1872,  2,  303-409,  the  "ethereal  vehicles,"  306, 
the  "spirit  of  iiature,"  397. 

Page  382,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  I.,  chap.  1,  ante.  p.  67, 
and  note  to  p.  67,  lines  3,  4,  ante,  p.  732. 

Page  382,  note  2.  Add:  Cf.  also,  Dutens,  Leihnit.  op.  om.,  6,  Pt.  I., 
315,  Leibnitiana,  No.  C,  where  Leibnitz  says:  "  Henricus  Moms  statuit 
prseexistentiam  animariim,  sive  quod  animee  creatfe  fuerint  cum  mundo, 
quam  sententiam  Plato,  Origines,  aliique  jampridem  foverunt.  JNIea 
opinio  est,  omnia,  ut  sic  dicam,  plena  esse  animarum  vel  analogarum 
naturarum,  et  ne  brutorum  quidem  anunas  interire." 

Page  386,  note  1.  Instead  of  "Jacques  reads,"  read:  Jacques  and 
Janet  read,  etc. 

Page  387,  note  1.  Add:  In  the  "Bulletin  des  Sciences  Math^ma- 
tiques,  2d  Serie.s,  Vol.  16,  1892,. Pt.  I.,  p.  18,  in  a  review  of  C.  Hnygens, 
(Euvres  completes.  La  Haye,  1888  sq.,  the  following  statement  occurs: 
"  La  courbe  orij  =  x^{a  —  x)  rentre  dans  la  categoric  g^nerale  des  courbes 
(iP+q-ryr  —  xP{a—x)i,  qu'on  appelle  les  perles  de  de  Sluse.  EUe  est  une 
cubique  a  centre(au  point  d'inflexion  x=^a,  ?/=o)."  Cf.,  also,  the  letters 
in  this  ed.  of  Huygens,  Nos.  401,  403,  408,  419,  434,  436,  referred  to  in 
this  review.  In  letter  461,  the  review  goes  on  to  say  :  "  il  est  question 
d'un  rapport  remarquable  entre  les  deux  perles  a~y"  =  x^{a  —  -x)  et  y*  — 
x3(a  -  x)."     Cf,  also,  letter  435. 

Page  388,  lines  23,  27,  32,  "  §§  23,  23,  24."  These  sections  are  numbered, 
respectively,  §§  23,  24,  25,  in  Eraser's  Lockers  Essay,  2,  142-143  ;  also  in 
Locke,  Philos.  Works,  Bohn's  ed.  2,  108-109;  and  in  Coste's  French 
trans.,  Amsterdam,  1742,  pp.  409,  410,  4  vols,  ed.,  Amsterdam,  1774,  3, 
248,  249. 

Page  392,  lines  6,  7.  "The  majority  of  the  mixed  modes  nowhere  exist 
together."  The  French  text  of  all  the  editions  is:  "La  pluspart  des 
modes  composes  n'existent  nuUe  part  ensemble."  The  grammatical  con- 
fusion of  a  singular  subject  and  plural  verb  is  probably  occasioned  by  the 
too  condensed  summary  of  Locke's  statement,  i.e.  "Another  reason  that 
makes  the  defining  of  mixed  modes  so  necessary,  especially  of  moral 
words,  is  what  I  mentioned  a  little  before,  viz.  that  it  is  the  only  way 
whereby  the  signification  of  the  most  of  them  can  be  known  with  cer- 
tainty. For  the  ideas  they  stand  for,  being  for  the  most  part  such  whose 
component  parts  nowhere  exist  together,"  etc.  (Eraser's  Lockers  Essay, 
2,  158;  Locke,  Philos.  Works,  Bohn's  ed.,  2,  122);  in  Coste's  trans., 
ed.  1742,  p.  421,  ed.  4  vols.,  1774,  3,  276  :  "  Une  autre  raison  qui 
rend  la  definition  des  Modes  mixtes  si  n^cessaire,  et  sur-tout  celle  des 
mots  qui  appartiennent  k  la  Morale,  c'est  ce  que  je  viens  de  dire  en  pas- 
sant, que  c'est  la  seule  voie  par  ait  Von  puisse  avoir  certainement  la  sig- 
nification de  la  plupart  de  ces  mots.  Car  la  plus  grande  partie  des  id^es 
qu'ils  signifient,  ^tant  de  telle  nature  qu'elles  n'existent  nulle  part  ensem- 
ble," etc. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  769 


Page  404,  note  1.  Add :  For  a  specimen  of  Euclid  reduced  to  syllo- 
gisms, extracted  from  the  very  curious  and  rare  Anahj>>es  Geometrktv  of 
Herhnus  and  Dasypodius,  cf.  Aldrich,  Artis  Logical  Rudimenta  ed 
Mansel,  Oxford,  1856,  3d  ed.,  Appendix,  note  L,  ad  tin.,  pp.  264-2GG 
Sir  William  Hamilton  calls  Herlinus  and  Dasypodius  ""zealous  but  thick- 
headed logicians,"  Aldrich,  ojx  cit.,  p.  248,  note  r  (Mansel).  The  oth 
proposition  of  the  1st  Bk.  is  also  analyzed  by  Mill,  Logic,  Bk.  II.,  chap. 
4,  pp.  162,  163,  8th  ed..  New  York,  Harper  and  Bros.,  1881. 

Page  405,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add  :  Janet. 

Page  405,  note  2.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  408,  note  1.  Add  :  For  a  brief  account  of  the  Ramist- Aristotelian. 
controversy,  cf.  Piinjer,  Gesch.  d.  Christlich.  Religionsphilos.,  1,  80-02; 
Eiig.  trans.,  Hist,  of  the  Christian  Philos.  of  Religion,  1,  118-123. 

Page  412,  note  1.     After  "Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  414,  note  1.     After  "  Erdmann,"  add:  Janet. 

Page  414,  note  2.     Add:  Fraser,  Locke's  Essay,  2,  185. 

Page  425.  At  end  of  first  paragraph  of  note  continued  from  \^.  424, 
after  "  1,  187,"  add  :  letter  to  Conring,  March  10, 1678,  ibid.,  1,  100  ;  also 
the  writing  with  "neither  superscription  nor  place  nor  date,"  ibid.,  4, 
274  sq.,  especially  277,  278. 

Pages  428,  429.  "  Certain  theologians  claim  that  the  fire  of  liell  burns 
up  separated  souls."  Cf.  New  Essays,  Preface,  ante,  p.  62,  and  note  to 
line  10  from  bottom,  ante,  p.  720,  730. 

Page  431,  line  10  from  bottom.  "  Et  quidquid  Schola  finxit  otio.sa." 
I  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  author  or  source  of  the  Latin  line. 

Page  432,  line  11,  '■^Lignum  nephrilicnm.''^  A  term  used  by  the  old 
pharmacologists,  signifying  a  wood,  supposed  to  be  that  of  the  horse- 
radish tree,  which  has  been  used  in  decoction  for  affections  of  the  kid- 
neys,—  Nephritic  toood,  from  the  Greek  v€(pp6s,  a  kidney. 

Page  434,  note  1.  Line  2,  after  "1890),"  add:  CoUectio  Lihroruni. 
Juris  Antejustiniani,  ed.  Krueger,  Mommsen  and  Studomuiid,  Berlin, 
Weidmann,  1891,  1,  86;  and  line  6,  after  "1888),"  add:  Cori>i,s  .hn-is 
Civilis,  Berlin,  Weidmaim,  1803,  1,  23  b. 

Page  445,  note  1.  Add  :  On  the  lii.story  and  significance  of  the  terms  '/)ai'- 
Taaia,  (pavTaa/jLa,  "phantasma,"  (f.  Siebeck,  Gesch.  d.  Psijcltiilogic.  (Jotha, 
1880,  1884,  passim.  Leibnitz  in  his  letter  to  Tiiomasius,  Feb.  Ki,  16(i6, 
Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  1,8,  says:  "  Omiiis  color  est  inii)n'.ssio 
in  sensorium,  non  qualitas  qu;edam  in  rebus,  sed  cxtrinseca  deiKnninatio, 
sen  ut  Th.  Ilobbes  appellat,  phantasma."  On  Ilobbcs'  use  of  tlic  term, 
cf.  his  Works,  and  Lange,  LList.  of  Materialism,  2d  ed.,  1,  2H8-2H0.  For 
Thomas  Aquinas'  use  of  the  term,  cf.  Ueberweg,  I  list,  of  Philos.,  New 
York,  1875,  1,  449. 


770  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Page  447,  note  L  Add:  Eraser,  Locke's  Essay,  2,  237-239,  and  cf. 
ibid.,  2,  73,  note  3:  "An  idiot,  'Such  men  do  chaungeliugs  call,  so 
chaunged  by  faries'  theft.'  Spenser,  Faerie  Queen,  Bk.  I.,  canto  X.; 
also  Shakespeare,  Midsummer  Night's  Dream,  ii.,  I.,  2L" 

Page  450,  note  1,  line  4  from  bottom.  After  "  pp.  312-314,"  add  :  also, 
G.  Croom  Eobertson,  Fhilos.  Bemains,  Williams  &  Norgate,  1894,  pp. 
274-278. 

Page  462,  note  1.  Add  :  Cf.  "  Leibnitz  and  Protestant  Theology,"  by 
Professor  John  Watson,  of  Queen's  University,  Kingston,  Canada,  in 
"The  New  World,"  March,  1896,  Vol.  5,  pp.  112-122.  Cf.,  also.  New 
Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  7,  §  11,  Th.  (2),  infra,  p.  474,  and  note  1 ;  chap. 
17,  §  23,  Th.  (2),  infra,  p.  579,  and  note  1. 

Page  464,  line  6,  "The  nutuber  of  the  axioms."  Mausel,  in  the  Appen- 
dix to  his  ed.  of  Aldrich,  Artis  Lngicce  Budimenta,  3d  ed.,  Oxford,  1856, 
p.  258,  says:  "The  numerous  attempts  of  Geometers  to  diminish  or  get 
rid  of  their  axioms  have  been  steps  in  a  wrong  direction.  The  number 
of  axioms,  instead  of  being  diminished,  should  be  very  considerably  in- 
creased ;  and  the  errors  that  have  hitherto  prevailed  on  the  nature  and 
foundation  of  Geometrical  reasoning  have  been  mainly  owing  to  the  man- 
ner in  which  many  indispensable  assumptions  have  been  either  omitted 
altogether,  or  concealed  among  the  definitions." 

Page  465,  note  1.     Add  :   Cf.  also  addition  to  this  note,  ante,  p.  768. 

•  Page  474,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  6,  ad  fin., 
ante,  p.  462,  note  1,  and  addition  thereto  above  ;  chap.  17,  §  23,  Th.  (2), 
infra,  p.  579,  and  note  1,  and  addition  thereto,  infra,  p.  773.  Dieckholi, 
Leibnitz  Stellung  zur  Offenbarung,  Rostock,  1888. 

Page  481,  note  1.  Add:  For  Ari.stotle  on  the  "middle  term,"  cf. 
Wallace,  Outlines  of  the  Philos.  of  Aristotle,  3d  ed.,  1883,  §§  23,  24, 
especially  the  latter,  and  the  passage  of  Aristotle  there  quoted.  For  the 
history  of  the  term,  cf.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik. 

Page  482,  lines  1-3.  The  text  should  read:  "Made  him  reject  alto- 
gether their  use  in  the  establishment  of  the  truth,  and  goes  as  far  as  to 
make  them  a  party  to  confusion  [of  ideas]  in  conversation." 

Page  483,  note  1.  After  ''Princip.  Philos.,  II.,  §§  1,  4,  11,"  add: 
ed.  Cousin,  3,  120,  123,  129. 

Page  484,  note  1,  line  2.     After  "  §§  16  s^.,"  add  :  ed.  Cousin,  3,  133  sq. 

Page  486,  note  1.  Add :  Corpus  Juris  Civilis  (Digest  ed.  Mommsen, 
and  paged  separately),  Berlin,  1893,  1,  718  b. 

Page  486,  note  2.  Line  3,  after  "locupletiorem,"  add:  Corpus  Juris 
Civilis,  Berlin,  1893,  1,  873b;  after  "Tit.  VI.,  14,"  add:  ibid.,  1,  169b; 
line  6,  after  "lucrum,"  add:  ibid.,  1,  300a;  after  "§  4,  ad  fin.,"  add:  1, 
190  a. 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  771 


Page  487,  note  1.  After  "  Tit.  XVII.,  1,"  add  :  Corpus  Juris  Civilis, 
Berlin,  1893,  1,  808  a. 

Page  487,  note  2.  Line  2,  after  "1888),"  add:  Collectio  Librorum 
Juris  AntejusUniani,  Berlin,  Weidmann,  1893  {Inst.  ed.  Krueger),  1, 
47  b  ;  at  end  of  note,  add  :  ed.  1893,  1,  120  a,  593  a. 

Page  487,  note  4.  At  end,  add :  On  Sennert,  c/.  Lasswitz,  Gescli.  d. 
Atomistik,  1,  43G-454. 

Page  492,  note  3.  Line  4,  after  "24,  ad  fin.,''  add:  ed.  Mommsen, 
1893,  599b  ;  line  0,  after  "^•6.,  26,"  add:  ih.,  599b;  line  7,  after  "55," 
add:  ib.,  8G9b  ;  line  8,  after  "  ib.,  129,"  add  :  ib.,  871  b. 

Page  495,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.,  also,  the  quotation  from  the  llieodicee, 
P.  II.,  §  184,  infra,  p.  635,  note  2,  ad  fin. 

Page  495,  note  2.  Add:  Cf.,  also,  Leibnitz's  letter  to  Conring  (with- 
out place  or  date  ;  probably  written  at  the  beginning  of  1670  —  Gerhardt's 
note),  Gerhardt,  Leibniz,  philos.  Schrift.,  1,  160:  Ego  suppono  cum 
Carneade  (et  Hobbius  consentit)  Justitiani  sine  utilitate  propria  (sive 
praesente  sive  futura)  sumniam  esse  stultitiam  longe  enini  absunt  ab 
humana  natura  Stoicoruni  et  Sadducseorum  de  virtute  propter  se  colenda 
superbte  jactationes.  Ergo  onme  justum  debet  esse  privatim  utile,  sed 
cum  Justitiae  foi"ma  consistat  in  publica  utilitate,  sequitur  quod  non  pos- 
sit  accurate  demonstrari  h?ec  propositio :  homo  prudens  debit  semper  at/ere 
quod  justum  est,  nisi  demonstretur  esse  quendam  porpetuum  viudicem 
publicte  utilitatis  (nam  aliorum  oculi  nietusque  non  ultra  ligabunt  pru- 
dentem,  quam  quousque  juvare  aut  nocere  possunt)  id  est  Deum,  cumque 
sensu  manifestum  sit,  eum  non  esse  semper  vindicem  in  hac  vita,  super- 
esse  aliam,  id  est  esse  aliquem  Deiim,  et  humanam  animam  esse  immor- 
talem.'' 

Page  496,  line  7  of  note  continued  from  p.  495.  After  "  1877,"  add: 
J.  L.  Lincoln,  "Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus,"  in  In  Memorinm  John 
Larkin  Lincoln,  1817-1S91,  pp.  484-502,  Boston,  Houghton,  Miniiii  & 
Co.,  1894. 

Page  506,  note  1.  After  "Bolin's  ed.,"  add:  Eraser,  Locke's  Essay, 
2,  315.  Coste's  translation  of  Locke's  Essay,  ed.  1742,  p.  519,  4  vol.  ed., 
1774,  4,  131,  reads:   "finis." 

Page  510,  note  1.  Add  :  The  note  here  referred  to  {cf,  also,  Coste's 
translation  of  Locke's  Essay,  ed.  1742,  p.  523,  note  2,  4  vol.  ed.  1774,  4, 
141,  note  2  ;  translation  of  a  part  of  the  note.  Eraser  Locke's  Kssay,  2, 
321,  note  2),  reads  thus:  "  Ici  M.  Locke  excite  notrc  curiosite,  sans 
vouloir  la  satisfaire.  Bien  des  gens  s'6tant  imagines  (lu'il  m'avoit  com- 
munique cette  manifere  d'expliquer  la  creation  de  la  mati(.M-e,  me  prii'a-eiit 
pen  de  tems  apros  que  ma  traduction  cut  vu  le  jour,  de  leur  en  faire  part ; 
mais  je  fus  oblige  de  leur  avouer  que  M.  Locke  m'en  avuit  fait  un  secret 
k  moi-meme.     Enfin  long-tcms  apr^s  sa  mort,  M.  le  Chevalier  Xewlon,  h 


772  LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

qui  je  parlai  par  hazard  de  cet  endroit  du  livre  de  M.  Locke,  me  d^couvrit 
tout  le  uiystere.  Souriant,  il  me  dit  d'abord  que  c'^toit  lui-meme  qui 
avoit  imagine  cette  manifere  d'expliquer  la  creation  de  la  matifere,  que  la 
peus^e  lui  en  6toit  venue  dans  I'esprit  un  jour  qu'il  vint  k  tomber  sur 
cette  question  avec  M.  Locke  et  un  seigneur  Anglois  [Le  feu  Comte  de 
Peiiibrolce,  mort  au  mois  de  Fevrier  de  la  prdsente  aunde,  1738].  Et  voici 
comment  il  leur  expliqua  sa  pens^e.  '  On  i^ourroit,'  dit  il,  'se  former  en 
quelque  maniere  une  idee  de  la  creation  de  la  matifere  en  supposant  que 
Dieu  eut  empech^  par  sa  puissance  que  rien  ne  put  entrer  dans  une 
certaine  portion  de  I'espace  pur,  qui  de  sa  nature  est  p^n^trable,  ^ternel, 
n^cessaire,  infini ;  car  d6s-l^  cette  portion  d'espace  auroit  I'imp^n^tra- 
bilit^,  I'une  des  qualitfe  essentielles  a  la  matifere  :  et  comme  I'espace  pui- 
est  absolumeut  uniforme,  on  n'a  qu'a  supposer  que  Dieu  auroit  com- 
munique cette  espece  d' impenetrability  k  une  autre  pareille  portion  de 
I'espace,  et  cela  nous  donueroit,  en  quelque  sorte,  une  idde  de  la  mobilite 
de  la  matiere,  autre  quality  qui  lui  est  aussi  tr^s-essentielle. '  Nous  voila 
maiutenant  deiivres  de  I'embarras  de  chercher  ce  que  M.  Locke  avoit 
trouve  bon  de  cacher  h  ses  lecteurs  :  car  c'est  1^  tout  ce  qui  lui  a  donne 
occasion  de  nous  dire,  '  Que  si  nous  voulious  donner  1' effort  k  notre  esprit, 
nous  pourrions  concevoir,  quoique  d'une  maniere  imparfaite,  comment 
la  matiere  pourroit  d'abord  avoir  ete  produite,'  etc.  Pour  moi,  s'il  m'est 
permis  de  dire  librement  ma  pensee,  je  ne  vols  pas  comment  ces  deux 
suppositions  pen  vent  contribuer  a  nous  faire  concevoir 'la  creation  de  la 
matiere.  A  mon  sens,  elles  n'y  contribuent  non  plus  qu'un  pont  contri- 
bue  <\  rendre  I'eau  qui  coule  immediatement  dessous,  impenetrable  ^  un 
boulet  de  canon,  qui  venant  k  tomber  perpendiculairement  d'une  hauteur 
de  vingt  on  trente  toises  sur  ce  pont  y  est  aiTete  sans  pouvoir  passer  ;\ 
travers  pour  entrer  dans  I'eau  qui  coule  directement  dessous.  Car  dans 
ce  cas-1^,  I'eau  reste  liquide  et  penetrable  k  ce  boulet,  quoique  la  solidite 
du  pout  empeche  que  le  boulet  ne  tombe  dans  I'eau.  De  meme,  la  puis- 
sance de  Dieu  pent  empecher  que  rien  n'entre  dans  une  certaine  por- 
tion d'espace,  mais  elle  ne  change  point  par-1^  la  nature  de  cette  portion 
d'espace,  qui  restant  toujours  penetrable,  comme  toute  autre  portion  d'es- 
pace, n'acquiert  point  en  consequence  de  cet  obstacle,  le  moindre  degre 
de  I'impenetrabilite  qui  est  essentielle  a  la  matiere,"  etc. 

Eraser,  Locke's  Essay,  2,  321,  322,  note  2,  above  referred  to,  states  that 
"the  idea  of  the  creation  of  matter  which  Locke  had  in  view  in  this 
curious  passage  has  occasioned  various  conjectures,"  and  he  refers  to 
that  of  Leibnitz  in  this  passage,  to  Reid's  in  Intell.  Powers,  Essay  II. , 
10  [ed.  Hamilton,  8th  ed.,  1880,  1,  287  a],  and  to  Dugald  Stewart,  Essay 
II.,  chap.  1,  p.  63.  Reid  thinks  Locke  agrees  with  Berkeley;  Stewart 
is  almost  tempted  to  think  that  Locke's  idea  of  matter  is  "somewhat 
analogous  to  that  of  Boscovich."  Fraser  says  that  "this  'dim  concep- 
tion,' if  it  means  that  the  material  world  may  be  resolved  into  a  con- 
stant manifestation  of  God's  power  to  man's  senses,  conditioned  by 
space,  so  far  coincides  with  Berkeley's  account  of  it  ;  he  emphasises  the 
sensuous  manifestation  of  divine  power  in   selected  spaces,  as  well  as 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  773 


the  ultimate  dependence  of  space  on  sense.  Newton,  it  seems,  suggested 
tliat  'creation  of  matter'  means,  God  causing  in  sentient  beings  tiie 
sense-perception  of  resistance,  in  an  otlierwise  pure  space,  —  a  theory 
akin  to  Berkeleyism  in  its  recognition  of  tlie  Supreme  Power,  and  to 
Boscovich  in  its  conception  of  the  effect." 

Page  513.  At  end  of  note,  add:  translation.  Appendix,  infra,  n 
717  sq.  '      ./     '  1 

Page  522,  note  1.     After  "  Gerhardt,"  add :  Janet. 

Page  534,  note  1.  Line  1,  after  "Tit.  VII.,  1,"  add:  Collectio  Li- 
brormn  Juris  AnUjnstiniani,  ed.  Krueger,  Mommsen  and  Studemund, 
Berlin,  Weidmann,  1878,  2,  52;  line  5,  after  "Tit.  I.,  33,"  add:  Corpus 
Juris  Civilis  {Digest,  ed.  Mommsen),  Berlin,  1893,  1,  667  b. 

Page  534,  note  2.     Add:  ed.  Mommsen,  1893,  1,  665a. 

Page  534,  note  3.     Add  :  ed.  Cousin,  1,  148. 

Page  545,  note  2.     Add :  New  ed.  of  Bolsec,  Vie  de  Calvin,  by  P.  L. 

Chastel,  Lyons,  1875. 

Page  548,  note  3.     Add  :  Eraser,  Locke's  Essay,  2,  379. 

Page  552,  note  1.  Add:  Cf.,  also,  note  to  New  Essays,  Preface,  ante, 
p.  51,  lines  11-13,  infra,  p.  727;  also,  Xew  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  20, 
§  11,  Th.,  infra,  p.  613,  and  note  1. 

Page  567,  note  1,  line  3.  After  "296,"  add:  Bolin's  ed.;  Fraser, 
Locke's  Essay,  2,  403-405. 

Pages  575,  576,  note  1.  Add:  The  doctrine  set  forth  in  the  note  is 
closely  allied  to  the  inner  light  of  the  Quaker  theology.  Cf.  Neio  Essays, 
Bk.  IV.,  chap.  19,  infra,  p.  599,  and  note  1 ;  also,  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  the 
United  States,  Centenary  ed.,  1876,  Vol.  2,  pp.  87-92. 

Page  579,  note  1.  Add:  Cf  Neio  Essays,  Bk.  IV.,  chap.  6,  ad  fin., 
ante,  p.  462,  note  1 ;  7,  §  11,  Th.  (2),  ante,  p.  474,  note  1  ;  also,  on  the 
general  philosophical  question,  "The  Roots  of  Agnoisticism,"  by  Pro- 
fessor James  Seth,  in  "The  New  World,"  September,  1884,  Vol.  3,  itj). 
458-471  ;  and  on  the  s^DCcial  problem  here  under  discussion,  "  Leibnitz 
and  Protestant  Theology,"  by  Professor  John  Watson,  in  "The  New 
World,"  March,  1896,  Vol.  5,  pp.  102-122.  Professor  Watson's  state- 
ment and  criticism  of  Leibnitz's  doctrine  is  admirable.  He  holds  tliat 
Leibnitz's  distinction  of  two  kinds  of  truth,  truths  of  reason  and  tnitlis  of 
fact,  cannot  be  maintained,  that  "for  a  Being  of  inlinite  knowledge  the 
possible  and  the  actual  are  coincident,"  that  "the  only  possiljle  reality  is 
that  which  is  capable  of  being  actualized,"  that  there  can  be  no  choice 
between  hypothetical  worlds,  and  tliat  the  existing  world  is  the  only  jjos- 
sible  one,  and  is  "necessary  just  because  it  is  the  expression  of  an  al)so- 
lute  reason." 


774  LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 

Page  581,  note  1.  At  end,  add:  Further  references  on  the  whole 
subject:  Lange,  Gesch.  d.  Materialismus,  2d  ed.,  1,  182  sq;  Eng.  trans., 
1,  218  sq. ;  E.  Kenan,  Averroes  et  VAverroisme,  Paris,  1852  ;  3d  ed.,  Paris, 
1869. 

Page  585,  line  6,  "  Motives  of  credibility."  Cf.  New  Essays,  Bk.  IV., 
chaps.  16,  §  14,  Th.,  ante,  p.  554;  17,  §  23,  Th.  (2),  ante,  p.  579,  and 
note  1.  Cf.,  also,  Dutens,  Leihnit.  op.  om.,  1,  680,  where  Leibnitz  says: 
"Motifs  de  croyance  ou  de  credibility  (comme  ils  les  appellent)  c'est-a- 
dire,  outre  les  raisons  explicables  de  notre  Foi,  qui  ne  sont  qu'un  amas 
d'argumens  de  differens  degi'fe  de  force,  et  qui  ne  peuvent  fonder  tons 
ensemble  qu'une  foi  liumaine,  ils  demandent  une  lumiere  de  la  grace  du 
Ciel,  qui  fasse  une  eutiere  conviction,  et  forme  ce  qu'on  appelle  la  Foi 
divine,"  i.e.  "  Motives  of  belief  or  of  credibility  (as  they  call  them),  that 
is  to  say,  besides  the  explicable  reasons  of  our  faith,  which  are  only  a 
mass  of  arguments  of  different  degrees  of  force,  and  which  all  together 
can  establish  only  a  human  faith,  they  demand  a  light  of  the  grace  of 
heaven,  which  produces  a  complete  conviction,  and  forms  what  is  called 
the  divine  faith." 

Page  588,  lines  16-19.  "  What  is  only  necessary  by  a  physical  neces- 
sity (i.e.  founded  upon  induction  from  that  which  is  customary  in  nature, 
or  upon  natural  laws  which,  so  to  speak,  are  of  divine  institution),"  etc. 
Cf.  ante,  p.  261,  note  1,  and  addition  thereto,  ante,  p.  761. 

Page  606,  note  concluded  from  p.  605.  Line  10,  after  "April  20-30, 
1609,  G.  1,  27,"  add  :  Appendix,  infra,  650;  line  20,  after  "p.  33,"  add: 
translation.  Appendix,  infra,  631-651. 

Page  613,  note  1.  Line  1,  after  "p.  51,  line  11,"  add :  and  note  thereto, 
infra,  p.  727  ;  line  2,  after  "  §§  52,  90,"  add  :  ed.  Cousin,  3,  217,  256; 
line  5,  after  "  §  48  sq.,''  add:  ibid.,  3,  214  sq. 

Page  634,  line  24,  "  Gilbert."  William  Gilbert,  1540-1603,  private 
physician  to  Queen  Elizabeth,  was  "  the  first  real  physicist  and  positively 
methodical  experimenter  known  in  the  Histoiy  of  Physics  before  Kepler 
and  Galileo."  By  tbe  experiments  and  discoveries  published  in  his  De 
macjnete  magneticisque  corporibus  et  de  magno  magnete  teUiire,  Physiologia 
no ra,  London,  1600,  later  editions,  Sedan,  1628,  1633,  Frankfort,  1629, 
1638,  he  became  "  the  founder  of  the  doctrine  of  magnetism  and  electric- 
ity." He  called  the  latter  vis  electrica.  For  an  account  of  his  philoso- 
phy, c/.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  1,  315-321  ;  for  his  view  of  vacuum, 
ibid,  319. 

Page  634,  line  24,  "  Gassendi."  For  Gassendi  on  the  vacuum,  cf.  Lass- 
witz, Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  136  sq.,  168-169. 

Page  634,  line  24,  "  Gericke."  Cf.  ante,  p.  127,  note  2.  An  accoimt 
of  his  views  is  given  by  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  293-300. 

Page  634,  line  25,  "Digby."  Cf  ante,  p.  83,  note  1.  On  Digby's  phi- 
losophy, cf.  Lasswitz,  Gesch.  d.  Atomistik,  2,  188-207  ;  on  his  view  of  the 
vacuum,  ibid,  199, 


ADDITIONS   AND   CORRECTIONS  775 


Page  641,  line  11,  "Angliis."  Cf.  ante,  p.  634,  note  1.  A  peculiar 
notion  of  White's  concerning  the  state  of  the  soul  separated  from  the 
body,  involved  him  in  a  controversy  with  the  Bishop  of  Chalcedon. 
White  wrote  two  tracts  on  the  subject:  De  Medio  Animarum  Statu, 
Paris,  1053,  8vo,  Agr.  1659,  8vo ;  Besponsio  ad  duos  Theologos  Parisi- 
enses  Hen.  Hohlenum,  et  alium  de  Medio  Animarum  Statu,  1662,  8vo. 
The  former,  together  with  Hobbes'  Leviathan,  was  censured  by  the 
House  of  Commons  in  1666.  Archbishop  Francis  Blackburue,  1705-1787, 
gives  an  extended  account  of  both  tracts  in  his  own  Historical  \'icw  of 
the  Controversy  concernimj  an  Intermediate  State,  1st  ed.,  1765,  I'd,  nmcii 
enlarged,  1772  ;  in  Vol.  3  of  his  Works,  Theoloy.  and  3Iiscellani<)Us,  7 
vols.,  1804.  Hobbes  and  White  frequently  engaged  in  disputations,  in 
which  White  commonly  proved  himself  the  abler  dialectician. 

Page  657,  note  1.  Add :  On  Leibnitz's  dynamical  views,  cf.  P.  Ilarzer, 
"Leibniz'  dynamische  Anschauungen,  mit  besonderer  Rtichs.  auf  d. 
Reform  des  Kraftemaasses  u.  d.  Entwickelung  des  Princ.  der  Erhaltung 
der  Energie,"  in  "  Vierteljahrsschr.  f.  wissenschaftl.  Philos.,"  1881,  Vol. 
?>,  pp.  265-295 ;  D.  Selver,  Der  Entiuicklungscjanci  der  Leibniz'' schen 
Monadenlelire  his  1695,  Leipzig,  1885  ;  M.  Zwerger,  Die  lehendicje  Kraft 
und  ihr  3Iass,  Miinchen,  1885  ;  M.  Planck,  Das  Princip  der  Erhaltung 
der  Energie,  Leipzig,  1887,  p.  6  sq. 

Page  679,  note  1.     Add :  and  additions  thereto,  infra,  p.  733. 

Page  692,  note  1.  Add:  Translated  also  by  Duncan,  Philos.  Wks.  of 
Leibnitz,  with  the  title  "  On  the  Ultimate  Origin  of  Things." 

Page  705,  line  10  from  bottom  (of  text).  The  Latin  text  roads: 
"Prfeterquam  finiam,  adjicere  placet,"  etc.,  of  the  first  phrase  of  which  I 
have  not  been  able  to  find  any  better  rendering  than  that  given  in  the  text. 

Page  712,  note  1,  at  the  end  (p.  713).  Add:  Cf,  also,  Foucher  de 
Careil,  Nouvelles  Lettres  et  Opuscides  inedits  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1857,  pp. 
412-437,  —  Note  sur  la  loi  de  continuite,  by  the  editor.  The  passage  refer- 
ring to  the  letter  here  translated  occurs  p.  433.  Tiic  note  itself  is  a  very 
complete  and  valuable  account  of  Leibnitz's  principle.  Cf,  also,  Nour- 
risson,  La  Philosophie  de  Leibniz,  Paris,  1860,  pp.  221-238. 


INDEX   A 


TO   THE   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"A  in  theology,"  applied  to  Antoinette 
Bourignoii,  (iOo. 

"A  is  not  B,"  compared  with  "  A  is 
non-B/'Sl. 

A  posteTtori  and  a  priori,  complemen- 
tary methods,  315. 

A  posteriori  truths,  499. 

A  priori  proofs,  227  ;  truths,  499  ;  ar- 
gument for  existence  of  God,  503. 

"  A  B  "  who  says,  says  "  A,"  471. 

Abridge,  natural  inciination  of  mind 
to,  5(;i. 

Absolute,  idea  of,  anterior  to  that  of 
limits,  158;  anterior  to  all  compo- 
sition, 1()2;  is  that  of  the  infinite, 
12,  17,  162  ;  "  in  us  internally,"  1()3; 
oijjjosed  to  relative,  236. 

Absolutes,  the  attributes  of  God  are, 
163 ;  the  source  of  ideas,  163. 

Abstract,  and  concrete,  how  related, 
128 ;  thoughts  have  need  of  things 
sensible,  78;  entities,  their  reality? 
178. 

Abstracts  affirmed  of  each  other,  not 
always  purely  verbal,  497. 

Al)straction,  its  process,  309;  by  it 
we  arrive  at  essences,  497 ;  gives  no 
knowledge  of  real  existence,  497. 

Abstractions,  when  not  errors,  51 ;  to 
be  avoided,  225,  226. 

Academic  disputes,  478,  479. 

Academicians,  421. 

Accidental  and  contingent,  498. 

Accidents,  real  beings,  154 ;  when  be- 
stowed miraculously,  428. 

Accidents  of  bodies,  not  arbitrarily  ac- 
corded by  God,  428,  431 ;  are  not  as 
pigeons  going  into  and  out  of  tlieir 
lioles,  428 ;  sometimes  virtually 
made  substances,  428 ;  if  not  modes 
of  their   being  or  modifications  of 


their  substances,  then  miraculous, 
428;  are  suitable  to  their  nature, 
431 ;  are  not  removed  from  '  reason 
in  general,'  431. 

Acervi  Ruentis,  problem  of,  328. 

Acroamatic,  42,  272. 

Act,  how  forced  yet  voluntary,  181, 
184. 

Actes  de  Leipzic,  227,  319,  502;  des 
S(;avans,  14. 

Action,  essential  to  substance,  U,  218; 
body  and  soul  ever  in,  HI ;  two  kinds 
of,  175, 218 ;  constant  because  nature 
ever  labors  to  put  herself  at  ease, 
194;  perception,  a  form  of,  218,  219; 
motion,  a  form  of,  218;  tiiat  which 
takes  pla(!e  in  substance  spontane- 
ously, 218;  compared  with  passion, 
218,  219 ;  in  substance  when  percei>- 
tion  is  distinct,  219;  a  step  towards 
pleasure,  219 ;  a  change  towards  per- 
fection, 219;  great  business  of  num- 
kind,  223;  consists  in  thouglits  or 
motions,  223;  in  Aristotle,  321. 

Acts  17  :  28  quoted,  153. 

Actus pitrus,  God  is,  113. 

Adamic  language,  the,  its  alleged  pres- 
ervation in  German,  298. 

Adequate  ideas,  17. 

Adhesion  of  bodies,  123.,  124. 

Adverb,  its  use,  3()4. 

'jEgean,'  Bochart's  derivation,  302. 

ASqualia  wquaUbus,  the  axiom,  540. 

Affinity,  259. 

Aggregata,  361. 

Aggregates,  in  what  their  unity  con- 
sists, 2.35:  artificial,  361;  natural, 
.3()1. 

Aggregations,  beings  l)y,  119. 

Ah !  3(i8. 

'Aha,' 301. 


777 


778 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


'Ains,'  '  anzi,'  367. 

Air-gun,  4()(). 

Albert,  tliu  Great,  278. 

Albiuus  or  Alcuiu,  546. 

Alchemists,  (501 ;  called  '  adepts,'  379; 
write  ouly  for  '  sons  of  the  art,'  379 ; 
dangerous,  fiOl. 

Alexander  the  Great,  208;  his  dream, 
267. 

Algebra,  432,  571 ;  does  not  require  re- 
currence to  ideas,  443;  Vieta's  use 
of  letters  in,  468;  Leibnitz  proposes 
use  of  figures  in,  468;  its  use  in  ex- 
tracting roots,  571 ;  not  art  of  inven- 
tion, 573. 

'Allein,'  its  equivalents  in  French,  366. 

Alliance,  259. 

Aliiot,  Dr.,  his  verses,  .352. 

Alphabet,  Chinese  have  no,  74;  its 
connection  vcith  sounds,  78. 

Alps,  derivation  of  word,  308. 

Amailis  de  Gaul,  399,  431,  546. 

Ambition,  one's,  should  be  to  huild 
rather  than  destroy,  99. 

America,  lack  of  iron  there,  525. 

American,  meaning  Red  Indian,  90, 
359;  savage  regarded  clocks  as 
alive,  388. 

Analogy,  as  a  rule  of  probability,  549 ; 
foundation  of  rational  hypothesis, 
549;  how  employed  by  Huygens, 
550;  to  be  searched  after,  553 ;  mira- 
cles admitted  in  despite  of,  553. 

Aualj'sis,  411,  412;  its  relation  to  in- 
vention, 412;  infinitesimal.  440; 
Pappus  on,  521,  565 ;  Conring  criti- 
cises, 521 ;  ultimate,  difficult  to  ar- 
rive at,  521 ;  involves  a  return  by 
synthesis,  565. 

Anatomy,  comparative,  recommended, 
553. 

Ancient  book,  see  Books. 

Andradians,  593. 

Andradius,  on  salvation  of  heathen, 
592. 

'Angebornen  Ideen,'  3. 

Angel,  the  change  in  its  signification, 
289. 

Angelicus  Doctor,  503. 

Angels,  as  to  their  subtle  bodies,  53; 
according  to  the  Fathers,  229;  ac- 
cording to  Aquinas,  230. 


Anger,  what,  173. 

Anglicans,  613. 

Animals,  Cartesian  view  of,  62;  con- 
servation of,  in  miniature,  62 ;  auto- 
mata with  souls,  6(3:  immortal,  68; 
reason  upon  particular  ideas  by  con- 
nection, 145;   do  not  form  abstract 
thoughts,  145;  their  love,  its  source, 
145;    have  no  knowledge  of  num- 
bers, 145;    have  no  understanding, 
178;  rational,  other  than  man,  244 
how  the  idea  of,  is  produced,  310 
how  the  name   is   arrived   at,  310 
speech  of,  .352,  353;    and  man  con- 
nected,  549,   552;     and   'man,'   the 
terms  compa"red,  569. 

Animant,  examjjles  of,  125. 

Annuities,  540. 

Anselm,  his  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  18,  502,  503. 

Antipathies,  surprisingly  common,  27, 
37 ;  the  explanation  of,  27,  28 ;  de- 
serve the  attention  of  educators, 
29. 

Antipodes,  the  ground  on  which  re- 
jected, 217,  442 ;  '  pretended  heresy  " 
of,  443. 

Antiquity,  of  value  in  religion,  618. 

Antisthenes  on  virtue,  519. 

aVTiTViriaf  3. 

Apagogical  demonstration,  491. 

Ape,  a  human  ancestor,  353. 

Aphorism,  476,  486. 

Apinm,  .394. 

Apollonius,  14,  108,  402,  416,  463,  573. 

"Apologie  du  genre  humain"  of  M. 

Fabritius,  21. 
Appellative  names,  309, 
Ai^perceptions,   past,  46 ;    depend  on 

attention  and  order,  7() ;  we  are  often 

without,  166. 
Appetite,  and  hunger,   distinguished, 

170;    tends  to  pleasure  rather  than 

happiness,  207. 
Appetitions,  what?  177;  apperceptible, 

177 ;  tend  to  go  to  their  end  directly, 

not  wisely,  195;  can  be  directed  by 

reason,  196;  motus  primo  priini  are 

towards  joy,  195. 
Apuleius,  ass  of,  243. 
Aquaviva,  Claudio,  619. 
Arabia  Deserta,  259. 


INDEX   A 


779 


Arabs,  influence  on  medicine,  371. 

Arbitrariness,  not  in  ideas  but  in 
words,  325. 

Archnsi,  67. 

Archelans,  his  "law  makes  virtue," 
51!). 

Archimedes,  93;  demonstrations  in 
physics,  414,  415;  on  equilibrium, 
415,  41(i ;  has  shown  a  square  equal 
to  a  circle,  424;  further  investiga- 
tions by  him  regarding  circle,  424 ; 
on  curvilinears,  473 ;  how  he  arrived 
at  quadrature  of  jiarabola,  475;  his 
definition  of  straight  line,  522;  on 
the  spiral,  573. 

Areopagites,  their  practice  of  releasing 
one  whose  case  was  too  hard  to  de- 
cide, 1.86. 

Argumenta,  398. 

Arguments,  the  two,  of  the  rhetori- 
cians, 529;  mixed,  630;  from  greater 
number,  530;  Nicole  on,  530. 

Arguments  in  form,  what?  659;  a 
recto  ad  obliquum,  5f)0,  564;  four 
sorts,  ad  verecundiam,  676 ;  ad  ig- 
norantiam,  57G;  ud  hoitiinem,  57(!; 
ad  judicium,  576 ;  ad  vertiginein, 
577. 

Aristides,  392. 

Aristippus,  on  happiness,  518. 

Ariosto,  398. 

Aristotle,  392,  418,  466,  495,  521 ;  his 
entelechy,  66,  174  ;  on  time,  156 ;  on 
free  acts,  180;  on  future  life,  208; 
on  probability,  214  ;  his  definition  of 
motion,  320 ;  his  definition  of  light, 
321 ;  on  materia  prima,  383 ;  defects 
arising  from  the  fact  that  some  of  his 
writings  were  posthumous,  384;  defi- 
nition of  man,  384;  defended,  385;  his 
"Prior  Analytics,"  414,  416;  as  a 
philosophic  writer,  416;  assump- 
tions, 479;  his  KadoXov  irpurov^  488; 
additions  to  what  he  left  concern.- 
iug  body,  495;  his  .fiyTon^^vi;,  495;  his 
estimate  of  metaphysics, '495;  how 
he  referred  accident-  to  matter,  498; 
liis  "  Posterior  Analytics,"  521;  liis 
"  Topics,"  541 ;  Locke's  estimate  of, 
557 ;  his  disposition  of  the  prem- 
ises in  the  syllogism,  discussed,  568; 
his  expre.ssiou  "  B  is  in  A  "  justified 


by  reference  to  ideas,  509;  is  he 
"  saved"?  593. 

Arithmetic,  its  propositions  innate.  76, 
78;  can  be  presented  apart  from 
sight  or  touch,  78 ;  awakened  in  us 
by  touch,  78. 

Armenian  books,  372. 

Arniinius,  72. 

Arnauld,  his  "New  Elements,"  463, 
464;  argues  against  insensible 
changes,  618. 

Arrangement,  its  importance,  475. 

Ars  Combinatoria,  pirated,  4;>1. 

Art  of  Signs,  needed,  573. 

Arts,  advantage  of  cultivating,  525 
526. 

Ass,  golden,  of  Apuleius,  243. 

Assassins,  196,  197. 

Assent,  degrees  of,  .529;  often  based 
on  memory  of  previous  reasonings, 
632,  533;  such  use  of  memory  in,  its 
advantages  and  disadvantages,  533; 
as  a  guide  of  action,  534,  5;^;  its 
varieties,  537,  538 ;  as  assurance,  538; 
as  confidence,  538;  as  firm  belief, 
538;  has  varying  degrees  of  proba- 
bility, 538;  granted  to  Miracles  and 
Revelation,  553 ;  founded  on  motives 
of  credibility,  554:  supernatural, 
founded  on  Divine  Grace,  .5,j4. 

Association  of  ideas,  a  non-natural 
often  observable,  281,  282;  ground 
of  acquired  sympathies  and  antip- 
athies, 282;  affects  intellectual 
habits,  282;  source  of  the  non- 
natural,  283;  depends  on  associ- 
ation of  perceptions,  283;  strengtli- 
ened  by  repetitions,  283,  284; 
strengthened  by  "  vehemence  of  im- 
pression," 284;  infiuenced  by  "au- 
thority, party,  custom,"  284. 

Assumptions,  Aristotle's,  479. 

Assurance,  how  belief  becomes,  5.'{8. 

Assyrians,  dou])fs  about  history  of, 545. 

Asyllogistic,  conclusions,  5(i0,  561. 

Asymptote,  209,  .523. 

Atom,  defined,  5.'!,  54. 

Atoms,  65,  (i8,  239;  of  Kpicuriis,  126, 
132;  of  Denio(;ritus,  .'109;  fortuitous 
concourse  of,  folly,  ()15. 

Attention,  115,  1()5,  166;  division  of,  a 
means  of  securing  sleep,  115. 


780 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


Attraction  over  distance,  56. 

Attributes  and  modifications,  distin- 
guished, 58. 

Augustan  Confession,  612. 

Augustine,  410;  on  eternal  truths  in 
Divine  intelligence,  516;  damning 
infants  unbaptized,  594;  his  "  De 
Utilitate  Credendi,"  616. 

Augustus,  308  ;  his  "  Brevarium  Im- 
perii," 610. 

Augustus,  Elector  of  Saxony,  an 
alchemist,  339. 

Aumont,  Due  d',  an  antiquarian,  547. 

Australians,  supposed  invasion  of,  456. 

Authority,  how  far  to  be  yielded  to, 
616. 

Avarice  and  ambition,  the  principle  at 
bottom  of  both  wholesome,  212. 

Avarice,  its  application  to  different 
complex  ideas,  313,  314. 

Aventin,  546. 

Averroists,  53. 

Axioms,  are  they  indispensable?  12; 
should  be  demonstrated,  18,  72,  99, 
107,  175,  473,  518;  truths  other  than 
self-evident,  4()4  ;  secondary,  should 
be  reduced  to  primitive,  464 ;  primi- 
tive, 464;  primitive,  are  identicals 
and  undemonstrable,  464;  its  par- 
ticular and  more  general  meaning, 
469;  in  what  sense  prior  to  other 
parts  of  knowledge,  470;  other 
truths  alleged  to  be  as  evident  as, 
471:  the  result  of  discarding,  472: 
their  use  in  geometry,  473;  should 
be  assumed  with  caution,  518;  when 
the  secondary  may  be  employed,  524 ; 
their  principal  use  to  connect  ideas, 
527. 

"  B  in  mathematics,"  used  by  Bertrand 
la  Coste,  603. 

Babylonians,  doubts  about  mathe- 
matics of,  416 ;  doubts  about  history 
of,  545. 

Baldness,  the  problem  concerning,  328, 
353. 

Baptism,  conditional,  244,  343,  344. 

Barantoli,  could  not  understand  '  hal- 
lowed,' 103. 

Barbarism  and  cultivation  contrasted, 
96,  97. 


Barclay.  Quaker  theologian,  590. 

Barner,  his  Prodromus,  487  ;  suggests 
abridgment  in  medical  works,  488. 

Battles,  almost  no  good  account  of, 
543;  those  of  Li^"y  imaginary,  543; 
Dahlberg's  plans  of,  543. 

Bauhin,  308. 

Baumgarten,  his  story  of  the  Santon, 
89. 

Bayle,  66,  507. 

Beasts,  men  distinguished  from,  by 
innate  knowledge,  76. 

Beatific  vision,  575. 

Becan,  303. 

Beda, 295. 

Being,  have  idea  of,  because  we  are 
beings,  76;  knowledge  of,  how  de- 
rived? 100;  some  have  no  word 
for,  103;  God,  finite  spirits,  and 
matter  may  be  modifications  of  a 
common,  154 :  corporeal,  knowledge 
of,  given  in  sensation,  229 ;  spiritual, 
knowledge  of,  given  in  sensations, 
229 ;  thinking,  if  thought  comes 
from,  such  Being  is  God,  501  •,  one 
original,  reasonable  to  believe  that 
there  is,  .501 ;  thinking,  can  it  come 
from  a  non-thinking  stmrce  ?  505 ; 
eternal  first,  cannot  be  matter,  506. 

Beings,  outside  of  us,  are  they  demon- 
strable ?  469 ;  eternal,  may  there  be  ? 
501 ;  may  this  state  of  things  origi- 
nate in  a  concurrence  of?  501. 

Belgian  Confession,  012. 

Belief,  how  it  becomes  assurance,  538 ; 
not  according  to  wish,  but  sight  of 
most  apparent,  615;  can  be  indirectly 
influenced,  615 ;  founded  on  slight 
reasons,  explained,  616. 

Bellarmine,  621. 

Bernier,  64. 

Beverovicius,  his  book  on  medicine, 
624. 

Beyerling,  622. 

Beza,  his  views  of  Eucharist,  612. 

Blind,  their  opinion  of  scarlet,  128, 
321 ;  have  learned  geometry,  139 ; 
may  learn  optics,  139;  can  speak 
pertinently  of  light  and  color,  305. 

Bochart,  302. 

Bodies,  "  two  cannot  be  in  same  place 
at  same  time,"  the  statement  con- 


INDEX   A 


781 


sidered,  83;  impenetrability  of,  83; 
extension  of,  and  equality  of  space, 
not  inseparable,  127;  act  only  by 
impulse,  132 ;  do  not  act  where  they 
are  not,  132;  in  what  sense  neces- 
sary agents,  183;  do  not  remain 
same  in  appearance,  240;  of  entel- 
echies  are  machines,  3()2;  of  entel- 
echies,  imperishable,  3(52 ;  of  en- 
telechies,  an  infinite  replication  of 
inanimates,  362. 

Body,  never  without  motion,  11,  24, 
47,  110;  least  inij)ression  upon, 
readies  its  entirety,  and  therefore 
to  part  whose  motions  correspond 
to  actions  of  Soul,  25;  Leibnitz  al- 
leges a  change  in  Locke's  views  as 
to,  38;  and  mind,  their  differences 
not  modifications,  58;  and  mind, 
exact  corresi^ondence  between,  117, 
182;  to  say  it  is  extended  without 
parts  unintelligible?  118;  acts  (agit) 
when  spontaneity  in  its  motion,  219 ; 
is  passive  (patit)  when  urged  or  hin- 
dered by  another,  219 ;  possesses 
an  image  of  substance  and  action, 
219 ;  as  composed  of  parts,  not  one 
substance,  219 ;  its  unity  comes  from 
the  thought,  219 ;  like  a  flock,  219 ; 
organized  not  the  same  but  equiva- 
lent, 241 ;  Descartes'  view  of,  483 ; 
cau  it  be  only  in  one  place  at  same 
time,  4(36,  589;  substance  of,  does 
not  consist  in  extension  or  dimen- 
sion, 612;  glorious  of  Jesus  Christ, 
612  ;  glorious,  its  local  presence,  612 ; 
glorious,  its  sacramental  presence, 
612 ;  glorious,  its  miraculous  pi'es- 
ence,  612. 

Bodies,  mechanical  affections  of  .colors, 
sounds,  etc.  how  explained,  441; 
movements  of,  correspond  to,  but 
do  not  resemble,  affections  of  soul, 
441 ;  their  connection  with  soul  (ix- 
plained  by  Pre-established  Har- 
mony, 441 ;  the  statement  that  two, 
cannot  be  in  the  same  plat^e  at  the 
same  time,  discussed,  4()f) ;  the  state- 
ment true  if  body  be  an  impenetra- 
ble mass,  466  ;  the  statement  not  true 
of  real  body,  466 ;  tlie  statement 
only  true  in  natural  order  of  things, 


467 ;  knowledge  of,  being  increased, 
495;  knowledge  of,  acquired  by  ex- 
perience, 524;  knowledge  of,  ac- 
quired by  rational  and  regular 
experiment,  524;  investigation  of 
internal  parts  of,  most  useful  of  our 
present  efforts,  552. 

Boehnie,  Jacob,  298 ;  Teutonic  Philoso- 
pher, 603;  believed  to  make  gold, 
603. 

Bohlius,  3(;6. 

Boldness,  223. 

Bolsec,  his  slanders  on  Calvin,  545. 

Boniface,  443. 

Bonosus,  wherein  his  drinking  might 
be  praised,  2(i3. 

Book,  never  formed  by  throwing  type 
together  pell-mell,  422. 

Books,  ancient,  to  be  investigated,  es- 
pecially on  medicine,  372;  Cinnese, 
3f2. 

Boreas  and  the  traveller's  cloak, 
613. 

Borgia,  Francis  de,  how  he  reduced 
his  wine,  193. 

Bouhours,  his  Art  de  Penscr,  144. 

Bouillaud  upon  the  spiral,  573. 

Bouquetin,  ibex,  394. 

Bourignon,  Antoitiette  dc,  an  enthusi- 
ast, 599,  602,  603. 

Boutan,  91. 

Boyle,  Chevalier,  324 ;  denies  absolute 
rest,  47 ;  concludes  that  everything 
in  nature  takes  place  mechanically, 
527. 

Brahmins,  372. 

Brenner  or  Pyrenees,  .'508. 

Brocards,  require  reform,  48(). 

Brugnolns,  106;  Brugnol,  107. 

Brus(pier,  370. 

Brutes,  tlieir  knowledge,  44;  tlicir 
"consecutions,"  44;  have  inipi'rish- 
able  souls,  (12,  113. 

Brutus,  origin  of  name,  30S;  and  tlic 
Britons,  54(). 

J'uljbies,  as  nieniori(!S,  51.;. 

Bucephalus,  ;'>i)8. 

Buratini,  150. 

Buridan'.s  ass,  IHi. 

Burnett,  Thomas,  a  corrcs|>oiidt  iil  of 
Leibnitz,  6. 

'But,'  its  ililTcrent  signiticatiniis,  3(i6; 


782 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


its  equivalents  in  French  and  Ger- 
man, 3()G;  its  derivation,  3(i7. 

CiBdmon,  21)5. 

C-Bsar,  308,  575. 

Calvin,  his  strong  views  of  Eucliarist, 
612. 

Camilhis  ami  the  Gauls,  story  con- 
tradicted, 545. 

Campanella,  (17. 

'  Candle  of  the  Lord,'  437. 

Cannon-balls,  why  i)iled?  570. 

Canon,  general,  4GS. 

Capacity,  149,  174. 

Capito,  308. 

Cardan,  67 ;  on  the  logic  of  the  proba- 
ble, 56fi. 

Caribbees,  their  cruelty,  89. 

Carlowitz,  peace  of,  259. 

Carrington,  his  life  of  Cromwell,  543. 

Cartesians,  (i2,  66,  67,  68,  113,  126,  133. 

Cartesians,  their  appeal  to  ideas,  13; 
perplexed  by  souls  of  brutes,  62; 
on  space  and  matter,  128;  on  space 
and  extension,  129;  on  transfer  of 
motion,  176;  on  souls  giving  new 
direction  to  force,  233;  cannot 
demonstrate  real  external  existence, 
319 ;  their  first  truth,  410,  463 ;  their 
argument  (the  Anselmic)  for  exist- 
ence of  God,  502;  their  grooved 
particles,  613. 

Casati,  17(). 

Casaubon  on  the  Sorbonne,  478. 

Casimir,  King  of  Poland,  and  his  forest 
child,  .344. 

Cassowary,  sign  of  a  complex  idea,  357 ; 
exact  idea  of  its  skin  might  distin- 
guish it,  357  :  "  wide  nails  "  wanting 
to  make  it  a  man,  384,  385. 

Ca.stor  and  Pollux,  with  one  soul, 
114. 

Cause,  final,  224,  .550 ;  proximate  for- 
mal, 337. 

Cause  and  effect,  237 ;  can  they  be  ex- 
pressed apart  from  action  ?  224. 

Causes,  efficient,  parallel  in  all  worlds, 
440;  final,  various,  224,  ilO. 

'Cavalcar,'  222. 

Cebes,  Table  of,  436. 

Celery-plant,  394. 

Censors,  593. 


Censures,  Theologic,  537. 

(Jppendant,  its  use,  367. 

Certainty,  in  human  knowledge,  15 ; 
of  truth  and  of  knoMiedge,  453;  ex- 
perimental, 400;  moral  or  physical, 
distinguished  from  metaphysical  or 
necessity,  4G2  ;  what?  513. 

Certitude,  mathematical,  13 :  the  place 
of  particular  demonstration  in,  318. 
403;  depends  on  certain  universal 
propositions,  403. 

'  Chain  of  reasoning,'  561. 

Chance,  what  ?  203 :  a  mathematical 
treatment  of  games  of,  541. 

'Chancellor  of  England,  the,'  526. 

Change,  what?  174.  ' 

Characteristic,  a  universal,  453,  469. 

Chemistry,  its  infido  successii,  331. 

Chemnitius,  .592. 

Chess,  Ai-abs  play,  by  memory,  1.52. 

Chiliagon  (figure  of  a  thousand  sides), 
269,  272,  273. 

Children,  why  they  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  innate  principles,  76;  their 
exposure,  89. 

Chimerical,  difficulty  of  affixing  epi- 
thet, 277. 

China,  race-mules  in,  345;  Jesuits  in, 
594. 

Chinese,  geometers,  22 :  alphabet,  no, 
74;  drawings,  136;  writing,  140; 
language,  287, 452,453 ;  Golius"s  opin- 
ion about  language,  287, 292 ;  salva- 
bility  of,  according  to  Jesuits,  594. 

Choices,  suspensory  power  exists  over, 
186;  different,  prove  varying  opin- 
ions of  good,  207:  future  life  should 
influence  our,  208;  man's,  never 
wrong  if  present  alone  regarded, 
208. 

Christmas  eve,  superstition  concern- 
ing, 470. 

Chronicles,  II.,  6: 18,  1.58. 

Chrysostom,  ou  natural  piety,  591. 

Church,  ambiguity  of  term,  271;  its 
relation  to  controversies,  617,  618. 

Cicero,  308;  on  the  sight  of  the  beauty 
of  virtue  awaking  love  to  it,  192; 
on  the  praise  of  virtue,  264;  on  the 
existence  of  God ,  500. 

Circle,  quadrature  cf,  603. 

City  of  God,  .53. 


INDEX   A 


783 


Clair-confus  conceptions,  are  they  pos- 
sible to  the  blind  ?  140. 

Clauberg  on  sources  of  German,  303, 
304. 

Clavius,  424. 

Clearness,  a  species  of  certainty,  513. 

Clelie,  223. 

Clement,  Second,  his  family,  544;  uf 
Alexandria,  591. 

'  Coaxare,'  as  a  stem,  298. 

Vodex  AryciUeus  of  the  Euxine  Goths, 
295. 

Codex  juris  (jeatium,  diplomulicus, 
Uu. 

Cogltationes  csecee,  191. 

Cohesion,  causes  traction,  54;  in  all 
bodies,  125  ;  its  explanation  as  diffi- 
cult as  that  of  thought,  231 ;  not  es- 
sential to  extension,  231;  does  it 
arise  from  pressure  of  ambient 
fluid?  231,232. 

Collective  unity,  what  ?  149. 

Collius,  593. 

Color  of  gold  would  disappear  if  senses 
more  penetrating,  227. 

Colors,  their  common  properties,  323; 
their  divisions,  .323;  intimate  nat- 
ure of,  determined  by  analogy,  549. 

Comenius,  his  air-gun  argument,  4()(j ; 
his  "  Lux  inTeuebris,"  (504;  prophe- 
cies popular,  604. 

Compactness,  123,  126. 

Comparison,  144. 

Compass,  525. 

Complex  ideas,  5,  147-149. 

Composition  of  ideas,  144. 

Compossil)le,  capable  of  existing  to- 
gether, 277,  334. 

Compound  directicm  of  volition,  200. 

Compulsion,  physical,  what?  182, 183; 
moral,  what?  184. 

Conatus,  177,  224. 

Conceptivity,  creature's  measure  of 
nature's  power,  GO. 

'  Concreate,'  80. 

Concrete  terms,  best  to  bo  employed, 
220. 

Concrete  and  iibstract,  how  related, 
128. 

Concurrence,  144. 

Condensation,  124;  there  is  none,  127. 

Condensations,  real,  460. 


Conditions,  an  early  thesis  upon,  re- 
ferred to,  434. 

Cone,  an  illustration  of  the  gliding 
of  the  sensible  and  rational  into 
each  other,  549. 

Confidence,  538. 

Contiguration  can  abide  specifically 
without  abiding  individually,  240. 

Confucius,  Jesuits'  opinion  regarding, 
594. 

Conjectures,  .529,  538. 

Conjunctions,  364. 

Connaway,  Countess  of,  67. 

Conring,  520 ;  his  criticism  ou  Pappus, 
521. 

Consanguinity,  2Jj9. 

Conscience,  borne  witness  to  by  best 
part  of  race,  90:  remor.se  of,  91; 
"  lattk(/u$  ct  ictus  "  of,  91. 

Conscious,  we  are  not  always,  of  hab- 
its and  stores  of  menu)ry,  4(). 

Consciousness  of  objects  di'pcndent  on 
attention,  115;  what?  245;  "silent 
in  forgetfulne.ss,"  247;  cannot  be 
transferred,  247,  248;  as  a  represen- 
tation, 248. 

Consecutions  of  animals,  CO,  145. 

Consent,  general,  may  como  from  tra- 
dition, 72. 

Consecpience  discussed,  213 

Conservation  of  souls,  52  :  of  animals 
in  miniature,  02. 

Consideration,  166. 

Consistence,  12(;. 

Consubstantiation,  Oil,  G12. 

"Containing"  and  "contained"  not 
same  as  "  whole  "  aiul  "  part,"  .509. 

Contemi)lation,  l(i5,  Kiti;  of  ac<iuir('d 
knowledge,  142;  of  innate  knowl- 
edge, 142. 

Contingence,  angle  of,  258. 

Contingent  truths,  183. 

Continuity,  law  of,  50,  331,  ,5.52;  ai>- 
parently  violated  for  reasons  of 
beauty,  552;  why  not  evident  be- 
tween man  and  beast,  5.52. 

Continuum,  152,  100. 

Contradiction,  axiom  of,  a  (irst  princi- 
ple, 14;  made  use  of  always,  77; 
liow  it  may  be  employed  in  logic, 
406,  407;  how  it  may  be  cmpbiyed 
in  matliemati(;s,  400. 


784 


LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Contradictories,  23. 

Coutrition,  the  act  of,  what  ?  591 ;  how 
it  saves,  591. 

Coutroversy,  ofteu  due  to  the  disput- 
ers  "speaking  a  different  language 
while  meaning  tlie  same  thing,"  388. 

Conversation,  its  nature,  341 ;  angelic, 
341. 

Conversion,  principle  of,  how  used  in 
logic,  407. 

Copernican  hypothesis,  one  opposed 
to  it  maintained  with  zeal,  613. 

Copernicans,  70. 

CoiJeruicus,  419 ;  the  detriment  of  sui>- 
pressing  his  views,  614. 

Coptic  books,  372. 

Copy,  force  of  a,  as  evidence,  541 ; 
copy  of  a,  its  value  in  evidence,  541 ; 
adds  no  weight  to  the  original,  545. 

Corbau, 327. 

Corinthians,  XL,  5 :  10,  447. 

Corollaries,  4:!4. 

Corpus  delicti,  538. 

Corruptio  optimi  pessima,  482. 

Coste,  Pierre,  his  translation  of  Locke's 
Essay,  7,  27. 

Coste,  La,  Bertrand,  603. 

'Couaquen,'  see  'Quaken,'  298. 

Councils,  advantage  and  disadvantage 
of,  617 ;  their  sphere  according  to 
Henry  Holden,  617,  618. 

Count,  to,  what  ?  160. 

Creation,  continuous,  16,  511 ;  Locke's 
statement  concerning,  that "  its  mys- 
tery is  open  to  some  extent  to  \)vo- 
found  meditation,"  509;  probable 
that  Locke's  hinted  explication  is 
Platonic,  510;  not  more  inconceiv- 
able than  movements  produced  in 
bodies  by  volition,  510;  a  gradual 
connection  in  all  its  parts,  549;  the 
boundaries  of  its  sensible  and  ra- 
tional regions  difficult  to  define,  549. 

Creator,  ruled  by  nature  of  things,  431 ; 
produces  and  conserves  only  what 
suits  the  nature  of  things,  431 ;  pro- 
duces only  what  can  be  exj^laiued 
by  their  natures,  431 ;  gives  no  acci- 
dental powers  detached  from  inward 
constitution,  431 ;  acts  according  to 
general  reason,  431;  knowledge  of 
his  acts,  because  of  their  reasonable- 


ness, not  beyond  us,  431 ;  difficulty  of 
compiehending  his  work  not  in  their 
reasons  but  their  multitude,  431. 

Credibility,  motives  of,  554,  579,  585. 

CreduUtate,  de,  oath,  530. 

Crime,  what  ?  262. 

Criterion  of  objects  of  sense :  the  con- 
nection of  the  phenomena,  422 ;  veri- 
fication by  truths  of  reason,  422  ;  yet 
does  not  afford  highest  certitude,  422. 

Criticism,  372. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  did  he  ever  leave 
the  British  Isles  ?  543. 

Crusca,  La,  function  of,  18. 

Ctesias,  disagrees  with  Herodotus,  545. 

Cud  worth,  65. 

Cuivis  potest  accidere,  quod  cuiquam 
potest,  492. 

Cyrano,  de  Bergerac,  his  "Voyages," 
399 ;  fancies  of,  concerning  beings  in 
the  sun,  228,  229;  in  the  moon,  551. 

Cyrus,  doubts  about,  54-5. 

Dahlberg,  Count  of,  his  plan;>  of  the 
battles  of  Charles  Gustavus  of 
Sweden,  543;  his  defence  of  Riga, 
.543. 

Dalgarno,  George,  his  artificial  lan- 
guage, 292. 

Darapti,  568. 

Day  and  night,  their  succession  in 
twenty-four  hours  not  necessary,  43. 

De  Dominis,  442. 

Be  officio  vin  boni  circa  futura  con- 
thtc/entict,  605. 

Deaf  and  dumb,  those  born,  enquiries 
concerning,  140. 

Death,  a  sleep,  49,  52;  cannot  last 
always,  53;  separation  in,  proves 
movement  of  soul,  229. 

Decahedron,  a  regular,  an  impossible 
combination,  315,  354. 

Deduction,  as  an  instinct  and  as  a  log- 
ical power,  88 ;  employed  by  aU,  88. 

Definition,  nominal,  17,  316,  339:  real, 
17,  316 ;  as  applied  to  substances  and 
predicates,  317 ;  empiric,  only  pro- 
visional, 324;  external  marks  in, 
sufficient  for  exact,  339;  should  be 
capable  of  being  substituted  for 
name,  340;  dependent  on  exterior 
of  bodies  imperfect  and  provisional. 


INDEX  A 


785 


342;    often  several,   for  an   object, 
392 ;    whose  possibility  appears    at 
once  to  involve  intuitive  knowledge, 
410;    adequate,    contains    intuitive 
knowledge,  410. 
Degrees  of  assent,  532. 
Deity,  knowledge  of,  given  by  nature, 
72 ;  confirmed  and  rectified  by  knowl- 
edge, 72;  readiness  with  which  men 
have   received   notion   of,   if    tradi- 
tion  or  not,   proves  that  it  comes 
from  depth  of  soul,  72. 
Ae?  TTiffTetjeiv  top  fiavOdvovra,  519. 
Democritus,  (35  ;  his  ijromise  of  another 
life,  ()6;  his  correct  surmise  regard- 
ing Milky  Way,  277;  atoms  of,  309; 
the  principle  of  individuation  in  con- 
nection with  his  atomic  theory,  309. 
Demonstration,  defined,  22,  556 ;  phil- 
osophic, why  inferior  to  mathemat- 
ical, 416,  417 ;  not  to  be  always  ex- 
pected, 512 ;  mathematical,  its  stages, 
556. 
Demonstrative  knowledge,  not  so  clear 
as   intuitive,   411 ;    illustrated  by  a 
series  of  mirrors,  411. 
Demonstrative  science  founded  on  in- 
nate knowledge,  77. 
Denial  is  positive,  131,  2S9. 
Denominatio  iture  extrhiseca,  cannot 

exist  metaphysically,  236. 
Denomination,  intrinsic,  456;   extrin- 
sic, 450. 
Deo,  omnia  in,  viclerc,  3. 
Desargues,  on  tints  and  shades,  137. 
Descartes,  62,  64,  67,  123,  46();  advo- 
cated innate  idea  of  (Jod,  70 ;  on  fal- 
laciousness of  senses,  134 ;  on  limit- 
less   matter,    154;     makes    infinite 
equal   to   indefinite,   154 ;    his    idea 
about  pineal  gland  insufficient,  2:50; 
his  affection  for  squint-eyed  persons, 
283 ;  his  idea  of  body,  483 ;  denies  a 
vacuum,  483;  at  La  Fleche,  504;  on 
Bacon's  method,  526;    his  expected 
telescope,  551;  his  hypothesis  uncon- 
firmed, 552  ;  employed  the  knowledge 
of  his  time,  552 ;  on  solution  of  equa- 
tion of  fourth  degree,  572;    applies 
calculus  to  geometry,  57.'!. 
Description  may  fall  upon  the  impossi- 
ble, 398,  399. 


Desire,  founded  on  uneasiness,  49; 
what?  168-170,  189;  its  relation  to 
pain,  170 ;  accompanies  the  passions, 
198;  in  midst  of  joy  leads  to  new 
actions  and  neglect  of  present  pleas- 
ures, 198;  produces  voluntary  ac- 
tion, 199 ;  aroused  by  happiness,  200; 
its  suspension  is  man's  freedom, 
202;  its  advantage,  202,  203;  occurs 
through  insensible  lassitude,  202 ;  oc- 
curs through  contrary  inclinations, 
202;  may  be  brought  about  by 
methodical  mental  processes,  203; 
brought  about  by  direct  power  of 
mind,  204. 
Despair,    what  ?    172,    173 ;    reasons 

against,  437. 
Despreaux,  97. 

Determination,  of  will,  what?  183; 
useful  and  necessary,  205 ;  needful 
to  effective  choice,  205;  does  not 
necessitate,  but  incline,  206 ;  an  in- 
clination rather  than  a  neces.sity, 
206;  when  founded  on  reason  gives 
largest  freedom,  20(5;  resting  on 
final  result  necessary  to  freedom, 
205 ;  its  strength  in  superior  beings 
does  not  limit  their  freedom,  205 ; 
"confirmation"  of  unfallen  angels 
rests  on,  205;  is  in  God,  and  is  not 
inconsistent  with  perfect  divine  free- 
dom, 206. 
Determin(jd,  all    tilings    in   soul   are, 

15. 
Diagram,  435. 
Dialogue,  advantages  of  that  form  of 

writing,  42. 
"  Diaphaiu)us  "  in  Aristotle,  321. 
Die  cur  hie,  16(i,  203. 
Dicliotomies,  200 ;  their  use,  312. 
Dictionaries  of  simple  ideas  observed 
in  individuals  nl"  each  species  desid- 
erated, 394  ;  wilh  small  illusl  rat  ions, 
recommended,  394;  Chinese  have  il- 
lustrated, 395  ;  "the  most  excellent 
of,"  49. 
Difficulties    often    createil    and    liicn 

lamenteil,  460. 
Digi)y,  Ch(!valier,  83. 
Digests,  272,  486. 

Diogenes  wishes  In   make   a  I'lalnnlc 
man,  385- 


(86 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


Diophant,  573;  on  reduction  of  equa- 
tions, 571. 

Dioscorides,  371. 

Discernment,  14.')-147. 

Discovery,  tiuds  general  truths,  474; 
a  chance  example  often  assists  in, 
475 ;  ways  of,  might  be  systematized, 
4715;  sometimes  arrived  at  by  ra- 
tional but  extended  circuits,  476. 

Discussion,  art  of,  its  importance,  477  ; 
frequent  in  beginning  of  Reforma- 
tion, 477 ;  art  of,  needs  remodelling, 
478;  "last  word"  in,  478;  assump- 
tions in,  479;  confusion  in,  from 
want  of  axioms,  479;  rules  and  ex- 
ceptions in,  480;  replications  and 
duplications  in,  480;  cavilling  in, 
reprehended,  481 ;  its  academic  for- 
mula not  to  be  paraded  in  conver- 
sation, 482;  of  matters  of  faith, 
regarded  by  some  as  of  the  devil, 
610. 

Disease,  like  a  plant  or  animal,  488. 

Disparates,  what  ?  405,  406. 

Disposition,  what?  223. 

Dispositions,  remains  of  past  impres- 
sions in  the  soul,  143 ;  conscious  of, 
on  occasions,  143. 

Distance,  what?  149;  of  places  and 
times,  congruity  between,  209. 

Distinct,  267. 

Distinctions,  ^^rtual,  of  the  Scotists, 
587. 

Diversity,  involves  an  internal  princi- 
ple of  distinction,  238;  time  and 
space  are  helps  to  recognize,  2.38 ;  not 
destroyed  by  interpenetration,  238. 

Divine  grace,  a  pleasure,  192. 

Divini,  Eustachio,  613. 

Dogmatists,  420. 

Drabitius,  005. 

Draudius,  626;  his  method  criticised, 
627. 

Dreaming,  165,  166. 

Dreams,  absence  of,  no  disproof  of 
soul's  activity,  115;  leave  marks  on 
brain,  117  ;  shall  we  infer  from  iuco- 
herency  of,  that  rational  thought  de- 
pends on  body?  117  ;  of  persons  and 
places  before  they  have  been  ceen 
by  dreamer,  514. 

Drinking,  a  virtue,  263. 


Drunkard,  under  the  illusion  of  time. 
209. 

Duration,  155-158,  220;  idea  of,  how 
awakened?  15();  could  perceptions 
give  idea  of  ?  156 ;  how  measured  ? 
156 ;  not  eomj)rehensible  in  all  its 
extension,  158 ;  indicates  possibilities 
beyond  supposition  of  existences, 
158 ;  infinite,  an  easier  conception 
than  an  uifinite  expansion  of  space, 
158. 

Duties  and  sins,  how  they  differ  from 
virtues  and  vices,  261,  262. 

Dynamics,  440. 

Eau,  its  derivation,  302. 

Ebenbitar,  371. 

"  Ecclesiastical  Polity  "  of  Hooker, 
quoted,  566. 

Echantillon  de  Reflexions  sur  I'Essay 
par  Locke,  6. 

Economic  faculty  as  an  indicial  term, 
627. 

Ecstasy,  165,  166. 

Ecthesis  (mathematical),  464,  556. 

Effect,  often  confounded  with  cause, 
137. 

Effort,  174. 

Ego,  spiritual,  preserved,  241 ;  has  no 
parts,  247 ;  same  jAysical  preserved. 
247. 

Egyptian,  geometers,  22,  410;  vases 
religiously  decorated,  390. 

Elbe,  308 ;  applied  to  all  rivers  in  Scan- 
dinavia, 308. 

Embryology,  question  in,  347. 

Empiricism,  liable  to  mistake,  44 ;  un- 
reasoning, 556. 

Enchiridion  sapientix,  proposed,  610. 

Encyclopedia,  623-625. 

Endoxon,  418. 

Enigma,  its  use,  by  Pythagoras,  .379; 
by  Orientals,  379. 

Entelechy,  66 ;  Aristotle's  view  of,  174 : 
Leibnitz's  view  of,  174. 

Entelechies,  when  they  are  souls,  175; 
perception  belongs  to  all,  218;  sub- 
stantial unities.  234;  primitive,  their 
bodies  niaL'hines,  3ti2. 

Enthusiasm,  Locke's  thoughts  on,  31- 
37 ;  defined.  ,32,  '?&.  .".!Hi.  .597  ;  difficult 
to  rescue  its  victim,  33,  600,  601;  its 


INDEX   A 


787 


I  ground  examined,  33,  .34,  596;  how 
to  guard  against,  35 ;  rests  on  a  feel- 
ing of  revelation,  597  ;  at  first  had  a 
good  siguiticatiou,  59S. 

Enthusiast,  a  young  lady,  600. 

Enthusiasts,  may  become  a  dangerous 
sect,  600. 

Enthymeme,  73,  481,  559,  563,  564. 

Envy,  what  ?  173. 

Epictetus,  495. 

Epicurean  atom,  54  ;  tendency  to  mo- 
tion wlien  at  rest,  380;  tendency  to 
motion  is  gravity,  382. 

Epicureans,  501. 

Epicurus,  12(; ;  his  life  exemplary,  535. 

Epiphany,  361. 

Episcopius,  179. 

Equation,  method  of  solution  often 
depends  on  good  luck,  572. 

Erasmus,  5!)1. 

Errors,  arise  from  false  principles  as- 
sumed as  once  proved,  37;  arise  from 
carelessness  in  deduction,  37 ;  arise 
from  the  bias  given  by  emotion,  .37, 
38;  arise  from  little  time  left  for 
study  by  necessary  occupation,  607; 
of  people  of  leisure,  608;  of  people 
of  narrow  logical  power,  608 ;  are 
they  dependent  on  nature  of  soul  or 
lack  of  exercise  ?  608,609;  often  dae 
to  f)ower  of  example,  609;  enter- 
tained by  those  who  lack  will  to 
stndy,  609;  from  false  measures  of 
probability,  610 ;  arise  from  earliest 
education,  (ill;  arise  from  believing 
teachings  of  an  accepted  coininunion, 
611 ;  from  accepted  hypothesis,  613 ; 
from  improperly  understood  author- 
ity, 616;  the  sin  of,  607,  616;  not  so 
common  as  apparent?  ii'20. 

Essay,  concerning  Human  Understand- 
ing, by  Locke,  its  translation  into 
French,  4,  27,  65 ;  its  successive  edi- 
tions and  abstracts,  4, 26,  27 ;  its  con- 
tents, 4,  6,  70;  its  translation  into 
Latin,  37,  65;  errors  corrected  in, 
and  additions  made  to,  26,  27  ;  com- 
mended, 567. 

Essence,  its  import,  315;  'nominal' 
and  'real,'  is  tlie  terminology  cor- 
rect? .315,  .■'.16,  385;  and  delinition 
distinguished,  316 ;  and  projierty  dis- 


tinguished, 317 ;  how  perpetual,  318 ; 
into  which  opinion  enters,  ;428;  half 
nominal,  328;  is  it  confined  to  sorts 
or  does  it  enter  into  individuals?  331 ; 
real,  when  chimerical,  356;  more 
than  signs,  356 ;  words  may  be  used 
regarding,  387 ;  if  unknown  in  some 
respects,  may  be  known  in  others, 
387 ;  our  ignorance  of,  does  not  pre- 
vent their  existence,  387 :  a  real,  may 
be  assumed  by  means  of  a  reciprocal 
proposition  as  to  genus  anil  species, 
457;  of  substance,  makes  its  finali- 
ties emanate  from  its  depths,  and 
makes  itself  known  by  them,  460; 
knowledge  of,  arrived  at  by  abstrac- 
tion, 497  ;  and  existence,  498;  natu- 
ral as  applied  to  accidents,  498. 

Eternal  truths,  their  reality  in  connec- 
tion with  ideas,  516;  require  either 
created  or  Divine  mind  for  existencre, 
516 ;  the  Divine  mind  their  constant 
region,  516. 

Eternity,  how  notion  originates,  158; 
in  what  sense  a  positive  idea  of,  pos- 
sible, 164;  we  have  a  just  idea  of, 
but  no  image,  274. 

Ethics,  a  true  philosophy  stiengthens, 
()6;  though  demonstrative  has  its 
innate  princi))les,  85,  86;  its  maxims 
often  only  conveni(!iit  rules,  86;  its 
truths  not  independent,  86 ;  has  prin- 
ciples which  are  not  demonstrable, 
86;  has  principles  not  known  purely 
by  reason,  86 ;  its  maxims  sometimes 
known  by  instinct,  8(),  89;  deriva- 
tive truths  of,  87  ;  depeiuls  on  dem- 
onstrations furnished  by  natural 
light,  89;  are  not  ijcrceivcd  at  ducc, 
89;  obedience  usually  inircasoriing, 
90;  its  impulses  not  invincible,  90; 
natural  impressions  serve  in,only  a.s 
aids  to  reason,  and  indices  to  the 
plan  of  nature,  itl ;  natural  instincts 
not  beyond,  but  in  spite  of  exceptions 
tend  to  what  is  right  and  decent,  91 ; 
if  geometry  were  as  much  opixised 
to  men's  inclinations  as,  it  \voul<l  bn 
equally  contested,  9.1;  best  treiiled 
by  delinition,  392;  ami  nietapliysics, 
495;  geometry  might  be  applied  in, 
r)24;  what  it  comprises,  62L 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Eucharist,  opinions  concerning,  611 ; 
participation  in,  of  thought,  H12. 

Euclid,  14,  22,  44,  93,  108,  403,  404,  416, 
4(53,  465,  4<37,  471,  473,  491,  522,  523, 
613:  does  not  expressly  use  "the 
whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  its 
parts,"  471 ;  does  use  "  the  whole  is 
greater  than  its  parts,"  471 ;  axioms 
of,  diminished  hy  Roherval,  473;  his 
definition  of  a  straight  line  ohscure 
and  gives  rise  to  difficulties,  522 ;  his 
demonstrations,  arguments  in  form, 
559,  560. 

Euphorhus,  21,  100. 

Evangelicals,  their  opinions  on  the 
Eucharist,  611. 

Evidence,  luminous  certainty,  513. 

Evil,  what?  167,  200,  203,  260;  its  ad- 
vantages, 170.  [198. 

Evils,  present,  possible  remedies  for, 

Exami)le,  its  force,  609. 

Exclusion,  method  of,  413. 

Excommunication,  2(34. 

Existence,  our  own,  known  by  intui- 
tion, 18,  439,  498,  499;  of  God,  by 
demonstration,  18, 439, 499,  500;  idea 
of,  whence  ?  1.30,  220 ;  real,  one  of  the 
"  four  sorts  of  agreement  or  disa- 
greement," 400  ;  beyond  the  mind, 
how  determined,  419  ;  of  things 
besides  God  and  ourselves,  how 
known,  499;  earliest  apperceptions 
of,  furnish  earliest  experiences,  499 ; 
of  God,  the  Lockian,  Anselmic,  and 
Cartesian  arguments  for,  499-505 

Exoteric,  272. 

Experience,  twofold,  4 ;  not  sole  source 
of  truth,  11  ;  not  everything  in 
physics,  18;  never  assures  of  per- 
fect imiversality,  22 ;  never  assures 
of  necessity,  22  ;  determines  to 
thoughts  but  does  not  furnish  ideas, 
110 ;  its  first  truth,  501 ;  not  a  good 
thing  to  judge  by,  582. 

Experimenting,  Bacon  put  art  of,  into 
maxims,  526. 

Extended,  the,  what?  152. 

Extending  ideas,  144. 

Extension,  what?  152,  160,  163,  220  ; 
different  from  matter,  1.55 ;  not  nec- 
essary to  existence,  430.  [129. 

Extensions,  ai-e  there  two?  127,  128, 


External  causes  of  sensation,  reality 
of,  511,  512 ;  if  a  dream,  yet  suitable 
to  circumstances  and  hence  satis- 
factory, 512 ;  have  an  assurance  of, 
as  certain  as  pleasure  or  pain,  512. 

Fabri,  his  "  Summa  Theologiae,"  586 : 
his  \aew  of  movement  of  sun,  613. 

Fabritius,  or  Fabricius,  JI..  21,  102. 

Factum,  in,  the  action,  486. 

Faculty,  more  than  the  possession  of 
ability  without  using  it,  80 ;  requires 
not  merely  object  but  disposition 
towards  object  before  it  will  act,  80 : 
not  lull  explanation  of,  mind's  easy 
consent  to  certain  truths,  81 ;  naked, 
does  not  exist,  110,  143,  174,  204,  428. 

Faculties,  have  disposition  and  ten- 
dency to  action,  110;  how  they  act, 
179 ;  secondary,  more  than  relations, 
185 ;  naked,  little  goblins  as  it  were, 
431 ;  their  limits  and  sphere,  525 ; 
lessons  to  be  drawn  thence,  525. 

Fairies,  how  their  transformations 
would  be  regarded,  244,  245. 

Faith,  the  analysis  of,  555 ;  what?  580, 
583;  grounded  on  reason,  580,  582; 
and  reason,  their  distinctive  limits, 
583;  proper  matters  of ,  584 ;  requires 
internal  grace  of  Holy  Spirit,  585 : 
does  not  refuse  a  knowledge  of 
reasons,  585;  cannot  receive  what 
subverts  all  belief,  587;  implicit, 
Bellarmine  on,  621;  involves  a  rea- 
sonable docility,  621. 

False  judgment,  in  allowing  the  "  dis- 
tance" of  a  pleasure  or  pain  to 
determine  its  value,  209;  depends 
on  limited  capacity  of  mind,  210; 
by  which  the  absent  is  annihilated, 
210;  distinguished  from  bad  taste, 
210 ;  as  to  the  greatness  or  certainty 
of  consequences,  212 ;  in  hazarding 
a  greater  good  for  a  less,  213 ;  causes 
of,  214;  the  reckoning  required  to 
escape,  214,  215 ;  in  accepting  first 
pleasure  which  comes  to  hand,  216; 
to  expose  oneself  to  a  possible  dan- 
ger in  next  life,  217. 

Falsehood,  its  nature,  452. 

Family  names,  258. 

Fanatic,  33,  596. 


INDEX   A 


789 


Fear,  what  ?  172. 

Feel,  without  knowing  it,  191. 

Felicity,  what?  87;  reason  prompts 
to,  87. 

Ferrari,  Lewis,  his  equations,  572. 

Feuille  morte,  an  idea  of  the  color, 
how  conveyed  to  peasant,  391. 

Figural  arrangements,  145. 

Figure,  what?  151,  KiO;  ,s(!arcely  a 
simple  mode,  152;  does  not  pass  de 
subjecto  in  subjectum,  240 ;  knowl- 
edge of,  does  not  depend  on  "  imagi- 
nation," 273. 

Figures,  in  logic,  5fi0;  principal  one, 
407;  less  principal  ones,  407;  in- 
direct or  fourth,  407. 

Plngers,  countiug  on,  482,  562. 

Finite,  the  concept  of,  how  arrived  at, 
12. 

Finnish,  297. 

Fire,  not  known  by  Marian  Islanders, 
104 ;  its  intimate  nature  more  than 
probable,  549,  552. 

Flacius,  295. 

FUegende  Gedanken,  182. 

Florileges,  548. 

Fludd,  Robert,  his  "  Philosophia  Mo- 
saica,"  (J3. 

Fluid,  perfect,  of  Cartesian,  impossi- 
ble, 120. 

Fluidity,  in  all  bodies,  126. 

Fonteuelle,  on  ijlurality  of  worlds,  550. 

Force,  174;  as  active  power,  174. 

Form,  of  Man,  not  enough  to  consti- 
tute man,  244;  of  words,  what? 
304,  305;  arguments  in,  what?  559. 

Forms,  substantial,  term  inaptly  era- 
ployed  by  scholastics,  347,  380;  Des- 
cartes on,  348. 

"  Formalities,"  569. 

Formido  oppositi  or  scrupulousness, 
210. 

"  Forty-Seventh  "  proposition,  its  dem- 
onstration, how  dependent  on  formal 
logic,  565. 

Foueher,  Abbe,  420. 

Fractions,  their  reduction  to  lowest 
terms,  426. 

Fractive  faculty  in  grain-niill,  63. 

Frauds,  pious,  sonieliines  more  effec- 
tive than  truth  badly  managed,  198; 
to  be  avoided,  606. 


Free,  when  a  man  is,  179 ;  a  man 
awake  is  not,  as  to  thinking,  181 ; 
is,  as  to  transference  of  his  thoughts, 
181;  man  is  not,  in  certain  circum- 
stances to  certain  ideas,  181 :  and 
voluntary,  term  illustrated,  181 ;  act, 
in,  what  sense  necessary,  183;  beings 
do  not  act  indeterminately,  183. 

Freedom,  term  ambiguous,  179;  of 
right,  179;  of  fact,  179;  in  its  gen- 
eral sense,  179;  in  its  particular 
sen.se,  179;  why  a  ball  in  motion  not 
an  instance  of,  180;  properly  cannot 
belong  to  Mill,  184;  of  ecpiilibrium 
impossible,  184  ;  what  understood  by 
term,  184 ;  without  understanding,  of 
no  use,  216. 

Freedom  of  Will,  opposed  to  internal 
restraint,  179  j  opposed  to  restraint 
of  necessity,  179;  what  it  consists 
in,  180,  202;  not  placeil  in  a  perfect 
indifferencie  or  eiiuilibrium,  203, 204 ; 
does  not  throw  off  yoke  of  reason, 
206;  consistent  with  determination 
of  will,  206;  founded  in  real  happi- 
ness, 206. 

Frenicle,  M.,  393. 

Fromondus,  234. 

Future  life,  how  most  men  regard  it, 
196;  its  inrtuence  on  choice,  208; 
grounds  on  which  wicked  deem  it 
impo.ssible,  217  ;  favorabh;  conject- 
ures concerning,  217;  certitude  of, 
218;  delinition  of,  246;  its  intluence 
on  practice  of  virUie,  495,  I'.WJ. 

Galen,  407. 

Galileo,  on  great  anli(juily  of  snn, 
2.37;  his  condemnation  (tonsidcn.Ml, 
613. 

Gallic,  language,  29(!. 

Galilean  conf(!Ssion,  (;12. 

Gallows,  a  use  of,  92. 

Gassendi,  62,  i'A,  ^Wt. 

Gaudinm  and  helitin  <'oni|p;inMl,  172. 

Gender,  of  no  account  in  |iliilosii|iliical 
grammar,  365. 

Genealogical  tree,  tn  illuslral(!  rela- 
tions, 2;{6. 

General  notions,  4;!;  origin  "f,  71; 
signs  used  l>y  men  di-piivcd  of 
speech,   145;     truths  (proposiilims, 


790 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


maxims),  their  universality  not 
proved  by  examples,  43;  do  not 
come  to  us  from  the  senses,  70 ;  we 
lind  them,  do  not  form  them,  70, 
3l2o ;  the  senses  give  us  occasion  to 
perceive  tlieni,  70;  recognized  as 
soon  as  heard,  73 ;  employed ,  though 
not  distinctly,  in  thought,  73;  as 
little  in  thought  in  reasoning  as 
muscles  in  thought  in  walking,  74 ; 
not  easily  represented  distinctly,  74 ; 
why  not,  though  innate,  most  vivid 
in  minds  of  children,  idiots,  and 
savages '?  85 ;  their  usefulness,  307  ; 
how  their  truths  may  be  deter- 
mined, 454;  can  they  be  applied  to 
substances?  454-456. 

Generality,  its  reality  discussed,  313. 

Genii,  always  joined  to  body,  52,  334; 
their  powers  of  perception,  228 ; 
their  alleged  employment  in  future 
ages,  551 ;  are  they  animals  more 
perfect  than  we  ?  574 ;  there  is  much 
they  do  not  know,  574 ;  are  in  infi- 
nite gradation,  575. 

Genus,  physical  and  logical  distin- 
guished, 58;  logical  may  exist  be- 
tween heterogeueous  things,  58 ; 
its  genealogy,  59;  definition  of,  in 
what  case  not  provisional  but  per- 
fected, 45tJ,  457. 

Genus,  and  species,  how  tliey  origi- 
nate, 310 ;  classification  into,  too 
little  esteemed,  311 ;  and  difference, 
interchangeable,  313. 

Geometry,  employs  pure  reason,  22; 
declines  experience,  22 ;  its  proposi- 
tions innate,  76 ;  in  us  virtually,  78 ; 
can  be  prosecuted  apart  from  sight 
or  touch,  78;  mind  awakened  to  by 
touch,  78 ;  its  demonstrations  would 
be  disputed  if,  like  ethics,  it  op- 
posed our  passions,  93 ;  no  exact  cat- 
alogue of  its  axioms,  95 ;  can  be 
learned  by  blind  and  paralytic,  139 ; 
built  on  general  axioms,  473;  of 
Greeks,  523;  of  Egyptians,  523;  of 
Chinese,  523  :  if  follow  senses  in,  fall 
into  error,  523 ;  asymptotes  in,  52.3 ; 
permits  us  a  glimpse  of  eternal  truth, 
523;  ancient,  the  system  described, 
524. 


Gei'hardt,  his  introduction  to  the 
Nouveaux  Essuis,  3-12;  his  esti- 
mate of  Leibnitz's  Meditationes  de 
Cogitatione,  Veritate  et  Ideis,  3. 

Gerontophony,  222 ;  name  of,  if  be- 
stowed, would  not  give  a  new  idea, 
222. 

Gesner,  his  Pandects,  620. 

Gideon,  37. 

Gobien,  Father,  104. 

God,  apparent  absence  of  idea  of, 
means  only  absence  of  occasion  to 
awaken  it,  21 ;  inclination  to  idea 
of,  from  nature  of  soul,  72 ;  penetra- 
tion of  space  possible  to,  83;  his 
existence  binds  us  to  observance  of 
most  moral  precepts,  94 ;  idea  of, 
innate,  94,  234,  493,  499;  are  there 
nations  which  have  no  idea  of? 
Fabricius's  denial,  102,  103;  Locke 
quoted  on  idea  of,  103,  104 ;  Locke, 
in  his  descrij)tion  of  the  idea  of, 
approaches  innate  truths,  104 ;  is 
actus  pvrus,  113;  the  ground  of 
eternal  truths,  153;  the  place  of 
things,  153;  not  extended,  159;  im- 
mensity of,  159:  by  his  essence, 
source  of  possibilities,  1.59;  by  his 
will,  source  of  actualities,  159;  the 
principle  of  beings,  KiS:  chooses 
freely,  yet  is  determined  in  choice, 
183 ;  continually  produces,  230 ;  fills 
the  universe,  230;  iu  social  connec- 
tion with  us,  247 ;  and  created  spirits, 
difference  between,  332;  exti'a-  ve.l 
supra-nnindana  intelligentia,  382; 
the  supreme  substance,  430;  his  pure 
and  universal  act  essential  to  all 
changes  in  matter,  430 ;  his  existence 
demonstrable,  469,  499,  500;  wit- 
ness to  his  existence,  in  our  con- 
stitution, 499;  impressions  on  the 
soul  which  indicate,  499 ;  evidence  of 
his  existence,  according  to  Locke, 
equals  mathematical  demonst  ra- 
tions, 499 ;  e\adence  of  existence  of, 
arises  from  reflection  on  ourselves 
and  our  own  indubitable  existence, 
500. 

God,  existence  of,  Anselmic  argument 
for,  misunderstood  by  scholastii'S, 
502-504 ;  imperfect  but  not  a  paralo- 


INDEX  A 


791 


gism,  504;  morally  demonstrable, 
504;  Descartes'  argument  for,  from 
"  idea  of  Him  in  the  soul,"  504,  505 ; 
his  argument  for,  involves  an  un- 
proved assumption  :  that  we  have  the 
"  idea,"  and  that  it  comes  from  the 
original,  505 ;  proved  by  Pre-estab- 
lislied  Harmony,  505 ;  nearly  all  ar- 
guments to  prove,  good,  but  must  be 
perfected,  505. 

God,  as  Thinking  Being,  cannot  be 
material,  since  infinite  and  eternal, 
'508;  absurd  if  all  matter  thinks, 
508 ;  absurd  if  pavt  of  matter  thinks, 
508 ;  cannot  be  a  mass  of  unthinking 
matter,  50i) ;  cannot  be  matter  in 
motion,  509;  cannot  be  matter  at 
rest,  509;  possible  to  attain  a  con- 
ception of  how,  made  matter,  509 ; 
how  he  gives  existence  to  spirit  is 
more  difficult  to  understand,  509; 
his  existence  only  has  a  necessary 
connection  with  ours,  511. 

Godwin,  Franc,  on  the  moon,  551. 

Gold,  result  of  its  artificial  production 
if  possible,  340;  if  a  body  had  all  the 
qualities  of,  without  malleal)ility, 
what  then  ?  357 ;  on  the  determina- 
tion of  its  inner  constitution,  393. 

"Gold,  all,  is  fixed"  is  an  identical 
proposition,  340;  is  it  intelligible? 
340 ;  not  known  by  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement of  ideas,  4(J0;  can  we  cer- 
tainly know  this  for  a  truth,  and 
why  ?    4G0,  461. 

Golden  Rule,  88. 

Golius,  his  theory  on  Chinese  language, 
287. 

Gonzales,  traveller  to  the  moon,  .'542. 

Goropize,  what?  303. 

Goropius,  Becanus,  his  ridiculous  ety- 
mologies, 303;  claims  tliat  German 
can  contest  honor  of  being  primitive 
language  with  Hebrew,  303. 

Good,  what,  107,  200,  202;  its  division, 
l(i7  ;  when  is  one  in  possession  of  a, 
172 ;  how  it  may  become  an  evil, 
202;  how  to  be  utilized,  207;  moral, 
2(10;  moral,  not  an  arbitrary  institu- 
tion, 2()1 ;  moral,  conformrid  to  nature 
or  reason,  201;  moral,  fonndcd  in 
(foil's  rule  <^f  reason,  201 ;  moral,  not 


dependent  on  legislation,  201 ;  phys- 
ical, what?  201. 

Goodwill,  men  of,  G08. 

Goose,  Mother,  the  transformation  in, 
245. 

Government,  its  claim  on  the  absolute 
freedom  of  its  citizens,  433. 

Grace,  defined,  377. 

Gradations  in  nature,  549. 

Gratitude,  an  act  of  justice,  497; 
foundation  of  Actio  inyrali,  497. 

Gravitation,  59. 

Greaves,  his  theory  as  to  the  pyramids 
of  Egypt,  150. 

Greeks,  as  geometers,  22 ;  their  admi- 
rable style  in  mathematical  compo- 
sition, 410. 

Green,  its  definition  and  analysis,  120, 
320,  458. 

Gretser,  his  "Analysis  of  Faith,"  ()18; 
believes  that  a  new  article  of  faith 
may  be  made  tlirough  continuous 
presence  of  the  Spirit,  018. 

Grimaldi,  394. 

Grotius,  Hugo,  494,  542. 

"  Ground,  the,  is  everywhere  the 
same,"  a  fundamental  principle, 
575. 

Guericke,  127,  153. 

Guerre,  the  pcrsonator,  310. 

Guilt  connected  with  inability,  TM. 

Habit,  what  ?  223. 

Habitus  intellectnales,oa  these  depend 
the  sects  in  philosophy,  30;  formed 
through  Association  of  Ideas,  30,  .31. 

Hans  Kalb,  and  liis  repiitiul  calfs 
head,  352. 

Happiness,  ncner  consists  in  cninph'tc 
po.ssession,  194;  and  joy,  195;  is  op- 
posite extreme  to  misery,  200;  is  llir 
utmost  pleasure  of  which  we  are 
capal)le,  200;  its  lowest  .legrce,  2tKl; 
is  lasting  pleasure,  20(1,  207;  in- 
volves progression,  200,  201 ;  un- 
equal in  different  persons,  2(M),  201  ; 
a  "road  through  pleasures,"  200; 
reason  will  carry  to,  200;  shortest 
way  to,  may  not  be  best,  201  ;  search 
after,  man's  perfection,  2(Mi;  <lis- 
tinetionhelweeii  real  and  imaginary, 
20(1 :  rc(|iiires  not  soniueli  knowledge 


792 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


as  good  will,  215;  within  reach  of 
idiot,  21U. 

Hardness,  what?  125;  conceived  by 
reason,  126 ;  terms  preferred  to  that 
of,  12G. 

Hardy,  Leibnitz's  discussion  with, 
4(35 :  believed  the  demonstration  of 
Serenus  paralogistic,  4(15  ;  com- 
mended by  Descartes,  46(i. 

Harlequin's  stripping,  an  illustration 
from,  362  ;  in  moon,  551. 

Harmony,  Pre-established,  11,  66,  334, 
430,  553. 

Hatred,  what?  167,  173. 

Health,  its  neglect  commented  on,  610. 

Heap  of  thirty-six  stones,  illustration 
from,  269. 

Heat,  relative  to  suitable  organs,  133, 
134 ;  why  sensation  of,  varies,  134 ; 
wrongly  said  not  to  be  in  son,  134, 
135. 

Heathen,  salvation  of,  594,  .595;  ac- 
cording to  Romish  doctors,  594. 

Hebrew  particle,  a,  has  fifty  significa- 
tions, 365. 

Heliogabalus,  if  his  soul  is  in  the  hog, 
what  is  the  hog?  241. 

Hell  fire  burns  up  souls  ?  428,  429. 

Helraont,  Van,  67. 

Helmstadt,  581. 

Herbert,  Lf)rd,  his  catalogue  of  innate 
principles,  95. 

Hercules,  as  the  figure  of,  in  rude  mar- 
ble outlined  by  veins,  so  idea  in 
mind,  3,  46  ;  known  by  gait,  357. 

Herlinus,  editor  of  Euclid,  404. 

Herodotus,  his  one-eyed  nation,  389; 
disagrees  with  Ctesias,  545 ;  accords 
with  Old  Testament,  547. 

Herostratus,  a  hero  with  some,  536. 

Hijipocrates,  the  physician,  48,  476; 
the  geometer,  527. 

Historica,  Defide,  of  jurisconsults,  545. 

Historical  doubts,  545. 

History,  satire  in,  542;  romance. to  be 
expelled  from,  542  ;  details  in,  un- 
certain, 543;  battles  of,  imperfectly 
described,  543 ;  writers  of,  posterior 
to  events  they  describe,  worthy  of 
attention,  544;  its  value,  544,  545; 
the  private,  of  a  people,  when  of 
much   value,   545 ;    the   fabulous   in 


history,  .546 :  when  stories  of  differ- 
ent and  far-separated  people  agree, 
it  is  a  sign  of  truth  in  them,  546 ; 
value  of  medals,  inscriptions,  etc., 
in,  547;  of  China  much  to  be  de- 
sired, 547  ;  princii)al  uses  of,  547  ;  of 
clothing,  valuable,  547;  as  a  diver- 
sion, allowable,  548;  ought  to  be 
instructive,  548. 

Hobbes,  450 ;  writes  against  mathema- 
ticians, 93 ;  afraid  of  ghosts,  283. 

Hofmanu,  Daniel,  581. 

Holdeu,  Henry,  his  "Analysis  of 
Faith,"  617. 

Homicide,  .385 ;  as  murder,  385 ;  as 
manslaughter, '  385 ;  chance-medley, 
385. 

Honor,  as  a  principle  of  action,  536. 

Honorius  and  his  hen,  610. 

Hooker,  "  the  judicious,"  566,  567, 570. 

Hope,  what?  172. 

Horace,  328,  335,  566. 

Horodeictic  faculty  in  watches,  63. 

Horses,  Welsh  and  Flemish,  2.37 ;  with 
genealogical  trees,  259. 

Horseshoe,  iron,  when  converted  by  a 
certain  spring  into  copper,  changes 
as  individual,  240. 

Hottentots,  name  for  Holy  Spirit 
among,  103,  290. 

"Houses,  dwellers  in  small,"  we  can- 
not expect  much  search  after  truth 
among,  608,  609. 

"Hundred  Horses,"  an  illustration, 
617. 

Hunger,  as  an  illustration  of  mental 
perception,  119. 

Huygens,  150  ;  gives  up  '  vacuum,'  16 ; 
on  logic  in  mathematics,  18;  on 
planetary  men,  343;  "  De  Alea," 
539;  his  "  Cosmotheoros,"  550;  his 
view  regarding  other  planets,  550; 
his  use  of  analogy,  550. 

Hyhrida  conclusio,  84. 

Hybrids,  do  they  multiply?  ;?45. 

Hyiiothesis,  how  proved.  520,  521 ; 
must  be  combined  with  experimen- 
tation, 526;  may  lead  to  new  dis- 
coveries, 526 ;  is  a  help  to  memory, 
526;  must  not  be  hastily  framed, 
526;  greatly  shortens  the  roail  to 
discovery,  526;  physical,  cannot  be 


INDEX  A 


r93 


demonstrated,  5f55;   zeal  for,  what? 
613;    variable,  (ilo;    source  of  love 
for,  614. 
Hysteron  proteron  {le    rebours),  not 
arguing  in  a  circle,  409. 

"  I  and  He  "  without  parts,  247. 

"  I  exist  "  carries  with  it  highest  evi- 
dence, 469. 

"I  think,  therefore  I  am,"  not  an 
axiom,  4()i) ;  a  truth  of  fact,  469 ; 
does  not  prove  existence  by  thought, 
469. 

"I"  and  "existence"  oidy  God  un- 
derstands how  they  are  united, 
469. 

Icarus,  442. 

Ice  and  the  King  of  Siam,  530. 

Idese  adiequatm,  what?  17,  278;  p?'o- 
priie,  3 ;  what  ?  3 ;  necessity  of  hav- 
ing, 3;  how  in  mind,  3. 

Idea  and  image,  confounded  by  Locke, 
273;  in  a  chiliagon,  former  possilde 
but  not  latter,  273  ;  how  they  differ, 
274. 

Ideal  world,  326. 

Ideas,  association  of,  281 ;  instances 
of,  282,  283. 

Ideas,  when  true  and  real,  14;  the 
origin  of,  not  i^reliminary  in  philoso- 
pliy,  15  ;  come  from  within  the  soul, 
15;  when  doubtful,  15;  when  chi- 
merical, 15  ;  their  possibility  proved 
a  priori,  15 ;  their  iwssibility  proved 
a  posteriori,  15  ;  primitive  or  deriva- 
tive, 21;  in  what  sense  both  sorts  in 
us,  21;  defined,  21,  109;  in  what 
sense  can  subsist  unijerceived,  21 ; 
innate,  what?  22;  and  truths,  how 
related,  22  ;  Locke's  two  sources  for, 
23;  implanted,  of  Plato,  38;  if  they 
come  from  without,  then  we  should 
be  outside  ourselves,  76;  pure,  op- 
posed to  '  phantoms  '  of  sense,  78 ; 
which  do  not  come  from  sense,  ad- 
mitted by  Locke,  82 ;  of  s(;nse  con- 
fused, as  also  the  truths  founded  on 
them,  82 ;  of  intellect  are  distinct,  as 
are  also  the  truths  founded  on  them, 
82;  difiiculties  in,  depend  on  amount 
of  attention  required,  82;  in  mind 
as  habitudes,  aptitudes,  dispositions. 


105;  distinct,  represent  God,  109; 
confused,  the  universe,  109:  imme- 
diate, internal  objects  of  thought, 
109;  not  forms  of  thought,  109; 
their  perception,  not  themselves, 
come  through  sensation  and  experi- 
ence, 111;  pure  and  distinct,  inde- 
pendent of  the  senses,  119;  distin- 
guished from  thoughts,  119;  whidi 
come  to  us  by  one  sense  only,  121, 
122;  supposed  to  come  to  us  by  dif- 
ferent senses  enumerated,  129;  sup- 
po.sed  to  come  by  sensation  and 
reflection  enumerated,  130;  their 
simplicity  disputed,  130 ;  their  cause : 
are  they  arbitrary,  or  have  they  an 
expressive  resemblance?  1.33;  and 
the  secondary  qualities  which  i>ro- 
duce  them,  their  relations  discusseil, 
133;  resemble  both  primary  and 
secondary  qualities,  133;  re.seml)le 
motions  which  cause  them,  i;'.4  ;  from 
sensations  often  unconsciously  al- 
tered by  mental  judgment,  l.">6;  are 
modes  of  thought,  143;  internal  ob- 
jects, 143;  do  not  cease  when  not 
matters  of  consciousness,  143;  and 
'bodily  movements'  'correspond,' 
181;  and  'movements,'  there  is  an 
order  and  connection  in,  ISI ;  or 
notions,  three  degrees  of,  217 ;  ob- 
jects of,  proposed  classification  of, 
221;  simple,  those  most  modified, 
223 ;  collective,  of  substances,  'SM ; 
often  applied  by  Locke  to  the  objec- 
tive realities  which  the  ideas  rejire- 
sent,  2.37;  clearness  and  oliscurity 
of,  265;  wlien  distinct,  266,  267; 
when  confused,  267;  confusion  in, 
when  blamable,  267;  confusiim  of, 
sometimes  lies  in  tlie  composition, 
269 ;  sometimes  in  the  bad  use  of 
names,  269;  sometimes  in  defiuMivt^ 
analysis,  269;  avoided  lo  some  ex- 
tent l)y  precision  in  names,  271  ; 
real,  275;  fantastical,  275;  not 
nei'essarily  conformed  to  tiicir  fmiii- 
datioiis  in  nature,  275;  tlic  erro- 
neous o|)inioii  ri!gardiiig,  that  (Jud 
has  arbitrarily  assi;ined  them  to 
mark  <iualities,  276;  assoeialion  <if, 
281  ;    privative,    why    sliould    lliere 


(94 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


not  be?  289;  natural  order  of,  289; 
same  for  all  inlellij^ciices,  289;  sub- 
stances and  modes  represented  by, 
30(>;  of  substances  and  sensible 
qualities  more  fixed,  3(Ki ;  refiective, 
enter  into  those  of  things,  306 ; 
how  they  become  general,  307 ;  ab- 
stract, may  be  attributed  to  one 
another,  313, 497  ;  simple,  and  of  sub- 
stance, their  reality  not  necessary, 
318 ;  God  has,  and  can  communicate 
them  before  creating  their  objects, 
318 ;  cannot  demonstrate  that  ob- 
jects of,  are  without  us,  319 ;  simple, 
can  have  real  definition,  320;  express 
only  possibilities,  325;  are  they  arbi- 
trary? 325;  are  in  God  eternally, 
325;  are  in  us  before  thought,  325; 
not  to  be  taken  as  actual  thoughts 
of  men,  325, 326 ;  influence  of  names 
on,  328;  physical,  what  regulates 
their  combination,  353,  354 ;  generic, 
do  not  follow  models  set  in  nature, 
355  ;  agreement  or  disagreement  of, 
four  kinds  according  to  Locke, 
400;  that  of  identity  or  diversity, 
400;  that  of  relation,  400;  that  of 
coexistence,  400 ;  that  of  real  ex- 
istence, 400;  Locke's  four  kinds 
reduced  to  two,  401 :  that  of  com- 
parison, 400,  401 ;  that  of  concur- 
rence, 401 ;  concurrence  includes 
coexistence  and  existence,  401 ;  want 
of,  439;  of  substances  have  neces- 
sary conformity  to  eternal  arche- 
type, 446 ;  what  meant  when  said  to 
be  true  or  false  ?  452:  general,  may 
be  broken  up  ecthetically  into  par- 
ticular propositions,  464,  465  ;  super- 
fluous expressions  of,  483 ;  we  may 
not  have  real,  yet  know  what  we 
are  saying,  505 ;  may  be  in  us  not 
consciously,  but  availably,  505;  do 
not  prove  existence,  511 ;  distinct, 
our  knowledge  of,  defective,  570; 
their  multitude  perplexing,  570:  not 
enougli  for  reasoning,  570  ;  confused, 
many  lacking  to  men,  570;  are 
'  images '  or  '  impressions,'  570 ;  give 
rise  to  instincts,  570. 
Ideas,  complex,  of  three  kinds,  5 ; 
when    clear,    266;    their    obscurity 


rests  on  more  than  names,  268 : 
may  rest  on  presence  in  them  of 
ideas  too  few  or  too  confused,  268 ; 
may  be  clear  and  yet  obscure,  272 ; 
something  volitional  in  formation  of, 
276 ;  how  to  avoid  mistakes  in  form- 
ing, 276;  of  substance,  when  real, 
277;  of  substance,  when  fantastical, 
277  ;  are  not  entirely  without  arche- 
type, 280;  the  combination  of,  not 
w^holly  voluntary,  280;  of  a  triangle 
give  a  iierfect  idea,  280 ;  which  enter 
into  courage,  280 ;  can  they  be  com- 
posed of  different  simple  ideas  in 
different  minds,  313;  can  they  be 
regarded  as  arbitrary  in  formation, 
325,  326 ;  are  they  made  by  mind  or 
have  they  archetypes  in  eternal  pos- 
sibility of  things,  446. 

Ideas,  derivative,  21  ;  are  formed. 
21. 

Ideas,  innate,  what?  4,  21 ;  denied  by 
Locke,  4;  at  foundation  of  meta- 
physics and  ethics,  11 ;  the  propo- 
sitions of  arithmetic  and  geometry 
are,  76. 

Ideas,  primitive,  what?  15;  distin- 
guished, 21;  their  reduction,  220; 
some  susceptible  of  further  reduc- 
tion, 220;  how  they  may  be  ar- 
ranged, 220. 

Ideas,  real :  not  necessarily  conformed 
to  their  foundations  in  nature,  275; 
when  possible,  275;  simple  ideas 
are,  275 ;  when  complete,  278 ;  when 
incomplete,  278;  simple  complete, 
278 ;  adequate  and  inadequate,  278, 
279;  Imperfect,  give  rise  to  many 
and  at  present  independent  defini- 
tions, 279 ;  of  geometry,  give  per- 
fect ideas,  279. 

Ideas,  simple,  4;  rudiments  of  knowl- 
edge, 119;  which  come  to  us  by 
one  sense,  121 ;  which  come  to  us  by 
different  senses,  129 ;  those  most 
modified,  223;  when  clear,  265,  266: 
all  real,  275 ;  mind  passive  in  reganl 
to,  276;  mind  active  in  separating 
them  for  consideration,  27(i;  simjtk- 
only  as  regards  us,  .322;  have  littli' 
subordination  in  line  of  predicatioii 
because  of  our  ignorance,  323;  only 


INDEX    A 


r95 


in  appearaiK^e,  323 ;  our  uncertaiuty 
as  to  tlieir  incompatibility,  446. 

Identical,  propositions,  not  to  be 
despised,  18;  maxim,  the  general, 
83;  propositions  employed  in  logic, 
40(i ;  affirmations,  their  use  exhib- 
ited in  logical  conversion,  409. 

Identily,  axiom  of,  a  fir.st  principle,  13, 
100;  did  it  persist  under  the  forms 
of  Euphorbus,  the  cock  and  Pythag- 
oras, in  which  forms  the  soul  of 
Pythagoras  had  been?  21,  100;  not 
dependent  on  memory,  114;  depends 
on  fact  that  future  in  each  substance 
is  united  to  past,  115  ;  or  Diversity, 
Vk'hat  is  it  ?  238;  Locke's  definition 
of,  240;  organization  by  itself  not 
enough  for,  240;  configuration  by 
itself  not  enough  for,  240;  the 
monad  essential  to,  240;  not  in 
bodies,  240  ;  but  in  substance,  241 ; 
in  plants  and  animals  it  is  depend- 
eut  on  souls  241 ;  depends  on  soul  or 
spirit  which  constitutes  the  Ego  in 
thinking  beings,  241,  242;  depends 
on  vital  union  of  body  with  soul, 
241;  not  on  fluent  body,  242;  not 
upon  certain  atoms,  242 ;  maintained 
only  by  conservation  of  same  soul, 
242 ;  is  it  affected  by  luetemixsychosis 
of  Pythagoras?  243;  depends  on 
memory,  243 ;  physical  and  real, 
243,  24fj;  moral  and  personal,  243, 
245 ;  founded  on  consciousness,  245  ; 
something  more  than  a  mere  pres- 
ervation of,  needful  to  be  called 
"  man,"  245  ;  apparent,  to  be  distin- 
guished from  real,  240;  moral,  con- 
stitutes a  person  ca]iable  of  rewards 
or  punishments,  240;  apparent  im- 
plies real,  246;  does  not  depend  on 
unbroken  memories,  240,  247 ;  pre- 
served by  a  nnddle  bond  of  con- 
sciousness, 246;  personal,  proved 
with  utmost  certainty  1)y  present 
reflection,  247;  i)ersonal,  proved  for 
ordinary  purposes  l)y  memory  dur- 
ing interval,  or  t{;stinu>ny  of  otlun's, 
247;  personal,  absolutely  dependent 
on  real  identity,  247 ;  personal,  not 
solely  dependent  on  consciousness, 
247 ;  personal,  rests  on  phenomenon 


of  self,  247;  physical,  rests  on  self, 
247 ;  can  a  breach  of,  occur  in  con- 
sciousness of  same  immaterial  sub- 
stance? 248;  real,  depends  on  bond 
of  perceptions,  250;  moral,  depends 
on  Ijond  of  apperceptituis,  250. 

Idiots,  their  defects,  140;  compared 
witli  madmen,  146;  compared  with 
stujiid  persons,  146  ;  imaginative 
and  well  read,  arrogate  inspiration, 
599. 

Idol,  the,  of  the  day,  always  the  great- 
est saint  of  paradise,  211. 

Ignorance,  falsely  praised  by  some, 
85;  not  always  affected,  214;  a 
cause  of  false  judgment,  214;  a 
knowledge  of,  desirable,  439;  its 
three  principal  causes,  439 ;  a  first 
cause  of,  want  of  ideas,  439;  a  sec- 
ond cause  of,  inability  to  discover 
connection  between  ideas,  439 ;  a 
third  cause  of,  we  do  not  follow  the 
ideas  wo  have,  441 ;  a  despair  of  dis- 
tinct explanation  favors  continuance 
of,  442;  bad  use  of  terms  has  lielped 
to  maintain,  443;  how  a  sin,  615. 

Ilargus,  its  derivation,  302. 

Illustrations,  value  of,  394. 

Image,  and  idea,  iiow  they  differ,  274  ; 
clear,  may  consist  with  a  confused 
idea,  274. 

Images,  Avhat?  182;  come  to  us,  182; 
not  controllable,  182;  distinguished 
from  exact  ideas,  182;  nuiy  arrest 
182. 

Imagination,  144,  145;  not  need! id  to 
number  or  figure,  273. 

liiuu/inea  majoriim,  259. 

Imlieciles,  why  regarded  as  nuui,  .'542. 

Immediate  truths,  what?  49!). 

Immortality,  not  a  miraculous  grace 
from  God,  53;  of  human  soul  ilis- 
tiiignished  from  incessability  of  ani- 
mal sold,  245;  of  hiuiiaii  sold,  245, 
246. 

Impact  of  bodies,  nf  tlie  motion  aris- 
ing from,  175,  17li. 

Impenel  rability  of  bodies,  83 ;  perfect, 
125,  127. 

Impercepti))le  bodies,  112. 

Imiietiuisily  I'f  Itodies,  123. 

Impudence,  223. 


700 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Impulsions  between  parts  of  matter, 
dilTeriiig  views  of,  54,  55. 

Inability  in  some  cases  consistent  with 
guilt,  5()4. 

Tiiuttentiun,  a  cause  of  false  judgment, 
21i. 

Incessability  of  animal  soul,  245,  246. 

Inclination,  how  it  passes  into  a  prac- 
tical truth,  87. 

Inclinations  or  propensious,  how 
formed,  201;  various  kinds,  201; 
originate  in  soul,  202 ;  beginning  of 
desire,  202  ;  combated  by  contrary 
inclinations,  203;  com])ated  by  oc- 
cupations of  another  nature,  203. 

"  Incorporeal  things,"  329. 

Index,  an,  in  geometry,  t)25;  its  plan, 
025 ;  its  use,  625 ;  to  science  as  a 
whole,  625 ;  to  science  as  a  whole 
might  be  systematic,  625 ;  to  science 
as  a  whole  might  be  alphabetic,  625. 

Indian,  pbilosoiAer,  his  theory  of  how 
the  earth  is  supported,  226,  227. 

Indices,  ml  torturam,  539;  ad  teiTen- 
diim,  539;  ad  capturam,  539;  ad 
inquirendum,  539. 

Indiilerence  of  will  not  essential  to 
freedom  of  will,  203,  204 ;  not  possi- 
ble, 171.  204;  whence  notion  of,  205  ; 
an  absolute,  an  imperfection,  204, 
205 :  the  alleged,  only  apparent,  205  ; 
dependent  on  a  small  prevalence, 
205 :  is  really  only  a  capability  of 
being  determined  by  least  sensible 
suljjects,  205. 

Individual,  precise  idea  of.  difficult  to 
discern,  310;  absence  of  precise  idea 
of,  shown  in  deception  by  persona- 
tion, 310;  mathematical,  335,  336; 
physical,  336. 

Individuals,  knowledge  of,  impossible, 
309;  something  essential  to,  331 ;  of 
one  species  never  alike,  332. 

Individual  (proper)  names;  usually 
given  to  ideas  of  substances,  .301 : 
given  occasionallv  to  an  accident, 
361. 

Individuality,  includes  inlinity,  309. 

Individuation,  principle  of,  239. 

Inertia,  123. 

Infants,  why  regarded  as  men.  314. 
342,  350,  448;  damnation  of,  held  by 


Augustine,  rejected  by  the  Scholas- 
tics, 594. 

Infer,  to,  illustrated,  557. 

Inference,  5.55. 

Infinite,  the,  according  to  Locke,  12 ; 
according  to  Leibnitz,  12;  as  posi- 
tive, 17;  as  composite,  denied,  17; 
not  applicable  to  a  whole,  1.54,  162, 
163,  164;  is  it  a  mode  or  quantity? 
161 ;  the  number  of  things  is,  161 ; 
a  number  never  is,  161,  163;  syn- 
categorematic,  what  ?  161  ;  exists 
only  in  the  absolute,  162 ;  idea  of, 
how  applied  to  God,  162;  not  neces- 
sarily suggested  by  magnitude,  162 ; 
not  a  modification,  162 ;  arises  from 
consideration  of  similarity  or  the 
same  ratio,  162 ;  completion  of  idea 
of,  comes  from  oui\selves,  163  ; 
source  of  notion,  163,  164;  in  in- 
tention, 163;  in  extension,  163;  can 
only  be  thought  into  original  quali- 
ties, 163;  space,  no  idea  of,  163; 
duration,  in  what  sense  a  positive 
idea  of,  possible,  164;  divisibility, 
gives  no  image,  but  an  idea,  234,  275. 

Infinites,  our  relation  to,  51. 

Infinitesimal,  i^arts  used  only  by  ge- 
ometers 163  ;  analysis  (calculus) 
unites  geometry  with  physics,  440; 
discovered  by  Leibnitz,  573  ;  relieves 
imagination,  574;  is  superior  to  ge- 
ometry of  Descartes,  574. 

Inhesion,  62. 

"Injustice,  there  is  none  where  there 
is  no  property,"  discussed,  433. 

Innate  ideas,  truths,  principles,  max- 
ims, not  to  be  used  as  a  cloak  for 
idleness,  13,  72,  99;  perceived  less 
easily  than  acquired  or  recollected, 
20 :  difficulty  in  their  perceptions 
does  not  prove  their  non-existence, 
20:  occasions  cause  them  to  be  seen, 
do  not  bring  them  into  being,  20; 
defined,  21.  22,  74;  not  proved  en- 
tirely by  universal  consent.  23,  71 ; 
not  proved  by  approval  on  presenta- 
tion, 23;  sensations  reminders  of, 
38 :  proof  of,  on  internal  grounds. 
38;  Locke  repudiates,  ."S :  none,  65: 
not  needed,  70:  why  Locke  opposed 
them,  71 ;   often  prejudices,  71 ;  not 


INDEX   A 


797 


alone  tliose  confusedly  known  by 
inslinct.,  74  ;  truths  are,  yet  we  learn 
them,  75;  often  suppressed  as  pre- 
mise in  euthymeme,  77  ;  external 
"  doctrine  "  stirs  them  up,  77 ;  a  con- 
sent among  men  sufficiently  general 
an  "  indication,"  not  a  demonstra- 
tion of,  77 ;  their  certitude  comes 
from  what  is  in  us,  77  ;  are  employed 
without  express  consideration,  77  ;  if 
not  known,  do  not  cease  to  bo  innate, 
77  ;  recognized  as  soon  as  heard,  77  ; 
at  bottom  known  by  all,  77  ;  senses 
not  sufficient  to  show  their  necessity, 
81 ;  give  the  occasion  and  attention 
required  for  their  discovery,  81  ; 
contain  some  of  which  we  have  not 
thought  and  some  of  which  we  will 
never  think,  81;  appear  through 
attention,  85 ;  some,  are  not  part  of 
natural  light,  8G;  derivative  truths 
are,  88;  formed  by  insight  and  in- 
stinct, 88. 

Innate,  practical  principles,  how  ad- 
mitted by  Locke,  87  ;  principles  and 
innate  truths  distinguished,  88  ;  prin- 
ciples, some  moral  rules  are  not,  and 
yet  are  innate  truths,  88 ;  compre- 
hend instinct,  and  natural  light,  8S, 
92 ;  distinguished  from  natural  light 
as  genus  from  species,  92 ;  that  men 
violate  the  limits  of  justice  no  proof 
that  they  are  not,  92,  93 ;  truth,  not 
known  always  and  by  all,  93 ;  viola- 
tions of  moral  law,  do  not  disprove 
that  it  is,  93;  ideas,  are  not  at  first 
known  clearly  and  distinctly  as  such, 
94;  require  attention  and  method, 
94;  all  not  indubitably  evident  at 
first,  94;  can  be  asserted  only  of 
necessary  truths  and  instincts,  95 : 
influence  of  education  on,  98;  may 
be  obscured  but  not  effaced,  98. 

Innate  truths,  in  what  sense  difficult 
and  profound  sciences  are,  76;  dis- 
tinguish us  from  beasts,  77 ;  can 
both  be  known  and  also  found  by 
mind,  80;  principles  and  innate 
truths  distinguished,  88;  idea  of 
God  among,  94;  idea  of  future  life 
among,  94;  doctrine  of,  may  lead  to 
assumption  of  infallibility,  96;  uni- 


versal consent  to,  not  principal  but 
confirmatory  proof,  96 ;  can  tlu'y  be 
effaced  by  education  or  custom  ?  98 ; 
why  not  more  lustrous  in  children 
and  illiterates  than  in  adults  and 
literati?  98;  may  be  obscured  but 
not  effaced,  98;  not  creatures  of 
prejudice,  98;  reduce  to  first  prin- 
ciples, 99 ;  "  it  is  impossible  for  a 
thing  to  be  and  not  to  be;  "  is  this 
among?  100;  'impossibility'  and 
'identity'  among,  100;  'being,' 
'possibility,  and  'identity'  among, 
100;  '  whole  is  gi-eater  than  its  part,' 
Locke  denies  its  place  among,  102; 
'  God  shoidd  be  worshipped  '  among, 
102;  idea  of  virtue  among,  104;  are 
they  in  mind  as  memories?  105  ; 
defined,  105;  may  lead  to  laziness, 
107 ;  unravelled  by  discernment,  143. 

Innocent,  262. 

Innocents,  448. 

Innovation,  must  guard  against  ambi- 
tion to  make,  99. 

Insensibllia  corpora,  3;  ingredientia 
perceptionwn  confmaruut,  3. 

Insensible  perception,  basis  of  relation 
between  sensible  qualities,  50. 

Instant,  deiined,  155. 

Instinct,  in  ethics,  86;  not  always 
practical,  87;  its  principles  become 
conclusions  of  natural  light,  88 ; 
its  principles  proved  by  reason,  H8; 
(le  naturcl)  inclines  custom  to  good 
side,  90;  establishes  tradition  of  ex- 
istence of  God,  90;  gives  alTectionate 
feeling  between  members  of  si)ecies, 
90,  91 ;  what?  391 ;  oven  in  man,  .391. 

Instincts,  sometimes  hard  to  distin- 
guish from  customs,  96;  their  rea- 
son unknown,  99;  reasons  of,  to  bo 
sought,  107. 

Intellection,  what?  178. 

"  Intellectual  System  of  Universe,"  65. 

Intention,  16.3. 

Intentional  species,  55,  .381. 

Intei-jection,  says  all  in  a  wcu'd,  .368. 

Intuit  ion,  a  certain  knowledge  by,  404 ; 
piimilive  truths  known  by,  404. 

Invention,  .")5((. 

Invciizione  la  pin  va(/a,  employed  in 
the  spiritual  world,  335. 


798 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Livisiblc  movement,  112. 

Involuntary,  defined,  177. 
lo  ti  vedo,  addressed  by  Italian  to  gal- 
lows, 92. 
Irish,  291). 
Isogon  is  in  rectangle,  5G8. 

John,  St.,  fecit  aurum,  603. 

"  Journaux  des  Savaus,"  66,  421. 

Joy  defined,  171,  172;  and  felicity,  87; 
and  sadness,  arise  from  prevalence 
of  pleasure  or  pain,  211. 

Jndirment,  what?  14;> ;  distinguished 
from  mind,  114;  false,  209;  reasons 
of.  214 ;  Day  of,  254. 

Jure  suo,  qui  utitur,  nemini  faeit  in- 
jur i  am,  492. 

Jurisconsults,  bonmot  of,  91 ;  a  rule  of, 
492;  juramenta  of,  538. 

Jus  accrescendi,  434. 

Juvenal  quoted,  91. 

Kepler,  123,  531. 

Kerkring,  345. 

Knowledge,  our  present,  best,  227.  228 : 
can  go  on  to  infinite,  228  :  of  body,  a 
perfect,  perhaps  possible,  228 :  em- 
pirical, how  useful,  273;  of  truth, 
what?  397,  400;  a  particular  signifi- 
cation of,  397;  a  general  significa- 
tion of,  .397,  398 ;  confused  perception 
in  empirical,  400;  of  hypothetical 
truths,  ideas  in,  400;  of  truth,  its 
content,  400,  401 ;  as  actual  and 
habitual,  401 ;  habitual,  its  employ- 
ment and  improvement,  401,  402; 
two  sorts  of,  suggested,  402;  intui- 
tive, 404,  410;  demonstrative,  what? 
411 ;  opinion,  perhaps  not,  417  :  sen- 
sitive, 417,  419;  sensitive,  its  certi- 
tude, 420:  certain,  420:  probable, 
420;  clearness  of,  related  to  clear- 
ness of  ideas,  423 ;  extent  of,  423 ; 
not  always  intuitive,  423 ;  not  always 
demonstrative,  423;  sensitive,  lim- 
ited, 423;  sensitive,  more  limited 
than  ideas,  423 :  sensitive,  can  be  ex- 
tended, 423,  424:  in  confused  ideas, 
424;  its  limits  presented,  4-32;  of  real 
existence,  4.39 :  difficulties  in  the  way 
of,  439,  440;  of  bodies  and  spirits, 
441 ;  have  ideas  for,  441 ;  lack  facts 
for,  441 ;    lack   acuteness   of  senses 


for,  441 ;  though  concerned  entirely 
with  ideas  may  have  certainty,  445 ; 
certainty  of,  suggested  criteria  of, 
445 ;  mathematical,  real  though 
founded  on  ideas,  446;  is  of  gen- 
eral or  particular  truths,  452;  of 
general  truths  best  conceived  by 
help  of  words,  452;  certainty  of, 
454;  when  self-evident,  464;  order 
of,  469;  particular,  or  of  facts  dis- 
tinguished from  universal  and  neces- 
sary, 470 ;  appellations  of,  possibility 
of  their  extension,  513;  commences 
in  particular  propositions  ?  517 ;  em- 
ployment of  mnemonic  maxims  in, 
517 ;  mnemonic  maxims  not  formed 
by  induction,  318 :  what  conduces  to 
the  extension  of,  527 ;  mediate  ideas, 
their  place  in,  527;  neither  wholly 
necessary,  nor  wholly  voluntary, 
528;  divine,  intuitive,  574;  angelic 
and  beatified,  574. 

Kotval  evvoiai,  43,  71. 

Koran,  90, 

Kuhlmann,  Querin,  GOl ;  on  the  Trin- 
ity, 601. 

"  L  "  employed  to  signify  gentle  move- 
ment, 300. 

Labadists.  602. 

Labbe,  Father,  his  language,  293. 

"Labyrinth,  site  de  compositione  con- 
tinui,"  234. 

LsBtitia  and  goudium  compared,  172. 

Language,  Locke  on,  5;  tropical  use 
of,  must  be  guarded,  271,  272 :  origi- 
nates in  desire  of  being  understood, 
287 ;  serves  in  reasoning,  287 ;  of 
tones,  287 ;  place  of  general  terms 
in,  288;  study  of,  reveals,  not  the 
origin  of  ideas,  but  the  history  of 
their  discovery,  289 ;  primitive  root 
of,  297 ;  German  likely  the  primi- 
tive? 298. 

Languages,  have  altered,  294;  have 
common  roots,  297;  Keltic,  Latin, 
and  Greek,  have  common  origin, 
297  ;  a  primitive  element  in  all,  298 ; 
show  the  origin  and  migration  of 
nations,  303,  304 ;  best  mirrors  of 
human  mind,  3(58;  practical  but  not 
precise,   370;    same  terms  in,  may 


INDEX  A 


799 


convey  different  ideas,  371 ;  of  world 
will  finally  be  reduced  to  grammar 
and  dictionary,  372;  will  be  better 
known  with  increase  of  knowledge 
of  mind,  372. 

Lateran  Council,  581. 

Law  of  continuity,  50. 

Law,  divine,  202;  natural,  262,  487; 
jjositive,  2(>2. 

Law,  civil,  2(!2;  of  reputation,  improp- 
erly so  called,  2C2 ;  described,  2(J4 ;  its 
reformation  needed,  2(U,  265;  a  pre- 
cept of  wisdom  or  of  the  science  of 
happiness,  391. 

Laws,  three  sorts,  according  to  Locke, 
261. 

Leander  and  Hero,  211. 

Leaves,  no  two  alike,  240. 

Leeuwenhock,  346. 

Legislator,  not  implied  in  all  natural 
rewards  and  punishments,  04. 

Leibnitz,  his  sketch  of  Locke's  Essay 
in  "  Monatliche  Auszug,"  7;  hints 
at  a  more  comijlete  reply,  7 ;  delays 
therein,  8;  was  to  be  in  form  of 
dialogue,  9;  unfinished,  9;  his  esti- 
mate of  Locke's  Essay,  10, 13 ;  turns 
to  Theodicee,  10;  Raspe  publishes 
reply,  10;  differs  from  Locke  as 
Plato  from  Aristotle,  10 ;  thinks  soul 
not  a  "  tabula  rasa,"  but  that  it 
has  principles,  11 ;  truth  has  other 
foundations  than  experience,  11 ; 
credits  Locke  with  an  approach  to 
his  views,  11,  45;  regards  bodies  as 
always  in  motion,  11 ;  on  axioms, 
12 ;  on  logic,  12;  on  nominal  and  real 
being,  12;  on  the  Infinite,  12;  his 
explanation  of  Locke's  aversion  to 
the  doctrine  that  principles  are  born 
with  us,  13;  his  first  principles,  13; 
differs  from  Locke  on  the  soul  ever 
thinking,  16;  how  he  differentiates 
his  system  from  that  of  Locke,  42 ; 
on  German  philology,  304. 

Leibnitz's  system,  gives  a  new  aspect 
to  interior  of  things,  66;  unites 
different  schools,  66;  explains  union 
of  soul  and  body,  6();  gives  true 
principle  of  things,  66;  is  simple, 
6();  is  uniform,  66;  explains  laws  of 
nature,  (56;  Iiow  characterized,  68. 


Leine,  the  river,  whence  its  name,  300 
308. 

Leipsic  Acts,  266. 

Lemma,  what?  413. 

Lemnius,  Leviuus,  his  monster,  448. 

Length,  an  idea  of  determinate,  not 
in  mind,  149,  150;  preserved  only 
by  real  measures,  150;  i)yrami<l  lo 
serve  as  standard,  150;  peuilulum 
measures,  150. 

Leutulus,  308. 

Lerins,  Vincent  de,  617. 

Lessius,  153. 

Lethargy,  166. 

Liars  who  contradict  themselves  uni- 
versally obnoxious,  23,  77. 

Licetus,  351. 

Life,  a  good  one  preferable  to  a  bad, 
apart  from  eternal  felicity,  217 ; 
Ejiicurean  doctrine,  even  apart  from 
felicity,  not  most  reasonable,  217  ; 
indefinite  ideas  of,  388;  notion  of, 
is  accompanied  by  perception  in 
the  soul,  388;  of  man,  that  it  should 
be  a  dream,  not  imiwssibli^  meta- 
physically, but  rationally,  422 ;  even 
if  a  dream,  does  not  deceive,  since 
its  phenomena  are  in  reliable  series, 
422. 

Light,  why  referred  to  fire,  133;  rel- 
ative to  suitable  organs,  133;  like 
sugar,  140;  Aristotle's  deliiiit ion  of, 
321. 

Light,  internal,  what  ?  22,590 ;  opposed 
by  perceptions  of  sense,  98  ;  is  source 
of  science,  law,  and  morals,  98;  its 
struggle  with  perception  of  sense 
described  in  Scripture  and  ancient 
and  modern  philosophers,  98;  diilieil 
by  sense  and  custom,  98;  —  natural, 
74. 

Lights,  first,  499. 

Li;inum  ncphriticuni,  432. 

Linf/ua  Franca,  293;   Zeiv/a,  293. 

Lion, known  by  claw,  357;  its  deriva- 
tion, 300,  301. 

Li  pen  ins,  626. 

Livy,  his  accounts  of  l)attles  imagi- 
nary, .543. 

Locki;,  John,  his  Essay  conci'rnliig 
human  iniderslaiidiiig,  4;  d(!iiieH  in- 
nate ideas,  1 ;  declines  reply  lo  Leib- 


soo 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


nitz's  criticism  on  his  Essay,  6 ;  on 
axioms,  1'2 :  on  logic,  12 ;  on  the 
Infinite,  12;  liis  cliange  of  view  on 
Newton's  tlieory  of  gravitation,  12; 
both  assayer  and  trausmuter,  19 ;  in 
his  view  of  reflection  relaxes  liis  doc- 
trine about  innate  ideas,  45;  denies 
anything  virtual  inns,  4(5;  believes 
that  mind  does  not  always  think, 
47;  his  antagonism  to  innate  princi- 
ples explained,  71. 

Logic,  its  fruitfnlness,  12;  valuable, 
18 ;  full  of  truths  which  can  only  be 
proved  by  innate  principles,  44;  a 
natural,  88;  has  it  helped  to  main- 
tain the  obscurity  of  words,  378; 
ignorance  of,  accounts  for  inaccurate 
use  of  terms,  379 :  as  much  a  demon- 
strative science  as  mathematics,  414  ; 
of  geometers  but  a  part  of  general, 
414 :  of  probabilities  suggested,  541 ; 
chains  of  reasoning  in,  whence  their 
complexity,  5G1;  laws  of ,  principles 
of  good  sense  reduced  to  writing, 
562 ;  a  severe,  not  necessarily  scho- 
lastic, needed  in  practical  delibera- 
tions, 5G3  :  because  men  reason 
without  artificial,  does  not  prove  its 
inutility,  5IJ3;  its  scholastic  forms 
inconvenient,  5G4 ;  have  its  rules 
entire  sway  in  probal)le  questions? 
505,  5GG;  of  the  probable.  Cardan 
on,  5fi6;  a  sublime,  suggested,  to 
which  common  is  but  as  alphabet, 
566  ;  its  possible  improvement,  566  ; 
Hooker  upon  its  improvement,  566 ; 
as  a  universal  mathematics,  569 :  in 
what  particulars  reason  needs  it, 
570;  not  needed  in  intuitive  knowl- 
edge, 574 :  what  it  comprises,  621 :  its 
contents  according  to  the  ancients, 
622;  includes  artes  dicendi,  622;  its 
boundaries  indefinite,  622;  discur- 
sive, 623 :  medicinal,  624. 

Logical  form  reveals  force  of  argu- 
ment, 562. 

Lombai-ds,  brothers  of  the,  449. 

Lot,  man's,  a  ground  of  praise  rather 
than  complaint,  4:>9. 

Loubere,  M.  de  la,  60. 

Louis  le  Debonnaire,  the  oatii  of,  294. 

Love.   Mhat?  167,   168;    extension  of 


term,  168 ;  of  complacency,  108 ;  of 

benevolence,  108;  disinterested,  168. 
Lucan,  a  sally  of  his  criticised,  144. 
Lucian,  his  "  True  History,"  399. 
Ludolphe,  75. 
Lully,  Raymond,  590. 
Lunajixa,  324. 
Lune,  its  quadrature  by  Hippocrates, 

527  :  axiom  employed  in  its  quadra- 

tui-e,  527. 
Lutheran  view  of  Eucharist,  611,  612. 
Lutheranism,  name  disapproved,  544. 
"  Lux  in  Tenebris,"  604. 
Luz  of  the  Rabbis,  242. 
Lynx,  its  derivation,  301. 
Lysimachia,  267.    ' 

Machine,  its  archetypes,  280. 

Madmen,  their  defects,  146;  from  rev- 
erie, 166. 

Magnetology,  a  science,  525. 

Magnitude,  258. 

Magots,  342,  343. 

Mais,  its  equivalents  in  German,  366; 
its  derivation,  3G7;  its  elliptic  use, 
368. 

Malotru,  Abbot,  351 

Man,  should  we  call  an  irrational  creat- 
ure in  human  form  a  ?  244 ;  should  we 
call  a  parrot  discoursing  philosophi- 
cally a  ?  244 ;  requires  not  merely  rea- 
soning soul,  but  something  of  figure 
and  constitution  of  body,  245 ;  can- 
not be  a  machine,  246  ;  a  social  being, 
285 ;  his  speech  the  instrument  and 
bond  of  society,  285 ;  how  the  name 
is  arrived  at,  310 ;  what  creatures 
may  be  so  called,  342 ;  definition  of, 
at  once  real  and  nominal,  342;  no 
rational  animal  has  yet  been  found 
with  a  body  differing  much  from 
that  of,  351 ;  definitions  of,  Aris- 
totle's, 384 ;  definitions  of,  Plato's, 
384;  a  working  definition  of,  391,392; 
the  most  stupid,  more  rational  than 
the  most  spiritual  beast,  552, 553 ;  ad- 
vantage of  his  position  on  the  globe, 
575. 

Man-ness  {Vhommeit^) ,  369. 

"Mansions  "  applied  to  planets,  548. 

Manual  arts,  their  principles  sliould  be 
taugiit  by  scholars,  628. 


INDEX  A 


801 


Marble,  a  veined  block  of,  the  illus- 
tration of,  4G,  76,  82,  84;  block  of, 
with  or  without  veins,  40. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  495. 

Marian  islanders,  104. 

Marin  us,  4G5. 

Marionettes  regarded  as  alive,  3S8. 

Mariotte,  M.,  an  experiment  of,  121 ; 
on  the  color  blue,  337. 

Martin  Corneille,  his  attempts  to  rec- 
oncile i)hilosopliy  and  religion,  581. 

Masham,  Lady,  (J5. 

Mass,  an  image  of  substance,  219. 

Matei'ia  prima,  has  impenetrability, 
383 ;  has  inertia,  383. 

Mathematics,  paralogisms  of,  faults  of 
form ,  18 ;  some  propositions  demon- 
strated outside  of,  272,  414 ;  not  the 
only  science  capable  of  demonstra- 
tion, 414 ;  why  it  has  become  so  per- 
fectly demonstrative,  414. 

IMathematicians,  accused  of  jjassion 
for  glory,  93. 

Matter,  how  regarded  by  Locke,  11, 
16;  how  regarded  by  Leibnitz,  11, 16  ; 
"medley  of  effects  of  surrounding 
infinite,"  51;  is  not  rigid,  54;  can  it 
think?  56,  59,  61,  62,  427;  contro- 
versy with  Bishop  of  Worcester 
regarding,  56 ;  distinct  from  exten- 
sion, 155;  secondary,  231 ;  primary, 
possesses  a  perfect  fluidity,  231 ;  its 
indivisibility,  a  perplexed  notion, 
234;  distinct  from  body,  388;  are 
discussions  concerning,  as  materia 
prima  futile?  383;  can  it  think, 
427;  primary,  purely  passive,  and 
therefore  incomplete,  428 ;  primary, 
cannot  jwoduce  perception,  sensa- 
tion, reason,  428  ;  se(;()ndary,  a 
complete  being,  428;  secondary,  a 
real  mass,  428  ;  secondary,  supposes 
real  unities,  428;  secondary,  its 
unities  percipient,  428;  secondary, 
constitutes  an  intelligible  world  of 
substances,  428;  secondary,  when 
God  gives  it  organs  for  rational  ex- 
pression He  gives  it  immaterial 
thinking  substances,  428;  second- 
ary, substances  of,  have  within 
them  (correspondence  or  harmony, 
428;  secondary,  primitive  powers  of, 
3f 


are  substances  themselves,  428 ;  sec- 
ondary, derivative  powers  of,  are 
modes  of  being,  428  ;  new  hypothe- 
sis of,  attributes  to  soul  and  budy 
only  the  modilications  we  experi- 
ence in  oui'selves  and  them,  430; 
new  hypothesis  of,  gives  to  our 
ideas  of  matter  greater  regularity 
and  connection,  430;  presents  diffi- 
culty only  to  those  who  must  im- 
agine what  is  only  intelligible,  430; 
changes  in,  dependent  on  reasons 
incapable  of  arising  from  extension 
and  luitures  purely  passive,  430; 
changes  in,  cannot  arise  even  from 
particular  and  inferior  active  na- 
tures without  the  pure  and  univer- 
sal act  of  the  superior  substance, 
430;  not  unintelligible,  but  in  parts 
not  clear  because  of  our  confused 
jierceptions,  which  contain  the  infi- 
nite, and  are  tlie  detailed  expression 
of  what  occurs  in  bodies,  431 ;  can- 
not produce  pleasure  or  pain,  431 ;  if 
susceptible  of  thought,  may  create, 
501;  if  first  eternal  thinking  being, 
means  an  infinite  number  of  tliink- 
ing  beings,  506  ;  cannot  give  rise  to 
perceiJtions,  507 ;  not  a  moinul  or 
unity,  507;  a  mass  of  an  infinite 
number  of  bikings,  507 ;  cadi  being 
of,  is  material  or  immaterial,  507; 
has  a  General  and  Superior  Cause, 
507;  under  Pre-established  llarnutny, 
507 ;  all  is,  518. 

Maurier,  his  slanders  on  Cirotius,  542. 

Maurolycns,  442. 

Maxims  or  Axioms,  on  what  their  self- 
evidence  rests,  4(J2;  are  they  evident 
ex  terminis,  462:  demonstrated  by 
geometers,  4(>2;  when  to  l)e  assumed, 
464;  their  use,  473,  474;  their  intro- 
duction into  public  disputations, 
477,  478,  479;  formed  through  an 
instinct,  481  ;  bad  use  of,  4S2  ;  help- 
ful to  knowledge,  484,  not  to  bo 
blamed  for  iniproi)er  use  of  terms, 
484;  of  special  use  in  long  pro<'e.sses 
of  reasoning, -IS,"! ;  liow  formed,  48."<; 
use  in  matlienialics,  1^5:  use  in 
jurisi)rudciice,  486;  what  iiicliidrd 
under,  486;  f  uudameulal,  487 ;  some- 


802 


LEIBNITZ'S   CKITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


times  employed  out  of  season ,  489 ; 
identical,  not  nugatory,  490;  their 
use,  491;  semi-identical,  tbeir  use, 
492 ;  by  many  regarded  as  basis  of 
knowledge,  517 ;  relieve  memory, 
517;  not  arrived  at  by  induction, 
517 ;  are  present  implicitly  in  exam- 
ples, 518  ;  exist  in  miuds  of  all  men, 
518;  their  certainty  dependent  on 
comparison  of  ideas,  519 ;  must  not 
be  assumed  gratis,  519 ;  borrowed  by 
subaltern  sciences  from  superior  in 
which  they  have  been  proved,  519 ; 
accepted  provisionally,  520. 

Medicine,  the  antiquities  of,  important, 
371,  372;  improbability  of  a  better 
science  of,  442;  bad  use  of  terms  in, 
443;  well-detailed  observations  desir- 
able in,  489 ;  as  an  indicial  term,  627. 

Meditation,  1G6. 

"  Meditationes  de  Cognitione,  Veri- 
tate,  et  Ideis,"  3,  14. 

Medius  teruiinus  often  sufficient,  481. 

Megiddo,  battle  of,  547. 

Meier,  Gerard,  philologist,  304. 

Melanchthon,  his  views  of  Eucharist, 
612. 

"Memoires  de  Trevoux,"  502. 

Memory,  and  reminiscence,  77  ;  effects 
of  former  impressions  without,  106 ; 
does  not  make  same  man,  114:  after 
a  time  may  deceive,  248 ;  immediate 
and  internal,  cannot  deceive,  248 ; 
mediate  and  external,  may,  248; 
its  fallibility,  403;  an  illustration 
of,  from  keeping  accounts  of  Hartz 
mines,  403;  how  Leibnitz  apjilied 
laws  of,  in  keeping  accounts,  403; 
its  functions,  513;  its  limitations, 
514. 

Men,  deprived  of  speech  use  other 
general  signs,  145 ;  with  tails,  341 ; 
distribution  of  beard  among,  341 ; 
prefer  to  deceive  and  be  deceived, 
389.  [545. 

Menage,  his  abbot  of  Saint  Martin,  350, 

Mercures  Galans,  438. 

Mere,  Chevalier  de,  his  "  Agremens," 
539.  [495. 

Metaphysic,  a  real,  being  established. 

Metaphysics,  abstracts  of,  teach  only 
words,  493;  the  most  general  science 


according  to  Aristotle,  495 ;  ethics, 
how  related  to,  495. 

Metempsychosis,  53,  68. 

Microscope,  227,  228;  its  use  recom- 
mended, 553. 

MiKfibv,  rb,  not  to  be  neglected,  51. 

Milky  Way,  Democritus'  correct  sur- 
mise regarding,  277. 

Mill,  why  unconscious  of  its  continu- 
ous noise?  47. 

Mind,  things  may  be  in,  of  which  one 
is  not  always  conscious,  20;  may  take 
necessary  ideas  from  itself,  78 ;  has 
more  than  mere  passive  capacity  for 
receiving  impressions,  80 ;  is  not  as 
wax  or  tablet,  '80;  and  judgment, 
distinguished,  144;  are  its  ideas  of 
itself  no  clearer  than  its  ideas  of 
substance  ?  226 ;  the  Supreme  and 
Universal,  516. 

Miracles,  not  to  be  recurred  to  in  ordi- 
nary way  of  nature,  55 ;  accepted  in 
despite  of  analogy,  553;  refused  by 
Christ,  when  ?  606. 

Miraculous,  its  use  in  philosophy,  61. 

Mirror,  knowledge  of  its  construction 
as  affecting  rays  of  light,  an  illustra- 
tion of  interior  constitution  of  sub- 
stance and  its  relation  to  qualities, 
458. 

Misery,  what?  200. 

Mixed, conclusion,  84 ;  modes,  acquired 
by  observation,  222 ;  modes,  acquired 
by  invention,  222;  modes,  acquired 
by  explaining  terms,  222 ;  modes, 
acquired  in  di-eaming  and  revei'ie, 
222, 223  ;  modes,  are  they  real  ?  329; 
modes,  do  we  always  change  .species 
of,  with  change  of  a  constituent  idea, 
385. 

Mixta  imperfecte,  361. 

Mode,  a  geometrical,  may  be  referred 
to  specific  essences,  386. 

Modes,  the,  according  to  Locke,  5 ; 
their  kinds,  5;  what?  148;  majority 
of,  not  simple,  164;  mixed,  what? 
221;  how  distinguished  from  ideas 
of  substance,  221;  dependent  on 
mind,  276;  must  be  possible  and 
compatible,  276;  may  be  real  acci- 
dents, 277 ;  ingredients  of,  must  be 
compossiblc,  277 ;  impossible,  can  be 


INDEX   A 


803 


invented,  280;  if  an  idea  in  one  of 
them  clianged,  it  becomes  another 
thing,  o85. 

Moditication  and  attribute  distin- 
giiislied,  58. 

Modilications  which  may  belong  nat- 
urally to  a  thing,  60. 

Mola,  -Mi. 

Molyneux,  his  problem  as  to  a  man's 
power  of  discriminating  between  a 
cube  and  globe  presented  to  him  for 
the  first  time  after  obtaining  sight, 
138,  139,  141;  his  Dioptric,  481. 

Monad,  defined,  147. 

Monads,  doctrine  of,  101  ;  substantial 
unities,  231 ;  not  mass,  .WT;  how  the 
soul  acts  in,  507  ;  Bayle's  objection 
to  theory  of,  507  ;  originate  from 
(T()d  and  depend  on  Him,  511  ;  the 
"how  in  detail  "  incomprehensible, 
511 ;  their  conservation  a  continual 
creation,  511 ;  doctrine  of,  evident 
everywhere,  553. 

"Monatliche,  Auszug,"  5;  Leibnitz's 
sketch  of  Locke's  essay  in,  7,  2(5-38. 

Monej^,  should  not  be  debased,  578. 

Monkeys,  said  to  possess  organs  of 
speecli,  287. 

Monster,  is  it  a  man?  314 ;  can  it  be  a 
species  midway  between  beast  and 
man,  447,  448;  his  future  state  di.s- 
cussed,  447,  448;  possession  of  rea- 
son settles  its  manhood,  448;  its 
birth  and  shai^e  presumptions  of 
its  rationality,  448 ;  we  save  it  from 
destruction  during  uncertainty,  449 ; 
not  made  for  nothing,  449. 

Monsters,  344,  345,  340,  350,  351,  352; 
their  classification  discussed,  339. 

Montausier,  605. 

Mood,  one  added  to  fourth  figure,  501. 

Moods,  in  each  figure  six,  560;  four 
common,  what?  560;  two  added  to 
first  figure,  5(i0  ;  two  added  to  sec- 
ond figure,  561. 

Moon,  emperor  of,  his  saying,  574. 

Moral  entities,  their  reality,  329;  re- 
garded as  "  things  "  by  jurisconsults, 
329. 

Moral,  good,  260;  evil,  200;  sphere, 
436. 

Morality,  truths  ol,  demonstrable,  86  ; 


laws  of,  their  violation  does  not 
disprove  them  to  be  innate,  93;  ol>- 
scured  by  excesses,  93 ;  their  neces- 
sity not  denionstrateil  as  it  ought  to 
be,  93;  its  principal  point  God's  so- 
cial connection  with  us,  247  ;  partly 
founded  in  reason,  partly  in  experi- 
ence and  disposition,  392;  "  tlie  New 
Hypothesis"  lays  deep  the  founda- 
tions of,  433;  consideration  of  goods 
of  life  conduces  to, 433;  its  questions 
can  be  decided  as  incoutestably  as 
those  of  mathematics,  4.33 :  diagrams 
proposed  in,  4^35;  definitions  invalu- 
able in,  435  ;  algel)ra  may  help,  43i'> ; 
Weigel's  diagrams  to  illustrate,  435 ; 
are  its  problems  simpler  than  fho.se 
of  geometry,  436?  ideas  of,  are  they 
of  human  invention,  446  ;  the  proper 
science  of  all  men,  525. 

More,  Henry,  ()7 ;  his  "aerial  vehi- 
cles," 380;  bis  "  Hylarchic  princi- 
ple," 382. 

Moses,  37. 

Motion,  in  Aristotle,  174;  by  physical 
impulse  and  by  thought,  is  it  con- 
ceivable in  either  instance?  232;  its 
transference  as  an  accident  not  con- 
ceivable, 232 ;  amount  of,  lost  in 
impact  of  bodies,  232. 

Motions,  never  lost,  24 ;  become  indis- 
tiuguisiiable,  25;  according  to  Aris- 
totle, 174,  320;  real  phenomena, 
219:  image  of  action,  219;  motivity, 
220;  laws  of,  derived  from  a  cause 
superior  to  matter,  233;  )>roduced 
by  thought,  no  idea  or  experience 
of,  233. 

Motive,  the  present  and  tlie  sensory 
furnish  a  stronger,  tJiaii  the  future 
and  rea.sonable,  92. 

Mouton,  150. 

Murder,  its  degrees  employed  to  illus- 
trate how  mixed  modes  cliange  in 
speckles  with  change  of  a  const  it  ucnt 
idea,  .'>85. 

Musauis,  Jean,  590;  "  U.so  of  Kcasun 
in  Theology,"  587,  588. 

Mussels,  perception  in,  142. 

Name,  why  not  given  to  nmnlrr  of  an 
old  man'?  222. 


80-1 


LEII?NITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Names,  family,  258,  259 ;  how  bestowed 
(iu  tribes,  25!) :  improper  use  of,  gives 
rise  to  confusion  (obscurity)  of 
ideas,  2!)8,  271 ;  how  tliey  should  be 
employed,  271 :  a  particular  one  for 
each  thiuij;  impossible,  307  ;  such  mul- 
tiplicity would  baffle  the  end  of  lan- 
guage, .■)07  ;  such  multiplicity  would 
not  extend  our  knowledge,  307 ; 
proper,  their  use,  307 ;  have  usually 
been  appellations  at  first,  307;  of 
species,  how  given,  308 ;  first  used 
by  young  children  personal,  300; 
their  influence,  328;  of  substances 
saj"  more  than  definition,  393,  394. 

Narquois,  293. 

Nations,  common  origin  of,  297. 

Natural  light,  3(),  38^  8G,  88,  89,  92,  96, 
597. 

Naturally,  or,  "  in  the  order  of  nat- 
ure," defined,  fiO,  61. 

Nature,  questioning,  18 ;  makes  no 
leaps,  50;  of  things  and  of  mind 
agree,  74;  labors  to  put  herself 
more  at  her  ease,  194 ;  a  good  econo- 
mist, 356 ;  grand  in  effects,  sparing 
in  causes,  356 ;  proceeds  by  shortest 
paths,  484;  its  order,  not  of  meta- 
l^hysical  necessity,  582;  grounded  in 
good  i^leasure  of  God,  582 ;  may  de- 
■viate  therefore  for  superior  reasons 
of  grace,  582. 

Naude',  580. 

Naudeana,  580. 

Nebuchadnezzar,  545.  [486. 

Ne  quis  alterius  damno  fiat  luciipletior, 

Necessary,  idea  of,  founded  on  pre- 
sumption of  God's  reasonable  im- 
muta1)ility,  180. 

Necessary  truth,  when  possible  to 
prove,  3 ;  what  ?  4,  326. 

Necessitate  medii,  620  ;  Prxceptl,  620. 

Necessity,  never  proved  by  experience, 
22  ;  when  thought  wanting,  182  :  when 
compulsion,  182  ;  when  restraint,  182 ; 
of  geometrical  and  metai)hysical  con- 
sequences, 183 :  does  not  enter  into 
l^hysical  and  moral  consequences, 
183 ;  opposed  to  contingency,  183 ; 
not  determination,  183. 

Need,  art  of  thinking  in  time  of,  214. 

Nicole,  M.,  617. 


Nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod  nonfuerlt 

in  sensu  excipe  nisi  ipse  intelleetus, 

111. 
Nisi,  eUiptic  use  of,  368. 
Nisus,  in  Vergil,  598. 
Nodus  in  sclrpo,  460. 
Nomenclator,     330  ;     an    illustrated, 

printed  at  Nuremberg,  395. 
Nominalists,  178,  623;  seemed  to  make 

nature  seem  stingy,  356. 
Nominati,  in  Roman  law,  360;  age  of 

puberty,  an  example  of,  360. 
Non-ajipearauce,    not    equivalent    to 

non-being,  98. 
Non-consistence  of  bodies,  124. 
Nothing  cannot  produce   real  being, 

500,  .jOI. 
"  Nothing  in  us  but  of  what  we  have 

been  formerly  conscious,"  4(j. 
Notion,  what?  221,  222,  493;  the  true 

mark  of  a  clear  and  distinct,  227 ; 

the  word  discussed,  329. 
Notoriety,  as  evidence,  538. 
"Nouveaux  Essais,"  their  origin,  5,  6. 
"  Nouvelles    de    la    Republique    des 

Lettres,"  50. 
Novelle  of  Boiardo,  398. 
Nuf/atorise,  490. 
Number,   220;    knowledge  of,  not  in 

animals,  145;  ideas  precise  in,  160; 

has  no  minimum  in  extent,  160 ;  col- 
lective idea  in,  160;  memory  in,  160; 

does  not  dejiend  on  imagination,  273 ; 

short   methods    in,   desirable,  570; 

prime,  how  to  recognize  easily,  571. 
"  Number,  The  great,"  argimieut  f rom, 

617. 

Gates,  65. 

Oath  cannot  fix  opinion,  though  it  may 
teaching,  619. 

Obediential  power,  428. 

Obreption,  276. 

Occam,  588. 

Occult  qualities,  63,  204,  431. 

Ocker,  302,  308. 

CEcumenical  councils  preserved  from 
error  as  to  doctrine,  618. 

Old  man  of  the  mountain,  196. 

Oldenburgh,  526 ;  Count  of,  259. 

"One  and  one  make  two,"  a  defini- 
tion, not  an  axiom,  23. 


INDEX  A 


805 


"  One  aud  two  are  three,"  471. 

Opal,  432. 

Opiuiou,  the  perception  of  a  truth,  92 ; 
natural,  the  perception  of  an  innate 
trutli,  92;  its  value  in  snpport  of 
truth,  530;  freedom  of,  what?  537; 
how  acquired,  55(i. 

Opinions,  voluntary  indirectly,  528; 
theoretic,  their  practical  influence, 
535 ;  how  they  spread,  535. 

Opposition,  between  tlie  individual  and 
the  public  an  evil,  620;  between 
sects,  an  evil,  020 ;  often  an  accident 
of  party  rather  than  result  of  rea- 
soned conviction,  620. 

"  Opposite  angles  made  by  intersec- 
tion of  two  straight  lines  an  equal " : 
is  this  trutli  innate  ?  105. 

Optics,  may  be  learned  by  the  blind, 
140 ;  founded  on  maxim  that  nature 
proceeds  by  the  shortest  jjaths,  484. 

Oracles,  internal,  derived  from  early 
education,  611. 

Orel  galea,  479. 

Order,  tempore  vel  natura,  82 ;  of  analy- 
sis, different  from  that  of  occasion, 
220;  the  natural  distinguished  from 
the  historical,  470. 

Orders  of  Rome,  have  narrower  rules 
than  their  Church,  619. 

Origin  of  ideas,  not  preliminary  in 
philosophy,  15. 

Ostensives,  the,  491. 

Ostracism,  222. 

Otfried,  gospel  of,  294. 

Ourang-outang,  man  may  become  as 
stupid  as,  yet  preserve  rational  soul, 
244 ;  illustrative  of  human  form 
without  human  soul,  244. 

Outlines,  impression  on  empty  taldets 
of  mind,  a  thing  of  self-perception, 
20. 

Oyster,  perception  in,  142;  tossed  by 
monkey,  an  illusti-ation,  491. 

Pain,  and  pin,  relation  between,  133; 
why  referred  to  body?  133;  rudi- 
ments of,  their  place  in  our  welfare, 
170,171;  includes  apperception,  194; 
partly  unconscious,  195  ;  what?  200 ; 
a  fcseling  of  imperfection,  201. 

Painting,  deceives  by  metonymy  aud 


metaphor,  1.37 :  iu  fresco,  some  good 
tilings  like,  173;  a,  which  was  only 
iutelligible  when  looked  at  through 
a  cylindrical  mirror,  269. 

Pajon,  595. 

Pallium,  394. 

Pandects,  2iHJ,  415  ;  similarity  of  style 
among  authors  far  separated  in  time, 
416. 

Pappus,  573;  on  analysis,  521,  565. 

Parabola,  how  one  may  add  to  his  idea 
of,  without  changing  its  concealed 
constitution,  386. 

Parallel  lines,  their  definitions,  318. 

Paralogisms  often  dependent  on  as- 
sumptions, 481. 

Paralytic,  could  learn  geometry,  139. 

Parrhesia,  Trapprjffla,  223. 

Parricide  as  a  possible  crime,  325. 

Parrot  who  talked  philtisophy,  wouhl 
it  be  a  parrot?  244. 

Parrots,  possess  words  without  organs 
of  speech,  287. 

Partes  extra  partes,  163. 

Particles,  what?  364;  their  use,  3C4; 
not  absolutely  necessary,  'M'A  ;  their 
explanation,  .3(i6,  367;  may  connect 
parts  of  an  idea,  ;?64 ;  should  lie  in- 
vestigated, 368:  catalogues  of,  ;>('>5; 
concealed  iu  inflections  of  nouns  and 
verbs,  365 :  best  explained  by  para- 
phrase, 367  ;  by  ellipsis  equal  to  com- 
plete sentiment,  368. 

Particular  propositions  appear  as  uni- 
versal affirmations,  56H. 

Pascal,  on  calculations  of  <-liaiices, 
539. 

Passah,  Hebrew,  .361. 

Passion,  how  controlled,  207;  or  pas- 
.sive  power  dLscussed,  218;  towanis 
imperfection,  219;  when  it  is  con- 
fused, a  step  towards  pain.  219. 

Passions,  whence?  li'>7;  what?  172:  af- 
fect body,  173 ;  can  \w  mastcrcfl,  207  ; 
their  illogical  iutlucnce,  611,  61.'"(. 

"  Pater,  si)ace  of,"  578. 

"Patience,  forcfil,"  of  soul,  496. 

Paul,  St.,  43,  153. 

Paulas,  jurisconsuU,  his  rule,  '18(j. 

Pearls  of  Sbisius,  geometric  ligures 
about  which  iniicli  was  known  lieforo 
they  were  found  to  bo  cubic  parabo- 


806 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


loids,  387;  or  the  lines  of  the  cubic 
parabola,  4()5. 

Peas,  tlirowiiig,  against  pins,  208. 

Pelissou,  591,  5',>2. 

Pendulum,  employed  to  measure 
length,  150,  15LI ;  called  in  German, 
"  lairuhe,"  171. 

Penn,  (i02. 

Pensees  voluntes,  182. 

Perceptions,  exist  too  feeble  to  be  re- 
membered :  illustration  of,  24 ;  if  we 
did  not  always  have,  could  not  be 
waked  from  sleep,  24 ;  illustration  of 
man  waked  by  several  voices,  not  by 
one,  24 ;  never  lost,  25 ;  become  in- 
distinguishable by  composition,  28; 
without  apperception  infinite,  47 ; 
reasons  why  we  may  not  be  conscious 
of,  47,  48;  insensible,  their  efficacy, 
form  images  of  qualities,  48;  con- 
nect each  being  with  rest  of  imi- 
verse,  48;  make  present  big  with 
future,  and  laden  with  past,  48; 
insensible,  explain  Pre-established 
Harmony,  49  ;  insensible,  render 
death  a  sleep,  49;  insensible,  con- 
stitute sameness  of  individual,  49; 
insensible,  their  determining  influ- 
ence, 49;  and  objects,  their  relations 
not  arbitra,ry,  50 ;  insensible,  give 
rise  to  noticeable  perceptions,  50; 
insensible,  of  use  in  pneumatology, 
50;  insensible,  explain  why  souls  are 
never  jjerfectly  alike,  50,  52 ;  not 
perceived  or  remembered,  kuo^vn 
only  by  consequences,  112 ;  have 
them  while  asleep,  112 ;  minute, 
mental,  though  not  perceptible, 
have  effects,  11(>  :  unpremeditated 
actions,  result  of  minute,  116 ;  thence 
customs,  116;  thence  passions,  IKJ: 
these  in  morals,  what  corpuscles  are 
in  physics,  116;  prevent  indifference 
in  moral  actions,  116 ;  incline  with- 
out necessitating,  116 ;  of  which  not 
conscious,  121,  135;  defined,  135; 
animals  have,  135 ;  have  we,  uncon- 
sciously? 135  ;  mind  passive  in,  135  : 
Locke  denies  unconscious,  136;  in 
plants,  141,  142 ;  of  images,  142, 143 : 
feeble,  in  oyster  and  mussel,  142 : 
never  without   minute,   166 ;    none 


indifferent  to  us,  167 ;  confused, 
advantages  of,  170  ;  perceptible 
only  in  mass,  199;  pertain  to  all 
the  entelechies,  218;  in  enthusiast, 
597. 

Perfection,  man's  highest,  in  search 
for  true  happiness,  206. 

Perfections,  certain,  bring  greater  im- 
perfections, 208,  209. 

Peripatetics,  65 ;  obscure,  378 ;  on  rare- 
faction aud  condensation,  124  ;  their 
ten  predicaments,  380. 

Perpetual  mechanical  movement,  il- 
lustration of  an  "apparent  idea," 
505. 

Persians,  doubts  about  the  history  of 
the,  545. 

Persius  quoted,  272. 

Person,  its  content  according  to  Locke, 
245. 

Persons,  can  there  be  two  with  same 
immaterial  substance?  248. 

Peruvians,  their  cruelty,  89. 

Petronius,  "  adolescentes  in  scholLs 
stultissimos  fieri,"  482. 

Pha;do,  Plato's,  170. 

Phantasms,  459;  sensitive,  459;  good 
term  for  "  secondary  qualities  "  or 
"sensitive  ideas,"  459:  confused, 
cannot  abide  if  distinguished  intu 
ingredients,  459. 

Phantoms  of  sense  opposed  to  pure 
ideas,  78. 

Pharsalia  I,  128, 144. 

Philalethes,  why  the  name  was  as- 
sumed, 69. 

Philanthropy  defined,  91. 

Philology,  372. 

"  Philosophia  Mosaica,"  63. 

Philosophy,  practical,  621 ;  as  an  indi- 
cial  term,  627  ;  introductory  to  other 
divisions,  628. 

<f>opd,  its  signification,  321. 

Pliotis  (Fotis)  and  the  golden  ass,  243. 

Physical  laws,  as  to  God,  not  neces- 
sary, 183. 

Physicist,  525. 

Physics,  as  a  whole,  will  never  be  a 
perfect  science,  525 ;  some  parts  of, 
scientifically  detailed,  525;  cannot 
give  a  reason  for  all  experiments  in, 
525 ;  its  content,  621. 


INDEX  A 


807 


Piety,  practical,  526;  natural,  does  it 

save?  590,591. 
Pin,  and  pain,  133;  affrights,  283. 
Pineapple,  cannot  experience  its  taste 
by  account,  321;  its  cultivation,  322. 
Pisani,  Ottavio,  his  "Lycurgus,"  283. 
Piso,  308. 

Place,  what?  152;  particular,  152; 
universal,  152  ;  if  nothing  fixed, 
could  yet  be  determined,  152;  an 
order  of  coexistences,  229. 

Planetary  communication,  complica- 
tions connected  with,  343. 

Plants,  fecundation  in,  338. 

Plato,  392;  supposed  to  believe  that 
soul  has  originally  principles  or 
ideas,  42,  43 ;  his  idea  of  matter,  (JtJ ; 
his  "  Meno,"  78;  on  conscience,  91 ; 
his  "  PhfEdo,"  170. 

Platonist,  his  soul  of  world,  380,  382; 
his  reminiscence  refuted,  105. 

Pleasure,  how  founded  ?  on  semi- 
pleasures,  170;  on  semi-pains,  170; 
a  step  to  happiness,  200  ;  its  low- 
est degree,  200;  its  most  estimable 
kind,  200;  what?  200,  201;  feeling 
and  appetite  carry  to,  201 ;  can  grow 
infinitely,  201 ;  cannot  have  a  nomi- 
nal definition,  201 ;  allows  a  causal 
definition,  201;  and  happiness  dis- 
tinguished, 207  ;  a  feeling  of  perfec- 
tion, 200,  201,  208;  or  displeasure 
accompanying  an  action  can  be 
changed,  216 ;  good,  of  God,  defined, 
431 ;  cum  r-atione  insanire,  an  ele- 
ment in,  459. 

Pleasure  and  pain,  167-173 ;  not  capable 
of  nominal  definition,  167;  attinity 
of,  170;  pertain  only  to  mind,  200; 
originate  in  mind  and  body,  200, 
202;  not  in  matter  but  in  soul,  430. 

Pleasures,  luminous,  how  they  improve 
us,  207 ;  confused,  the  danger  of,  207 ; 
two  cannot  be  enjoyed  at  once,  210 ; 
can  they  be  enjoyed  witli  pain?  211 ; 
do  men  diminish  future?  212. 

Plenum,  unnecessary  hypothesis,  54; 
uses  of,  54. 

Pliny,  on  Democritus,  66. 

Plus  vident  ocull  quam  oculus,  617. 

Pluto,  his  helmet,  479. 

Pneumatics,  doctrine  of  spirit,  3(i2. 


Pneumatology,  52. 
Point,  defined,  156. 
Polemo,  "  the  world  is  God,"  518. 
Police,  a  better,  desired,  438,  526. 
Pollen,  338,  347. 

Polygon,  to  illustrate  relations,  2;J6. 
Poniatovia,  prophet,  604. 
Portugal,  Sea  of,  134. 
Possible,  'distinctly  intelligible,'  277. 
Power,  idea  of,  how  formed,  130,  174; 
possibility   of  change,   174;   active, 
may  be  called  force,  174 ;  active,  the 
proper  attribute  of  spirit,  174,  233; 
passive,  as  mobility  and  resistance, 
174,  175;    passive,   that   of    bodies, 
174,  177,  233 ;  a  simple  idea  through 
ignorance,   175  ;     relation    of,   175  ; 
active,  idea  of,  fiiruislied  by  reriec- 
tion,  175,  177  ;  an  obscure  idea  of, 
given  by  an  impinging  Ijody,  17() ;  its 
noblest  sense,  176  ;  active,  in  cntele- 
chies  alone,  177;    liberty  the  most 
important  form  of,  218;  what?  224; 
includes  tendency,  224  ;  an  entelechy, 
224. 
Powers,  pure,  are  fictions,  110;    real, 
not  possibilities,  112;  have  tendency, 
112. 
Prsetor's  all)um,  44,  86. 
Predicaments,  361 ;  use  of,  important, 
311,  380 ;  the  ten,  of  the  Peripatetics, 
380 ;  may  bo  reduced,  380. 
Predicate  is  in  subject,  .5(i8,  569. 
Pre-establislied    Harmony,    49,    2'M), 
233,  252,  333,  421 ;  re(iuires  sensible 
outlines,    78;     exi)lains    motion    of 
bodies,  229 ;  its  iuil  nence  on  theoK)gy 
and  pneumatology,  .■i<)3. 
Pre-judgments,  by  which  men  would 
except  themselves  from  discussion, 
531 ;  legitimate  in  the  liomish  con- 
troversy, 531. 
Prejudice.  98,  99.  [3(U. 

Prepositions,  their  use  and  origin,  290, 
Prescriptions  of  Tertnllian,  5.31. 
Presentiments,  we  liavc,  15. 
Presumptions,  wlial  ?  260;  of  the  juris- 
consults, 5:58,  616. 
Primary  matter,  231. 
Primitive  language,  sec;  I>;ingu;ige. 
Primitive  truths  cannot  Im-  ])rov«;d  i)y 
anything  more  certain,  41U. 


808 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"Prince,  a  great,"  as  benefactor  of 
the  race,  exijected  by  I^eibnitz,  438, 
G29. 

Principium  individuationis,  239. 

I'riufiple  of  principles  :  union  of 
definitions  by  means  of  identical 
axioms,  521. 

Principles,  first,  according  to  Leibnitz, 
13 ;  on  which  men  agree,  71 ;  not  im- 
pressions which  minds  receive  with 
their  existence,  71 ;  universal  con- 
sent does  not  prove  them  innate,  71 ; 
not  universal,  71;  the  two  great 
speculative,  77;  first,  how  arrived 
at,  99;  should  be  open  to  judicious 
investigation,  108,  473. 

Probabilities,  mathematical  calcula- 
tion of,  539;  illustrated,  540,  541; 
a  new  logic  of,  541 ;  methods  of  es- 
caping unpleasant,  014,  615. 

Probability,  the  part  of  logic  which 
estimates,  still  wanting,  213;  Aris- 
totle's mistake  concerning,  214;  its 
consideration  important  yet  neg- 
lected, 417 ;  degrees  of  resem- 
blance {ex  datis)  can  be  determined, 
417;  teaching  of  Jesuit  moralists 
concerning,  418 ;  must  be  drawn 
from  the  nature  of  things,  419; 
oinnions  of  persons  collateral  only 
to  its  determination,  419;  opinion 
of  Copernicus,  though  he  was  alone, 
had  most,  419;  art  of  estimating, 
more  useful  than  most  demonstra- 
tive sciences,  419;  grounds  of,  529, 
530,  532;  its  highest  degree,  538; 
nature  of,  529,  585 ;  false  measures 
of,  ill  what  they  consist,  611;  one  can- 
not lean  to  side  of  less,  615. 

Probable  reasoning  of  jurisconsults, 
577. 

Problems,  what?  411. 

Proclus,  108,  463,  491 ;  demonstrates 
axioms,  14 ;  his  philosophical  style, 
416. 

Procopius,  when  credible,  542. 

"  Profereiidis,  Be,  scientias  demon- 
st}-andi  pouioeriis,"  437. 

Progress,  in  all  things,  142;  to  be  ex- 
pected, 440,  629. 

Progymnasmata,  399. 

Projection,  of  a  circle  on  a  plane,  illus- 


trative of  relation  between  idea  and 
its  cause,  133. 

Prolepsis,  of  Stoics,  43. 

Proof,  advantage  of  continued  appli- 
cation of,  402,  403;  complete,  538; 
more  than  complete,  538 ;  more  than 
half  complete,  538;  less  than  half 
complete,  538 ;  slender,  should  it  in 
criminal  charges  be  in  any  case  ac- 
cepted against  a  man  ?  577 ;  slender, 
accepted  against  a  man  not  to  con- 
demn him ,  but  to  prevent  him  doing 
harm,  577. 

Proofs,  411. 

Propositions,  which  secure  acquies- 
cence as  soon  "as  heard,  are  they 
found  in  i^hysics  as  well  as  mathe- 
matics? 83;  identical,  do  not  admit 
proof,  83 ;  universal,  of  the  truth  or 
certitude  of,  452;  being  certain  of, 
454 ;  can  they  be  obtained  by  expe- 
rience of  "  consequences  in  a  con- 
stant manner  "  ?  461 ;  express  as 
late  an  effort  of  mind  as  formulat- 
ing axioms,  470 ;  general,  concerning 
substance,  are  often  trifling,  493 ; 
some  grand  and  beautiful,  4W ;  uni- 
versal, do  not  relate  to  existence, 
498;  universal,  may  be  accidental, 
498 ;  a  division  of,  into  general  and 
particular,  virtually  a  di^^sion  into 
those  of  fact  and  those  of  reason, 
514 ;  capable  of  a  certain  generality, 
514;  of  reason,  515;  mixed,  515;  how 
far  general  and  certain,  515 :  cate- 
gorical and  hyijothetical,  how  re- 
lated, 515,  516;  of  two  kinds:  of 
fact,  537  ;  of  speculation,  537. 

Propensities,  insensible  perceptions  of 
perfections  and  imperfections,  201. 

Proper  names,  originally  appellatives, 
307. 

Property,  term  discussed,  433,  434. 

Prophecies,  instances  of  pretended, 
604;  their  bad  effects,  605;  alleged, 
said  to  have  had  a  good  effect,  606. 

Proportion,  the  relation  of,  258. 

Propriety,  regard  for,  among  men,  91. 

Prosmptio,  222. 

P?-osth<>pfise7-e}iis,  in  probability,  540; 
how  employed  by  peasantry,  540. 

Protestants,  non-opinionative,  may  be 


INDEX  A 


809 


saved,    according   to   some  Romish 

doctors,   591. 
Proverbs,  481. 
Psittacisra,  191,  196. 
Public,  opinion,  its  force,  2G2;    spirit 

depends  on  morality  and   religion, 

r)3(J. 
"  Public  spirits,"  53G. 
Puccius,  Franciscus,  593. 
Puffendorf,  435. 
Punishment,  '2G0. 
Pyramid,  conservation  of  measure  by, 

150. 
Pyrenees,  308. 
Pythagoras,  100,  474. 

"  Quaken,"  as  a  stem,  298. 

QusD  uiio  splritu  continentur,  241. 

Quakers,  599. 

Qualities  of  things,  defined,  131 ;  pri- 
mary, what?  131;  secondary,  what? 
132 ;  power,  when  regarded  among 
the  primary,  132;  power,  when  re- 
garded among  the  secondary,  132; 
secondary,  their  relations  to  corre- 
sponding ideas,  133 ;  even  primary, 
do  not  appear  uniformly,  134;  clas- 
sified upon  basis  of  most  common 
conditions,  134;  real,  what?  134; 
what?  148;  sensible,  confused,  432; 
sensible  connections  known  only 
through  experience,  432 ;  analysis 
employed  in,  432;  secondary  (sensi- 
tive ideas),  their  relation  to  interior 
constitution  of  bodies,  a  confused  re- 
sultant of  the  actions  of  bodies  upon 
us,  458. 

Quarto  modo,  properties  in,  how  appli- 
cable to  infima  species,  455. 

"Quek,"299. 

Questions,  are  themes  between  ideas 
and  propositions,  398. 

Quia  inter  omnes  homines,  etc.,  91. 

Quietists,  "  bad,"  53;  "  idle,"  526. 

Quinquina,  525. 

Quodlibets,  419. 

"R,"   employed  to  signify  a  violent 

movement  and  noise,  299. 
Rabbinage,  372. 
Ragosky  impelled   to  attack  Poland, 

604. 


Ramists,  398. 

Ramus,  Peter,  on  the  reduction  of  logi- 
cal figures,  408,  409. 

Rank,  of  man  in  scale  of  being,  439 ; 
carries  with  it  requirements,  609, 
610. 

Rarefaction,  of  matter,  124;  none 
127. 

Raspe,  publisher  of  "  Nouveaux  Es- 
sais,"  10. 

"Rauschen,"  defined,  299. 

Realists  seem  to  make  nature  prodigal, 
178,  356. 

Reality,  what?  22,  148;  of  relations 
depends  not  merely  ou  the  minds  of 
men  but  on  that  of  God,  276,  277  ;  of 
the  nominal  detinition,  316;  of  onr 
knowledge,  444. 

Reason,  natural  n^velation,  32;  essen- 
tial to  all  revelation,  32;  its  place 
in  iuvestigating  an  alleged  revela- 
tion, 36;  of  men,  69;  aninuils  lia\e, 
145;  prefers  to  consecrate  term 
to  man,  146;  to  declaim  :igainst, 
foolish,  206;  "a  eoncatenalion  of 
truths,"  206;  consists  in  knowing 
the  truth  and  following  the  good, 
206;  depends  on  characters,  220; 
Leibnitz's  delinitiou  of,  555  ;  ]x)cke's 
definition  of,  555 ;  a  special  detini- 
tion of,  555;  its  uses  as  defined,  5")5; 
a  pi'iori,  556;  in  truths  corresponds 
to  cause  in  things,  5.56;  coulined 
to  man,  556;  apparent  in  aninutls, 
what?  556;  its  two  parts,  556;  its 
four  degrees,  556 ;  one  of  tluise  not 
apparent,  .556;  contrary  to,  wlien? 
.578;  above,  when  ?  578,  579  ;  tilings 
beyond  our  present  faculties  not 
above,  578,  579 ;  not  ojiposed  to  fiiith, 
580;  defined,  583;  used  by  all  as 
long  as  it  seems  to  aid  them,  583; 
in  theology  agitated  between  Socin- 
ians  and  Catholics,  585 ;  aiul  custom, 
ditHcult  to  satisfy  both,  609. 

Reasoning,  an  oddni'ss  in  some  people 
due  to  a  non-nalui"il  (•onnc<'tion  of 
ideas,  282:  \vh;it?  411;  all,  spriiigH 
from  things  already  known  mid 
agreed  to,  413;  is  ex  prmcoi/iiitis 
el  j/r.-iiconcessis,  413,  470;  claims  <if, 
an  infinite  numijor  of,  561. 


810 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Recalling  absent  ideas,  an  active 
power,   219. 

Receptivity,  174. 

Recollection,  its  two  meanings,  165. 

Reduction,  of  figures  in  logic  best  ef- 
fected by  principle  of  contradiction, 
407. 

Reflection,  according  to  Locke,  4;  "  a 
regard  for  what  is  in  us,  and  born 
in  us,"  11,  45;  more  than  Locke 
makes  it,  reaches  mind,  23,  24,  45, 
75,  82;  where  Locke  approaches 
nearest  Leibnitz,  111 ;  senses  furnish 
material  for,  220. 

Reguln,  non  ex,jiis  sumi,  sed  ex  jure 
qicod  est  regulam  fieri,  maxim  of 
Paulas,  486. 

Reiuesius,  372. 

Relata,  235. 

Relations,  a  complex  idea  according  to 
Locke,  5 ;  of  comparison,  144 ;  of  con- 
currence, 144;  subjects  of,  2:35;  have 
something  of  essence  of  reason,  235  ; 
have  foundations  in  things,  235 ;  come 
from  supreme  reason,  235  ;  may 
change,  without  change  of  subject, 
235 :  ideas  of,  their  clearness,  236 : 
of  proportion,  258  ;  of  imperfect 
magnitude,  258;  of  origin,  258;  of 
the  family,  258 :  of  consanguinity, 
259;  alliance,  259;  aflinity,  259;  nat- 
ural and  moral,  260 :  by  institution, 
260 ;  itself  often  clearer  than  its 
ground,  265  ;  value  of  knowing 
ground  of,  265  :  dependent  on  Di\'ine 
Mind,  277  ;  knowledge  of,  largest 
field  of  human  investigation,  432. 

Relative  terms,  what?  235,236;  which 
are  usually  deemed  positives,  237. 

Religion  demands  imambiguous  words, 
379. 

Remembrance,  what?  {suhvenire),  77, 
165. 

Reminiscence,  15, 20,  77,  107  :  of  Plato, 
15,  46 ;  of  what  we  know  sometimes 
difficult,  20;  Plato's  doctrine  of,  de- 
nied, 21,  79,  80;  how  distinguished 
from  other  forms  of  thinking,  105. 

Resemblances,  possibilities  in,  356. 

Resistance  in  m.atter,  is  it  invinci- 
ble? 122:  arises  in  different  ways, 
122,  123;  defined,   122;   comes  from 


inertia,  123;  comes  from  impetuos- 
ity of  body,  123 ;  comes  from  adhe- 
sion, 123. 

Resolutions,  should  be  made  when 
a  man  is  in  the  midst  of  good  im- 
pulses, 192;  should  be  kept  when 
their  sensible  reasons  are  only  surd 
thoughts,  196. 

Respondentes.  478,  479. 

Rest,  its  privative  nature  discussed, 
131 ;  cause  of,  131. 

Ftestraint,  what?  182. 

Restitutio  in  integrum,  534. 

Retention,  a  faculty  of  mind  in  con- 
templation, 142;  in  memory,  142, 
143. 

Revelation,  what?  32;  mu.st  be  sure 
concerning,  554;  original,  584;  tra- 
ditional, 584 ;  cannot  go  against  clear 
evidence  of  reason,  584 ;  cannot  be 
received  against  intuitive  knowl- 
edge, 584;  determines  against  prob- 
ability, 585;  supernatural  reason, 
596 ;  had  external  signs,  597 ;  God 
sometimes  illumines  mind  in,  597; 
defined, 598;  judged  by  reason  and 
Scripture,  598. 

Reveries,  165,  166. 

Reversal  of  viscera,  352. 

Revolution,  a  general,  said  to  be  im- 
minent through  the  spread  of  loose 
opinions,  536 ;  will  be  a  punishment 
and  yet  an  advantage,  536. 

Reward,  260. 

Rhetoric,  not  truthful  or  calm,  389; 
though  fallacious,  popular,  389 :  cer- 
tain ornaments  of,  wisely  employed, 
390. 

Rhine,  308. 

Richard  First  of  England,  exonerated 
from  charge  of  murder  by  Old  Man 
of  the  ^fountain,  197. 

River  changes  its  waters,  yet  is  same 
river,  240. 

Rivers,  their  names,  308. 

Roberval,  at  eighty  publishes  his  geom- 
etry, 463 ;  his  work  on  Euclid's  ele- 
ments, 107,  473. 

Rod  and  sugar  illustration,  470. 

Rohaut  on  motiou,  23.>. 

Romans  ii.  15,  quoted,  43;  14 : 4,  quoted, 
447. 


INDEX  A 


811 


Romans  who  built,  99 ;  excelled  Greeks 

in  law  and  arms,  415. 
Romulus,  doubts  about,  545. 
"  Rorarius,"  (;6. 
Rothwelsch,  its  nature,  292. 
Round,  why  distant  things  seem  so, 

120. 
Ruentis  Acervi,  problem  of,  328. 
Ruhr,  308. 
Rules,  sure  when  established  on  reason, 

45;  good,  their  division,  486;  when 

universal,    487 ;    of    jurisprudence, 

their  uses,  493. 

Sagacity,  411,  555. 

Sancho  Pauza,  saw  Dulcinea  by  hear- 
say, 321. 

Sarmatian,  297  ;  salt  pits,  696. 

Satires,  as  historical  material,  542. 

Satisfaction  intiuences  will,  188. 

Saxons,  ancient  books  of,  295. 

Scaliger,  Joseph,  writes  against  math- 
ematicians, 93;  Julius,  his  semina 
wternitatis,  43 ;  dream  of,  106. 

Scaudiano,  Count  of,  398. 

Scarlet,  like  sound  of  trumpet,  128, 
321. 

Sceptics,  m,  420,  422. 

Scheubelius,  his  edition  of  Euclid,  403. 

Schilter,  295,  304. 

Sch(euberg,  106. 

Scholastics,  55, 62, 66,  428,  503, 511 ;  the 
question  of  immortality  among,  52 ; 
their  attempts  at  definition  ridiculed 
by  Locke,  320;  sometimes  present 
discussions  of  value,  494;  their  de 
constantia  suhjecti,  516;  abandoned 
infant  damnation,  594. 

Science,  demonstrative,  founded  on 
innate  knowledge,  79 ;  its  content, 
326  ;  historical,  its  content,  326;  each 
has  its  prxcognita,  517 ;  divided  into 
three  kinds,  621 ;  each  division  may 
be  made  to  absorb  the  others,  622 ; 
Nominalists  on,  623;  one  for  each 
truth,  623;  like  ocean,  arbitrarily 
divided,  623;  truths  may  be  placed 
in  diiferent  divisions,  623  ;  a  twofold 
division  proposed,  623;  a  syntlietic 
and  practical  part  of,  624;  an  ana- 
lytic and  practical  part  of,  624  ;  how 
the  ancient  trii)le  division  should  be 


understood,  625;  civil  division  of, 
62(; :  a  third  division,  an  index,  pro- 
po.sed,  62."). 

Scipio  Ferreus,  571. 

Scriptures,  Holy,  may  the  literal  sense 
of,  ever  be  abandoned  ?  589. 

Scj-thians,  297. 

Sea,  noises  of,  as  an  illustration  of  in- 
sensible perceptions,  15,  48. 

"  Search  after  Truth,  The,"  176. 

Seckendorf,  nature  of  his  work,  543, 
544. 

Secondary  matter,  not  of  utmost 
subtlety,  231;  unity  in,  from  con- 
spirant  movements,  231 ;  doctrine  of 
monads  throws  much  light  upon,  231 . 

Secondary  qualities,  can  any  neces- 
sary coexistence  or  incompatibility 
between  them  be  known  with  cer- 
tainty? 461. 

Sectarianism,  its  strange  influence, 
618. 

Self,  dwells  in  us,  246 ;  basis  of  phys- 
ical identities,  247;  to  be  distin- 
guished from  phenomenon  of  self 
and  pure  consciousness,  247 ;  piie- 
nomenon  of,  basis  of  personal  iden- 
tity, 247. 

Semicircle,  a  centre  of  magnitude  of, 
cannot  be,  354. 

Semina  xternitatis,  43. 

Semi-identicals,  492. 

Semi-pains,  170. 

Semi-pleasures,  170. 

Scndoniir,  Council  of,  612. 

Sennertus,  487-W9. 

Sensations,  wliat?  according  to  I.,ocko, 
4;  reminder  of  innate  truths  rallu^r 
than  proofs,  38;  carried  by  nerves 
to  brain,  121 ;  how  received  by  nerves 
or  meml)ranes,  122:  dilTereiit,  pro- 
duced by  same  object,  133;  wliat  ? 
165 ;  of  light,  its  genesis,  171  :  of 
heat,  its  genesis,  171  ;  action  in, 
220  ;  and  imagination,  difTcrcnce 
between,  419,  422  ;  may  be  same 
species  witli  imagination,  422;  give 
certainty,  511  :  scepticism  regard- 
ing, im])()ssibl(!,  511;  are  "percep- 
tions of  sensil)le  things,"  511  ;  arise? 
from  extcrn;il  cause,  511,  512:  jus- 
tify mathematical  demonstrations, 


812 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LUCRE 


512;  of  the  different  organs  bear 
witness  to  each  other,  512;  beyond 
these,  no  knowledge  but  probabil- 
ity, 512. 

Sense-qualities,  capable  of  real  defini- 
tion, 17;  give  occasion  to  perceive 
ideas  and  truths,  82 ;  not  of  arbi- 
trary constitution,  171. 

Senses,  some  ideas  not  from,  70;  give 
confused  ideas  and  truths,  82;  do 
not  give  truths  absolutely  certain, 
470;  are  liable  to  illusion,  ■170. 

Sensible,  qualities,  pleonasm  of  per- 
ception in  regard  to,  324;  sj^ecies, 
381. 

Sentiments  and  beautiful  sentences  of 
authors,  their  use,  492. 

Serenus,  405. 

Series,  a  continued,  to  what  extent 
in  corporeal  and  intelligent  worlds, 
332-334;  certain,  not  compossible  in 
universe,  334. 

Series,  infinite,  424 ;  expi-essive  of  pro- 
portion of  square  and  circle,  425; 
can  it  be  expressed  in  a  finite  quan- 
tity, 425 ;  a,  of  syllogisms,  o(J4. 

Sextus  Pomponius,  241. 

Shadows  interpenetrate,  yet  are  dis- 
tinct, 238. 

Shame,  what?  173. 

"  Shepherd,  The  Extravagant,"  389. 

Siam,  King  of,  and  existence  of  ice, 
530,  582. 

Sibyl,  Cumfean,  598. 

Sifrid,  Petri,  54(5. 

Sight,  object  of,  may  not  be  in  ex- 
istence when  seen,  137;  educated, 
of  physicians,  392;  neither  wholly 
necessary,  nor  wholly  voluntary, 
528. 

Signs,  621 ;  and  indications,  medical, 
539. 

Simple  ideas,  4  ;  simple  in  ai^pear- 
ance,  120  ;  apperception  does  not 
divide  them,  120;  analyzed  by  rea- 
son, 121 ;  which  come  by  one  sense 
only,  121  ;  arranged  according  to 
means  by  which  we  perceive  them, 
121 ;  cannot  have  nominal  defini- 
tions, 319. 

Simple  modes,  164. 

Sins  and  duties,  261. 


Size,  knowledge  of,  how  acquired,  160. 

Sleep,  165, 166  ;  does  not  arrest  percep- 
tion, 112;  if  soul  exist  in,  without 
perception,  why  not  thought  exist 
without  perception  ?  113 ;  secured  by 
division  of  attention,  115;  dream- 
less, has  a  feeble  consciousness, 
115. 

Sleidan,  his  forgetf ulness,  114  ;  Charles 
Fifth's  opinion  of,  543 ;  nature  of  his 
work,  543. 

Slusius,  his  "  pearls,"  387,  4G5. 

Society,  founded  in  nature  and  con- 
venience, 285,  286;  not  founded,  as 
according  to  Hobbes,  in  the  wicked- 
ness of  the  species,  285,  286. 

Socinians,  586,  589. 

Socrates,  4r'5  ;  in  "  Meno,"  78;  on 
affinity  of  pleasure  and  pain,  170 ; 
his  demon,  598. 

Solem  dicere  falsum  auclet,  156. 

Solidity,  220;  how  caused,  122;  im- 
penetrability, a  synonyme,  122,  123 ; 
sensible,  124;  essential,  what?  124; 
what?  125;  perfect,  an  experiment 
regarding,  126. 

Solomon,  quoted,  158. 

Solon,  on  parricide,  325. 

Something,  the  Eternal,  is  it  a  being, 
501. 

Sondern,  its  meaning,  366. 

Sophia  of  Russia,  601. 

Sophists,  their  obscurity  of  teaching 
ridiculed  by  Lucian,  378. 

Sorbonne,  Casaubon's  bon-mot  con- 
cerning, 478. 

Sorites,  559,  561. 

Sorrow,  what?  172. 

Soul,  in  it  a  mullitude  of  impressions, 
inarticulate  like  noise  of  waves,  11 : 
always  thinks,  11 ;  more  independent 
than  thought,  15,  24 ;  its  thoughts 
not  always  distinct  enough  for  re- 
membrance, 24 ;  if  passive,  is  with- 
out life,  25 ;  its  immortality  not  de- 
pendent on  gracious  miracle,  25,  53, 
63 ;  its  alleged  reunion  with  ocean 
of  Divinity,  53 ;  its  ineilaceable  con- 
nection with  organic  body,  53;  its 
immortality  proved,  62 ;  can  it  be 
annihilated?  62;  the  importance  of 
its    immateriality   to   religion   and 


INDEX  A 


813 


morality,  G2,  63 ;  Locke's  view  of 
its  iniiuateriality,  63;  our  thoughts 
aud  acts  come  from  its  depths, 
70;  is  its  failure  to  perceive  only 
a  failure  to  remember  what  was 
learned  formerly?  79;  can  a  thing 
be  in,  and  yet  not  known  when 
the  soul  has  the  capacity  of  know- 
ing it  ?  79 ;  may  not  nature  have 
concealed  therein  some  original 
knowledge  ?  79 ;  its  proi^erties  and 
affections  cannot  be  all  considered 
at  once,  79 ;  may  have  possessions  of 
which  we  have  made  no  use,  80 ;  has 
more  than  naked  faculty  towards  in- 
nate truths,  81 ;  has  dispositions,  ap- 
titudes, propensities  toward  innate 
truths,  81;  nothing  in,  which  will 
not  be  expressed  by  understanding, 
87 ;  what  it  comprises,  111 ;  never 
witliout  perception,  112;  continuity 
of  its  perceptions  not  disproved  by 
dreamless  men,  115;  of  child,  what 
ideas  in,  before  or  at  moment  of  un- 
ion with  body,  117  ;  its  thoughts  indis- 
tinct when  a  multitude  of  movements 
in  bi'ain,  117 ;  it  always  expresses  a 
body  which  is  always  impressed  in 
an  intinite  multitude  of  ways,  117 : 
perception  in,  of  which  it  is  not  con- 
scious, 117 ;  does  not  require  that 
impressions  be  of  a  certain  form  aud 
size  to  be  perceived,  117  ;  movements 
within,  correspondent  to  circulatory 
and  digestive  movements  in  the 
body,  117 ;  how  do  we  know  it  al- 
ways thinks,  117 ;  what  is  perceiva- 
ble is  composed  of  what  is  not  so, 
118  ;  is  to  say  that  it  thinivs  witliout 
consciousness,  to  say  tliat  it  thinks 
unintelligibly?  118;  not  merely  tlie, 
always  flunks,  but  the  man,  118 ; 
passive  only  in  perception  of  simple 
ideas,  119;  active  in  forming  com- 
plex ideas,  119;  impossible  for  it  to 
think  expressly  upon  all  its  thoughts, 
119 ;  if  thinking  on  all  its  thouglits, 
it  would  never  pass  to  a  new  thought, 
119;  its  connection  with  body,  l.'iS; 
vegeta))le,  141;  a  simple  substance 
or  monad,  147;  wliile  representing 
))ody,  preserves  its  own  perfections. 


181  :  dependent  on  body,  181 ;  in 
voluntary  acts  body  dependent  met- 
aphysically on  it,  182;  a  living 
mirror,  219;  a  "separate."  inconceiv- 
able, 220,  221 ;  thinks  aud  feels  al- 
ways, 230 ;  never  leaves  entirely  and 
at  once  the  body,  230;  in  animals 
and  vegetables  secures  their  iden- 
tity, 241 ;  cannot  wholly  leave  body, 
242;  keeps  even  in  death  an  organ- 
ized body  part  of  preceding,  242; 
basis  of  identity,  242;  no  transmi- 
gration of,  but  transformation,  242; 
sliould  doctrine  of  its  imnuiterial- 
ity  be  received  on  faith?  429:  im- 
materiality of  soul  not  the  only 
basis  of  morality,  429;  produces 
pleasure  or  pain  iu  conformity  to 
what  takes  place  in  matter,  431 ;  is 
there,  if  it  is  not  perceived?  490. 

Souls,  always  joined  to  a  body,  52, 
113;  of  brutes,  their  conservation 
does  not  require  metenipsydiosis, 
53 ;  not  perishable,  08,  166 ;  not 
absurd  to  suppose  that  there  are 
truths  in,  wliich  may  yet  be  devel- 
oped, 80;  capable  not  merely  of 
Ivuowing  innate  truths,  but  of  lind- 
ing  tlieni,  80;  all  dilfer,  but  not  spe- 
cifically, 110  :  never  without  organs, 
220;  never  without  sensations,  220; 
a  kind  of  movement  attributable  to, 
231 ;  change  nothing  in  the  ftu'cc  of 
bodies  nor  in  their  direction,  233; 
as  primitive  entelechies  are  infinite, 
348. 

Soul  and  body,  independent,  yet  mutu- 
ally obedient,  (iS  ;  dilliculty  regard- 
ing union  of,  removed  by  doctrine 
of  monads,  510,  511 ;  harmony  of, 
553. 

"  Soul  and  machine,"  348,  .349. 

Sound,  heard  by  teeth  and  verlex.  122. 

Space,  views  of  Locke  and  Lcilinit/. 
regarding,  12;  full  of  iiilinilely 
divisible  matter,  54;  without  boily, 
a  fiction  of  philosophers,  114:  "  full 
of  cub('s?"  124;  and  solidity,  are 
they  two?  128;  a  kind  of  order.  128  ; 
defined,  153:  indicates  the  iiossiblo 
as  well  as  the  actual,  158:  has  its 
reality  from  Ciod,  159;   infiiiitr!,  no 


814 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


idea  of,  163 ;  a  vacuum  in,  consid- 
ered, 16,  IL'O,  484. 

Spain,  castles  in,  lli(). 

Species,  inunission  of,  a  tlieory  of  self- 
perception,  20;  intentional,  55,  381; 
names  of,  originally  given  to  individ- 
uals, 308 ;  receive  names  of  genera, 
308  ;  ascend  from,  to  genera,  309 ;  can 
be  infinitely  varied,  314;  is  the  es- 
sence or  idea  of,  factitious  or  existent 
in  nature  ?  314  ;  are  they  dependent 
entirely  on  name,  315;  its  limits, 
usually  fixed  by  nature,  may  be 
arbitrary,  328  ;  logical,  will  never  be 
fonnd,  331,  332;  cannot  be  founded 
on  essence  or  interior  constitution, 
332 ;  is  their  foundation  in  nature 
or  in  naming  ?  335 ;  an  ambiguity  in 
connection  with  terms,  335,  336  ; 
what  can  after  change  be  returned 
to  its  first  form,  has  preserved  its 
first,  336 ;  in  organized  bodies,  336 ; 
determined  by  generation,  33() ;  what 
constitutes  human,  336 ;  all,  truth- 
fully distinguished,  have  founda- 
tions in  nature,  337;  in  botany, 
337;  assumptions  involved  in  the 
supposition  that,  are  dependent  on 
model  essences,  338  ;  may  there 
not  be  a  common  internal  specific 
mark  of?  339  ;  if  dependent  on 
propagation,  qi^estions  concerning, 
343,  344  ;  which  are  not  unum  per 
se,  343 ;  devised  by  the  ignorant,  but 
constantly  under  scientific  correc- 
tion, 349,  350;  if  work  of  nature, 
why  such  differing  conceptions  of? 
350;  may  have  real  essences  inde- 
j)endent  of  our  knowledge,  353  ; 
much  alike,  seldom  occur  together, 
353 ;  in  what  cases  passage  between 
may  be  insensible,  353;  to  what 
extent  we  can  combine  ideas  to 
produce,  353,  354 ;  definition  of, 
depends  on  ability  and  industry 
of  definer,  354 ;  conceptions  of,  may 
vary,  355  :  may  be  good  and  natural, 
though  not  best  and  most  natural, 
355 ;  men  determine  name  but  not, 
357;  mathematical,  357;  physical, 
357;  accidental  changes  do  uot  af- 
fect, 358  ;  provisional  mark  of,  358 ; 


do  the  house  dogs  of  England  and 
those  of  Boulogne  belong  to  different , 
358;  infima,  'S5S;  dog  and  eleiihant, 
of  different,  358 ;  of  time-pieces,  how 
determined,  359  ;  all  men  of  one,  359 ; 
do  not  depend  on  opinion,  360 ;  exist 
in  nature,  3(50;  purely  logical,  360; 
purely  physical,  360  ;  founded  on 
specific  civil  differences,  360 :  nomi- 
nal, 360;  legal,  360;  of  artificial 
things,  the  hesitation  to  admit  them 
into  the  Predicamental  Tables,  361 ; 
a  rule  for  determining,  i^ractically, 
361 ;  sensible,  381 ;  do  we  wrongly 
think  that  nature  fixed  limits  to 
each  by  specific  essence,  and  that 
this  follows  some  specific  name  ?  386 ; 
a  dictiouai-y  of  simple  ideas  observed 
in  each  individual  of,  desiderated, 
394 ;  description  of,  is  natural  his- 
tory, 395  ;  is  being  completed  by 
degrees,  395 ;  why  retarded,  395  ; 
will  be  defined  provisionally  only 
by  definitions  of  genera,  457 ;  medi- 
ate, why  kept  from  our  observation, 
552  ;  connection  of,  552. 

Speculative  discussion  usually  affords 
two  sides,  378. 

Speech,  the  instrument  and  bond  of 
society,  285 ;  monkeys  said  to  have 
organs  of,  286:  might  consist  of 
musical  tones,  287;  by  words  more 
suited  to  man's  original  simplicity, 
287 ;  organs  of,  not  in  birds  who  use 
words,  287 :  man  alone  can  employ 
organs  of,  287. 

Spendthrift,  his  undue  estimate  of 
"  advantage  of  the  present,"  209. 

Spider's  voracity,  91. 

Spinoza,  "  the  subtle  Jew,"  cautiously 
quoted,  52() ;  life  of,  exemplary,  535. 

Spinozists,  Leibnitz's  relation  to,  69; 
their  views  of  God,  69;  their  views 
of  final  causes,  69. 

Spirit,  existence  of,  more  certain  than 
that  of  sensible  objects,  229 ;  uot  "  in 
loco  sed  ill  aliquo  ubi,"  the  expres- 
.sion  challenged,  230 ;  their  ''  ubiety  " 
detailed,  2; )0:  cannot  be  stripped  of 
perceptions  of  past  existence,  249; 
has  presentiments  which  can  be  de- 
veloped,  249 ;  an  illustration  of  a 


INDEX   A 


S15 


word  passing  frnm  a  sensible  origin 
to  a  siguitication  more  abstruse, 
289. 
Spirits,  united  to  some  organic  body, 
159 ;  related  to  other  bodies,  159 ; 
related  to  space,  159 ;  can  perhaps 
assume  suitable  organs  of  sensation, 
228 ;  can  operate  only  where  they 
are,  229 :  active  power  perhaps,  the 
proper  attribute  of,  233;  created, 
not  totally  separate  from  passive 
matter,  234;  in  the  future  state, 
possess  very  perfect  organs,  393 ; 
influence  matter,  440;  form  a  kind 
of  State  under  God,  441. 

Spring,  a  mineral,  240. 

"  Square  is  not  a  circle  "  :  is  the  idea 
innate  ?  83,  84. 

Square  may  be  known  by  child,  though 
its  incommensurability  with  its  diag- 
onal unknown,  100. 

"  Square  equal  to  circle,"  how  nearly 
done,  424. 

Stabbing,  English  opinion  of,  326. 

"  State  of  Vision  "  of  theologians,  429. 

Stegmann,  Christopher,  a  Socinian, 
585.  [585. 

Stegmann,  Joshua,    an  anti-Socinian, 

Stoics,  their  prolepses,  43;  their  views 
of  the  passions,  172;  their  "wise 
man  alone  free,"  179;  on  future  life 
and  virtue,  208. 

Srop7T7,  91. 

Strabo,  345. 

Strauchius,  365. 

Street-porter  surpasses  a  statesman  in 
determining  the  weight  of  a  burden, 
273. 

Strigil,  curry-comb,  394. 

Study,  165,  166 ;  reasons  for  aversion 
to,' 609. 

Stupidity,  146. 

Suarez,  494. 

Sub-exceptions,  480. 

Subscription  to  syra])ols,  619. 

Substance,  its  existence  dependent  on 
activity,  11 ;  '  a,  whose  knowledge 
and  power  are  infinite  should  be 
honoured,'  an  innate  i)rinciple,  23; 
how  perceived,  24;  Locke's  view  of, 
57,  58;  activity  belongs  to  its  es- 
sence, 60;  immaterial,  necessary  to 


thought,  62;   unities  of,  66;    Locke 
denies  we  have  idea  of,  105 :  reflec- 
tion discovers  idea  of,  105;  once  in 
action  always  so,  111;  has  a  degree 
of  liquidity.  111 ;  activity  of,  implies 
activity  of  soul,  112;  Locke's  delini- 
tion,  148;  idea  of,  not  obscure,  148; 
division   of,    148;    may    God,   finite 
spirits,  and  matter  be  modifications 
of   a  common?    153;    do  accidents 
subsist    in  ?    154  ;    divergency    of 
opinion   between   Locke   and    Leib- 
nitz upon,  154;  that  which  is  active, 
218;   one  created,  cannot  inriucncc 
another,  218;  is  idea  of,  due  to  in- 
advertence?  225;   is  assumption  of 
substratum  in,  unreasonable?  225; 
whence  our  ignorance  of  substance? 
227;  Locke's  opinion  of,  2;>4;  if  one 
add  a  quality  to  tlie  idea  of  a,  does 
he  change  essence  of  substance,  or 
perfect    his    idea    of    it?    385;    an 
allegation  tliat  ideas  of,  being  fan- 
cies,  prevent    advance    in    knowl- 
edge, 389;  the  visible  in,  gives  first 
ideas,   392;    knowledge  of   internal 
con.stitution  of,  necessary  to  ulterior 
knowledge  both  of  qualities  and  of 
accidents,  457,  458 ;  can  it  be  multi- 
plied when   the   individual   es.sence 
does  not  exist  ?  589 :  in  theology,  (il2. 
Substances,   according    to    Loclvc,    5; 
simple,  created,  always  joined  to  a 
body,  52 ;  never  naturally  separated 
from  matter,  63;  universally  differ- 
ent, 110;  internal  vortices  of,  cannot 
be   .stopped,   112;    'these    uiaciiines 
arc,"2S0;  their  <lefinitioii,  317  :  gen- 
era and  species,  oidy  sorts  of,  3:50 ; 
ideas  of  individual   names  usually 
confined  to  ideas  of,  3(il ;  perfect.  In 
be  distinguished   from  ((if/f/rri/iitu) 
assemblages  of  substances,  'Ml;  di- 
recting or  characteristic  (inalilics  in, 
."i92:  names  of,  say  more  tiiaii  d(^tini- 
tion,  393,  :!94;  dciiiiilinMS  of,  arrived 
at  by  study  of  naliir.-il  history,  394  ; 
(U)    not   have   tlicir    (pialitics    inde- 
pendent of  other  sulistaiiccs,  161. 
Subslrutuin,  5. 
Subvenh-d,  77. 
Huccedaiieum,  417. 


816 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"  Summa  Theologise  "  of  Fabri,  nSG. 

Summa  rerum,  215,  (510. 

"^vixTTVoLa.    iravra,    phrase    of    Hippo- 
crates, 48. 

Sim,  birds  in  the,  intelligent,  244. 

Snppressions,  internal,  77. 

Sard  thoughts,  191,  193,  I'M,  198,  210, 
2G.5,  270,287. 

vSnspension  of  desire,  202. 

Sweden,  theological  authority  in,  Oil. 

Swedish  youth,  a  prodigy  in  numbers, 
78,  393." 

Sweetness  different  from  bitterness,  a 
fact  of  primitive  experience,  23. 

Swiss  Confession,  612. 

Syllogism,  when  terms  equivocal,  484; 
does  it  present  only  a  single  exam- 
ple? 5.57,  5()2:  does  it  help  mind? 
557,  .558 ;  used  on  authority,  557 : 
if  we  can  reason  without  it,  what 
then  ?  557,  563 ;  its  forms,  557  :  when 
to  be  used,  557,  562,  563;  cannot 
show  connection  of  mediate  ideas, 
558;  its  use  confined  to  the  schools, 
558 ;  a  i:)Ossible  use  for,  558 :  its  in- 
utility, 5.58  :  serves  as  spectacles,  559 ; 
Leibnitz's  view  of,  559  ;  the  scholas- 
tic, not  often  employed,  559;  a  most 
important  and  beautiful  discovery, 
559;  a  universal  mathematics,  5.59 ; 
contains  an  infallible  art,  559;  cate- 
gorical (simple  and  comj)lex),  560; 
hypothetical,  560;  disjunctive,  560; 
like  counting  on  the  fingers,  561, 
562 ;  it  may  be  trilling,  562 ;  useful 
in  probabilities,  564,  565 ;  its  use  in 
invention  questioned,  565;  its  scope 
as  "formal  argumentation,"  565; 
Locke's  visible  mistake  about,  567 ; 
does  not  require  a  universal  proposi- 
tion for  its  validity,  567  ;  a  transpo- 
sition of  25remises  proposed,  568; 
begins  with  universal  proposition  as 
more  didactic,  568 ;  its  doctrine  de- 
pends on  "  (?e  continente  et  eon- 
tento,"  569;  single,  people  of  a, 
608. 
Symbolic    books,    the    propriety    of 

swearing  to  adhere  to,  619. 
Sympathy,  391. 
Symptom,  113. 
Syncategorematic,  161. 


Syn(!retists,  537. 

Synthesis,   often    leads    to    beautiful 

truths,  412. 
Syrus,  Publilius,  492. 

Tabula  rasn,  is  the  mind  originally 
a  ?  4,  10, 15,  42,  6.5, 105  :  of  Aristotle, 
38 ;  a  fiction  based  on  imperfect  no- 
tions of  philosophers,  109,  110;  if 
soul  a,  then  when  ideas  taken  away 
there  is  nothing,  110 ;  notion  of,  i-ests 
really  on  corporality  of  soul,  111. 

Tacitus,  91. 

Taking  words  for  things,  484. 

Tartar,  297. 

Taste,  felt  by  nose-,  122. 

Tastes,  confused  percejitions,  208;  how 
to  be  treated,  208  ;  l)oth  of  palate 
and  of  soul  can  be  changed,  216. 

Teaching,  employs  general  ijroposi- 
tions,  475. 

Tendency,  174 ;  included  in  power, 
224. 

Tenderness,  what?  223. 

Tentamen,  .38. 

Terence,  quoted,  459,  492. 

Terms,  peculiar  to  each  language,  222 ; 
dependent  on  change  of  custom,  222 ; 
general,  their  place  in  language,  288 ; 
did  language  originate  in,  288 ;  how 
arrived  at,  309,  310;  abstract  and 
concrete,  .368 ;  abstract,  distinct, 
368  ;  can  they  be  affirmed  of  each 
other?  ;t68,  369;  abstract,  logical, 
368,  369;  real,  368,  369;  are  they 
confined  to  schools,  369 ;  a  chaos  of, 
much  time  lost  over,  442. 

Tertullian,  his  prxftcriptiones,  531 ; 
"  the  impossible  must  be  believed," 
582. 

Testimony,  may  secure  moral  certi- 
tude, 247 ;  and  opinion  compared, 
5.30;  its  force  diminished  as  it  is  re- 
'moved  from  the  original  statement, 
541 ;  the  value  of  contemporary, 
541 ;  subjects  about  Avhich  it  cauuot 
be  obtained,  548. 

Tetragonism,  75. 

Teutonic  language  and  antiquities 
enter  into  European  history,  304. 

Thales  of  IMiletus,  4(i.3. 

"  Theatrum  Vitas  Humauaj,"  548. 


INDEX   A 


817 


Theme,  ineoinplex,  398  ;  complex,  398. 

Themes,  which  are  between  ideas  and 
propositions,  398. 

Theogony,  3G1. 

Theology,  Christian,  ridiculed  hy  one 
wlio  persisted  in  explaining  its  terms 
according  to  their  original  force, 
290  ;  based  upon  revelation,  474 ; 
unites  with  it  '  natural '  theology, 
474;  natural,  "the  axioms  of  ex- 
ternal reason,"  474;  founded  on 
"the  veracity  and  atti-ibutes  of 
God,"  474;  natural,  theoretical  or 
metaphysics,  practical  or  ethics, 
496;  reason  in,  585;  logical  necessity 
accepted  in,  588  ;  physical  necessity 
not  sufficient  to  refute  a  miracle, 
588 ;  a  conclusion  in,  is  it  to  be 
judged  by  its  terms  or  means  of 
proof?  588;  as  an  indicial  term,  627. 

Theophilus,  why  assumed,  69. 

The'otisque,  294. 

'  Therefore,'  its  use,  564. 

Theresa,  St.,  600. 

Theseus,  ship  of,  240. 

Thieving,  why  praised  by  Spartans, 
263. 

Things,  not  perceived,  should  not 
therefore  be  denied,  24j  of  which 
we  are  not  conscious  are  neither  in 
soul  nor  body,  51 ;  "  themselves,"  59; 
cannot  be  and  not  l)e  at  same  time, 
are  there  some  to  whom  this  axiom 
is  not  known?  72,  83;  uniform  ab- 
stractions, 110;  substantial,  have 
each  characteristic  relations  to  each 
other?  110  ;  of  the  same  kind,  y(!t 
not  perfectly  alike,  238;  "  identical 
witli  a  tlurd  thing  are  identical  with 
fine  another,"  denied  by  some  in 
theology,  586. 

"  Tlunk,'i,  therefore  I  am,"  410,  469. 

Thinking,  art  of,  in  time  of  need,  214; 
its  elements  not  yet  found,  214; 
not  mnemonics,  214;  -being,  can  it 
come  from  non-tliinking?  505;  not 
from  the  spirituali/.ation  of  matter 
by  minute  division,  605 ;  not  by  its 
configuration,  506 ;  not  by  its  organ- 
ization, .506. 

"Thirteen,"  28.3. 

Thouiasius,  Jacob,  600. 
3g 


Thorn,  Council  of,  dl.i. 

Thought,  immediate  objects  of,  109 ; 
mediate  objects  of,  109:  external 
immediate  object  of,  (iod,  109;  in- 
ternal immediate  object  of,  soul, 
109;  is  what?  135,178;  past  persists 
or  memory  could  not  preserve  it, 
143;  an  essential  act  of  soul,  166; 
what  animals  have  no,  178;  trains 
of,  182  ;  pertains  to  mind.  218;  only 
a  passive  power,  219;  should  not 
think  of,  apart  from  things  senses 
furnish,  220. 

Thoughts,  and  acts,  all  from  depths 
of  soul,  70;  external  senses  in  part 
causes  of,  70 ;  are  acts,  84 ;  distin- 
guished from  ideas,  119;  we  are 
never  without,  119;  correspond  to 
sensation,  119;  in  general,  119;  re- 
markable, 119:  involuntary,  182; 
partly  from  external  objects,  182; 
from  remaining  impressions,  182. 

"Three,  is  as  muerh  as  two  anil  one," 
a  definitinn,  410  ;  conceals  an  intui- 
tive conviction  that  the  ideas  are 
possible,  410. 

Time,  "  a  kind  of  order,"  128 ;  is  num- 
ber not  measure  of  motion,  157  ;  the 
vacuum  in,  wliat  it  shows,  1.57  :  lias 
its  reality  from  God,  159;  a  vacuum 
in,  concealed,  159;  distinguished, 
238. 

Tobacco-smoking,  its  spread  illustra- 
tive of  spread  of  tradition,  72 ;  ilhis- 
trative  of  habit,  216. 

Tojjics  {(ir(ju))ienta),i^^ ;  explain,  398  ; 
prove,  .398;  of  Aristotle,  498,  .541. 

Torricclli,  tube  of,  127. 

Touch,  qualities  of,  are  mollifications 
of  resistance  or  solidity,  122. 

Traction,  in  bodies  which  do  not  touch. 
125,  127. 

Trades,  how  best  taught,  62s. 

Tranqtiil  times  of  progress  l(H)Ued  for- 
ward to,  437. 

Transmigration,  Van  ITelmont's  idea 
of,  242;  held  by  Rabbins,  212; 
distinguishal)le  front  transforma- 
tion, 212;  in  what  .senses  may  be 
lield,  212;  in  what  sense  possible, 
243;  not  conformed  to  onler  of 
things,  243;    of  human  soul  into  a 


818 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


hog,  does  it  make  a  man  ?  243 ;  in- 
volves no  apparent  absurdity,  249; 
of  immaterial  substance  without 
same  conseiousuess  does  not  con- 
vey same  personality,  249. 

Transparency,  artificial,  produced  by 
rapid  rotation  of  a  co-j-wheel,  illus- 
trative of  confused  sensitive  percep- 
tions, 459. 

Travel,  books  of,  their  uses,  548. 

Trebeta  and  Treves,  546. 

Trent,  Council  of,  612. 

Trimalchio,  204. 

Trithemius,  546. 

Tropical  use  of  language,  271. 

True  and  false,  belong  to  propositions, 
281 ;  how  applicable  to  ideas,  281. 

True,  the,  may  be  drawn  from  the 
false,  565. 

Truth,  necessary,  alone  capable  of 
proof,  .3;  what?  4;  not  founded  on 
experience,  11 ;  seeker  of,  described, 
31 ;  he  who  does  not  seek  it  sin- 
cerely himself  dictates  'to  others, 
31 ;  unknown  to  brutes,  44 ;  imme- 
diate to  understanding  and  always 
present,  45 ;  not  established  by  long- 
past  experience,  45 ;  from  under- 
standing alone,  81 ;  mind  source  of, 
81 ;  cannot  be  innate  unless  its  ideas 
are  innate,  84:  a,  may  be  known 
without  knowing  all  about  it,  100; 
though  natural,  not  known  from 
cradle,  100;  nothing  stronger  to 
influence  men  than,  198 ;  of  sensible 
things  only  in  connection  of  phe- 
nomena, 421 ;  how  distinguished 
from  di-eams,  421 ;  not  a  supreme 
attraction  to  man,  437 ;  what  is 
it  ?  449 ;  is  it  in  agreement  or  disa- 
greement of  signs  ?  449,  4.")0 ;  does  it 
lie  in  words  ?  450,  451 ;  Hobbes'  view 
of,  450 ;  as  to  its  di\ision  into  men- 
tal or  nominal,  451 ;  why  not  have 
literal  too  ?  451 ;  its  definition  as 
lying  between  objects  of  ideas, 
451 ;  common  to  us  with  God  and 
angels,  451 ;  its  provisional  indica- 
tion, 451;  moral,  what?  452;  meta- 
physical, what?  452;  lies  in  the 
correspondence  of  propositions  in 
the  mind  with  the  things  in  ques- 


tion, 452 ;  certainty  of,  454 ;  is  there 
theological,  opposed  to  philosophi- 
cal, each  being  true  ?  581  ;  how 
judged  of,  (511. 

Truths,  speculative  and  practical,  the 
same,  23 ;  do  all  depend  on  experi- 
ence? 43;  necessary,  of  mathematics 
do  not  depend  on  examples,  43 ;  yet 
such  truths  may  be  evolved  by  the 
senses,  44;  necessary,  how  discov- 
ered, 44;  necessary,  68;  of  fact, 
69 ;  origin  of,  71 ;  necessary,  their 
origin,  71 ;  particular,  sooner  per- 
ceived, 74  ;  their  proof  dependent  on 
more  general,  74 ;  of  arithmetic  and 
geometry  innatej  76  ;  imprinted  on 
the  soul,  yet  not  always  perceived, 
77 ;  of  fact,  78 ;  necessary,  78 ;  are 
innate  which  can  be  drawn  from 
primitive  innate  truths,  79;  are 
innate  when  their  proof  lies  in  what 
is  within  and  not  in  what  is  given  by 
experience,  80;  either  necessary,  or 
stores  of  experience,  81 ;  universal, 
we  cannot  be  assured  of  by  induc- 
tion, 81 ;  have  their  necessity  in 
reason,  81 ;  necessary,  their  source 
in  intellectual  ideas,  82 :  are  they 
subsequei^t  to  ideas?  82:  express 
knowledge  of,  how  subsequent  to 
express  knowledge  of  ideas,  82 ;  that 
are  within  us  are  habitudes  or  dis- 
positions, not  thoughts,  84 ;  of  rea- 
son not  so  evident  as  immediate  or 
identical  truths,  86 :  opinions  taken 
as,  which  are  only  effects  of  custom 
and  credulity,  98,  99. 

Truths,  individual,  only  given  by 
senses,  11 ;  knowledge  of,  not  in- 
nate, 21 ;  actual  consideration  of. 
not  innate,  21  ;  contingent,  how 
they  come  to  us,  22;  of  fact,  how 
they  come  to  us,  22;  necessary 
derivative,  what  they  depend  on, 
22 ;  primitive,  their  source,  22 ; 
dependent  on  di^^ne  mind,  277 ; 
negative,  289;  primitive,  known  by 
intuition,  404;  divided  into  those 
of  reason  and  those  of  fact,  404 ;  of 
reason,  identical,  401 :  affirmative 
and  negative,  404,  405;  identical, 
negative,  which  belong  to  principle 


INDEX  A 


819 


of  contradiction,  405 ;  primitive,  of 
fact,  are  immediate  internal  experi- 
ences of  an  immediateness  of  feel- 
ing, 410 ;  not  to  be  confounded  with 
their  expressions,  451 ;  general,  their 
establishment  more  important  than 
resolution  of  particular  cases,  4(57 ; 
their  natural  and  historical  order, 
470 ;  why  many  pass  as  self-evident, 
yet  are  capable  of  farther  reduction, 
473;  of  experience  and  truths  of 
pure  reason  compared,  493;  eternal, 
at  bottom  conditional,  515;  neces- 
sary, are  determining  reasons  and 
regulating  principles  of  existence, 
51() ;  anterior  to  existence  of  con- 
tingent beings,  51(>;  grounded  in 
necessary  substance,  517 ;  in  mind 
originally  not  as  propositions  but 
as  sources  of  judgment,  517. 

Tulpius  on  man-like  ape,  244. 

Tunica,  cloak,  394. 

"Two  and  two  are  four,"  its  demon- 
stration, 472. 

"  Two  homogeneous  magnitudes  are 
equal  when  one  is  neither  greater 
nor  smaller  than  the  other  " :  an  ax- 
iom of  Euclid  and  Archimedes,  473. 

Ubiety,  circumscriptive,  230;  defini- 
tive, 230 ;  repletive,  230. 

Unconscious  pain,  195. 

Understand,  not  to,  a  thing,  no  ground 
for  denial  of  its  existence,  GO;  to, 
what?  177. 

Understanding,  "to  be  in,"  according 
to  Locke,  and  according  to  Leibnitz, 
81 ;  a  resemblance  to,  147 ;  adds  re- 
lations, 148 ;  the  origin  of  all  things, 
148 ;  what  ?  177  ;  animals  have  none, 
178 ;  corresponds  to  intellectus,  178 ; 
its  action  intellection,  178;  guardedly 
called  a  faculty  of  soul,  178;  with- 
out freedom  of  no  use,  216. 

Uneasiness,  49,  171,  172;  as  a  stimu- 
lus, 168;  expressed  by  "inquie- 
tude," rather  than  "chagrin,"  169; 
its  influence  on  will,  188;  may  be 
an  insensible  perception,  188;  not 
always  a  displeasure,  188;  arises 
from  nature's  efforts  to  put  herself 
more  at  ease,  194  ;    determines  in 


cases  apparently  indifferent,  194; 
the  tield  of  a  series  of  little  sue- 
cesses  Miiich  afford  pleasure,  liKt; 
not  incompatible  with  happiness, 
194;  consists  in  feeling  without 
knowing  it,  194  ;  more  pressing  not 
always  prevalent  with  will,  2(M). 

Unhappiness,  the  result  of  false  judg- 
ments, 209. 

Unities  of  substance,  66. 

Unity  of  languages  can  only  be  at- 
tributed to  migration  of  peoples, 
297. 

Unity,  perfect,  not  secured  by  homo- 
geneity, reserved  to  animated  bodies. 
362. 

Universality,  never  proved  by  experi- 
ence, 22 ;  in  what  it  consists,  567. 

Universals,  are  they  real?  31.?:  com- 
prise (in  form)  particulars,  .567. 

Unpremeditated  actions,  result  of 
minute  perceptions,  116. 

Unruhe,  term  applied  to  pendulum, 
171. 

Unum  ex  pnmis  cognitis  inter  ter- 
minos  complexos,  469. 

Urim  and  Thummim,  early  teachings 
a  sort  of,  (ill. 

"Utilitate  Credendi,  De,"  of  Augus- 
tine, 616. 

"  Utriusque,"  227. 

Vacuum,  65 ;  Ix)cke  and  Leibnitz  upon, 
16;  is  it  necessary  to  motion?  53; 
excluded,  68  ;  perfect  cannot  bo 
proved  by  experiment,  127 ;  would 
opposite  sides  touch  in  ?  155  ;  in 
time  and  space,  159;  abhorrence  of, 
can  be  soundly  understood,  3HI  ; 
denied  by  Descartes  and  Ijeibnilz, 
483 ;  in  forms  or  species,  552. 

Valla,  Laurentius  on  tlie  Jurists,  415. 

Van  Helmont  on  transmigration,  242. 

Vandal  king,  99. 

Vayer,  La  Motiie  Ic,  593. 

Vcdelius,  his  "Kationale  Tlicologi- 
cum,"  .587,  588,  595. 

Vega,  Garcilasso  de  la,  89. 

Vegetative  .souls,  not  to  be  iighlly  dis 
carded,  3S(),  .'Wl. 

Vellcity,  168,  IC!!. 

VelleUd,  what?  188. 


820 


LEIBNITZ'S   CEITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Venus  Urania  and  the  bastard  VenuS) 
390. 

Vergil,  200,  415,  598;  on  the  praise  of 
virtue,  203;  quoted  by  the  Priscil- 
liauists,  345 ;  quoted  by  Coperui- 
caus,  614. 

Vers  lira,  326. 

Vice,  by  what  standard  adjudged  a, 
261,  263;  its  relatiou  to  sin,  262. 

Vieta,  extended  algebra,  468,  573. 

Vincent  de  Lerius,  his  "  Commonito- 
rium,"  617. 

"  Vindication  of  Doctrine  of  Trinity," 
by  Stillingfleet,  56 ;  Locke's  oj^in- 
ions  examined  in,  56;  ensuing  con- 
troversy, 57. 

Viottus,  520. 

Vires  centripetss,  132. 

Virgil  of  Salzburgh,  443. 

"  Virtually,"  defined,  78. 

Virtue,  its  meanings,  95 ;  the  philo- 
sophic notions  of,  96;  Aristotle's 
definition  of,  96 ;  a  pleasure  of  mind, 
167 ;  its  success  if  fashionable  for  a 
day,  198 ;  is  useful,  201 ;  not  depen- 
dent on  opinion,  262;  and  vice,  are 
they  founded  on  tacit  consent?  262: 
what  is  generally  praised  is  usually 
worthy  of  praise  in  some  respects, 
263;  the  term,  and  that  of  praise 
often  applied  to  same  quality,  263, 
264:  pi-aise  attributed  to,  in  Vergil 
and  Cicero,  263, 264 ;  is  it  that  which 
is  praised,  or  that  which  is  worthy 
of  praise  ?  2(>4 ;  called  '  honesty '  by 
ancients,  264. 

Visions,  what  ?  160 ;  divine,  166 ;  state 
of,  429. 

Vivacity  of  mind,  what?  143. 

Vives,  Ludovicus,  591. 

Vladislas,  king  of  Poland,  612. 

Volition,  what?  177;  a  result  of  con- 
flict of  i^erceptions  and  inclinations, 
199 ;  has  at  bottom  i3ercei)tions  only 
perceptible  in  mass,  199 ;  most  press- 
ing uneasiness  not  always  prevalent 
to  secure,  200 ;  obeys  sometimes  a 
'compound  direction,'  200;  finally 
determined  by  result  of  tendencies, 
200:  mind  can  employ  the  dichoto- 
mies to  vary  intluence,  200. 

X'^oluntary,  defined,  177 ;  and  free,  187 ; 


and  involuntary  not  distinguishable, 
553. 
Vulcan's  buckler,  479. 

Water,  its  apparent  compression  due 
to  air,  120:  changed  into  wine  on 
Christmas  Eve,  470. 

Waterfall,  why  unconscious  of  its 
noise?  47. 

Water-mill,  117. 

Weigel,  his  moral  diagrams,  435. 

"  Wliatever  is,  is"  not  imiversally 
known,  72. 

"White  is  not  red,"  83. 

Whiteness,  what?  163. 

"Whole,  the,  is  equal  to  its  parts," 
not  exi>ressly  used  by  Euclid,  471 ; 
its  limitations,  471. 

Wilkins,  Bishop,  his  artificial  lan- 
guage, 292. 

Will,  not  exclusively  influenced  by 
assurance  of  greater  good,  26;  influ- 
enced by  present  unrest  accompa- 
nied by  desire,  26 :  what  ?  177 ;  and 
power  united,  action  follows,  177 ; 
"  is  free,"  phrase  discussed,  185, 186 ; 
and  under.standing,  relation  of,  185 ; 
may  suspend  its  exercise,  186;  acts 
in  advance  of,  may  influence,  187; 
action  of,  determined  by  what 
pleases,  188;  what  determines  the, 
188;  and  desire  distinct,  188;  what 
determines,  not  greater  good,  188; 
some  actual  uneasiness,  188 ;  great- 
est good  fails  to  influence,  because 
not  strongly  sensible  to  us,  192 ;  re- 
moval of  present  jiain  determines 
it,  194;  why  so  little  swayed  by 
thoughts  of  future  life,  196 ;  and 
desire,  why  confounded,  198;  its 
intelligent  determination  desirable, 
204 :  its  indifference  an  imperfection, 
204;  absolute  indifference  never  pos- 
sible, 204;  in  cases  of  seeming  indif- 
ference it  is  yet  determined  by  a 
concurrence  of  internal  dispositions 
and  external  insensible  impressions, 
204;  determination  of,  useful,  205; 
secures  effectis-e  choice,  205:  deter- 
mination of,  if  it  exists  in  anything 
but  final  choice,  not  free,  205:  com- 
plete in  superior  beings,  yet  they  not 


INDEX   A 


821 


less  free,  205 ;  in  God  secured  by 
what  is  best,  206 ;  iu  God  not  tixed 
by  neeessity,  20G ;  secured  l)y  iucli- 
iiation,  206;  to  the  best,  is  freedom, 
206;  should  be  determined  by  hap- 
piness in  general,  206;  should  be 
determined  by  particular  goods  only 
when  found  agreeing  with  our  true 
])appiness,  206;  and  taste  under  one 
control,  207  ;  acts  by  present  percep- 
tions, 211 ;  acts  by  present  image  of 
the  future,  211 ;  acts  by  discomfort 
of  opposition  to  a  resolution  or 
habit,  212. 

Wisdom,  the  science  of  happiness, 
.'577. 

Witt,  Pensionary  De,  420;  on  Annu- 
ities, 540. 

Wittemberg,  611. 

AVitty  sayings  not  to  be  too  rigorously 
treated,  144. 

Worcester,  Bishop  of,  Locke's  reply 
to  second  letter  of,  quoted,  54,  55; 
on  immortality  of  soul,  58. 

Words,  the  twofold  abuse  of,  270 ;  re- 
present and  explain  ideas,  285 ;  trans- 
ferred from  origin  in  simple  ideas 
to  more  abstruse  significations,  289; 
their  tropical  signification  depends 
on  analogy  between  the  sensible  and 
non-sensible,  290 ;  are  the  meanings 
of,  arbitrary?  292;  the  use  of,  im- 
plies that  speaker  has  ideas,  305 ; 
may  sometimes  be  those  of  another 
than  speaker,  305 ;  hollow  use  of, 
305 ;  speaker  of,  means  something 
general,  ;!05 ;  men  often  think  more 
of,  than  things,  305 ;  connect  them- 
selves with  ideas  and  things,  305, 
30{) ;  often  secure  attention  to  exclu- 
sion of  tilings,  305 ;  are  supposed  to 
have  a  secret  relation  to  another's 
ideas,  and  to  things,  305;  form 
of,  what?  305;  are  often  parrot's 
sounds,  305;  as  applied  to  simple 
ideas  and  modes,  306;  as  applied  to 
substances,  300;  spoken  of  some- 
times in  a  nuiterial  way,  300 ;  larg(^st 
nuin))er  of,  are  general  terms,  307 ; 
originally  general  terms,  308;  how 
they  become  general.  30!) :  genus  and 
dilfercnce  employed  in  defining,  312 ; 


dichotomous  definitions  of,  best,  312 ; 
their  use,  356,  ;>.")7 ;  their  analysis 
shows  best  the  workings  of  the 
understanding,  368;  their  imperfec- 
tions, 3()9;  double  use  of,  Vii'<9,  370; 
civil  use  of,  370;  philosophic  use  of, 
370;  are  nolle  for  us  and  otiu-rs,  37(»: 
cases  in  which  it  is  ditticult  to  learn 
and  to  retain  ideas  of,  370;  how 
their  defects  may  be  remedied,  373; 
have  a  double  relation  to  things 
signified,  374;  those  which  indicate 
simple  ideas  not  wholly  unequivo- 
cal, 375;  those  which  indicate  .simple 
modes  least  doubtful,  375;  act  as  a 
medium  between  untlerstanding  and 
thing,  375;  removal  of  imperfections 
of,  would  lessen  disputes,  375 ;  re- 
form iu  use  of,  suggested,  375; 
uncertainty  in  regard  of,  sliould  pro- 
duce modesty  in  controversy,  376; 
have  changed  much  in  Latin  and 
other  languages,  376;  Iiave  changed 
little  in  Greek  authors,  .376;  Italian. 
have  not  changed  so  much  as  French, 
376;  imperfections  of,  arising  from 
intention  and  negligence,  .370;  are 
abused,  when  we  attach  no  clear 
ideas  to,  370 ;  there  are,  which  never 
had  a  definite  idea,  377;  there  arc, 
wliich  have  lost  their  first  idea.  377  ; 
insignificant,  not  many,  377 ;  abused, 
because  we  learn  them  l)efore  their 
ideas,  377;  bad  use  of,  leads  to  mis- 
construction, 378;  abuse  of,  from  in- 
constancy of  use,  37H;  incdiislancy 
of  use  in,  dependent  on  inadvi'i'tence, 
378;  abuse  of,  thmugh  alTeclcd  ob- 
scurity, 378;  abused,  ^^llcn  we  i.-ikc 
them  for  things,  379;  pardonabio 
and  praiseworthy  obscurities  of,  .379 ; 
not  so  much  taken  f<ir  things  as  be- 
lieved to  be  what  they  are  not,  ."iSO; 
arc  abused,  when  used  for  tliing.s 
they  cannot  signify,  .'Wl ;  are  they 
abused  when  ajiplicd  to  coniplcx 
ideas  as  if  tlicsc  had  a  real  esscnco 
on  whicii  I  lie  ]ir(q)erlics  depend? 
.384;  abused  when  we  atl:ich  (tcrlain 
ideas  to  them,  and  then  suppose 
that  evf^-ybody  acccipis  our  mean- 
ings, 387;    their    uses,  388;    corre- 


822 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


sponding  defects,  388;  abuse  of,  in 
figurative  terms  and  allusions,  38!) ; 
remedies  for  the  philosophic  abuse 
of,  :!S)0 ;  always  use,  with  ideas,  391 ; 
ideas  of,  applied  to  modes  should  be 
more  determined  and  those  of  sub- 
stance carefully  conformed  to  what 
exists,  391 ;  usage  should  be  re- 
garded in,  391;  when  new  are  used, 
or  old  ones  in  a  new  sense,  the 
sense  in  which  taken  should  be 
declared,  391 ;  for  simi:)le  ideas  are 
explained  by  synonyms  or  by  show- 
ing the  thing,  391 ;  convejing  mixed 
modes  are  explained  by  definition, 
391 :  diagrams  remedy  uncertainty 
of,  435 ;  put  in  place  of  things,  451. 


World,  ideal,  326;  existing,  32G. 
Wormwoods,  Bauhins  on,  308. 
Worsley,  259. 
Writing,  cliaracters  in,  what?  512. 

Ximenes,  Cardinal,  his  cure  by  Moor- 
ish woman,  G23. 

Yellowness  not  sweetness,  83. 

^TjTov/xivn,  Aristotle's,  495. 

Zopyra,  43. 

Zwinger,  "  Theatrum  Vitse  Human^e," 

548. 
Zwingli,    on    salvation    of    heathen, 

595. 
Zwinglians,  589. 


INDEX    B 

TO   THE   APPENDIX 


Act,  to,  a  mark  of  substance,  671. 

Acta  Eruditoriun  Lipslensiuiii,  699, 
705. 

Action,  moving  {actio  motrix,  I'action 
motrice),  661,  703;  moving,  general 
rule  of,  661 ;  and  reaction,  law  of, 
689;  composed  of  body,  time,  and 
force,  702. 

"  Agreement,  natural,"  as  a  theory 
explanatory  of  relation  of  body  and 
soul,  709. 

Agrippa,  liis  augelic  obstetrician,  646. 

Anaxagoras,  bis  sophism  concerning 
black  snow,  639. 

Angle,  the  right,  the  determinate  of 
all  angles,  ()94. 

Antitypy,  avTirvwia,  637,645,  647,  648. 

Ape  and  the  infant  Christian  of  Den- 
mark, 697. 
Airopa,  657. 

Apparent  phenomena,  what?  719. 

Archaais  {hylarchic  principle)  of 
Henry  More,  679. 

Ariosto,  his  hippogryphs,  718. 

Aristotle,  his  ^vaLKrj  'AKpiaais,  "  Phys. 
Auditus,"  634,  641  ;  his  teachings 
compatible  with  Reformed  Philoso- 
phy, 634,  635,  636,  645;  "the  irrec- 
oncilable," 634;  his  view  of  "vac- 
uum," 634,  699;  his  "  Ethics,"  635  ; 
his  "Logic,"  635;  his  "Metaphys- 
ics," 635,  642;  liis  "  Physics,"  635 ; 
liis  meaning  perverted  by  the  scho- 
lastics especially  in  physics,  635, 636; 
incorrectly  represented  to  say  that 
geometry  was  not  a  science,  642; 
his  "Aiuilytics,"  642;  places  origin 
of  motion  in  mind,  643,  651 ;  how  he 
regards  form  as  a  cause  of  motion, 

8ii3 


643;  does  not  employ  the  "  substan- 
tial forms"  of  the  Scholastics,  64.3; 
ascends  to  the  First  Mover,  (>43 ;  his 
definition  of  time,  645 ;  his  "  pri- 
mary matter,"  651 ;  his  "  vi>rtices," 
651;  adds  intelligence  only  to  prin- 
ciiml  rings  of  his  vortices,  651,  680; 
his  geocentricism,  651 ;  his  errors 
extenuated,  651 ;  his  entelechies, 
(PTeUxeiai,  671,  699.  701,  712. 

Atheism,  its  prevalence  in  Leibnitz's 
time,  648;  a  philosophy  which  af- 
forded a  unique  plank  by  which 
nnm  could  save  themselves  in  the 
shipwreck  of  impending,  648. 

Atoms,  there  are  no,  (,>52;  defined, 
653;  of  any  figure,  653  ;  it  is  inijxis- 
sible  for  all  bodies  to  consist  of, 
demonstrated,  6.53;  scluilimn  to 
demonstration  against,  tl.")4;  api"'n- 
dix  to  demonstration  against,  65ti; 
do  not  exist,  since  their  existence 
would  make  change  of  motion  take 
place  by  leaps,  669,  68();  do  not  ex- 
ist, since  curvilinear  motion  is  com- 
posed of  rectilinear  motions,  6'.«i; 
theory  of,  opposed  to  subilcty  of  na- 
ture, 712. 

Averroists,  on  "  interniinato  "  quan- 
tity of  matter,  637. 

Bagheminns,  as  a  writer,  6.32. 

Basnage  de  Beauval,  his  "  Hisloire  dps 
Oiivrages  des  Savants,"  706. 

Bayle,  Leihiiit/'s  explanation  of  tlio 
dillicultitis  iircsciiled  by,  to  the  the- 
ory of  i)re-eslal)lish('d  harmony,  706. 

Being,  A  llni(iue,  692;  how  lie  ruli-H 
the  world, 692;  la  ultimate  n;is f 


824 


LElENirZ-S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


things,  692 ;  His  existence  not  to  be 
escaped  by  assuming  eternity  of  the 
world,  (592,  (593;  He  exists  of  raeta- 
pliysical  necessity,  (593;  is  free  yet 
determined,  (595 ;  in  Him  essences 
and  eternal  truths  exist,  695;  the 
connection  of  all  things  with  each 
other  ijroves  Him  their  one  source, 
696 ;  that  the  most  perfect,  exists, 
714 ;  what  ?  717. 

Beings,  all  natural,  form  only  one 
chain,  713. 

Bodiu,  his  dangerously  atheistical 
"Arcana  Sublimium,"  648. 

Body,  defined,  647 ;  enquiry  after  con- 
stitutive quality  of,  647,  700 ;  infinite 
creatures  are  in  any  given,  652,  702; 
coheres  with  its  fellows,  652 ;  never 
wholly  quiescent,  652,  657,  699,  703  ; 
errors  arising  from  false  notions  of, 
684 ;  Leibnitz's  view  of,  684 ;  differ- 
ence between  the  views  of  Leibnitz 
and  Descartes  concerning,  699 ;  what 
the  nature  whose  diffusion  consti- 
tutes? 700;  a  "machine,"  701,  702; 
cannot  be  destroyed  nor  absolutely 
produced,  702  ;  has  a  degree  of  prim- 
itive activity,  702;  conspectus  of 
systems  presented  as  explanations 
of  union  of,  ^ith  soul,  709. 

Bodies,  all  that  is  in,  explicable  by 
magnitude,  figure,  and  motion,  634, 
648 ;  are  something  during,  nothing 
between,  instants  of  motion,  648 ; 
particular,  arise  from  conflicting 
motions,  652 ;  are  all  elastic,  668, 687, 
703 ;  their  action  against  each  other 
the  same,  if  they  approach  with 
same  velocity,  685 ;  no  elements  of, 
687 ;  distance  between,  never  the 
same,  (590 :  their  ijhenomena  can  be 
explained  mechanically,  (599;  can- 
not demonstrate  existence  of,  719. 

Boeder,  650. 

Burgoldensis,  probable  author  of 
"  Itinerarium  Politicum,"  650 ;  com- 
mentator on  "  Instrumentum  Pacis," 
650. 

Campanella,  his  "  De  Sensu  Rerum  et 

Magia,"  64(5. 
Cartesians,  have  added  li(tle  to  dis- 


coveries of  Descartes,  632 ;  Leibnitz 
refuses  to  be  classed  among,  (534 ;  re- 
lations to  the  ancient  philosophers, 
645;  "subtile  matter"  of,  651;  on 
communication  of  motion  by  im- 
pact, 685,  688,  704;  admit  no  vac- 
uum, 699  ;  essence  of  body,  according 
to,  (599 ;  acknowledge  inertia,  701 ; 
reject  action  in  bodies  and  find  it  in 
God,  703 ;  modifications  of  views  on 
force,  704 ;  suppose  a  body  in  mo- 
tion proceeds  ^^er  saltum,  704;  the 
disciples  among,  not  so  careful  in 
statements  as  their  master,  705 ;  as- 
sume redimdautly  the  "  Deus  ex 
Machina,"  709  ■;  posit  "primary 
elements"  instead  of  veritable 
imities,  712;  their  reasoning  con- 
cerning the  existence  of  the  most 
perfect  being,  715. 

Cause,  The,  through  which  minds 
have  intercourse,  720. 

Causes,  final,  agents  in  research,  680 : 
both  final  and  efficient,  pertain  to, 
and  help  in  physical  discussion,  704. 

Centaur,  the  species  of,  exists  in  mind, 
718. 

Change,  spontaneous,  admitted  by 
philosophers  in  simple  being,  711. 

Changes,  enumerated,  638;  reduced  to 
forces,  706. 

Cicero  politely  laughs  at  Epicurus, 
643;  his  "  De  NaturaDeorum,"  (543. 

Classes  of  beings,  linked  together  in 
one  chain,  713;  their  limits  cannot 
be  precisely  given,  713. 

Coins,  how  two  of  different  metals 
may  be  distinguished,  653. 

Collegium  Philadelphicum,  650. 

Colors,  arise  from  motion,  639. 

Column,  how  extracted  from  the  rough 
block,  638. 

Conatus,  671,  673,  675,  678,  695,  701, 
702,  706. 

Concurrent  bodies,  same  relative  ve- 
locity preserved  between,  658; 
"total  progress"  preserved  be- 
tween, 658 ;  absolute  force  con- 
served in,  659,  6(50;  why  they  can 
stop  each  other,  though  unequal  in 
"living  force,"  6(50;  augmentation 
of  "li\'ing  force"  in,  woiUd  lead  to 


INDEX   B 


82& 


perpetual  mecliauical  motion,  GGl ; 
diminution  of  "  living  force  "  in, 
would  lead  to  destruction  of  force, 
661;  conservation  of  "moving  ac- 
tion "  in,  general  rule  as  to,  661; 
conservation  of  "moving  action" 
in,  general  demonstration  of,  663; 
conservation  of  "moving  action" 
in,  proved  by  an  example  in  num- 
bers, 663;  conservation  of  "  moving 
action  "  in,  proved  by  rules  of  per- 
cussion, 666 ;  lineal  equatiou  which 
expresses  conservation  of  cause  of 
impact  in,  6()7 ;  plane  equation 
which  expresses  conservation  of 
total  progress  in,  667 ;  solid  equation 
which  expresses  conservation  of 
total  absolute  force  in,  or  of  "  mov- 
ing action"  in,  667;  the  iuterde- 
Ijeudence  of  the  three  equations  con- 
cerning, 668;  are  to  be  regarded  as 
"hard-elastic,"  668;  influence  of 
degree  of  elasticity  in,  670 ;  both  act 
equally  in  concourse,  688 ;  compres- 
sion from  impact  equal  in  each  of 
them,  689. 

Conditions  amid  space,  645. 

Congruity  of  i^henomena,  718. 

Connection  between  all  parts  of  uni- 
verse, 713. 

Conring,  Hermann,  636  ;  on  forms,  638. 

Contin.ua,  how  defined  by  Aristotle, 
637;  of  two  kinds,  700;  successive, 
700 ;  simultaneous,  700. 

Continuity,  law  of,  668 ;  excludes 
change  per  saltum,  687 ;  applied  to 
zoology  and  botany,  713. 

Continuum,  687. 

Corporeal  things,  more  involved  in 
their  explanation  than  geometry 
and  logic,  679. 

Corpuscle,  each,  awaits  an  occasion 
of  exercising  its  power,  705. 

Corpuscular  philosophy,  its  abuse,  672. 

Corruption  and  its  correlative  genera- 
tion result  from  motion,  6.39. 

Creation,  continuous,  in  motion,  648, 
650,  679;  a  Divine  Mathematics  or 
Metaphysical  Mechanics  in,  694. 

Dance,  tight-rope,  why  pleasing?  697  ; 
sword-,  why  pleasing  ?  697. 


Death,  if  we  awaken  in,  what  then? 

719. 
Democritus,  his  atoms  freed  from  con- 
tempt, 671 ;  regarded  body  as  inert 
mass,  677;  holds  a  vacumn,  699; 
regarded  rarefactions  as  only  ai>- 
parent,  699;  thought  there  was 
something  passive  in  body,  699; 
taught  that  the  phenomena  of  bod- 
ies can  be  explained  mechanically, 
699,  712. 

Descartes,  Clauberg  clearer  than,  63'J ; 
disciples  of,  633;  argument  of  his 
method  the  only  distinctive  doctrine 
of,  held  by  Leibnitz,  634;  his  "  Me- 
ditationes,"  634;  opposes  vacuum, 
634,699;  contends  for  pleinim,  (KU  ; 
" subtile  matter  "  of,  651 ;  his  "uni- 
versal rings,"  ()51 ;  distinguished 
velocity  from  direction,  675;  re- 
garded motion  quoad  phenomena  as 
mere  relation,  685;  his  inaccurate 
statement  about  concourse  of  a 
larger  and  smaller  body,  685 ;  de- 
nies that  all  reflection  arises  from 
elasticity,  687;  a  testing  application 
of  his  co-ordinates  to  conditions  of 
motion  in  concurrent  ho<lics,  688; 
saw  only  extension  in  body,  699; 
believed  that  phenomena  of  l)ody 
could  be  explained  mechanically, 
699;  acknowledged  natural  inertia, 
701 ;  believed  force  to  be  a  compo- 
site system  of  mass  and  velocity, 
704 ;  found  no  reason  for  assuming 
forms  and  forces  in  bodies,  705  ; 
his  assumption  that  the  notion 
of  a  perfect  being  exists  criticised, 
715. 

DcuncuU,  substantial  forms  \irtually, 
646. 

Deusing,  632. 

Development  in  perfect  order,  the  law 
of  all  things,  712. 

Digby,  Kenelm,  (i32;  liis  "  rcriiiatolic 
Institutions,"  641. 

Discontinuity,  how  imliicrd  in  primary 
matter,  (!37. 

Dreams,  how  related  to  body,  708: 
well-ordered,  are  equivalent  lo  truth. 
719. 

Duration,  delincil,  7ftO. 


826 


LKICNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Effect,  violent,  what  ?  650,  662. 

Effort,  an  illustration  of,  674  ;  is  two- 
fold. 674. 

Elasticity,  whence?  GGS:  everywhere 
present,  6(iit,  (i.S7  ;  often  insufficient, 
66!);  all  reflection  comes  from,  677, 
687 ;  necessary  to  laws  of  motion, 
703;  necessary  to  "law  of  continu- 
ity," 704;  necessary  to  "law  of 
equivalence,"  705  ;  assists  in  uniting 
"  necessity  of  matter  with  beauty  of 
form,"  705;  shows  the  presence  of 
internal  motion  ninl  infinite  primi- 
tive force,  705. 

Ellipse  passing  into  parabola  used  as 
an  illustration,  687;  may  represent 
a  circle  optice,  717. 

Energy,  primitive,  70o. 

Entelechies,  ivTeKexeia-L,  671,  672,  679, 
680,  699,  701,  703,  705,  712. 

Entities,  the  only  given,  645. 

Epicurus,  64.3,  644;  bestows  pei-  se 
downward  motion  on  his  atoms,  64.3 ; 
laughed  at  by  Cicero,  643;  denies 
motion  from  without,  044  ;  admitted 
Ijrogress  into  infinite,  644. 

Equilibrium,  what?  659;  relation  of 
heights  and  weights  in,  659. 

Essence,  or  possibility  itself,  693,  695; 
of  matter,  637 ;  of  body,  647,  671, 
678,  684,  ()99,  700. 

Eternity,  of  world,  does  not  set  aside 
an  extramundane  reason  for  its 
exi.stence,  693  :  of  existence  does  not 
explain  existence,  719,  720. 

Existence,  its  sufficient  reason  not  in 
a  succession  of  states,  692 ;  not  in 
things,  692;  essence  jie)-  se  tends  to, 
693 ;  quantity  of,  greatest  possible 
under  conditions,  694 ;  in  the  num- 
ber of  the  perfections,  715 ;  how 
proved?  717. 

Express,  to,  what  ?  716. 

Extension,  what?  647,  671,  699,  700; 
how  we  conceive,  711. 

Feelings  of  soul,  a  consequence  of  that 

which  is  in  it,  707. 
Figure,   what?    637,   045,   703;    arises 

from  motion,  642. 
Flowing,  free  curvilineity,  (>40. 
Force,   and   quantity   of   motion,   not 


the  same,  659 ;  absolute,  to  be  meas- 
ured by  violent  effect,  6.59;  dead, 
the  equivalent  of  equilibrium,  659 ; 
when  living,  developed,  660;  how 
dead,  estimated?  660;  how  living, 
estimated,  660;  is  twofold,  674; 
dead,  or  elementary,  674;  living,  is 
twofold,  675;  total  living,  675;  par- 
tial living,  675  ;  partial  respective, 
675 ;  partial  directive,  675 ;  total  ab- 
solute, how  composed,  675;  — prim- 
itive active,  701 ;  is  the  ei/reXexfi 
?!  vpuiTr)  of  Aristotle,  701 ;  is  form  of 
substance,  701 ;  how  affected  by  im- 
pact, 703;  — derivative,  what?  702, 
703;  its  amount,  maintained,  702; 
differs  from  action,  702;  — -active, 
placed  in  bodies,  702;  originally  in 
God,  702 ;  internal,  turns  itself  with- 
out, 703. 

Forces,  how  they  exist,  704. 

Form,  what?  6.37;  substantial,  con- 
sists in  the  indivisible,  (>40;  what, 
according  to  Scholastics,  643. 

Forms,  from  active  power  of  Efficient 
One,  632 ;  how  they  originate,  638 ; 
substantial,  endowed  with  intelli- 
gence, (J46 ;  appetite  assigned  to, 
646;  axioms  connected  with,  (J46; 
—  how  the  doctrine  of,  must  not  be 
employed,  672. 

Full,  all  things  are,  652. 

Galileo,  his  expression  "  the  infinite 
force  of  percussion,"  674;  his  inves- 
tigations concerning  living  force. 
675. 

Gassendi,  632 ;  not  strictly  a  Cartesian, 
6.33;  contends  for  a  vacuum,  634, 
699;  places  body  in  inert  matter, 
677 ;  his  remarkable  exi^eriments, 
691. 

Generation,  how  explained  by  motion, 
638. 

Geometry,  demonstrates  from  causes, 
642;  Aristotle's  ^iew  of,  642;  is  a 
science,  642;  defined,  700:  its  rela- 
tion to  arithmetic,  700. 

Glanvill,  Joseph,  his  History  of  the 
growth  of  science  since  Aristotle, 
631. 

God,  the  primary  matter  of  things, 


INDEX   B 


827 


G32;  forms  produced  from  his  ac- 
tive power,  632 ;  produces  creatures 
from  his  active  power,  632;  must 
uot  be  introduced  iu  explanation  to 
the  exclusion  of  acting  in  things, 
G79 ;  free,  yet  does  all  things  deter- 
minately,  (lOo ;  in  him  uot  only  ex- 
istences but  possibilities  have  reality, 
695  ;  progress  to  be  recognized  in  his 
works,  698 ;  how  beings  exist  in  the 
ideas  of,  712;  world  in  a  measure 
represents,  717  ;  not  a  deceiver,  719 ; 
is  Cause  of  intercourse  between 
minds,  720;  is  a  Cause,  but  has  no 
cause,  720. 

Goezius,  publishes  the  "  Collegium 
Philadelphicum,"  650. 

Greatest  expressed  in  smallest,  712. 

Gijri,  651. 

Heat,  a  form  of  motion,  639. 
Hermetics,  712. 
History,  how  confirmed,  720. 
Hobbes,  632;  not  strictly  a  Cartesian, 

633;  asserts  possibility  of  both  jjle- 

num  and  vacuum,  634;  his  vortices, 

651. 
Hooke,  his  "  Micrographia,"  639;  his 

"Sylvula"  of  rust,  639. 
Huygens,  his   "method  of    a  boat," 

666 ;   adorns  the  age  with  .splendid 

discoveries,  676. 
Hypotheses,  rule  for  choosing  among, 

637. 
Hypothesis,  the,  of  modern  philosophy, 

637;  a  defect  in,  646. 

Idea,  something  in  mind,  716;  not  im- 
pression on  brain,  716 ;  not  every- 
thing in  mind  is  an,  716;  is  a  power 
in  mind,  716;  may  exist  without 
thinking,  716  ;  a  power  near  at  hand 
of  thinking  about  a  thing,  716;  must 
not  only  tend  to  the  thing,  but  e.x- 
Ijress  it,  716;  need  not  resemble  its 
thing,  but  it  presents  truths  which 
would  be  contirmed  in  the  thing,  717. 

Ideas  for  which  the  age  was  uot  pre- 
pai'ed,  714. 

Impetus,  what?  673. 

Impulse,  made  from  infinite  degrees, 
674. 


Incompatibility,  only  demonstrated  by 
resolution  of  terms  compared,  714. 

Increment,  the  momentary,  in  a  force 
striving  for  change  is  real,  671. 

Indiiference  of  will,  arises  from  igiio- 
rani:e,  695. 

Infinite,  should  be  recognized  in  every 
thing,  712. 

"Inrinence,  the  system  of,"  the  Scho- 
lastic method  of  explaining  connec- 
tion of  body  and  soul,  709. 

Intelligences,  of  Aristotle,  651,  711 ; 
discarded,  680;  —  used  by  God  not 
as  machines  but  subjects,  698,  702. 

Intercourse,  and  by  consequence  ex- 
istence, of  minds,  its  cause  iu  God, 
720. 

"  Journal  des  Savants,"  707. 
"  Journaux,"  699. 
Joy,  the  law  of,  697. 
Justice,  the  law  of,  697. 

Kabbalist,  712. 
Kepler,  701. 

Laws,  mechanical,  from  higher  reas- 
ons, 680;  of  God  imply  means  of 
accomplishment,  709. 

"  Leap,"  no  change  by,  669,  686. 

Leibnitz,  how  far  a  Cartesian,  d'M  ; 
his  juvenile  production,  "Hypotlic- 
sis  I'hysica,"  677  ;  his  malurer  judg- 
ment of  "  Hypothesis,"  695. 

Light  from  motion,  639. 

Living  force,  see  Force. 

Malebranche.his"  Search  after  Truth," 
657  ;  his  rules  of  motion,  (iSS. 

Marci,  Marcus,  his"De  Ideis  Ojjcra- 
tricibus,"  64(;. 

Mariotte,  on  rules  of  motion,  677; 
points  out  that  a  body  l)ends  before 
it  is  priipelled,  687. 

Matter,  defined,  645;  subtile,  of  Des- 
cartes, 651  ;  tends  to  rest  or  anni- 
hilation, 652  ;  infinitely  divided,  652  ; 
more  tlian  extension,  7(X). 

Matter,  primary,  what  ?  (i:i7,  672;  dis- 
continuity in,  how  ••(Tecled,  637; 
liow  all  liiings  produced  from,  037  ; 
of    Aristotle,   651 ;    and    space    llie 


828 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


same,  652 ;  if  at  rest  is  notliing,  652 ; 
obscurely  hinted  at  by  Scholastics, 
652;  if  moving  iu  parallel  Hues  is 
nothing,  ()0"2. 

^lechanics,  ancient,  dealt  with  dead 
force,  ()T5. 

Mechanism,  a  physical,  illustrative  of 
metaphysical  problems,  695. 

Mercury,  the  basis  of  all  metals,  640. 

Metals,  whence  thej'^  arise,  640. 

Metaphysical  laws  prevail  over  geo- 
metrical, 695. 

Mind,  source  of  motion,  64.3:  liberty 
and  spontaneity  alone  in,  643;  de- 
fined, 645. 

Mobile,  673. 

Molyneux,  his  "  Dioptrics,"  680. 

Moral  perfection  is  physical,  696. 

More,  Henry,  his  Archaeus,  679. 

Motion,  originates  in  mind,  643;  de- 
fined, 645,  673;  not  given  in  bodies, 
648 ;  a  continual  creation,  648 ;  source 
of  all  particulars,  651 ;  is  circular, 
652 ;  and  body,  652 ;  in  what  case 
not  external,  652 ;  same  quantity  of, 
not  ijreserved  in  concurrent  bodies, 
657;  quantity  of,  what?  657,  673; 
never  exists,  671 ;  term  applied  to 
instantaneous  element  of  motion, 
673;  sy.stematic  rules  of,  678,  679; 
why  real,  685  ;  a  relation,  685;  Des- 
cartes' mistakes  in  relation  to,  685 ; 
proper,  separated  from  common,  689 ; 
as  a  tendency  rectilinear,  689 ;  why 
curvilinear,  690;  its  true  nature, 
690,  691 ;  when  common  in  many 
bodies,  does  not  change  their  action 
among  themselves,  691. 

Motions,  their  compositions  and  resolu- 
tions, 691,  692. 

Motive  force,  in  bodies  intrinsically, 
699. 

Natural  history,  discoveries  expected 
in,  by  employment  of  Law  of  Con- 
tinuity, 713. 

Nature,  Two  Laws  of,  which  Leibnitz 
first  made  known,  668;  Aristotle's 
definition  of,  approved,  699. 

Naudaeus,  648. 

Necessity  metaphysical,  693 ;  physical , 
693;  hypothetical,  693. 


"  Nouvelles  de  la  Eepublique  des  Let- 

tres,"  687. 
Number  defined,  645. 

Order,  a  general  principle  of,  687  ;  its 
foundation,  687;  its  enunciation, 
687  ;  its  illustration,  687. 

Origin  of  things,  on  the  radical,  692. 

Paradise,  why  the  world  is  not  yet  a, 
698. 

Parts  not  neglected  for  sake  of  total- 
ity, 697. 

Passion  of  bodies,  spontaneous  yet 
occasioned,  688;  proper,  arises  from 
percussion,  688. 

Perfection  is  quantity  of  essence,  693 ; 
is  degree  of  essence,  695 ;  that  through 
which  greatest  number  of  things  are 
compossible,  695 ;  a  source  of  ex- 
istence, 695. 

Peripatetics,  their  forms  referred  to 
intelligible  notions,  671. 

Phantasmata,  how  certified  that  things 
are  not,  647. 

Philosophic  temperament,  the,  which 
suits  piety  and  science,  680. 

Philosophies,  none  of  them  worthy  of 
contempt,  671. 

Philosophy,  the  Reformed,  its  com- 
mon rule,  634 ;  its  reconciliation  with 
Aristotle,  636 ;  its  relations  with 
Aristotle,  645. 

Physics,  why  misunderstood  by  Schol- 
astics, 636. 

Plato,  his  Ideas,  671 ;  his  entelechies, 
699. 

Platonists,  712. 

Plenum,  6;34. 

Position,  defined,  645. 

Possibility,  is  essence,  693,  695. 

Power,  active,  is  force  or  form,  701 ; 
a  tendency  to  action,  701 ;  not  a 
faculty,  701 ;  is  primitive  or  sub- 
stantial, 701;  is  derivative  or  acci- 
dental, 701. 

Power,  passive,  is  matter,  701 :  is  im- 
penetrability or  antityiiy,  701 ;  is 
resistance  or  inertia,  701 :  is  every- 
where the  same,  701. 

Power  iu  body,  twofold,  701. 

Progress,  quantity  of,  what,  658;   of 


INDEX   B 


829 


universe   never    comes   to  an   end 

G98. 
Projectiles,  G91,  702. 
Putrefaction,  638. 

Quadratlces,  711. 

Qualities,  changed  through  motion, 
G39;  depend  on  organs,  640;  with 
exception  of  forms  reduce  to  forces, 
706. 

RfBus,  on  Aristotle,  641. 

Reality,  both  of  essences  and  exist- 
ences, their  ultimate  reason,  695. 

Red  Cross,  Society  of,  650. 

Reiser,  Anton,  649. 

Repetition,  discrete  or  continuous,  700. 

Rest,  evanescent  motion,  687 ;  "  ex- 
cludes leap  from  change,"  687;  ad- 
vantage of  regarding  it  as  a  case  of 
motion,  687,  688;  not  cause  of  sta- 
bility, 690;  true,  does  not  exist, 
690. 

Rings  in  i^rimary  matter,  651. 

Rust,  639. 

Salts,  their  nature,  640 ;  the  causes  of 
fixity,  640. 

Sarmatian  salt-pits,  690. 

Scaliger,  harmonized  Aristotle  and 
moderns,  641 ;  his  dvvafiis  irXaartK-q, 
646. 

Scholastics,  their  queries  concerning 
primary  matter,  637 ;  their  relation 
to  mathematics,  642. 

Schurztleisch,  650. 

Sciences,  "  a  certain  harmonizing  of 
the,"  642. 

Snow,  what  ?  639. 

Solicitation,  an  infinitely  small  mo- 
tion, 659,  674. 

Solidity  from  motion,  (>51. 

Souls  and  entelechies,  we  give  no  place 
to,  680;  why  so  much  conferred  on? 
698;  concentrate  universe  in  them- 
selves, 698;  always  connected  with 
organic  bodies,  701. 

Space,  defined,  645 ;  why  real,  684, 685 ; 
no  vacant,  690 ;  in  what  sense  said 
to  be  extend(!d,  700. 

Spener,  649. 


Sphericity,  tendency  of  bodies  in  flu- 
idity to  assume,  694. 

Spizel,  his  "Coufessio  natiiraa  contra 
Atheistas,"  649. 

Stability,  true  notion  of,  689;  absiv 
lute,  does  not  exist,  689;  defined, 
690 ;  not  derived  from  rest,  690 ;  not 
explained  l)y  pressure,  690. 

Stoics,  tranquillity  of,  671. 

Substance,  changed  by  motion,  639; 
what  happens  in,  hapi)ens  in  an  or- 
derly manner,  686;  apart  from  soul, 
an  aggregate,  701. 

Sufferings  of  good  men  result  in  greater 
good,  698 ;  short  roads  to  perfection, 
698. 

Theologians  and  philosophers  discuss 

the  same  questions,  644. 
Thing,  a,  how  distiuguished  from  other 
things,  052. 

Things,  corporeal,  po.ssess  tendency 
or  elTort,  671;  something  has  been 
placed  in  them  by  God,  679 ;  are  part 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Power  or  of  tlie 
Kingdom  of  \Vi.sdom,  680;  existing, 
in  what  sense  necessary,  693;  their 
original  formation,  693,  694 ;  reasons 
of,  not  found  in  tlicir  series,  l)ut  in 
metaphysical  truth,  695  ;  depend  not 
on  material  necessities,  but  formal 
reasons,  695. 

Thomas  Anglus,  on  immortality  of 
soul,  641. 

Thomasius,  Jacob,  Leibnitz's  letter  to, 
631. 

Time  defined, 645, 711 ;  Aristotle's  defi- 
nition of,  645;  never  exists,  071;  real, 
684. 

Trew,  Abdias,  041. 

Truths,  contingent,  originate  in  meta- 
physical, (i93;  — eternal,  exist  in  a 
metaphysical  subject,  God,  695 ;  reg- 
ulate things,  (i95;  are  reasons  of 
existence  rather  than  non-t>xislence, 
695;  are  reasons  of  tlie  so-existing 
ratlK^r  tlian  the  olhcrwisc-cxisling 
world,  695;  prevail  nvcr  l'i'uMU'I  i-ii-:il 
laws,  695. 

"  Uniformly,"  Imw  iippiicd  to  ai'l  ioii  of 
beings,  710. 


830 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"Unities,  veritable,"  to  be  posited  at 
foundation  of  things  rather  than 
"  primary  elements,"  712. 

"  Untliinking,  the,"  nothing,  652;  no 
variety  in,  652. 

Vacuum,  G34,  635,  638.  699,  708,  712. 

Vaninus,  648. 

Velocity,  relative,  between  concurrent 
bodies,  preserved,  658;  how  esti- 
mated, 662;  defined,  673;  with  di- 
rection called  co7iatus,  673;  distin- 
guishable from  direction,  675. 

"  Vi\idness,"  of  phenomena,  718. 

Vossius,  his  criticism  on  Descartes, 
634. 

Wallis,  677,  692. 
Water,  elastic,  703. 

Weights  in  motion  exhibit  the  greatest 
possible  descent  of  hea\-y  bodies,  694. 
Weigel,  641. 
White,  the  color,  639. 
Whole  never  exists,  671. 


Wisdom  determines  to  the  most  per- 
feet,  695. 

World,  the  four  things  necessary  to 
explain  its  phenomena,  646  ;  in 
it  is  realized  the  greatest  produc- 
tion of  possibilities,  694 ;  physically, 
not  metaphysically,  necessary,  694 ; 
—  this,  not  the  best,  apparently 
shown  by  experience,  696;  a  priori 
argument  against,  696 ;  a  supposi- 
tion founded  on  partial  knowledge, 
696  ;  the  most  perfect  possible, 
696 ;  the  most  perfect  physically, 
696 ;  the  most  perfect  morally,  696 ; 
an  admirable  mechanism  and  the 
best  Republic  of  Sotils,  696 ;  its  evils 
but  as  purposed  discords  in  a  musi- 
cal composition,  697 ;  represents  God, 
717. 

Wren,  677. 

Zeno,  Leibnitz  claims  accord  with,  711. 
Zoophytes,  not  monstrous,  but  orderly 
productions,  713. 


INDEX   C 

TO   THE   NOTES,  ADDITIONS,  AND  CORRECTIONS 


A  posteriori  knowledge,  Leibnitz's 
view  of,  109,  227,  758 ;  Kant's  view 
of,  100,  227,  758. 

A  priori  Ivnowledge,  Leibnitz's  view 
of,  109,  227,  758 ;  Kant's  view  of,  109, 
227,  758. 

Ab  universali  ad  particulare,  is  it  ap- 
plicable always?  5G9;  the  principle, 
De  contineute  et  contento,  569. 

Abel,  Niels  Henrik,  demonstrates  the 
impossibility  of  reducing  by  radi- 
cals general  equations  higher  than 
the  fourth  degree,  571. 

Ahsinthium,  765. 

Absolute,  belongs  to  reason,  158;  how 
we  become  acquainted  with  it,  158. 

Abstraction,  to  what  extent  a  depart- 
ure from  reality,  728. 

Academie,  des  Inscriptions  et  Belles- 
Lettres,  547  ;  Franc^aise,  550  ;  des 
Sciences  de  Paris,  550. 

Academy,  Old,  518. 

Accidentia,  455. 

"  Accidents  and  abstracts,"  their  con- 
sideration develops  the  differences 
between  the  theories  of  Locke  and 
Leibnitz,  749. 

"  Acroamatic,"  the  epithet  explained, 
42,  272,  724. 

"  Acta  Concil.  Reg.,"  581. 

"  Acta  Eruditoruni,"  6,  14,  101,  174, 
227,  425,  434,  484,  502,  511,  670. 

Acts  17  :  28, 15:?. 

Adam  as  a  symbol  in  Boehrae's  philos- 
ophy, 298. 

Adams,  F.,  "The  Genuine  Works  of 
Hippocrates,"  476.' 

Adarason,  on  Gassendi,  421. 


.A.delung,  J.  C,  "  Geseh.  d.  men.sch. 
Narrheit,"  600,  001,  604,  605. 

Aerial  vehicles  of  spirits,  .380. 

iE.schylus,"  Prometheus  Viiictus,"  ;W9. 

Agnosticism,  195. 

Agreement  or  disagreement,  Leibnitz 
reduces  Locke's  enumeration  of  the 
kinds  of,  401. 

Aimant,  1',  Leibnitz  writes  upon,  740. 

Air,  .scholastic  conception  of,  740. 

Ai.\,  its  derivation,  301. 

Albertus  Magnus,  278,  .381 ;  unjustly 
suspected  of  magical  practices,  27S. 

Albinus  Flaccus,  instructor  of  Charle- 
magne, 546  ;  "  Opera,"  546. 

Alcuin,  see  Albinus  Flaccus. 

Aldrich,  Henry,  "  Artis  Logicie  Rudi- 
menta,"  4.")(J,  766,  769. 

Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  581. 

Alexander  the  (ireat,  536. 

Alexandrists,  .581. 

Allheseeltheit,  7.32. 

Alliot,  Jean  Baptiste,  his  "Traite'  du 
cancer,"  352;  —  Pierre,  liis  " 'I'hcses 
medicaj  de  motu  sanguinis  circii- 
lato,"  3.52 ;  his  "  Epistola  <h'  cancro 
apparente,"  352;  his  "Nuntius  jiro- 
tligati  sine  ferro  et  igne  carcino- 
ma t  is,"  352. 

Allman,  G.  J.,  "Greek  Geometry  from 
Thales  to  Euclid,"  108,  4i;3.  47.".,  527  ; 
"  Pythagorean  Cieometry,"  475. 

Alsted,  J.  IL,  311,  .39H;  Ill's  "  Encydo- 
liu'dia,"  311,  3(;3  ;  and  "  Systcma 
logicii'  harmonicum,"  398. 

Amadisde  Gaula,.399. 

.Aniarc  (dilig(>rc)  dolim'd,  7.'(). 

Amor  ii'iii  iiicririiiiriiis.  7.5(1. 


831 


832 


LKIBMTZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"  Anabaptisticum  et  enthusiasticum 
Pantheon,"  COl. 

Anabaptists,  602. 

Analogy,  the  class  of  phenomena  in 
which  it  affords  probable  conclu- 
sions, 549;  its  conclusions  are  only 
rational  hypotheses  since  not  founded 
on  complete  inductions  or  mathe- 
matical data,  S'lO;  the  rationality  of 
a  conclusion  drawn  from,  on  what 
it  depends,  550. 

Analysis,  how  explained  by  Pappus, 
52L 

Anaxagoras,  65,  519. 

Anaximeiies.  519. 

Andrada,  Diego  Payva  d',  theologian, 
592;  on  salvability  of  heathen,  592; 
his  "  Orthodoxarum  explicationum 
de  religionis  Christiana?  capitibus 
libri  X.,"  592;  his  "  Defensio  Tri- 
dentinae  tidei,"  etc.,  592;  maintains 
a  controversy  with  Chemnitz,  592. 

Andrews,  E.  B.,  "  Institutes  of  General 
History,"  453;  on  quartus  modus, 
455. 

Andriaj,  Tobias,  633. 

'AviKdora,  Ta,  of  Procopius,  512. 

Anima  )iiundi,  .382. 

Animalcula  within  animalcula,' 722. 

"  Animant,"  its  meaning,  125;  its  per- 
haps preferable  variant,  125,  740. 

Anselm,  founder  of  Christian  Scholas- 
ticism, 502;  his  "Monologium,"502; 
his  "  Cur  Dens  Homo,"  502,  503 ;  his 
"  Proslogium,"  502,  503;  his  "  Liber 
apologeticus,"  503;  his  ontological 
argument  for  existence  of  God,  503; 
several  of  his  tractates  which  have 
been  translated,  503. 

Antimony,  324. 

Antipodes,  444. 

Anti-Ramists,  408. 

Antisthenes,  518;  taught  that  virtue 
only  is  good,  518  ;  a  list  of  his  writ- 
ings, 519. 

Antitypy,  avTiTviria,  721,  722. 

Antoninus,  Marcus  Aurelius,  495  ;  his 
"  Meditations,"  or  "  Tlioughts,"  495. 

Apagogical  demonstration,  491. 

Apes  have  organs  of  speech,  286. 

Apodeictic  syllogism,  565. 

'ATTodei^LS,  564. 


Apollonius of  Perga,  108 ;  his  "Treatise 
on  Conies,"  108,  405. 

Ai)ostolici  Regimiuis,  the  papal  decree 
of,  581. 

Appuleius,  455. 

Apuleius,  243  ;  his  "  Metamorphoses  " 
summarized,  243. 

Aquaviva,  Claudius,  019 ;  his  "  Ratio 
Studiorum,"  619. 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  230,  503;  his 
"  Summa  Theologiaj,  230,  496,  503, 
729 ;  on  species,  381 ;  a  realist,  382 ; 
criticises  ontological  argument  for 
existence  of  God,  503;  his  "Contra 
Gentiles,"  503 ;  censured  by  Spinoza, 
504;  on  "ignis  infeVnus,"  730;  op- 
posed by  Lessius,  749;  his  use  of 
"phantasm,"  769. 

Arbor  Porphyriana,  322  ;  prsedlca- 
mentalis,  322;  prsedicabilis,  322. 

Archaeus,  67,  382,  733. 

Archilaus,  a  physicist,  519. 

Archimedes,  93,  108;  greatest  Greek 
mathematician,  414 ;  the  first  mathe- 
matical engineer,  414;  best  edition 
of  his  works,  414. 

Argenteus,  Codex,  295. 

Argot,  293. 

"Argument,"  as  applied  to  middle 
term,  481. 

Argument,  topical,  564. 

Argumentum,  simplex,  398  ;  com- 
plexum.,  398. 

Ariosto,  his  "  Orlando  Furioso,"  399. 

Aristippus,  518 ;  made  pleasure  end  of 
life,  518 ;  his  definition  of  pleasure, 
518  ;  his  writings  enumerated,  518 ; 
his  philosophy  discussed,  518. 

Aristotle,  66;  his  "  Xicomachean 
Ethics,"  96,  180,  285,  321,  7.52,  7.53; 
his  "Physics"  (^vaiKr]  'AKpoacrii), 
156,  157,  174,  272,  320,  321,  750,  751: 
his  "  Metaphysica,"  156,  174,  311, 
320,  495,  498,  751 ;  his  definition  of 
probability,  214;  his  "Rhetoric," 
214;  his  "AnalylicaPriora,"214, 636; 
his  "Meteorologica,"  277;  on  Milky 
Way,  277  ;  his  "  De  Anima,"  281. 321, 
724,  769,  76;!;  his  "  De  Interpreta- 
tione,"  281,  291,  452,  763;  on  man  as 
a  social  being,  285;  his  "Politeia," 
285,    286,    482;    his     "Categories," 


INDEX   C 


833 


311 ;  on  genus  and  difference,  312 ; 
Leibnitz's  defence  of,  from  Locke's 
strictures,  312;  bis  "Topica,"  312, 
418,  5(;4,  5()5,  63G;  on  motion,  320, 
321 ;  on  ligbt,  321 ;  omla,  bow  used 
by,  349  ;  bis  vovs  wadr^riKos,  381 ;  bis 
vovs  TToiijTiKus,  381  ;  on  knowledge 
as  dependent  on  tbings  previously 
known,  413;  bis  "Analytica  Posteri- 
ora,"  413,  636  ;  Leibnitz's  opinion  of, 
416 ;  on  ivdo^a,  418 ;  his  use  of  i'diov, 
455;  bis  limit  to  scientific  considera- 
tion, 488;  bis  KadoXov  vpCoTov,  488; 
Ids  irepi  I,o(pia-TLKQv  'EX^yxt^v,  519; 
on  a  pupil's  prior  and  provisional 
failb  in  bis  teacher,  519;  bis  defini- 
tion of  "  topical  argument,"  564;  is 
"  unsaved,"  593  ;  on  mind  as  an 
unwritten  tablet,  726;  his  "Magna 
Moralia,"  752,  753;  bis  "  Eudemean 
Ethics,"  753;  on  will  and  freedom, 
753  ;  on  soul  as  not  indifferent  to 
every  kind  of  matter,  760 ;  on  mid- 
dle term,  770. 

Arminians,  the  later,  733. 

Arminius,  James,  72. 

Arnauld,  Antoine,  463,  530;  Leibnitz's 
letter  to,  101 ;  on  Descartes'  funda- 
mental dictum,  410;  "Qinvres," 
4()3 ;  "  La  Logique  on  L'Art  Penser," 
464;  bis  controversy  with  Holden, 
617 ;  —  Simon,  Marquis  de  Pomponne, 
605. 

Arnold,  Gottfried,  "  Kircben  und 
Ketzerbistorie,"  600,  602. 

Arrian,  reporter  of  Epictetus'  talk, 
496. 

Art  schools,  Leibnitz  favors  their 
founding,  628. 

Artes  liherales,  628. 

A.tkath  Rachel,  242. 

Assassins,  the,  197. 

Association,  Law  of,  its  germ  in  Leil)- 
nitz's  teaching,  764. 

"  Assurance  Magazine,"  540. 

Atomism,  Leibnitz  early  defends,  723. 

Atoms,  an  additional  argument  against, 
656;  non-existent,  722;  why  rejected 
by  Leibnitz,  727. 

Anbery,  see  Maurier. 

Augustinus,  ,\urelius,  anticipated  Des- 
cartes'   lundaraoutal    dictum,   410  ; 


his  "  Soliloquium,"  410,  516;  ground 
of  bis  philosophy,  516  ;  his  "De 
Beata  Vita,"  516;  "De  Trinitate," 
516,  589;  "  De  Vera  Religione,"  .516 ; 
literature  illustrative  of  philosophy 
of,  516 ;  "  De  Ideis,"  516,  rm ;  on  con- 
sciousness involving  in  itself  the 
idea  of  God,  575  ;  "  De  peccatorum 
meritis  et  remissione  et  de  Bajv 
tismo  parvulorum,"  594:  "De  pec- 
cato  originali,"  594 ;  "  Encheiridiou 
ad  Laurent.,"  594  ;  "  De  nupliis  et 
concupiscentia,"  594;  "Contra  Juli- 
anum  Pelagianum,"  594  ;  "Contra 
duas  epistdlas  Pclagii,"  594:  teaches 
that  babes  dying  unbaptized  are  in 
some  sort  damned,  .">94 ;  his  "Do 
Civitate  Dei,"  5iH,  729 :  his  "Opera," 
616  ;  on  a  future  material  fire,  729. 

Augustus  I.,  alchemist,  339. 

Authority,  Leibnitz  opposes  blind  sub- 
mission to,  579. 

Aventinus,  Johaiin  Tlinrmayr,  his 
"  Annales  Boiorum,"  54(i. 

Averroes,  581. 

Averroists,  581,  590,  732;  related  to 
Mystics  and  Quiet ists,  728. 

Axioms,  their  demonstration,  163: 
should  they  be  lessened?  77(1. 

Baader,  von,  liis  relation  to  Boi-iinic, 
298. 

Bacbet  de  Merzeriac,  his  edition  nf 
"  Dioi)hantus,"  .571. 

Bacon,  Francis,  591  ;  on  Iiloht  Fori, 
30ii;  his  "Novum  Organinii,"  306, 
his  "  De  Augmentis,"  30(i ;  Leil)nitz's 
estimate  of,  306;  editions  of  his 
works,  306,  307;  Spinoza's  refer- 
ence to,  526;  his  "Spirilus,"  tiSI ; 
-  Roger,  278. 

Bagheminus,()32. 

Baitar,  Ilni  al,  371;  greatest  of  Ara- 
liiaii  l)olanisls,  .'571  ;  liis  alphalieti<'al 
list  of  simpb-s,  .371;  his  ".Materia 
Mediea,"  ."i7l  ;  sources  of  iiifurnia- 
tion  concerning,  .")71. 

Balaam,  Leibnitz's  essay  <m,  7f!7. 

Bancroft,  "History  of  lliiiled  States 
of  America,"  599,  77:''. 

Baraiitola,  737. 

Barl)eyrac,  .lean,   '.'Sti ;    Iranslaiiir  <»f 


834 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


the  "  De  Jure"  of  Grotius,  286; 
translator  of  Pufendorf,  486. 

Barcl:iy,  Robert,  51)9 ;  his  " Apolo,i,'y  for 
the  True  Christian  Divinitj%"  599. 

Bardeen,  C.  W.,  editor  of  Comeuius, 
4G(). 

Barner,  Jacob,  487;  his  "  Prodromus 
Sennerti  novi,"  487. 

Basilius,  Valeutiuus,  his  '"  Schluss-Re- 
deu,"  324;  his  "Cliymisehe  Schrif- 
ten,"  324. 

Basnage  de  Beauval,  his  "  Histoire 
des  Ouvrages  des  Savants,"  50, 
507;  his  "Histoire  critique  de  la 
Republique  des  Lettres,"  508. 

Baudoin,  Jean,  his  "  L'homme  dans 
la  Lune,"  342. 

Bauhin,  Jean,  a  founder  of  modern 
botany,  his  "  De  Plantis  Absinthii 
nomen  habentibus."  308:  his  "  His- 
toria  universalis  Plantarum,"  309; 
—  Caspar d,  308. 

Baumgarten,  H.,  "  Ueber  Sleidanus 
Leben  und  Briefweehsel,"  114. 

Baumgarten,  Martin,  his  "  Travels 
through  Egypt,  Arabia,  and  Pales- 
tine," 89,  735. 

Bayle,  Pierre,  .507,  727  ;  his  "  Nouvelles 
de  la  Republique  des  Lettres,"  50  ; 
his  "  Dictionnaire  historique  et  cri- 
tique," 278. 444, 507. 531, 601,004, 727  ; 
his  '"Dictionary"  article  "Rora- 
rius,"  66,507,  508. 

Baynes,  Thomas  Spencer,  translates 
the  "La  Logique  ou  L'Art  de  Pen- 
ser,"  or  the  Port  Royal  Logic,  14, 464. 

Bears,  child  of  the,  344. 

Becan,  John  (Van  Corp),  303;  his 
"  Origines  Antwerpiaua;,"  303;  on 
the  original  language,  303;  on  the 
site  of  Paradise,  303. 

Bede,  the  Venerable,  his  "  Ecclesias- 
tical History,"  295. 

Begriff,  330. 

Begriffiic.he  Wcsen,  311. 

Beings,  notional  or  conceptional,  311. 

Bellarmin,  his  "De  Purgatorio,"  730. 

Bellay,  Cardinal  du,  114. 

Benn,  Alfred  ^Yilliam,  his  "Greek 
Philosophers,"  108, 156,  421,  576,  724. 

Bergerac,  Cyrano  de,  228,  399;  his 
"  Histoire  comique  des  etats  et  em- 


pires du  soleil,"  228,  and  also  "  de  la 
lune,"  228. 

Berkeley,  772;  his  "Essay  toAvards  a 
new  Theory  of  Vision,"  747. 

Berkum,  H.  van,  his  "  De  Labadie  et 
de  Labadisten,"  602. 

Bernays,  his  "  Die  Dialoge  des  Aris- 
toteles,"  272;  "  Der  Chronik  des 
Sulpicius  Severus,"  .345. 

Bernhardt,  E.,  his  "  Vulfila  oder  die 
gotische  Bibel,"  290. 

Bernier,  Francois,  "  Abrege  de  la  Phi- 
losophie  de  Gassendi,"  64,  730. 

Bernouilli,  James,  213. 

Beverwyck,  Jan  van,  physician,  624; 
simi^lifies  ^jrescriptions,  624  ;  his 
"  Idea  medicinae  veterum,"  624. 

Beyerlinck,  Laurent,  his  "Theatrum 
vita;  humauip,"  622. 

Bibliotheca,  Maxima  Veterum  Patrum, 
444 ;  Sacra,  503. 

Bibliotheque  Universelle,  see  Leclcrc. 

Biel,  382. 

Bigg,  his  "  Christian  Platonists  of 
Alexandria,"  729. 

Blackie,  John  Stuart,  his  "  Four 
Phases  of  Morals,"  .598. 

Blackburne,  Francis,  his  "Historical 
View  of  Controversy  concerning  an 
Intermediate  State,"  775. 

Blasius,  Gerard,  351. 

Bochart,  Samuel,  3fj2;  on  the  connec- 
tion of  languages,  302. 

Bodin,  Jean,  the  earliest  systematizer 
of  Political  Economy,  f>48. 

Boeder,  Johann  Heinrich,  650. 

Body,  in  Cartesian  sense.  348  ;  invisi- 
ble, why  believed  in,  721;  what? 
721,722;  mere  phenomena,  756;  its 
action  phenomenal,  756. 

Boehme,  Jacob,  298,  732;  a  Protestant 
theosoi)hist,  298;  the  first  charac- 
teristically German  philosopher,  298 ; 
forerunner  of  Leibnitz's  metaphysic, 
298;  his  "Das  dreyfache  Leben," 
298;  his  "  Siimmtliche  Werke,"  298; 
Leibnitz's  estimate  of,  298,765;  in- 
fluences Quirin  Kuhlmann,  601. 

Boethius,  455,  724. 

Bohl,  Samuel,  his  researches  into  the 
Massoretic  system  of  Hebrew  mark- 
ings. 366. 


INDEX   C 


835 


Boiardo,  Matteo  Maria,  Count  of 
Scaudiano,  his  "  Orlando  lunamo- 
rato,"  3!»8. 

Boileau-Despreaux,  Nicolas,  his  "  Sat- 
ires," 97,  73G. 

Bolsec,  Jerome  Hermes,  advocates 
Pelagian  views  in  Geneva,  545  ;  cen- 
sured by  Calvin,  545 ;  imprisoned  by 
Senate,  545;  pursued  by  Calvin's 
hostility  to  Bern,  545 ;  conceives 
hatred  to  his  persecutors,  545  ;  writes 
his  "  Histoire  de  la  Vie,  Mujurs, 
Actes,  Doctrines  et  Mort  de  Jean 
Calvin,"  545,  ibid,  new  ed.,  773  ;  and 
his  "  Histoire  de  la  Vie,  Moeurs,  Doc- 
trines et  Deportement  de  Theodore 
de  Beze,"  545. 

Boniface,  apostle  to  the  Germans,  443 ; 
his  ''Opera  quie  extant,"  443;  his 
controversy  with  Virgil,  444;  Pope 
Zacliary's  letter  to,  444. 

Bonino,  G.  G.,  "  Biografia  medica 
pieraontese,"  521. 

Bonitz,his  "  Index  Aristotelieus,"  383. 

Bonosiis,  descril)ed  by  Vopiscus,  761. 

Borelli,  Giovanni  Alfonso,  67f5. 

Borgia,  Francisco,  754. 

Boscovich,  772. 

Bosses,  Des,  Leibnitz's  correspondence 
with,  in  which  is  contained  clearest 
exposition  of  the  Monadology,  101. 

Bossuet,  Jacques  Benigne,  his  corre- 
spondence with  Leibnitz,  531. 

Bouliours,  Dominique,  his  "  Maniere 
de  bien  penser  dans  les  ouvrages 
d'esprit,"  144;  Leibnitz's  estimate 
of,  748. 

Bouillier,  his  "Histoire  de  la  Philo- 
sophie  Cartesienne,"  421;  his 
"Eloges  de  Fontenelle,"  550. 

Bonlliau,  Ismael,  his  "  Ad  astronomos 
monita  duo,"  573;  his  "De  lineis 
spiralil)iis,"  573;  his  theory  concern- 
ing variable  stars,  573. 

Bouquet,  his  "  Kernm  Gall,  et  Franc. 
scriptores,"  99;  his  "Rec.  Hist. 
Gaules,"  737. 

Bourignon,  Antoinette,  599,  728;  her 
"  Traite  de  I'aveuglement  des 
hommes,"  599;  her  "  La  lumiere  du 
monde,"  599;  her  "  De  la  luniicre 
ne'e  en  tenebres,"  599;    Kuhlmann 


relations  with,  601 ;  Labadie's  rela- 
tions with,  (i02;  Lacoste's  revulsion 
of  feeling  towards,  604 ;  Leibnitz  re- 
fers to,  728. 

Boutan  (Bhutan),  736. 

Bowne,  Borden  P.,  his  "  Metaphysics  " 
470. 

Boyle,  Robert,  324;  discovers  law  of 
compressibility  of  gases,  324;  a 
founder  of  the  Royal  Society, 
England,  324;  his  "Of  Ab.solu'te 
Rest  in  Bodies,"  324;  his  works, 
324,   726. 

Brachet,  his  "  Historical  Grammar  of 
the  French,"  294. 

Bradley,  F.  IL,  his  "Principles  of 
Logic,"  214,  764. 

Brambach,  W.,  his  "  G.  W.  Leibniz, 
Verfasser  der  Histoire  de  Bileam," 
767. 

Braunfels,  his  "  Kritischer  Versuch 
iiber  Amadis,"  399. 

Briiutigam,  L.,  his  "Leibniz  nnd 
Herbart  iiber  die  Freiheit  d.  menschl. 
Willcns,"  752. 

Bre'mont  d'Ars  corrects  a  mistake  of 
Moreri's,  539. 

Britaunica,  Encyclopedia,  67,  68,  244, 
294,  311,  399,  421,  425,  475,  542,  552, 
573,  598. 

Brocardica,  486. 

Brooke,  Stopford  A.,  his  "History  of 
Early  English  LitfM-atnre,"  295. 

Briicker,  "  Histoiia  I'hilos.,"  278,606. 

Bruno,  Giordano,  his  use  of  term 
"monad,"  101;  his  "Delia  Causa," 
732. 

Bryce,  James,  his  article  "  Procoiiius," 
in  "  Encyclop.  Britannica,"  542. 

Bucer,  Martin,  114. 

Buddeus,  Johann  Franz,  713. 

Bulletin  des  Sciences  Matiu-inatiqncs. 
768. 

P.nratiiii,  his  flying  madiine,  719. 

Bnrckhanl,  his  "  Historia  l'.ihliollicca« 
August;!',"  242. 

"  Burgoldcnsis,"  an  anagram,  650. 

Buridan,  John,  his  "  Qu(!Stioiies  Kllii- 
corum  .Arislotelis,"  llii;  his  view  of 
liberty,  IKi;  the  illustration  of  the 
fatally  iiidiffcrcnl  ass  not  of  his 
authorship,  116. 


836 


LEIBNITZ  S   CRITIQUE    OF   LOCKE 


Burnet,  Thomas,  his  correspondence 
with  Leibnitz,  6,  478. 

Burridge  of  Dublin,  the  Latin  trans- 
lator of  the  "  Nouveaux  Essais,"  37. 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  his  "Great 
Educator.s,"  ()19. 

Csedmon,  his  Anglo-Saxon  Paraphrase 

of  Scripture,  2!I5. 
Caird,  E.,  his  article  "  Cartesianism," 

in  "  Encyclop.  Britannica,"  421;  his 

"  Philosophy  of  Kant,"  319,  332,  503 ; 

his  "Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant," 

503. 
Caird,  John,  his  "Introduction  to  the 

Philosophy  of  Religion,"  274. 
Calculus  of  Infinitesimals,  controversy 

regarding    its    discoverer,    573;    of 

Probabilities,  213. 
Calendar,  Gregorian,  424. 
Calixtus,  George,  5S7. 
Campanella,  Tommaso,  67,  64fi,  732. 
Camper,  Peter,  his   "  ISTatuurkundige 

Verhandelingen,"  280;   on  the  lan- 
guage of  apes,  286. 
Capella,  Marcianus,  455. 
Capes,  his  "  Stoicism,"  496. 
Cardano,  Girolamo,  67,  106,  566,  572; 

his  "De  Subtilitate,"  106;    on   the 

splritus /(uidliaHs,  730. 
Carlowitz,  peace  of,  2.^9. 
Carrington,  his  "  History  of  the  Life 

and  Death  of  Oliver  Cromwell,"  543. 
Casati  and  Christiana  of  Sweden,  751. 
Casaubon, Isaac,  478. 
Casimir,  John,  344. 
Casuistry  to  be  supplanted  by  logic  of 

probabilities,  213. 
Categories  of  Kant,  arise  from  Leib- 
nitz's doctrine,  741. 
Cats,  Jacob,  Dutch  poet,  624. 
Cause,  primal,  its  signification,  757 ; 

Hume  upon,  7.~)7. 
Causes,  efficient,  depend  upon   final, 

721. 
Cebes    of    Thebes,  436;    his    reputed 

JlLva^  "  spurious,"  436. 
Century  Dictionary,  67. 
"  Certain  author,  a,"  738. 
Certainty,    its    kinds,    metaphysical, 

462;  moral  or  physical,  -!62. 
Cervantes,  "Don  Quixote,"  321. 


Ceulen,  Ludolph  van,  his  "Van  de 
Circkel,"  734 ;  his  "  De  arithmetische 
en  geometrischefondamenten,"  734; 
his  "  Zetemata,"  734 ;  computes  ratio 
of  diameter  of  circle  to  its  circum- 
ference to  thirty-five  places  of  deci- 
mals, 734. 

Chabree  of  Geneva,  his  "  Sciagraphia," 
309. 

Changeling,  447  ;  "  Chaungelings,"770. 

"Characteristic,  a  General,"  292,  375, 
437. 

Chastel,  P.  L.,  edits  Bolsec's  Vie  de 
Calvin,  773. 

Chau^in,  Stephen,  his  "  Lexicon  Philo- 
sophieum,"  363. " 

Chemnitz,  Martin,  greatest  of  imme- 
diately post-Lutheran  theologians, 
592 ;  his  "  Examen  Concilii  Triden- 
tini,"  592;  his  "Loci  Theologici,'" 
592. 

Cherler,  collaborator  with  the  Bauhins, 
309. 

Cheruel,  his  "  Dictionnaire  des  Insti- 
tutions Fran(;aises,"  757. 

"  Chevauchier,"  757. 

"  Chimerisme,"  Leibnitz  defines,  762. 

Chinese,  their  dictiimaries,  .394. 

Xupifffioi,  the  Aristotelian,  736. 

Christianity  consists  in  its  ethical  con- 
tent, 607. 

Chrocus,  the  Vandal,  99. 

Chronicles,  IL,6:1S.  158. 

Chrysostom,  John,  on  Greek  culture, 
591 ;  his  hopeful  views  of  humanity, 
591. 

Cicero,  his  "  De  officiis,"  192,  261,  765  : 
"De  Finibus,"  192,  272,  765;  "  De 
Oratore,"  214,  765;  "  Qu<estioncs 
Tusculanaj,"  264;  "Ad  Atticum," 
327 ;  "  De  Legibus,"  500 ;  "  Topica," 
766. 

Circle-quadrature,  historical  sketch  of, 
425 :  Leibnitz's  relation  to  the  prob- 
lem of,  425. 

Cisner,  Nicolas,  546. 

Clarke,  John,  his  translation  of 
"Jacobi  Rohaulti  Physica,"  233; 
—  Samuel,  his  notes  on  "Rohaulti 
Phy.sica,"  233. 

Class,  G.,  his  "  Der  Leibnizsehe  Deter- 
minismus,"  752. 


INDEX  C 


887 


Clauberg,  Jean,  303,  SOi;  Leibnitz's 
opinion  of,  304;  bis  "  De  Conjunc- 
tione  aniraae  et  corporis  humani 
scriptum,"  303 ;  his  "  Ontosopbia,  de 
cognitioue  Dei  et  uostri,"  303. 

Clavius,  Cbristopber,  the  Euclid  of 
the  sixteenth  century,  424;  assists 
in  correcting  the  calendar,  424 ;  his 
"  Euclidis  elemeuta,"  424;  his 
"Sinus  linese  taugeutis,"  424;  his 
"  Romani  Caleudarii  explicatio," 
424  ;  edits  "  Photismi  "  of  Maurolico, 
442. 

"  Clelie,  Histoire  Roraaine,"  223. 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  575 ;  his  "  Stro- 
mata,"  591;  on  "light  of  nature," 
591 ;  on  purgatorial  tire,  729. 

Clerc,  Jean  le,  bis  "  Bibliotheque  uni- 
verselle  et  historique,"  723;  bis  "  Bi- 
bliotheque choisie,"  723;  bis  "Biblio- 
theque ancieime  et  moderue,''  723; 
his  abstract  of  Locke's  essay,  728. 

Clericus,  J.,  733. 

Gierke,  Gilbert,  634. 

Clerselier,  Claude,  his  "  Les  Lettresde 
Descartes,"  (133. 

Clichtoveus,  "  Elucidatorium  Eccle- 
siasticuni,"  r)03. 

Clcelia,  the  Rom;in  maiden,  223. 

Co-divisions,  337. 

Cock,  made  into  Platonic  man,  38.'). 

Codex  Justinian,  see  Corpus  Juris; 
■ — Argenteus,  295. 

Collateral  distributions,  3.37. 

Collectio  Libroriim  Juris  Antejusti- 
niani,  edited  by  Krueger,  Mommsen, 
and  Studemuud,  7()Ij,  769,  771,  773. 

Collid,  Francesco,  .593;  his  views  on 
salvabilityof  pagans,  593;  held  .'\ris- 
totle  "  unsaved,"  .593  ;  his  "  De  aui- 
mabus  paganorum,"  593. 

Comenius,  John  Amos,  a  vi^riter  on 
pedagogy,  46G;  bis  "Opera  didac- 
tica,"  4613;  publishes  his  "  Physicie 
ad  lumen  Divinuin  reformarre  synop- 
sis," 466;  estimates  and  biographies 
of,  4(1G. 

Compressibility  explained  by  Leibnitz, 
723. 

"  Comptes  Rendus,"  425. 

Conarion,  why  the  suggested  seat  of 
soul?  758. 


Concepts,  the  hypostatizing  of,  a  large 
source  of  error,  306. 

Concepiio,  conceptus,  330. 

"Conclusion,  that  the,  cannot  contain 
more  than  the  premises,"  variously 
expressed,  515. 

Connaway  (Conway) ,  Count  ess  of,  732 ; 
her  "Opuscula  pbilosophica,"  732. 

Connotations,  intrinsic,  738. 

Conriug,  Hermann,  his  vast  erudition, 
520;  his  "Opera  omnia,"  520;  his 
voluminous  correspondence  witli 
Leibnitz,  520  ;  taught  Oldciibur- 
gerus,   650. 

Consciousness,  E.  G.  Robin.son  on,  741. 

"  Consequent,  greatness  of  the,"  Janet 
explains  the  phrase,  7.")6. 

"  Contemporary  Review,"  542. 

Gontinens  et  contentum,  569. 

Continuity,  Law  of,  334,  509,  712. 

Contradictory  ideas,  tlieir  combina- 
tion under  one  notion  how  delected, 
354. 

Copernicus,  Nicolas,  419  ;  liis  "  De 
orbium  coelestium  revolutionibus," 
419. 

Corban,  j?-!^,  327. 

Coriuthian.s',  L,  2:9,  200,  583. 

Corneille,  Thomas,  5.36. 

"  Corpus  Juris  Civilis,"  Mommsen  and 
Paris  editions,  241,  329,  4:U,  486.  487, 
492,  497,  534,  735,  759,  766,  769,  770, 
771,  773. 

Corruptio  opf.imi  pessi^na,  482. 

Coste,  Pierre,  169  ;  "  Essai  pbiloso- 
phique  concernant  I'l'^nlcndcment 
humain — par  M.  Locke,"  xiv,  4, 
7;  as  translator  of  Locke,  161,  727; 
is  sometimes  dearer  tlian  Locke, 
103. 

Cousin,  bis  "(Etivres  (\i-  Descartes," 
731,  748,  749,  7.58,  7.59,  770,  77:i,  774. 

Cnialion,  Leibnitz's  view  of,  224  ; 
Lo(!ke's  view  of,  77  L 

"Credibility,  motives  of,"  dclimil  by 
Lei))nitz,  774. 

Cremer,  liis"  Bil)lic(i-'riicolngir:il  Lexi- 
con of  New  Testament  (Jreek," 
289. 

Cromwell.  543. 

Crown,  laurel,  in  surgery.  520. 

"Crnsca,  La,"  18. 


838 


LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE    OF    LOCKE 


Cndworth,  Ralph,  65 ;  his  "  True  In- 
tellectual System  of  the  Universe," 
(55,  730  ;  editions  of  his  works,  65. 

Cynic  School,  518. 

Cyrenaic  School,  518. 

Dahn,  F.,  his  "  Prokopius  von  Csise- 
rea,"  542. 

Daial-Kirbal,  197. 

Dais,  r.t7. 

Dalgarno,  George,  292 ;  his  "Ars  Sig- 
norum,"  292;  inventor  of  manual 
alphabet,  292. 

DamiLUtio  levissima  omnium,  the  fate 
of  infants  dying  unbaptized,  594. 

Dangicourt,  a  correspondent  of  Leib- 
nitz. 101. 

Darapti  may  become  Darii,  568. 

Darwin,  C,  his  "  Origin  of  Species," 
345. 

Dasyjiodius,  Conrad,  404;  his  "Ana- 
lysis Geometricfe,"  404. 

D'Aumont,  Louis  Marie-Victor,  numis- 
matist, 547. 

Debidour,  M.,  his  "  Thesis  "  in  defence 
of  Empress  Theodora,  542. 

Decahedron,  a  nominal  definition,  317. 

Definition,  according  to  Aristotle,  312; 
Leibnitz's  vindication  of  Aristotle's 
rule  concerning,  312;  on  the  use  of 
loose,  313 ;  Leibnitz's  definition  of 
nominal,  317, 398 ;  of  real,  317  ;  of  ge- 
netic, 317 ;  of  causal,  317 ;  Leibnitz 
defines  analytically,  318. 

Delecluse,590. 

Delbriick,  B.,  his  "  Einleitung  in  das 
Sprachstudium,"  292. 

Delphin  classics,  605. 

Democritus,  64  ;  on  Milky  Way,  277. 

Demoivre,  his  "Doctrine  of  chances, 
or  method  of  calculating  the  proba- 
bilities of  events  at  play,"  213. 

"  Demons  or  goblins,"  730. 

Demonstration,  philosophical,  reduced 
to  syllogism  an<l  prosyllogism,  404; 
none  according  to  Leibnitz  in  Aris- 
totle and  Plato,  416;  proposal  to  ex- 
tend its  bounds,  437 ;  direct,  491 ; 
what  it  appeals  to,  766. 

Denores,  Jason,  636. 

Desargues,  Gaspard,  geometer  and 
engineer,  137. 


Descartes,  Rene,  64,  348;  friend  of 
Digby,  83;  denies  vacuum,  127;  his 
"  Principia  Philosophic,"  127,  128, 
148,  230,  48;;,  484,  502,  552,  602,  613, 
727,  TAi,  741,  748,  749  ;  his  letter  to 
Samuel  Clarke,  127;  his  letter  to  Mer- 
senne,  137,  759;  his  "  Meditationes 
de  Prima  Philosophia,"  229,  502,  731 ; 
his  "  Dioptrica,"  230 ;  his  "  Passiones 
Anim8e,"230;  his  theory  concerning 
the  Pineal  Gland,  230,  758;  friend 
of  Froidmont,  234;  his  "Epistles," 
348 ;  bis  remarks  on  the  programme 
of  Regius,  348;  explodes  "inten- 
tional species,"  382;  his  opinion  of 
Freuicle,  393 ;  his  preliminary  dictum 
anticipated,  410; "corresponds  with 
Hardy  and  Fermat,  466;  on  the 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God, 
502 ;  "  Discours  sur  la  methode  pour 
bien  conduire  sa  raison,  etc.,"  502, 
534 ;  his  theory  of  vortices,  552,  613  ; 
his  theory  of  matter  of  the  first  and 
second  elements,  613;  avoids  his 
"  rock  of  velocity,"  659  ;  Reponses  to 
"  Objectiones  quintaj  "  of  Gasseudi, 
731 ;  his  "  Regulip,  ad  directionem 
iugenii,"  734;  his  Platonic  Aris- 
totelian dualism,  757  ;  letter  to 
Meissonier,  758. 

Deschales,  Claude  Francois  Miniet,676. 

Deusing,  Anton,  iiis  "De  vero  system- 
ate  mundi,"  6.32. 

De  Vise,  4.")8. 

Dewey,  John,  his  "Leibniz's  New 
Essays,  a  Critical  Exposition,"  xv., 
17,  128,  129,  131,  317,  319,  336,  .•363. 

Dialectic  syllogism,  5(J4. 

Dieckhoff,  his  "Leibniz  Stellung  zur 
Offenbarung,"  770. 

Dietz,  his  "  Analecta  Medica,"  371. 

Diez,  Friedrich  Christian,  founder  of 
Romance  philology,  294 ;  his  "  Altro- 
nianische  Sprachdenkraaler,"  2S>4. 

Difference,  actual,  in  what  it  consists, 
761. 

Digby,  Sir  Kenelm,  his  "Treatise  on 
the  Nature  of  Bodies.  83:  "  Demon- 
stratio  immortalitatis  aniniJB  ratio- 
nalis,"7.35;  on  "  vacuum,"  774. 

Digesta,  see  Corpug  Juris  Civilis. 

Dillmann,  Edward,  his    "Eiue  neue 


INDEX   C 


839 


Darstelluug  der  Leibnizischen  Mou- 
adlehre  auf  Grund  der  Quelleu,"  102, 
180,  225,  o49. 

Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  519. 

Diogenes  the  Cynic,  and  "  the  man  of 
Plato,"  385. 

Diogenes  Laei-tius,  his  "Lives  of  tlie 
Pliilosophers,"  ;'.7',».  ;>S5,  518,  519. 

Diophantus,  571 ;  his  "  Arithnieticornin 
libri  sex,"  571. 

Dioscorides,  371. 

Direct  demonstration,  491. 

Disamis,  liow  it  may  be  derived  from 
Barl)ara,  407. 

"  Disting'uislied  sufficiently,"  727. 

Divini,  Eustachio,  013;  his  alleged 
controversy  with  Huygens,  in  "  Sys- 
tema  Saturninm,"  613,  614. 

Doctor  juris  utrhisque,  758. 

Dods,  M.,  translator  of  Augustine,  51(), 
729. 

Doniinis,  M.  Ant.  de,  442;  his  "De 
Kcpublica  eeclesiastica,"  443;  his 
"  De  radiis  visns  et  lucis  in  vitris 
perspectivis  et  iride,"  443. 

"  Don  JiiaTi  ou  le  Festin  de  Pierre  "  of 
Molicre,  536. 

Don  Quixote,  321,  766. 

"Donation,"  the  so-called,  "of  Con- 
stantine,"  exposed  by  Valla,  415. 

Dorner,  I.  A.,  his  "  System  der  Christ- 
lichen  Glaubenslehre,"  249,  503. 

"  Double  truth,"  the  doctrine  of,  581. 

Di-abitius,  Nicolas,  an  enthusiast,  604  ; 
stirs  George  of  Transylvania  to  an 
unsuccessful  movement  against  Po- 
land, 605  ;  burned  at  the  stake,  ()U5. 

Draud,  George,  626;  his  "  Bibliotheca 
Classica,"  ()2(). 

Dreier,  Christian  (Peter),  635. 

Drobisch,  Moritz  Wilhelm,  337;  on 
"collateral  distril)utions,"  ;i37. 

Du  Harael,  Jean  Baptiste,  (!34. 

Du(-hesne,  Andrew,  546;  his  "Hist. 
Franc.  Script.,"  737. 

Duncan,  G.  W.,  his  translation,  "The 
Philosophical  Works  of  Leibnitz," 
xiii,  3,  14,  15,  18,  68,  101,  127,  128, 
1.31,  136,  154,  167,  174,  2.39,  317,  332, 
34(i,  363,  381,  383,  420,  421,  470,  502, 
504,  511,  553,  722,  723,  7.37,  748,  749, 
750,  751,  775. 


Duns  Scotus,  see  Scotus. 

Dupin,  Louis  Ellies  ;  his  "  Bihliotheque 
Universelle  des  Auteurs  ecclesias- 
tiques,"418,  593,617. 

Durandus,  382. 

Durrius,  Joliaiin  Conrad,  636. 

Dutens,  his  "  Leibuitii  Opera  Omnia," 
101,  290,  292,  294,  295,  298,  302,  'Mn, 
306,  311,  317,  318,  324.  333,  337,  'MA, 
345,  346,  381,  382,  383,  3!H,  415,  417, 
420,  425,  434,  435,  436,  438,  443,  -150. 
451,  465,  466,  478,  484,  486,  495,  496, 
502,  504,  508,  511,  520,  532,  5.39.  544, 
546,  .550,  551,  552,  553,  554,  561,  .573, 
579,  590,  .591,  592,  595,  600,  606,  626, 
631,  638,  649,  683,  706,  733,  737,  748, 
750,  761,  766,  767,  7()8,  774. 

Dynamic  Idealism,  that  of  Leibnitz, 
723. 

Dyoor,  341. 

Eccard,304. 

EiSos,  349. 

Eguazio,  Giovanni  Battista,  610;    his 

"De  Romanis  priucipibus,"  610. 
Elaterium,  655. 
Eleatic  School,  93. 
Elementcwf/eister,  730. 
Elements,  the,  according  to  Empedo- 

cles,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  362. 
Elimination,  a  metliod  of,  413. 
Elof/es  of   the   French  .\cademicians, 

550. 
Elwes,  R.  H.  M.,  translator  of  Spiuo/a, 

192. 
Emotion  and  passion,  notdisfingni.shcd 

by  Ijcibnitz  and  Lo(d<e,  751. 
Empedocles,  .'i()2;    his   four   elements, 

.3(i2. 
"  End  organs  "  of  nerves,  739. 
Ende,  Francis  Van  der,  345. 
Eudoxa,  in  Aristotle,  418. 
Enthymeme,  481. 
EiiHk  ralionif:,  311,  759. 
'E7rtxf'P'?M"i  what'.'  5(i5. 
Epictctus,  4"H);  liis  AmTp//:Jai,  -HH;. 
Epicurus,  126,   421  :    literature   of   his 

life  and  philosophy,  121. 
Ei)igrani,  its  nature,  481. 
Episcopius,  Simon,   179,7.'"!;  his  "  De 

lilxjro  arbitrio,"  179. 
Equations:  "  ordinary  "  or  algebraic, 


840 


LEIBNITZ'S    CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


425;  "extraordinary"  or  transcen- 
dental, 425;  reduction  of,  571. 

Erasmus,  oitl,  5<)2. 

Eratosthenes,  93. 

Erdniann,  J.  E.,  his  "  Leibnitii  Opera 
Fhilosophica,"  xii,  3,  13,  14,  15,  l(i, 
19,  42,  46,  47,  49,  50,  52,  53,  56,  58, 
62,  63,  73,  80,  87,  89,  90,  91,  97,  101, 
118,  119,  120,  121,  123,  125,  127,  128, 
131,  i;^j,  147,  150,  154,  155,  159,  167, 
174,  180,  185,  203,  204,  205,  210,  211, 
213,  218,  219,  220,  225,  227,  229,  239, 
240,  245,  246,  249,  251,  254,  257,  259, 
261,  263,  267,  270,  272,  273,  274,  275, 
282,  283,  284,  290,  293,  300,  301,  30(i, 
310,  314,  316,  317,  318,  319,  .321,  323, 
32(),  332,  333,  334,  341,  346,  349,  363, 
376,  379,  381,  382,  .383,  386,  405,  412, 
414,  419,  420,  421,  434,  436,  437,  450, 
451,  4()0,  466,  476,  496,  497,  502,  504, 
506,  508,  511,  513,  537,  5.39,  548, 
551,  553,  561,  580,  588,  631,  632,  6.35, 
638,  644,  (577,  687,  692,  693,  698,  705, 
706,  717,  721,  727,  731,  735,  749,  750, 
751,  752,  753,  766;  "  Grundriss  d. 
Gesch.  d.  Philos.,"  67,  68,  129,  131, 
278,  303,  590. 

Erkoiintnixslehre,  319,  633. 

Ermerins,  F.  Z.,  his  "  Hippocratis  et 
aliorum  medicorum  reliquse,"  476. 

Erpeuitis,  287. 

Esoteric  teachings,  272. 

"Esprit,"  28.  [768. 

"Ethereal  vehicles"  for  si^irits,  380, 

Ethics,  its  truths  founded  in  natural 
theology,  496. 

Eucharist,  Lutheran  view  of,  611. 

Eucken,  Rudolph,  his  "Fundamental 
Concepts  of  Modern  Philosophical 
Thought,"  227,  239 ;  his  "  Gesch.  und 
Kritik  der  Grundhegriffe  der  Gegen- 
wart,"  758 ;  his  "  Die  Grundhegriffe 
der  Gegenwart  historisch  und  kri- 
tisch  eutwickelt,"  758. 

Euclid  of  Alexandi'ia,  93 ;  his  response 
to  Ptolemy,  93  ;  coiuinentators  upon, 
108;  his  Elements  reduced  to  syllo- 
gisms, 769 ;  —  of  Megara,  93. 

Euler,  Le'onard,  393. 

Eutocius  of  Ascalouita,  465. 

Evolution,  theory  of,  hinted  at  by 
Leibnitz,  347. 


"  Ex  professo,"  739. 

"  Exception,  some,"  728. 

Exclusion,  a  method  of,  413. 

Existence,  what  ?  401. 

Existence  of  God,  Descartes  on,  502; 
Spinoza  on,  .j02;  Leibnitz  on,  502; 
Anselmic  argument  for,  503. 

Exoteric  teachings,  272. 

Experience,  its  incompetency,  725. 

"  Experientia,"  its  use  among  Scho- 
lastics, 724. 

Eye,  "  accommodation  "  of  the,  228 ; 
men  with  only  one,  389;  Maurolico 
upon  the,  412. 

Fabri,  Honore,  586";  disputes  with  Sen- 
nert  upon  the  immateriality  of  the 
souls  of  animals,  488 ;  his  "  Syuojisis 
Geometrica,"  586  ;  his  "  Physica  seu 
scieutia  rerum  corporearum,"  58(): 
his  "  Summula  Theologife,"  58(5;  as- 
sists Di\ani  in  the  controversy  with 
Huygens,  (514. 

Fabricius,  John  Lewis,  102 ;  saves  the 
Heidelberg  archives,  102 ;  his  "  Apo- 
logise generis  humani  contra  calum- 
niam  Atheismi,"  102 ;  letter  to  Spi- 
noza, 723. 

"  Factum,  in,"  486. 

^avTacrla,  (pavracrfia,  769. 

Farrar,  F.  W.,  his  "Seekers  after 
God,"  496. 

Fedais,  the  devoted  ones,  197. 

Feder,  "  Commercii  epistolici  Leibni- 
tiani,"  728. 

Feeling,  defined,  TM;  and  ideas,  their 
relations,  754. 

Felden,  Johannes,  (i36. 

Feller,  his  "  Otium  Hanoveranum,  ' 
595;  edits  "Miscellanea  Leibniti- 
ana,"  443. 

Fehvinger,  635. 

Fergil,  St.,  443. 

Fermat,  Pierre  de,  213,  393,  465,  4(5(5, 
571 ;  his  "  De  Maximis  et  Minimis,  ' 
465  ;  "  Opera  Mathematica,"  571. 

Ferrari,  Luigi,  572 ;  resolves  equations 
of  third  and  fourth  degrees,  572. 

Ferri,  L.,  his  "La  Psicologia  di  P. 
Pomponazzi,"  581. 

Ferro,  Scipioue  del,  571 :  solves  cubic 
equations,  571. 


INDEX   C 


841 


Feyerabend,  626. 

Fiymenta  mentis,  623. 

Figure,  syllogistic,  the  iuveutiou  of 
the  Fourth,  408. 

^LKo(Tb<pr)ij.a,  what?  565. 

Fiore,  Autouio  del,  571. 

Fire,  as  (ppoviixov,  721). 

Fischer,  Kuuo,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  neuern 
Philos.,"  218,  239,  3(i3,  391,  421,  554, 
579,  584,  629,  752  ;  his  "  Descartes 
and  his  School,"  634. 

Florentinus,  735. 

Fludd,  Robert,  his  "  Philosophia  Mo- 
saica,"  63,  730;  his  "  Utrumque 
Cosmi,"  730. 

Foerster  und  Koschwitz,  their  "  Alt- 
frauzosisches  Uebungsbuch,"  294. 

Foiitenelle,  Bernard  le  Bovier  de,  his 
"  Entretiens  sur  la  pluralite  des 
luoudes,"  550;  his  "  Eloge  de  Leib- 
niz," 550;  his  "Dialogues  des 
Morts,"551 ;  "  Doutes  sur  le  systeme 
physique  des  causes  occasionelles," 
551. 

Fontanier-Pellisson,  Paul,  591 ;  corre- 
sponds with  Leibnitz,  591 ;  his  "  liis- 
toria  I'Academie  Fran^aise,"  591 ; 
his  "Traite  de  I'Eucharistie,"  591; 
his  "  Reflexions  sur  les  differeuds  en 
niatiere  de  religion,"  591. 

*opd,  321. 

Force,  primitive  and  derivative,  721. 

"  Formalities,"  569. 

Forms,  substantial,  their  origin,  319; 
Locke's  view  of,  349 ;  Leibnitz's  view 
of,  349. 

Foucher  de  Careil,  his  "  Lettres  et 
opuscules  iuedits  de  Ijeibniz,"  xii, 
677,  748,  757  ;  "  Nouvelles  lettres  et 
opuscules  ine'dits  de  Leibniz,"  xii, 
101,  420,  49(),  728,  748,  750,  752,  775; 
his  "CEuvres  do  Leibniz,"  xii,  532, 
544,  591,  592,  629,  7.".7,  740,  7.57,  765; 
his  "  Leibniz  et  Pierre  le  (Jraiid," 
629. 

Foucher,  Simon,  420;  "the  restorer 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  Academy," 
420;  his  "Critique  de  la  Recherche 
dela  Ve'rite,"420;  Malebrancbe  crit- 
icises, 420 ;  his  ol)jectioiis  to  doctrine 
of  Pre-established  Harmony,  420;  his 
correspondence  with  Leibnitz,  420. 


Fraser,  Alexander  Campbell,  his 
"Locke,"  .56,  747;  his  edition  of 
"  Locke's  Essay  concerning  llumau 
Understanding,"  549,  728,  730,  735, 
736,  737,  738,  747,  7.50,  755,  756,  760, 
762,  763,  765,  7(i6,  767,  768,  769,  770, 
771,  772,  773;  edits  Berkeley,  747. 

Free-will,  Leibnitz's  definition  of,  752. 

Freedom,  ethical,  distinguished  from 
free-will,  752. 

Freigius,  J.,  311. 

French  version  of  Locke's  Essay,  728. 

Fre'nicle  de  Bessy,  Bernard,  a  rapid 
calculator,  393  ;  his  method,  39:! ;  liis 
"Traite  des  triangles  el  rectangles 
in  nombres,"  393. 

Frenicle,  Nicolas,  poet,  393. 

Friedlein,  G.,  edits  works  of  Produs, 
108,  463. 

Fries,  G.  F.,  his  "  Neue  Kritik  der 
Vernunft,"  764. 

Frisch,  Ch.,  edits  Kepler's  works,  123. 

Frobeii,  edits  "Alcuini  Opera,"  546. 

Froidmont  (Fromont)  Libert,  2."i4;  his 
"  Labyrinthus  sive  de  compositiouo 
continui,"  234. 

Fuchs,  a  botanist,  308. 

Gabeleutz  ami  Loebe,  their  "  Ullilas," 
29(;. 

Gains,  his  "  Elements  of  Unman  l^aw," 
32i),  434. 

Galenas  Claudius,  407;  his  "Do  usii 
partium  corporis  human!,"  407;  his 
"  Opera  omnia,"  408;  invents  fourlii 
syllogistic  figure,  408. 

Galileo,  paves  the  way  to  formulation 
of  law  of  gravitation,  440. 

Ganzarini,  Tito  Giovanni,  il  Scandi- 
anese,  .">99. 

Garner,  R.  L.,  on  language  of  mon- 
keys, 764;  his  "Spcecli of  Monkeys," 
764. 

Gass,  W.,  liis  "Gesch.  d.  protestanl- 
ischen  Dogmalik  ilirem  Znsamnirn- 
hange  mit  der  Theologie,"  589,  595. 

Gassendi,  Piiirre,  (il,  ()5,  TM\  attacks 
doctrine  of  int(;ntiiinal  species,  'Mv>\ 
on  Eiiicurus,  421  :  Iiis  "  Synt.-igma 
Phil()soi)liicuni,"  421:  "  (lassendy," 
his  Cin((uicnie  Objections,"  731;  on 
vacuum,  774. 


842 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"  Gaunersprache,"  its  composition, 
292. 

Gaunilo,  502:  his  "Liber  pro  Insipi- 
euti,"  503. 

Gauss,  Carl  Friedrich,  his  "Theo- 
ria  motus  corporum  ccelestium," 
152. 

Gautier,  L.,  his  "CEuvres  Poetiqnes 
d"Adam  de  St.-Victor,"  603. 

Gayard,  his  "Fragments  relatifs  a  la 
doctrine  des  Ismaelis,"  197. 

Genera  and  species,  the  philosophies 
of  Locke  and  Leibniiz  most  sharply 
divergent  on,  310. 

"  Generation,  spontaneous,"  346. 

Genii,  52,  313. 

Gergo.  293. 

Gerhard,  J.,  .587. 

Gerhardt,  Carl  Immannel,  "Die  phi- 
losophischen  Schriften  von  G.  W. 
Leibniz,"  xii,  3,  10,  14,  15,  16,  26,  28, 
41, 49,  50,  53,  55,  56,  57,  65,  66,  72,  73, 
80,  87,  89,  90,  91,  97,  101,  105,  118, 
119,  120,  121,  123,  125,  128,  131,  1.3^5, 
147,  150,  154.  155,  159,  174,  180,  184, 
185,  199,  203,  204,  205,  210,  211,  213, 
218,  219,  220,  225,  227,  229,  239,  245, 
246,  249,  251,  254,  259,  263.  270,  272, 
273,  274,  282,  283,  284,  292,  300,  301, 
306,  310,  311,  314,  316,  317,  319,  .321, 
323,  324,  330,  332,  333,  3.31,  341,  344, 
346,  348,  319,  362,  363,  376,  379,  381, 
382,  383,  386,  393.  394,  412,  420,  421, 
425,  434,  436,  437,  450.  451,  458,  4<X), 
463,  466,  478,  496,  497,  502,  504,  50t5, 
SOS,  511,  513,  520,  .521,  522,  532,  537, 
548,  552,  553,  561,  576,  580,  586,  588, 
606,  623,  631,  (33.3,  6:35,  »>38,  643,  644, 
(551,  652,  653,  6.>4,  655,  676,  677,  687, 
692,  693,  697,  698,  6'.>9,  705,  706,  714, 
715,  716,  717,  727,  728,  730,  731,  733, 
741,  748,  749,  7.50,  751,  752,  753,  754, 
755,  762,  7()6,  771 :  his  "  Einleitung," 
463;  his  "Sammlung  des  Pappus 
siebentes  und  achtes  Bueh."  521 ; 
"Leibniz,  math.  Schrift.,"  573,  .586, 
634,  657,  659,  670,  671,  676,  677,  683, 
6S4.  699.  7:33,  7:34,  767. 

Gerland,  E.,  his  "  Leibnizens  imd  Huy- 
gens  Brief wechseln,"  343. 

Gesner,  Conrad,  "  the  German  Pliny," 
626 ;   makes   the  first    attempt    at 


a    literary    encyclopedia,  626 :    his 
"  Bibliotheca  Universalis,"  626. 

Gibbon,  Edward,  his  "  Decline  and 
Fall  of  the  Eoman  Empire,"  197, 
345. 

Gilbert,  WiUiam,  earliest  methodical 
experimentalist,  774 :  his"Demag- 
nete  magneticisque  eorporibus,"  774. 

Glanvill,  Joseph,  631. 

Glass,  Pliny  on  flexible,  316. 

Gobien,  Charles  A.,  104;  his  "  Histoire 
des  Isles  Mariannes,"  104. 

Goclen,  R.,  .311 :  his  "Lexicon  philoso- 
phicum, "  311 ;  his  "  Isagoge  in  Orga- 
num  Aristotelis,"  311 :  his  regressive 
sorites,  311 :  mediates  between  Aris- 
totle and  Ramus,  408. 

God,  as  place  of  things,  1.53;  as  art  us 
pwnis,  159 ;  omnipresence  of,  dyna- 
mic, 159;  his  veracity,  its  place  in 
Cartesian  system,  319 :  his  existence 
required  by  doctrine  of  monads,  :363 : 
the  scholastic  distinction  of  will  and 
understanding  in,  462;  object  of 
man's  highest  moral  aspiration  and 
effort,  49«j;  source  of  all  truth  and 
of  all  beings,  517. 

Godwin,  Francis,  his  "Man  in  the 
Moon,  '  342,  551. 

Goebel,  602. 

Gohl,  Jacob,  287,  468;  his  "Lexicon 
Arabico-Latinnm,"  287. 

Gottling,  379. 

Gombanlt,  Antoine,  5-39. 

Gonzales,  Domingo,  his  "Voyage  chi- 
merique  au  monde  de  la  lune."  342. 

Gonzalez,  Tirso,  opposed  probabilism, 
418:  his  "  Fundamentnm  Theologije 
moralis,  tractatus  de  recto  usu  opi- 
nion tim  probabilium,"  418. 

Goodwin,  W.  W.,  his  "Plutarch's 
Morals,"  476. 

Gijppert,  his  "  Ueber  einheitliche, 
zusammengesetzte  und  Gesammt- 
sachen  nach  rom.  Reeht,"  759. 

Gorgias,  518. 

Goropius,  see  Becan. 

Gow,  his  "  Short  History  of  Greek 
Mathematics,"  527.  [21>5. 

Graff,  E.  Th.,  his  "  Gospel  of  Otfrid,  ' 

Grammatical  confusion  in  the  text  ex- 
plained, 768. 


INDEX   C 


843 


Grant,  Alex.,  his  "  Ethics  of  Aris- 
totle," 321,  752,  753. 

Greaves,  John,  his  "  Pyramidogra- 
phia,"  150. 

Green,  when  the  product  of  hlue  and 
yellow,  320. 

Gregory,  IX.,  444;  XIII.,  reforms  the 
Calendar,  424. 

Grein,  C.  W.  M.,  his  "  Bihliothek  der 
Aiigel-Siichsischen  Poesie,"  295. 

Gretser,  Jacob,  (ilS;  his  response  to 
magistrates  of  Marckdorf,  (J18. 

Grimaldi,  Charles  Philip,  3U4. 

Grimm,  Jacob,  his  "  Kleinere  Schrif- 
ten,"  294;  his  "  Deutsches  Worter- 
buch,"  294. 

Groot,  see  Grotius. 

Grotefend,  C.  L.,  his  "  Briefwechsel  z. 
Leibniz,  Arnauld  und  Laudgrafin 
Ernst,  etc.,"  4()3. 

Grotins,  Hugo,  G3C;  founder  of  phi- 
losophy of  law,  494 ;  on  man  as  a 
social  animal,  285;  his  "  De  Jure 
Belli  et  Pacis,"  285;  his  "  Epistoliw 
ad  Gallos,"  494. 

Ground-truths,  theoretical,  how  con- 
scious of,  735 ;  practical,  how  con- 
scious of,  735. 

Guericke,  Otto  von,  774;  experiments 
on  vacuums,  127 ;  his  air-machine, 
127;  "  Experimenta  nova  ut  vocant 
Magdeburgica,"  127. 

Guerre,  Martin,  the  story  of  his  per- 
sonation, 310. 

Guerrier,  (i29. 

Guhrauer,  Dr.  G.  E.,  his  "  G.  W.  Frei- 
herr  v.  Leibnitz.  Eine  Biographic," 
xii,  213,  239,  334,  365,  394,  415,  434, 
435,  436,  532,  573,  591,  712,  715,  765  ; 
edits  "  Leibnitz's  De  priiicipio  Indi- 
vidui,"  239,  606,  (523;  edits  "Leib- 
nitz's deutsche  Schriften,"  7,  379, 
435,  602,  626,  736,  757,  764;  his 
"J.  Jung  und  sein  Zcitalter,"  636; 
edits  Bodin's  "Colloquium  Hepta- 
plomeres,"  648. 

Guyou,  Mme.,  728. 

Haaxman,    biographer    of    Leeuwen- 

hoek,  346. 
Hadley,     "Introduction      to      Koman 

Law,"  329. 


Hagenbach,  his  "History  of  Doc- 
trines," 594,  729. 

Hakluyt  Society,  the,  89. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  "Lectures  ou 
Logic,"  14,  311,  317,  408,  515,  568; 
his  "Reid,"  50,  116,  136,  382,  4(>3, 
576,  764;  Note  A,  43,  576;  on  the 
Infinite,  274;  "Lectures  on  Meta- 
physics," 382,  734,764. 

Hamm,  Ludwig,  346. 

Hammer,  Von,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Assassi- 
neu,"  197. 

Hardy,  Claude,  his  "  Data  Euclidis," 
465,  4()6. 

Harlay,  Archbishop  of  Paris,  348. 

Harmony,  Pre-established,  147,  319, 
363,  420,  759. 

Harris,  W.  T.,  "Journal  of  Specula- 
tive Philosophy,"  8. 

Harrison-Verrall,  his  "  Mythology  and 
Monuments  of  Ancient  Athens,"  3'.K). 

Hartenstein,  his  "Locke's  Lchre  von 
der  mensehlichen  Erkenntiiiss  in 
Vcrgleichung  mit  Leibniz's  Kritik 
derselbeii,"  5,311 ;  his  "  Hist.  Philos. 
Abhandlungen,".311,  .349;  liis edition 
of  "  Kant,'"'  332. 

Harvey,  William,  'M6. 

Harzer,  P.,  his  "  Leibniz's  dynamische 
Ausschauungen,"  etc.,  775. 

Hashishin,  197. 

Hasse,  his  "  Anselm  von  Canlcrlmry," 
503. 

Haure'au,  Barthclmy,  his  "  Ilistoire  de 
la  Philosophie  Scholastique,"  349, 
382,  503,  588;  his  "  De  la  philosophie 
scholasti(pie,"  767. 

Haurisius,  his  "  Scriptores  Historisu 
Romanai  I^atini  veteres  qui  extant 
omnes,"  (ilO. 

Heath,  James,  his  "  Flagellum ;  or 
Life  and  Death,  Birth  and  Burial  of 
Oliver  Cromwell,"  543. 

Hebrew  in  Gaunersprachc,  292. 

Hedge,  F.  11.,  in  "  Journal  of  Specula- 
tive Philosophy,"  101,  l.''^,  332. 

Heereboord,  .Adrian,  633. 

Hegel,  his  "Gesch.  d.  Piiilos.,"  lOS, 
156;  on  iiochnic,  298 ;  his  "  Vorlrs- 
ungen  iiber  Bcweisc  von  Dascin 
Gottes,".W3;  eniph.-isizcs  like  1-cib- 
nitz  the  concrete,  749;  agrees  witli 


84i 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Leibnitz's  view  of  absolute,  750 ;  in- 
terprets Leibnitz's  Principle  of  Indi- 
viduation, 766. 

Heidegger,  J.  H.,  edits  woi-ks  of  Fab- 
ricius,  102. 

Helmont,  Francois,  Mercure  van,  67, 
101,  242;  his  "  Opuscula  philoso- 
phica,"  242  ;  his  relations  with  Leib- 
nitz, 242 ;  Leibnitz  writes  his  epitaph, 
242;  physician  of  the  Countess  of 
Connaway,  732 ;  —  John  Baptiste 
van,  64.5. 

Hendriks,  Frederic, his  "Contributions 
to  the  History  of  Insurance,"  540. 

Henke,  E.  L.  Th.,  his  "  Georg  Calixtus 
und  seine  Zeit,"  582. 

Heppe,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Pietismus,"  602. 

Heraclitus,  729. 

Herbart,  J.  F.,  on  "working  over  of 
notions,"  463. 

Herbell,  J.  F.  M.,  translator  of 
Camper,  286. 

Herbert  of  Cherbury,  Lord  Edward, 
587;  his  "De  Veritate,"   05. 

Herlinus,  Christian,  collaborator  with 
Dasypodius  upon  the  "  Analyses 
Geometricse,"  404;  Hamilton's  opin- 
ion of,  769;  where  examples  of  the 
Analysis  of,  may  be  found,  769. 

Hermathena,  of  Trinity  College,  Dub- 
lin, 108. 

Herodotus,  389,  547. 

Herostratus,  the  incendiary,  536. 

Hertz,  Wilhelm,  67. 

Herzog,  his  "  Realencyclopadie,"  296, 
587,  OT2,  595. 

Higginson  translates  Epictetus,  496. 

Hippocrates,  of  Chios,  527  ;  deterniines 
area  of  lune,  527  ;  —  of  Cos,  476, 527  ; 
"Father  of  Medicine,"  476;  based 
practice  of  physic  on  observation, 
476;  enforced  dietetics,  476;  his 
Aphorisms,  4:76  ;  his  aviiirvoia  wavra, 
conspirantia  omnia,  476. 

Hispauus,  Petrus,  322.  [50,  68. 

"  Histoire  des  Ouvrages  des  Savants," 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  93,  285,  450  ;  his  "  De 
Corpore,"  93 ;  his  "  Six  Lessons  to  the 
Professors  of  Mathematics,"  93 ;  his 
"  De  Cive,"  285;  his  "Leviathan," 
285,  450;  his  doctrine  of  Society, 
285;   on  truth,  450;    a  Nominalist, 


450;  literature  upon  the  teachings 
of,  450:  his  "Leviathan"  censured 
by  Parliament,  775. 

Holden,  Henry,  his  "  Diviufe  Fidei 
Analysis,"  617 ;  his  controversy  with 
Arnauld,  617. 

Holtzendorff  and  Virchow,  their 
"  Sammlung  wissenschaftlicher  Vor- 
triige,"  425. 

Homme'ite,  "man-ness,"  369. 

Honestum  and  utile,  261. 

Honorius,  his  "gallus  pugnax,"  610. 

Hooghelande,  Cornelius  Van,  633. 

Hooke,  Robert,  his  "  Micrographia," 
639. 

Hooker,  Richard,  his  "  Laws  of  Eccle-     ] 
siastical  Polity,"  566. 

Hoole,  Samuel,  translator  of  Leeuwen- 
hoek,"  346. 

Horace,  "Epistles,"  87,  328,  566; 
"  Satires,"  335. 

Hottentots,  language  of,  290. 

Hughes,  his  "Loyola,  and  the  Educa- 
tional System  of  the  Jesuits,"  619. 

Hugony,  9. 

Hultsch,  F.,  his  "  Pappi  Alexandrini 
Collectiones  quae  supersunt,"  521. 

Humanities,  628. 

Hume,  accords  with  Leibnitz  on  basis 
of  morals,  735  :  "Inquiry  concerning 
the  Principles  of  Morals,"  735;  bis 
"Treatise  of  Human  Nature,"  736; 
ou  Causes,  757. 

Hunt,  T.  W.,  his  "  Csedmon's  Exodus 
and  Daniel,"  295. 

Huygens,  Christian,  150,  213,  539,  676, 
723;  his"TraitedelaLumiere,"  150: 
discovers  double  refraction,  150: 
places  the  wave  theory  of  light  ou  a 
sure  foundation,  150;  applies  the 
pendulum  to  the  clock,  150 ;  his  "  De- 
scription de  I'horloge  a  pendule." 
150 ;  experiments  ou  the  isochronous 
pendulum,  150;  his"De  Ratiociniis 
aleae  ludo  "  539;  his  "  Cosmotheo- 
ros,"  550;  his  speculations  concern- 
ing planets,  550 ;  controversy  with 
Divini,  614 :  his  "  De  uiotu  corporum 
ex  percussione,"  676;  his  "  OSuvres 
completes,"  723. 

"  Hypothesis  physica  nova,"  its  struct- 
ure, 677. 


INDEX   C 


845 


Ibn-al-Baitar,  see  Baitar. 

Idatius,  Chronicle  of,  99. 

Idea,  'SSO. 

Ideas,  their  natural  order,  289;  pure 
truths  of  reason,  325  ;  their  content, 
325 ;  their  realization,  325 ;  in  what 
sense  "true"  or  "false,"  452;  in 
Divine  Mind  as  radoties  reriim  sta- 
biles et  iiicoinniutabiles,  51();  in- 
nate, their  criterion,  733:  simple, 
mind  active  in  reference  to,  703. 

I'lee,  330. 

Identitatis,  irrincipium,  569;  indis- 
cernibilium,  principium,  332. 

'  ISlov,  455. 

idiila  Fori,  omnium  molestissima,  30(). 

lllyricus,  Matthias  Flacius,  294. 

liiiase  and  Idea,  274. 

Inunams,  197. 

Immediate  Revelation  of  God  to  Soul, 
Locke's  statement  concerninsj;,  474. 

In  factum,  an  action  at  law,  48G. 

Incessabilite,  245. 

Indefinite-infinite,  1()2. 

Independents,  600. 

Indirect  demonstration,  40(),  491. 

Iiidiseernibles,  principle  of,  332. 

Individual,  the,  its  existence  alone 
allowed  by  Locke,  567. 

Individualism,  norainalistic,  623. 

Individuation,  principle  of,  239. 

Inductive  conclusions  founded  on 
"  truths  of  fact,"  493. 

Infants,  concerning  their  salvatioii, 
594. 

Infinite,  the  syncategorematic  and  cat- 
egoreniatic,  161,  162;  whence  the 
errors  and  difficulties  in  discussi<)n 
of,  274;  cannot  form  an  image  of, 
274;  knowledge  of  the,  denied,  274; 
"  trois  sens  du  mot,"  750. 

Infinite  series,  424. 

Infinitesimal  calculus,  its  application 
in  Newton's  "Priucipia,"  440;  dis- 
covery of,  573. 

Infi.nitivum,  inde/initum,  162. 

"  inner  Light  "  defined,  599,  773. 

Inspiration,  Divine,  gives  "  lumen 
Gratiae,"  576;  regarded  as  associ- 
ated with  ment.al  derangement,  598. 

"Instinct,"    how    used    by    l^eibnitz, 


Insurance,  John  de  Witt,  its  first  sci- 
entific proponnder,  540. 

Intelligence,  The  Supreme,  His  rela- 
tion to  ideas,  763. 

Intuition,  immediate,  of  Plato,  575. 

"Inward  Light"  of  William  Penn, 
602. 

Ionic  School  of  Philosophy,  519. 

Jackson,  H.,  on  the  Sai/xinov  of  Soc- 
rates, 598. 

Jacoby,  D.,  his  "  De  Leibnitii  studiis 
Aristotelis,"  753. 

Jacques,  Amedee,  his  "  (Euvres  de 
Leibniz,"  xii,  42,  46,  47,  49,  50,  53, 
56,  .58,  62,  63,  73,  80,  87,  89,  tX),  91, 
97.  101,  118,  119,  120,  121,  123,  125, 
147,  150,  154,  184,  185,  20:!,  204,  205, 
210,  211,  213,  218,  219,  240,  245,  246, 
249,  251,  254,  257,  259,  263,  267,  270, 
273,  274,  275,  282,  283,  284,  290,  298, 
300,  301,  310,  314,  316,  321,  323,  32(), 
332,  333,  334,  346,  349,  352,  363,  381, 
382,  383,  386,  405,  412,  414,  460,  466, 
476,  496,  497,  504,  506,  508,  511,  522, 
537,  548,  550,  551,  553,  580,  588,  705, 
727,  750,  751,  754,  76(1,  768. 

"Jalkut  Chadasch,"  242. 

James,  W.,  his  "  Psychology,"  760. 

Jancourt,  his  "  Historia  vit;u  Leib- 
nitii," 573. 

Janet,  "  Giuvres  ii]iili)SO]>hi(|ues  de 
Leibniz,"  7.3,  451,  463,  705,  727,  I'M, 
735,  7.".8,  739,  740,  741,  749,  75(1,  751, 
754,  7.")6,  7(i0,  761,  7(;2,  763,  764,  765, 
766,  768,  769;   his  "  La  Morale,"  4I.S. 

Janiiey,  his  "Life  of  William  Penn," 
602. 

Jansen,  H.  C,  translator  of  Camiier, 
286. 

Je  ne  say  quoi,  a])iilicd  to  ultiniale 
essence  of  things,  128. 

Jebal,  Sheik-al,  197. 

Jenichen,  J.  A.,  62(i. 

Jerome,  his  "  .^d  Clcsiiihontem,"  345. 

Jerome  de  la  Lande,  551. 

Jesuits,  418. 

Jevons,  W.  S.,  his  "  Principles  of  Sci- 
ence," 214;  "Lessons  ill  Li>gic,"322; 
his  "  Subslitulion  of  Siniihirs,"  569. 

Jijcber,  his  "  Allgemiriiies  (Jelehrlen- 
Lexicon,"  403,  585,  .586. 


846 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


"Journal,"  "des  Savants,"  15,  101, 
420,  507;  "of  Speonlative  Philoso- 
phy," 8,  101,  332  ;  "  for  Math.," 
Crelle,  571 ;  "  of  Pliilology,"  598. 

Jowett,  translator  of  "  Politics  of  Aris- 
totle," 285,482;  translator  of  "Dia- 
logues of  Plato,"  21tl,  292,  298,  390. 

Julius,  Duke,  his  decision  in  the  case 
of  Martin  of  Helmstadt,  582. 

Jung,  Joachim,  (!3(). 

Jurists,  the  Roman,  Leibnitz's  opinion 
of,  415. 

Jus  accrescendl,  434. 

Jus  non  ex  regida  sumatur,  sed  ex 
jure,  487. 

Justin  Martyr,  his  "  Aj)ologies,"  591 ; 
his  ' '  Spermatic  Logos, ' '  591. 

Justinian,  his  "Institutes,"  434,  487, 
492,  591 ;  his  "  Codex,"  497. 

"  Kabbala  "  on  pre-existence  of  souls, 
250;  "Denudata,"  732. 

Karllubek,  Vincent,  his  "  Historia 
Polonica,"  546. 

KaOoXov  TTpSiTov,  488. 

Kalbkopf ,  see  Moscherosch. 

Kant,  his  "  Kritik  d.  prakt.  Ver- 
nunft,"  184;  his  "Die  Religion  in- 
nerhalb  der  grenzen  der  blossen 
Vernunft,"  248;  his  "  Kritik  d.  rein. 
Vernunft,"  128,  332,  503,  733;  "  Di- 
lucidatio  nova,"  332  ;  his  a  priori 
(necessary  and  universal)  and  u 
posteriori  (contingent  and  actual) 
thought,  725  ;  his  Kategories  or 
original  notions  of  the  understand- 
ing, 726,  737,  741  ;  on  truths  of 
reason,  733  ;  refers  to  Copernicus, 
733;  his  reason  practical,  754;  his 
definition  of  "virtue,"  754;  his 
ground  of  faith  in  immortality,  755. 

Keckermann,  Earth.,  311 ;  his  proof  of 
Trinity,  589 ;  his  "  Systema  ss.  Theo- 
logite,"  589;  his  "Opera  omnia," 
589. 

Kelle,  J.,  his  "  Gospel  of  Otfrid,"  295. 

Kepler,  John,  123;  Iiis  "Sumnium  seu 
de  Astronomia  lunari,"  551. 

Kerkkrinck,  Theodore,  his  "  Anthro- 
pogeniiE  Ichnographia,"  345. 

Kessler,  Andreas,  his  "  Physical  Pho- 
tiniaiiie  Examen,"  586  ;  his  "  Meta- 


physicse  Photinianse  Examen,"  586; 

his  "  Logicse  Photinianre  Examen," 

586. 
Kestner,  his  "  jNIedicinisches  Gelehrten- 

Lexicou,"  521. 
King,  his  "Life  and  Correspondence 

of  Locke,"  728. 
Kings,  I.,  8:27,  158. 
Kirchmanu,  J.  H.   von,   his   "  Philos. 

Biblioth.."  125,  227,  239,  286, 349.  504, 

540,  552,  555,  613,  732,  739,  748,  754 ; 

his     "Die    klein.    philos.    'wichtig. 

Schrift.  V.  G.  W.  Leibniz,"  218,  227, 

239,   722,    723;    "  Erlauterungen   zu 

J.  Locke's   Versuch.  ii.  d.  menschl. 

Yerstand,"  555  ;  his  "  Erlauterungen 

zur  Theodicee,"  751,  758. 
Kirchner, his"  Leibniz's Psychologie," 

752. 
Kleutgen,   his    "  Philosophic   d.  Vor- 

zeit,"  382. 
Klopp,  O.,  his   "Die  Werke  v.  Leib- 
niz," 239. 
Knowledge,  mediate  and  immediate, 

109 ;   its  relation  to  Kant's  division 

of,  109 ;  of  senses,  how  classified,  317. 
Konig's  "  Appel,"  713. 
Kortholt,    Christian,    his    "  Leibnitii 

Epist.  ad   diversos,"   415,  486,   606, 

631,  632, 748 ;  — Sebastian,  Leibnitz's 

letter  to,  436. 
Koschny,  Erick,  218. 
Kotter,  C,  604. 
Kraift,  his  "  Kirchengesch.  d.  deutsch. 

Volker,"  296. 
Krauth-Fleming,    their    "  Vocabulary 

of  Philosophical  Sciences,"  125,  1.36, 

$.30,  363. 
Kiddmann,  Quirin,  his  hallucination 

and  fate,  601. 
Kummer,  his  "  Festrede  am  Leibniz- 

tage,"  425. 

Labadie,  Jean  de,  602. 

Labadists,  602. 

Labbe,  Philippe,  293;  his  "Concordia 

chronologica,  technica  et  historica." 

293;   his  "  Erudita3   pronuutiationis 

catholici  indices."  293. 
Lacoste.  Bertrand  de,  his  "Scheda  de 

inventa  quadratura  circuli,"  604. 
Lactantius.  327. 


INDEX   C 


847 


Laertius,  Diogenes,  his  "  De  vitis,  dog- 
inatibus,  et  apophthegmatis  claro- 
rum  philosophorum  libri  decern," 
^85,  518,  519. 

Lagrange,  Jos.  Louis,  393. 

Lallemant,  Ave,  his  "Das  deutsche 
Gaunertham,"  292. 

Lambert  of  Auxerre,  his  "  Summa 
Logicse,"  322. 

La  Mothe  le  Vayer,  Francois  de,  503 ; 
his  "  De  la  vertu  des  pa'iens,"  593. 

Lang,  Andrew,  liis  "  Myth,  Ritual  and 
Religion,"  85. 

Lauge,  his  "  Gesch  d.  Materialismus," 
3G3,  421,  592,  727,  730, 774 ;  his  article 
"  Vives,"  in  "Encykl.d.  ges.  Erzieh. 
.-u.  Unterrichtswesen,"  592. 

Langley,  Alfred  G.,  his  article,  "Reve- 
lation, Inspiration  and  Authority," 
in  "  Andover  Revievr,"  32,  195. 

Language,  an  aid  to  society,  286;  of 
apes,  280 ;  Leibnitz's  mistake  as  to 
its  origin,  288;  involves  advance  to 
abstract  ideas,  290;  early  discus- 
sions upon,  291;  Leibnitz  upon  for- 
mation of,  292;  modern  discussions 
upon,  292;  philosophical,  292,  375. 

Languages,  Leibnitz's  presentiment  of 
their  connection,  297;  the  compara- 
tive study  of,  recommended,  298. 

Laplace,  his  "Theorie  analytique  des 
probabilites,"  213. 

Larousse,  P.,  his  "  Dictionnaire  uni- 
versel  du  XIXe  siecle,"  310, 443, 494, 
527,  539. 

Lasiks,  197. 

Lasswitz,  his  "Gesch.  d.  Atomistik," 
6.32, 633,  635,  6.36,  639,  (i45,  (^6,  648, 
676,  684,  723,  727,  730,  732,  735,  740, 
7.51,752,771,774. 

Lateran  Council,  the  fifth,  581. 

"  Latio,"  (popd,  321. 

Laurie,  S.  S.,  his  "Comenius,"  466. 

Leclerc,  his  "  15ibliotheque  universelle 
et  historique,"  26. 

Leeuwenhoek,  Anton  van,  discovers 
spermatozoa  and  capillary  circula- 
tion, 346;  oi)])(ises  "  H))(iiitaneous 
generation,"  346. 

Leibnitz,  Gottfried  Wilhelin;  his 
"  Meditationes  de  Cognitione,  Veri- 
tate  et  Ideis,"  3,    14,  17,  227,   266, 


317,  363,  404,  502 ;  his  correspondence 
with  Bierling,  3,  101,  131,  4.'<G,  542, 
721,  748:  his  correspDudence  with 
Burnet,  6,  7,  ;)82,  458,  478,  5<>9,  728; 
anonynuius  letters  of,  8,  712;  cor- 
respdudence  with  Coste,  9:  cor- 
respondence with  Reniond,  9,  101, 
131,731;  correspondence  with  Lady 
Masham,  9,  65;  titles  given  by  him- 
self to  his  review  of  Lticke's  Essay, 
9,  10,  65;  his  use  of  parentheses  in 
"NouveaiLx  Essais,"  xiv,  10;  his 
"  Eclaircissemcnt  des  ditticultes  que 
M.  Bayle  a  trouvc'es  dans  le  systeme 
nouveau  de  I'union  de  ranu-  et  du 
corps,"  50;  his  remarks  on  "  Rora- 
rius,"  66,  507;  his  "  Considerations 
sur  la  Principe  de  Vie  et  sur  les 
Natures  plasticpies,"  67,  (iS,  :>t>3,  731 ; 
his  relation  to  Spinoza,  69 ;  his  "  Sys- 
teme nouveau  de  la  nature,"  101, 
147,  154,  346,  ;U9,  3(;;',,  7;!:'. :  his  "  Res- 
ponse sur  rellexions  contenues  dan.s 
la  seconde  edition  de  Dictionnaire 
critique  de  M.  P.aylo,"  101,  333,  508, 
539 ;  his  correspondence  with  R. 
Ch.  Wagner,  101,  131,  379,  550,  559; 
his  correspondence  with  Eardella, 
101;  his  correspondence  with  Dan- 
gicourt,  101;  his  correspondence 
with  Arnauld,  101,  334,  426,  463,  553, 
739;  his  "  De  ipsa  natura,"  101,  1.54. 
218,  332,  349,  .383,  705;  correspon- 
dence with  Des  Bosses,  101, 128,  1.31, 
155,  229,  Ml,  740;  correspondence 
withDe  Voider,  101 ;  correspomleneo 
with  Bourguet,  101,  213,  436,  .561 ; 
correspondence  with  von  llessen- 
Rheinfels,  101;  his  "  Un  p<Mit  dis- 
coursde  Me(aphysi(|uc,"  101,261,  319, 
.330, 349,  496,  ."i.53,  .").54  ;  bis  "  Specimen 
dynaniiciim  \tvn  admiramlis  natural 
legibus,"  101,  171,  38.3,  670.  73.3,  751  ; 
his  "  I'rincipe  do  la  Nature,"  101; 
his  "  La  Monailologie,"  101,  225,  .3:!2, 
.502,  511,  733;  his  corrcspondeneo 
with  Clarke,  128,  3.32,  381,  .•is:t,  .5.53, 
749,750;  corrcspoudenci'  with  Tolo- 
mei,  131  ;  his  "  l)i'  :uiima  luiitoniiri," 
131  ;  his  "  Principcs  lie  l;i  nature  et 
de  la  grace  fftnili-scMi  raisoii,"  13(i,  316, 
.36,'!,  .502;  his  "Codex  juris  gentium 


848 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


diplomaticus,"  167,  495,  496,  750;  his 
"  ])e  notionibus  juris  et  justitiae," 
167;  his  "  De  primse  philosophia; 
emendatione,"  154,  174;  his  corre- 
spondence with  Fabri,  174,  586,  67(), 
699,  751 ;  his  "  Essais  de  Theodice'e," 
180,  227,  239,  310,  333,  334,  349,  382, 
383,  415,  450,  496,  508,  511,  551,  553, 
576,  581,  582,  585,  5S(),  587,  589,  590, 
592,  594,  595,  602,  606,  635,  752; 
on  logic  of  probabilities,  213 ;  ac- 
quainted with  Pascal's  investigations 
on  probabilities,  213;  on  creation, 
225  ;  his  correspondence  with  Bayle, 
225, 2()1,  334;  his  "  Disputatio  Meta- 
physica  de  principio  individui,"239, 
606, 623 ;  correspondence  with  Sophie 
Charlotte,  239,  748;  his  "Miscel- 
lanea," 242,  435,  443,  539,  5<X);  his 
"De  stilo  philos.  Nizolii,"  272,  450, 
588,  623;  his  correspondence  with 
Geheimrath  von  Ilgen,  293 ;  his  corre- 
spondence with  Fr.  S.  Loeffler,  298; 
was  an  idealistic  realist,  319 ;  his 
"Animadversiones  in  j)artein  gener- 
alem  principiorum  Cartesianorum," 
334,  363,  504 ;  his  views  of  substan- 
tial forms,  349  ;  "  Leibniz  gegen 
Descartes  und  den  Cartesianismus," 
363;  on  Pythagoras,  379;  his  opinion 
of  formal  Logic,  379, 559 ;  his  corre- 
spondence with  G.  Wagner,  379,  559 ; 
corresi^ondence  with  Placciiis,  382, 
435,  520 ;  correspondence  with  editor 
of  "  Journal  des  Savans,"  383;  cor- 
respondence with  Alberti,  383 ;  cor- 
respondence with  Thomasius,  383, 
606,  631,  7(i9;  correspondence  with 
Hobbes,  387,  450:  correspondence 
with  Kestner,  415,  417,  436,  486; 
his  "  Epist.  ad  diversos,"  ed.  Kor- 
tholt,  417,  486,  748;  correspondence 
with  S.  Kortholt,  436,  438,  649,  748; 
correspondence  with  Foucher,  420, 
677 ;  correspondence  with  Male- 
branche,  421 ;  his  infinite  series,  424 ; 
his  infinitesimal  calculus,  424,  573 ; 
correspondence  with  Conring,  425, 
504,  520,  521,  7(19,  771 ;  his  "  De  vera 
proportione  circuli  ad  quadratnm 
circumscriptum  in  numeris  ration- 
alibus,"   425;    his  "Thesis  de  con- 


ditionibus,"  434;  his  "  Specimina 
Juris,"  434;  his  "De  Arte  Com- 
binatoria,"  434,  561;  on  Weigel, 
435;  his  criticism  of  Pufendorf,  436; 
his  "  Monita  qujedam  ad  S.  Puffen- 
dorfii  principia,"  436;  his  "Pre- 
ceptes  i^our  avancer  les  sciences," 
437  ;  a  philosophical  fragment,  437  ; 
his  "Reflexions  sur  I'ouvrage  que 
M.  Hobbes  a  publie  de  la  liberte, 
de  la  necessite  et  du  hazard,"  450, 
451;  on  Revelation,  474;  his  "  Uui- 
cnm  opticas  catoptricae  et  dioptricae 
l^rincipium,"  484;  his  "Nova  me- 
thodus  discendae  docendaeque  juris- 
prudentije,"  486;  "his  "  Nouvelles 
lettres  et  opuscules  inedits,"  by 
Foucher  de  Careil,  496  ;  on  rela- 
tion of  Natural  Theology  to  Meta- 
physics, 496  ;  his  letter  to  Electress 
Sophie,  496 ;  source  of  ethical  truth 
according  to,  4!)();  his  "  Definitiones 
ethicse,"  496;  on  ontological  argu- 
ment for  existence  of  God,  502  ; 
his  doctrine  of  Monads  requires  ex- 
istence of  God,  502;  his  "  De  la  de- 
monstration Cartesienne,"  502,  504 ; 
his  "  Confessio  Naturae  contra  Athe- 
istas,"  502 ;  his  correspondence  with 
Jacquelot,  504;  his  correspondence 
with  Eckhard,  504;  his  "  Probatio 
existientiae  Dei  ex  ejus  essentia,"' 
504 ;  correspondence  with  Basnage  de 
Beauval,  507,  727  ;  his  "  Observatio 
ad  rescensionem  libri  de  fidei  et  rati- 
onis  consensu  a  Domino  Jacquoloto 
editi,"  511;  his  "  De  modo  distin- 
guendi  phenomena  realia  ab  imagi- 
nariis,"  513 ;  regarded  idea  of  God  as 
constitutive,  517 :  regarded  idea  of 
God  as  principle  of  all  thought,  517; 
regarded  actuality  of  God  as  consti- 
tutive i)rinciple  of  all  things,  517 ; 
his  correspondence  with  Bossuet, 
544;  his  "  Introductio  in  coUec- 
tionem  Scriptoruni  Historise  Bruns- 
vicensi  inservientium,"  546  ;  his 
correspondence  with  Tentzel,  553 ; 
his  "  Response  aux  objections  contre 
le  systeme  de  I'harmonie  preetablie 
qui  se  tronvent  dans  Ic  livre  de  la 
connoissance   de   soy-memes,"  553; 


INDEX   C 


849 


his  "Systema  Theologicum,"  554; 
Ids  correspondence  with  Hartsocker, 
554,740;  his  "Annotatiunculse  subi- 
taneiB  ad  Tolandi  librum,"  554,  579 ; 
his  views  of  miracles,  554 ;  his  "  Diffi- 
cultates  quajdam  logicre,"  561 ;  his 
controversy  with  Newton,  573;  his 
"  Historia  et  origo  calculi  differeu- 
tialis,"  573 ;  his  correspondence  with 
Countess  Kielmannsegge,  573;  his 
"Hypothesis  physica  nova,"  586; 
his  "Theoria  niotus  abstracti,"  586, 
634;  his  views  of  the  Trinity,  590: 
his  "Defensio  Trinitatis,"  590;  his 
"  Duae  EpistolfE  ad  I.oeflerum,"  590; 
his  "Remarques  sur  le  livre  d'un 
Antitrinitaire  Anglois,"  590;  letter 
to  M.  B.,  590;  his  correspondence 
with  Pellisson,  591,  592  ;  his  corre- 
spondence with  Magliabechius,  592; 
his  correspondence  with  Fabricius, 
592  ;  his  "  Sur  I'esprit  sectaire,"  600 ; 
his  correspondence  with  Spizel,  602; 
his  correspondence  with  Wolf,  606; 
on  Nominalism,  623  ;  his  "  Idea  Leib- 
nitiana  Bibliothecae  Publicfc,"  626,' 
his  "  Representation  au  Due  de 
Wolfeubuttel  pour  I'eucourager  a 
Tentretien  de  sa  Bibliotheque,"'  626; 
his  relations  with  Peter  the  Great, 
629,  740;  his  "Theoria  motus  con- 
creti,"  634,  733  ;  correspondence 
with  Spener,  649  ;  correspondence 
with  Huygens,  676,  767  ;  corre- 
spondence with  Wallis,  677  ;  his 
comparison  of  himself  to  Plato,  and 
of  Locke  to  Aristotle  investigated, 
723,  724;  his  "Remarques  sur  le 
Sentiment  de  M.  de  Worcester  et 
de  M.  Locke,"  728  ;  is  "inclined 
towards  ethics,"  731  ;  eclectic  in 
thought,  731 ;  his  "Animadvei-siones 
cin;a  Assertiones  aliijuas  Theori;c 
Mediciu  vene  Clar.  Stahlii,"  733; 
his  "  Vermischtc  Bemerlcungen  und 
Urtheile,"  736;  correspondence  with 
Leuwenhoek,  740;  his  "  01)serva- 
tions  iibcr  die  Magnet-Nadel,"  740; 
correspondence  with  Guericke,  741  ; 
his  "De  Libertate,"  752:  on  Made- 
moiselle de  Scudcry,  757  ;  his  "  Ob- 
servationes  de  Principio  Juris," 
3i 


761;  his  "  Bedenken  welchergestalt 
den  Miingeln  des  Justiz-Wesens  in 
theoria  abzuhelfen,"  764  ;  letter 
from  Burckhardt  to,  766;  corre- 
spondence with  (iackenholtzius,  766; 
his  "  Critical  Essay  ou  the  Story  of 
Balaam,"  767. 

Lemnius,  Levinus,44S;  his  "  De  mira- 
culis  occultis  natune,"  449. 

Lcssing,  his  "Tlieolog.  Streitschrif- 
ten,"  194;  his  statement  regarding 
search  after  truth  vindicated,  1".>4, 
195;  his  "  Erziehung  des  INIensclien- 
geschlechtes,"  24S;  his  "  Dass  mehr 
als  fiinf  Sinne  fiir  den  Men.schen 
sein  konnen,"  584. 

Lessius,  quoted  by  Pascal,  749;  "  De 
justitia  et  jure," 749;  his  theological 
works,  especially  on  Freedom  of 
Will,  749. 

Library,  Leibnitz  on  its  classification 
and  catalogue,  626. 

Libri,  his  "  Histoire  des  Sciences  ma- 
the'matiques  en  Italie,"  572. 

Liceti,  Fortunio,  on  monsters,  351 ; 
Guiseppe,  on  monsters,  351. 

Light,  Aristotle's  definition  of,  321 ; 
the  inner,  591,  599. 

Lifjnum  nephriticum,  769. 

Limborch,  733. 

Linc'oln,  J.  L.,  his  "Marcus  Aurclius 
Antoninus,"  771. 

Liudeniann,  demonstrates  non-:ilge- 
braic  character  <if  tt,  425. 

Linden,  J.  A.  van  der,  liis  '"  De  scriptis 
medicis,"  521. 

Linca  prxdlcanieittalts,  322. 

Lipenius,  Martin,  his  various  "  Biblio- 
theca;  reales,"  6'_'(i;  his  use  of  rpn/is, 
626. 

Littre,  his  "  Dictionnair.'  de  la  l;ingiie 
fran(,'aise,"  191,  757;  his  "(Euvres 
completes  d'lliiipocrate,"  476. 

Lobeira,  Vasco  de,  his  "  Aniadis  dc 
Gaul,"  399. 

Locke,  John,  his  "Essay"  translaled 
and  summarized  in  "  Uibliolhi-qiio 
Univer.selle,"  4:  editions  of  his 
"  Essay,"  4  ;  iiis  "  Essay  "  1  ranslalod 
by  Coste,  4  ;  his  "  Thoii^dils  on  Edu- 
cati(m,5;  "Some  Familiar  LcMi-rs" 
of,  5,  6;  correspondenuo  with  Moly- 


850 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


neux,  f),  747 ;  his  philosophy  con- 
trasted with  that  of  Leibnitz,  310, 
72.">;  his  view  of  .substantial  forms, 
349  ;  on  truth,  452  ;  on  religion, 
474;  his  view  of  reason,  555;  his 
sensistie  realism,  567  ;  his  "  Exami- 
nation of  Malebranche,"578;  on  rea- 
son and  faith,  579;  his  controversy 
with  Stillingfleet,  728;  his  idea  of 
creation  of  matter,  772. 

Logic,  formal,  the  views  of  Locke  and 
Leibnitz  regarding,  555,  559,  561 ;  its 
function,  555. 

Aoyos,  its  part  in  formation  of  society, 
2S(>;  defined,  555. 

Long,  George,  his  translations  of  the 
•'  Thoughts  of  Aurelius  Antoninus," 
and  of  the  "  Discourses,  Eucheiri- 
dion  and  Fragments  of  Epictetus," 
496. 

Loul)ere,  La,  Simon,  60. 

Lucan,  "  Pharsalia,"  144. 

Lucian,  his  "Lucius  or  Ass,"  243;  his 
"True  Histories,"  399. 

Ludolph,  see  Ceulen. 

Ludnlphe,  John  Job,  his  "  Tetragono- 
metria  Tabularia,"  75. 

Ludolphische  Zahl,  734. 

Lully,  Raymond,  his  "  Tabula  Logica," 
322;  inventor  of  the  "Great  Art," 
590;  his  "Articuli  Fidei  Sacro- 
sanctae,"  590. 

Lumen,  naturals,  576 ;  grutias,  576. 

Lunufixa,  .')24. 

Lune,  first  curvilinear  space  whose 
area  was  determined,  527. 

Luz,  n^,  the  incorruptible  bone  of  the 
Rabbis,  242. 

"  Lyra  Germanica,"  586. 

I.,ycostheues  ( Wolffhart) ,  548. 

Maass,  Johann  G.  E.,  764. 

Machine  (i.e.   body),   a  term  among 

Cartesians,  348. 
Madvig,  his   edition  of  Cicero's  "De 

Finibus,"  272. 
Magnet,  Leibnitz  on,  740. 
Magnitude,  Imperfect,  what?  761. 
Magot,  342. 

Maher,  his  "  Psychology,"  382. 
Mahaffy,    J.    P.    his      "Descartes," 

727. 


Maimbourg,  his  "  Histoire  du  Luthera- 
nisme,"  544. 

Majority  of  professors,  argument 
from,  531. 

Malebranche,  Nicolas,  his  "De  la  Re- 
cherche de  la  Ve'rite',"  64,  176,  421; 
on  "  seeing  things  in  God,"  153;  his 
"  Traite  de  la  communication  du 
mouvement,"  176  ;  opposed  by 
Regis,  348 ;  his  change  of  view,  752. 

Malpighi,  346. 

Man,  a  selfish  or  a  social  animal?  285. 

Mancini,  his  monograph  on  Valla,  415. 

Man-ness,  as  a  translation  of  hom- 
meity,  369. 

Mansel  on  the  Infinite,  274 ;  on  limita- 
tion of  axioms,  770. 

Marci  von  Kronland,  Johannes  Mar- 
cus, 676. 

Marinus,  Neo-Platonist,  and  commen- 
tator on  Euclid,  465. 

Mariotte,  Edme,  121 ;  discovers  blind 
spot  in  retina,  121. 

Mark  7: 11-13,  327. 

Markham,  Clements  R.,  translator  of 
Garcilasso  de  la  Vega,  89. 

Martineau,  James,  his  "  Types  of 
'  Ethical  Theory,"  153,  421  ;  his 
"Study  of  Spinoza,"  633;  a  mis- 
take of  his,  633. 

Masham,  Lady,  65,  730. 

Mass,  what?  722. 

Massa  perditionis,  infants  naturally 
a  part  of,  according  to  Augustine, 
594. 

Massmann,  H.  F.,  his  "Die  kleinen 
Sprachdenkmale  des  VIII  bis  XII 
Jahrhundert,"  294;  his  "Ulphilas,'' 
29(5. 

Materia  prima,  110. 

Mathematics  as  science  of  magnitude 
applicable  only  to  sensible  things, 
756. 

Matthew  5  :  5,  6.  327. 

Matter,  primary  and  secondary,  131 ; 
can  it  think?  427;  what?  722;  sub- 
tile to  infinity,  722. 

Maupertuis,  his  charge  against  Konig, 
713. 

Maurier,  Louis  Aubery  du,  his  Dutch 
"  Memoires,"  542. 

Maurolico,  Francesco,  his  "Treatise 


INDEX    C 


851 


on  Conies,"  442;  his  "  Problemata 
ad  perspectivam  et  iridem  perti- 
nentia,"442;  liis  "  Theodosii  sphav 
rioorum,"  442;  his  "  Photismi  (or 
Theoreraata)  de  lumine  et  umbra," 
etc.,  442. 

Maywald,  M.,  his  "Die  Lehre  v.  d. 
zweifaclien  Wahvheit,"  581. 

Moclianism,  its  source,  721. 

M'dlus  terminus,  481. 

JMugarian  School  of  Philosophy,  93. 

Meier,  Gerhard,  304,  705. 

Melancthon,  592. 

Membranes,  what  Leibnitz  meant  by? 
740. 

"  Memoires  de  Trc'voux,"  444,  502. 

Menage,  Gilles,  his  "  Dictionnaire 
etymologique  de  la  laugue  fran- 
(;;aise,"  344. 

"  Menagiana,"  .350. 

"Mentor,  the,"  a  magazine  published 
by  the  blind,  747. 

"  Mercure  galant,"  438. 

Mere,  Chevalier  de,  213;  his  "  Agre- 
mens,"  539. 

Merkelius,  editor  of  Ovid,  211. 

Mersenne,  410;  his  "  Synopsis,"  465. 

Merz,  J.  T.,  his  "  Leibniz,"  307,  629. 

Merzeriac,  Bac-het  de,  571. 

Metempsychosis,  Aristotle  opposes, 
760. 

Meyer,  H.  A.  W.,  "  Kommentar,"  327. 

Mieliaud,  his  "  Biographie  Univer- 
sale," 404,  418,  520,  546,  551;  his 
"  Histoire  des  Croisades,"  197. 

Microcosm,  109. 

Middle  term,  770. 

Migne,  his  "  Theologiae  Cursns  com- 
pletus,"  749;  his  "  Patrologiae  Cur- 
sns completus,"  345,  443,  502,  516, 
.546,  618,  737. 

Milky  Way,  the  successful  conjecture 
of  Democritus  concerning,  277,  763. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  his  "  Logic,"  213,  769. 

"Mind,"  69. 

Mind,  what  we  know  in,  721. 

Minute  perceptions,  the  value  of 
Leibnitz's  teachings  on,  727. 

Miracles,  Leibnitz's  attitude  towards, 
(iO(),  ()07. 

Mnemonics,  their  alleged  invention, 
214. 


"Modes,"  Descartes  ru,  748;  mixed. 
their  formation  acr'Tding  to  Locke, 
757,  768.  '■ 

"Mola,"344.  '^" 

Moliere,  his  "Don'P'\an  ou  le  Festin 
de  Pierre,"  536. 

Molyneux,  William  <^  founded  Dublin 
Philosophical  Socie,y,  138;  his  "Di- 
optrica  Nova,"  13!-',  484;  his  corre- 
spondence and  rel-  ions  with  Locke, 
747.  '' 

Mommsen,  Theodore;  his  edition  of 
the  "Digests."  ir'^-e  Corpus  Juris 
Civilis. 

Monad,  the  term  whence  borrowed, 
101 ;  where  first  m^itioned,  101 ;  the 
writings  of  Leibnitz  in  which  men- 
tioned, 101;  the  primitive,  722;  the 
derivative,  722;  how  divided,  722; 
inextinguishable,  "22;  the  created, 
endowed  with  an  organic  body,  722; 
contains  the  e-litelechy,  722;  like 
mirror,  738. 

Monadology  nc„  pantheistic,  732. 

Moiiatliche  ^^aszug,  26. 

"  Monist,  the,"  425. 

Monists,  Leibnitz,  Spinoza,  and  Locke 
were  in  dilTerent  ways,  757. 

Montagne,  Vieux  de  la,  197. 

Montferrat,  Conrad  of,  197. 

Montalvo,  (iarcia  Ordonez  do,  '.W.). 

Montuela,  his  "  Misloire  des  Malhe- 
matiques,"  572,  573. 

"Monnmenta  Germaniic  Pa-dago- 
gica,"  619. 

Moon  dicmoiis,  551. 

Moral  Law,  Leibnitz's  view  of,  262; 
E.  (i.  lliibinson's  view,  262. 

Moral  Philosophy,  Pythagorean  j)rin- 
ciple  applied  to,  4.35. 

Morality,  according  to  Ihimc,  "' de- 
pends ou  some  internal  seuse  or  feel- 
ing," 735,  7.36. 

More,  Henry,  his  tlieory  of  jire-exi.st- 
ence  of  souls,  2."i0  ;  ou  nilriul  vc/iiclrit, 
380;  h\n p7'incii)iuiii  hi^litrchicum or 
Spiritus  ixitiirii;,  ;i82;  Ills  fricndsliiji 
with  the  Viscoiinless  Conway,  732. 

Moniri,  his  mistake,  5.">9. 

Morhof,  Ills  "  Polyiiisloria,"  iVM',,  6."i(). 

Morley,  Henry,  his"  l'',nglish  W'rilcrs," 
295." 


852 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Moscherosch,  /ohn    Mich.,  his   "Ge- 

sichte  Philam  'jrs  vou  Sitteiiwald," 

293.  U. 

Motion,  AristotA,  on,  320;  the  source 

of  laws  of,  72rt,  ^ 
MoutoD,  Gabiie/     ivents  "  Method  of 

Differences,"  Lj'iO;     his    "Observa- 

tioues  dianief)' a-um  solis    et    luuae 

apparentium,t  150. 
Muler,  Nicolas,!  ;-is  "Astronomia  In- 

staurata,"  i^J^ 
Mulford,  his  "  I^^aihlic  of  God,"  503. 
Mullach,  his  "Fii  igmt.  Philos.  Grajc," 

.37!  >,  519.  ".' 

Miillenhoff  and  'sscherer,  their  "  Denk- 

maler  deutschl^  Poesie  und  Prosa  aus 

VIII-XII  Jahrii.,"  294. 
Miiller,  Julius,  "Die  Christ.  Lehre  von 

der  Siinde,"  248 ;  —  Max,  "  Lectures 

on  the  Science  of  Language,"  7&1, 765. 
Mundj^  the  blind  .sculptor,  747. 
Musseus,  Johannes,  his  "De  Luminis 

Naturffi,"  587  ;  his  '  De  usu  principi- 

orum  rationis  et  phi  osophise  in  con- 

troversiis  theologicis,  '  ^87,  590. 
Musfeus,    his    "poem    of    love    and 

death,"  211. 
Mystics,  mediaeval,  576,  728. 

"  Nation,  the,"  764. 

"  Naturals,  "  341. 

Nature,  coi)ies  after,  what  ?  353 ;  an 
aggregate  of  monads,  722 ;  conserves 
"the  same  force,"  731;  conserves 
"  the  same  total  direction,"  731. 

Naude,  Gabriel,  his  "  Apologie  des 
Grands  Hommes  Sonptj-onnes  de 
Magie,"  278;  founder  of  "  Biblio- 
theque  Magazine,"  580;  Naudeana, 
580. 

Neauder,his  "  History  of  the  Christian 
Religion  and  Church,"  345,  443,  444, 
590. 

Neff,  L.,  his  "  G.  W.  Leibniz  als  Sprach- 
forscher  und  Etymologe,"  304,  37(>. 

Nerves,  "  end  organs  "  of,  739 ;  specific 
energy  of,  739. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  233;  his  "  Prin- 
cipia,"  440;  first  to  apply  infinitesi- 
mal calculus  to  phj'sics,  440;  his 
"Optics,"  443;  almost  a  Berkeleyau, 
773. 


Niam-niam,  the,  341. 

Niceron,  J.  P.,  his  "  Me'moires  d'hom- 

mes,"  .587. 
Niehol,  John,  his  "  Bacon,"  306. 
Nicole,  Pierre,  418,   530;    his  "  L'Art 

de    Peuser,"   531;    his   "  Essais    de 

Morale,"  531 ;  his  "  Unite  de  I'eglise 

ou  refutation  du  nouveau  Systeme 

de  Jurieu,"  531. 
Nihus,  Bartholomew,  his  controversy 

with  Vedel,  587. 
Nithard,  his  "  Historia  de  dissidio  fili- 

orum  Ludovici  Pii,"  2^)4. 
Nolen,  his  "  Leibniz,  La  Monadologie," 

511 ;  his  "  Quid  Leibnizius  Aristoteli 

debuerit,"  753. 
Nominalism,  623. 
Nominalists,  382. 
Nourisson,  M.,  his  "  La  Philosophie  de 

Leibniz,"  752,  775. 
Noi)s  of  Plato,  555,  723;  of  Aristotle, 

5.55. 
"  Nouvelles    de    la    Republique    des 

Lettres,"   50,   334. 

Obreption,  276 ;  Leibnitz's  definition 

of,  762. 
Occam,    'William    of,    450;    develops 

Nominalism  in  form  of  Termiuism, 

382,  .588. 
Oi/cefwirts,  286. 

Oldenburgerus,  Philippus  Andrea,  650. 
Oleum  Martis  et  Veneris,  324. 
Olle-Laprune,    his    "  La    Philos.    de 

Malebranche,"  421. 
Onesimus,   "  adhuc    in   vino    pruden- 

tior,"  762. 
"Ontosophia,"  303. 
Order,  the  historical,  470 ;  the  natural 

or  logical,  470. 
Ordo  prsedicamentalis,  322. 
Ordonez,  Garcia,  399. 
Origen.  a  believer  in  pre-existence,  248 ; 

on  "  Visio  Beatifica,"  575. 
"  Orlando,  Furioso,"  399;    "  luuamo- 

rato,"  398. 
Orphica,  153. 
Ostensives,  491. 

Otfrid.  his  "Life  of  Christ,"  294;  in- 
troduces rhyme,  295. 
Ovffia,  in  Aristotle,  349. 
Ovid,    his     "Tristia,"    56,     729;    his 


INDEX   C 


853 


"Metamorphoses,"  ()8,  190,733;  bis 
"Heroides,"  211  ;  liis  "  Fasti,"' 598. 

Pajon,  Claude,  his  view  of  conversion, 
595. 

Palfyn,  Jean,  351. 

Panaitius,  '261. 

Panilects,  see  Corpus  Juris  Civilis. 

Pappus  of  Alexandria,  521 ;  his  "  Lem- 
mata," 4(5.');  his  "  Syuagoge,"  521; 
his  explanation  of  analysis  and  syn- 
thesis, 521. 

Paracelsus,  Theophrastus,  645;  his 
"Philosophise  Sagax,"  730;  "  De 
Nymphis,  Sylphis,  Pygmaeis  et  Sala- 
mandris,"  730. 

Pardies,  Ignace  Gaston,  676. 

Uappr]aia  (parrhesia) ,  223. 

Pascal,  founder  of  Calculus  of  Proba- 
bilities, 213;  on  equitable  division 
of  stakes  in  games  of  chance,  213; 
bis  "  Lettres  Provinciales,"  418, 749. 

Pasch,  G.,  on  "De  novis  inventis," 
521. 

Passion  in  spirit,  what?  75();  its  rela- 
tion to  pain,  756;  in  bodies,  756. 

Paul,  Hermann,  292;  his  "  Principien 
der  Sprachgeschichte,"  292  ;  his 
"  Grundriss  d.  germ.  Philologie," 
295,  296. 

Panlus,  on  soui'ce  of  rules,  487 ;  his 
"  Sententiarura,"  5.34. 

Pausanias,  quoted,  390. 

"  Peccatura  originale,"  594. 

"  Pellucid,  the,"  in  Aristotle.  321. 

Penjon,  his  "  De  Infinito  apud  Leib- 
nitium,"  750. 

Penii.  William,  602. 

Penzler,  M.,  bis  "Die  Monadcnlcbre 
nnd  ibre  Beziehung  z.  griech.  Phi- 
losophie,"  752,  753. 

Perception  and  apperception,  1.36. 

Perfectibility,  755;  relation  of  lumi- 
nous pleasures  to,  755. 

Peripatetics,  362,  455. 

"Perles  de  De  Sluse,"  d(!fin(!d,  768. 

Persius,  bis  "Satires,"  264,  272. 

Personality,  double  and  allernate,  760. 

Pertz,  his  "  Monumenta  Germanise 
Historica,"  294. 

Peters,  F.  II.,translatorof"  Aristotle," 
285. 


Petitio  principii,  84. 

Petronius,  "  Satyricon,"  204,  482. 

Petrus,  Hispaiius,  322. 

Pfleiderer,  O.,  on  Boehme,  298;  his 
"  Religionsphilosophie,"  249,  298, 
503,  553,  584,  598. 

"  Phantasies,"  how  to  render  the  term, 
445. 

Phantasm,  445,  459;  Hobbes'  use  of, 
769. 

Phenomena,  connection  of,  422;  pro- 
duces certainty  in  sense-knowledge, 
422;  verified  by  truths  of  reason, 
423. 

Pbilo,  598,  732 ;  on  pre-existence.  248 ; 
on  "  Visio  Heatifica,"  575. 

"  Philosopbia  Altdortiana,"  635. 

Photiiiians,  5S(). 

"  Physical,"  its  occasional  meaning  in 
Leibnitz,  2()1. 

Piccart,  Michael,  636. 

Pichler,  his  "  Die  Theologie  des  Leib- 
niz," 511,  532,  554,  .579. 

Hiva^  of  Cebes,  its  genuineness,  43('i. 

Piper,  P.,  an  editor  of  "  Otfrid,"  295. 

Pisani,  Ottavio,  764. 

Planck,  M.,  his  "Das  Princip  der 
Erbaltung  der  Energie,"  775. 

Plato,  6(i;  bis  "  Meno,"  78;  his 
"Phaedo,"  170,  240,  4.%;  liis  "  Pha-- 
drus,"  192, 2.50,  .598 ;  on  pre-e.\istcnce, 
248,768;  his  method  of  teaching,  272; 
his  "Cratylus,"  291,292,299;  e'lSoi 
in,  .349;  bis  "Symposium,"  li'M  ; 
Leibnitz's  opinion  of,  41(i;  on  im- 
mediate intuition,  575;  bis  "Ion," 
,598;  his  "Tinnuus,"  59.S ;  Leibnitz 
compares  himself  to,  723;  his  doc- 
trine of  reminiscence,  726  ;  liis 
world-soul,  732,  7<iH. 

Plautus,  "  Meno'chmi,"  22(i. 

Pleasure,  according  to  Aristip]>us,  518. 

"Pliable,"  the  epithet  explained,  72.3. 

Pliny,  the  Elder,  "  Hislori:i  Nalur- 
alis,"  316. 

Plotinus,  ,598;  on  ecstatic  intuition, 
.'')75;  bis  world-soul,  73>2. 

Plutarch,  476,  .5".IS;  his  "  De  Kato," 
476;  his  "Moralia,"  476,  .551;  "I>o 
Facie  in  orbe  luna-,"  ,5.'>I  ;  on  mooii- 
da'mons,  .551;  bis  "  I'laeila  I'liili*- 
sophorum,"  721. 


854 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


llvevfia,  Cremer  upon,  289. 

"  Pneumatics,"  as  a  term  in  mental 
philosophy,  3()2. 

Pneumatology,  50,  363. 

Pneumatosophy,  363. 

Poe,  Edgar  A.,  refers  to  Gousales,  342. 

Poiret,  Pierre,  biographer  of  Antoi- 
nette Bourignon,  599 ;  his  "  CEco- 
nomie  de  la  Nature,"  599. 

Pt)isson,  his  "  Recherches  sur  la  Prob- 
abilite',"  etc.,  213. 

Polemo,  statement  of  Stobaeus  con- 
cerning, 518;  his  philosophy,  518. 

Pollock,  F.,  his  "  Spinoza,  his  Life  and 
Pliilosophy,"  345,  733.  [315. 

Polyhedra,  the  only  possible  regular, 

Pomponazzi,  Pietro,  581 ;  his  "  Trac- 
tatus  de  Immortalitate  Animi,"  581. 

Pomponius  Sextus,  241,  48(). 

Poniatowa,  Christine,  a  visionary,  G04 ; 
her  death  from  chagrin,  604;  her 
visions  rendered  into  Latin  by 
Comenius,  604. 

Porphyry,  his  "  Tabula  Logica,"  322; 
his  FJcaycoyri,  322. 

Port  Royalists,  530. 

Portugal,  Sea  of,  134. 

Possible,  everything  -which  is,  an  ob- 
ject of  intelligence  human  or  divine, 
763. 

Poste,  his  "  Gaius,  Elements  of  Roman 
Law,"  329. 

Potestas  Diaholi,  infants  under,  ac- 
cording to  Augustine,  .594. 

Pouchet,  F.  A.,  his  "  Histoire  des  Sci- 
ences naturelles  en  moyen  age,"  371. 

Power  distinguished  by  Leibnitz  from 
force,  751. 

PrxiJicubiliu,  Prasdicamenta,  322. 

Prasscripfiones,  531. 

Prantl,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Logik,"  116, 322, 
349,  382,  408,  415,  456,  488,  515,  565, 
588,  590,  765,  770. 

Pre-existence  of  souls,  248;  no  expla- 
nation of  the  origin  of  sin,  248,  249. 

Preller,  his  "  Griech.  Mythologie,"  390. 

Premise,  when  the  philosophical  is 
general  and  the  theological  is  par- 
ticular, what  is  to  be  done?  761. 

''Prince,  A  great,"  Leibnitz's  expec- 
tation from  one  in  the  future,  629. 

Priscillianists,  345. 


Probabiliorism,  418. 

Probabilism,  418. 

Probabilities,  Calculus  of,  213. 

Probability,  Aristotle's  definition  of, 
214;  logic  of,  417. 

Proclus,  Diadochus,  93,  108,  465;  the 
"  schoolman  of  Neo-Platonism," 
108;  his  "Treatise  on  the  Sphere," 
108;  his  "Institutes  of  Theology," 
108;  his  "In  primum  Euclidis  Ele- 
mentorum  librum  commentarii," 
108,  463;  Leibnitz's  opinion  of,  416. 

Procopius,  alleged  author  of  "  Anec- 
dota,"  542. 

Proculus,  762. 

Prolepses,  Stoic  doctrine  of,  724. 

"Promoter,"  defined,  757. 

Proof,  indirect,  what?  406. 

Propositions,  "  weaker,"  515. 

Propria,  455. 

Proprium,  455. 

Prosthaphasresis,  540. 

Prosyllogism,  404. 

Proverbs,  Book  of,  437. 

Pucci,  Francesco,  593 ;  his  "  De  fide  in 
Deum,"593;  his  views  of  universal 
grace,  .593. 

Pufendorf,  Samuel,  4.35;  his  "  Ele- 
menta  Jurisprudentiae  universalis," 
436 ;  his  "  De  Statu  imperii  German- 
ici,"  436;  his  "  De  jure  naturte  et 
gentium,"  436;  Leibnitz  severelj' 
criticises,  436. 

Piinjer,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Christliche  Re- 
ligionsphilosophie,"  298,  581,  582, 
584,  587,  589,  607,  761,  769. 

Pythagoras,  379 ;  his  "  Symbols,"  379 ; 
literature  upon,  474. 

Pythagoreans,  248. 

"  Quadratura  Aritlimetica,"  425. 

Quadrivium,  628. 

"  Qualitateti  occuHse,"  729. 

"Qualities,  inexplicable,"  729. 

Quartan  fever,  488. 

"  Quarto  Modo,  in,"  455. 

Question,  how  "begged"  in  the  as- 
sumption tliat  because  we  are  not 
conscious  of  ideas,  therefore  we  do 
not  think,  738. 

Qui  jure  suo  utitur  nemini  facit  in- 
jur iatu,  492. 


INDEX   C 


855 


Quietists  approach  Averroists  in  doc- 
trine, 728. 

Quintic  equations,  as  to  possibility  of 
tlieir  solution,  571. 

Quintilian,  his  "  Institutes,"  7GG. 

QuodlibeturisR  questiones,  419. 

QtiodlibetuiiL,  419. 

Quolibet,  419. 


Rabbinage,  372. 

Rabelais,  399. 

Raey,  Jean  de,  632;  his  "  Clavis  Phil- 
osophica,"  G33. 

Ramists,  398,  408. 

■Ramus,  Petrus,  398,  408;  opposes 
Aristotelianism,  408;  his  "  Auiinad- 
versiones  Aristotelicse,"  408;  his 
"  Institntiones  dialectics,"  408. 

Raspe,  510,  532. 

j  "  Ratio  "  a  department  of  the  scho- 
lastic "threefold  source  of  knowl- 
edge," 724. 

Real  and  physical,  their  relations,  261. 
'  Realism,  Locke's  sensistic,  set  forth  in 

sharp  outline,  567. 
I  Realists,  349,  382. 

Reality,  demonstrable,  319;  how 
known,    766. 

Reason,  how  used  by  Locke  and  Leib- 
nitz, 555;  can  apprehend  the  super- 
natural as  fact,  579;  and  faith,  579; 
its  chief  end  practical,  754. 

Rebus,  453. 

'■  Rccueillement,"  its  translation,  165. 

Refiks,  197. 

Reflection,  726. 

Regiomontanns,  Iiis  discovery,  571. 

Regis,  Pierre  Sylvain,  an  empiric  Car- 
tesian, 348,  633;  his  "  Cours  entier 
de  philosophic,"  348;  censured  by 
Descartes,  348. 

Regius,  see  Roy. 

"  Regulative,"  517. 

Reimarus,  H.  S.,  his  "  Allgemeine  Be- 
trachtungen  iiber  die  Kunsttriebe 
der  Thiere,"  725. 

Reimer,  (t.,  in2. 

Reinesius,  Tliomas,  physician  ami  i)!ii- 
Idlogist,  372. 

Reinkens,.!.  II.,  enquires  "  '  Auecdota  ' 
sintne  scripta  a  Procopio,"  542. 

Reiser,  Anton,  649. 


Reisland,  0.  K.,  102. 

Relation,   two  kinds  of,  401  ■    wliat " 

759. 
Remembrance,  734. 
Reminiscence,  734;   Platonic  view  of 

726. 
Renan,  E.,  his  "Averroes  et  I'Aver- 

roisme,"  774. 
Representationism,  382. 
Res,  incurporales,  329;  judicata,  5:;4 

602. 
Revelation,    Divine,   Langley  on,   32, 
195;  Locke  assumes,  474;  Leibiiit/. 
while  insisting  on  rational  element 
in  theology,  admits  possibility,  and 
discusses  metliod  and  actuality,  of, 
474;  its  truth  rests  on  "  veracity  of 
God,"  474. 
Revelation,  universal,  474. 
Revius,  J.,  633. 

"  Revue  des  deux  Mondes,"  590. 
Ritschl,   his   "  Gesch.   d.    Pietismus," 

602,  649. 
Robertson,      G.      Croom,      69;       liis 
"Hobbes,"    93,    450;    his   ••Pliiius. 
Remains,"  733,  770. 
Roberval,    Gilles    Personue    de,    1(I7, 
127 ;    his    method    for  con.struction 
of    tangents,    108;    Descartes'   esti- 
mate of,  466. 
Robinson,  E.  G.,  his  "  Principles  and 
Practice  of   Morality,"  90,  95,  2(i2, 
752,  7.')3,  754 ;    his  "  ('hristian  Tlie- 
ology,"  594,  (i06;  liis  "Lectures  on 
Psychology"  (iMS.)  quoted,  741-747; 
on  "Moral  Law  in  its  Relations  to 
Physical  Science  and  to  Popular  Re- 
ligion," 761. 
Rohault,  James,  his  "  Pbysica,"  2;!.".. 
Humana  ruslica  lunjiiu,  2!14. 
Romanes,  his  "  Aniiual  Intelligence," 
725;  his  "  Mental  Evolution  in  Ani- 
mals," 725. 
Romans,  2  ;  15,  89. 
"Rompu,  le,"  750. 
Rorario,  Geronimo,  732. 
Rothvviil.scli,  292. 

Roy,  Heiidrik  van  (liegiiis),  n-jccli'd 
by  Descartes,  63.'!;  Iiis  notions  of 
soul,  motion,  ami  rest,  63,3;  his 
"  Fiindainenta  Pliysira-"  .and  bis 
"  Philosopliia   Naturalis,"  (i.'i.t. 


856 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Ruach  C:)!-*),  defined,  289. 

Ruland,    Martin,    his    "  Lexicon    Al- 

c-heiiiiae,"  324. 
Russia,  Leibnitz's  plan  for  study  of  its 

languages,  705. 

Sabbah,  Hassan  Ben,  197. 

S.acy,  De,  bis  "  Me'moires  de  I'lnsti- 
tute,"  197. 

Sadness,  its  nature,  7.35. 

Saint- Vincent,  Gregoire  de,  his  "  Opus 
geonietricum  quadratune  circuli  et 
sectiouum  coni,"  573. 

Sainte-Maure,  Charles  de,  edits  "  Del- 
phi n  Classics,"  G05. 

Salmasius,  371. 

Sandars,  his  "  Institutes  of  Justinian," 
329,  431,  487. 

Sanseverino,  his  "  Dynamilogia,"  382. 

Santon,  89. 

"Savage,"  85. 

Scaliger,  Joseph  Justus,  reconstructs 
"Chronicle  of  Eusebius,'"  lOti;  — Jul- 
ius Caesar,  his  "  Exotericae  Exercita- 
tiones,"  106. 

"  Scaligerana,"  107. 

Schaarschmidt,  125,  128,  1.50,  152,  168, 
214,  242,  272,  311,  316,  317,  321,  330, 
339,  362,  371,  394,  399,  408,  413,  415, 
424,  436,  445,  459,  465,  466,  476,  492, 
499,  504,  510,  521,  543,  555,  569,  582, 
588,  589,  590,  (iOl,  606,  622,  623,  723, 
724,  725,  726,  727,  728,  729,  7.30,  731, 
733,  7-34,  735,  736,  738,  739,  741,  749, 
752,  754,  755,  756,  757,  758,  759,  763. 

Schaff,  P.,  edits  "  Nicene  and  Post- 
Nicene  Fathers,"  516. 

Schelliug,  his  relation  to  Boehme, 
298. 

Scherer,  W.,  "  Gesch.  d.  deutsch- 
Literatur,"  295,  296. 

Sobering,  E.  J.,  edits  Gauss's  works, 
152. 

Scherz  and  Schilter,  joint  editors  of 
"Thesaurus  antiquitatum  teutoni- 
cum,"  295. 

Schilter,  John,  Leibnitz  refers  to,  295; 
his  death  a  note  of  time  as  to  revi- 
sion of  the  "  New  Essays,"  765. 

Schlee,  E.,  his  "Der  Streit  des  Dan. 
Hofmann  iiber  die  Yerhiiltniss  der 
Philosophie  iind  Theologie,"  582. 


"  Scholarch,"  518. 

"  Scholastic,  The  last  great,"  494. 

Scholastic  philosophy,  its  threefold 
source  of  knowledge,  724. 

Schooten,  F.  van,  468:  his  "  Exercita- 
tiones  Mathematica;,"  539. 

Schopenhauer,  298. 

Schubert,  H.,  425. 

Schuchardt,  B.,  .372. 

Schurman,  J.  G.,  his  "  Ethical  Import 
of  Darwinism,"  90,  97. 

Schiirman,  Anna  Maria  v.,  602. 

Schurtzticisch,  Konrad  S.,  650. 

Schwabe,  Ludwig,  244. 

Schweiufurth,  G.  A.,  on  men  witli 
tails,  341;  his  "  Im  Herzen  vom 
Afrika,"  341. 

Schweizer,  his  "  Central-Dogmen," 
595. 

"  Sciences  as  many  as  truths,"  623. 

Scientific  consideration,  its  limits  ac- 
cording to  Aristotle,  488. 

Scotus,  .Johannes  Major,  322  ;  — Johan- 
nes Duns,  .381 ;  —  Michael,  278. 

Sculpturing  bj-  sense  of  touch,  747. 

Scudery,  Mile.,  her  "Clelie,  Histoire 
Romaine,"  223;  Leibnitz  on,  757. 

Seckendorf,  Veit  Ludwig  von,  his 
"  Commentarius  historicus  et  apobi- 
geticus  de  Lutheranismo,"  543 ;  Leib- 
nitz's opinion  of,  544. 

"Self,  The,"  defined,  760;  "the  phe- 
nomenon of,"  760;  how  related  to 
consciousness,  760;  constitutes  iden- 
tity, 760  ;  a  real  entity,  760. 

Selver,  D.,  his  "Der  Entwicklungs- 
gang  d.  Leibniz.  Monadenlehre  bis 
1695,"  723,  775. 

Semi-Ramists,  408. 

Seneca,  "  De  Tranquilitate,"  492. 

Sennert,  Daniel,  introduces  chemistry 
into  curriculum  at  Wittenberg,  487  ; 
maintained  that  souls  of  animals 
were  immaterial,  487  ;  his  "  lustitu- 
tiones  medicae,"  488;  attempts  to 
unite  principles  of  Galen  and  Para- 
celsus, 488. 

Sensation,  how  related  to  nerves,  7.39. 

Sense-impressions  likely  composite, 
but  at  i^resent  irresolvable,  317,  751. 

Sense-knowledge,  confused,  317;  needs 
classification,  317. 


INDEX  C 


857 


Sense-perception,  when  possible,  741. 

Senses,  when,  according  to  Idealists, 
we  have  truth  by,  512. 

Sensitive,  417;  —soul,  380. 

Serarius,  Nicolas,  443. 

Serenus  of  Antissa,  his  "  De  sectione 
Cylindri  et  Coni,"  4G5. 

Series,  infinite,  of  Leibnitz,  424,  723. 

Seth,  James,  his  article  "  Roots  of  Ag- 
nosticism," in  "  New  World,"  773. 

Shakespeare,  his  "  Midsummer  Night's 
Dream,"  770. 

Shcdd,  W.  G.  T.,  his  "  History  of  Chris- 
tian Doctrine,"  594. 

Sheikh-al  Jebal,  197. 

Ship,  the  sacred,  of  the  Athenians, 
240. 

Siebeck,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Psychologic," 
HJ'J. 

Sifrid,  on  Frisian  antiquities,  546. 

Sigogne,  Francois  de,  107. 

Sigwart,  W.,  "Die  Leibniz'sche  Lehre 
V.  d.  prastabilirten  Harmonic,"  7.'il. 

Simonides,  inventor  of  mnemonics, 
214. 

Sleidan,  John,  his  "  Commentariorum 
de  statu  religionis  et  republics, 
Carolo  Quinto  Ciesare,"  114. 

Sluse,  Rene  Francois  "Walter  de,  his 
"  Mesolabium,"  387;  his  treatment 
of  equations  of  the  third  and  fourtli 
degree,  387;  his  "perles,"  768. 

Smitli,  his  "Dictionary  of  the  Bible," 
327;  and  Wace,  their  "Dictionary 
of  Christian  Biography,"  34."),  44.'!, 
444,  531 ,  CIS. 

Socicte  des  auciens  textes  fran(;ais, 
Album  of,  294. 

Socinus,  F.,  593. 

Socrates,  595;  his  djKmon,  598. 

Socratic  school  of  philosophy,  9.">. 

Sohm,  Rudolpli,  his  "Institutes  of 
Roman  Law,"  766. 

Solidity,  in  its  conception  tlie  views 
of  Locke  and  Leilinil/,  come  to 
clearest  antithesis,  741. 

Soner,  Ernst,  6.35. 

Sophie  Charlotte,  Queen,  239. 

Soul,  what?  722. 

Soulliood,  universal,  732. 

Souls,  three  forms  of,  in  scholastic 
philosophy,  380. 


Space  defined,  152. 

"  Spatium  fit  ordo  existentium  phieno- 
mcnorum,"  128. 

Species,  its  meaning,  314;  intentional, 
381,  382;  real,  381,  382;  sensible, 
381;  intelligible,  381. 

Specieuse  generale,  292,  375. 

Spectroscope,  the,  549. 

Spencer,  Hcrl)ert,  274. 

Spener,  Philip  Jacob,  649. 

Spenser,  "  Faerie  Queen,"  770. 

Spermatic  logos,  591. 

Speusippus,  518. 

Spinoza,  102, 192,723:  offered  diair  of 
philosophy  at  Heidelberg,  102;  his 
"Ethica,"  148,  192,  5(ri,  732;  his 
"  Tractatus  Theologico-politicus," 
289;  his  fatalism,  4(i2 ;  letter  to  De 
Vries,  502;  maintains  ontological 
argument  for  existence  of  God,  5it2  ; 
his  "  Korte  Yerhandeling  van  God," 
504,  754,  755 ;  his  reference  to  Bacon, 
526;  reference  to  Descartes,  526;  on 
probabilities,  539,  540;  receives  a 
letter  from  Fabritius,  723;  his  "  Om- 
nis  d(^lerminatio  est  ncgatio,"  75((; 
on  value  of  faith  in  a  future  life 
upon  this  one,  755;  monism  of,  757. 

Spirits  incomprehensible  to  senses  and 
imagination,  721;  of  the  elements, 
730. 

Spiritual  things  i)rior  to  material,  721. 

Spiritxts,  289;  naturx,  382,  768;  /<t- 
miliaru,  730. 

Spitzel,  Theophil  Gottlieb,  649. 

Spontaneity  of  soul,  733. 

Sprengol,  K.,  liis  "  Ijcitriige  z.  (h'.scli. 
des  Medecin,"  408;  on  Scnnert,  4S8. 

Stamm,  his  "  Ulfilas,"  296. 

Stegmann,  Christopher,  Iiis  "l)y:is 
Philosoi)hica,"  585;  —  Joachim, 
matliematician  and  tlieologian,  5.S5; 
—  Josluia,  liis  "  Ach  blcib'  mil 
dcinem   gnadc,"   586. 

Stein,  Lndwig,  liis  "  Leibniz  iind 
Spinoza,"  6!i,  102,  242,  .■«9,  5ii4,  6.52, 
6.53,655,  73L 

Steintlial,  II.,  his  "  I'linlcilimg  in  die 
Psychologic  uiid  Siiraclj-wisscn- 
.schaft,"  292. 

Stcphanus,  his  " 'I'hcs.'iurus  Lin;;ii:c 
Gra'ca-,"  476. 


858 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF   LOCKE 


Stewart,  J.  A.,  his  "  Notes  on  the  Nico- 
machean  Ethics  of  Aristotle,"  753. 

Stillinglieet,  Bisliop  Edward,  54;  con- 
troversy with  Loi'ke.  54,  55,  56. 

iStoba-us,  "  EclogiB  Pllysil•a^"  518. 

Stiickl,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Fhilos.  d.  Mittel- 
alters,"  116,  278,  298,  349,  380,  382, 
408,  415,  421,  494,  503,  566,  581,  588, 
590,  592,  632,  635,  645,  646,  730,  732. 

Stoic  philosophers,  261,  729. 

"  Stomachi  Janitor,"  67. 

Strabo,  his  "  Geographica,"  345;  on 
fertility  of  mules,  345. 

Strauch,  Johaiin,  his  "Lexicon  parti- 
cularura  juris,"  etc.,  365. 

"  Strong-minded,"  728. 

Struve,  F.  W.,  edits  the  "  Bibliotheca 
juridica  "  of  Lipenius,  626. 

Stniyck,  Nicolas,  on  De  Witt's  rea.son- 
ing  on  Insurance,  540;  his  "  Iiilei- 
ding  tot  het  algemeine  geography," 
540. 

Sturm,  -Johann  Christoph,  705. 

Suarez,  Francisca,  his  "  De  Anima," 
382;  his  "Tract,  de  legibus  ac  Deo 
legislatore,"  494. 

Substance,  idea  of  the  individual,  its 
development  in  mind  of  Leibnitz, 
101;  list  of  Leibnitz's  papers  on, 
154  ;  what,  according  to  Leibnitz, 
227  ;  what,  according  to  Aristotelian 
scholasticism,  227  ;  changing  yet  nu- 
merically the  same,  243  ;  first  in 
sense  of  Aristotle,  311 ;  first,  irpwrrj 
oixria,  311,  349;  corporeal,  what?  722; 
its  absolute  spontaneity,  739 ;  opin- 
ions of  Locke  and  Leibnitz  regard- 
ing, 749;  Leibnitz,  in  speaking  of, 
accommodates  himself  to  linguistic 
usage,  759  ;  Leibnitz's  view  of,  760. 

"  Succedaneum,"  417. 

^vXXoyL(T/j.6s,  two  kinds  of,  565. 

Sulpicius  Severus,  345. 

'Zu/j.0€0T]KOTa,  453. 

^vfiTTvota  iraiTa,  476. 

Si^uTrrouy,  universe,  476. 

Supernatural,  its  relation  to  reason, 
579. 

Surd,  an  ()])Solete  mathematical  term, 
750. 

Suter,  H.,  his  "Gesch.  d.  math.  Wi.s- 
senschaften,"  527. 


Swift,  his  "Gulliver's  Travels,"  342; 

did  he  plagiarize?  .399. 
Syllogism,  fourth  figure  of,  408;   all 

its  terms  not  always   expressed   in 

argumentation,  481 ;   dialectic,  564 ; 

apodeictic,  565. 
Syraonds,  J.  A.,  his   "Studies  of  the 

Greek  Poets,"  211,  ibid.  3d  ed.,  755  ; 

his    "Renaissance    in    Italy,"    399, 

415. 
Synthesis,  explained  by  Pappus,  521. 
"  System,  New,"  commented  on,  731. 

"  Tabula,"  "  logica,"  322 ;  "  rasa,"  724. 

Tacitus,  "Annales,"  91,  327. 

Tails,  men  with,  341. 

Tartaglia,  his  contest  with  Fiore,  572. 

Taste  through  nose,  7.39,  740. 

Taylor,  Thomas,  108. 

Technical  schools  advocated  by  Leib- 
nitz, 628. 

Teeth  transmit  sound  ?   740. 

Temperament,  what?  3(J2. 

"  Tempus  fit  ordo  successivorum,"  128. 

Ten  Brink,  B.,  his  "  Early  English  Lit- 
erature," 295. 

Tcotixca,  linr/ua,  old  German,  294. 

Terence,  "Andria,"  226;  "Phormio," 
327;  "Eunuchus,"  459;  "Heauton- 
timoroumenos,"  492. 

Term,  middle,  481 ;  the  general,  511. 

Terminism,  588. 

Tertullian,  5.31;  his  "De  Praescripti- 
one  Hfereticorum,"  531;  his  "  De 
Carne  Christi,"  582;  his  "credibile 
est  quia  inept um  est,"  etc.,  582. 

Teuffel,  his  "Gesch.  d.  Rom.  Lit.,*' 
244. 

Thales,  463. 

"Theodicce,  Essais  de,"  see  Leibnitz. 

Theology,  Natural,  made  a  depart- 
ment of  Metaphysics  by  Scholastics, 
496. 

Theophrastus  adds  to  first  figure  of 
the  Syllogism,  408. 

"  Theseus,  ship  of,"  240. 

Thil,  Arnaud  du,  the  personator  of 
Martin  Guerre,  310. 

Thomas,  the  Pseudo-,  322. 

Thtimasius,  G.,  his  "De  Controversia 
Hnffmanuiana,"  5S2; — Jacob,  pro- 
fessor   of    Philosophy    at    Leipzig, 


INDEX   C 


859 


605;  his  "De  officio  liomiiiis  circa 
notitiam  futurorum  coutingenti- 
um,"  606;  liis  "  Origin es  liistorise 
pliilosopliicae  et  ecclesiasticie,"  606; 
—  Christian,  son  of  above,  and  ed- 
itor of  liis  works,  606. 

Thompson,  Archbishop,  455. 

Thorpe,  B.,  his  "  Cajdmou's  Metrical 
Paraphrase,"  295. 

Thought,  objects  of,  classified,  148; 
riglit,  leads  back  to  God,  505 ;  may  be 
distinct,  yet  not  clear,  754 ;  how  the 
word  is  employed  by  Leibnitz,  756. 

"  Thought-necessity,"  281. 

Tichborne  case,  olO. 

Time,  defined,  128  ;  —  of  writing,"  New 
Essays,"  5;>2;  of  revising  "New 
Essays,"  765. 

Tiraboschi,  his  "  Storia  della  I>ettera- 
tura  Italiana,"  415,  ,593. 

Todliunter,  Isaac,  liis  "History  of  the 
Theory  of  Probability  from  Pascal 
to  La  Place,"  213,  539. 

Tcdomei,  Giovanni  Battista,  705. 

Toniiies,  F.,  his  "  Leibniz  und 
.  Hobbes,"  4.'^0. 

Torricelli,  Evangelista,  invented  mer- 
curial barometer,  127;  discovered 
quadrature  of  cycloid,  127  ;  his  "  De 
motu  gravium  naturaliter  accele- 
rato,"  127. 

"  Tot  scientife  quot  veritates,"  623. 

"  Transcendent  "  in  mathematics,  750. 

Trebatius,  492. 

Trendelenburg,  his  "  Ueber  Leibniz- 
ens  Ent  wurf  einer  allgemeinen  Char- 
akteristik,"  292,  375;  his  "Ueber 
d.  element  d.  definition  in  Leibniz. 
Philosophic,"  317  ;  his  "  Histor.  Bei- 
trilge  z.  Philos.,"  753,  765. 

Trent,  Council  of,  114. 

Trew,  Abdias,  641. 

Trino,  the  I)e("urions  of,  520. 

Tritlieniius,  his  "Aniiales  Hirsangien- 
ses,"  278;  his  "Conip(!ndiuni  primi 
voluminis  annalium  de  origine  re- 
rum  {;t  gcntis  Francoruni,"  546. 

Trivinm,()28. 

True,  tlic,  is  the  thinkable,  2S1. 

Truth,  Aristotle  on,  281 ;  of  two  kinds, 
404;  Leibnitz  on  its  definition,  445 ; 
Locke's    and   Leibnitz's   views    of, 


452;  Schaarschmidt's  delinilion  of, 

762. 
"Trulh,  twofold,"  tlie,  5S1. 
Truths,   of  fact  and   of   reason,  462, 

493;  of  reason,  their  genesis,  725; 

necessary,  725  ;  factual,  725. 
Tulloch,  his  "Rational  Theology  and 

Cliristian  Pliilosophy  in  England  in 

17lh  Century,"  767. 
Tulp,    Nicolas,    his   "  Observationuni 

jMedicaruni,"  244. 
TutUmsm,  418. 
"Twofold  Trutli,"581. 

Ueberweg,  his  "Hist,  of  Philosophy," 
116,  332,  763,  7()9;  his  "  Grnndriss 
der  Gesch.  der  PInlosi)i)hi(',"  5; 
-Heinze,  332,  408,  503,  516,  592. 

Ulfilas,  29(). 

Ulpianus,  486. 

Ulrich,  .J.  H.  F.,  German  translator 
of  tlie  French  and  Latin  works  of 
Leibnitz,  Raspe's  ed.,  344. 

"  Unconscious  Mental  States,"  727. 

"  Un  Je  ne  say  quoi,"  128. 

Uncle  of  Leibnitz,  .365. 

"Understaniling,"  72."..  [."UO. 

Universal,  tlie,  does  it  really  exist'.' 

Univer.se  not  a  whole,  155. 

Uppstrom,  edits  "Codex  .\r;;('Mlcus," 
29(i. 

Ursinus,  Joseph,  767. 

fifile  and  honeslum,  261. 

Uylenbroek,  P.  L,  767:  his  "Clnist. 
Hugenii  aliorumque  celebriuni  <!.\cr- 
cilaliones  matlieiuatica!  ct  jibilo- 
soi)hica',"  767. 

Vacuum,  Descartes'  view  of,  127  ;  /<ir- 
7n((?'ain,  3;>4  ;  defined,  74il. 

Valla,  Laurentius,  exi)lo(lcs  llic  alleged 
"Donation  of  t^oiislantinc,"  415; 
his  "  Disputationes  contra  Aristol(!- 
licos,"  415;  Ills  "  De  voluplale  ct 
vero  bono,"  415  ;  his  "  Libcro  arbit- 
rio";  his  "Elcganliiu  Latinai  Lin- 
gua!." 415. 

Van  Ilelniout,  67,  212. 

Vanini,  I>ucilio,  61S. 

Vassal! ,  107. 

Vaughan,  Alfred,  liis  "  Hours  willi  Ibc 
Mystics,"  298. 


800 


LEIBNITZ'S   CRITIQUE   OF  LOCKE 


Vayer,  Francois  de  la  Mothe  le,  his 
"  De  la  Vertu  des  Paieiis,"  oDo. 

Vedelius,  587;  his  "  Ratiouale  Theo- 
logicum,"  587  ;  his  controversy  with 
Miisiuus,  587,  7G1. 

Vega,  Garcilasso  de  la,  his  "  Commen- 
tarios  Reales,"  89. 

"  Vegetative  soul,"  the,  380. 

"  Vehicles,  aerial,"  of  spirits,  380. 

Veitch,  J.,  translator  of  Descartes, 
127,  348,  483. 

Vellettas,  1(38. 

Velleite,  its  rendering,  168. 

Venn,  J.,  his  "  Logic  of  Chance, "  214. 

Venturi,  his  "  Commentarii  sopra  la 
storia  et  le  teorie  dell'  ottica,"  443. 

Vergil,  his  "  Georgics,"  200,  211,  727; 
"JEueid,"  300,  415,  598,  614;  "Ec- 
logues," 614. 

"  Vernunft,  die,"  its  Kantian  accepta- 
tion, 723. 

Versura,  326. 

Vertunien,  Fran9ois,  107. 

Verulamius,  526. 

Vibration  Theory  of  Light,  639. 

Viete,  Francois,  468 ;  his  improve- 
ments in  algebraical  operations,  468 ; 
laj's  down  the  principle  of  "homo- 
geneity," 468;  his  "Opera  mathe- 
matica,"  468. 

Vincent  of  Lerins,  his  "  Adversus 
novitates  hajreticorum  commonito- 
rium,"  617;  author  of  the  dictum, 
"  Quod  semper,  quod  ubique,  quod 
ab  omnibus  creditum  est,"  ()17. 

Viotto,  Bartolomnieo,  his  "  De  balne- 
orum  naturalium  viribus,"  520  ;  his 
"  Demonstrationum  in  methodum 
medendi,"  520;  Conring's  opinion 
of,  520. 

A^irgil,  St.  (Fergil),  443. 

"Virtual,"  726. 

Virtue,  on  what  its  usefulness  de- 
pends, 495  ;  Kant's  definition  of,  754 ; 
E.  G.  Robinson's  definition   of,  754. 

Vision,  the  Beatific,  its  nature,  575; 
history  of  idea,  575. 

Voiit-Schoock-Descartes  controversy, 
633. 

VoUtio  imperfecta,  168. 

Voltaire  in  the  ISIaupertnis-Koiiig  con- 
troversy, 713. 


Vopiscus,  in  "  Scriptores  Hist.  Au- 
gust.," 263,  761. 

"  Vorstellen,"  756. 

"  Vorstellung,"  330,  736,  756. 

Vortices,  theory  of,  according  to  Des- 
cartes, 552,  613,  727. 

Vossius,  Isaac,  107. 

Waitz,  his  "Das  Leben  des  Ulfilas," 
296. 

Wallace,  E.,  his  "Outlines  of  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Aristotle,"  96,  156,  157, 
214,  281,  291,  311,  312,  320,  321,  ;J49, 
421,  488,  565,  751,  770;  his  "Aris- 
totle's Psychology  in  Greek  and 
English,"  281,  331  ;  —  W.,  his  "  Epi- 
cureanism," 421;  his  "Logic  of 
Hegel,"  750,  766. 

Wallis,  John,  677. 

Walpole,  F.,  his  "Ansayrii,"  197. 

Walton,  Isaac,  566. 

Warr,  G.  C.  W.,  244. 

Watson,  John,  his  "Philosophy  of 
Kant  in  Extracts,"  128;  his  article 
"Leibnitz  and  Protestant  The- 
ology," in  "  Xew  World,"  770,  773. 

"  Weaker  or  Worse,"  in  Logic,  515. 

Weigel,  Erhard,  engaged  on  Calendar, 
4:35;  a  school  reformer,  435;  his 
"  Arithmetique  de  la  Morale,"  435; 
Leibnitz  upon,  435. 

Weil,  his  "  Gesch.  d.  Chalifen,"  197. 

Werner,  K.,  his  "  Suarez,"  494. 

Wetzer  und  Welte,  their  "  Kircheu- 
lexicon,"'  600. 

White,  Thus.  (Anglus),  634;  his  "  In- 
stitutionum  Peripateticarum  ad 
mentem  K.  Digba>i,"  634;  his  "  De 
Medio  Animarum  Statu,"  775;  cen- 
sured by  Parliament,  775;  his  "  Re- 
sponsio  ad  duos  theologos  de  IMedio 
Animarum  Statu,"  775. 

Whitney,  W.  D.,  his  "Language  and 
the  Study  of  Language,"  291,  292. 

Wilkin,  "Gesch.  d.  Kreuzziige,"  197. 

Wilkins,  Bishop  John,  his  "Essay 
towards  a  Real  Character  and  a 
Philosophical  Language,"'  292. 

"  Will,  vigor  of,"  754. 

M'iUensfieigunf/,  168. 

Willkiir,  7.52. 

Wiudclbaud,  his  "History  of  Philos- 


INDEX   C 


861 


ophy,"  488,  502,  503,  516,  576,  581, 
588,  724,  727,  7o2,  733,  753.     ' 

Winer,  his  "  Handbucli  d.  Theol.  Lit.," 
586,  587. 

Winfrid,  see  Boiiif.ace. 

Wisdom,  Leibnitz's  definition,  754. 

Witsen,  Nicolas,  sends  specimens  of 
the  language  of  the  Hottentots  to 
Leibnitz,  290;  his  "  Architectonica 
nautica  non-antiqua,"  737. 

Witt,  John  De  (Pensionary),  426;  his 
"  Elementa  linearum  cnrvorum," 
427 ;  his  report  on  annuities  to 
States-General,  540. 

Wohlwill,  E.,  his  "  Jungius,"  636. 

Wolf,  Christian,  303;  his  "  Kurzer 
Unterriclit  v.  d.  vornehmsten  math. 
Schrift,"  463;  made  existence  the 
source  of  its  concept,  741 ;  ac- 
cepts Leibnitz's  delinition  of  truth, 
76;!;  his  delinition  of  philosophy, 
763;  his  "  Psychologia  Empirica," 
7(il. 

Wolffhart,  Conrad  ( Lycosthenes ) , 
548. 

World-soul,  732. 

Wrangham,  D.  S.,  his  "Liturgical 
Poetry  of  Adam  St.  Victor,"  603. 

Wren,  Sir  Christopher,  346,  677. 

Wright,  J.,  his  "Primer  of  Gothic," 
296. 

Wundt,   William,   his    "  Lectures    on 


Human   and   Animal  Psychology," 

725. 

Xenocrates,  518. 

Xeno])hon,  "Memorabilia,"  240. 

Xylander,  571. 

Yvon,  Pierre,  his  "  Abre'ge  precis  de 
la  vie  et  de  la  conduite  et  ties  vrais 
sentiments  de  feu  M.  de  Labadie," 
602. 

Zabarella,  Jacopo,  ()35. 

Zachary,  Pope,  444. 

Zeller,  his  "  Outlines  of  the  History  of 
Greek  Philosophy,"  65,  93,  96,  108, 
156;  his  "  Philos.  d.  Griech.,"  108, 
156,  2(;i,  277,  285,  311,  312,  320,  321, 
349,  362,  379,  3S3,  408.  421,  436,  463, 
465,  474,  488,  496,  518,  519,  565,  576, 
598,  724,  750,  751,  753;  "  Gesch.  d. 
deutschen  I'hilos.,"  363. 

Zigliara,  his  "  Summa  I'hilosophica," 
382. 

Zimmermann,  his  "  Leibniz  und  Les- 
sing,"  584. 

Zwerger,  M.,  his  "  Die  lebendige  Kraft 
und  ihr  Mass,"  775. 

Zwinger,  Theodore,  311;  his  "Thea- 
trum  Vitii;  Humauai,"  548. 

Zwingli,  Ulrich,592,  595;  his  "  Christ. 
Fidei  brevis  et  clara  cxpositio,"  595; 
his  "  De  Providentia,"  595. 


%5  1  5      12 


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